1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
36 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
61 use crate::util::events;
62 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
63 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
64 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
65 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
66 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
69 use crate::prelude::*;
71 use core::cell::RefCell;
73 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
74 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
75 use core::time::Duration;
78 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
79 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry};
81 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
83 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
84 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
85 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
87 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
88 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
89 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
90 // before we forward it.
92 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
93 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
94 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
95 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
96 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
98 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
99 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
101 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
102 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
103 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
104 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
107 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
108 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
109 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
112 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
113 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
117 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
118 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
119 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
120 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
121 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
122 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
123 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
124 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
129 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
130 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
133 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
134 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
135 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
136 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
137 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
140 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
141 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
143 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
144 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
145 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
148 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
149 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
151 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
152 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
155 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
156 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
159 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
163 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
164 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
165 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
166 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
167 short_channel_id: u64,
169 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
170 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
172 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
173 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
178 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
180 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
181 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
182 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
184 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
185 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
188 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
189 struct ClaimableHTLC {
190 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
192 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
194 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
196 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
200 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
201 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
202 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
203 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
205 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
206 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
211 impl Readable for PaymentId {
212 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
213 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
218 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
219 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
220 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
221 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
223 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
224 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
229 impl Readable for InterceptId {
230 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
231 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
235 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
236 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
237 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
238 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
239 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
242 session_priv: SecretKey,
243 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
244 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
245 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
246 payment_id: PaymentId,
247 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
248 /// Note that this is now "deprecated" - we write it for forwards (and read it for
249 /// backwards) compatibility reasons, but prefer to use the data in the
250 /// [`super::outbound_payment`] module, which stores per-payment data once instead of in
252 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
255 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
256 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
257 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
259 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
261 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
263 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
266 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
267 payment_id.hash(hasher);
268 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
269 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
270 payment_params.hash(hasher);
275 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
278 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
279 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
281 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
282 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
283 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
284 payment_secret: None,
285 payment_params: None,
290 struct ReceiveError {
296 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
297 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
299 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
300 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
301 pub enum FailureCode {
302 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
303 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
304 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
305 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
306 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
307 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
308 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
309 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
310 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
311 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
312 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
315 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
317 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
318 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
319 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
320 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
321 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
323 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
324 err: msgs::LightningError,
325 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
326 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
328 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
330 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
332 err: LightningError {
334 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
335 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
342 shutdown_finish: None,
346 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
348 err: LightningError {
350 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
353 shutdown_finish: None,
357 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
358 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
361 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
363 err: LightningError {
365 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
366 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
372 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
373 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
377 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
380 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
382 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
383 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
387 log_level: Level::Warn,
390 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
392 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
394 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
396 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
397 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
405 shutdown_finish: None,
410 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
411 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
412 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
413 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
414 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
416 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
417 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
418 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
419 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
420 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
421 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
422 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
424 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
428 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
429 struct ClaimingPayment {
431 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
432 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
434 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
435 (0, amount_msat, required),
436 (2, payment_purpose, required),
437 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
440 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
441 struct ClaimablePayments {
442 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
443 /// failed/claimed by the user.
445 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
446 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
448 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
449 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
450 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
452 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
453 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
454 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
455 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
458 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
459 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
460 /// quite some time lag.
461 enum BackgroundEvent {
462 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
463 /// commitment transaction.
464 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
467 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
468 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
469 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
470 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
471 /// event can be generated.
472 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
473 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
474 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
477 /// State we hold per-peer.
478 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
479 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
481 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
482 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
484 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
485 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
486 latest_features: InitFeatures,
487 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
488 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
489 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
490 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
491 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
492 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
496 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
497 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
498 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
499 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
500 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
501 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
504 self.channel_by_id.len() == 0
508 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
509 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
511 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
514 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
515 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
516 struct PendingInboundPayment {
517 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
518 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
519 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
520 /// this payment being removed.
522 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
523 user_payment_id: u64,
524 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
525 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
526 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
529 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
530 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
531 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
532 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
533 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
534 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
535 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
537 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
538 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
546 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
548 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
553 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
554 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
555 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
556 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
557 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
558 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
559 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
560 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
562 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
563 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
565 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
566 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
568 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
569 /// to individual Channels.
571 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
572 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
573 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
574 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
576 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
577 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
578 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
579 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
580 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
581 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
582 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
584 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
585 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
586 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
587 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
590 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
591 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
592 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
593 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
594 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
596 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
597 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
598 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
599 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
600 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
603 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
604 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
605 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
606 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
607 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
611 // `total_consistency_lock`
613 // |__`forward_htlcs`
615 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
617 // |__`per_peer_state`
619 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
621 // | |__`claimable_payments`
623 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
629 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
631 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
635 // | |__`pending_events`
637 // | |__`pending_background_events`
639 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
641 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
642 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
643 ES::Target: EntropySource,
644 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
645 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
646 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
650 default_configuration: UserConfig,
651 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
652 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
658 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
660 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
662 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
663 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
665 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
666 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
667 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
668 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
670 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
671 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
673 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
674 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
675 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
676 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
677 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
678 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
679 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
680 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
682 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
684 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
685 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
687 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
689 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
690 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
691 /// and via the classic SCID.
693 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
694 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
696 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
698 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
700 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
701 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
702 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
704 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
705 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
707 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
708 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
710 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
711 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
713 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
714 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
715 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
716 /// active channel list on load.
718 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
719 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
721 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
723 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
724 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
725 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
727 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
728 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
729 /// the handling of the events.
731 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
732 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
735 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
736 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
737 /// would break backwards compatability.
738 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
739 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
740 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
742 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
743 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
745 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
747 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
748 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
749 /// confirmation depth.
751 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
752 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
753 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
755 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
757 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
759 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
761 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
763 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
765 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
766 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
767 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
769 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
770 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
772 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
773 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
774 /// keeping additional state.
775 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
777 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
778 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
779 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
780 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
782 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
783 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
785 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
786 /// are currently open with that peer.
788 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
789 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
792 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
794 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
795 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
796 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
797 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
798 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
800 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
801 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
802 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
803 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
804 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
805 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
806 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
807 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
808 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
809 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
810 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
812 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
821 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
823 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
824 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
825 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
826 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
827 pub struct ChainParameters {
828 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
829 pub network: Network,
831 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
833 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
834 pub best_block: BestBlock,
837 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
843 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
844 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
845 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
846 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
847 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
848 /// updates are ready for persistence).
850 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
851 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
852 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
853 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
854 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
856 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
857 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
860 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
861 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
862 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
865 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
866 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
868 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
869 persistence_notifier: notifier,
870 should_persist: persist_check,
871 _read_guard: read_guard,
876 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
878 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
879 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
884 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
885 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
887 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
889 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
890 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
891 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
892 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
893 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
895 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
896 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
898 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
900 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
901 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
902 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
903 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
904 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
905 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
906 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
907 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
908 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
909 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
910 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
911 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
912 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
914 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
915 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
917 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
918 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
919 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
920 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
922 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
923 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
924 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
925 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
926 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
927 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
930 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
932 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
933 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
936 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
938 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
939 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
941 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
942 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
943 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
944 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
946 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
947 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
948 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
949 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
950 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
951 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
952 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
953 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
954 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
955 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
956 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
959 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
960 /// to better separate parameters.
961 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
962 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
963 /// The node_id of our counterparty
964 pub node_id: PublicKey,
965 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
966 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
967 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
968 pub features: InitFeatures,
969 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
970 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
971 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
973 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
975 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
976 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
977 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
978 /// payments to us through this channel.
979 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
980 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
981 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
982 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
983 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
984 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
985 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
988 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
989 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
990 pub struct ChannelDetails {
991 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
992 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
993 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
994 /// lifetime of the channel.
995 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
996 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
997 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
998 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
999 /// our counterparty already.
1001 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1002 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1003 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1004 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1006 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1007 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1008 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1009 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1011 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1012 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1014 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1015 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1017 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1018 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1019 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1020 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1021 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1022 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1023 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1024 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1025 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1028 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1030 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1031 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1032 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1033 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1034 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1035 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1036 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1038 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1039 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1041 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1042 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1043 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1044 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1045 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1046 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1047 /// this value on chain.
1049 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1051 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1053 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1054 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1055 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1056 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1058 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1059 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1060 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1061 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1063 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1064 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1065 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1066 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1068 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1069 pub balance_msat: u64,
1070 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1071 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1072 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1073 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1075 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1077 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1078 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1079 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1080 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1081 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1082 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1083 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1084 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1086 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1087 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1088 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1089 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1090 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1091 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1092 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1094 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1095 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1096 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1097 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1098 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1099 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1100 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1101 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1102 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1104 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1106 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1107 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1108 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1109 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1110 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1112 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1113 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1114 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1115 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1116 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1117 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1118 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1120 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1121 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1122 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1123 pub is_outbound: bool,
1124 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1125 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1126 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1127 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1128 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1130 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1131 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1132 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1133 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1135 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1136 pub is_usable: bool,
1137 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1138 pub is_public: bool,
1139 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1140 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1141 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1142 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1143 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1144 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1146 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1147 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1150 impl ChannelDetails {
1151 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1152 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1153 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1155 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1156 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1157 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1158 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1161 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1162 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1163 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1165 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1166 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1167 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1168 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1172 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1173 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1174 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1175 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1176 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1178 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1180 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1181 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1182 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1185 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1186 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1187 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1189 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1190 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1191 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1193 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1194 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1195 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1197 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1198 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1202 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1204 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1206 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1207 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1208 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1209 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1211 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1212 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1213 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1216 macro_rules! handle_error {
1217 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1220 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1221 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
1223 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1224 // entering the macro.
1225 debug_assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1226 debug_assert!($self.per_peer_state.try_write().is_ok());
1229 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1231 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1232 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1233 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1234 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1238 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1239 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1240 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1241 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1246 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1247 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1249 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1250 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1251 action: err.action.clone()
1255 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1256 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1257 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1258 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1259 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1263 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1270 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1271 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1272 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1273 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1274 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1275 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1277 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1278 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1279 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1280 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1281 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1283 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1284 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1286 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1290 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1291 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1292 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1294 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1295 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1297 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1298 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1300 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1301 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1302 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1303 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1304 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1305 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1311 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1312 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1316 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1318 $entry.remove_entry();
1326 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1327 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1331 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1333 $entry.remove_entry();
1341 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1342 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1344 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1345 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1351 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1352 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1354 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1355 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1356 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1357 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1358 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1359 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1360 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1361 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1362 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1363 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1364 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1365 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1366 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1367 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1370 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1371 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1372 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1373 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1374 match $action_type {
1375 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1376 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1378 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1379 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1381 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1382 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1383 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1384 if !$resend_commitment {
1385 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1388 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1390 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1391 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1393 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1398 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1399 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1401 $entry.remove_entry();
1405 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1406 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1407 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1409 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1410 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1412 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1413 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1415 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1416 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1418 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1419 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1423 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1424 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1425 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1426 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1427 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1429 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1430 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1431 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1432 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1433 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1434 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1435 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1436 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1437 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1438 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1443 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1444 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1445 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1447 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1448 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1449 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1450 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1451 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1452 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1455 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1460 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1462 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1463 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1464 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1465 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1466 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1467 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1471 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1473 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1474 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1476 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1478 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1479 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1480 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1481 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1482 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1483 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1484 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1485 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1487 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1488 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1489 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1494 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1496 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1497 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1498 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1499 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1500 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1501 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1502 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1503 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1505 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1508 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1509 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1511 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1513 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1515 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1517 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1518 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1519 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1520 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1530 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1531 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1532 &self.default_configuration
1535 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1536 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1537 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1540 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1541 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1543 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1545 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1549 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1554 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1556 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1557 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1558 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1559 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1560 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1562 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1563 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1565 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1566 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1567 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1569 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1570 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1571 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1572 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1573 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1574 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1576 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1577 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1578 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1579 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1580 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1581 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1584 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1585 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1586 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1588 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1590 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1591 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1593 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1595 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1596 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1597 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1598 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1599 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1600 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1604 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1609 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1611 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1612 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1613 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1615 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1617 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1620 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1623 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1624 node_id: their_network_key,
1627 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1630 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1631 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1632 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1633 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1634 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1635 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1636 // the same channel.
1637 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1639 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1640 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1641 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1642 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1643 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1644 for (channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1645 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1646 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1647 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1648 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1649 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1650 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1651 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1652 features: peer_state.latest_features.clone(),
1653 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1654 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1655 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1656 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1657 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1658 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1659 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1660 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1661 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1662 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1664 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1665 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1666 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1667 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1668 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1669 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1670 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1671 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1672 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1673 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1674 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1675 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1676 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1677 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1678 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1679 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1680 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1681 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1682 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1683 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1684 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1685 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1686 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1687 config: Some(channel.config()),
1695 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1696 /// more information.
1697 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1698 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1701 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1702 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1704 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1705 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1708 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1709 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1710 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1711 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1712 // really wanted anyway.
1713 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1716 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1717 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1719 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1720 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1721 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1723 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1724 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1725 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1726 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1727 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1728 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1729 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1730 total_msat: *total_msat,
1733 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1734 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1736 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1737 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1739 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1744 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1745 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1746 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1747 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1748 Some(transaction) => {
1749 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1753 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1754 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1755 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1756 reason: closure_reason
1760 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1761 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1763 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1764 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1765 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1767 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1768 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1770 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1771 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1772 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1773 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1774 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1775 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1777 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1778 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1779 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
1780 let (result, is_permanent) =
1781 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1783 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1788 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1789 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1793 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1794 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1795 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1796 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1800 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1804 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1808 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1809 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1810 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1811 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1814 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1818 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1819 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1820 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1822 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1823 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1825 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1826 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1827 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1828 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1830 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1832 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1833 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1834 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1835 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1836 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1839 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1840 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1841 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1843 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1844 /// the channel being closed or not:
1845 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1846 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1847 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1848 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1849 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1850 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1851 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1853 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1855 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1856 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1857 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1858 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1859 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1863 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1864 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1865 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1866 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1867 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1868 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1869 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1870 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1872 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1873 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1874 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1875 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1876 // ignore the result here.
1877 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
1881 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1882 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1883 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1884 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1885 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1886 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
1887 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
1889 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1890 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1891 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1892 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1893 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1895 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1897 remove_channel!(self, chan)
1899 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
1902 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1903 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1904 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1905 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1906 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1911 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1914 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1915 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1916 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1917 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1918 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1919 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1920 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1921 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
1922 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1923 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1924 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1925 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1936 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
1937 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
1938 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
1940 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1941 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1942 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
1945 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
1946 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
1947 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
1949 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
1950 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
1951 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1952 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1953 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
1956 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1957 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1958 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
1959 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1960 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1964 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
1965 /// local transaction(s).
1966 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
1967 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1968 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1972 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
1973 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
1975 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1976 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
1977 return Err(ReceiveError {
1978 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
1980 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
1983 // final_expiry_too_soon
1984 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1985 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1987 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1988 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1989 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1990 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1991 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1992 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
1993 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
1994 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
1995 return Err(ReceiveError {
1996 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
1997 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2000 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2001 return Err(ReceiveError {
2003 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2004 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2008 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2009 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2010 return Err(ReceiveError {
2011 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2012 err_data: Vec::new(),
2013 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2016 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2017 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2018 return Err(ReceiveError {
2019 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2020 err_data: Vec::new(),
2021 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2023 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2024 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2026 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2027 phantom_shared_secret,
2029 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2030 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2031 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2032 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2033 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2034 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2035 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2036 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2037 return Err(ReceiveError {
2038 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2039 err_data: Vec::new(),
2040 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2044 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2046 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2049 return Err(ReceiveError {
2050 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2051 err_data: Vec::new(),
2052 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2057 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2060 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2061 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2062 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2063 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2067 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2068 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2069 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2071 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2072 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2073 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2074 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2075 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2076 failure_code: $err_code,
2082 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2083 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2086 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2087 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2088 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2090 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2091 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2092 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2093 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2094 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2095 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2096 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2097 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2099 macro_rules! return_err {
2100 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2102 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2103 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2104 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2105 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2106 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2107 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2113 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2115 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2116 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2118 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2119 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2123 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2124 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2126 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2128 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2129 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2130 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2131 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2132 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2134 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2137 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2138 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2139 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2141 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2142 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2143 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2146 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2147 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2148 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2149 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2153 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2154 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2155 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2158 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2159 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2160 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2161 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2162 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2167 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2168 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2169 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2170 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2171 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2172 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2173 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2174 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2175 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2176 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2177 // phantom or an intercept.
2178 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2179 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2180 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2184 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2187 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2189 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2190 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2191 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2192 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2193 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2195 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2196 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2197 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2199 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2200 // have no consistency guarantees.
2201 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2205 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2206 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2207 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2208 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2209 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2211 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2212 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2213 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2214 // we don't have the channel here.
2215 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2217 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2219 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2220 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2221 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2222 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2223 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2224 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2225 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2227 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2228 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2230 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2231 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2235 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2236 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2237 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2238 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2240 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2247 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2248 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2249 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2250 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2251 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2252 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2254 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2255 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2257 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2258 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2259 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2260 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2261 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2262 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2263 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2264 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2265 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2266 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2272 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2273 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2274 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2275 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2277 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2278 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2280 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2281 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2282 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2284 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2285 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2286 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2287 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2288 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2289 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2290 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2294 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2299 pending_forward_info
2302 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2303 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2304 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2306 /// Note that in `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the `peer_state`
2307 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2308 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2309 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2310 if !chan.should_announce() {
2311 return Err(LightningError {
2312 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2313 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2316 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2317 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2319 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2320 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2323 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2324 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2325 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2326 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2328 /// Note that through `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the
2329 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2330 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2331 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2332 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2333 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2334 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2338 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2340 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2341 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2342 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2344 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2345 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2347 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2348 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2349 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2350 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2351 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2352 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2353 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2354 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2356 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2357 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2358 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2360 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2362 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2368 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2369 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2370 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2371 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2372 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2374 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2375 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2376 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2377 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2378 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2380 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2382 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2384 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2385 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2386 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2387 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2390 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2391 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2392 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!" })?;
2393 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2394 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2395 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2397 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2398 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2400 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2401 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2403 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2404 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2406 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2407 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2408 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2411 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2412 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
2413 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2415 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2416 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2418 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2419 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2420 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2421 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2422 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2423 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2424 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2425 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2426 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2427 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2429 _ => unreachable!(),
2432 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2433 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2434 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2435 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2436 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2437 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2438 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2439 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2448 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2449 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2450 // `channel_by_id` map.
2451 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2452 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2457 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2458 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2460 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2465 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2467 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2468 /// fields for more info.
2470 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2471 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2473 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2475 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2476 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2477 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2478 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2479 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2481 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2482 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2483 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2484 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2485 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2487 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2488 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2489 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2490 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2492 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2494 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2495 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2496 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2498 /// In general, a path may raise:
2499 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2500 /// node public key) is specified.
2501 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2502 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2504 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2505 /// relevant updates.
2507 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2508 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2509 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2511 /// # A caution on `payment_secret`
2513 /// `payment_secret` is unrelated to `payment_hash` (or [`PaymentPreimage`]) and exists to
2514 /// authenticate the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization)
2515 /// attacks. For newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one,
2516 /// the [`Route`] must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a
2517 /// recipient-provided `payment_secret`.
2519 /// If a `payment_secret` *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret
2520 /// feature bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the
2521 /// [`Route`], we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2523 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2524 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2525 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2526 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2527 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2528 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2529 self.pending_outbound_payments
2530 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2531 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2532 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2535 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2536 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2537 pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2538 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2539 self.pending_outbound_payments
2540 .send_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2541 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2542 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2543 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2544 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2548 fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2549 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2550 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2551 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2552 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2556 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2557 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2558 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2562 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2563 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2564 /// retries are exhausted.
2566 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2567 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2569 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2570 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2571 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2573 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2574 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2576 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2577 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2578 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2579 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2580 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events);
2583 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2584 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2585 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2586 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2587 /// never reach the recipient.
2589 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2590 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2592 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2593 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2595 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2597 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2598 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2599 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2600 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2601 route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
2603 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2604 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2607 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2608 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2610 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2613 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2614 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2615 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2616 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, payment_id,
2617 retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2618 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2620 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2621 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2624 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2625 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2626 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2627 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2628 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2629 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2630 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2631 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2634 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2637 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2638 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2641 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2642 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2643 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2644 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2645 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2646 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2647 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2648 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2650 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2651 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2654 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2656 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2658 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2659 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2660 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2661 } else { unreachable!(); })
2664 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2667 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2668 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2671 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2672 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2677 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2678 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2681 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2682 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2683 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2685 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2686 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2687 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2688 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2697 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2698 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2699 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2703 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2705 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2706 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2708 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2709 /// across the p2p network.
2711 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2712 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2714 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2715 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2716 /// keys per-channel).
2718 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2719 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2720 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2722 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2723 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2724 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2726 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2727 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2728 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2729 /// for more details.
2731 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2732 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2733 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2734 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2736 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2737 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2738 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2739 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2744 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2745 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2746 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2747 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2748 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2749 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2750 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2754 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2755 let mut output_index = None;
2756 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2757 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2758 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2759 if output_index.is_some() {
2760 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2761 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2764 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2765 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2766 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2769 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2772 if output_index.is_none() {
2773 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2774 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2777 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2781 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2783 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2784 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2785 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2786 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2788 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2789 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2791 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2792 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2794 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2796 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2797 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2798 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2799 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2800 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2801 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2802 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2803 pub fn update_channel_config(
2804 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2805 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2806 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2807 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2808 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2812 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2813 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2815 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2816 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2817 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2818 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2819 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2820 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2821 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2822 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2823 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2827 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2828 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2829 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2832 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2833 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2834 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2835 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2836 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2844 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2845 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2847 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2848 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2850 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2851 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2852 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2853 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2854 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2856 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2857 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2859 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2862 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2863 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2864 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2865 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2866 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2867 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2869 let next_hop_scid = {
2870 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2871 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
2872 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
2873 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2874 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2875 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2877 if !chan.is_usable() {
2878 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2879 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2882 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
2884 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2885 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
2890 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2891 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2892 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2895 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
2896 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
2897 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
2899 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2901 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
2902 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
2905 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
2906 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2907 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2908 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
2909 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
2911 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
2915 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
2916 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
2918 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2921 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2922 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2923 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2925 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2926 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2927 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2930 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
2931 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2932 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2933 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2934 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
2935 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2936 phantom_shared_secret: None,
2939 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
2940 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
2941 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
2942 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2947 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2949 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2950 /// Will likely generate further events.
2951 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2952 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2954 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2955 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2956 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
2958 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
2959 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
2961 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
2962 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2963 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
2965 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2966 match forward_info {
2967 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
2968 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
2969 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2970 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
2971 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
2974 macro_rules! failure_handler {
2975 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
2976 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2978 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2979 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2980 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2981 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2982 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2983 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
2986 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
2987 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
2989 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
2992 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2993 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
2999 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3000 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3002 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3006 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3007 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3009 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3013 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3014 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3015 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3016 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3017 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3019 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3020 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3021 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3022 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3023 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3025 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3027 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3028 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3032 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3033 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3034 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3035 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3041 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3044 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3047 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3048 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3049 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3050 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3051 // problem, not ours.
3057 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3058 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3060 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3064 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3065 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3066 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3067 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3070 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3071 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3072 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3073 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3074 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3077 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3078 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3079 match forward_info {
3080 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3081 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3082 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3083 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3084 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3087 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3088 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3089 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3090 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3091 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3092 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3093 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3094 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3096 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3097 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3098 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3100 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3101 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3103 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3105 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3106 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3107 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3108 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3113 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3114 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3116 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3117 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3118 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3119 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3121 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3122 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3124 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3126 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3127 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3128 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3137 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3138 match forward_info {
3139 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3140 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3141 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3142 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3145 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3146 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3147 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3148 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3150 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3151 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3153 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3156 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3157 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3158 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3159 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3160 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3161 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3162 phantom_shared_secret,
3164 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3166 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3171 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3172 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3173 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3174 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3175 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3177 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3178 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3179 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3180 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3181 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3182 phantom_shared_secret,
3184 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3185 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3189 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3190 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3191 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3192 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3193 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3196 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3197 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3198 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3200 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3201 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3202 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3205 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3206 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3207 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3210 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3211 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3212 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3213 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3214 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3215 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3219 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3220 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3221 total_value += htlc.value;
3222 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3223 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3224 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3225 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3226 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3227 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3229 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3231 _ => unreachable!(),
3234 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3235 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3236 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3237 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3238 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3239 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3240 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3241 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3242 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3245 amount_msat: total_value,
3246 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3247 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3249 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3251 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3252 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3254 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3256 payment_claimable_generated
3260 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3261 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3262 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3263 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3264 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3265 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3266 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3267 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3268 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3269 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3270 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3271 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3272 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3273 Ok(result) => result,
3275 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3276 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3280 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3281 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3282 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3283 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3284 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3285 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3289 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3291 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3292 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3293 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3294 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3297 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3298 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3299 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3300 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3301 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3302 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3303 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3305 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3307 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3308 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3311 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3312 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3313 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3319 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3320 if payment_data.is_none() {
3321 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3322 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3325 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3326 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3327 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3328 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3329 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3330 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3331 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3332 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3334 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3335 if payment_claimable_generated {
3336 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3342 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3343 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3351 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3352 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3353 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3354 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3355 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3356 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3358 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3359 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3361 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3363 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3364 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3365 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3367 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3369 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3370 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3371 events.append(&mut new_events);
3374 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3376 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3377 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3379 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3380 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3381 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3382 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3383 if background_events.is_empty() {
3387 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3389 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3390 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3391 // monitor updating completing.
3392 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3399 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3400 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3401 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3402 self.process_background_events();
3405 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3406 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3407 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3408 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3409 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3410 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3411 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3413 if !chan.is_live() {
3414 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3415 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3416 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3418 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3419 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3421 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3422 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3426 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3427 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3428 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3429 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3430 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3431 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3432 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3434 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3436 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3437 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3438 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3439 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3440 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3441 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3442 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3450 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3452 /// This currently includes:
3453 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3454 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3455 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3457 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3458 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3459 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3461 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3462 /// estimate fetches.
3463 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3464 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3465 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3466 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3468 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3470 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3471 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3472 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3474 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3475 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3476 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3477 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3478 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3479 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3480 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3481 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3482 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3484 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3485 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3486 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3487 if needs_close { return false; }
3490 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3491 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3492 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3493 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3494 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3495 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3496 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3497 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3501 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3502 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3504 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3505 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3506 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3510 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3511 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3516 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3520 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3521 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3526 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3527 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3528 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3529 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3530 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3531 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3532 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3533 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3534 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3535 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3536 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3537 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3538 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3539 // have no channels to the peer.
3540 let remove_entry = {
3541 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3542 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3545 entry.remove_entry();
3548 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3553 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3554 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3555 // This should be unreachable
3556 debug_assert!(false);
3559 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3560 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3561 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3562 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3564 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3565 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3566 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3568 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3575 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3576 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3577 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3578 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3579 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3582 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3583 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3586 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3588 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3589 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3590 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3591 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3592 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3599 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3600 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3601 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3603 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3604 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3605 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3606 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3608 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3609 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3610 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3611 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3612 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3613 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, &FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3616 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3617 /// reason for the failure.
3619 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3620 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: &FailureCode) {
3621 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3623 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3624 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3625 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3626 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3627 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3628 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3629 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3634 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3635 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: &FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3636 match failure_code {
3637 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16),
3638 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16),
3639 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3640 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3641 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3642 HTLCFailReason::reason(*failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3647 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3648 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3650 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3652 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3653 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3654 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3655 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3656 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3657 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3658 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3660 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3662 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3663 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3665 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3670 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3671 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3672 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3673 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3674 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3675 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3676 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3677 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3678 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3679 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3681 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3682 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3683 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3684 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3686 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3687 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3688 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3689 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3690 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3694 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3695 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3696 // be surfaced to the user.
3697 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3698 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3699 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3701 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3702 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3703 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3704 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3705 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3706 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3707 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3708 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3710 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3712 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3715 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3716 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3717 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3718 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3722 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3723 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3724 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3725 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
3727 // Ensure that the peer state channel storage lock is not held when calling this
3729 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
3730 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3731 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock aquired would.
3732 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3733 for (_, peer) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3734 debug_assert!(peer.try_lock().is_ok());
3738 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3739 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3740 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3743 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3744 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3745 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3747 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3748 self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_params, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
3750 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3751 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3752 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3754 let mut forward_event = None;
3755 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3756 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3757 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3759 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3760 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3761 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3763 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3764 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3767 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3768 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3769 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3770 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3771 time_forwardable: time
3774 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3775 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3776 failed_next_destination: destination,
3782 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3783 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3785 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3786 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3787 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3789 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3790 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3791 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3792 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3794 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3795 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3796 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3797 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3798 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3799 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3800 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3802 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3805 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3806 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3807 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3808 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3809 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3810 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3811 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3812 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3817 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3818 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3819 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3821 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3822 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3823 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3824 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3829 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3831 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3832 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3833 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3834 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3835 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3837 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3838 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3840 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3841 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3842 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3843 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3844 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3846 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3847 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3848 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3849 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3850 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3851 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3852 let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3853 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3860 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3861 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3866 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3867 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3869 if peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id).is_none() {
3874 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3875 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3876 debug_assert!(false);
3881 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3882 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3883 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3884 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3885 if sources.len() != 1 {
3886 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3887 debug_assert!(false);
3893 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3895 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3896 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
3897 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3898 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
3901 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
3902 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3903 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
3904 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
3908 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3909 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
3910 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
3911 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
3913 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3914 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3915 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3916 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3917 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3922 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3923 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3924 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3925 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3926 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3927 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
3928 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3930 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3933 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
3934 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3935 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3936 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3940 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
3941 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
3942 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
3943 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3945 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3946 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
3948 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3949 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
3953 let mut peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
3954 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).map(
3955 |peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap()
3959 if let Some(hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan)) = peer_state_opt.as_mut().map(|peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id))
3961 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3962 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3963 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3964 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3965 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
3966 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3968 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3969 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3970 payment_preimage, e);
3971 let err = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err();
3972 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3973 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3974 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
3975 return Err((counterparty_node_id, err));
3978 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3979 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3980 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3981 peer_state_opt.as_mut().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3982 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3983 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3984 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3985 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3986 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3987 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3993 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3994 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3995 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
4001 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4002 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
4003 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4005 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4006 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4007 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same update and try
4008 // again on restart.
4009 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4010 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4011 payment_preimage, e);
4014 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4016 chan.remove_entry();
4018 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
4019 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4020 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4021 Err((counterparty_node_id, res))
4025 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4026 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4027 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4031 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4032 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4033 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4034 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4035 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4036 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4037 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4038 // again on restart.
4039 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4040 payment_preimage, update_res);
4042 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
4043 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4044 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4045 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4046 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4047 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4048 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4049 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4054 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4055 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4058 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4060 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4061 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4063 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4064 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4065 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4066 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4067 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4068 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4069 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4072 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4073 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4075 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4077 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4083 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4084 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4085 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4091 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4092 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4093 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4096 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4097 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4099 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4100 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4101 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4102 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4103 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4107 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4108 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4114 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4115 /// update completion.
4116 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4117 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4118 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4119 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4120 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4121 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4122 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4124 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4125 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4126 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4127 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4130 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4131 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4133 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4134 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4135 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4140 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4142 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4143 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4144 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4145 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4150 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4151 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4152 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4153 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4154 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4159 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4163 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4169 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4170 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4171 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4177 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4178 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4181 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4182 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4183 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4185 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4186 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4187 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4188 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4189 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4194 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4195 let mut peer_state_lock;
4196 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4197 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4198 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4199 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4201 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4202 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4203 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4206 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4210 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4211 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4212 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4213 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4214 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4215 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4217 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4218 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4219 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4224 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4225 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4226 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4229 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4231 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4232 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4234 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4235 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4236 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4237 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4241 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4243 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4244 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4247 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4248 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4249 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4251 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4252 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4253 /// used to accept such channels.
4255 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4256 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4257 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4258 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4261 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4262 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4264 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4265 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4266 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4268 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4269 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4271 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4272 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4274 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4275 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4277 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4278 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4279 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4280 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4283 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4284 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4286 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4287 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4288 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4289 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4290 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4291 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4292 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4293 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4294 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4297 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4298 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4299 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4300 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4301 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4302 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4305 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4306 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4307 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4310 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4311 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4312 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4315 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4316 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4322 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4323 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4324 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4327 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4328 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4331 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4332 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4333 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4335 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4336 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4337 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4339 debug_assert!(false);
4340 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4342 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4343 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4344 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4345 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4346 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4349 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4350 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4354 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4355 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4356 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4357 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4359 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4360 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4361 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4362 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4364 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4365 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4366 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4369 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4370 pending_events.push(
4371 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4372 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4373 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4374 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4375 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4376 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4381 entry.insert(channel);
4387 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4388 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4389 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4390 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4392 debug_assert!(false);
4393 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4395 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4396 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4397 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4398 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4399 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4400 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4402 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4405 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4406 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4407 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4408 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4409 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4411 user_channel_id: user_id,
4416 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4417 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4418 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4420 debug_assert!(false);
4421 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4423 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4424 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4425 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4426 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4427 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4428 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4429 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4431 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4434 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the peer_state
4435 // lock before watch_channel
4436 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4437 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4438 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4439 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4440 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4441 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4442 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4443 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4444 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4445 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4446 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4447 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4448 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4450 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4451 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4452 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4453 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4454 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4455 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4456 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4459 // It's safe to unwrap as we've held the `per_peer_state` read lock since checking that the
4460 // peer exists, despite the inner PeerState potentially having no channels after removing
4461 // the channel above.
4462 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4463 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4464 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4465 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4466 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4468 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4469 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4470 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4471 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4472 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4473 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4474 funding_msg.channel_id))
4476 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4477 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4480 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4481 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4484 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4485 send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4493 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4495 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4496 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4497 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4499 debug_assert!(false);
4500 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4503 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4504 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4505 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4506 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4507 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
4508 Ok(update) => update,
4509 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4511 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4512 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4514 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4515 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4516 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4517 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4518 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4519 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4520 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4526 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4527 send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4531 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4534 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4535 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4539 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4540 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4541 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4543 debug_assert!(false);
4544 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4546 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4547 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4548 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4549 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4550 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4551 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4552 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4553 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4554 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4555 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4556 msg: announcement_sigs,
4558 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4559 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4560 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4561 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4562 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4563 // announcement_signatures.
4564 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4565 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4566 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4567 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4573 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4577 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4581 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4582 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4583 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4584 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4585 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4587 debug_assert!(false);
4588 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4590 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4591 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4592 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4593 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4595 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4596 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4597 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4598 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4601 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4602 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4604 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4605 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4606 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
4607 let (result, is_permanent) =
4608 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4610 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4615 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4616 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4617 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4624 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4627 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4628 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4629 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4630 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4633 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4637 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4638 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4639 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4641 debug_assert!(false);
4642 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4644 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4645 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4646 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4647 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4648 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4649 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4650 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4651 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4652 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4657 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4658 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4659 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4660 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4661 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4662 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4663 } else { (tx, None) }
4665 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4668 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4669 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4670 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4672 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4673 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4674 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4675 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4676 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4680 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4685 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4686 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4687 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4688 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4690 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4691 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4692 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4693 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4695 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4696 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4697 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4699 debug_assert!(false);
4700 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4702 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4703 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4704 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4705 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4707 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4708 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4709 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4710 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4711 match pending_forward_info {
4712 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4713 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4714 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4715 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4717 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4718 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4719 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4720 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4721 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4724 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4726 _ => pending_forward_info
4729 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4731 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4736 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4737 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4738 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4739 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4741 debug_assert!(false);
4742 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4744 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4745 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4746 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4747 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4748 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4750 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4753 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4757 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4758 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4759 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4761 debug_assert!(false);
4762 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4764 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4765 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4766 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4767 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4768 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4770 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4775 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4776 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4777 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4779 debug_assert!(false);
4780 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4782 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4783 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4784 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4785 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4786 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4787 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4788 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4790 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4793 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4797 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4798 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4799 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4801 debug_assert!(false);
4802 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4804 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4805 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4806 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4807 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4808 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4809 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4810 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4811 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4812 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4813 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &update);
4814 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
4819 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
4820 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
4824 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4825 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4826 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4828 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4829 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4830 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4831 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4832 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4833 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4834 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4835 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4837 commitment_signed: msg,
4843 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4848 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4849 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4850 let mut forward_event = None;
4851 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4852 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4853 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4854 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4855 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4856 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4857 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4858 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4860 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4861 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4863 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4864 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4865 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4866 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4867 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4868 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4870 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4871 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4872 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4874 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4875 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4876 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4877 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4878 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4879 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4880 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4881 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4882 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4885 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4886 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4888 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4889 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4890 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4891 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4892 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4893 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4894 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4895 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4898 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4899 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4900 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
4905 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
4906 // payments are being processed.
4907 if forward_htlcs_empty {
4908 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4910 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4911 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
4918 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
4919 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4922 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
4923 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4924 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
4927 match forward_event {
4929 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4930 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4931 time_forwardable: time
4939 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4940 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4942 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4943 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4945 debug_assert!(false);
4946 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4948 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4949 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4950 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4951 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4952 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4953 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4954 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4955 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4956 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &raa_updates.monitor_update);
4957 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
4958 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4959 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4960 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4961 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4962 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4963 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4965 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4966 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
4967 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4968 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
4969 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4970 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4972 } else { unreachable!(); }
4974 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4975 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4976 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4980 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4981 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4982 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4983 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
4984 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
4985 chan.get().get_user_id()))
4987 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4990 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
4992 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4993 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) =>
4995 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4996 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
4997 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4999 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
5000 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5007 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5008 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5009 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5011 debug_assert!(false);
5012 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5014 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5015 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5016 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5017 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5018 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5020 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5025 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5026 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5027 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5029 debug_assert!(false);
5030 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5032 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5033 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5034 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5035 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5036 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5037 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5040 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5041 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5042 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5043 msg, &self.default_configuration
5045 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5046 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5047 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5050 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5055 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5056 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5057 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5058 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5060 // It's not a local channel
5061 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5064 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5065 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5066 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5067 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5069 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5070 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5071 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5072 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5073 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5074 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5075 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5076 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5077 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5078 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5080 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5082 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5083 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5084 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5085 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5087 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5088 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5091 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5093 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5096 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5098 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5099 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5101 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5103 debug_assert!(false);
5104 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5106 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5107 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5108 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5109 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5110 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5111 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5112 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5113 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5114 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5115 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5116 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5117 let mut channel_update = None;
5118 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5119 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5120 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5123 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5124 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5125 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5126 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5127 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5128 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5129 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5134 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5135 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5136 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5137 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5138 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5139 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5143 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5147 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5148 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5151 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5152 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5157 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5158 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5159 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5160 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5161 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5162 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5163 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5164 match monitor_event {
5165 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5166 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5167 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5168 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5170 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5171 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5172 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5173 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5176 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5177 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5178 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5179 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5181 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5182 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5183 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5184 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5187 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5188 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5189 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5190 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5191 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5192 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5193 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5194 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5195 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5196 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5197 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5201 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5202 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5204 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5206 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5207 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5208 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5209 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5210 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5217 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5218 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5224 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5225 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5228 has_pending_monitor_events
5231 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5232 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5233 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5235 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5236 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5239 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5240 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5241 /// update was applied.
5242 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5243 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5244 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5245 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5247 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5249 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5250 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5251 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5252 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5253 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5254 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5255 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5256 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5258 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5260 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5263 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5264 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
5265 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5266 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5267 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5268 updates: commitment_update,
5272 has_monitor_update = true;
5273 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5274 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5275 if close_channel { return false; }
5282 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5283 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5284 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5292 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5293 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5294 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5297 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5298 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5304 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5305 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5306 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5307 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5308 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5309 let mut has_update = false;
5311 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5313 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5314 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5315 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5316 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5317 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5318 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5319 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5320 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5322 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5323 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5326 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5327 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5328 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5329 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5330 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5335 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5337 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5338 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5339 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5345 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5346 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5354 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5355 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5361 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5362 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5364 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5365 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5366 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5367 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5368 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5369 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5370 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5371 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5372 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5373 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5374 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5375 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5376 assert!(should_broadcast);
5377 } else { unreachable!(); }
5378 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5380 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5384 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5385 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5387 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5388 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5391 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5393 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5394 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5395 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5396 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5397 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5398 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5399 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5400 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5401 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5402 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5403 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5404 // never fail a payment too early.
5405 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5407 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5410 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5415 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5418 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5419 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5421 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5422 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5423 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5424 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5426 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5428 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5429 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5433 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5434 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5436 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5438 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5439 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5441 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5442 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5443 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5444 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5445 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5446 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5447 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5448 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5449 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5450 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5451 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5454 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5455 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5457 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5460 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5462 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5464 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5465 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5466 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5467 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5468 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5471 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5472 /// stored external to LDK.
5474 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5475 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5476 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5478 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5479 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5482 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5483 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5484 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5485 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5487 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5488 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5489 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5490 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5491 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5493 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5494 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5495 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5496 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5497 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5499 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5500 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5502 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5503 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5507 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5508 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5510 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5512 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5513 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5515 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5516 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5517 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5518 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5519 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5520 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5521 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5524 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5525 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5527 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5530 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5532 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5534 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5535 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5538 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5539 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5541 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5542 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5543 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5546 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5547 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5549 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5550 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5551 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5552 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5554 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5555 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5556 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5557 Some(_) => continue,
5558 None => return scid_candidate
5563 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5565 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5566 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5568 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5569 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5570 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5574 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5575 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5576 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5578 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5579 /// times to get a unique scid.
5580 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5581 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5582 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5584 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5585 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5586 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5587 return scid_candidate
5591 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5592 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5593 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5594 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5596 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5597 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5598 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5599 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5600 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5601 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5602 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5603 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5612 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5613 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5614 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5615 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5616 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5620 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5621 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5622 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5627 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5628 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5629 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5633 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5634 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5638 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5639 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5642 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5643 /// using the given event handler.
5645 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5646 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5649 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5650 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5651 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5653 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5655 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5656 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5657 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5658 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5661 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5662 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5663 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5666 for event in pending_events {
5667 handler(event).await;
5670 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5671 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5676 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5678 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5679 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5680 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5681 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5682 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5683 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5687 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5688 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5689 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5690 /// is always placed next to each other.
5692 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5693 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5694 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5695 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5697 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5698 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5699 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5700 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5701 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5702 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5703 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5705 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5706 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5707 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5708 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5711 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5712 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5714 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5715 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5718 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5719 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5720 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5721 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5722 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5723 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5724 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5728 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5729 events.replace(pending_events);
5738 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5740 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5741 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5742 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5743 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5744 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5745 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5749 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5751 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5752 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5753 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5754 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5755 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5757 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5758 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5759 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5760 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5763 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5764 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5765 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5768 for event in pending_events {
5769 handler.handle_event(event);
5777 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5779 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5780 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5781 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5782 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5783 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5784 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5788 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5790 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5791 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5792 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5793 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5794 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5797 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5798 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5801 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5802 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5803 let new_height = height - 1;
5805 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5806 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5807 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5808 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5809 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5810 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5813 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5817 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5819 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5820 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5821 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5822 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5823 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5824 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5828 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5829 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5830 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5831 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5833 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5834 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5836 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5837 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5838 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5840 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5841 if height < last_best_block_height {
5842 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5843 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5847 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5848 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5849 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5850 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5852 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5853 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5855 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5857 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5859 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5861 macro_rules! max_time {
5862 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5864 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5865 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5866 // having an explicit local time source.
5867 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5868 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5869 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5870 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5871 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5877 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5878 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5879 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5880 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5884 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5885 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5886 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5887 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5888 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5889 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5890 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5891 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
5898 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5899 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5900 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5901 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5902 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5903 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5904 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5905 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5910 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5912 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5913 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5914 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5915 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5916 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5917 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5921 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5922 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5924 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5925 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5926 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5927 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5928 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5930 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5931 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5933 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5934 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5935 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5936 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5937 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5938 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5939 let res = f(channel);
5940 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5941 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5942 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5943 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5944 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5946 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5947 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5948 if channel.is_usable() {
5949 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5950 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5951 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5952 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5957 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5961 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
5963 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5964 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5965 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5966 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5967 msg: announcement_sigs,
5969 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5970 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
5971 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5973 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5974 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5975 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
5980 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5981 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5982 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5983 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5984 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5985 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
5986 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
5987 // is always consistent.
5988 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
5989 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
5990 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
5991 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5992 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5995 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5996 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
5997 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5998 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5999 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6000 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6001 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6005 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6006 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6007 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6008 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6009 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6010 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6011 data: reason_message,
6021 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6022 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6023 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6024 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6025 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6026 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6027 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6028 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6029 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6030 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6032 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6033 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6034 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6038 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6041 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6042 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6043 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6044 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6045 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6046 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6047 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6048 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6049 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6052 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6053 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6054 _ => unreachable!(),
6056 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6057 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6058 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6059 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6065 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6067 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6068 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6072 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6073 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6074 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6075 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6077 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6079 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6080 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6081 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6082 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6083 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6084 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6087 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6088 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6089 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6091 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6092 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6093 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6094 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6097 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6098 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6099 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6100 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6101 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6104 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6105 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6106 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6109 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6110 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6111 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6112 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6115 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6116 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6117 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6118 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6121 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6122 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6124 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6125 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6126 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6127 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6128 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6131 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6132 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6133 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6134 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6137 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6138 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6139 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6140 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6143 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6144 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6145 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6146 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6150 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6151 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6153 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6154 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6155 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6156 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6157 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6158 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6162 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6163 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6164 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6167 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6168 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6169 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6172 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6173 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6174 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6177 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6178 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6179 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6182 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6183 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6184 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6187 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6188 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6189 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6192 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6193 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6194 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6197 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6198 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6199 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6202 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6203 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6204 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6207 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6208 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6209 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6212 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6213 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6214 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6217 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6218 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6219 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6222 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6223 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6224 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6227 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6228 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6229 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6232 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6233 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6234 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6237 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6238 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6239 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6242 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6247 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6248 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6249 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6252 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6253 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6254 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6255 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6257 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6258 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6259 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6260 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6261 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6262 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6263 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6264 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6265 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6266 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6267 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6272 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6274 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6275 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6276 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6277 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6278 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6279 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6280 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6281 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6282 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6283 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6284 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6285 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6286 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6287 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6288 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6289 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6290 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6291 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6292 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6293 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6294 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6297 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6298 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6299 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6303 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6305 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6307 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6308 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6312 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6313 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6314 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6318 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6320 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6323 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6324 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6325 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6326 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6327 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6328 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6329 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6333 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6334 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6335 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6336 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6337 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6342 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6344 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6345 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6346 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6347 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6348 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6349 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6350 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6351 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6352 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6353 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6357 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6358 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6359 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6364 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6365 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6366 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6367 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6368 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6377 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6381 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6382 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6384 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6385 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6386 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6387 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6388 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6389 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6390 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6391 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6393 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6394 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6395 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6399 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6400 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6401 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6402 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6403 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6404 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6405 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6406 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6407 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6408 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6416 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6417 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6421 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6422 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6425 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6426 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6430 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6431 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6432 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6433 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6436 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6437 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6439 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6440 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6441 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6442 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6443 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6446 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6447 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6448 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6449 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6452 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6453 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6454 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6455 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6458 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6459 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6460 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6461 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6462 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6463 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6464 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6465 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6466 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6467 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6468 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6469 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6470 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6471 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6472 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6473 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6474 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6475 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6477 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6478 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6479 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6485 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6486 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6488 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6489 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6490 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6491 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6494 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6495 (2, node_id, required),
6496 (4, features, required),
6497 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6498 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6499 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6500 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6503 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6504 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6505 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6506 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6507 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6508 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6509 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6510 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6511 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6512 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6513 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6514 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6515 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6516 (7, self.config, option),
6517 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6518 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6519 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6520 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6521 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6522 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6523 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6524 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6525 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6526 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6527 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6528 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6529 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6530 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6531 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6532 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6533 (32, self.is_public, required),
6534 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6535 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6536 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6542 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6543 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6544 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6545 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6546 (2, channel_id, required),
6547 (3, channel_type, option),
6548 (4, counterparty, required),
6549 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6550 (6, funding_txo, option),
6551 (7, config, option),
6552 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6553 (9, confirmations, option),
6554 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6555 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6556 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6557 (16, balance_msat, required),
6558 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6559 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6560 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6561 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6562 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6563 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6564 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6565 (26, is_outbound, required),
6566 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6567 (30, is_usable, required),
6568 (32, is_public, required),
6569 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6570 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6571 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6574 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6575 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6576 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6577 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6578 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6582 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6584 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6585 outbound_scid_alias,
6589 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6590 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6592 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6593 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6594 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6595 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6596 confirmations_required,
6598 force_close_spend_delay,
6599 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6600 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6601 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6602 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6603 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6604 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6609 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6610 (2, channels, vec_type),
6611 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6612 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6615 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6617 (0, onion_packet, required),
6618 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6621 (0, payment_data, required),
6622 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6623 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6625 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6626 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6627 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6631 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6632 (0, routing, required),
6633 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6634 (4, payment_hash, required),
6635 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6636 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6637 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6641 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6642 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6644 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6646 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6647 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6648 reason.write(writer)?;
6650 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6651 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6654 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6655 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6656 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6657 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6664 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6665 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6666 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6669 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6670 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6671 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6672 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6676 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6677 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6678 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6679 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6680 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6683 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6684 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6685 // messages contained in the variants.
6686 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6687 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6688 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6690 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6691 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6692 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6693 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6694 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6697 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6698 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6699 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6700 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6701 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6703 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6708 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6713 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6714 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6715 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6716 (2, outpoint, required),
6717 (4, htlc_id, required),
6718 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6721 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6722 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6723 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6724 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6725 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6727 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6728 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6729 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6730 (2, self.value, required),
6731 (4, payment_data, option),
6732 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6733 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6739 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6740 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6741 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6743 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6744 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6745 let mut total_msat = None;
6746 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6747 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6748 (0, prev_hop, required),
6749 (1, total_msat, option),
6750 (2, value, required),
6751 (4, payment_data, option),
6752 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6753 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6755 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6757 if payment_data.is_some() {
6758 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6760 if total_msat.is_none() {
6761 total_msat = Some(value);
6763 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6766 if total_msat.is_none() {
6767 if payment_data.is_none() {
6768 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6770 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6772 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6776 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6779 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6786 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6787 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6788 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6791 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6792 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6793 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6794 let mut payment_id = None;
6795 let mut payment_secret = None;
6796 let mut payment_params = None;
6797 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6798 (0, session_priv, required),
6799 (1, payment_id, option),
6800 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6801 (3, payment_secret, option),
6802 (4, path, vec_type),
6803 (5, payment_params, option),
6805 if payment_id.is_none() {
6806 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6808 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6810 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6811 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6812 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6813 path: path.unwrap(),
6814 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6819 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6820 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6825 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6826 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6828 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6830 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6831 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6832 (0, session_priv, required),
6833 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6834 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6835 (3, payment_secret, option),
6836 (4, *path, vec_type),
6837 (5, payment_params, option),
6840 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6842 field.write(writer)?;
6849 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6850 (0, forward_info, required),
6851 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6852 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6853 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6854 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6857 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6859 (0, htlc_id, required),
6860 (2, err_packet, required),
6865 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6866 (0, payment_secret, required),
6867 (2, expiry_time, required),
6868 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6869 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6870 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6873 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6875 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6876 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6877 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6878 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6879 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6880 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6884 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6885 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6887 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6889 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6891 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6892 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6893 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6896 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
6898 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6899 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6900 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6901 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6902 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6903 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6904 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
6905 serializable_peer_count += 1;
6907 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
6908 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6909 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6910 unfunded_channels += 1;
6915 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6917 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6918 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6919 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6920 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6921 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6922 channel.write(writer)?;
6929 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6930 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6931 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6932 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6933 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6934 for forward in pending_forwards {
6935 forward.write(writer)?;
6940 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6942 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6943 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6944 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6946 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6947 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6948 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6949 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6950 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6951 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6952 htlc.write(writer)?;
6954 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6957 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
6958 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6959 let peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6960 let peer_state = &*peer_state_lock;
6961 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
6962 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
6963 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
6965 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
6966 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6967 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6971 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6972 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6973 for event in events.iter() {
6974 event.write(writer)?;
6977 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6978 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6979 for event in background_events.iter() {
6981 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6983 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6984 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6989 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
6990 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
6991 // likely to be identical.
6992 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6993 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6995 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6996 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6997 hash.write(writer)?;
6998 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7001 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7002 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7003 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7004 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7005 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7008 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7009 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7011 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7012 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7013 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7014 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7017 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7018 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7022 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7023 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7024 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7026 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7027 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7028 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7034 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7035 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7036 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7037 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7040 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7041 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7042 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7043 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7044 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7046 debug_assert!(false, "While we have code to serialize pending_claiming_payments, the map should always be empty until a later PR");
7049 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7050 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7051 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7052 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7053 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7054 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7055 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7056 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7057 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7064 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7066 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7068 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7069 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7070 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7071 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7072 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7073 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7074 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7075 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7076 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7077 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7078 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7079 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7080 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7082 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7083 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7085 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7086 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7088 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7089 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7090 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7091 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7092 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7093 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7095 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7096 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7098 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7099 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7100 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7101 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7102 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7103 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7107 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7108 pub entropy_source: ES,
7110 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7111 pub node_signer: NS,
7113 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7114 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7116 pub signer_provider: SP,
7118 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7120 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7121 pub fee_estimator: F,
7122 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7124 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7125 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7126 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7127 pub chain_monitor: M,
7129 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7130 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7131 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7132 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7133 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7134 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7136 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7138 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7139 /// deserialization.
7141 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7142 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7143 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7145 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7146 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7148 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7149 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7150 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7151 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7153 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7156 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7157 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7160 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7161 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7163 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7164 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7165 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7166 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7167 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7168 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7172 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7173 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7174 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7175 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7176 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7178 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7179 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7184 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7185 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7186 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7187 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7189 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7190 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7191 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7192 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7193 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7194 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7198 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7199 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7200 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7204 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7205 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7207 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7208 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7209 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7210 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7211 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7212 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7216 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7217 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7219 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7220 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7221 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7223 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7225 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7226 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7227 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7228 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7229 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7230 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7231 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7232 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7233 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7235 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7236 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7237 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7238 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7239 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7240 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7241 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7242 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7243 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7244 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7245 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7246 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7247 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7248 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7249 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7250 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7251 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7252 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7253 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7254 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7255 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7256 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7257 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7258 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7259 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7260 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7261 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7262 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7263 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7264 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7265 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7266 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7268 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7269 let mut found_htlc = false;
7270 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7271 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7274 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7275 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7276 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7277 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7278 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7279 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7280 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7281 log_info!(args.logger,
7282 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7283 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7284 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7288 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7289 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7290 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7292 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7293 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7295 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7296 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7297 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7298 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7300 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7301 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7302 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7303 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7307 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7308 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7309 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7310 // safely discard the channel.
7311 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7312 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7313 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7314 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7315 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7318 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7319 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7320 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7321 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7322 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7323 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7327 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7328 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7329 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7330 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7334 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7335 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7336 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7337 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7338 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7339 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7340 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7341 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7342 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7344 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7347 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7348 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7349 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7350 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7351 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7352 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7353 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7354 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7356 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7359 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7360 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7361 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7362 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7363 let peer_state = PeerState {
7364 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7365 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7366 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7367 is_connected: false,
7369 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7372 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7373 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7374 for _ in 0..event_count {
7375 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7376 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7381 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7382 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7383 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7384 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7385 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7386 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7390 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7391 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7393 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7394 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7395 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7396 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7397 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7401 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7402 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7403 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7404 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7405 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7406 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7407 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7409 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7410 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7414 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7415 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7416 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7417 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7418 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7419 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7420 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7421 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7422 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7423 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7424 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7425 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7426 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7427 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7428 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7429 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7430 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7431 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7433 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7434 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7437 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7438 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7441 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7442 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7443 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7444 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7445 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7446 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7448 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7450 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7451 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7452 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7453 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7454 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7455 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7456 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7458 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7459 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7460 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7461 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7462 if path.is_empty() {
7463 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7464 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7466 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7467 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7468 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7469 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7470 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7471 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7472 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7473 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7475 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7476 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7477 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7478 retry_strategy: None,
7479 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7480 payment_params: None,
7481 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7482 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7484 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7485 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7486 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7487 total_msat: path_amt,
7488 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7490 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7491 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7496 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7497 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source {
7498 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7499 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7500 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7502 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7503 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7504 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7505 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7506 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7507 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7508 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7509 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7510 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7511 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7512 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7517 !forwards.is_empty()
7519 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7520 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7521 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7522 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7523 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7524 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7525 intercepted_id != ev_id
7537 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
7538 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7539 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7540 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7541 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7542 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7543 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7544 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7548 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7549 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7551 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7552 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7553 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7554 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7556 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7557 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7560 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7561 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7562 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7563 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7564 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7566 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7567 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7568 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7569 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7570 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7571 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7572 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7573 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7575 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7576 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7580 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7582 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7584 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7585 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7587 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7591 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7592 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7594 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7595 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7598 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7600 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7602 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7603 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7604 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7605 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7609 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7610 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7611 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7612 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7613 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7614 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7615 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7617 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7618 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7619 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7621 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7622 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7623 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7624 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7625 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7626 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7628 if chan.is_usable() {
7629 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7630 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7631 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7632 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7633 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7639 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7641 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7642 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7643 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7644 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7645 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7646 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7647 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7648 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7649 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7650 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7651 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7653 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7654 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7656 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7657 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7658 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7659 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7661 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7662 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7663 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7664 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7666 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7667 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7668 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7669 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7671 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7672 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7673 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7674 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7675 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7676 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7677 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7680 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7681 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7684 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7687 purpose: payment_purpose,
7688 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7694 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7696 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7697 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7698 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7699 router: args.router,
7701 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7703 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7704 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7705 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments { pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()) },
7706 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7708 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7709 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7710 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7711 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7712 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7713 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7715 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7720 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7722 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7724 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7725 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7726 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7727 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7729 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7730 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7731 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7733 logger: args.logger,
7734 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7737 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7738 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7739 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7740 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7741 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7744 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7745 //connection or two.
7747 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7753 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7754 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7755 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7756 use core::time::Duration;
7757 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7758 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7759 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId};
7760 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7761 use crate::ln::msgs;
7762 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7763 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7764 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7765 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7766 use crate::util::test_utils;
7767 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7768 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7771 fn test_notify_limits() {
7772 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7773 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7774 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7775 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7776 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7777 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7779 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7780 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7781 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7782 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7783 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7785 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7787 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7788 // to connect messages with new values
7789 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7790 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7791 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7792 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7794 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7795 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7796 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7797 // ... but the last node should not.
7798 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7799 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7800 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7801 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7803 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7804 // about the channel.
7805 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7806 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7807 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7809 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7811 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7812 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7813 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7814 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7815 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7816 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7818 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7819 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7820 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7822 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7823 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7824 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7825 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7826 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7827 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7829 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7830 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7831 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7832 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7833 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7834 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7835 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7836 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7838 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7839 // the channel info has updated.
7840 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7841 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7842 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7843 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7844 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7845 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7849 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7850 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7852 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7853 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7854 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7855 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7856 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7858 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7859 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7860 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7861 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7863 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7864 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7865 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7866 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7867 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7868 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7869 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7870 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7871 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7872 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7874 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7875 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7876 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7877 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7878 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7879 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7880 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7881 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7882 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7883 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7884 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7885 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7886 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7887 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7888 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7889 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7890 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7891 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7892 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7893 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7894 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7895 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7897 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7898 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7899 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7900 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7901 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7902 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7904 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7905 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7906 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7907 // lightning messages manually.
7908 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7909 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7912 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7913 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7914 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7916 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7917 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7918 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7919 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7920 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7922 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7923 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7924 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7926 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7927 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7928 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7930 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7931 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7932 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7933 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7934 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7935 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7938 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7939 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7940 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7941 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7943 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7944 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7945 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7946 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7948 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7951 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7952 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7953 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7954 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7956 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7959 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7960 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7961 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7962 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7964 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7969 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7970 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7971 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7972 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7973 // fails as expected.
7974 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7975 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7976 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7977 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7978 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7979 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7980 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7982 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7983 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7984 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7986 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7987 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7988 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
7989 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7990 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7992 let route = find_route(
7993 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7994 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7996 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7997 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7998 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7999 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8000 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8001 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8002 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8003 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8004 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8005 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8006 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8007 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8008 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8009 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8010 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8011 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8012 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8013 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8014 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8015 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8016 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8017 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8018 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8020 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8021 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8023 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8024 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8025 let route = find_route(
8026 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8027 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8029 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8030 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8031 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8032 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8033 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8034 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8035 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8037 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8038 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8039 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8040 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8041 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8042 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8043 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8044 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8045 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8046 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8047 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8048 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8049 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8050 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8051 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8052 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8053 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8054 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8055 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8056 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8057 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8058 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8059 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8061 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8062 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8066 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8067 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8068 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8069 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8070 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8071 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8072 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8074 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8075 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8077 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8078 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8079 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8080 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8081 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8083 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8084 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8085 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8086 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8087 let route = find_route(
8088 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8089 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8092 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8093 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8094 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8095 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8098 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8099 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8100 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8101 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8102 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8103 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8104 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8106 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
8110 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8111 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8112 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8113 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8114 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8115 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8117 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8118 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8120 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8121 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8122 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8123 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8124 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8126 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8127 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8128 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8129 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8130 let route = find_route(
8131 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8132 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8135 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8136 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8137 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8138 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8139 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8140 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8142 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8143 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8144 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8145 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8146 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8147 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8148 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8150 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8154 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8155 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8156 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8157 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8158 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8160 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8161 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8162 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8163 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8165 // Marshall an MPP route.
8166 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8167 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8168 route.paths.push(path);
8169 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8170 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8171 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8172 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8173 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8174 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8176 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8177 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8178 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8179 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8184 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8185 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8186 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8187 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8188 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8190 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8192 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8193 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8195 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8196 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8197 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8198 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8201 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8202 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8203 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8204 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8205 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8206 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8209 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8212 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8213 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8218 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8219 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8220 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8221 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8222 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8223 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8225 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8226 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8228 total_msat: 100_000,
8231 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8232 // payment verification fails as expected.
8233 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8234 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8235 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8236 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8238 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8242 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8243 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8247 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8248 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8249 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8250 // the channel is successfully closed.
8251 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8252 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8253 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8254 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8256 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8257 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8258 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8259 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8260 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8262 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8263 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8265 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8266 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8267 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8268 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8271 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8273 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8274 // as it has the funding transaction.
8275 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8276 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8277 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8279 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8282 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8284 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8286 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8287 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8288 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8290 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8291 // as it has the funding transaction.
8292 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8293 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8294 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8296 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8297 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8298 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8299 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8300 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8301 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8302 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8304 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8305 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8306 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8307 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8309 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8310 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8312 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8313 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8314 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8315 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8316 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8317 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8318 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8320 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8321 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8322 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8323 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8324 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8325 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8326 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8329 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8331 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8332 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8333 // closing transaction).
8334 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8335 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8336 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8338 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8339 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8340 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8341 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8342 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8345 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8347 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8349 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8350 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8351 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8353 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8355 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8356 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8359 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8360 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8361 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8364 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8365 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8366 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8369 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8371 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8372 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8374 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8375 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8377 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8378 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8383 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8384 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8385 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8386 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8387 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8388 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8389 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8390 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8393 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8394 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8395 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8397 // Test the API functions.
8398 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8400 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8402 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8404 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8406 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8408 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8410 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8415 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8416 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8417 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8418 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8419 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8420 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8421 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8422 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8423 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8424 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8425 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8427 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8428 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8429 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8431 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8432 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8434 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8435 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8437 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8440 let error_msg = get_err_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8441 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8443 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8444 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8446 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8450 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8452 use crate::chain::Listen;
8453 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8454 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8455 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8456 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8457 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8458 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8459 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8460 use crate::util::test_utils;
8461 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8462 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8464 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8465 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8466 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8468 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8472 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8473 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8474 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8475 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8476 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8477 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8478 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8479 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8484 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8485 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8488 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8489 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8490 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8492 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8493 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8495 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8496 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8497 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8498 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8499 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8501 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8502 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8504 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8505 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8506 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8507 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8509 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8511 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8513 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8514 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8515 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8516 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8517 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8519 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8521 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8523 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8524 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8525 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8526 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8527 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8530 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8531 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8532 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8534 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8535 } else { panic!(); }
8537 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8538 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8540 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8543 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8546 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8547 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8549 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8550 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8551 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8552 match msg_events[0] {
8553 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8554 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8555 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8559 match msg_events[1] {
8560 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8564 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8565 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8567 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8568 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8570 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8573 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8574 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8576 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8577 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8579 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8582 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8584 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8585 macro_rules! send_payment {
8586 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8587 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8588 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
8589 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
8590 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8591 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8592 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8593 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8594 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8595 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8597 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8598 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8600 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8601 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
8603 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8604 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8605 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8606 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8607 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8608 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8609 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8610 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8612 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8613 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8614 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8615 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8617 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8618 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8619 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8620 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8621 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8623 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8626 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8627 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8628 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8629 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8631 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8636 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8637 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);