1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 pub use crate::ln::channel::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
48 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
50 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
56 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
60 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
61 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
62 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
63 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
65 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
69 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
70 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
71 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
72 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
73 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
74 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
75 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
76 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
77 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
78 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
79 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
81 crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
82 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
83 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
84 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
85 crate::sign::KeysManager,
89 crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
90 crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
93 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
96 use crate::prelude::*;
98 use core::cell::RefCell;
100 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
101 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
102 use core::time::Duration;
103 use core::ops::Deref;
105 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
106 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
107 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
109 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
111 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
112 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
113 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
115 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
116 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
117 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
118 // before we forward it.
120 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
121 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
122 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
123 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
124 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
126 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
129 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
130 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
132 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
133 /// do with the HTLC.
134 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
135 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
137 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
138 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
139 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
140 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
141 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
142 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
144 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
146 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
147 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
149 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
150 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
151 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
152 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
153 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
155 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
156 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
157 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
158 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
159 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
161 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
162 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
163 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
164 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
166 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
167 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
169 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
170 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
171 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
172 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
173 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
174 requires_blinded_error: bool,
176 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
177 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
178 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
180 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
181 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
183 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
184 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
185 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
186 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
187 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
188 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
189 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
191 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
192 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
193 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
194 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
196 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
197 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
198 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
200 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
201 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
202 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
203 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
204 requires_blinded_error: bool,
208 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
209 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
210 pub struct BlindedForward {
211 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
212 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
213 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
214 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
215 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
216 /// the introduction node.
217 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
220 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
221 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
222 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
224 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
225 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
226 Self::ReceiveKeysend { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
232 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
234 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
235 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
236 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
237 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
238 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
239 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
241 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
242 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
243 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
244 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
245 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
247 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
249 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
250 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
251 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
253 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
254 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
255 /// it along another path).
257 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
258 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
259 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
260 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
261 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
262 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
263 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
264 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
265 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
267 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
270 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
272 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
274 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
277 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
278 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
279 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
280 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
283 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
284 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
285 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
286 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
287 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
290 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
291 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
292 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
294 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
295 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
296 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
299 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
300 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
302 prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
303 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
304 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
307 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
308 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
309 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
312 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
317 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
321 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
322 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
323 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
324 pub enum BlindedFailure {
325 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
326 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
327 FromIntroductionNode,
328 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
329 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
333 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
334 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
335 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
336 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
337 short_channel_id: u64,
338 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
340 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
341 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
342 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
343 channel_id: ChannelId,
345 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
346 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
351 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
353 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
354 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
355 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
357 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
358 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
361 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
362 struct ClaimableHTLC {
363 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
365 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
367 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
368 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
369 sender_intended_value: u64,
370 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
372 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
373 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
374 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
375 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
377 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
378 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
381 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
382 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
383 events::ClaimedHTLC {
384 channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
385 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
386 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
387 value_msat: val.value,
388 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
393 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
394 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
396 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
397 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
398 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
401 /// Number of bytes in the id.
402 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
405 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
406 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
411 impl Readable for PaymentId {
412 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
413 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
418 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
419 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
420 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
424 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
426 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
427 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
428 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
430 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
431 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
436 impl Readable for InterceptId {
437 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
438 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
443 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
444 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
445 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
446 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
447 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
450 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
452 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
453 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
454 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
456 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
457 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
461 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
462 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
463 (0, short_channel_id, required),
464 (2, htlc_id, required),
466 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
467 (0, session_priv, required),
472 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
473 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
474 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
475 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
476 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
479 session_priv: SecretKey,
480 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
481 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
482 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
483 payment_id: PaymentId,
486 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
487 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
488 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
490 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
492 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
494 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
497 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
498 payment_id.hash(hasher);
499 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
505 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
507 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
508 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
509 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
510 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
511 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
512 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
516 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
517 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
518 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
519 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
520 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
521 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
523 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
529 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
530 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
532 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
533 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
534 pub enum FailureCode {
535 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
536 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
537 TemporaryNodeFailure,
538 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
539 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
540 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
541 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
542 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
543 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
544 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
545 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
546 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
547 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
549 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
550 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
551 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
554 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
555 fn into(self) -> u16 {
557 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
558 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
559 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
560 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
565 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
566 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
567 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
568 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
569 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
571 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
572 err: msgs::LightningError,
573 closes_channel: bool,
574 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
576 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
578 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
580 err: LightningError {
582 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
583 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
589 closes_channel: false,
590 shutdown_finish: None,
594 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
595 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
598 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
599 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
600 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
601 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
602 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
603 // commitment upon reconnecting.
604 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
606 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
609 err: LightningError { err, action },
610 closes_channel: true,
611 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
615 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
618 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
620 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
621 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
625 log_level: Level::Warn,
628 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
630 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
632 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
634 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
635 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
642 closes_channel: false,
643 shutdown_finish: None,
647 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
652 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
653 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
654 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
655 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
656 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
658 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
659 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
660 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
661 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
662 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
663 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
664 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
666 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
670 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
671 struct ClaimingPayment {
673 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
674 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
675 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
676 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
678 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
679 (0, amount_msat, required),
680 (2, payment_purpose, required),
681 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
682 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
683 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
686 struct ClaimablePayment {
687 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
688 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
689 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
692 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
693 struct ClaimablePayments {
694 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
695 /// failed/claimed by the user.
697 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
698 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
700 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
701 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
702 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
704 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
705 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
706 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
707 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
710 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
711 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
712 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
713 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
715 enum BackgroundEvent {
716 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
717 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
718 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
719 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
721 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
722 /// are regenerated on startup.
723 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
724 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
725 /// channel to continue normal operation.
727 /// In general this should be used rather than
728 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
729 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
730 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
732 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
733 /// are regenerated on startup.
734 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
735 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
736 funding_txo: OutPoint,
737 channel_id: ChannelId,
738 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
740 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
741 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
743 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
744 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
745 channel_id: ChannelId,
750 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
751 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
752 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
753 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
754 /// event can be generated.
755 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
756 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
757 /// operation of another channel.
759 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
760 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
761 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
762 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
764 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
765 event: events::Event,
766 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
768 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
769 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
770 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
772 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
773 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
774 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
775 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
776 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
778 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
779 /// stored for later processing.
780 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
781 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
782 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
783 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
784 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
788 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
789 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
790 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
791 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
792 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
793 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
794 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
795 (4, blocking_action, required),
796 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
797 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
798 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
800 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
801 (0, event, upgradable_required),
802 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
803 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
804 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
805 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
806 // downgrades to prior versions.
807 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
811 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
812 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
813 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
814 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
815 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
816 channel_id: ChannelId,
819 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
820 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
821 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
822 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
823 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
824 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
825 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
829 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
830 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
831 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
832 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
833 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
834 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
836 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
837 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
838 channel_id: ChannelId,
839 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
844 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
845 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
846 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
847 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
848 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
853 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
854 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
858 /// State we hold per-peer.
859 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
860 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
862 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
863 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
864 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
866 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
867 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
868 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
869 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
870 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
871 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
872 latest_features: InitFeatures,
873 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
874 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
875 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
876 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
877 /// user but which have not yet completed.
879 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
880 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
881 /// for a missing channel.
882 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
883 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
884 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
886 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
887 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
888 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
889 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
891 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
892 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
893 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
894 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
895 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
896 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
897 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
898 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
899 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
900 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
901 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
902 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
903 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
904 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
905 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
906 pub is_connected: bool,
909 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
910 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
911 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
912 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
913 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
914 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
917 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
919 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
920 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
922 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
924 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
927 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
928 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
931 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
932 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
933 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
936 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
937 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
938 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
939 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
943 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
944 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
945 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
946 /// The original OpenChannel message.
947 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
948 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
949 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
952 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
953 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
954 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
956 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
957 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
959 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
962 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
963 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
964 struct PendingInboundPayment {
965 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
966 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
967 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
968 /// this payment being removed.
970 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
971 user_payment_id: u64,
972 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
973 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
974 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
977 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
978 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
979 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
980 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
981 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
982 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
983 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
984 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
986 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
987 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
988 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
996 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
999 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
1000 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1001 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1006 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1007 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1008 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1009 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1010 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1011 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1012 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1013 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1014 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1016 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1017 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1018 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1027 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1030 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1031 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1032 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1037 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1039 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1041 pub trait AChannelManager {
1042 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1043 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1044 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1045 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1046 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1047 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1048 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1049 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1050 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1051 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1052 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1053 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1054 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1055 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1056 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1057 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1058 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1059 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1060 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1061 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1062 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1063 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1064 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1065 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1066 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1067 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1068 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1069 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1070 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1071 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1072 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1073 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1074 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1075 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1076 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1077 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1080 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1081 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1083 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1084 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1085 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1086 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1087 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1088 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1092 type Watch = M::Target;
1094 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1096 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1098 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1100 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1101 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1103 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1105 type Router = R::Target;
1107 type Logger = L::Target;
1109 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1112 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1113 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1115 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1116 /// to individual Channels.
1118 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1119 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1120 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1121 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1123 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1124 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1125 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1126 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1127 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1128 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1129 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1130 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1131 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1133 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1134 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1135 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1137 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1138 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1139 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1140 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1141 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1143 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1144 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1145 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1146 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1148 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1149 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1150 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1152 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1153 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1154 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1155 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1156 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1158 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1159 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1160 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1161 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1162 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1163 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1164 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1165 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1168 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1169 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1170 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1171 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1172 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1176 // `pending_offers_messages`
1178 // `total_consistency_lock`
1180 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1182 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1184 // |__`decode_update_add_htlcs`
1186 // |__`per_peer_state`
1188 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1190 // |__`claimable_payments`
1192 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1196 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1198 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1200 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1204 // |__`pending_events`
1206 // |__`pending_background_events`
1208 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1210 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1211 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1212 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1213 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1214 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1215 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1219 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1220 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1221 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1227 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1229 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1231 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1232 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1234 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1235 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1236 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1237 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1239 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1240 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1242 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1243 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1244 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1245 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1246 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1247 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1248 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1249 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1251 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1253 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1254 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1256 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1258 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1259 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1260 /// and via the classic SCID.
1262 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1263 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1265 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1267 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1269 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1270 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1271 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1273 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1274 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1276 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> pending `update_add_htlc`s to decode.
1278 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1279 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1280 /// and via the classic SCID.
1282 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1283 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `channel_id` in `UpdateAddHTLC`!
1285 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1286 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>>,
1288 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1289 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1291 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1292 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1294 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1295 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1296 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1297 /// active channel list on load.
1299 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1300 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1302 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1304 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1305 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1306 /// the handling of the events.
1308 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1309 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1312 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1313 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1314 /// would break backwards compatability.
1315 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1316 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1317 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1319 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1321 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1323 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1325 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1327 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1328 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1329 /// confirmation depth.
1331 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1332 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1333 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1335 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1337 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1339 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1341 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1343 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1345 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1346 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1347 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1349 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1350 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1352 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1353 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1354 /// keeping additional state.
1355 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1357 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1358 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1359 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1360 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1362 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1363 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1365 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1366 /// are currently open with that peer.
1368 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1369 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1372 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1374 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1375 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1376 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1377 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1378 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1380 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1381 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1382 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1383 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1384 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1386 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1387 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1389 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1390 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1391 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1392 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1393 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1395 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1396 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1398 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1399 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1400 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1401 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1402 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1404 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1406 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1408 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1409 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1410 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1411 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1412 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1413 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1414 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1415 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1416 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1417 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1418 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1420 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1421 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1422 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1424 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1426 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1427 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1429 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1431 /// Tracks the message events that are to be broadcasted when we are connected to some peer.
1432 pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
1436 signer_provider: SP,
1441 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1443 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1444 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1445 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1446 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1447 pub struct ChainParameters {
1448 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1449 pub network: Network,
1451 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1453 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1454 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1457 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1461 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1462 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1465 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1466 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1467 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1468 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1469 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1470 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1472 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1473 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1474 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1475 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1476 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1477 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1479 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1480 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1483 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1484 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1485 /// events to handle.
1487 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1488 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1490 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1491 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1494 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1495 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1496 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1497 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1499 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1500 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1501 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1502 should_persist: move || {
1503 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1504 // processing and return that.
1505 let notify = persist_check();
1506 match (notify, force_notify) {
1507 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1508 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1509 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1510 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1511 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1514 _read_guard: read_guard,
1518 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1519 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1520 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1521 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1522 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1523 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1525 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1526 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1527 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1528 should_persist: persist_check,
1529 _read_guard: read_guard,
1534 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1535 fn drop(&mut self) {
1536 match (self.should_persist)() {
1537 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1538 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1539 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1541 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1542 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1543 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1548 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1549 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1551 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1553 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1554 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1555 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1556 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1557 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1559 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1560 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1562 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1564 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1565 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1566 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1567 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1568 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1569 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1570 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1571 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1572 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1573 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1574 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1575 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1576 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1578 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1579 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1581 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1582 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1583 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1584 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1586 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1587 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1588 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1589 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1590 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1591 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1593 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1595 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1596 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1598 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1600 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1601 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1603 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1604 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1605 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1607 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1608 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1609 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1611 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1612 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1613 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1614 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1616 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1617 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1618 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1620 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1621 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1622 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1624 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1625 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1626 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1627 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1628 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1629 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1630 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1631 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1632 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1633 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1634 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1637 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1638 /// to better separate parameters.
1639 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1640 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1641 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1642 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1643 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1644 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1645 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1646 pub features: InitFeatures,
1647 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1648 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1649 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1651 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1653 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1654 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1655 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1656 /// payments to us through this channel.
1657 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1658 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1659 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1660 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1661 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1662 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1663 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1666 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1667 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1668 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1669 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1670 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1671 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1672 /// lifetime of the channel.
1673 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1674 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1675 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1676 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1677 /// our counterparty already.
1678 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1679 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1681 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1682 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1683 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1684 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1686 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1687 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1689 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1690 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1692 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1693 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1694 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1695 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1696 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1697 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1698 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1699 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1700 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1703 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1705 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1706 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1707 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1708 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1709 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1710 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1711 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1713 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1714 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1716 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1717 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1718 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1719 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1720 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1721 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1722 /// this value on chain.
1724 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1726 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1728 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1729 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1730 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1731 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1732 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1733 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1734 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1736 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1737 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1738 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1739 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1740 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1741 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1743 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1744 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1745 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1746 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1747 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1749 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1750 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1751 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1752 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1754 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1755 pub balance_msat: u64,
1756 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1757 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1758 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1759 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1761 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1763 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1764 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1765 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1766 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1767 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1768 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1769 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1770 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1772 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1773 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1774 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1775 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1776 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1777 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1778 /// route which is valid.
1779 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1780 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1781 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1782 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1783 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1784 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1786 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1787 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1788 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1789 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1790 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1791 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1792 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1793 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1794 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1796 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1798 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1799 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1800 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1801 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1802 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1804 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1805 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1806 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1807 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1808 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1809 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1810 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1812 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1813 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1814 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1815 pub is_outbound: bool,
1816 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1817 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1818 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1819 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1820 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1822 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1823 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1824 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1825 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1826 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1827 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1828 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1830 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1831 pub is_usable: bool,
1832 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1833 pub is_public: bool,
1834 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1835 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1836 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1837 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1838 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1839 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1841 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1842 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1843 /// Pending inbound HTLCs.
1845 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
1846 pub pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCDetails>,
1847 /// Pending outbound HTLCs.
1849 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
1850 pub pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails>,
1853 impl ChannelDetails {
1854 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1855 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1856 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1858 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1859 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1860 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1861 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1864 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1865 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1866 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1868 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1869 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1870 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1871 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1874 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1875 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1876 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1879 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1880 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1882 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1883 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1884 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1886 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1887 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1888 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1889 features: latest_features,
1890 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1891 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1892 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1893 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1894 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1895 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1896 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1897 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1898 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1899 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1901 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1902 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1903 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1904 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1905 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1906 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1907 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1908 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1909 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1910 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1911 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1912 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1913 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1914 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1915 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1916 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1917 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1918 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1919 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1920 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1921 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1922 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1923 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1924 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1925 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1926 config: Some(context.config()),
1927 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1928 pending_inbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(),
1929 pending_outbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(),
1934 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1935 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1936 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1937 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1938 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1939 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1940 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1941 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1942 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1944 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1946 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1947 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1949 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1950 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1951 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1952 /// to drop the channel.
1956 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1957 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1958 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1959 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1960 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1962 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1963 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1964 payment_id: PaymentId,
1966 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1968 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1969 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1970 payment_id: PaymentId,
1971 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1973 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1974 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1975 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1978 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1979 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1980 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1982 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1983 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1984 payment_id: PaymentId,
1985 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1986 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1987 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1989 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1990 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1991 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1993 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1994 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1995 payment_id: PaymentId,
1996 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1997 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2001 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
2003 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
2005 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
2006 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
2007 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
2008 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
2010 pub phantom_scid: u64,
2011 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
2012 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
2015 macro_rules! handle_error {
2016 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
2017 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
2018 // entering the macro.
2019 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2020 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2024 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2025 let mut msg_event = None;
2027 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2028 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2029 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2030 let logger = WithContext::from(
2031 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
2033 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2035 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2036 if let Some(update) = update_option {
2037 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = $self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
2038 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2043 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2046 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2048 msg_event = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2049 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2050 action: err.action.clone()
2054 if let Some(msg_event) = msg_event {
2055 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2056 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2057 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2058 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(msg_event);
2062 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2069 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2070 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2071 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2072 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2074 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2075 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2076 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2078 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2079 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2080 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2081 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2082 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2084 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2085 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2087 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2091 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2092 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2093 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2095 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2096 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2098 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2099 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2101 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2102 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2103 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2104 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2105 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2106 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2108 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2113 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2114 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2116 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2117 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2119 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2120 match $channel_phase {
2121 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2122 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2124 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2125 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2127 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2128 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2130 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2131 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2132 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2134 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2135 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2136 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2142 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2143 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2147 let key = *$entry.key();
2148 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2150 $entry.remove_entry();
2158 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2159 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2163 let key = *$entry.key();
2164 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2166 $entry.remove_entry();
2174 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2175 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2177 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2178 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2184 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2185 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2186 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2187 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2188 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2190 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2191 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2192 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2193 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2194 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2195 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2196 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2197 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2198 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2199 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2204 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2205 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2206 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2207 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2208 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2209 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2210 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2211 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2212 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2213 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2215 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2220 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2221 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2222 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2223 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2224 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2225 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2226 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2227 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2228 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2230 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2235 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2236 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2237 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2238 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2239 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2240 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2241 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2242 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2243 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2244 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2245 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2246 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2248 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2249 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2250 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2256 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2257 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2259 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2260 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2261 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.pending_update_adds,
2262 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2263 updates.announcement_sigs);
2264 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2265 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2268 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2269 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2270 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2271 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2273 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2274 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2275 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2276 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2277 let mut batch_completed = false;
2278 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2279 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2280 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2281 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2283 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2284 channel_state.2 = true;
2286 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2288 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2290 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2293 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2294 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2295 if batch_completed {
2296 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2297 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2298 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2299 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2300 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2301 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2302 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2303 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2304 chan.set_batch_ready();
2305 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2306 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2310 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2311 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2312 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2317 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2319 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2320 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2322 if let Some(decode) = decode_update_add_htlcs {
2323 $self.push_decode_update_add_htlcs(decode);
2325 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2326 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2327 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2328 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2333 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2334 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2335 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2336 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2338 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2339 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2340 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2341 panic!("{}", err_str);
2343 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2344 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2345 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2348 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2354 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2355 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2356 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2358 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2359 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2360 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2361 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2362 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2363 // filter for uniqueness here.
2364 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2365 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2366 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2367 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2369 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2370 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2372 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2373 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2374 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2380 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2381 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2382 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2383 while !processed_all_events {
2384 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2391 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2392 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2393 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2395 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2396 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2397 result = $self.process_background_events();
2399 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2400 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2401 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2402 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2406 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2407 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2408 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2409 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2412 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2414 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2415 $event_to_handle = event;
2417 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2418 post_event_actions.push(action);
2423 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2424 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2425 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2426 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2427 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2428 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2431 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2432 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2433 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2434 processed_all_events = false;
2438 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2439 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2440 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2442 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2443 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2444 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2450 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2452 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2453 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2454 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2455 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2456 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2457 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2461 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2463 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2465 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2466 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2468 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2470 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2471 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2472 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2475 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2476 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2477 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2479 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2480 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2481 current_timestamp: u32,
2483 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2484 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2485 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2486 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2488 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2489 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2490 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2495 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2497 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
2498 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2499 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2500 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2501 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2502 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
2503 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2504 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2505 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2507 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2510 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2511 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2513 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2515 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2517 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2519 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2520 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2521 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2522 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2523 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2524 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2525 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2526 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2528 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2529 pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2539 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2540 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2541 &self.default_configuration
2544 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2545 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2546 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2549 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2550 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2552 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2554 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2558 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2563 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2565 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2566 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2567 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2568 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2569 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2571 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2572 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2574 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2575 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2576 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2578 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2579 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2580 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2582 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2583 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2585 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2586 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2587 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2588 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2589 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2590 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2592 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2593 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2594 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2595 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2596 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2597 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2600 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2601 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2602 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2604 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2606 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2607 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2609 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2611 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2612 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2613 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2618 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2619 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2620 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2621 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2622 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2623 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2627 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2632 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2634 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2635 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2636 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2638 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2640 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2643 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2646 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2647 node_id: their_network_key,
2650 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2653 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2654 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2655 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2656 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2657 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2658 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2659 // the same channel.
2660 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2662 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2663 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2664 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2665 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2666 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2667 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2668 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2669 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2670 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2674 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2675 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2676 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2684 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2685 /// more information.
2686 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2687 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2688 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2689 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2690 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2691 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2692 // the same channel.
2693 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2695 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2696 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2697 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2698 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2699 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2700 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2701 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2702 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2710 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2711 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2713 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2714 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2716 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2717 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2718 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2719 // really wanted anyway.
2720 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2723 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2724 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2725 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2726 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2728 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2729 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2730 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2731 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2732 let context_to_details = |context| {
2733 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2735 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2737 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2738 .map(context_to_details)
2744 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2745 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2747 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2748 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2749 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2751 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2752 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2753 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2754 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2755 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2756 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2758 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2759 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2760 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2762 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2763 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2764 payment_id: *payment_id,
2765 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2766 total_msat: *total_msat,
2769 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2770 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2772 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2773 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2775 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2780 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2781 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2783 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
2784 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2787 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2789 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2790 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2792 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2793 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2795 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2796 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2797 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2798 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2799 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2800 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2801 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2802 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2804 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2805 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2806 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2807 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2808 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2812 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2813 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2815 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2816 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2817 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2818 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2821 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2822 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
2825 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2826 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2828 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2829 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
2836 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2837 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2838 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2839 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2842 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2843 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2849 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2850 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2851 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2853 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2854 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2856 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2857 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2858 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2859 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2861 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2863 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2864 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2865 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2868 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2869 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2870 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2871 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2872 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2873 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2876 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2877 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2878 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2880 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2881 /// the channel being closed or not:
2882 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2883 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2884 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2885 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2886 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2887 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2888 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2890 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2891 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2892 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2893 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2895 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2897 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2898 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2899 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2902 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2903 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2904 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2905 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2906 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2909 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2910 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2911 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2912 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2913 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2916 let logger = WithContext::from(
2917 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
2920 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
2921 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2922 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2923 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2924 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2925 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2926 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2928 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2929 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2930 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2931 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2932 // ignore the result here.
2933 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2935 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2936 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2937 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2938 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2939 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2940 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2941 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2942 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2943 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2944 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2945 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2946 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
2949 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2952 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2953 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2958 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2959 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2960 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
2961 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
2962 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
2963 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
2964 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
2965 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
2968 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
2969 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2970 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
2974 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2975 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2979 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2980 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2981 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2982 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2983 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2984 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2985 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2986 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2987 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2988 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2989 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2991 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2993 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
2994 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2995 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2996 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2997 mem::drop(peer_state);
2998 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3000 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
3001 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
3002 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
3004 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
3005 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3006 // Unfunded channel has no update
3007 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3009 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
3010 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
3011 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
3012 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3013 // Unfunded channel has no update
3014 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3017 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
3018 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
3019 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
3020 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
3022 (None, *peer_node_id)
3024 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3027 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3028 // If we have some Channel Update to broadcast, we cache it and broadcast it later.
3029 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
3030 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3035 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3038 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3039 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3040 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3041 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3042 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3043 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3044 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3045 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3046 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3047 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3048 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
3049 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
3060 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
3061 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
3062 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
3064 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3065 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3066 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3069 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3070 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3071 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3073 /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3074 /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3075 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3076 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3077 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3080 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3081 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3082 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3083 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3084 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3088 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3089 /// local transaction(s).
3090 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3091 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3092 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3096 fn can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(
3097 &self, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet: &NextPacketDetails
3098 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3099 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3100 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3101 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3102 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3103 return Err(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3105 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && next_packet.outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3106 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3107 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3108 // we don't have the channel here.
3109 return Err(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3112 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3113 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3114 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3115 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3116 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3117 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3118 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3119 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3120 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3121 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3122 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3123 return Err(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3125 return Err(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3128 if next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3129 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3130 return Err(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3132 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(msg, next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat, next_packet.outgoing_cltv_value) {
3133 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3134 return Err((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3140 /// Executes a callback `C` that returns some value `X` on the channel found with the given
3141 /// `scid`. `None` is returned when the channel is not found.
3142 fn do_funded_channel_callback<X, C: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> X>(
3143 &self, scid: u64, callback: C,
3145 let (counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&scid).cloned() {
3146 None => return None,
3147 Some((cp_id, id)) => (cp_id, id),
3149 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3150 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3151 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3154 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3155 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3156 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).and_then(
3157 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3160 Some(chan) => Some(callback(chan)),
3164 fn can_forward_htlc(
3165 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet_details: &NextPacketDetails
3166 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3167 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3168 self.can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(chan, msg, next_packet_details)
3171 Some(Err(e)) => return Err(e),
3173 // If we couldn't find the channel info for the scid, it may be a phantom or
3174 // intercept forward.
3175 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3176 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3177 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3179 return Err(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3184 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3185 if let Err((err_msg, err_code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3186 cur_height, next_packet_details.outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3188 let chan_update_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3189 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
3191 return Err((err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt));
3197 fn htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3198 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, err_msg: &'static str,
3199 mut err_code: u16, chan_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, is_intro_node_blinded_forward: bool,
3200 shared_secret: &[u8; 32]
3201 ) -> HTLCFailureMsg {
3202 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3203 if chan_update.is_some() && err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3204 let chan_update = chan_update.unwrap();
3205 if err_code == 0x1000 | 11 || err_code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3206 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3208 else if err_code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3209 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3211 else if err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3212 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3213 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3215 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3216 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3217 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3218 } else if err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3219 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3220 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3221 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3223 err_code = 0x2000 | 2;
3227 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3228 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", err_msg
3230 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3231 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3232 return HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3233 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3234 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3235 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3236 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3240 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_blinded_forward {
3241 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3243 (err_code, &res.0[..])
3245 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3246 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3247 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3248 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3249 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(shared_secret, &None),
3253 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3254 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3256 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3258 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3259 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3262 let next_packet_details = match next_packet_details_opt {
3263 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3264 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3265 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3268 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3269 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3270 self.can_forward_htlc(&msg, &next_packet_details).map_err(|e| {
3271 let (err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt) = e;
3272 self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3273 msg, counterparty_node_id, err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt,
3274 next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward(), &shared_secret
3278 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_details.next_packet_pubkey)))
3281 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3282 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3283 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3284 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3285 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3286 macro_rules! return_err {
3287 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3289 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3290 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3291 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3292 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3293 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3294 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3295 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3296 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3297 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3301 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3302 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3303 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3304 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3305 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3311 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3313 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3314 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3315 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3316 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3319 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3320 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3321 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3322 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3323 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3325 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3328 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3329 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3330 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3331 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3332 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3338 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3339 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3340 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3342 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3343 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3344 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3346 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3347 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3348 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3349 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3350 return Err(LightningError {
3351 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3352 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3355 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3356 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3358 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3359 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3360 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3363 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3364 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3365 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3366 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3368 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3369 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3370 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3372 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3373 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3374 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3375 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3376 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3377 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3378 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3382 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3385 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3386 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3387 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3388 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3390 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3391 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3392 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3393 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3394 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3397 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3398 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3400 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3401 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3402 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3403 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3404 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3405 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3406 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3407 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3409 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3410 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3411 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3413 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3415 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3422 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3423 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3424 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3425 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3430 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3431 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3432 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3435 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3436 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3437 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3438 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3440 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3441 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3442 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3444 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3445 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3449 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3450 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3452 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3453 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3454 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3456 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3459 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3461 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3462 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3464 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3465 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3466 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3467 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3468 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3469 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3470 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3471 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3472 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3473 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3475 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3476 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3477 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3478 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3480 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3481 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3483 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3484 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3485 Some(monitor_update) => {
3486 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3488 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3489 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3490 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3491 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3492 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3493 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3494 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3502 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3505 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3506 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3507 // `channel_by_id` map.
3508 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3509 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3513 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3514 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3516 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3521 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3523 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3524 /// fields for more info.
3526 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3527 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3529 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3531 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3532 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3533 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3534 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3535 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3537 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3538 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3539 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3540 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3541 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3543 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3544 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3545 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3546 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3548 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3550 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3551 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3552 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3554 /// In general, a path may raise:
3555 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3556 /// node public key) is specified.
3557 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3558 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3559 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3560 /// relevant updates.
3562 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3563 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3564 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3566 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3567 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3568 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3569 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3570 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3571 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3572 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3573 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3574 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3575 self.pending_outbound_payments
3576 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3577 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3578 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3581 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3582 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3583 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3584 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3585 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3586 self.pending_outbound_payments
3587 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3588 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3589 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3590 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3594 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3595 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3596 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3597 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3598 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3599 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3603 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3604 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3605 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3609 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3610 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3613 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3614 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3615 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3616 self.pending_outbound_payments
3617 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3618 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3619 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3620 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3621 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3625 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3626 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3627 /// retries are exhausted.
3629 /// # Event Generation
3631 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3632 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3634 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3635 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3636 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3638 /// # Requested Invoices
3640 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3641 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3642 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3643 /// once the invoice has been received.
3645 /// # Restart Behavior
3647 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3648 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3649 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3651 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3652 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3653 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3654 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3657 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3658 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3659 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3660 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3661 /// never reach the recipient.
3663 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3664 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3666 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3667 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3669 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3670 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3671 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3672 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3673 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3674 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3675 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3678 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3679 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3681 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3684 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3685 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3686 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3687 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3688 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3689 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3690 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3691 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3694 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3695 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3696 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3697 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3698 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3699 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3700 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3701 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3702 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3705 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3708 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3709 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3712 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3713 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3715 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3716 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3717 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3718 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3719 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3720 let payment_params =
3721 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3723 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3725 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3728 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3729 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3731 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3732 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3733 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3734 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3736 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3737 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3738 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3739 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3740 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3741 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3742 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3743 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3744 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3745 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3747 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3748 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3749 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3750 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3754 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3756 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3757 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3760 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3762 let mut res = Vec::new();
3764 for mut path in route.paths {
3765 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3766 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3767 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3768 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3769 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3772 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3775 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3776 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3778 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3780 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3781 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3786 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3789 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3794 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3795 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3796 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3798 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3799 let used_liquidity =
3800 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3802 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3803 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3805 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3808 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3813 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3814 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3815 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3822 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3823 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3824 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3825 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3826 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3827 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3828 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3829 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3830 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3832 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3833 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3835 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3836 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
3837 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3839 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3840 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3841 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3842 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3843 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
3844 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
3845 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
3846 } else { unreachable!(); });
3848 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
3849 Err((chan, err)) => {
3850 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3851 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3852 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3853 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3854 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3860 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3861 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3863 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3864 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3867 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3868 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3869 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3873 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3874 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3875 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3879 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3880 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3881 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3883 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3884 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3885 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
3886 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
3887 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
3889 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
3890 funding_txo, o.get()
3892 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
3893 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3894 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3895 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
3896 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
3897 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
3900 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
3907 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3908 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3909 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3913 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3915 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3916 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3918 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3919 /// across the p2p network.
3921 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3922 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3924 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3925 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3926 /// keys per-channel).
3928 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3929 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3930 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3932 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3933 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3934 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3936 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3937 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3938 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3939 /// for more details.
3941 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3942 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3943 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3944 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3947 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3949 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3950 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3952 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3953 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3954 /// signature for each channel.
3956 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3957 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3958 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3959 let mut result = Ok(());
3961 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3962 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3963 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3964 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3965 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3970 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3971 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3972 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3976 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3977 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3978 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3979 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3980 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3981 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3982 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3983 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3985 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3986 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3991 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3992 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3993 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3994 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3998 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3999 match states.entry(txid) {
4000 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4001 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4002 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
4006 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
4009 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
4010 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
4011 temporary_channel_id,
4012 counterparty_node_id,
4013 funding_transaction.clone(),
4016 let mut output_index = None;
4017 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
4018 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4019 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
4020 if output_index.is_some() {
4021 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4022 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
4025 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4028 if output_index.is_none() {
4029 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4030 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
4033 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4034 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4035 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4036 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4037 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4038 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4044 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4045 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4046 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4047 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4048 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4049 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4050 .into_iter().flatten()
4051 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4053 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4054 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4056 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4058 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4059 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4060 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4061 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4062 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
4064 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4065 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4066 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4070 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4071 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4072 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4078 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4080 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4081 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4082 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4083 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4085 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4086 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4088 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4089 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4091 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4093 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4094 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4095 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4096 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4097 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4098 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4099 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4100 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4101 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4102 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4103 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4104 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4105 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4109 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4110 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4111 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4112 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4113 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4114 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4116 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4117 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4118 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4119 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4123 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4124 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4125 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4126 config.apply(config_update);
4127 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4130 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4131 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4132 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
4133 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4134 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4135 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4136 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4143 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4144 debug_assert!(false);
4145 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4147 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4148 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4155 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4157 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4158 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4159 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4160 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4162 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4163 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4165 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4166 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4168 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4170 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4171 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4172 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4173 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4174 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4175 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4176 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4177 pub fn update_channel_config(
4178 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4179 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4180 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4183 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4184 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4186 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4187 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4189 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4190 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4191 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4192 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4193 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4195 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4196 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4197 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4200 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4203 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4204 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4205 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4206 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4207 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4208 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4209 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4211 let next_hop_scid = {
4212 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4213 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4214 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4215 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4216 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4217 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4218 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4219 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4220 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4221 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4224 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4226 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4227 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4228 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4231 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4232 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4233 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4234 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4235 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4242 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4243 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4244 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4247 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4248 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4249 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4250 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4253 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4255 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4256 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4257 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4258 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4259 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4262 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4263 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4264 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4265 payment.prev_channel_id,
4266 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4267 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4269 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4273 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4274 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4276 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4279 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4280 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4281 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4283 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4284 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4285 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4288 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4289 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4290 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4291 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4292 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4293 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4294 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4295 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4296 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4297 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4300 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4301 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4302 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4303 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4308 fn process_pending_update_add_htlcs(&self) {
4309 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4310 mem::swap(&mut decode_update_add_htlcs, &mut self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4312 let get_failed_htlc_destination = |outgoing_scid_opt: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash| {
4313 if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt {
4314 match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid) {
4315 Some((outgoing_counterparty_node_id, outgoing_channel_id)) =>
4316 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
4317 node_id: Some(*outgoing_counterparty_node_id),
4318 channel_id: *outgoing_channel_id,
4320 None => HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop {
4321 requested_forward_scid: outgoing_scid,
4325 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }
4329 'outer_loop: for (incoming_scid, update_add_htlcs) in decode_update_add_htlcs {
4330 let incoming_channel_details_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
4331 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4332 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
4333 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
4334 let user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
4335 let accept_underpaying_htlcs = chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs;
4336 (counterparty_node_id, channel_id, funding_txo, user_channel_id, accept_underpaying_htlcs)
4339 incoming_counterparty_node_id, incoming_channel_id, incoming_funding_txo,
4340 incoming_user_channel_id, incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs
4341 ) = if let Some(incoming_channel_details) = incoming_channel_details_opt {
4342 incoming_channel_details
4344 // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
4348 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
4349 let mut htlc_fails = Vec::new();
4350 for update_add_htlc in &update_add_htlcs {
4351 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = match decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
4352 &update_add_htlc, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
4354 Ok(decoded_onion) => decoded_onion,
4356 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, HTLCDestination::InvalidOnion));
4361 let is_intro_node_blinded_forward = next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward();
4362 let outgoing_scid_opt = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref().map(|d| d.outgoing_scid);
4364 // Process the HTLC on the incoming channel.
4365 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
4366 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4367 chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(
4368 update_add_htlc, &self.fee_estimator, &logger,
4372 Some(Err((err, code))) => {
4373 let outgoing_chan_update_opt = if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt.as_ref() {
4374 self.do_funded_channel_callback(*outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
4375 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
4380 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
4381 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
4382 outgoing_chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
4384 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
4385 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
4388 // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
4389 None => continue 'outer_loop,
4392 // Now process the HTLC on the outgoing channel if it's a forward.
4393 if let Some(next_packet_details) = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref() {
4394 if let Err((err, code, chan_update_opt)) = self.can_forward_htlc(
4395 &update_add_htlc, next_packet_details
4397 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
4398 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
4399 chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
4401 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
4402 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
4407 match self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
4408 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
4409 incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_details_opt.map(|d| d.next_packet_pubkey),
4411 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(htlc_forward) => {
4412 htlc_forwards.push((htlc_forward, update_add_htlc.htlc_id));
4414 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(htlc_fail) => {
4415 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
4416 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
4421 // Process all of the forwards and failures for the channel in which the HTLCs were
4422 // proposed to as a batch.
4423 let pending_forwards = (incoming_scid, incoming_funding_txo, incoming_channel_id,
4424 incoming_user_channel_id, htlc_forwards.drain(..).collect());
4425 self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&mut [pending_forwards]);
4426 for (htlc_fail, htlc_destination) in htlc_fails.drain(..) {
4427 let failure = match htlc_fail {
4428 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(fail_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
4429 htlc_id: fail_htlc.htlc_id,
4430 err_packet: fail_htlc.reason,
4432 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(fail_malformed_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
4433 htlc_id: fail_malformed_htlc.htlc_id,
4434 sha256_of_onion: fail_malformed_htlc.sha256_of_onion,
4435 failure_code: fail_malformed_htlc.failure_code,
4438 self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().entry(incoming_scid).or_insert(vec![]).push(failure);
4439 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4440 prev_channel_id: incoming_channel_id,
4441 failed_next_destination: htlc_destination,
4447 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4449 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4450 /// Will likely generate further events.
4451 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4452 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4454 self.process_pending_update_add_htlcs();
4456 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4457 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4458 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4460 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4461 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4463 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4464 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4465 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4466 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4468 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4469 match forward_info {
4470 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4471 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4472 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4473 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4474 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4477 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4478 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4479 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id));
4480 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4482 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4483 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4484 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4485 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4486 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4487 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4488 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4489 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4490 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4493 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4494 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4496 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4499 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4500 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4506 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4507 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4509 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4513 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4514 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4516 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4520 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4521 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4522 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4523 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4524 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4525 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4526 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4529 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4530 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4531 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4532 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4533 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4535 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4537 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4538 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4542 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4543 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4544 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4545 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4546 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4547 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4549 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4550 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4556 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4559 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4562 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4563 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4564 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4565 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4566 // problem, not ours.
4572 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4573 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4574 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4576 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4580 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4581 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4582 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4583 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4584 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4587 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4588 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4589 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4590 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4591 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4592 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
4593 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4594 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4595 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4596 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4597 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4598 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4599 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4602 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4603 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4604 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4605 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4606 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4607 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4608 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4609 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4610 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4611 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4612 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
4614 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4615 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4616 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4617 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4618 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4619 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4622 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4623 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4624 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4627 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4628 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4630 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4632 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4633 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4634 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4635 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4641 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4642 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4644 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4645 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4646 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
4648 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4649 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4650 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
4651 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
4653 Some((res, htlc_id))
4656 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4657 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4658 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4659 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4661 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
4663 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4664 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4665 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4671 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4675 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4676 match forward_info {
4677 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4678 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4679 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4680 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4681 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4684 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4685 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4686 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4687 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
4688 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4690 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4691 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4692 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4693 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4694 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4696 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
4697 payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata,
4698 incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4700 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4701 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4705 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4706 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4709 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4712 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4713 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4714 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4715 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4716 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4717 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4718 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4719 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4720 phantom_shared_secret,
4723 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4724 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4725 // if routing nodes overpay
4726 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4727 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4729 total_value_received: None,
4730 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4733 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4736 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4738 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4739 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4740 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4741 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4742 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4743 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
4745 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4746 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4747 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4748 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4749 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4750 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4751 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4752 phantom_shared_secret,
4755 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4756 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4758 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4761 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4762 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4763 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4764 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4765 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4768 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4769 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4770 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4771 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4772 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4773 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4775 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4776 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4777 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4779 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4780 .entry(payment_hash)
4781 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4782 .or_insert_with(|| {
4783 committed_to_claimable = true;
4785 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4788 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4789 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4790 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4791 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4793 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4794 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4795 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4797 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4798 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4799 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4802 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4804 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4805 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4806 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4807 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4808 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4809 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4810 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4811 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4812 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4813 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4815 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4817 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4818 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4819 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4820 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4821 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4822 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4824 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4825 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4826 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4827 committed_to_claimable = true;
4829 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4830 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4831 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4832 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4833 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4834 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4835 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4836 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4837 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4841 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4842 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4843 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4844 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4845 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4847 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4849 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4850 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4852 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4853 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4854 committed_to_claimable = true;
4857 payment_claimable_generated
4861 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4862 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4863 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4864 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4865 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4866 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4867 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4868 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4869 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4870 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4871 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4872 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4873 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4874 Ok(result) => result,
4876 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4877 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4880 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4881 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4882 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4883 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4884 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4885 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4888 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4889 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4890 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4892 check_total_value!(purpose);
4894 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4895 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4896 check_total_value!(purpose);
4900 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4901 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4902 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4903 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4905 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4906 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4907 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4908 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4909 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4910 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4911 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4912 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4914 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4915 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4916 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4918 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4919 if payment_claimable_generated {
4920 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4926 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4927 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4935 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4936 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4937 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4938 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4940 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4941 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4943 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4945 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4946 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4947 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4949 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4951 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4952 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4953 events.append(&mut new_events);
4956 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4958 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4959 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4960 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4962 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4964 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4965 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4966 if background_events.is_empty() {
4967 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4970 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4972 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
4973 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4974 // monitor updating completing.
4975 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4977 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
4978 let mut updated_chan = false;
4980 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4981 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4982 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4983 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4984 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4985 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4986 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4987 updated_chan = true;
4988 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4989 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4991 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4994 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4999 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
5000 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5003 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
5004 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5005 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5006 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5007 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5008 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
5009 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5011 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5012 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5013 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5014 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5015 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5021 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5024 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5025 /// Process background events, for functional testing
5026 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
5027 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5028 let _ = self.process_background_events();
5031 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
5032 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
5034 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5036 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
5037 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
5038 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5040 if !chan.context.is_live() {
5041 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
5042 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5043 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5045 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
5046 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5048 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
5049 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5053 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
5054 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
5055 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
5056 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
5057 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
5058 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5059 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5061 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5062 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5064 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5065 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5066 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5067 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5068 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
5069 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
5071 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5076 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5077 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5085 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
5087 /// This currently includes:
5088 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
5089 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
5090 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
5092 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
5093 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
5094 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
5095 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
5096 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
5097 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
5098 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
5099 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
5101 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
5102 /// estimate fetches.
5104 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
5105 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
5106 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
5107 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5108 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5110 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5111 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5113 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
5114 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
5115 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
5116 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
5118 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
5119 chan_id: &ChannelId,
5120 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
5121 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
5122 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5123 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
5125 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5126 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
5127 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
5129 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
5130 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
5131 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
5132 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5133 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5134 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5135 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5136 channel_id: *chan_id,
5137 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
5148 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5149 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5150 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5151 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5152 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5153 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
5154 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
5156 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5157 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5162 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5163 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5165 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
5166 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
5167 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
5168 if needs_close { return false; }
5171 match chan.channel_update_status() {
5172 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5173 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5174 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5175 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5176 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5177 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5178 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5180 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5181 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5182 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5183 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5184 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5188 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5190 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5193 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5195 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5196 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5197 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5198 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5199 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5203 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5205 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5211 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5213 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5214 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5215 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5216 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5217 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5218 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5219 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5220 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5221 channel_id: *chan_id,
5222 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5230 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5231 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5232 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5234 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5235 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5236 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5238 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5239 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5240 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5241 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5243 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5244 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5245 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5246 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5251 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5252 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5253 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5254 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5255 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5256 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5257 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5258 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5259 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5265 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5267 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5268 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5273 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5274 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5275 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5276 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5277 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5278 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5279 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5280 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5281 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5282 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5283 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5284 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5285 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5286 // have no channels to the peer.
5287 let remove_entry = {
5288 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5289 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5292 entry.remove_entry();
5295 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5300 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5301 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5302 // This should be unreachable
5303 debug_assert!(false);
5306 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5307 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5308 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5309 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5310 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5311 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5312 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5315 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5316 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5317 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5319 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5320 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5327 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5328 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5329 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5330 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5331 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5334 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5335 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5338 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5339 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5342 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5343 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5344 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5345 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5346 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5347 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5348 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5351 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5352 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5355 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5356 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5357 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5358 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5359 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5366 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5367 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5368 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5370 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5371 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5372 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5373 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5375 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5376 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5377 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5378 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5379 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5380 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5383 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5384 /// reason for the failure.
5386 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5387 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5388 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5390 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5391 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5392 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5393 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5394 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5395 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5396 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5401 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5402 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5403 match failure_code {
5404 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5405 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5406 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5407 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5408 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5409 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5411 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5412 let fail_data = match data {
5413 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5416 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5421 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5422 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5424 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5426 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5427 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5428 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5429 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5430 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5431 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5432 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5434 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5436 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5437 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5439 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5444 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5445 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5446 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5447 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5448 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5449 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5450 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5451 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5452 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5453 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5455 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5456 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5457 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5458 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5460 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5461 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5462 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5463 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5464 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5468 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5469 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5470 // be surfaced to the user.
5471 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5472 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5473 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5475 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5476 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5477 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5478 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5479 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5480 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5481 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5482 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5483 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5485 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5486 debug_assert!(false);
5487 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5490 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5492 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5495 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5496 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5497 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5498 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5502 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5503 let push_forward_event = self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(source, payment_hash, onion_error, destination);
5504 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5507 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5508 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5509 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) -> bool {
5510 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5511 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5512 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5513 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5514 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5515 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5516 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5519 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5520 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5521 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5524 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5525 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5526 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5527 let mut push_forward_event;
5529 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5530 push_forward_event = self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5531 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5532 &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
5534 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5535 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5536 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
5539 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id)),
5540 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5541 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5543 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5544 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5545 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5546 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5547 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5549 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5551 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5552 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5554 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5555 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5559 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5560 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5562 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5566 push_forward_event = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
5567 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5568 push_forward_event &= forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5569 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5570 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5571 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5573 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5574 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5577 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5578 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5579 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5580 prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
5581 failed_next_destination: destination,
5588 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5589 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5591 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5592 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5593 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5594 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5596 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5597 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5598 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5599 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5601 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5602 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5603 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5605 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5606 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5607 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5608 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5609 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5610 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5611 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5612 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5613 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5616 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5617 /// even type numbers.
5621 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5622 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5624 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5625 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5626 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5629 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5630 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5632 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5635 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5636 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5637 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5638 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5639 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5640 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5641 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5642 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5647 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5648 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5649 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5650 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5651 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5653 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5654 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5655 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5659 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5660 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5661 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5662 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5663 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5664 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5665 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5666 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5667 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5668 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5669 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5678 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5680 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5681 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5682 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5683 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5684 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5685 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5686 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5687 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5688 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5689 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5690 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5691 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5692 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5693 debug_assert!(false);
5697 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5699 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5700 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5701 debug_assert!(false);
5705 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5706 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5708 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5709 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5710 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5711 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5714 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5715 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5716 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5717 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5721 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5722 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
5723 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5724 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5725 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5726 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5727 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5730 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5731 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5732 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5733 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5734 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5735 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5740 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5741 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5742 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5743 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5744 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5745 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5746 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5748 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5751 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5752 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5753 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5754 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5758 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5759 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5760 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5761 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5763 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5764 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5765 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5766 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5768 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5769 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5770 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5771 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5774 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5775 let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
5776 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5777 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5781 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5782 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5783 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5786 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5787 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5788 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5789 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5790 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5791 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5792 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5793 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5796 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5797 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5798 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5800 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5803 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5804 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5806 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5807 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5808 // monitor update as a background event.
5809 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5810 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5811 counterparty_node_id,
5812 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5813 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
5814 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5818 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5819 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5824 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5826 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5828 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
5829 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5830 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5831 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5832 blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
5834 (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
5836 debug_assert!(false,
5837 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5840 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5841 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5842 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5843 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5844 .get_mut(&channel_id)
5846 let mut found_blocker = false;
5847 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5848 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5849 // which case we need to only remove the one
5850 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5851 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5852 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5853 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5855 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5858 debug_assert!(false);
5867 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5868 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5869 counterparty_node_id: None,
5870 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5873 channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
5877 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5878 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5879 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5880 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5881 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5882 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5883 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5884 // again on restart.
5885 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id)),
5886 "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5887 payment_preimage, update_res);
5890 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5891 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5893 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5894 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5895 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5896 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5897 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5898 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5899 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5900 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5901 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5902 prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
5905 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5906 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5907 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5908 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5909 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5910 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5914 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5915 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5918 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5919 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
5920 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
5921 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId, next_user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
5924 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5925 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5926 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5927 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5928 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5930 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5931 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
5932 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5934 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5935 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5938 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5939 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
5940 let prev_user_channel_id = hop_data.user_channel_id;
5941 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5942 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5943 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5944 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5945 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5946 let chan_to_release =
5947 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5948 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
5950 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5951 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5952 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5953 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5958 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5959 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5960 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5961 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5962 // in the background.
5963 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5964 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5965 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5966 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5968 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5969 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5970 funding_txo, update, ..
5972 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5973 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5974 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5975 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5977 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5983 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5984 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5985 (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
5987 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5988 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5990 monitor_update.updates[0],
5991 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5996 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5997 // immediately once we get going.
5998 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
6001 *channel_id == prev_channel_id,
6003 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
6006 } else if definitely_duplicate {
6007 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
6008 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6009 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
6010 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
6011 downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
6012 blocking_action: other_chan.3,
6016 let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
6017 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
6018 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
6021 debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
6022 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
6023 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6024 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
6025 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
6026 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
6027 prev_user_channel_id,
6028 next_user_channel_id,
6029 total_fee_earned_msat,
6031 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
6032 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
6034 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
6038 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
6039 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6040 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
6046 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
6047 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
6048 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
6051 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
6052 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6053 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6054 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6056 for action in actions.into_iter() {
6058 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
6059 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6060 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
6062 payment_purpose: purpose,
6065 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
6067 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
6071 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
6073 sender_intended_total_msat,
6077 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6078 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
6080 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
6081 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
6082 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
6085 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6086 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
6088 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
6089 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
6090 downstream_funding_outpoint,
6091 downstream_channel_id,
6092 Some(blocking_action),
6099 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
6100 /// update completion.
6101 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
6102 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
6103 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
6104 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
6105 funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
6106 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
6107 -> (Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)>, Option<(u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)>) {
6108 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6109 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {} pending update_add_htlcs, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
6110 &channel.context.channel_id(),
6111 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
6112 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
6113 pending_forwards.len(), pending_update_adds.len(),
6114 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
6115 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
6116 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
6118 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6119 let short_channel_id = channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias());
6121 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
6122 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6123 htlc_forwards = Some((short_channel_id, channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
6124 channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
6126 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = None;
6127 if !pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
6128 decode_update_add_htlcs = Some((short_channel_id, pending_update_adds));
6131 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
6132 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
6134 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
6135 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6136 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6141 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
6142 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
6143 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
6144 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6149 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
6150 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
6151 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
6152 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6153 msg: revoke_and_ack,
6158 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
6162 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
6168 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
6169 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
6170 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6174 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6175 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
6176 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6179 (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs)
6182 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
6183 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6185 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6186 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6188 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6189 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6190 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6191 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6192 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6197 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6198 let mut peer_state_lock;
6199 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6200 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6201 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6202 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6204 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6207 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6208 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6209 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6210 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6211 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6214 let remaining_in_flight =
6215 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6216 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6219 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6220 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6221 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6222 remaining_in_flight);
6223 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
6226 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6229 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6231 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6232 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6235 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6236 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6237 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6239 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6240 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6241 /// used to accept such channels.
6243 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6244 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6245 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6246 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6249 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6250 /// it as confirmed immediately.
6252 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6253 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6254 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6256 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6257 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6259 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6260 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6262 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6263 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6265 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6266 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6267 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6268 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6271 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6273 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6274 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6276 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6277 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6278 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6279 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6281 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6282 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6284 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6286 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6287 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6288 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6290 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6291 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6292 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6294 let res = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6295 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6296 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6297 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6298 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6299 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6300 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|err| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(err, *temporary_channel_id))
6303 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6304 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6306 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6312 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6313 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6314 match handle_error!(self, Result::<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>::Err(err), *counterparty_node_id) {
6315 Ok(_) => unreachable!("`handle_error` only returns Err as we've passed in an Err"),
6317 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err });
6321 Ok(mut channel) => {
6323 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6324 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6325 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6326 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6327 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6328 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6329 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6332 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6333 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6334 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6336 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6338 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6339 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6340 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6341 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6342 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6343 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6344 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6345 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6348 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6349 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6350 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6352 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6356 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6357 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6358 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6360 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6361 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6362 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6365 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6372 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6373 /// or 0-conf channels.
6375 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6376 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6377 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6378 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6379 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6380 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6382 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6383 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6384 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6385 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6386 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6387 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6388 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6392 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6395 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6396 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6398 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6399 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6401 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6402 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6403 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6404 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6405 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6407 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6410 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6411 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6412 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6415 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6416 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6417 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
6418 // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
6419 // included in the unfunded count.
6420 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6421 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
6422 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6425 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6426 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6429 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6430 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6431 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6432 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6437 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6440 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6441 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6442 // likely to be lost on restart!
6443 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6444 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
6445 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6448 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6449 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
6450 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6453 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6454 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6455 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6456 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6457 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6459 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6460 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6462 debug_assert!(false);
6463 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6464 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6465 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6467 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6468 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6470 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6471 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6472 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6473 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6474 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6475 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6477 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6478 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6479 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6482 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6483 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6484 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6485 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6486 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6489 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
6490 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6492 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6493 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
6494 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6497 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6498 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6499 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6500 &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6502 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6504 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6505 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6506 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6507 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6508 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
6509 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6512 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6513 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6514 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6519 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6520 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6521 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6522 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6523 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6524 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6525 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6528 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6533 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6534 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6535 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6536 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
6537 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6539 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6540 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6541 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
6542 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6545 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6546 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6548 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6549 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6550 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6552 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6556 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6557 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6558 // likely to be lost on restart!
6559 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6560 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6561 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6563 debug_assert!(false);
6564 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6566 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6567 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6568 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
6569 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6570 match phase.get_mut() {
6571 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6572 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6573 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6576 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6580 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
6583 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6584 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6585 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
6586 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6587 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6589 user_channel_id: user_id,
6594 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6595 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6597 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6598 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6600 debug_assert!(false);
6601 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6604 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6605 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6606 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6607 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6608 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6609 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6610 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6612 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
6613 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6614 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6615 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6616 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
6617 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
6618 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
6619 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
6620 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6624 Some(mut phase) => {
6625 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6626 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
6627 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6629 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6632 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
6634 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
6635 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
6636 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
6637 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
6638 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
6639 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
6641 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
6642 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
6643 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
6646 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
6647 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6648 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
6650 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6651 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6652 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
6653 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6654 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
6656 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6657 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6658 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6659 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6660 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
6662 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6663 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6664 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6665 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6666 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6667 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6668 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6673 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6674 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6675 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6677 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6681 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6682 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6683 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
6691 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6692 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6693 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6694 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6696 debug_assert!(false);
6697 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6700 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6701 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6702 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6703 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6704 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6705 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6706 let logger = WithContext::from(
6708 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6709 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6712 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6714 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
6715 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6716 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6717 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6718 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6719 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6720 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6721 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6722 } else { unreachable!(); }
6725 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6726 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
6727 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
6728 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
6729 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
6730 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
6731 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6735 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
6736 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
6737 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
6738 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
6739 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6740 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6744 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6747 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6751 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6752 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6753 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6754 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6755 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6757 debug_assert!(false);
6758 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6760 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6761 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6762 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6763 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6764 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6765 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6766 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6767 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6768 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6769 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6770 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6771 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6772 msg: announcement_sigs,
6774 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6775 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6776 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6777 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6778 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6779 // announcement_signatures.
6780 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6781 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6782 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6783 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6790 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6791 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6796 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6797 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6800 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6801 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6806 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6807 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6808 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6810 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6811 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6813 debug_assert!(false);
6814 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6816 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6817 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6818 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6819 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6821 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6822 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6823 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6824 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6826 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6829 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6830 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6831 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6832 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6834 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6835 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6836 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6837 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6838 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6839 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6843 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6844 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6845 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6846 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6849 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6850 let context = phase.context_mut();
6851 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6852 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6853 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6854 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6856 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
6857 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6858 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6859 let context = phase.context_mut();
6860 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6861 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6862 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6866 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6869 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6870 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6871 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6872 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6874 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6875 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6881 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6882 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6883 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6885 debug_assert!(false);
6886 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6888 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6889 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6890 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6891 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6892 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6893 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6894 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6895 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6896 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6897 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6898 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6903 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6904 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6905 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6906 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6907 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6908 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6909 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6911 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6912 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6915 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6918 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6919 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6920 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6921 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6923 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6924 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6925 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
6926 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6931 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6932 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6933 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6938 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6939 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6940 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6941 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6943 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6944 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6945 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6946 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6948 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6949 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6951 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6952 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6953 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6955 debug_assert!(false);
6956 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6958 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6959 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6960 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6961 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6962 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6963 let mut pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6964 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6965 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6966 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6967 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6969 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6971 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6972 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6973 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6974 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6975 if let Err((_, error_code)) = chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &logger) {
6976 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
6977 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
6978 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6979 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6980 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6981 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
6982 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6986 match pending_forward_info {
6987 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6988 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6990 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6991 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6992 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6993 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6994 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6996 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6997 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6998 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6999 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7000 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7003 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg));
7009 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), chan_phase_entry);
7011 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7012 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7015 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7020 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7022 let next_user_channel_id;
7023 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
7024 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7025 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7027 debug_assert!(false);
7028 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7030 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7031 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7032 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7033 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7034 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7035 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7036 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
7037 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7039 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
7041 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
7042 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7043 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
7045 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
7046 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
7047 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
7048 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
7049 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
7050 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
7051 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
7052 next_user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
7055 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7056 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7059 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7062 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
7063 Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
7064 funding_txo, msg.channel_id, Some(next_user_channel_id),
7070 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7071 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7072 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7073 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7074 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7076 debug_assert!(false);
7077 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7079 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7080 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7081 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7082 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7083 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7084 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
7086 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7087 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7090 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7095 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7096 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7097 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7098 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7099 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7101 debug_assert!(false);
7102 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7104 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7105 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7106 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7107 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7108 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
7109 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
7110 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
7112 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7113 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
7115 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7116 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7120 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7124 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7125 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7126 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7128 debug_assert!(false);
7129 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7131 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7132 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7133 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7134 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7135 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7136 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7137 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7138 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7139 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7140 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
7141 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7145 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7146 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7149 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7153 fn push_decode_update_add_htlcs(&self, mut update_add_htlcs: (u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)) {
7154 let mut push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7155 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7156 push_forward_event &= decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty();
7157 let scid = update_add_htlcs.0;
7158 match decode_update_add_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7159 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => { e.get_mut().append(&mut update_add_htlcs.1); },
7160 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(update_add_htlcs.1); },
7162 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
7166 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
7167 let push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(per_source_pending_forwards);
7168 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7172 fn forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) -> bool {
7173 let mut push_forward_event = false;
7174 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
7175 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
7176 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
7177 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
7178 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
7179 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
7180 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7181 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
7182 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
7184 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
7185 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
7187 let decode_update_add_htlcs_empty = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7188 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7189 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
7190 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7191 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7192 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7193 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
7195 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7196 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
7197 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
7199 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
7200 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7201 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
7202 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7203 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
7204 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
7205 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
7206 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
7207 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
7210 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7211 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
7213 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7214 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id));
7215 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7216 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7217 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7218 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7219 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7220 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7221 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7222 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7223 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7224 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7227 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7228 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7229 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7234 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7235 // payments are being processed.
7236 push_forward_event |= forward_htlcs_empty && decode_update_add_htlcs_empty;
7237 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7238 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7245 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7246 push_forward_event |= self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7249 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7250 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7251 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7257 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7258 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7259 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7260 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7261 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7263 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7264 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7265 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7266 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7267 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7268 // real by taking more time.
7269 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7270 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7271 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7276 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7277 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7278 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7279 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7280 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7281 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7282 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7284 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7285 .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7286 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7287 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7288 channel_funding_outpoint,
7290 counterparty_node_id,
7295 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7296 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7297 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7299 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7300 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7301 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7302 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7304 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7305 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7306 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7312 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7313 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7314 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7315 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7317 debug_assert!(false);
7318 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7319 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7320 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7321 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7322 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7323 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7324 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7325 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7326 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7327 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7328 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
7329 *counterparty_node_id)
7331 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7332 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7333 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7334 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7335 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7336 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7337 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7341 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7342 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7345 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7348 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7352 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7353 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7354 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7356 debug_assert!(false);
7357 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7359 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7360 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7361 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7362 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7363 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7364 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7365 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7367 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7368 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7371 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7376 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7377 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7378 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7380 debug_assert!(false);
7381 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7383 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7384 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7385 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7386 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7387 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7388 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7389 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7392 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7393 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7394 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
7395 msg, &self.default_configuration
7396 ), chan_phase_entry),
7397 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7398 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7399 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7402 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7403 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7406 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7411 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7412 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7413 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7414 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7416 // It's not a local channel
7417 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7420 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7421 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7422 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7423 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7425 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7426 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7427 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7428 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7429 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7430 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7431 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7432 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7433 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7434 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7435 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7437 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7439 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7440 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7441 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7442 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7444 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7445 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7446 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7447 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7450 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7454 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7455 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7458 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7460 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7463 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7464 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7465 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7467 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7469 debug_assert!(false);
7470 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7471 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7475 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7476 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7477 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7478 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7479 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7480 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7481 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7482 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7483 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7484 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7485 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7486 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7487 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7488 let mut channel_update = None;
7489 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7490 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7491 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7494 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7495 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7496 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7497 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7498 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7499 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7500 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7505 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7506 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7507 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7508 Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7509 debug_assert!(htlc_forwards.is_none());
7510 debug_assert!(decode_update_add_htlcs.is_none());
7511 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7512 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7516 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7517 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7520 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7521 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7523 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7524 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7525 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7526 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7527 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7528 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7530 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7531 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7532 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7533 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7534 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7535 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7536 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7537 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7538 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7539 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7540 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7541 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7542 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7543 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7544 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7545 next_funding_txid: None,
7548 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7549 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7550 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7556 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7557 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7559 Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents)
7562 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7563 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7564 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7566 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7567 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7568 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7569 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7570 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7571 match monitor_event {
7572 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7573 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id));
7574 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7575 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7576 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
7577 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
7578 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
7580 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7581 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
7582 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7583 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7586 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) | MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => {
7587 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7588 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7590 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7591 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7592 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7593 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7596 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7597 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7598 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7599 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7600 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7601 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7602 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
7603 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7604 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
7607 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
7609 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
7610 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7611 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
7612 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7616 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7617 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7618 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7619 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: reason.to_string() })
7627 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
7628 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7634 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7635 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7638 has_pending_monitor_events
7641 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7642 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7643 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7645 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7646 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7647 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7650 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7651 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7652 /// update was applied.
7653 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7654 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7655 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7657 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7658 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7659 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7660 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7662 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7663 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7665 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7666 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7667 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7668 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7670 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7671 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7672 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7673 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7674 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7675 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7677 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7678 has_monitor_update = true;
7680 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7681 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7682 continue 'peer_loop;
7691 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7692 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7693 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7699 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7700 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7702 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7703 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7705 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7706 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7707 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7708 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7710 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7711 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7713 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7714 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7715 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7716 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7721 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7722 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7727 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7728 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7731 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7732 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7733 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7739 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7743 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7744 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7745 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7746 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7747 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7748 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7749 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7753 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7754 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7755 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7756 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7757 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7763 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7764 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7765 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7766 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7767 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7768 let mut has_update = false;
7769 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7771 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7773 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7774 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7775 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7776 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7777 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7779 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7780 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7781 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7782 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7783 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7785 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7786 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7789 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7790 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7791 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7793 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7794 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7795 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7796 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7797 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
7798 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7803 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7804 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7805 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7811 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7812 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7817 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7823 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7824 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7827 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7828 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7834 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7835 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7837 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7838 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7839 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7840 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7841 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7842 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7843 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7844 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7845 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7846 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7847 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7848 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7849 assert!(should_broadcast);
7850 } else { unreachable!(); }
7851 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7852 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7853 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
7856 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7861 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
7862 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7863 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7864 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7868 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
7869 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7870 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7871 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7872 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7874 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
7878 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7883 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
7885 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7887 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7888 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7889 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7890 &$self, description: String
7891 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7892 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
7893 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
7894 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
7895 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
7897 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7898 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
7899 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
7901 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
7908 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
7909 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7910 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7914 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7915 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7917 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7918 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7919 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7922 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7923 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7924 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7926 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7927 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7931 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
7932 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7933 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7934 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7935 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7937 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
7941 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7942 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7947 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7948 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
7949 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
7951 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7953 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7954 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7955 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7956 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7957 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7958 &$self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7959 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7960 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7961 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
7962 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
7963 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
7964 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
7966 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7967 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7968 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7970 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
7971 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7974 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
7976 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7977 $self.pending_outbound_payments
7978 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7979 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7981 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7987 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7989 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7990 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7991 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7992 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7993 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7994 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7998 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
7999 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
8000 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8001 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
8004 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8006 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8008 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
8009 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
8010 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
8012 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
8013 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
8014 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
8015 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
8016 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
8017 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
8018 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
8020 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8021 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8025 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
8026 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
8029 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8030 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
8031 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8035 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
8036 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
8037 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
8038 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8042 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
8043 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
8044 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8049 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8050 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
8051 /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
8052 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
8055 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8056 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
8057 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
8058 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
8059 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8060 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8061 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8062 pub fn pay_for_offer(
8063 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
8064 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
8065 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8066 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8067 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8068 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8069 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8071 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
8072 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
8074 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
8076 let builder = match quantity {
8078 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
8080 let builder = match amount_msats {
8082 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
8084 let builder = match payer_note {
8086 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
8088 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
8089 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8091 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8093 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
8094 self.pending_outbound_payments
8095 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8096 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
8098 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8100 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8101 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
8102 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8103 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
8104 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
8107 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8109 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
8110 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
8111 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
8112 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
8113 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
8114 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8115 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
8116 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8117 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8119 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8126 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
8129 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
8130 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
8131 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
8135 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
8136 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
8137 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
8138 /// received and no retries will be made.
8143 /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
8144 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
8147 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8148 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8149 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8150 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8151 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8153 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
8154 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8156 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
8157 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
8160 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8162 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
8163 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8164 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
8165 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8167 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8168 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
8169 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
8171 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8172 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8173 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8175 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8176 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8177 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
8179 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
8180 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
8181 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
8182 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8184 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8185 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
8186 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8187 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
8188 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
8191 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8193 for path in refund.paths() {
8194 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8195 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8196 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8197 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8199 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8205 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
8209 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
8212 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
8213 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
8215 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
8216 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
8217 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
8218 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8220 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8222 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8223 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8227 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8228 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8230 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8232 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8233 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8235 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8236 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8237 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8238 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
8239 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
8240 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8241 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8242 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8243 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8244 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8245 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8248 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8249 /// stored external to LDK.
8251 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8252 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8253 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8255 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8256 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8259 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8260 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8261 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8262 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8264 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8265 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8266 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8267 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8268 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8270 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8271 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8272 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8273 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8274 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8276 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8277 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8279 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8280 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8284 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8285 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8287 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8289 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8290 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8292 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8293 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8294 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8295 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8296 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8297 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8298 min_final_cltv_expiry)
8301 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8302 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8304 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8305 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
8306 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
8309 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
8311 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8312 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8313 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8314 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8316 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8318 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8319 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
8320 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8323 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8324 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8327 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
8328 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
8329 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
8330 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
8331 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
8332 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8334 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
8335 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
8336 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
8337 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8338 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
8340 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
8342 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
8345 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8346 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
8350 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
8351 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
8353 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8354 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8355 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8356 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8358 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8359 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8360 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
8361 Some(_) => continue,
8362 None => return scid_candidate
8367 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
8369 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8370 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
8372 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
8373 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
8374 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
8378 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
8379 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8380 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8382 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8383 /// times to get a unique scid.
8384 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8385 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8386 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8388 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8389 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8390 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8391 return scid_candidate
8395 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8396 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8397 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8398 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8400 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8401 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8402 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8403 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8404 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8405 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8407 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8408 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8409 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8418 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8419 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8420 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8421 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8422 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8426 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8427 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8428 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8429 events.push_back((event, None));
8433 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8434 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8435 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8439 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8440 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8444 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8445 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8448 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8449 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8450 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8451 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8452 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
8453 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
8454 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8456 let logger = WithContext::from(
8457 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
8460 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8461 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8462 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8463 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8464 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8465 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8466 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8467 .get_mut(&channel_id)
8469 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8473 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8474 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
8475 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8476 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8477 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8478 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8483 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
8485 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8486 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8487 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8488 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8490 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8491 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8492 if further_update_exists {
8493 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8498 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8505 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8506 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8512 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8513 for action in actions {
8515 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8516 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
8518 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8524 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8525 /// using the given event handler.
8527 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8528 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8532 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8536 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8538 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8539 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8540 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8541 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8542 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8543 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8547 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8548 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8549 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8550 /// is always placed next to each other.
8552 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8553 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8554 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8555 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8557 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8558 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be placed among
8559 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8560 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8561 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8562 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8563 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8565 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8566 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8567 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8568 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8571 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8572 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8574 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8575 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8578 let mut is_any_peer_connected = false;
8579 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8580 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8581 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8582 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8583 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8584 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8585 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8587 if peer_state.is_connected {
8588 is_any_peer_connected = true
8592 // Ensure that we are connected to some peers before getting broadcast messages.
8593 if is_any_peer_connected {
8594 let mut broadcast_msgs = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8595 pending_events.append(&mut broadcast_msgs);
8598 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8599 events.replace(pending_events);
8608 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8610 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8611 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8612 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8613 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8614 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8615 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8619 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8621 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8622 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8623 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8625 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8629 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8631 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8632 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8633 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8634 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8635 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8636 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8640 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8642 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8643 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
8644 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8645 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
8646 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8649 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8650 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8653 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8654 let _persistence_guard =
8655 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8656 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8657 let new_height = height - 1;
8659 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8660 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
8661 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8662 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
8663 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8664 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8667 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8671 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8673 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8674 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8675 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8676 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8677 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8678 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8682 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8683 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8684 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8685 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8687 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8688 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8690 let _persistence_guard =
8691 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8692 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8693 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8694 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8696 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8697 if height < last_best_block_height {
8698 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8699 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8703 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8704 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8705 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8706 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8708 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8709 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8711 let _persistence_guard =
8712 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8713 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8714 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8716 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8718 macro_rules! max_time {
8719 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8721 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8722 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8723 // having an explicit local time source.
8724 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8725 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8726 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8727 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8728 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8734 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8735 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8736 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8737 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8741 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8742 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8743 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8744 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8745 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8746 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8747 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8748 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8749 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8750 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8751 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8758 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8759 let _persistence_guard =
8760 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8761 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8762 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8763 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8764 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8765 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8766 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8767 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8772 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8774 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8775 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8776 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8777 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8778 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8779 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8783 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8784 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8786 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8787 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8788 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8789 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8790 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8792 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8793 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8795 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8796 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8797 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8798 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8799 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8801 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8803 // Retain unfunded channels.
8804 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8805 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
8806 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
8807 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
8808 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8809 let res = f(channel);
8810 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8811 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8812 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8813 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8814 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8816 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8817 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8818 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8819 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8820 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8821 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8822 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8823 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8828 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8833 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8834 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8837 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8838 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8839 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8840 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8841 msg: announcement_sigs,
8843 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8844 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8845 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8847 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8848 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8849 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8854 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8855 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8856 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8857 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8858 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8859 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8860 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8861 // is always consistent.
8862 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8863 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8864 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8865 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8866 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8869 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8870 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8871 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8872 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8873 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8874 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
8875 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8876 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8877 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8881 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8882 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8883 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8884 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8885 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8886 data: reason_message,
8899 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8900 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8901 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8902 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8903 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8904 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8905 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8906 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8907 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8908 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8910 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8911 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8912 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8916 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8919 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8920 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8921 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8922 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8923 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8924 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8925 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8926 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8927 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8928 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8929 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
8930 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8933 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8934 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8935 _ => unreachable!(),
8937 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8938 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8939 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8940 let logger = WithContext::from(
8941 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id)
8943 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8949 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8951 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8952 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8956 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8957 /// may have events that need processing.
8959 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8960 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8962 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8963 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8964 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8965 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8968 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8969 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8970 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8973 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8974 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8975 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8978 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8979 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8980 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8981 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8984 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8985 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8986 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8987 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8990 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8991 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8993 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8994 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8995 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8996 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8997 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9000 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9001 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9002 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9003 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9006 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9007 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9008 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
9009 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
9012 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9013 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9014 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9015 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
9018 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9019 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9020 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
9021 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9025 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9026 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9028 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9029 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9030 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9031 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9032 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9033 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9037 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
9038 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9039 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9040 // change to the contents.
9041 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9042 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9043 let persist = match &res {
9044 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
9045 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
9046 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9048 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9050 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9055 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
9056 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9057 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9058 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9061 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
9062 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9063 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9064 // change to the contents.
9065 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9066 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9067 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
9071 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
9072 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9073 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9074 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9077 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
9078 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9079 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9082 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
9083 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9084 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9087 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
9088 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9089 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
9090 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
9091 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
9092 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9093 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9094 let persist = match &res {
9095 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9096 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9098 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9103 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
9104 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9105 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
9106 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9109 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
9110 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9111 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
9112 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9115 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
9116 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9117 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
9118 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9121 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
9122 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9123 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
9124 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9127 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
9128 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9129 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9132 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
9133 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9134 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9137 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
9138 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9139 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9140 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9141 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9142 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9143 let persist = match &res {
9144 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9145 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9146 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9148 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9153 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
9154 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9155 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9158 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
9159 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9160 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9161 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9162 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9163 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9164 let persist = match &res {
9165 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9166 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9167 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9169 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9174 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
9175 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9176 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
9177 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9178 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9179 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9180 let persist = match &res {
9181 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9182 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9183 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9185 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9190 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
9191 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9192 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9195 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
9196 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9197 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9200 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
9201 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9202 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9203 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9204 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9205 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9206 let persist = match &res {
9207 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9208 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9209 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9211 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9216 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
9217 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9218 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9221 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
9222 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9223 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
9226 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9231 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9232 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9233 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9234 let persist = match &res {
9235 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9236 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9237 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9239 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9244 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9245 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9246 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9247 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9248 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9251 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
9252 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9253 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9255 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9256 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9257 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9258 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9259 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9260 let context = match phase {
9261 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9262 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9263 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9264 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9269 // We retain UnfundedOutboundV1 channel for some time in case
9270 // peer unexpectedly disconnects, and intends to reconnect again.
9271 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
9274 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9275 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9278 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9279 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9282 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9283 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9287 // Clean up for removal.
9288 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
9289 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
9292 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9293 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9294 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9295 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
9297 // V1 Channel Establishment
9298 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
9299 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
9300 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
9301 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
9302 // V2 Channel Establishment
9303 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9304 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9305 // Common Channel Establishment
9306 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
9307 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
9309 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
9311 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
9312 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
9313 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
9314 // Interactive Transaction Construction
9315 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
9316 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
9317 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
9318 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
9319 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
9320 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
9321 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
9322 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
9323 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
9324 // Channel Operations
9325 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
9326 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
9327 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
9328 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
9329 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
9330 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
9332 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
9333 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9334 // [`ChannelManager::pending_broadcast_events`] holds the [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]
9335 // This check here is to ensure exhaustivity.
9336 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {
9337 debug_assert!(false, "This event shouldn't have been here");
9340 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9341 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
9342 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
9343 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
9344 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
9345 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
9348 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
9349 peer_state.is_connected = false;
9350 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
9351 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
9354 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
9356 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
9358 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
9359 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
9363 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
9364 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
9365 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
9366 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9370 let mut res = Ok(());
9372 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9373 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
9374 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
9375 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
9376 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
9377 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
9378 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
9381 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9382 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
9383 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
9384 if inbound_peer_limited {
9386 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9388 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
9389 channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9390 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9391 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
9392 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9393 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9394 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9395 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9399 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
9400 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
9401 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
9403 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9404 if inbound_peer_limited &&
9405 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
9406 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
9409 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9412 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
9413 peer_state.is_connected = true;
9418 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9420 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9421 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9422 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9423 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9424 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9426 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9428 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9429 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9430 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9431 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9432 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9436 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9437 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9438 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9439 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
9443 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9444 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9445 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9446 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9447 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9448 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
9452 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
9453 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9454 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9455 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9456 debug_assert!(false);
9459 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9460 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9461 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
9462 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9463 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9464 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9465 debug_assert!(false);
9471 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9472 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9477 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9478 match &msg.data as &str {
9479 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9480 "link failed to shutdown" =>
9482 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9483 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9484 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9485 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9486 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9487 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9488 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9489 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9490 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9492 || -> NotifyOption {
9493 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9494 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9495 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
9496 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9497 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9498 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9499 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9500 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9504 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9505 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9506 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9507 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9508 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9509 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9511 log_level: Level::Trace,
9514 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
9515 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
9516 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9518 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
9527 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9529 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9530 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9531 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9532 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9533 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9534 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9535 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9536 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9537 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9538 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9539 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9541 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9542 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9543 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9547 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9548 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9549 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9550 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9551 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9552 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9553 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9554 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
9555 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9556 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9557 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9563 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9564 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
9565 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9566 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9567 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9573 None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
9574 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9575 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
9579 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9580 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9584 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9585 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9588 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9589 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9592 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9593 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9596 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9597 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9598 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9599 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9602 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9603 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9604 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9605 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9608 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9609 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9610 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9611 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9614 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9615 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9616 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9617 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9620 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9621 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9622 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9623 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9626 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9627 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9628 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9629 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9632 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9633 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9634 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9635 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9638 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9639 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9640 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9641 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9644 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9645 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9646 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9647 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9651 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9652 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9654 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9655 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9656 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9657 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9658 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9659 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9663 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9664 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9665 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9668 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9669 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9672 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
9673 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9675 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9676 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9678 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9679 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9683 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9684 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
9685 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
9687 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
9689 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
9690 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9694 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9695 amount_msats, payment_secret
9697 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
9699 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
9700 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9704 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9705 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9706 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9709 if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
9710 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9711 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9712 payment_paths, payment_hash
9714 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9715 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9716 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9718 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey>, _> =
9719 builder.map(|b| b.into());
9720 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9721 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9722 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9725 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9726 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9727 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9728 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9729 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9731 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<ExplicitSigningPubkey>, _> =
9732 builder.map(|b| b.into());
9733 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9734 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9735 .and_then(|invoice| {
9737 let mut invoice = invoice;
9738 match invoice.sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
9739 self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
9741 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9742 Err(SignError::Signing) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9743 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9745 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9746 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9751 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9752 Err(error) => Some(error),
9756 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9757 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9759 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9761 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9762 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9765 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9766 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9767 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9774 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9775 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9781 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9782 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9786 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9787 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9788 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9789 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9790 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9794 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9795 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9797 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9798 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9799 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9800 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9801 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9804 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9805 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9806 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9807 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9810 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9811 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9812 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9813 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9816 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9817 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9818 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9819 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9822 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9823 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9824 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9825 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9826 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9827 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9828 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9829 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9830 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9831 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9832 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9833 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9834 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9835 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9836 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9837 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9838 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9839 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9840 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
9841 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9842 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9847 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9848 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9850 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9851 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9852 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9853 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9856 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9857 (2, node_id, required),
9858 (4, features, required),
9859 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9860 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9861 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9862 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9865 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9866 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9867 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9868 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9869 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9870 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9871 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9872 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9873 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9874 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9875 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9876 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9877 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9878 (7, self.config, option),
9879 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9880 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9881 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9882 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9883 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9884 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9885 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9886 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9887 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9888 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9889 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9890 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9891 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9892 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9893 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9894 (32, self.is_public, required),
9895 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9896 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9897 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9898 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9899 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9900 (43, self.pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9901 (45, self.pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9907 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9908 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9909 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9910 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9911 (2, channel_id, required),
9912 (3, channel_type, option),
9913 (4, counterparty, required),
9914 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9915 (6, funding_txo, option),
9916 (7, config, option),
9917 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9918 (9, confirmations, option),
9919 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9920 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9921 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9922 (16, balance_msat, required),
9923 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9924 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9925 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9926 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9927 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9928 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9929 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9930 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9931 (26, is_outbound, required),
9932 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9933 (30, is_usable, required),
9934 (32, is_public, required),
9935 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9936 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9937 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9938 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9939 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9940 (43, pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9941 (45, pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9944 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9945 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9946 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9947 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9948 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9952 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9954 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9955 outbound_scid_alias,
9959 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9960 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9962 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9963 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9964 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9965 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9966 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9967 confirmations_required,
9969 force_close_spend_delay,
9970 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9971 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9972 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9973 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9974 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9975 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9976 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9977 channel_shutdown_state,
9978 pending_inbound_htlcs: pending_inbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9979 pending_outbound_htlcs: pending_outbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9984 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9985 (2, channels, required_vec),
9986 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9987 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9990 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9991 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9992 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
9995 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9997 (0, onion_packet, required),
9998 (1, blinded, option),
9999 (2, short_channel_id, required),
10002 (0, payment_data, required),
10003 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10004 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10005 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10006 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10007 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10009 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
10010 (0, payment_preimage, required),
10011 (1, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10012 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10013 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10014 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
10015 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10019 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
10020 (0, routing, required),
10021 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
10022 (4, payment_hash, required),
10023 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
10024 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
10025 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
10026 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10030 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10031 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10033 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
10034 0u8.write(writer)?;
10035 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10036 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10037 reason.write(writer)?;
10039 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10040 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
10042 1u8.write(writer)?;
10043 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10044 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10045 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
10046 failure_code.write(writer)?;
10053 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10054 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10055 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10058 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
10059 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10060 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10061 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
10065 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10066 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10067 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10068 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
10069 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
10072 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
10073 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
10074 // messages contained in the variants.
10075 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
10076 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
10077 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
10079 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10080 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10081 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10082 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10083 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
10086 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10087 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10088 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10089 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10090 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
10092 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10097 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
10102 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
10103 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
10104 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
10107 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
10108 (0, short_channel_id, required),
10109 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10110 (2, outpoint, required),
10111 (3, blinded_failure, option),
10112 (4, htlc_id, required),
10113 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
10114 (7, user_channel_id, option),
10115 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
10116 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10117 (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10120 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
10121 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10122 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
10123 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
10124 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
10126 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10127 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
10128 (1, self.total_msat, required),
10129 (2, self.value, required),
10130 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
10131 (4, payment_data, option),
10132 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
10133 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
10134 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10135 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10141 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
10142 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10143 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10144 (0, prev_hop, required),
10145 (1, total_msat, option),
10146 (2, value_ser, required),
10147 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
10148 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
10149 (5, total_value_received, option),
10150 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
10151 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10152 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10154 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
10155 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
10156 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
10158 if payment_data.is_some() {
10159 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10161 if total_msat.is_none() {
10162 total_msat = Some(value);
10164 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
10167 if total_msat.is_none() {
10168 if payment_data.is_none() {
10169 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10171 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
10173 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
10177 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
10180 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
10181 total_value_received,
10182 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
10184 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
10185 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
10190 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
10191 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10192 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10195 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
10196 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
10197 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
10198 let mut payment_id = None;
10199 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
10200 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
10201 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10202 (0, session_priv, required),
10203 (1, payment_id, option),
10204 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10205 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
10206 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
10207 (6, blinded_tail, option),
10209 if payment_id.is_none() {
10210 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
10212 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
10214 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
10215 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
10216 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10218 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
10219 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
10220 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
10221 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10225 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10226 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
10227 first_hop_htlc_msat,
10229 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
10232 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
10233 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10238 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10239 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10241 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10242 0u8.write(writer)?;
10243 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10244 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10245 (0, session_priv, required),
10246 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10247 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10248 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10249 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10250 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10251 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10254 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10255 1u8.write(writer)?;
10256 field.write(writer)?;
10263 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
10264 (0, forward_info, required),
10265 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
10266 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
10267 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
10268 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
10269 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
10270 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10271 (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10274 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10275 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10276 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
10278 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
10282 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
10283 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10284 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10285 (0, htlc_id, required),
10286 (2, err_packet, required),
10289 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
10290 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
10291 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
10292 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
10293 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10294 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
10295 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10296 (0, htlc_id, required),
10297 (1, failure_code, required),
10298 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
10299 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
10307 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10308 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10309 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
10311 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
10313 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
10314 (0, htlc_id, required),
10315 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
10316 (2, err_packet, required),
10317 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
10319 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
10320 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
10321 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10323 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
10327 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10328 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
10332 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10337 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
10338 (0, payment_secret, required),
10339 (2, expiry_time, required),
10340 (4, user_payment_id, required),
10341 (6, payment_preimage, required),
10342 (8, min_value_msat, required),
10345 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10347 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10348 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10349 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10350 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10351 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10352 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10356 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10357 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
10359 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10361 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
10363 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
10364 best_block.height.write(writer)?;
10365 best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
10368 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
10370 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10371 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
10372 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10373 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10374 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10375 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10376 serializable_peer_count += 1;
10379 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
10380 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
10384 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
10386 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10387 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10388 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10389 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
10390 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
10391 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
10394 channel.write(writer)?;
10400 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10401 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10402 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
10403 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
10404 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10405 for forward in pending_forwards {
10406 forward.write(writer)?;
10411 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = None;
10412 let decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10413 if !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() {
10414 decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = Some(decode_update_add_htlcs);
10417 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10419 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10420 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
10421 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10423 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
10424 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
10425 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10426 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
10427 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
10428 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10429 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
10430 htlc.write(writer)?;
10432 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
10433 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
10436 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
10437 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
10438 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10439 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
10440 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
10441 // per_peer_state lock at all.
10442 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
10445 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
10446 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10447 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
10448 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
10449 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
10451 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10452 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
10453 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
10454 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
10455 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
10456 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
10457 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
10462 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
10463 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
10464 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
10465 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
10466 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
10467 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
10468 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
10469 // well save the space and not write any events here.
10470 0u64.write(writer)?;
10472 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10473 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
10474 event.write(writer)?;
10478 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
10479 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
10480 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
10481 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
10482 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
10483 0u64.write(writer)?;
10485 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
10486 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
10487 // likely to be identical.
10488 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10489 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10491 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10492 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
10493 hash.write(writer)?;
10494 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
10497 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
10498 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
10499 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10500 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
10501 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
10504 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
10505 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10507 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10508 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10509 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10510 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10513 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10514 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10515 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10516 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10520 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10521 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
10522 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10524 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10525 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10526 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10532 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10533 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10534 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10535 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10538 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10539 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10540 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10541 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10542 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10545 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10546 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10547 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10548 if !updates.is_empty() {
10549 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
10550 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10555 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10556 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10557 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10558 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10559 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10560 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10561 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10562 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10563 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10564 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10565 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10566 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10567 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10568 (14, decode_update_add_htlcs_opt, option),
10575 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10576 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10577 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10578 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10581 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10582 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10583 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10584 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10585 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10586 // check that the event is sane here.
10587 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10588 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10589 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10590 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10596 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10597 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10598 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10599 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10600 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10601 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10604 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10605 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10606 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10607 events.push_back((ev, action));
10608 } else if action.is_some() {
10609 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10616 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10617 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10618 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10619 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10620 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10621 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10624 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10626 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10628 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10629 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10630 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10631 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10632 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10633 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10634 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10635 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10636 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10637 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10638 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10639 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10640 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10642 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10643 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10645 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10646 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10648 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10649 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10650 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10651 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10652 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10653 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10655 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10656 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10658 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10659 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10660 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10661 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10662 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10663 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10667 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
10668 pub entropy_source: ES,
10670 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
10671 pub node_signer: NS,
10673 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
10674 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
10676 pub signer_provider: SP,
10678 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10680 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
10681 pub fee_estimator: F,
10682 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10684 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
10685 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
10686 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
10687 pub chain_monitor: M,
10689 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
10690 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
10691 /// force-closed during deserialization.
10692 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
10693 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10694 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10696 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10698 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10699 /// deserialization.
10701 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10702 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10703 pub default_config: UserConfig,
10705 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10706 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10708 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10709 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10710 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10711 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10713 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10716 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10717 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10720 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10721 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10723 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10724 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10725 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10726 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10727 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10728 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10732 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10733 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10734 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10735 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10736 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10738 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10739 channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
10740 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
10746 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10747 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10748 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10749 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10751 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10752 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10753 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10754 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10755 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10756 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10760 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10761 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10762 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10766 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10767 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10769 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10770 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10771 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10772 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10773 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10774 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10778 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10779 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10781 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10782 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10783 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10785 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10787 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10788 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10789 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10790 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10791 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10792 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10793 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10794 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
10795 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10796 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10797 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10799 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10800 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10801 funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
10802 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10803 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10804 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10805 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10806 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10807 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10808 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10809 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10810 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10811 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10812 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10813 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10815 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10816 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10817 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10819 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10820 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10821 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10823 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10824 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10825 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10827 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
10828 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10829 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10831 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10832 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10833 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
10836 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10837 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10838 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10839 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10840 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10841 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10842 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10843 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10845 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10846 let mut found_htlc = false;
10847 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10848 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10851 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10852 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10853 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10854 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10855 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10856 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10857 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10859 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10860 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10861 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10865 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10866 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10867 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10868 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10869 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10871 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
10872 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10874 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10875 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10876 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10877 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10879 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10880 let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
10881 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10882 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10886 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10887 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10888 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10889 // safely discard the channel.
10890 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
10891 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10892 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10893 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10894 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10895 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10896 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10897 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10900 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10901 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10902 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10903 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10904 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10905 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10909 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10910 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10911 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10912 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
10913 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10915 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10916 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10917 counterparty_node_id: None,
10918 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10919 channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
10921 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
10925 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10926 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10927 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10928 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10929 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10930 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10931 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10932 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10933 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10935 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10938 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10939 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10940 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10941 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10942 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10943 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10944 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10945 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10947 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10950 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10953 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10954 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10955 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10956 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10957 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10958 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10959 is_connected: false,
10963 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10964 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10965 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10966 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10967 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
10968 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10969 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10970 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10973 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10974 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10975 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10976 for _ in 0..event_count {
10977 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10978 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10983 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10984 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10985 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10987 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10988 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10989 // on-startup monitor updates.
10990 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10991 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10993 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10997 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10998 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11000 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11001 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
11002 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
11003 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
11004 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11008 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11009 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
11010 hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
11011 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
11012 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
11013 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
11014 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
11016 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
11017 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11021 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
11022 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
11023 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
11024 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
11025 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
11026 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11027 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11028 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
11029 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
11030 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
11031 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
11032 let mut events_override = None;
11033 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11034 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs: Option<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>> = None;
11035 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
11036 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
11037 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11038 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
11039 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11040 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
11041 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11042 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
11043 (8, events_override, option),
11044 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
11045 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11046 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
11047 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11048 (14, decode_update_add_htlcs, option),
11050 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = decode_update_add_htlcs.unwrap_or_else(|| new_hash_map());
11051 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
11052 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11055 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
11056 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11059 if let Some(events) = events_override {
11060 pending_events_read = events;
11063 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
11064 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
11067 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
11068 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
11069 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
11070 let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
11071 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
11072 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
11074 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
11076 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
11077 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
11078 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
11081 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
11082 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
11083 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
11084 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
11085 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
11087 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
11088 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
11089 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
11091 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
11092 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
11093 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
11094 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
11095 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
11097 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
11098 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11099 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
11100 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
11101 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
11102 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
11103 pending_background_events.push(
11104 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11105 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11106 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
11107 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11108 update: update.clone(),
11111 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
11112 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
11113 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
11114 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
11115 pending_background_events.push(
11116 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
11117 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11118 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11121 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
11122 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
11123 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11125 max_in_flight_update_id
11129 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11130 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
11131 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11132 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
11133 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11134 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11136 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
11138 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11139 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
11140 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
11141 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
11142 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
11143 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
11144 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
11145 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
11146 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
11149 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
11150 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return DangerousValue:
11151 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11152 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
11153 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
11154 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
11155 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11156 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11157 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11158 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11159 return Err(DecodeError::DangerousValue);
11162 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11163 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11164 debug_assert!(false);
11165 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11170 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
11171 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
11172 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
11173 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id);
11174 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
11175 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
11176 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
11177 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
11178 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
11179 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
11181 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11182 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
11183 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
11185 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11186 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
11187 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
11188 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11189 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11190 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11191 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11192 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11197 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
11198 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
11200 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
11201 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
11202 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
11203 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
11206 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
11207 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
11208 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
11209 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
11210 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
11211 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
11212 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
11214 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11215 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
11216 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
11217 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11218 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
11219 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
11220 if path.hops.is_empty() {
11221 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
11222 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11225 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
11226 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
11227 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
11228 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
11229 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11230 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
11231 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
11232 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
11234 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11235 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
11236 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
11237 retry_strategy: None,
11238 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
11239 payment_params: None,
11240 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
11241 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
11242 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11243 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11244 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11245 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11246 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11247 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11248 total_msat: path_amt,
11249 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11250 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11252 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11253 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
11258 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11259 match htlc_source {
11260 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
11261 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
11262 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
11263 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
11265 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
11266 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
11267 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
11268 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
11269 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
11270 decode_update_add_htlcs.retain(|scid, update_add_htlcs| {
11271 update_add_htlcs.retain(|update_add_htlc| {
11272 let matches = *scid == prev_hop_data.short_channel_id &&
11273 update_add_htlc.htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id;
11275 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-decode HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11276 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11280 !update_add_htlcs.is_empty()
11282 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
11283 forwards.retain(|forward| {
11284 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
11285 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11286 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11287 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11292 !forwards.is_empty()
11294 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
11295 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11296 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11297 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11298 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
11299 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
11300 intercepted_id != ev_id
11307 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
11308 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
11309 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
11310 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
11311 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
11312 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
11313 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
11314 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
11315 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
11316 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
11317 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
11319 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
11320 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
11321 channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
11322 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
11324 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
11325 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
11326 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
11333 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
11334 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
11336 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
11338 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
11339 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
11340 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
11341 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
11342 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
11343 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
11344 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
11345 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
11346 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11347 monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
11350 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
11351 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
11352 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
11353 // channel still live case here.
11357 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
11358 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
11363 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
11364 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
11365 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
11366 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
11367 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
11368 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
11369 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
11370 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
11374 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
11375 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
11377 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
11378 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
11379 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11380 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11382 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
11383 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11384 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11386 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
11387 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
11389 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11390 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
11392 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11395 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
11396 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11397 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11399 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11403 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
11404 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
11405 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
11406 if htlcs.is_empty() {
11407 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11409 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
11410 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
11411 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
11412 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
11413 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
11414 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
11415 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
11416 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
11418 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
11419 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11423 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
11425 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11427 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
11428 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
11430 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11431 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11436 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11437 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11439 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
11441 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11443 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
11444 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
11445 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
11446 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11450 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
11451 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11452 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11453 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11454 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
11455 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11456 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11457 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
11458 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
11460 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
11461 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
11462 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
11464 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
11465 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
11466 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11467 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11468 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11469 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11471 if chan.context.is_usable() {
11472 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
11473 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11474 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11475 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11476 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11480 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11481 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11482 debug_assert!(false);
11483 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11488 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
11490 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11491 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
11492 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
11493 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
11494 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
11495 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
11496 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
11497 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
11498 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
11499 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
11500 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
11502 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
11503 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
11505 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
11506 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
11507 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
11508 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
11510 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
11511 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
11512 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
11513 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
11515 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
11516 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
11517 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
11518 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
11520 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
11521 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11522 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
11523 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11524 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11525 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
11526 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11527 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
11530 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11531 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
11534 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11537 purpose: payment.purpose,
11538 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11539 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11540 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11546 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11547 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11548 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11549 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
11550 for action in actions.iter() {
11551 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11552 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11553 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
11555 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
11557 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11558 blocked_channel_id);
11559 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11560 .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
11561 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11563 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11564 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11565 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11566 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11570 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11571 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11575 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11577 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11578 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11582 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
11584 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
11585 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
11586 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
11587 router: args.router,
11589 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
11591 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
11592 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
11593 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
11594 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
11596 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
11597 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(decode_update_add_htlcs),
11598 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
11599 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
11600 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
11601 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
11602 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
11604 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
11606 our_network_pubkey,
11609 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
11611 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
11613 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
11614 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
11615 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
11616 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
11617 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
11619 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
11620 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
11622 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11624 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11626 pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11628 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11629 node_signer: args.node_signer,
11630 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11632 logger: args.logger,
11633 default_configuration: args.default_config,
11636 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11637 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11638 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11639 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11640 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11643 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11644 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11645 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11646 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11647 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
11648 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding,
11649 downstream_channel_id, None
11653 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11654 //connection or two.
11656 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11662 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11663 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11664 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11665 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11666 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11667 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11668 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11669 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11670 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11671 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11672 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11673 use crate::prelude::*;
11674 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
11675 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11676 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
11677 use crate::util::test_utils;
11678 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11679 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11682 fn test_notify_limits() {
11683 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
11684 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
11685 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11686 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11687 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11688 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11690 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
11691 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
11692 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11693 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11694 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11696 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11698 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
11699 // to connect messages with new values
11700 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11701 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11702 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11703 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11704 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11705 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11707 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
11708 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11709 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11710 // ... but the last node should not.
11711 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11712 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
11713 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11714 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11716 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
11717 // about the channel.
11718 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11719 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11720 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11722 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
11724 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11725 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11726 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11727 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11728 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11729 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11731 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11732 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11733 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11735 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11736 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11737 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11738 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11739 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11740 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11742 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11743 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11744 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11745 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11746 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11747 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11748 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11749 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11751 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11752 // the channel info has updated.
11753 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11754 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11755 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11756 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11757 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11758 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11762 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11763 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11765 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11766 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11767 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11768 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11769 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11771 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11772 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11773 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11774 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11776 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11777 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11778 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11779 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11780 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11781 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11782 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11783 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11784 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11785 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11786 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11787 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11789 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11790 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11791 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11792 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11793 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11794 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11795 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11796 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11797 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11798 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11799 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11800 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11801 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11803 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11804 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11805 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11806 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11807 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11808 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11809 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11810 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11811 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11813 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11814 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11815 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11816 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11817 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11818 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11819 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11821 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11822 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11823 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11824 // lightning messages manually.
11825 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11826 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11827 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11829 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11830 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11831 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11832 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11833 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11834 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11835 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11836 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11837 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11838 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11839 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11840 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11841 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11842 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11843 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11844 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11845 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11846 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11847 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11848 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11849 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11850 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11851 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11852 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11853 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11854 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11856 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11857 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11858 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11859 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11861 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11862 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11863 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11864 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11866 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11869 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11870 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11871 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11872 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11874 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11879 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11880 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11881 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11884 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11885 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11886 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11887 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11888 // fails as expected.
11889 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11890 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11891 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11892 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11893 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11894 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11895 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11896 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11897 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11898 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11899 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11900 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11901 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11902 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11903 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11905 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11906 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11907 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11909 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11910 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11911 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11912 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11913 let route = find_route(
11914 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11915 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11917 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11918 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11919 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11920 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11921 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11922 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11923 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11924 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11926 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11927 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11928 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11929 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11930 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11931 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11932 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11933 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11934 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11935 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11936 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11937 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11938 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11939 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11940 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11942 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11943 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11945 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11946 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11947 let route = find_route(
11948 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11949 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11951 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11952 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11954 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11955 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11956 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11957 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11958 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11960 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11961 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11962 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11963 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11964 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11965 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11966 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11967 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11968 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11969 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11971 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11972 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11973 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11974 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11975 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11976 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11977 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11978 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11979 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11980 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11981 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11982 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11983 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11985 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11986 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11988 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11989 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11990 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11991 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11992 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11993 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11994 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11995 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11996 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11997 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11999 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12000 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12001 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
12004 let route = find_route(
12005 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12006 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12008 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
12009 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12010 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
12011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12012 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12013 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12014 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12015 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12016 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12017 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12018 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12019 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12020 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12021 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12022 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12023 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12024 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12025 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12026 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12027 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12028 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12029 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12030 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12032 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12033 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12037 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
12038 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
12039 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
12040 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12041 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12042 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12043 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12045 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12046 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12048 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12049 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12050 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12051 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12052 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12053 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12054 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12055 let route = find_route(
12056 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12057 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12060 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12061 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
12062 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
12063 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12064 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
12065 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12068 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12069 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12070 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12071 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12072 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12073 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12074 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12076 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
12080 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
12081 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
12082 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
12083 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12084 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
12085 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12086 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12087 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12088 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12090 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12091 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12093 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12094 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12095 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12096 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12097 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12098 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12099 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12100 let route = find_route(
12101 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12102 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12105 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12106 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12107 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
12108 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
12109 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12110 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
12111 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
12112 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12113 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12115 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12116 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12117 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12118 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12119 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12120 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12121 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12123 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
12127 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
12128 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
12129 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
12130 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
12131 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12133 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12134 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12135 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12136 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12138 // Marshall an MPP route.
12139 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
12140 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
12141 route.paths.push(path);
12142 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12143 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
12144 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
12145 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
12146 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
12147 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
12149 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12150 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
12152 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
12153 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
12155 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
12160 fn test_channel_update_cached() {
12161 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12162 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12163 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12164 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12166 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12168 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, true).unwrap();
12169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12170 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12172 // Confirm that the channel_update was not sent immediately to node[1] but was cached.
12173 let node_1_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12174 assert_eq!(node_1_events.len(), 0);
12177 // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been added to node[0] pending broadcast messages
12178 let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12179 assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 1);
12182 // Test that we do not retrieve the pending broadcast messages when we are not connected to any peer
12183 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12184 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12186 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
12187 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12189 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12190 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 0);
12192 // Now we reconnect to a peer
12193 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12194 features: nodes[2].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12196 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12197 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12198 }, false).unwrap();
12200 // Confirm that get_and_clear_pending_msg_events correctly captures pending broadcast messages
12201 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12202 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 1);
12203 match &node_0_events[0] {
12204 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => (),
12205 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12208 // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been cleared from nodes[0] pending broadcast messages
12209 let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12210 assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 0);
12215 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
12216 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12217 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12218 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12219 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12221 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12223 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12224 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12226 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12227 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
12228 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12229 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12232 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
12233 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
12234 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
12235 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
12236 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
12237 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
12240 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
12243 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
12244 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
12249 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
12250 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
12251 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12252 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12253 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12254 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12256 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
12257 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12259 total_msat: 100_000,
12262 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
12263 // payment verification fails as expected.
12264 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
12265 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
12266 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
12267 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
12269 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
12273 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
12274 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
12278 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
12279 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
12280 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
12281 // the channel is successfully closed.
12282 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12283 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12284 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12285 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12287 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12288 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12289 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
12290 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12291 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12293 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
12294 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
12296 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
12297 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
12298 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12299 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12302 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12304 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
12305 // as it has the funding transaction.
12306 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12307 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12308 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12311 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12313 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12315 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12317 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12318 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12319 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12321 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12324 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
12325 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
12326 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12327 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12328 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12330 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12331 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12332 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12334 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12335 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
12336 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
12337 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
12339 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12340 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
12341 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12342 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
12344 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12345 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
12347 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
12348 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
12349 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
12350 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
12351 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12352 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12353 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12357 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
12358 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
12359 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
12360 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
12361 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12362 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12363 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12366 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
12368 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
12369 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
12370 // closing transaction).
12371 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
12372 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
12373 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12375 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
12376 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
12377 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12378 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12379 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12382 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12384 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
12386 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
12387 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
12388 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12390 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12392 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12393 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12396 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12397 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
12398 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12401 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12402 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
12403 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12406 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
12407 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
12408 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12411 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12412 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
12413 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12416 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12418 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
12419 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12421 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
12422 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12424 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
12425 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
12430 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
12431 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
12432 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
12433 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
12434 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12435 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12436 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12437 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12440 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12441 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
12442 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
12444 // Test the API functions.
12445 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
12447 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
12449 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12451 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12453 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12455 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
12457 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
12461 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
12462 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
12463 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
12464 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
12465 // the given `channel_id`.
12466 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12467 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12468 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12469 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12471 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12474 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12476 // Test the API functions.
12477 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
12479 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12481 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12483 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12485 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12487 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12491 fn test_connection_limiting() {
12492 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
12493 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12494 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12495 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12496 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12498 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12500 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12501 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12503 let mut funding_tx = None;
12504 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12505 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12506 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12509 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12510 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
12511 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
12512 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
12513 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12515 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12516 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12517 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12519 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12521 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12523 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12525 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12528 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
12529 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
12530 &nodes[0].keys_manager);
12531 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12532 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12533 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12535 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
12536 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
12538 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
12539 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
12540 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12541 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12542 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
12543 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12544 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12547 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12548 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12549 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12550 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12551 }, true).unwrap_err();
12553 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
12554 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
12555 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12556 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12557 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
12558 for ev in chan_closed_events {
12559 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
12561 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12562 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12564 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12565 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12566 }, true).unwrap_err();
12568 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
12569 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12570 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12571 }, false).unwrap();
12572 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12574 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
12575 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
12577 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
12578 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12579 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
12580 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
12581 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12583 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12584 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12585 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12587 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
12588 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12589 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
12591 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
12592 // "protected" and can connect again.
12593 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
12594 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12595 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12597 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12599 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
12601 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12602 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12606 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
12607 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
12608 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12609 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12610 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12611 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12613 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12615 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12616 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12618 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12619 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12620 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12621 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12624 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
12626 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12627 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12628 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12630 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
12631 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12632 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12634 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
12635 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12636 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12637 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12641 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
12642 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12643 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12644 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12645 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12646 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
12647 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12648 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
12649 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12651 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12653 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12654 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12656 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
12657 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12658 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12659 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12660 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12661 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12664 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12665 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12667 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12668 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12670 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12672 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
12673 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12676 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
12677 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12678 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12679 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12680 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12682 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12683 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12685 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12686 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12687 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12688 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12692 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12694 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12695 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12697 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12698 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12699 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12701 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12702 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12704 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12706 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12710 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12711 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12712 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12713 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12714 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12715 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12716 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12717 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12718 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12719 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12720 payment_metadata: None,
12721 keysend_preimage: None,
12722 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12723 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12725 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12727 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12728 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12729 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12730 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
12731 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12732 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12733 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12735 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12736 } else { panic!(); }
12738 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
12739 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
12740 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12741 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12742 payment_metadata: None,
12743 keysend_preimage: None,
12744 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12745 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12747 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12749 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12750 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12751 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12752 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
12756 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
12757 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12758 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12759 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12760 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12762 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12763 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12764 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12765 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
12766 payment_metadata: None,
12767 keysend_preimage: None,
12768 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12769 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
12771 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12772 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
12773 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
12775 // Should not return an error as this condition:
12776 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
12777 // is not satisfied.
12778 assert!(result.is_ok());
12782 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12783 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12784 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12785 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12786 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12788 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12789 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12791 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12792 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12793 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12794 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12795 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12797 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12798 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12800 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12801 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12802 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12803 match &msg_events[0] {
12804 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12805 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12807 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12808 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12809 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12812 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12815 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12816 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12818 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12819 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12820 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12822 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12826 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12827 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12828 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12829 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12830 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12831 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12832 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12833 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12834 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12835 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12836 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12838 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12839 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12840 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12842 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12843 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12845 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12846 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12848 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12851 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12852 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12854 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12855 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12857 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12858 // not have generated any events.
12859 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12863 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12864 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12865 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12866 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12867 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12868 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12869 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12870 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12872 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12873 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12874 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12876 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12877 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12878 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12879 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12880 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12882 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12883 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12886 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12887 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12888 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12890 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12891 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12892 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12893 ..Default::default()
12895 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12896 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12897 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12899 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12900 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12903 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12904 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12905 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12906 ..Default::default()
12908 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12909 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12910 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12911 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12913 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12914 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12917 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12918 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12919 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12920 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12921 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12924 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12925 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12926 ..Default::default()
12928 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12931 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12932 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12933 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12934 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12938 fn test_payment_display() {
12939 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12940 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12941 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12942 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12943 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12944 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12948 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12949 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12950 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12951 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12952 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12953 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12955 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12956 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12957 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12958 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12959 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12960 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12961 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12962 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12964 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12965 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12966 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12969 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12970 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12972 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12973 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12975 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12976 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12977 }, false).unwrap();
12978 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12979 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12980 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12982 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12984 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12985 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12986 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12987 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12988 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12989 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12990 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12991 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12992 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12993 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12994 } else { panic!() };
12995 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12996 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12997 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12998 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
13000 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13002 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13003 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13004 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13009 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
13010 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
13011 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13012 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13015 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13016 let deserialized_chanmgr;
13017 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
13019 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13020 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
13022 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13023 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
13026 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13027 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
13028 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13030 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13034 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13035 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
13036 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13038 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13043 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
13044 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
13045 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
13046 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
13048 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13049 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
13050 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
13052 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
13054 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13055 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
13056 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
13057 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
13059 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
13060 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
13062 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
13068 use crate::chain::Listen;
13069 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
13070 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
13071 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
13072 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
13073 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
13074 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
13075 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
13076 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
13077 use crate::util::test_utils;
13078 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
13080 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
13081 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
13082 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
13083 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
13085 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
13087 use criterion::Criterion;
13089 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
13090 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
13091 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
13092 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
13093 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
13094 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
13095 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
13097 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
13098 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
13100 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
13101 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
13103 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
13105 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
13108 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
13109 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
13112 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
13113 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
13114 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
13116 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
13117 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
13119 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
13120 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
13121 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13122 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
13123 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
13125 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
13126 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
13127 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
13129 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
13130 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
13131 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
13132 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13134 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13135 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13136 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
13138 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13139 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
13140 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
13141 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
13142 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13144 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13145 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13146 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
13148 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13149 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13151 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13152 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13153 }, false).unwrap();
13154 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13155 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13156 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13159 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
13160 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
13161 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
13163 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
13164 } else { panic!(); }
13166 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13167 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13168 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13169 match events_b[0] {
13170 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13171 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13173 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13176 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13177 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13178 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13179 match events_a[0] {
13180 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13181 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13183 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13186 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
13188 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
13189 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
13190 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
13192 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13193 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13194 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13195 match msg_events[0] {
13196 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
13197 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
13198 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13202 match msg_events[1] {
13203 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13207 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13208 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13209 match events_a[0] {
13210 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13211 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13213 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13216 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13217 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13218 match events_b[0] {
13219 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13220 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13222 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13225 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
13226 macro_rules! send_payment {
13227 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
13228 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
13229 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
13230 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
13231 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
13232 payment_count += 1;
13233 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
13234 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
13236 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
13237 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
13238 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
13239 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
13240 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
13241 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
13242 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
13243 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
13244 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13245 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13246 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13248 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
13249 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
13250 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
13251 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
13253 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
13254 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
13255 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
13256 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
13257 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
13259 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
13262 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
13263 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13264 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13265 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13267 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
13271 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
13272 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
13273 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);