1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::router::Route;
33 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
36 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, InMemoryChannelKeys};
38 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
41 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
42 use util::logger::Logger;
43 use util::errors::APIError;
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::Duration;
51 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
54 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
56 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
57 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
58 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
60 // When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
61 // which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
62 // filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
63 // the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
64 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
65 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
66 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
67 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
68 pub(super) struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
69 onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
70 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
71 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
72 short_channel_id: u64,
73 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
74 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
77 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
78 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
79 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
80 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
83 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
84 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
85 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
86 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
90 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
91 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
92 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
93 short_channel_id: u64,
95 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
98 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
99 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
100 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
101 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
104 session_priv: SecretKey,
105 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
106 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
107 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
112 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
113 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
114 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
115 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
116 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
121 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
122 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
124 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
132 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
133 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
134 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
135 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
136 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
137 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
139 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
141 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
142 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
143 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
144 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
145 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
147 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
148 err: msgs::LightningError,
149 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
151 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
153 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
155 err: LightningError {
157 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
158 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
160 data: err.to_string()
164 shutdown_finish: None,
168 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
170 err: LightningError {
172 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
174 shutdown_finish: None,
178 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
179 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
182 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
184 err: LightningError {
186 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
187 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
189 data: err.to_string()
193 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
197 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
200 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
202 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
204 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
206 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
207 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
209 data: msg.to_string()
213 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => LightningError {
215 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
216 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
218 data: msg.to_string()
223 shutdown_finish: None,
228 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
229 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
230 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
231 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
232 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
234 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
236 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
238 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
242 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
246 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
247 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
248 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
249 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
250 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
251 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
252 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
254 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
258 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
259 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
260 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<ChanSigner>>,
261 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
262 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
263 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
264 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
265 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
266 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
267 /// payment_hash -> Vec<(amount_received, htlc_source)> for tracking things that were to us and
268 /// can be failed/claimed by the user
269 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
270 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
272 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
273 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
274 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
275 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
278 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
279 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
281 latest_features: InitFeatures,
284 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
285 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
287 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
288 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
289 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
290 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
291 /// issues such as overly long function definitions.
292 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M> = Arc<ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, Arc<M>>>;
294 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
295 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
296 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
297 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
298 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
299 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions.
300 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, M> = ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, &'a M>;
302 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
303 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
305 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
306 /// to individual Channels.
308 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
309 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
310 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
311 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
313 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
314 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
315 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
316 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
317 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
318 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
319 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
321 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
322 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
323 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
324 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
327 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
328 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
329 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
330 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
331 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
333 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
334 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
335 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
336 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
337 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
338 pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
339 default_configuration: UserConfig,
340 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
341 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
343 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
346 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
348 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
349 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
350 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
353 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
355 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
356 our_network_key: SecretKey,
358 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
359 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
360 /// are currently open with that peer.
361 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
362 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
364 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
366 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
367 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
368 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
369 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
370 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
372 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>,
377 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
378 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
379 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
380 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
381 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
383 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
384 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
385 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
386 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
387 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
388 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
389 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
391 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
392 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
393 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
394 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
395 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
396 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
399 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
401 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
402 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
405 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
407 macro_rules! secp_call {
408 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
411 Err(_) => return Err($err),
416 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
417 pub struct ChannelDetails {
418 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
419 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
420 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
421 /// lifetime of the channel.
422 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
423 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
424 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
425 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
426 /// The node_id of our counterparty
427 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
428 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
429 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
430 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
431 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
432 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
433 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
434 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
436 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
437 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
438 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
439 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
440 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
441 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
442 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
443 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
444 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
445 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
446 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
447 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
448 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
452 macro_rules! handle_error {
453 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr, $locked_channel_state: expr) => {
456 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
457 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
458 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
459 if let Some(update) = update_option {
460 $locked_channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
465 log_error!($self, "{}", err.err);
466 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
467 } else { $locked_channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id: $their_node_id, action: err.action.clone() }); }
468 // Return error in case higher-API need one
475 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
476 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
479 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
480 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
482 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
483 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
484 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
485 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
486 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
488 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
490 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
495 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
496 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
499 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
500 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
502 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
503 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
504 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
505 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
506 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
508 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
510 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, update }) => {
511 log_error!($self, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
512 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
513 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
514 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
516 if let Some(update) = update {
517 if let Err(e) = $self.monitor.add_update_monitor(update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update) {
519 // Upstream channel is dead, but we want at least to fail backward HTLCs to save
520 // downstream channels. In case of PermanentFailure, we are not going to be able
521 // to claim back to_remote output on remote commitment transaction. Doesn't
522 // make a difference here, we are concern about HTLCs circuit, not onchain funds.
523 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {},
524 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {},
528 let mut shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown();
529 if shutdown_res.0.len() >= 1 {
530 log_error!($self, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction {} avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take", shutdown_res.0[0].txid());
532 shutdown_res.0.clear();
533 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
539 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
540 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
541 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
543 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
545 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
546 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
547 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
548 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
549 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
551 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
552 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
553 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
554 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
555 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
556 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
557 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
558 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
559 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
560 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
563 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
564 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
565 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
566 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
568 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
569 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
571 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
572 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
574 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
575 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
576 if !$resend_commitment {
577 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
580 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
582 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
583 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
589 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
590 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
591 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
593 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
594 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
598 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
599 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
600 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
601 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
602 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
605 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
610 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
611 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
613 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
614 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
616 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
618 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
620 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
621 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
623 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
624 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
625 /// However, rather than calling these methods directly, the user should register
626 /// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's
627 /// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one
629 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Result<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M>, secp256k1::Error> {
630 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
632 let res = ChannelManager {
633 default_configuration: config.clone(),
634 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
635 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
639 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
640 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
643 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
644 by_id: HashMap::new(),
645 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
646 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
647 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
648 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
650 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
652 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
654 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
655 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
665 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
667 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
668 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
669 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
670 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
672 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
673 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
675 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
676 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
677 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
678 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
679 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
682 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
683 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
685 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
686 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
687 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
688 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
689 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
690 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
692 panic!("RNG is bad???");
695 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
697 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
698 node_id: their_network_key,
704 fn list_channels_with_filter<F: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<ChanSigner>)) -> bool>(&self, f: F) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
705 let mut res = Vec::new();
707 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
708 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
709 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
710 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
711 res.push(ChannelDetails {
712 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
713 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
714 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
715 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
716 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
717 inbound_capacity_msat,
718 outbound_capacity_msat,
719 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
720 is_live: channel.is_live(),
724 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
725 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
726 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
727 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
733 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
734 /// more information.
735 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
736 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
739 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
740 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
742 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
743 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
744 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
745 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
746 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
747 // really wanted anyway.
748 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
751 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
752 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
753 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
755 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
756 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
757 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
759 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
760 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
761 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
762 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
763 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
764 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
765 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
766 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
769 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
770 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
771 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
773 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
774 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
776 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
779 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
780 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
782 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
783 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
788 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
789 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
790 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
799 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
800 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
801 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
802 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
803 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
805 for tx in local_txn {
806 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
807 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
811 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
812 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
813 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
814 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
817 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
818 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
819 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
820 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
821 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
828 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
829 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
830 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
831 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
832 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
838 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
839 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
840 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
841 for chan in self.list_channels() {
842 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
846 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>) {
847 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
848 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
850 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
851 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
852 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
853 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
854 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
855 failure_code: $err_code,
856 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
861 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
862 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
865 let shared_secret = {
866 let mut arr = [0; 32];
867 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
870 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
872 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
873 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
874 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
875 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
876 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
877 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
878 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
879 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
882 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
883 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
884 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
885 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
886 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
889 let mut channel_state = None;
890 macro_rules! return_err {
891 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
893 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
894 if channel_state.is_none() {
895 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
897 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
898 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
899 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
900 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
901 })), channel_state.unwrap());
906 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
907 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
908 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
909 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
911 let error_code = match err {
912 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
913 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
914 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
915 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
916 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
918 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
921 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
922 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
923 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
930 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
933 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
934 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
935 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
936 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
937 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
938 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
939 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
940 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
941 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
942 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
943 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
944 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
948 // final_expiry_too_soon
949 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
950 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
952 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
953 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
954 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
956 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
957 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
958 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
961 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
962 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
963 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
964 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
966 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
968 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
970 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
971 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
972 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
975 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
976 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
977 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
980 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
981 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
982 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
984 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
986 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
987 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
988 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
990 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
992 let blinding_factor = {
993 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
994 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
995 sha.input(&shared_secret);
996 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
999 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1001 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1003 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1006 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1007 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1010 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1011 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1012 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1013 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode => {
1014 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1018 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1019 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1020 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1021 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1022 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1023 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1024 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1028 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1029 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1030 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1031 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1032 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1033 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1034 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1036 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1038 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1039 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1041 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1042 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1043 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1044 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1045 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1046 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1047 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1049 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1050 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1052 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1053 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1054 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1056 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1057 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1059 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1060 // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1061 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1062 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1064 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1065 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1070 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1071 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1072 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1073 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1075 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1076 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1078 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1079 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
1081 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1083 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1088 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1091 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1092 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1093 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1094 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1095 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1099 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1101 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1102 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1103 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1104 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1105 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1106 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1107 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1108 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1109 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1110 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1113 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1114 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1116 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1122 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1124 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1125 /// fields for more info.
1127 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1128 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1129 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1130 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1131 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1132 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1134 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1136 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1137 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1138 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1139 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1140 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1141 /// relevant updates.
1143 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1144 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1145 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1146 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1147 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1148 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1149 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1150 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1152 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1153 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1154 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1155 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1159 let (session_priv, prng_seed) = self.keys_manager.get_onion_rand();
1161 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1163 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1164 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1165 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1166 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash);
1168 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1170 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1171 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1173 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1174 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1175 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1178 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1179 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1181 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1182 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1184 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1185 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1187 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1188 route: route.clone(),
1189 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1190 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1191 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1193 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1194 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1195 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1196 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1197 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1198 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1199 // something else in case we will resend later!
1200 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1203 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1204 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1205 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1206 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1207 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1208 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1209 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1217 } else { unreachable!(); }
1221 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey, channel_lock) {
1222 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1223 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err }) }
1227 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1229 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1230 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1232 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1234 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1235 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1236 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1237 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1239 let (mut chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1240 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1241 let (res, chan) = match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1243 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1244 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1245 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1246 } else { unreachable!(); })
1251 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id(), channel_state) {
1252 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1253 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1255 Err(_) => { return; }
1258 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1259 // lock before add_update_monitor
1260 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1262 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1264 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1265 match handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", *temporary_channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None)), chan.get_their_node_id(), channel_state) {
1266 Err(_) => { return; },
1267 Ok(()) => unreachable!(),
1271 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1272 // Its completely fine to continue with a FundingCreated until the monitor
1273 // update is persisted, as long as we don't generate the FundingBroadcastSafe
1274 // until the monitor has been safely persisted (as funding broadcast is not,
1276 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1281 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1282 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1283 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1286 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1287 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1288 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1290 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1296 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1297 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1299 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1301 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1303 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1304 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1306 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1307 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1308 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1309 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1310 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1314 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1316 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1317 /// Will likely generate further events.
1318 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1319 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1321 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1322 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1323 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1325 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1326 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1328 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1329 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1330 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1331 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1333 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1334 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1335 match forward_info {
1336 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1337 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1338 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1339 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1340 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1342 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1344 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1345 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1346 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1347 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1348 // problem, not ours.
1355 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1356 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1357 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1358 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1359 match forward_info {
1360 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1361 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1362 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1363 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1364 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1365 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1367 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1369 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1370 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), msg);
1372 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1374 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1375 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1380 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1382 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1383 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1384 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1385 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1386 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1387 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1388 // this channel currently :/.
1394 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1395 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1396 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1398 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1399 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1401 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1403 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1404 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1405 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1408 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1410 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1411 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1412 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1413 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1414 // messages when we can.
1415 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1416 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1417 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1424 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1425 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1428 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1429 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1430 let their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
1431 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1432 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1433 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1435 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1436 log_trace!(self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1437 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1438 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1439 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1441 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1443 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. } => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1445 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state) {
1446 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1447 Err(_) => { continue; },
1451 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1452 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1455 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1456 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1457 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1458 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1459 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1460 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1461 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1463 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1471 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1472 match forward_info {
1473 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1474 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1475 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1476 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1477 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1479 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1480 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push((forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)),
1481 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![(forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)]); },
1483 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1484 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1485 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1488 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1489 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1497 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1499 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1500 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1504 if handle_errors.len() > 0 {
1505 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1506 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1507 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
1511 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1512 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1513 events.append(&mut new_events);
1516 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1517 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1518 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1520 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1521 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1522 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1523 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1524 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1525 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1526 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1527 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1528 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1533 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1535 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1536 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1541 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1542 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1543 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1544 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1545 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1546 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
1547 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1549 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1550 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1551 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1552 for (recvd_value, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1553 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1554 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1555 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1556 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(recvd_value).to_vec() });
1562 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1563 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1564 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1565 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1566 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1567 /// still-available channels.
1568 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1569 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1570 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1571 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1574 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1575 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1576 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1577 match &onion_error {
1578 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1580 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1582 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1583 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1584 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1585 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1586 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1587 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1588 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1593 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1594 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1595 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1596 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1598 error_code: onion_error_code
1602 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1606 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1607 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1608 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1609 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1611 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1612 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1613 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1614 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1615 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1616 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1618 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1624 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1625 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1626 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1627 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1628 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1629 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1631 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1632 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1633 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1637 let mut forward_event = None;
1638 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1639 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1641 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1642 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1643 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1645 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1646 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1649 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1650 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1651 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1652 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1653 time_forwardable: time
1660 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1661 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1662 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1664 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
1665 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
1666 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
1667 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
1668 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
1669 /// motivated attackers.
1671 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1672 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
1673 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1675 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1677 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1678 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1679 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1680 for (received_amount, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1681 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1682 if received_amount < expected_amount || received_amount > expected_amount * 2 {
1683 let mut htlc_msat_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(received_amount).to_vec();
1684 let mut height_data = byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).to_vec();
1685 htlc_msat_data.append(&mut height_data);
1686 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1687 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), &payment_hash,
1688 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_data });
1690 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1696 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1697 let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
1699 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1700 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1701 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1702 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1706 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1707 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1708 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1710 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1711 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1713 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1714 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1715 // why it's missing.
1720 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
1721 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
1722 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1723 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1724 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1725 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1726 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
1727 assert!(msgs.is_none());
1729 break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
1733 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1734 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1735 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1736 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1737 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1738 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1739 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1740 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1748 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1749 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1750 //TODO: Do something with e?
1754 } else { unreachable!(); }
1760 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
1763 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1764 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1765 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1768 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1769 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1771 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1772 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1773 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1774 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1775 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
1776 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1779 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1780 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1781 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
1782 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1783 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1784 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1785 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor().clone();
1786 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1788 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1789 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1790 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1791 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1792 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1793 // on-chain confirmations.
1794 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once it's merged a test
1795 // should be written.
1796 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1797 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1799 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1800 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1801 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1807 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1810 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1811 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1812 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1814 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1816 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1817 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1818 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1819 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1824 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1825 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1826 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1827 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1828 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1833 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1837 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1842 if needs_broadcast_safe {
1843 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1844 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
1845 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1848 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
1849 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1850 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1853 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
1854 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1855 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1856 msg: announcement_sigs,
1859 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
1867 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
1869 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1870 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1872 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1874 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1875 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1879 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1880 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1881 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1884 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1885 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1886 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1887 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1888 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1889 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1890 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1891 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1892 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1893 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1895 entry.insert(channel);
1901 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1902 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1903 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1904 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1905 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1906 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1907 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1908 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1910 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
1911 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1913 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1916 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1917 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1918 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1919 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1920 output_script: output_script,
1921 user_channel_id: user_id,
1926 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1927 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = {
1928 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1929 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1930 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1931 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1932 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1933 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1935 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1937 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1940 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1941 // lock before add_update_monitor
1942 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1944 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1945 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
1946 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
1947 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
1948 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
1949 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None));
1951 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1952 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
1953 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
1954 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
1955 // until we have persisted our monitor.
1956 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1960 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1961 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1962 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1963 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1964 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1966 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1967 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1968 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1977 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1978 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1979 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1980 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1981 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1982 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1983 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1984 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1986 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1987 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1988 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
1990 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1992 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1995 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1996 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1997 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1998 user_channel_id: user_id,
2003 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2004 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2005 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2006 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2007 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2008 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2009 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2011 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2012 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2013 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2014 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2015 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2016 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2017 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2018 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2019 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2020 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2021 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2022 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2023 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2024 msg: announcement_sigs,
2029 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2033 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2034 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2035 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2036 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2038 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2039 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2040 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2041 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2043 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2044 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2045 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2046 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2050 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2051 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2052 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2056 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2057 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2058 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2060 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2061 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2063 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2066 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2067 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2069 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2070 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2071 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2072 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2080 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2081 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2082 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2083 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2084 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2085 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2086 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2087 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2089 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2090 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2091 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2092 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2097 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2098 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2099 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2100 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2101 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2102 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2103 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2105 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2106 } else { (tx, None) }
2108 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2111 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2112 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2113 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2115 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2116 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2117 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2118 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2126 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2127 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2128 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2129 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2131 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2132 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2133 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2134 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2136 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2137 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2139 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2140 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2141 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2142 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2144 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2145 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2146 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2147 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2148 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2149 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2150 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2151 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2152 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2153 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2154 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
2155 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
2156 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
2157 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
2159 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
2160 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2161 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
2162 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2166 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2167 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2168 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2169 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2170 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2171 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2176 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2178 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2183 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2184 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2186 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2187 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2188 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2189 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2190 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2192 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2194 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2197 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2201 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2202 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2203 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2204 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2205 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2206 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2207 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2209 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2211 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2216 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2217 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2218 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2219 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2220 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2221 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2222 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2224 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2225 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2227 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2230 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2234 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2235 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2236 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2237 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2238 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2239 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2240 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2242 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2243 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2244 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2245 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2246 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2248 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2249 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2250 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2252 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2253 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2254 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2255 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2256 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2257 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2258 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2259 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2261 commitment_signed: msg,
2265 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2266 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2267 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2273 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2278 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2279 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2280 let mut forward_event = None;
2281 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2282 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2283 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2284 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2286 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2287 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2288 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2289 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2291 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2292 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2297 match forward_event {
2299 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2300 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2301 time_forwardable: time
2309 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2310 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2311 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2312 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2313 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2314 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2315 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2316 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2318 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2319 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2320 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2321 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2322 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2323 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2324 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2326 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2329 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2330 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2331 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2335 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2336 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2337 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2341 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2343 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2346 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2347 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2349 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2354 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2355 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2356 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2357 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2358 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2359 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2360 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2362 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2364 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2369 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2370 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2371 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2373 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2374 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2375 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2376 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2378 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2379 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2382 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2383 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2384 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2386 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2387 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2388 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2389 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2390 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2393 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2395 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2396 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2397 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2398 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2399 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2400 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2401 contents: announcement,
2403 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2406 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2411 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2412 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2413 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2415 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2416 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2417 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2418 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2420 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2421 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2422 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2423 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2424 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2425 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2426 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2427 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2428 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2430 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2431 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2433 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2434 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2437 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2438 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2439 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2443 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2444 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2445 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2446 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2451 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2452 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2453 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2454 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2460 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2464 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2469 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2470 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2471 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2477 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2481 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2482 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2483 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2484 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2486 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2487 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2488 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2490 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2491 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2493 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2494 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2495 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2496 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2497 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2499 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2500 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2502 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2503 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2505 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2506 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2507 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2509 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2512 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2513 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2514 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2515 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2516 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2517 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2518 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2519 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2529 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock) {
2530 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2531 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
2536 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
2537 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2538 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2539 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2540 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2542 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2543 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2544 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2545 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2546 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2548 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2549 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2554 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2555 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2556 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2561 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
2562 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2563 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2564 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2565 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2567 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2568 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2569 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2570 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2571 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2573 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2574 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2579 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2580 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2581 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2586 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send> ChainListener for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
2587 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2588 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2589 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2590 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2591 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2593 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2594 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2595 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2596 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2597 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2598 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2599 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2600 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2601 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2602 msg: funding_locked,
2604 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2605 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2606 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2607 msg: announcement_sigs,
2610 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2611 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2612 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2613 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2614 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
2618 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2619 for tx in txn_matched {
2620 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2621 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2622 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2623 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2624 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2626 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2627 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2628 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2629 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2630 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2631 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2640 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2641 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2642 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2644 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2645 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2646 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2647 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2648 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2649 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2650 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2659 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2660 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2662 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2663 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2666 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2667 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
2668 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2669 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2671 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2672 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2673 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2674 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2675 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2676 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2677 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2678 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2680 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2681 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2682 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2692 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2693 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2695 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2696 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2700 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send> ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
2701 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
2702 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2703 let res = self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg);
2705 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2706 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2710 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
2711 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2712 let res = self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg);
2714 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2715 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2719 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
2720 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2721 let res = self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg);
2723 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2724 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2728 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
2729 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2730 let res = self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2732 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2733 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2737 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
2738 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2739 let res = self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg);
2741 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2742 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2746 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
2747 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2748 let res = self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg);
2750 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2751 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2755 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
2756 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2757 let res = self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2759 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2760 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2764 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
2765 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2766 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2768 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2769 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2773 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
2774 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2775 let res = self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2777 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2778 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2782 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
2783 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2784 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2786 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2787 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2791 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
2792 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2793 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2795 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2796 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2800 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
2801 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2802 let res = self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2804 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2805 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2809 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
2810 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2811 let res = self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg);
2813 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2814 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2818 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
2819 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2820 let res = self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg);
2822 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2823 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2827 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
2828 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2829 let res = self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg);
2831 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2832 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2836 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
2837 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2838 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg);
2840 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2841 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2845 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2846 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2847 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2848 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2849 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
2851 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2852 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2853 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2854 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2855 if no_connection_possible {
2856 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2857 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2858 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2859 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2860 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2862 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2863 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2864 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2874 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2875 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2876 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2877 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2878 chan.to_disabled_marked();
2879 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2880 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2881 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2883 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2884 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2885 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2889 no_channels_remain = false;
2895 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
2897 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2898 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2899 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2900 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2901 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2902 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2903 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2904 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2905 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2906 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2907 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2908 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
2909 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
2910 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2911 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
2915 if no_channels_remain {
2916 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(their_node_id);
2919 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2920 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2922 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2923 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2924 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2929 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
2930 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2932 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2935 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
2936 match peer_state_lock.entry(their_node_id.clone()) {
2937 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2938 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
2939 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
2942 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
2943 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
2948 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2949 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2950 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2951 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2952 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2953 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2954 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2955 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2956 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2960 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2961 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2962 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2968 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2971 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2972 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2974 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2975 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2976 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2977 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2981 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2986 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2987 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2989 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2990 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2991 self.onion_packet.write(writer)?;
2992 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2993 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2994 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2995 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2996 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3001 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
3002 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3003 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
3004 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3005 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3006 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3007 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3008 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3009 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3014 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3015 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3017 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3019 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3021 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3023 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3030 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
3031 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3032 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3033 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3034 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3035 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3040 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3041 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3043 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3045 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3047 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3049 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3056 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
3057 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3058 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3059 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3060 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3061 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3066 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3069 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3072 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3073 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3075 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3077 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3079 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3081 route.write(writer)?;
3082 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3083 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3090 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
3091 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3092 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3093 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3094 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3095 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
3096 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3097 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3099 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3104 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3105 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3107 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3111 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3113 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3114 data.write(writer)?;
3121 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3122 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3123 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3124 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3125 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3126 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3127 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3129 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3134 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3135 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3137 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3139 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3140 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3141 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3143 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3145 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3146 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3153 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCForwardInfo {
3154 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3155 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3156 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3157 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3158 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3159 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3161 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3162 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3163 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3165 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3170 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable, M: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
3171 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3172 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3174 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3175 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3177 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3178 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3179 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3181 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3182 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3183 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3184 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3185 unfunded_channels += 1;
3188 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3189 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3190 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3191 channel.write(writer)?;
3195 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3196 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3197 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3198 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3199 for forward in pending_forwards {
3200 forward.write(writer)?;
3204 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3205 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3206 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3207 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3208 for &(recvd_amt, ref previous_hop) in previous_hops.iter() {
3209 recvd_amt.write(writer)?;
3210 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3214 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3215 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3216 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3217 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3218 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3219 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
3226 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3228 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3230 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3231 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3232 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3233 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3234 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3235 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3236 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3237 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3238 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3239 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3240 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface.
3241 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
3242 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3243 /// deserialization.
3244 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>,
3246 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3248 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3249 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3250 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3252 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3253 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3254 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3257 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3258 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3259 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3260 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3261 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3262 /// deserialization.
3263 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3264 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3265 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3266 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3268 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3269 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3271 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3272 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3273 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3274 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3276 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3278 pub channel_monitors: &'a mut HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor>,
3281 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable<R>, M: Deref> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M>) where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
3282 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3283 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3284 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3285 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3286 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3289 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3290 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3291 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3293 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3295 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3296 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3297 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3298 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3299 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3300 let mut channel: Channel<ChanSigner> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3301 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3302 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3305 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3306 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3307 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
3308 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3309 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3310 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3311 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3312 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3313 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3315 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3316 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3318 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3321 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3325 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
3326 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3327 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3331 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3332 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3333 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3334 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3335 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3336 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3337 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3338 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3340 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3343 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3344 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3345 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3346 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3347 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3348 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3349 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3350 previous_hops.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3352 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3355 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3356 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, 128));
3357 for _ in 0..peer_count {
3358 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3359 let peer_state = PeerState {
3360 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
3362 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
3365 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3367 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3368 monitor: args.monitor,
3369 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3371 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3372 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3373 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3375 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3380 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3382 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3384 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
3386 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3387 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3388 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3389 logger: args.logger,
3390 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3393 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3394 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3395 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3396 //connection or two.
3399 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))