1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
41 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
42 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
43 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
44 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
45 // construct one themselves.
46 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
47 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
48 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus};
49 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
50 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
52 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
54 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
55 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
56 use util::config::UserConfig;
57 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
58 use util::{byte_utils, events};
59 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
60 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
61 use util::logger::Logger;
62 use util::errors::APIError;
66 use core::cell::RefCell;
67 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
68 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
69 use std::sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
70 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
71 use core::time::Duration;
72 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
73 use std::time::Instant;
75 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
77 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
79 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
80 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
81 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
83 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
84 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
85 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
86 // before we forward it.
88 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
89 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
90 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
91 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
92 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
94 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
95 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
97 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
98 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
101 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
102 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
106 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
107 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
108 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
109 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
110 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
111 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
112 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
115 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
116 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
117 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
118 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
121 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
122 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
123 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
124 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
125 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
128 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
130 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
132 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
133 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
134 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
136 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
138 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
142 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
146 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
147 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
148 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
149 short_channel_id: u64,
151 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
153 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
154 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
158 struct ClaimableHTLC {
159 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
161 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
162 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
163 /// are part of the same payment.
164 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
168 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
169 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
170 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
171 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
174 session_priv: SecretKey,
175 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
176 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
177 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
182 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
183 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
185 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
186 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
191 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
192 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
194 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
202 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
204 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
205 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
206 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
207 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
208 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
210 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
211 err: msgs::LightningError,
212 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
214 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
216 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
218 err: LightningError {
220 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
221 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
227 shutdown_finish: None,
231 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
233 err: LightningError {
235 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
237 shutdown_finish: None,
241 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
242 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
245 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
247 err: LightningError {
249 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
250 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
256 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
260 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
263 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
265 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
267 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
269 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
270 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
276 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
278 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
279 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
286 shutdown_finish: None,
291 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
292 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
293 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
294 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
295 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
297 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
298 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
299 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
300 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
301 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
302 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
303 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
305 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
309 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
310 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
311 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
312 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
313 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
314 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
315 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
316 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
317 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
318 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
319 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
320 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
322 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
323 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
324 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
325 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
328 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
329 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
330 /// quite some time lag.
331 enum BackgroundEvent {
332 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
333 /// commitment transaction.
334 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
337 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
338 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
340 latest_features: InitFeatures,
343 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
344 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
346 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
348 struct PendingInboundPayment {
349 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
350 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
351 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
352 /// this payment being removed.
354 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
355 user_payment_id: u64,
356 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
357 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
358 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
361 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
362 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
363 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
364 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
365 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
366 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
367 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
368 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
370 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
371 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
372 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
373 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
374 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
375 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
376 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
377 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
378 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
380 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
381 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
383 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
384 /// to individual Channels.
386 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
387 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
388 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
389 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
391 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
392 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
393 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
394 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
395 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
396 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
397 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
399 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
400 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
401 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
402 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
405 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
406 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
407 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
408 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
409 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
411 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
412 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
413 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
414 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
415 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
416 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
417 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
418 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
419 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
420 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
423 default_configuration: UserConfig,
424 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
430 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
432 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
433 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
435 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
436 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
437 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
438 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
440 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
441 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
442 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
443 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
444 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
445 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
447 /// The session_priv bytes of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
448 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
449 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
450 /// PaymentSent/PaymentFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
451 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
452 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
453 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
454 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
456 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
457 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashSet<[u8; 32]>>,
459 our_network_key: SecretKey,
460 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
462 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
463 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
464 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
466 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
467 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
468 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
469 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
471 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
472 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
473 /// are currently open with that peer.
474 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
475 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
477 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
479 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
480 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
481 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
482 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
483 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
484 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
485 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
486 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
487 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
489 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
496 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
498 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
499 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
500 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
501 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
502 pub struct ChainParameters {
503 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
504 pub network: Network,
506 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
508 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
509 pub best_block: BestBlock,
512 /// The best known block as identified by its hash and height.
513 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
514 pub struct BestBlock {
515 block_hash: BlockHash,
520 /// Returns the best block from the genesis of the given network.
521 pub fn from_genesis(network: Network) -> Self {
523 block_hash: genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(),
528 /// Returns the best block as identified by the given block hash and height.
529 pub fn new(block_hash: BlockHash, height: u32) -> Self {
530 BestBlock { block_hash, height }
533 /// Returns the best block hash.
534 pub fn block_hash(&self) -> BlockHash { self.block_hash }
536 /// Returns the best block height.
537 pub fn height(&self) -> u32 { self.height }
540 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
546 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
547 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
548 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
549 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
550 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
551 /// updates are ready for persistence).
553 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
554 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
555 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
556 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
557 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
559 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
560 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
563 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
564 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
565 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
568 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
569 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
571 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
572 persistence_notifier: notifier,
573 should_persist: persist_check,
574 _read_guard: read_guard,
579 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
581 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
582 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
587 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
588 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
590 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
592 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
593 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
594 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
595 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
596 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
598 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
599 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
601 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
603 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
604 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
605 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
606 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
607 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
608 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
609 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
611 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
612 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
614 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
615 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
616 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
617 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
619 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
620 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
621 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
622 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
623 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
624 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
627 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
629 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
630 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
633 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
635 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
637 pub struct ChannelDetails {
638 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
639 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
640 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
641 /// lifetime of the channel.
642 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
643 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
644 /// our counterparty already.
646 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
647 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
648 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
649 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
650 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
651 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
652 /// The node_id of our counterparty
653 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
654 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
655 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
656 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
657 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
658 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
659 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
660 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
662 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
663 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
664 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
665 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
666 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
667 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
668 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
669 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
670 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
671 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
672 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
673 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
674 pub is_outbound: bool,
675 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
676 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
677 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
678 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations).
679 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
680 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
681 /// the peer is connected, (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution, and (d) the
682 /// channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
684 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
686 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
688 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
689 /// payments to us through this channel.
690 pub counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
693 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
694 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
696 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
697 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
698 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
699 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
700 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
701 ParameterError(APIError),
702 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
703 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
704 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
707 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
709 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
710 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
711 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
712 /// paths than the ones selected).
713 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
714 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
715 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
716 /// in over-/re-payment.
718 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
719 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
720 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
722 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
723 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
724 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
725 /// with the latest update_id.
726 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
729 macro_rules! handle_error {
730 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
733 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
734 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
736 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
737 // entering the macro.
738 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
741 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
743 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
744 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
745 if let Some(update) = update_option {
746 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
752 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
753 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
755 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
756 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
757 action: err.action.clone()
761 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
762 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
765 // Return error in case higher-API need one
772 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
773 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
774 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
776 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
777 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
779 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
780 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
781 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
782 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
784 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
785 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&$channel).ok()))
787 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
788 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
789 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
790 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
792 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
793 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&$channel).ok()))
799 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
800 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
804 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
806 $entry.remove_entry();
814 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
815 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
819 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
821 $entry.remove_entry();
829 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
830 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
831 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
833 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
835 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
836 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
837 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
838 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
840 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
841 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
842 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
843 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
844 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
845 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
846 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
847 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
848 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
849 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&$chan).ok()));
852 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
853 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
854 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
855 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
857 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
858 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
860 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
861 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
863 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
864 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
865 if !$resend_commitment {
866 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
869 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
871 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
872 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
876 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { {
877 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $entry.key());
879 $entry.remove_entry();
885 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
886 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
887 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
889 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
890 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
894 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
895 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
896 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
897 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
898 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
901 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
906 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
907 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
908 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
909 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
910 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
911 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
913 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
914 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
916 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
917 if !forwards.is_empty() {
918 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
919 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
922 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
923 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
924 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
925 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
926 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
927 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
928 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
929 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
930 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
931 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
932 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
933 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
936 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
937 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
938 // before it should be allowed to.
939 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
940 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
941 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
944 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
945 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
946 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
947 msg: announcement_sigs,
950 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
953 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
954 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
955 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
956 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
957 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
958 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
959 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
960 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
961 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
962 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
963 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
964 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
965 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
966 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
967 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
968 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
969 let mut order = $order;
971 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
973 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
977 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
978 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
979 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
980 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
985 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
986 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
987 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
988 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
994 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
998 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1003 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1004 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1005 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1010 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1011 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1012 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1013 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1014 assert!(res.is_ok());
1017 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1021 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1022 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1023 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1025 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1027 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1028 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1033 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1034 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1035 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1036 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1037 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1040 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1042 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1043 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1045 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1047 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1049 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1050 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1051 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1052 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1053 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1054 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1057 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1058 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1059 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1063 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1065 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1066 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1067 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1068 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1069 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1070 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1072 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1073 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1075 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1076 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1079 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1080 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1082 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1084 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1085 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1086 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1087 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1095 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1096 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1097 &self.default_configuration
1100 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1102 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
1103 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
1104 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
1105 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
1106 /// otherwise ignored.
1108 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
1109 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1111 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
1112 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
1113 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1114 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1115 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1118 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1119 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
1120 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1122 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1123 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1124 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1126 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1127 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1128 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1129 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1130 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1132 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1135 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1137 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1138 node_id: their_network_key,
1144 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1145 let mut res = Vec::new();
1147 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1148 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1149 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1150 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1151 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1152 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1153 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1154 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1155 remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1156 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1157 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1158 inbound_capacity_msat,
1159 outbound_capacity_msat,
1160 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1161 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1162 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1163 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1164 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1165 counterparty_forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1169 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1170 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1171 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
1172 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1178 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1179 /// more information.
1180 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1181 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1184 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1185 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1187 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1188 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1190 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1191 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1192 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1193 // really wanted anyway.
1194 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1197 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1198 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1199 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1201 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1202 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1203 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1205 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1206 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1207 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1208 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1209 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1210 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
1211 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1212 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1215 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1216 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1217 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1219 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1220 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
1222 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1225 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1226 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1228 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1229 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1234 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
1235 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1236 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1245 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1246 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1247 log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1248 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1249 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1251 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1252 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1253 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1254 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1255 // ignore the result here.
1256 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1260 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1262 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1263 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1264 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1265 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1266 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1267 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1270 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1271 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1273 chan.remove_entry().1
1275 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1278 log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1279 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1280 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1281 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1282 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1287 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1290 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1291 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1292 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1293 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1294 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1295 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1296 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1297 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1298 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1299 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1300 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1310 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1311 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1312 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1313 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1314 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1318 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1319 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1320 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1322 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1323 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1324 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1325 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1326 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1327 failure_code: $err_code,
1328 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1333 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1334 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1337 let shared_secret = {
1338 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1339 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1342 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1344 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1345 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1346 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1347 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1348 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1349 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1350 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1351 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1354 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1355 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1356 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1357 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1358 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1361 let mut channel_state = None;
1362 macro_rules! return_err {
1363 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1365 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1366 if channel_state.is_none() {
1367 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1369 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1370 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1371 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1372 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1373 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1378 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1379 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1380 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1381 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1383 let error_code = match err {
1384 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1385 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1386 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1387 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1388 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1390 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1393 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1394 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1395 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1402 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1405 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1406 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1407 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1408 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1409 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1410 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1411 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1412 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1413 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1414 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1415 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1416 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1420 // final_expiry_too_soon
1421 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1422 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1423 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1424 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1425 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1426 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1428 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1429 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1430 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1432 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1433 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1434 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1437 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1438 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1439 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1440 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1443 if payment_data.is_none() {
1444 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1447 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1448 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1449 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1450 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1452 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1453 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1454 payment_data: payment_data.unwrap(),
1455 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1457 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1458 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1459 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1460 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1463 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1464 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1465 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1467 // Check two things:
1468 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1469 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1470 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1472 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1474 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1475 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1476 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1478 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1480 let blinding_factor = {
1481 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1482 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1483 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1484 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1487 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1489 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1491 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1494 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1495 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1498 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1499 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1500 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1501 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1502 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1506 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1507 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1508 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1511 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1512 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1513 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1514 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1518 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1519 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1520 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1521 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1522 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1523 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1524 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1525 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1526 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1527 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1529 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1531 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1532 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1534 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1535 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1536 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1537 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1538 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1539 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1540 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1542 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1543 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1545 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1546 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1547 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1549 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1550 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1552 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1553 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1554 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1555 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1556 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1558 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1559 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1561 // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1562 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
1563 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1564 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1570 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1571 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1572 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1573 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1575 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1576 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1578 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1579 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1580 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1582 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1584 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1589 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1592 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1593 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1594 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1595 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1596 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1600 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1602 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1603 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1605 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1606 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1607 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1608 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1609 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1610 fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1611 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1612 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1615 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1616 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1618 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1624 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1625 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1626 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1627 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1628 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1629 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1631 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1632 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1633 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1634 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1635 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1637 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1639 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1640 assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().insert(session_priv_bytes));
1642 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1643 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1644 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1645 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1646 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1649 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1650 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1652 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1653 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1655 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1656 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1658 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1660 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1661 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1662 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1664 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1665 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1666 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1667 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1668 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1669 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1670 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1671 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1672 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1675 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1676 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1677 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1678 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1679 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1680 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1681 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1689 } else { unreachable!(); }
1693 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1694 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1696 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1701 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1703 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1704 /// fields for more info.
1706 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1707 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1708 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1709 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1710 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1711 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1713 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1715 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1716 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1717 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1719 /// In general, a path may raise:
1720 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1721 /// node public key) is specified.
1722 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1723 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1725 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1726 /// relevant updates.
1728 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1729 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1730 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1732 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1733 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1734 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1735 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1737 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1738 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1739 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1740 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1741 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1742 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1744 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1745 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1746 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1747 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1748 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1750 let mut total_value = 0;
1751 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1752 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1753 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1754 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1755 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1756 continue 'path_check;
1758 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1759 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1760 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1761 continue 'path_check;
1764 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1765 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1767 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1768 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1771 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1772 let mut results = Vec::new();
1773 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1774 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1776 let mut has_ok = false;
1777 let mut has_err = false;
1778 for res in results.iter() {
1779 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1780 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1781 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1782 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1789 if has_err && has_ok {
1790 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1792 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1798 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
1799 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
1800 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
1801 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1803 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1805 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
1807 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
1808 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1809 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1810 } else { unreachable!(); })
1813 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
1815 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1816 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1819 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
1820 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
1825 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1826 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1827 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1830 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1831 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1832 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1834 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1842 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1843 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
1844 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
1848 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1850 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
1851 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1853 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1855 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
1856 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
1857 /// keys per-channel).
1859 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
1860 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
1861 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
1863 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
1864 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
1865 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
1867 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
1868 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1869 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1871 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
1872 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
1873 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1874 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
1878 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
1879 let mut output_index = None;
1880 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
1881 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1882 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
1883 if output_index.is_some() {
1884 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1885 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
1888 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
1889 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1890 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
1893 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
1896 if output_index.is_none() {
1897 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1898 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
1901 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
1905 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1906 if !chan.should_announce() {
1907 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1911 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1913 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1915 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1916 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1918 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1919 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1920 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1921 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1922 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1927 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1928 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1929 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1931 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1934 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1935 // smaller than 500:
1936 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1938 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
1939 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
1940 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
1941 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
1942 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
1943 /// our network addresses.
1945 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
1946 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1948 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
1949 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
1950 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
1951 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
1953 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
1955 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
1956 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
1957 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1959 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1960 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1963 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
1964 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
1965 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
1967 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1968 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1969 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1970 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1971 rgb, alias, addresses,
1972 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1973 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1975 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1976 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1978 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1979 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1981 let mut announced_chans = false;
1982 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
1983 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1984 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
1986 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update(chan) {
1991 announced_chans = true;
1993 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
1994 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
1995 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
1999 if announced_chans {
2000 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2001 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2002 signature: node_announce_sig,
2003 contents: announcement
2009 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2011 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2012 /// Will likely generate further events.
2013 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2014 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2016 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2017 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2018 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2020 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2021 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2023 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2024 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2025 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2026 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2028 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2029 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2030 match forward_info {
2031 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2032 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2033 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2034 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2035 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2036 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2037 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2039 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2040 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2043 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2044 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2045 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2046 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2047 // problem, not ours.
2054 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2055 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2056 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2057 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2058 match forward_info {
2059 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2060 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2062 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2063 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2064 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
2065 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2066 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2067 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2068 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2069 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2071 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2073 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2074 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2076 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2078 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
2079 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2080 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2086 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2088 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2089 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2090 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2091 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2092 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2093 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2094 // this channel currently :/.
2100 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2101 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2103 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2104 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
2105 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2107 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2108 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
2110 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2112 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2113 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2114 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2117 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2119 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2120 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2121 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2122 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2123 // messages when we can.
2124 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2125 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2126 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2133 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2134 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2137 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2138 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2139 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2140 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2141 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
2142 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2144 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2145 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2146 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2147 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2148 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2150 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
2152 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2154 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2158 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2159 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2162 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2163 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2164 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2165 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2166 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2167 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2168 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2170 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2178 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2179 match forward_info {
2180 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2181 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
2182 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2183 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2184 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2185 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2186 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2187 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2188 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2189 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2191 value: amt_to_forward,
2192 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
2193 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
2196 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2198 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2199 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2200 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2202 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2203 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2204 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2205 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2206 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2208 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2213 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2214 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2215 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2216 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2217 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2218 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2219 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2220 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2221 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2222 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2223 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2225 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2226 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2227 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2228 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2229 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2230 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2231 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2232 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2234 let mut total_value = 0;
2235 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2236 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2237 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2238 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2239 total_value += htlc.value;
2240 if htlc.payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2241 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2242 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc.payment_data.total_msat);
2243 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2245 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2247 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2248 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2249 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2250 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2253 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2254 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2256 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2257 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2259 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2261 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2262 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2264 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2266 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2267 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2274 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2275 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2277 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2278 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2286 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2287 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2290 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2291 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2294 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2295 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2296 events.append(&mut new_events);
2299 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2301 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2302 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2304 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2305 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2306 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2307 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2308 if background_events.is_empty() {
2312 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2314 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2315 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2316 // monitor updating completing.
2317 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2324 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2325 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2326 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2327 self.process_background_events();
2330 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
2331 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
2332 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
2334 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
2336 /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
2337 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2338 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2339 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2340 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2342 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2343 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2344 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
2345 match chan.channel_update_status() {
2346 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
2347 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
2348 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
2349 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
2350 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
2351 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2352 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2356 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2357 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
2359 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
2360 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2361 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2365 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2366 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
2376 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2377 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2378 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2379 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2380 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2381 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
2382 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2384 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2385 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
2386 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2387 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2388 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2389 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2390 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2391 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2392 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2393 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2394 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2400 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2401 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2402 // be surfaced to the user.
2403 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2404 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2406 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2407 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2408 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2409 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2410 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(&chan_entry.get()) {
2411 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2413 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2416 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2418 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2419 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2420 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2422 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2424 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2425 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2426 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2428 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2429 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2431 rejected_by_dest: false,
2439 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2446 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2447 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2448 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2449 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2450 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2451 /// still-available channels.
2452 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2453 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2454 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2455 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2458 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2459 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2460 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2462 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, .. } => {
2464 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2465 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2466 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2468 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2471 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2472 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2473 match &onion_error {
2474 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2476 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2478 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2479 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2480 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2481 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2482 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2483 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2484 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2489 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2490 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2491 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2492 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2494 error_code: onion_error_code,
2496 error_data: onion_error_data
2500 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2506 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2507 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2508 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2509 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2511 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2512 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2513 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2514 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2515 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2516 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2518 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2520 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2526 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2527 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2528 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2529 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2530 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2531 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2533 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2534 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2535 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2539 let mut forward_event = None;
2540 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2541 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2543 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2544 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2545 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2547 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2548 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2551 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2552 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2553 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2554 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2555 time_forwardable: time
2562 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2563 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2564 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2566 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
2567 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
2568 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
2569 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
2571 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2573 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
2574 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
2575 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
2576 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2578 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2580 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2581 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
2582 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2583 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2585 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2586 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2587 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2588 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2590 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2591 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2592 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2593 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2594 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2596 let mut valid_mpp = true;
2597 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2598 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2604 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2605 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2606 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2608 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2609 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2610 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2611 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2612 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2613 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2614 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2616 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2618 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2619 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2620 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2621 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2622 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2623 } else { errs.push(e); }
2625 Err(None) => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2626 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2631 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2632 // which were generated.
2633 channel_state.take();
2635 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2636 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2637 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2644 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2645 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2646 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2647 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2648 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2654 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2655 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2656 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2657 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2658 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2659 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2660 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2661 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2663 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2667 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2668 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2669 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2670 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2671 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2672 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2673 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2674 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2683 // TODO: Do something with e?
2684 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2685 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2686 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2687 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2688 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2689 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2690 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2694 } else { unreachable!(); }
2697 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2699 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2700 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2702 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2703 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2704 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2706 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2707 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2711 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
2714 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2715 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2716 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2719 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2720 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2721 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2722 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2725 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2726 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2727 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2728 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2729 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2730 payment_preimage, e);
2734 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2736 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2737 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2738 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2744 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2745 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2746 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
2749 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2750 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2753 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2754 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2756 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2757 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2758 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2759 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2761 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2762 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2763 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2764 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2765 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2766 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2767 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2768 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2769 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2770 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2772 let (mut pending_failures, chan_restoration_res) = {
2773 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2774 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2775 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2776 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
2777 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
2779 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2783 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2784 (pending_failures, handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked))
2786 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
2787 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2788 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2792 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2793 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2794 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2797 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2798 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2799 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2800 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2801 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2802 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2803 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2804 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2805 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2806 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2808 entry.insert(channel);
2814 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2815 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2816 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2817 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2818 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2819 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2820 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2821 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2823 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2824 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2826 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2829 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2830 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2831 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2832 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2834 user_channel_id: user_id,
2839 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2840 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
2841 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2842 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2843 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2844 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2845 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2846 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2847 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2849 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2851 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2854 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2855 // lock before watch_channel
2856 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
2858 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2859 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2860 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2861 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2862 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2863 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
2864 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
2865 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
2866 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
2867 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
2868 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
2870 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2871 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2872 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2873 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2874 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2875 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2879 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2880 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2881 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2882 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2883 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
2885 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2886 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2887 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2896 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2898 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2899 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2900 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2901 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2902 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2903 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2904 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2906 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
2907 Ok(update) => update,
2908 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2910 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2911 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2915 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2918 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
2919 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
2923 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2924 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2925 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2926 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2927 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2928 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2929 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2931 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2932 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2933 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2934 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2935 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2936 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2937 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2938 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2939 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2940 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2941 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2942 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2943 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2944 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2945 msg: announcement_sigs,
2950 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2954 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2955 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2956 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2957 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2959 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2960 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2961 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2962 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2964 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2965 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2966 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2967 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2971 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2972 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2973 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2977 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2978 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2979 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2981 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2982 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2984 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2987 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2988 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2990 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2991 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2992 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2993 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3001 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3002 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3003 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3004 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3005 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3006 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3007 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3008 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3010 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3011 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3012 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3013 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3018 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3019 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3020 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3021 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3022 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3023 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3024 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3026 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3027 } else { (tx, None) }
3029 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3032 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3033 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3034 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3036 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3037 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3038 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3039 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3047 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3048 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3049 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3050 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3052 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3053 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3054 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3055 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3057 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3058 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3060 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3061 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3062 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3063 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3066 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3067 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
3068 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
3069 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
3070 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3071 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3072 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3073 match pending_forward_info {
3074 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3075 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) {
3076 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3077 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3078 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3079 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3080 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3084 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3085 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3086 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3087 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3088 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3089 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
3090 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3091 // no problem just calling this
3092 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3093 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3095 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3096 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3097 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3100 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3102 _ => pending_forward_info
3105 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3107 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3112 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3113 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3115 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3116 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3117 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3118 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3119 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3121 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3123 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3126 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
3130 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3131 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3132 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3133 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3134 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3135 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3136 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3138 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3140 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3145 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3146 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3147 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3148 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3149 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3150 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3151 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3153 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3154 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3155 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3157 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3160 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3164 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3165 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3166 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3167 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3168 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3169 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3170 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3172 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
3173 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
3174 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3175 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3176 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3177 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3178 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3183 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3184 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3185 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
3187 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3188 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3189 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3191 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3192 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3193 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3194 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3195 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3196 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3197 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3198 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3200 commitment_signed: msg,
3204 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3205 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3206 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3212 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3217 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3218 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3219 let mut forward_event = None;
3220 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3221 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3222 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3223 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3225 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3226 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3227 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3228 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3230 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3231 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3232 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3234 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3235 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3236 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3241 match forward_event {
3243 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3244 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3245 time_forwardable: time
3253 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3254 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3256 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3257 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3258 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3259 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3260 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3261 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3263 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3264 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3265 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3266 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3267 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3268 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3269 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3270 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3272 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3274 } else { unreachable!(); }
3277 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3278 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3279 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3283 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3284 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3285 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3289 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3291 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3294 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3296 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3297 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3298 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3300 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3307 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3308 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3309 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3310 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3311 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3312 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3313 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3315 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3317 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3322 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3323 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3324 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3326 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3327 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3328 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3329 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3331 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3332 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3335 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3336 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
3337 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
3340 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3345 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3346 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3347 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3348 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3349 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3351 // It's not a local channel
3355 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3356 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3357 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3358 // TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
3359 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3361 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3363 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3368 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3369 let (htlcs_failed_forward, chan_restoration_res) = {
3370 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3371 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3373 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3374 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3375 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3376 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3378 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3379 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3380 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3381 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3382 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
3383 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3384 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3385 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3386 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3390 (htlcs_failed_forward, handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked))
3392 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3395 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3396 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
3400 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
3401 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
3402 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
3403 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
3404 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
3406 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3407 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3408 let counterparty_node_id;
3409 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3410 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3411 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3413 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3414 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
3415 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3416 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
3417 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
3419 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3420 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
3422 if !chan.get().is_live() {
3423 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3425 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3426 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
3427 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
3429 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3432 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3433 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3434 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3435 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3436 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3437 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3438 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3439 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3449 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3450 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3451 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3455 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
3456 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
3457 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3458 let pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
3459 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
3460 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events {
3461 match monitor_event {
3462 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3463 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3464 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3465 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
3467 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3468 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3471 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3472 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3473 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3474 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3475 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3476 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3477 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3478 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3479 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3481 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3482 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3483 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3487 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3488 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3489 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3490 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3498 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3499 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3502 has_pending_monitor_events
3505 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
3506 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
3507 /// update was applied.
3509 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
3510 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
3511 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
3512 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
3513 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
3514 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
3515 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3516 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3518 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3519 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3520 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3521 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3522 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3524 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
3525 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
3526 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
3527 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
3528 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
3530 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
3531 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3532 has_monitor_update = true;
3533 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
3534 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
3535 if close_channel { return false; }
3537 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3538 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3539 updates: commitment_update,
3546 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
3547 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
3554 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
3555 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3556 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
3559 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3560 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3566 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
3567 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
3569 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
3570 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3571 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
3572 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
3573 // reorganized out of the main chain.
3574 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
3575 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
3576 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
3577 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
3578 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
3579 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
3580 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
3581 assert!(should_broadcast);
3582 } else { unreachable!(); }
3583 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
3585 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3589 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3590 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
3592 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3594 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3595 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3596 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3597 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3598 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
3599 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
3600 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
3601 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
3602 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
3603 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
3604 // never fail a payment too early.
3605 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
3607 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
3610 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
3615 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
3618 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
3619 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
3621 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
3622 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
3623 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
3625 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
3627 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
3628 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3629 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
3630 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3631 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
3632 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3633 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3636 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3637 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
3640 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
3641 /// stored external to LDK.
3643 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
3644 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
3645 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
3647 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
3648 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
3650 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentReceived::user_payment_id`] events to
3651 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
3652 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
3653 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
3654 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
3656 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
3657 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
3658 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
3659 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
3661 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
3662 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
3663 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
3664 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
3665 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
3667 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
3668 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
3669 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
3670 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
3671 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
3673 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
3674 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
3675 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
3677 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
3679 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
3680 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
3682 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3683 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3684 /// [`PaymentReceived::user_payment_id`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::user_payment_id
3685 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3686 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3689 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
3690 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
3691 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
3692 let event_handler = |event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
3693 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
3698 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3699 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3700 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3701 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3702 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3705 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3706 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
3707 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3708 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3710 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3711 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3712 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3713 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3716 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3717 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3720 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
3721 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3722 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3724 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3725 events.replace(pending_events);
3734 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3736 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3737 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3738 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3739 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3742 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
3744 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
3745 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
3747 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
3748 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
3749 /// restarting from an old state.
3750 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
3751 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3752 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3754 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3755 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3756 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3757 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3760 let mut pending_events = std::mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
3761 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3762 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3765 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
3766 handler.handle_event(event);
3774 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3776 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3777 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3778 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3779 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3782 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
3784 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3785 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
3786 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
3787 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
3788 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
3791 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
3792 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
3793 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
3796 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3797 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3798 let new_height = height - 1;
3800 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
3801 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
3802 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
3803 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
3804 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
3805 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
3808 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time));
3812 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3814 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3815 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3816 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3817 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3820 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3821 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3822 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3823 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3825 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3826 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
3828 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3829 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
3832 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3833 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3834 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3835 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3837 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3838 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3840 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3842 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3844 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time));
3846 macro_rules! max_time {
3847 ($timestamp: expr) => {
3849 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
3850 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3851 // having an explicit local time source.
3852 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
3853 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
3854 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3855 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3856 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3862 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
3863 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
3864 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3865 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
3866 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
3870 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
3871 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3872 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
3873 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
3874 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
3875 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
3881 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
3882 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3883 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
3884 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
3885 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
3886 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed().map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
3887 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3888 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3893 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3895 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3896 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3897 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3898 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3901 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
3902 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
3904 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
3905 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
3906 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3907 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3908 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3910 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3911 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3913 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3914 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3915 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3916 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3917 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
3918 let res = f(channel);
3919 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
3920 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
3921 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3922 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3923 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
3927 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
3928 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3929 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3930 msg: funding_locked,
3932 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
3933 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3934 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3935 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3936 msg: announcement_sigs,
3939 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3941 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
3943 } else if let Err(e) = res {
3944 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3945 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3947 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
3948 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
3949 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
3950 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3951 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3955 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3956 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3957 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
3964 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
3965 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
3966 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3967 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
3968 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
3969 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
3970 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
3971 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3972 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3973 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
3974 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3975 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
3976 data: htlc_msat_height_data
3981 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
3986 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
3988 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
3989 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
3993 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
3994 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
3995 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3997 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
3998 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
3999 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4000 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4003 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4004 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4006 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4007 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4010 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4011 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4012 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4013 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4014 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4019 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4020 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4021 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4022 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4023 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4024 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4027 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4028 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4029 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4032 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4033 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4034 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4037 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4038 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4039 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4042 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4043 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4044 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4047 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4048 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4049 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4052 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4053 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4054 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4057 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4058 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4059 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4062 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4063 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4064 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4067 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4068 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4069 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4072 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4073 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4074 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4077 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4078 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4079 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4082 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4083 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4084 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4087 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4088 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4089 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4092 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4093 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4094 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4097 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
4098 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4099 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4102 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
4103 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4104 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4107 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
4108 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4109 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4112 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
4113 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4114 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4115 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
4117 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4118 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4119 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4120 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4121 if no_connection_possible {
4122 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4123 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4124 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4125 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4126 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4128 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
4129 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
4130 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4140 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4141 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4142 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4143 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
4144 if chan.is_shutdown() {
4145 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4146 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4150 no_channels_remain = false;
4156 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
4158 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4159 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4160 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4161 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4162 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4163 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4164 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4165 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4166 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4167 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4168 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4169 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4170 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4171 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
4172 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4173 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
4174 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
4175 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
4176 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
4180 if no_channels_remain {
4181 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
4184 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4185 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4189 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
4190 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4192 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4195 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4196 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
4197 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4198 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
4199 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
4202 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
4203 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
4208 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4209 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4210 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4211 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4212 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4213 if !chan.have_received_message() {
4214 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
4215 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
4216 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
4220 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
4221 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4222 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
4228 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
4231 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
4232 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4234 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
4235 for chan in self.list_channels() {
4236 if chan.remote_network_id == *counterparty_node_id {
4237 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4238 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4242 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4243 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4248 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
4249 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
4250 struct PersistenceNotifier {
4251 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
4252 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
4253 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
4256 impl PersistenceNotifier {
4259 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
4265 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4266 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4271 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
4272 let result = *guard;
4280 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4281 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4282 let current_time = Instant::now();
4284 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4285 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4290 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
4291 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
4292 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
4293 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
4294 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
4296 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
4297 let result = *guard;
4298 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
4302 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
4303 None => return result,
4309 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
4311 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
4312 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4313 *persistence_lock = true;
4314 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
4319 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4320 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4322 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
4325 (2, short_channel_id),
4329 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry),
4333 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
4335 (2, incoming_shared_secret),
4337 (6, amt_to_forward),
4338 (8, outgoing_cltv_value)
4341 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailureMsg, ;
4345 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
4350 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
4351 (0, short_channel_id),
4354 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret)
4357 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimableHTLC, {
4364 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCSource,
4365 (0, OutboundRoute) => {
4367 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat),
4371 (1, PreviousHopData)
4374 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
4375 (0, LightningError) => {
4385 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
4388 (2, prev_short_channel_id),
4390 (6, prev_funding_outpoint),
4398 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
4399 (0, payment_secret),
4401 (4, user_payment_id),
4402 (6, payment_preimage),
4403 (8, min_value_msat),
4406 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4407 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4408 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4409 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4410 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4413 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4414 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
4416 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4418 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
4420 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4421 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
4422 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
4425 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4426 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
4427 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4428 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4429 unfunded_channels += 1;
4432 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4433 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4434 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4435 channel.write(writer)?;
4439 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4440 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
4441 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4442 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4443 for forward in pending_forwards {
4444 forward.write(writer)?;
4448 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4449 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
4450 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4451 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4452 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
4453 htlc.write(writer)?;
4457 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4458 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4459 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4460 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4461 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4462 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
4465 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4466 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4467 for event in events.iter() {
4468 event.write(writer)?;
4471 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
4472 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4473 for event in background_events.iter() {
4475 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
4477 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4478 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
4483 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4484 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4486 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4487 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4488 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
4489 hash.write(writer)?;
4490 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
4493 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4494 (pending_outbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4495 for session_priv in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
4496 session_priv.write(writer)?;
4499 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {}, {});
4505 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
4507 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
4509 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
4510 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
4511 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
4512 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
4513 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
4514 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
4515 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
4516 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
4517 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
4518 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
4519 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
4521 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
4522 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
4524 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
4525 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
4526 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
4527 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
4528 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
4529 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
4530 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4531 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4532 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4533 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4534 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4537 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
4538 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
4540 pub keys_manager: K,
4542 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4544 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
4545 pub fee_estimator: F,
4546 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4548 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
4549 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
4550 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
4551 pub chain_monitor: M,
4553 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
4554 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
4555 /// force-closed during deserialization.
4556 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
4557 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
4558 /// deserialization.
4560 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
4561 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
4562 pub default_config: UserConfig,
4564 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
4565 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
4567 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
4568 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
4569 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
4570 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
4572 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
4575 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
4576 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4579 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4580 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4581 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4582 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4583 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4584 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4587 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
4588 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
4589 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
4590 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
4591 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
4593 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
4594 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
4599 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
4600 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
4601 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4602 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
4603 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4604 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4605 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4606 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4609 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4610 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
4611 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
4615 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4616 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
4617 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4618 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4619 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4620 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4623 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4624 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4626 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4627 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4628 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4630 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4632 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4633 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4634 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4635 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4636 for _ in 0..channel_count {
4637 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
4638 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
4639 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
4640 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
4641 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4642 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4643 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4644 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4645 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
4646 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4647 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4648 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4649 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4650 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4651 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
4652 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
4653 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
4654 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4656 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4657 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
4659 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
4662 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4666 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
4667 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
4668 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4672 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
4673 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4674 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4675 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
4676 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4677 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4678 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
4679 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
4680 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4682 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
4685 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4686 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4687 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
4688 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4689 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4690 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
4691 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
4692 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4694 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
4697 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4698 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
4699 for _ in 0..peer_count {
4700 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4701 let peer_state = PeerState {
4702 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
4704 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
4707 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4708 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
4709 for _ in 0..event_count {
4710 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4711 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
4716 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4717 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
4718 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
4719 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4720 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
4721 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4725 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4726 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4728 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4729 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
4730 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
4731 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
4732 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4736 let pending_outbound_payments_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4737 let mut pending_outbound_payments: HashSet<[u8; 32]> = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
4738 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count {
4739 if !pending_outbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?) {
4740 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4744 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {}, {});
4746 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4747 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4749 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
4751 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
4752 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
4753 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
4755 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
4757 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
4762 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
4764 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
4765 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments),
4767 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
4768 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
4771 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
4772 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
4774 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
4776 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
4777 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
4778 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
4779 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
4781 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
4782 logger: args.logger,
4783 default_configuration: args.default_config,
4786 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4787 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4790 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
4791 //connection or two.
4793 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
4799 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
4801 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
4803 use core::time::Duration;
4806 fn test_wait_timeout() {
4807 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
4808 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
4810 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
4811 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
4812 thread::spawn(move || {
4814 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
4815 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4816 *persistence_lock = true;
4819 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
4825 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
4826 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
4828 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
4831 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4836 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
4838 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
4841 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4848 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
4851 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
4852 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
4853 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
4854 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
4855 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
4856 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
4857 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
4858 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
4859 use routing::router::get_route;
4860 use util::test_utils;
4861 use util::config::UserConfig;
4862 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
4864 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4865 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4866 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
4868 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
4872 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
4873 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
4874 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
4875 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
4876 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
4877 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
4878 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
4883 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
4884 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
4887 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
4888 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
4889 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
4891 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
4892 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
4894 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
4895 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
4897 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
4898 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
4900 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
4901 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
4902 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
4903 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
4904 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
4906 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
4908 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
4910 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
4911 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
4912 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
4913 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
4914 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
4916 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
4918 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
4920 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
4921 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4922 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4925 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
4926 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
4927 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
4929 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4930 } else { panic!(); }
4932 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4933 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4935 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
4938 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4941 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
4942 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
4944 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4945 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4947 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
4949 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
4950 macro_rules! send_payment {
4951 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
4952 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
4953 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
4954 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
4956 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
4957 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
4959 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
4960 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
4962 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
4963 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
4964 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4965 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
4966 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
4967 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
4968 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
4969 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4971 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
4972 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
4973 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4975 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
4976 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
4977 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
4978 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4979 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
4981 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
4984 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
4985 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
4986 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
4987 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4989 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
4994 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
4995 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);