1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
33 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
34 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
36 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
46 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
50 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
51 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
53 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
55 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
57 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
59 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
60 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
61 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
62 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
63 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
65 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
66 use crate::onion_message::{Destination, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage};
67 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
68 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
69 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
70 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
71 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
72 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
73 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
74 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
76 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
79 use crate::prelude::*;
81 use core::cell::RefCell;
83 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
84 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
85 use core::time::Duration;
88 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
89 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
90 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
92 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
94 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
95 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
96 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
98 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
99 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
100 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
101 // before we forward it.
103 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
104 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
105 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
106 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
107 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
109 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
110 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
112 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
113 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
114 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
115 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
118 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
119 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
120 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
121 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
122 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
126 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
127 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
128 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
129 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
130 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
131 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
132 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
136 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
137 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
138 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
139 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
140 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
142 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
143 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
144 /// may overshoot this in either case)
145 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
146 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
147 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
148 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
149 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
152 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
153 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
154 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
155 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
158 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
159 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
160 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
161 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
162 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
165 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
166 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
168 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
169 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
170 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
173 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
174 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
176 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
177 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
180 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
181 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
184 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
188 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
189 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
190 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
191 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
192 short_channel_id: u64,
193 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
195 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
196 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
198 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
199 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
204 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
206 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
207 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
208 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
210 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
211 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
214 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
215 struct ClaimableHTLC {
216 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
218 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
220 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
221 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
222 sender_intended_value: u64,
223 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
225 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
226 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
227 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
228 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
230 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
231 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
234 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
235 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
236 events::ClaimedHTLC {
237 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
238 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
239 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
240 value_msat: val.value,
245 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
246 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
248 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
249 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
250 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
253 /// Number of bytes in the id.
254 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
257 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
258 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
263 impl Readable for PaymentId {
264 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
265 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
270 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
271 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
272 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
276 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
278 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
279 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
280 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
282 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
283 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
288 impl Readable for InterceptId {
289 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
290 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
295 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
296 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
297 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
298 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
299 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
302 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
304 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
305 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
306 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
308 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
309 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
313 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
314 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
315 (0, short_channel_id, required),
316 (2, htlc_id, required),
318 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
319 (0, session_priv, required),
324 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
325 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
326 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
327 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
328 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
331 session_priv: SecretKey,
332 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
333 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
334 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
335 payment_id: PaymentId,
338 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
339 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
340 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
342 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
344 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
346 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
349 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
350 payment_id.hash(hasher);
351 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
357 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
359 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
360 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
361 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
362 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
363 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
364 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
368 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
369 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
370 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
371 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
372 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
373 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
375 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
381 struct InboundOnionErr {
387 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
388 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
390 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
391 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
392 pub enum FailureCode {
393 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
394 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
395 TemporaryNodeFailure,
396 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
397 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
398 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
399 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
400 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
401 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
402 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
403 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
404 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
405 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
407 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
408 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
409 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
412 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
413 fn into(self) -> u16 {
415 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
416 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
417 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
418 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
423 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
424 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
425 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
426 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
427 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
429 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
430 err: msgs::LightningError,
431 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
432 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
433 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
435 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
437 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
439 err: LightningError {
441 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
442 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
449 shutdown_finish: None,
450 channel_capacity: None,
454 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
455 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
458 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
459 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
460 let action = if let (Some(_), ..) = &shutdown_res {
461 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
462 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
463 // commitment upon reconnecting.
464 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
466 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
469 err: LightningError { err, action },
470 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
471 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
472 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
476 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
479 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
481 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
482 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
486 log_level: Level::Warn,
489 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
491 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
493 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
495 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
496 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
504 shutdown_finish: None,
505 channel_capacity: None,
509 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
510 self.chan_id.is_some()
514 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
515 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
516 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
517 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
518 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
520 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
521 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
522 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
523 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
524 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
525 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
526 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
528 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
532 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
533 struct ClaimingPayment {
535 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
536 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
537 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
538 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
540 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
541 (0, amount_msat, required),
542 (2, payment_purpose, required),
543 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
544 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
545 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
548 struct ClaimablePayment {
549 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
550 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
551 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
554 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
555 struct ClaimablePayments {
556 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
557 /// failed/claimed by the user.
559 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
560 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
562 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
563 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
564 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
566 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
567 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
568 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
569 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
572 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
573 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
574 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
575 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
577 enum BackgroundEvent {
578 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
579 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
580 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
581 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
583 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
584 /// are regenerated on startup.
585 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
586 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
587 /// channel to continue normal operation.
589 /// In general this should be used rather than
590 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
591 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
592 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
594 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
595 /// are regenerated on startup.
596 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
597 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
598 funding_txo: OutPoint,
599 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
601 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
602 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
604 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
605 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
606 channel_id: ChannelId,
611 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
612 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
613 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
614 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
615 /// event can be generated.
616 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
617 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
618 /// operation of another channel.
620 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
621 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
622 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
623 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
625 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
626 event: events::Event,
627 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
629 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
630 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
631 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
633 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
634 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
635 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
636 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
637 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
639 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
640 /// stored for later processing.
641 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
642 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
643 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
644 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
648 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
649 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
650 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
651 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
652 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
653 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
654 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
655 (4, blocking_action, required),
657 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
658 (0, event, upgradable_required),
659 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
660 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
661 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
662 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
663 // downgrades to prior versions.
664 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
668 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
669 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
670 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
671 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
672 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
675 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
676 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
677 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
678 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
682 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
683 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
684 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
685 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
686 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
687 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
689 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
690 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
691 channel_id: ChannelId,
692 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
697 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
698 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
699 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
700 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
701 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
706 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
707 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
711 /// State we hold per-peer.
712 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
713 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
715 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
716 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
717 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
719 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
720 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
721 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
722 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
723 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
724 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
725 latest_features: InitFeatures,
726 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
727 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
728 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
729 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
730 /// user but which have not yet completed.
732 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
733 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
734 /// for a missing channel.
735 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
736 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
737 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
739 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
740 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
741 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
742 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
744 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
745 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
746 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
747 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
748 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
749 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
750 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
751 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
752 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
753 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
754 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
755 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
756 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
757 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
758 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
762 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
763 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
764 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
765 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
766 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
767 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
770 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
771 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
772 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
775 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
776 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
777 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
780 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
781 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
782 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
783 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
787 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
788 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
789 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
790 /// The original OpenChannel message.
791 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
792 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
793 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
796 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
797 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
798 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
800 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
801 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
803 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
806 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
807 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
808 struct PendingInboundPayment {
809 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
810 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
811 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
812 /// this payment being removed.
814 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
815 user_payment_id: u64,
816 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
817 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
818 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
821 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
822 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
823 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
824 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
825 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
826 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
827 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
828 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
830 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
831 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
839 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
841 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
842 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
843 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
848 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
849 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
850 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
851 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
852 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
853 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
854 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
855 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
856 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
858 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
859 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
868 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
870 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
871 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
872 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
877 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
879 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
881 pub trait AChannelManager {
882 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
883 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
884 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
885 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
886 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
887 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
888 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
889 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
890 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
891 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
892 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
893 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
894 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
895 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
896 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
897 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
898 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
899 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
900 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
901 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
902 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
903 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
904 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
905 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
906 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
907 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
908 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
909 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
910 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
911 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
912 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
913 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
914 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
915 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
916 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
917 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
920 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
921 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
923 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
924 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
925 ES::Target: EntropySource,
926 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
927 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
928 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
932 type Watch = M::Target;
934 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
936 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
938 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
940 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
941 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
943 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
945 type Router = R::Target;
947 type Logger = L::Target;
949 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
952 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
953 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
955 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
956 /// to individual Channels.
958 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
959 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
960 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
961 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
963 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
964 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
965 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
966 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
967 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
968 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
969 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
970 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
971 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
973 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
974 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
975 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
977 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
978 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
979 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
980 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
981 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
983 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
984 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
985 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
986 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
988 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
989 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
990 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
992 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
993 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
994 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
995 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
996 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
998 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
999 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1000 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1001 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1002 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1003 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1004 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1005 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1008 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1009 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1010 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1011 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1012 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1016 // `pending_offers_messages`
1018 // `total_consistency_lock`
1020 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1022 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1024 // |__`per_peer_state`
1026 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1028 // |__`claimable_payments`
1030 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1036 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1038 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1042 // |__`pending_events`
1044 // |__`pending_background_events`
1046 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1048 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1049 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1050 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1051 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1052 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1053 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1057 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1058 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1059 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1065 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1067 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1069 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1070 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1072 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1073 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1074 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1075 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1077 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1078 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1080 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1081 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1082 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1083 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1084 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1085 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1086 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1087 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1089 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1091 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1092 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1094 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1096 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1097 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1098 /// and via the classic SCID.
1100 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1101 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1103 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1105 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1107 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1108 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1109 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1111 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1112 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1114 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1115 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1117 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1118 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1120 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1121 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1122 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1123 /// active channel list on load.
1125 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1126 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1128 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1130 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1131 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1132 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1134 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1135 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1136 /// the handling of the events.
1138 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1139 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1142 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1143 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1144 /// would break backwards compatability.
1145 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1146 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1147 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1149 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1150 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1152 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1154 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1155 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1156 /// confirmation depth.
1158 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1159 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1160 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1162 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1164 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1166 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1168 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1170 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1172 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1173 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1174 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1176 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1177 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1179 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1180 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1181 /// keeping additional state.
1182 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1184 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1185 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1186 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1187 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1189 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1190 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1192 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1193 /// are currently open with that peer.
1195 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1196 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1199 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1201 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1202 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1203 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1204 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1205 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1207 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1208 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1209 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1210 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1211 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1213 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1214 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1216 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1217 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1218 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1219 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1220 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1222 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1223 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1225 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1226 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1227 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1228 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1229 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1231 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1233 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1235 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1236 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1237 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1238 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1239 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1240 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1241 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1242 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1243 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1244 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1245 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1247 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1248 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1249 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1251 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1253 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1254 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1256 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1260 signer_provider: SP,
1265 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1267 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1268 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1269 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1270 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1271 pub struct ChainParameters {
1272 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1273 pub network: Network,
1275 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1277 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1278 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1281 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1285 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1286 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1289 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1290 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1291 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1292 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1293 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1294 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1296 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1297 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1298 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1299 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1300 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1301 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1303 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1304 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1307 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1308 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1309 /// events to handle.
1311 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1312 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1314 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1315 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1318 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1319 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1320 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1321 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1323 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1324 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1325 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1326 should_persist: move || {
1327 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1328 // processing and return that.
1329 let notify = persist_check();
1330 match (notify, force_notify) {
1331 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1332 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1333 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1334 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1335 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1338 _read_guard: read_guard,
1342 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1343 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1344 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1345 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1346 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1347 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1349 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1350 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1351 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1352 should_persist: persist_check,
1353 _read_guard: read_guard,
1358 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1359 fn drop(&mut self) {
1360 match (self.should_persist)() {
1361 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1362 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1363 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1365 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1366 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1367 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1372 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1373 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1375 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1377 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1378 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1379 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1380 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1381 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1383 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1384 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1386 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1388 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1389 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1390 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1391 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1392 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1393 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1394 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1395 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1396 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1397 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1398 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1399 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1400 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1402 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1403 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1405 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1406 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1407 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1408 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1410 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1411 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1412 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1413 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1414 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1415 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1418 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1420 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1421 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1424 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1426 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1427 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1429 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1430 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1431 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1433 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1434 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1435 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1437 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1438 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1439 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1440 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1442 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1443 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1444 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1446 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1447 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1448 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1450 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1451 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1452 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1453 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1454 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1455 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1456 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1457 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1458 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1459 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1460 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1463 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1464 /// to better separate parameters.
1465 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1466 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1467 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1468 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1469 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1470 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1471 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1472 pub features: InitFeatures,
1473 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1474 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1475 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1477 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1479 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1480 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1481 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1482 /// payments to us through this channel.
1483 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1484 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1485 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1486 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1487 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1488 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1489 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1492 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1493 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1494 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1495 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1496 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1497 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1498 /// lifetime of the channel.
1499 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1500 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1501 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1502 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1503 /// our counterparty already.
1505 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1506 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1507 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1508 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1510 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1511 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1512 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1513 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1515 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1516 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1518 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1519 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1521 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1522 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1523 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1524 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1525 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1526 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1527 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1528 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1529 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1532 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1534 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1535 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1536 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1537 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1538 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1539 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1540 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1542 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1543 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1545 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1546 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1547 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1548 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1549 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1550 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1551 /// this value on chain.
1553 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1555 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1557 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1558 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1559 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1560 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1561 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1562 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1563 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1565 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1566 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1567 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1568 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1569 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1570 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1572 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1573 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1574 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1575 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1576 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1578 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1579 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1580 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1581 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1583 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1584 pub balance_msat: u64,
1585 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1586 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1587 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1588 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1590 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1592 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1593 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1594 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1595 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1596 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1597 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1598 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1599 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1601 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1602 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1603 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1604 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1605 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1606 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1607 /// route which is valid.
1608 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1609 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1610 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1611 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1612 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1613 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1615 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1616 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1617 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1618 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1619 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1620 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1621 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1622 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1623 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1625 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1627 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1628 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1629 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1630 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1631 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1633 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1634 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1635 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1636 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1637 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1638 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1639 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1641 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1642 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1643 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1644 pub is_outbound: bool,
1645 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1646 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1647 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1648 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1649 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1651 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1652 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1653 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1654 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1655 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1656 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1657 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1659 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1660 pub is_usable: bool,
1661 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1662 pub is_public: bool,
1663 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1664 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1665 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1666 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1667 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1668 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1670 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1671 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1674 impl ChannelDetails {
1675 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1676 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1677 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1679 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1680 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1681 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1682 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1685 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1686 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1687 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1689 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1690 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1691 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1692 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1695 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1696 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1697 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1700 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1701 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1703 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1704 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1705 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1707 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1708 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1709 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1710 features: latest_features,
1711 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1712 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1713 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1714 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1715 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1716 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1717 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1718 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1719 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1720 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1722 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1723 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1724 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1725 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1726 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1727 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1728 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1729 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1730 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1731 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1732 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1733 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1734 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1735 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1736 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1737 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1738 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1739 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1740 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1741 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1742 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1743 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1744 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1745 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1746 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1747 config: Some(context.config()),
1748 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1753 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1754 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1755 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1756 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1757 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1758 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1759 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1760 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1761 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1763 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1765 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1766 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1768 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1769 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1770 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1771 /// to drop the channel.
1775 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1776 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1777 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1778 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1779 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1781 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1782 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1783 payment_id: PaymentId,
1785 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1787 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1788 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1789 payment_id: PaymentId,
1790 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1792 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1793 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1794 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1797 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1798 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1799 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1801 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1802 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1803 payment_id: PaymentId,
1804 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1805 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1806 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1808 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1809 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1810 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1812 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1813 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1814 payment_id: PaymentId,
1815 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1816 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1820 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1822 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1824 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1825 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1826 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1827 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1829 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1830 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1831 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1834 macro_rules! handle_error {
1835 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1836 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1837 // entering the macro.
1838 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1839 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1843 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1844 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1846 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1847 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1848 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1849 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1853 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1854 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1855 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1856 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1857 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1858 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1863 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1864 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1866 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1867 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1868 action: err.action.clone()
1872 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1873 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1874 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1875 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1876 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1880 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1885 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1888 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1889 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1890 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1896 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1897 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1898 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1899 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1900 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1901 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1903 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1904 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1905 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1906 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1907 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1909 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1910 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1912 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1916 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1917 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1918 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1920 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1921 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1923 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1924 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1926 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1927 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1928 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1929 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1930 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1931 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1933 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1934 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1938 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1939 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1941 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1942 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1944 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1945 match $channel_phase {
1946 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1947 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1949 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1950 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1952 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1953 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1959 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1960 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1964 let key = *$entry.key();
1965 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1967 $entry.remove_entry();
1975 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
1976 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1980 let key = *$entry.key();
1981 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1983 $entry.remove_entry();
1991 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
1992 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1994 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1995 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2001 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2002 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2003 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2004 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2005 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2007 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2008 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2009 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2010 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2011 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2012 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2013 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2014 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2015 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2016 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2021 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2022 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2023 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2024 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2025 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2026 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2027 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2028 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2029 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2031 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2036 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2037 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2038 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2039 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2040 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2041 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2042 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2043 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2044 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2046 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2051 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2052 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2053 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
2054 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2055 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2056 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2057 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2058 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2059 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2060 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2061 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2063 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2064 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2065 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2071 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2072 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2074 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2075 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2076 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2077 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2078 updates.announcement_sigs);
2079 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2080 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2083 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2084 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2085 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2086 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2088 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2089 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2090 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2091 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2092 let mut batch_completed = false;
2093 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2094 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2095 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2096 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2098 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2099 channel_state.2 = true;
2101 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2103 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2105 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2108 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2109 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2110 if batch_completed {
2111 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2112 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2113 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2114 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2115 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2116 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2117 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2118 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2119 chan.set_batch_ready();
2120 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2121 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2125 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2126 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2127 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2132 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2134 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2135 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2137 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2138 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2139 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2140 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2145 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2146 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2147 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2149 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2150 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2151 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
2152 panic!("{}", err_str);
2154 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2155 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2156 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2159 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2165 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2166 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2167 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2169 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2170 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2171 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2172 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2173 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2174 // filter for uniqueness here.
2175 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2176 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2177 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2178 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2180 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2181 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2183 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2184 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2185 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2191 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2192 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2193 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2194 while !processed_all_events {
2195 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2202 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2203 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2204 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2206 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2207 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2208 result = $self.process_background_events();
2210 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2211 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2212 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2213 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2217 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2218 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2219 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2220 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2223 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2225 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2226 $event_to_handle = event;
2228 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2229 post_event_actions.push(action);
2234 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2235 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2236 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2237 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2238 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2239 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2242 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2243 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2244 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2245 processed_all_events = false;
2249 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2250 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2251 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2253 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2254 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2255 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2261 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2263 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2264 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2265 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2266 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2267 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2268 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2272 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2274 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2276 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2277 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2279 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2281 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2282 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2283 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2286 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2287 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2288 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2290 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2291 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2292 current_timestamp: u32,
2294 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2295 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2296 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2297 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2299 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2300 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2301 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2306 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2308 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2309 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2310 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2311 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2312 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2313 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2314 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2315 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2317 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2320 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2321 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2323 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2325 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2327 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2329 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2330 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2331 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2332 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2333 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2334 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2335 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2336 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2338 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2348 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2349 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2350 &self.default_configuration
2353 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2354 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2355 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2358 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2359 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2361 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2363 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2367 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2372 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2374 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2375 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2376 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2377 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2378 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2380 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2381 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2383 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2384 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2385 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2387 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2388 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2389 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2391 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2392 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2393 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2394 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2395 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2396 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2398 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2399 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2400 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2401 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2402 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2403 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2406 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2407 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2408 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2410 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2412 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2413 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2415 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2417 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2418 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2419 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2420 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2421 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2422 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2426 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2431 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2433 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2434 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2435 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2437 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2439 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2442 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2445 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2446 node_id: their_network_key,
2449 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2452 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2453 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2454 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2455 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2456 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2457 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2458 // the same channel.
2459 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2461 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2462 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2463 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2464 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2465 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2466 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2467 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2468 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2469 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2473 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2474 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2475 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2483 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2484 /// more information.
2485 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2486 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2487 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2488 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2489 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2490 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2491 // the same channel.
2492 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2494 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2495 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2496 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2497 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2498 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2499 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2500 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2501 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2509 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2510 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2512 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2513 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2515 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2516 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2517 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2518 // really wanted anyway.
2519 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2522 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2523 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2524 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2525 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2527 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2528 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2529 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2530 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2531 let context_to_details = |context| {
2532 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2534 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2536 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2537 .map(context_to_details)
2543 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2544 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2546 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2547 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2548 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2550 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2551 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2552 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2553 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2554 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2555 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2557 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2558 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2559 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2561 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2562 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2563 payment_id: *payment_id,
2564 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2565 total_msat: *total_msat,
2568 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2569 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2571 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2572 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2574 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2579 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2580 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2581 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2582 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2583 Some(transaction) => {
2584 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2585 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2590 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2591 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2592 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2593 reason: closure_reason,
2594 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2595 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2599 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2600 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2602 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2603 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2605 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2607 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2608 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2610 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2611 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2613 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2614 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2615 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2616 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2617 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2618 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2619 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2620 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2621 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2623 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2624 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2625 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2626 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2627 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2631 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2632 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2634 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2635 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2636 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2637 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2641 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2642 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2643 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2644 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2648 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2649 shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
2655 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2656 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2657 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2659 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2660 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2661 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2662 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2667 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2668 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2669 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2670 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2673 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2674 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2680 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2681 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2682 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2684 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2685 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2687 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2688 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2689 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2690 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2692 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2694 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2695 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2696 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2699 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2700 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2701 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2702 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2703 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2704 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2707 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2708 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2709 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2711 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2712 /// the channel being closed or not:
2713 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2714 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2715 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2716 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2717 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2718 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2719 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2721 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2722 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2723 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2724 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2726 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2728 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2729 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2730 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2733 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2734 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2735 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2736 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2737 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2738 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2741 fn finish_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2742 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2743 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2744 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2745 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2748 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs, unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid) = shutdown_res;
2749 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2750 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2751 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2752 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2753 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2754 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2756 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2757 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2758 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2759 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2760 // ignore the result here.
2761 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2763 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2764 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2765 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2766 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2767 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2768 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2769 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2770 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2771 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2772 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2773 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2774 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2775 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2778 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2781 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2782 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2785 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2786 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2790 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2791 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2792 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2793 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2794 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2795 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2796 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2797 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2798 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2799 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2800 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2802 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2804 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2805 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2806 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2807 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2808 mem::drop(peer_state);
2809 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2811 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2812 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2813 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2815 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2816 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2817 // Unfunded channel has no update
2818 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2821 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2822 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2823 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2824 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2826 (None, *peer_node_id)
2828 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2831 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2832 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2833 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2834 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2835 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2836 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2837 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2838 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2839 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2845 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2848 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2849 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2850 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2851 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2852 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2853 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2854 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2855 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2856 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2857 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2858 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2859 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2870 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2871 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2872 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2874 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2875 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2876 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2879 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2880 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2881 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2883 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2884 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2885 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2886 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2887 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2890 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2891 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2892 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2893 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2894 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2898 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2899 /// local transaction(s).
2900 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2901 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2902 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2906 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2907 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2908 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2909 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2910 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2911 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2912 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2914 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2915 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2919 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2920 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2921 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2922 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } =>
2923 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2924 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2925 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2926 err_data: Vec::new(),
2930 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2931 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2932 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2935 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2936 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2937 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2938 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2939 outgoing_cltv_value,
2940 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2944 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2945 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2946 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2947 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2948 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2949 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2950 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2951 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2953 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2954 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
2955 amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, ..
2957 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
2958 (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None)
2960 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => {
2961 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2962 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2963 err_data: Vec::new(),
2964 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2968 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2969 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2970 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2971 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2973 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2976 // final_expiry_too_soon
2977 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2978 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2980 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2981 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2982 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2983 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2984 if cltv_expiry <= current_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 {
2985 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2986 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2987 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2988 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2989 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2990 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2993 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2994 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2995 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2997 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2999 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
3000 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
3004 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
3005 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
3006 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
3007 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
3008 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
3009 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
3010 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3011 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
3012 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3013 err_code: 0x4000|22,
3014 err_data: Vec::new(),
3015 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
3018 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
3019 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3020 err_code: 0x4000|22,
3021 err_data: Vec::new(),
3022 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
3025 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
3029 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
3032 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
3033 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3036 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
3037 phantom_shared_secret,
3041 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3042 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
3043 err_data: Vec::new(),
3044 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
3047 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3050 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
3051 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
3052 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
3053 outgoing_cltv_value,
3054 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
3058 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3059 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
3060 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
3061 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
3062 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
3064 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3065 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3066 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3067 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3068 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
3069 failure_code: $err_code,
3075 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
3076 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
3079 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
3080 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
3081 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3083 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
3084 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
3085 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
3086 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
3087 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
3088 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
3089 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
3090 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
3092 macro_rules! return_err {
3093 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3095 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3096 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3097 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3098 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3099 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3100 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3106 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
3107 shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
3108 msg.payment_hash, &self.node_signer
3111 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3112 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
3114 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3115 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
3118 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
3119 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3120 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
3121 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
3124 let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
3125 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
3126 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
3128 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
3129 // inbound channel's state.
3130 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3131 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } |
3132 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } =>
3134 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
3138 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3139 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3140 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3141 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3142 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3143 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3144 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3145 // phantom or an intercept.
3146 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3147 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3148 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3152 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3155 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3157 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3158 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3159 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3160 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3161 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3163 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3164 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3165 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3166 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3169 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3170 // have no consistency guarantees.
3171 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3175 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3176 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3177 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3178 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3179 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3181 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3182 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3183 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3184 // we don't have the channel here.
3185 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3187 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3189 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3190 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3191 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3192 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3193 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3194 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3195 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3196 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3197 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3198 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3199 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3201 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3204 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3205 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3207 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3208 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3212 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3213 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3214 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3215 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3217 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3224 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3225 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3226 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3227 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3228 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3229 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3231 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3232 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3234 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3235 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3236 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3237 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3238 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3239 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3240 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3241 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3242 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3243 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3249 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3250 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3251 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3252 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3254 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3255 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3257 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3258 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3259 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3261 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3262 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3263 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3264 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3265 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3266 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3267 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3271 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3273 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3276 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3277 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3278 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3279 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3280 macro_rules! return_err {
3281 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3283 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3284 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3285 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3286 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3287 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3288 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3294 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3296 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3297 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3300 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3301 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3302 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3303 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3304 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3306 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3309 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3310 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3311 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3312 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3313 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3319 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3320 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3321 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3323 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3324 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3325 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3327 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3328 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3329 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3330 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3331 return Err(LightningError {
3332 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3333 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3336 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3337 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3339 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3340 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3343 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3344 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3345 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3346 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3348 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3349 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3350 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3352 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3353 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3354 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3355 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3356 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3357 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3361 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3364 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3365 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3366 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3368 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3369 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3370 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3371 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3372 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3375 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3376 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3378 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3379 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3380 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3381 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3382 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3383 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3384 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3385 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3387 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3388 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3389 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3391 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3393 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3400 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3401 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3402 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3403 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3408 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3409 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3410 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3413 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3414 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3416 log_trace!(self.logger,
3417 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3418 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3419 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3420 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3422 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3423 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3424 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3426 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3427 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3429 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3430 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3431 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3432 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3435 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3436 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3437 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3438 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3439 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3440 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3441 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3442 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3443 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3444 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3446 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3447 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3448 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3450 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3451 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3453 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3454 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3455 Some(monitor_update) => {
3456 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3458 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3459 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3460 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3461 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3462 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3463 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3464 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3472 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3475 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3476 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3477 // `channel_by_id` map.
3478 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3479 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3484 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3485 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3487 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3492 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3494 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3495 /// fields for more info.
3497 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3498 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3500 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3502 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3503 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3504 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3505 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3506 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3508 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3509 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3510 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3511 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3512 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3514 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3515 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3516 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3517 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3519 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3521 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3522 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3523 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3525 /// In general, a path may raise:
3526 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3527 /// node public key) is specified.
3528 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3529 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3530 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3531 /// relevant updates.
3533 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3534 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3535 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3537 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3538 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3539 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3540 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3541 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3542 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3543 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3544 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3545 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3546 self.pending_outbound_payments
3547 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3548 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3549 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3552 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3553 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3554 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3555 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3556 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3557 self.pending_outbound_payments
3558 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3559 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3560 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3561 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3565 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3566 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3567 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3568 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3569 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3570 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3574 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3575 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3576 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3580 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3581 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3584 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3585 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3586 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3587 self.pending_outbound_payments
3588 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3589 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3590 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3591 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3592 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3596 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3597 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3598 /// retries are exhausted.
3600 /// # Event Generation
3602 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3603 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3605 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3606 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3607 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3609 /// # Requested Invoices
3611 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3612 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3613 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3614 /// once the invoice has been received.
3616 /// # Restart Behavior
3618 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3619 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3620 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3622 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3623 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3624 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3625 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3628 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3629 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3630 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3631 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3632 /// never reach the recipient.
3634 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3635 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3637 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3638 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3640 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3641 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3642 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3643 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3644 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3645 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3646 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3649 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3650 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3652 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3655 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3656 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3657 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3658 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3659 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3660 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3661 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3662 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3665 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3666 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3667 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3668 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3669 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3670 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3671 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3672 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3673 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3676 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3679 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3680 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3683 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3684 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3686 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3687 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3688 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3689 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3690 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3691 let payment_params =
3692 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3694 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3696 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3699 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3700 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3702 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3703 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3704 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3705 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3707 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3708 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3709 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3710 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3711 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3712 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3713 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3714 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3715 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3716 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3718 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3719 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3720 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3721 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3725 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3727 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3728 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3731 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3733 let mut res = Vec::new();
3735 for mut path in route.paths {
3736 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3737 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3738 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3739 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3740 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3743 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3746 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3747 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3749 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3751 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3752 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3757 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3760 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3765 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3766 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3767 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3769 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3770 let used_liquidity =
3771 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3773 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3774 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3776 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3779 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3784 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3785 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3786 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3793 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3794 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3795 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3796 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3797 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3798 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3799 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3800 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3801 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3803 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3804 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3805 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3806 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3807 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3809 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &self.logger)
3810 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3811 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3812 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3813 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3814 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3815 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3816 } else { unreachable!(); });
3818 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3819 Err((chan, err)) => {
3820 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3821 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3823 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3824 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3825 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3831 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3832 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3834 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3835 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3838 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3839 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3840 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3844 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3845 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3848 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3849 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3850 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3852 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3853 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3854 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3855 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3857 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3864 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3865 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3866 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3870 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3872 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3873 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3875 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3876 /// across the p2p network.
3878 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3879 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3881 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3882 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3883 /// keys per-channel).
3885 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3886 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3887 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3889 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3890 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3891 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3893 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3894 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3895 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3896 /// for more details.
3898 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3899 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3900 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3901 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3904 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3906 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3907 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3909 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transcaction
3910 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3911 /// signature for each channel.
3913 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3914 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3915 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3916 let mut result = Ok(());
3918 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3919 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3920 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3921 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3922 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3927 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3928 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3929 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3933 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3934 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3935 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3936 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3937 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3938 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3939 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3940 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3945 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3946 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3947 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3948 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3952 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3953 match states.entry(txid) {
3954 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3955 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3956 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3960 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3963 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels.iter() {
3964 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3965 temporary_channel_id,
3966 counterparty_node_id,
3967 funding_transaction.clone(),
3970 let mut output_index = None;
3971 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3972 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3973 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3974 if output_index.is_some() {
3975 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3976 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3979 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3982 if output_index.is_none() {
3983 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3984 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3987 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3988 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3989 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3995 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3996 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3997 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3998 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3999 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4000 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4001 .into_iter().flatten()
4002 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4004 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4005 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4007 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4009 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4010 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4011 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4012 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4013 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
4015 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4016 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
4017 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
4021 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4022 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4028 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4030 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4031 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4032 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4033 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4035 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4036 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4038 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4039 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4041 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4043 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4044 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4045 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4046 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4047 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4048 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4049 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4050 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4051 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4052 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4053 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4054 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4055 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4059 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4060 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4061 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4062 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4063 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4064 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4065 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4066 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4067 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4068 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4072 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4073 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4074 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4075 config.apply(config_update);
4076 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4079 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4080 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4081 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4082 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4083 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4084 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4091 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4092 debug_assert!(false);
4093 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4095 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4096 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4103 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4105 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4106 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4107 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4108 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4110 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4111 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4113 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4114 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4116 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4118 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4119 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4120 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4121 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4122 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4123 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4124 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4125 pub fn update_channel_config(
4126 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4127 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4128 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4131 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4132 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4134 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4135 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4137 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4138 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4139 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4140 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4141 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4143 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4144 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4145 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4148 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4151 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4152 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4153 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4154 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4155 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4156 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4157 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4159 let next_hop_scid = {
4160 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4161 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4162 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4163 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4164 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4165 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4166 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4167 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4168 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4169 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4172 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4174 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4175 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4176 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4178 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4179 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4180 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4185 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4186 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4187 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4190 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4191 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
4192 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
4194 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4196 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4197 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4198 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4199 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4200 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4203 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4204 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4205 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4206 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4207 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4209 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4213 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4214 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4216 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4219 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4220 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4221 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4223 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4224 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4225 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4228 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4229 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4230 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4231 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4232 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4233 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4234 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4235 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4238 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4239 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4240 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4241 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4246 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4248 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4249 /// Will likely generate further events.
4250 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4251 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4253 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4254 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4255 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4257 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4258 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4260 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4261 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4262 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4264 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4265 match forward_info {
4266 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4267 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4268 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4269 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4270 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4273 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4274 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4275 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4277 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4278 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4279 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4280 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4281 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4282 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4283 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4286 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4287 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4289 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4292 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4293 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4299 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4300 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4302 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4306 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4307 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4309 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4313 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4314 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4315 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4316 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4317 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4318 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4319 payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4322 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4323 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
4324 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4325 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4326 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4328 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4330 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4331 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4335 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4336 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4337 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4338 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
4340 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4341 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4347 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4350 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4353 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4354 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4355 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4356 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4357 // problem, not ours.
4363 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4364 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4365 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4367 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4371 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4372 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4373 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4374 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4377 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4378 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4379 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4380 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4381 match forward_info {
4382 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4383 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4384 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4385 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4386 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4389 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4390 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4391 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4392 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4393 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4394 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4395 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4396 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4397 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4399 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4400 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4401 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4404 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4405 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4407 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4409 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4410 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4411 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4412 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4417 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4418 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4420 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4421 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4422 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4423 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4425 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4426 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4428 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4430 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4431 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4432 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4439 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4443 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4444 match forward_info {
4445 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4446 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4447 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4448 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4449 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4452 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4453 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4454 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4455 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4456 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4457 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4458 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4460 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4461 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4462 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4466 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4467 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4470 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4473 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4474 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4475 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4476 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4477 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4478 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4479 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4480 phantom_shared_secret,
4482 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4483 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4484 // if routing nodes overpay
4485 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4486 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4488 total_value_received: None,
4489 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4492 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4495 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4497 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4498 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4499 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4500 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4501 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4502 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4504 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4505 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4506 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4507 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4508 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4509 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4510 phantom_shared_secret,
4512 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4513 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4515 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4518 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4519 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4520 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4521 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4522 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4525 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4526 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4527 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4528 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4529 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4530 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4532 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4533 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4534 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4536 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4537 .entry(payment_hash)
4538 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4539 .or_insert_with(|| {
4540 committed_to_claimable = true;
4542 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4545 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4546 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4547 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4548 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4550 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4551 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4552 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4554 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4555 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4556 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4559 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4561 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4562 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4563 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4564 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4565 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4566 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4567 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4568 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4569 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4570 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4572 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4574 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4575 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4576 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4577 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4578 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4579 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4581 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4582 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4583 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4584 committed_to_claimable = true;
4586 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4587 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4588 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4589 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4590 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4591 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4592 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4593 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4594 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4595 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4599 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4600 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4601 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4602 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4603 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4605 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4607 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4608 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4610 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4611 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4612 committed_to_claimable = true;
4615 payment_claimable_generated
4619 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4620 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4621 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4622 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4623 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4624 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4625 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4626 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4627 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4628 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4629 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4630 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4631 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4632 Ok(result) => result,
4634 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4635 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4638 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4639 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4640 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4641 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4642 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4643 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4646 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4647 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4648 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4650 check_total_value!(purpose);
4652 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4653 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4654 check_total_value!(purpose);
4658 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4659 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4660 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4661 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4663 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4664 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4665 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4666 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4667 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4668 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4669 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4670 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4672 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4673 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4674 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4676 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4677 if payment_claimable_generated {
4678 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4684 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4685 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4693 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4694 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4695 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4696 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4698 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4699 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4701 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4703 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4704 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4705 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4707 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4709 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4710 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4711 events.append(&mut new_events);
4714 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4716 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4717 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4718 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4720 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4722 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4723 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4724 if background_events.is_empty() {
4725 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4728 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4730 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4731 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4732 // monitor updating completing.
4733 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4735 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4736 let mut updated_chan = false;
4738 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4739 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4740 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4741 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4742 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4743 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4744 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4745 updated_chan = true;
4746 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4747 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4749 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4752 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4757 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4758 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4761 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4762 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4763 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4764 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4765 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4766 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4767 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4769 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4770 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4771 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4772 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4773 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4779 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4782 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4783 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4784 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4785 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4786 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4789 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4790 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4791 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4792 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4793 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4794 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4795 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4797 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4799 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4800 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4801 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4802 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4804 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4805 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4807 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4808 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4812 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4813 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4814 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4815 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4816 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4817 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4818 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4820 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4821 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4823 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4824 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4825 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4826 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4827 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4828 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4830 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4835 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4836 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4844 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4846 /// This currently includes:
4847 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4848 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4849 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4851 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4852 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4853 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4854 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4855 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4856 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4857 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4858 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4860 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4861 /// estimate fetches.
4863 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4864 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4865 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4866 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4867 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4869 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4870 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4872 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4873 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4874 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4875 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4877 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4878 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4879 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4880 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4881 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4882 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4884 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4885 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4886 log_error!(self.logger,
4887 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4888 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4889 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4890 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4891 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4892 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4893 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4894 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4895 channel_id: *chan_id,
4896 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4907 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4908 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4909 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4910 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4911 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4912 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4913 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4915 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4916 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4921 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4922 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4924 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4925 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4926 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4927 if needs_close { return false; }
4930 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4931 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4932 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4933 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4934 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4935 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4936 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4937 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4939 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4940 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4941 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4942 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4946 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4948 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4951 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4953 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4954 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4955 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4956 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4960 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4962 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4968 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4970 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4971 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4972 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4973 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4974 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4975 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4976 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4977 channel_id: *chan_id,
4978 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4986 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4987 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4988 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4990 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4991 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4992 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4997 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4998 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4999 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5000 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5001 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5002 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5003 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5004 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5010 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5012 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5013 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5018 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5019 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5020 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5021 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5022 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5023 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5024 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5025 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5026 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5027 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5028 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5029 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5030 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5031 // have no channels to the peer.
5032 let remove_entry = {
5033 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5034 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5037 entry.remove_entry();
5040 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5045 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5046 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5047 // This should be unreachable
5048 debug_assert!(false);
5051 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5052 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5053 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5054 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5055 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5056 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5057 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5060 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5061 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5062 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5064 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5065 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5072 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5073 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5074 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5075 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5076 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5079 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5080 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5083 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5084 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5087 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5088 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5089 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5090 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5091 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5092 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5093 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5096 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5097 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5100 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5101 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5102 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5103 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5104 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5111 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5112 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5113 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5115 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5116 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5117 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5118 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5120 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5121 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5122 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5123 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5124 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5125 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5128 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5129 /// reason for the failure.
5131 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5132 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5133 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5135 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5136 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5137 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5138 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5139 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5140 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5141 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5146 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5147 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5148 match failure_code {
5149 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5150 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5151 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5152 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5153 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5154 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5156 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5157 let fail_data = match data {
5158 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5161 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5166 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5167 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5169 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5171 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5172 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5173 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5174 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5175 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5176 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5177 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5179 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5181 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5182 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5184 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5189 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5190 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5191 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5192 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5193 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5194 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5195 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5196 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5197 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5198 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5200 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5201 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5202 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5203 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5205 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5206 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5207 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5208 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5209 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5213 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5214 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5215 // be surfaced to the user.
5216 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5217 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5218 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5220 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5221 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5222 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5223 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5224 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5225 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5226 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5227 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5228 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5230 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5231 debug_assert!(false);
5232 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5235 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5237 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5240 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5241 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5242 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5243 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5247 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5248 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5249 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5250 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5251 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5252 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5253 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5254 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5255 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5256 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5259 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5260 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5261 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5264 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5265 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5266 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5268 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5269 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5270 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5271 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5272 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5274 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
5275 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
5276 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
5278 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5279 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5280 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5281 push_forward_ev = true;
5283 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5284 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5285 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5287 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5288 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5291 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5292 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5293 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5294 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5295 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5296 failed_next_destination: destination,
5302 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5303 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5305 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5306 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5307 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5308 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5310 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5311 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5312 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5313 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5315 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5316 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5317 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5319 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5320 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5321 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5322 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5323 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5324 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5325 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5326 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5327 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5330 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5331 /// even type numbers.
5335 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5336 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5338 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5339 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5340 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5343 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5344 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5346 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5349 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5350 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5351 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5352 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5353 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5354 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5355 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5356 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5361 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5362 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5363 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5364 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5365 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5367 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5368 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5369 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5373 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5374 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5375 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5376 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5377 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5378 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5379 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5380 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5381 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5382 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5383 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5392 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5394 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5395 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5396 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5397 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5398 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5399 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5400 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5401 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5402 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5403 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5404 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5405 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5406 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5407 debug_assert!(false);
5411 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5413 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5414 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5415 debug_assert!(false);
5419 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5420 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5422 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5423 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5424 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5425 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5428 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5429 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5430 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5431 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5435 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5436 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5437 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5438 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5439 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5440 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5443 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5444 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5445 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5446 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5447 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5452 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5453 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5454 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5455 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5456 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5457 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5458 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5460 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5463 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5464 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5465 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5466 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5470 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5471 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5472 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5473 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5475 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5476 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5477 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5478 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5480 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5481 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5482 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5483 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5486 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5487 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5488 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5489 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5493 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5494 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5495 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5498 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5499 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5500 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5501 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5502 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5503 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5504 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5507 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5508 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5509 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5511 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5514 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5515 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5517 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5518 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5519 // monitor update as a background event.
5520 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5521 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5522 counterparty_node_id,
5523 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5524 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5528 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5529 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5534 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5536 log_trace!(self.logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5538 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5539 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5540 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5541 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5542 blocking_action: blocker,
5544 (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5546 debug_assert!(false,
5547 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5550 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5551 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5552 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5553 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5554 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5556 let mut found_blocker = false;
5557 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5558 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5559 // which case we need to only remove the one
5560 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5561 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5562 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5563 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5565 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5568 debug_assert!(false);
5577 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5578 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5579 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5585 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5586 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5587 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5588 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5589 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5590 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5591 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5592 // again on restart.
5593 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5594 payment_preimage, update_res);
5597 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5598 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5600 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5601 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5602 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5603 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5604 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5605 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5606 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5607 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5608 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5609 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5612 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5613 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5614 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5615 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5616 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5617 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5621 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5622 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5625 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5626 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5627 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5630 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5631 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5632 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5633 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5634 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5636 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5637 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5638 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5640 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5641 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5644 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5645 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5646 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5647 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5648 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5649 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5650 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5651 let chan_to_release =
5652 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5653 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5655 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5656 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5657 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5658 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5663 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5664 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5665 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5666 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5667 // in the background.
5668 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5669 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5670 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5671 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5673 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5674 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5675 funding_txo, update, ..
5677 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5678 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5679 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5680 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5682 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5688 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5689 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5690 (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5692 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5693 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5695 monitor_update.updates[0],
5696 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5701 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5702 // immediately once we get going.
5703 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5706 *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5708 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5711 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5712 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5713 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5714 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5715 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5716 blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5720 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5721 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5722 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5725 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5726 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5728 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5729 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5730 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5731 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5733 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5737 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5738 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5739 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5745 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5746 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5747 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5750 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5751 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5752 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5753 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5755 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5757 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5758 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5759 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5761 payment_purpose: purpose,
5764 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5766 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5770 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5772 sender_intended_total_msat,
5776 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5777 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5779 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5780 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5781 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5784 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5785 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5787 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5788 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5789 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5790 Some(blocking_action),
5797 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5798 /// update completion.
5799 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5800 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5801 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5802 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5803 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5804 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5805 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5806 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5807 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5808 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5809 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5810 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5811 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5813 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5815 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5816 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5817 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5818 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5821 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5822 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5824 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5825 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5826 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5831 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5832 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5833 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5834 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5839 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5840 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5841 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5842 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5843 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5848 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5852 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5858 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5859 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5860 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5864 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5865 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5866 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5872 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5873 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5875 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5876 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5878 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5879 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5880 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5881 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5882 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5887 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5888 let mut peer_state_lock;
5889 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5890 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5891 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5892 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5894 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5897 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5898 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5899 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5900 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5901 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5904 let remaining_in_flight =
5905 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5906 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5909 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5910 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5911 remaining_in_flight);
5912 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5915 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5918 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5920 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5921 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5924 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5925 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5926 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5928 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5929 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5930 /// used to accept such channels.
5932 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5933 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5934 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5935 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5938 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5939 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5941 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5942 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5943 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5945 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5946 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5948 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5949 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5951 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5952 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5954 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5955 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5956 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5957 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5960 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5961 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5963 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5964 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5965 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5966 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5967 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5968 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5969 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5970 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5972 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5973 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5974 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5976 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5977 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5978 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5979 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5980 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5981 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5982 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5984 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5988 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5989 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5990 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5991 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5992 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5993 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5994 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5997 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5998 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
6000 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6001 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6002 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6003 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6004 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6005 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6006 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6007 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6010 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6011 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
6015 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6016 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6017 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6019 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6020 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6021 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6024 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6029 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6030 /// or 0-conf channels.
6032 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6033 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6034 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6035 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6036 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6037 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6039 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6040 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6041 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6042 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6043 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6044 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6045 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6049 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6052 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6053 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6055 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6056 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6058 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6059 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6060 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6061 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6062 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6064 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6067 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6068 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6069 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6072 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6073 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6078 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6081 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6082 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6083 // likely to be lost on restart!
6084 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6085 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6088 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6089 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6092 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6093 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6094 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6095 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6096 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6098 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6099 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6101 debug_assert!(false);
6102 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6104 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6105 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6107 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6108 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6109 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6110 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6111 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6112 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6114 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6115 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6116 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6119 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6120 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6121 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6122 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6123 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6126 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6127 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6129 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6132 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6133 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6134 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6135 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6136 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6137 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6138 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6139 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6140 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
6142 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6143 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6144 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6149 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6150 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6151 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6152 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6153 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6154 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6155 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6158 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6163 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6164 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6165 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6167 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6168 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6171 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6172 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6174 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6175 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6176 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6178 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6182 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6183 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6184 // likely to be lost on restart!
6185 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6186 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6187 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6189 debug_assert!(false);
6190 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6192 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6193 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6194 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6195 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6196 match phase.get_mut() {
6197 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6198 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6199 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6202 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6206 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6209 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6210 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6211 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6212 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6213 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6215 user_channel_id: user_id,
6220 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6221 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6223 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6224 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6226 debug_assert!(false);
6227 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6230 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6231 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6232 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
6233 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6234 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6235 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
6237 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6238 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6239 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6240 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6241 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6242 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6243 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6244 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6245 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6249 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6250 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6252 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6255 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
6256 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6257 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
6259 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6260 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6261 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6262 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6263 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6264 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6265 funding_msg.channel_id))
6267 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6268 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6269 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6270 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6271 mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6273 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6274 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6275 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6276 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6277 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6278 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6282 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6283 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6284 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6286 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6290 log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6291 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6292 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6293 funding_msg.channel_id));
6301 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6302 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6303 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6304 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6306 debug_assert!(false);
6307 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6310 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6311 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6312 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6313 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6314 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6315 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
6316 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6317 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6318 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6319 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6322 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
6326 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6330 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6334 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6335 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6336 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6337 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6338 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6340 debug_assert!(false);
6341 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6343 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6344 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6345 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6346 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6347 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6348 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6349 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6350 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6351 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6352 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6353 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6354 msg: announcement_sigs,
6356 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6357 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6358 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6359 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6360 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6361 // announcement_signatures.
6362 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6363 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6364 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6365 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6372 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6373 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6378 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6379 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6382 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6383 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6388 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6389 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6390 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6392 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6393 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6395 debug_assert!(false);
6396 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6398 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6399 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6400 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6401 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6403 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6404 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6405 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6407 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6410 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6411 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6412 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6413 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6415 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6416 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6417 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6418 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6419 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6420 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6424 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6425 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6426 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6427 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6430 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6431 let context = phase.context_mut();
6432 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6433 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6434 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6435 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6439 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6442 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6443 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6444 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6445 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6447 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6448 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6454 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6455 let mut shutdown_result = None;
6456 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid;
6457 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6458 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6460 debug_assert!(false);
6461 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6463 let (tx, chan_option) = {
6464 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6465 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6466 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6467 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6468 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6469 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
6470 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6471 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6472 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6473 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6478 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6479 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6480 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6481 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6482 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6483 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)))
6484 } else { (tx, None) }
6486 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6487 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6490 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6493 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6494 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6495 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6497 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6498 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6499 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6500 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6501 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6505 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6506 shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
6508 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6509 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6510 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6515 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6516 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6517 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6518 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6520 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6521 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6522 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6523 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6525 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6526 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6528 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6529 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6530 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6532 debug_assert!(false);
6533 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6535 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6536 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6537 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6538 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6539 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6540 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6541 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6542 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6543 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6544 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6546 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6547 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6548 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6549 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6550 match pending_forward_info {
6551 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6552 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6553 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6554 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6556 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6557 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6558 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6559 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6560 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6563 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6565 _ => pending_forward_info
6568 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6570 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6571 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6574 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6579 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6581 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6582 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6583 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6585 debug_assert!(false);
6586 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6588 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6589 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6590 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6591 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6592 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6593 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6594 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6595 log_trace!(self.logger,
6596 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6598 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6599 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6600 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6602 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6603 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6604 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6605 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6606 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6607 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6608 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6611 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6612 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6615 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6618 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6622 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6623 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6624 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6625 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6626 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6628 debug_assert!(false);
6629 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6631 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6632 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6633 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6634 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6635 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6636 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6638 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6639 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6642 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6647 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6648 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6649 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6650 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6651 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6653 debug_assert!(false);
6654 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6656 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6657 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6658 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6659 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6660 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6661 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6662 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6664 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6665 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6667 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6668 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6672 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6676 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6677 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6678 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6680 debug_assert!(false);
6681 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6683 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6684 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6685 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6686 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6687 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6688 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6689 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6690 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6691 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6692 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6696 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6697 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6700 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6705 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6706 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6707 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6708 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6709 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6710 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6711 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6712 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6713 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6714 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6715 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6717 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6718 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6720 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6721 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6722 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6723 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6724 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6725 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6727 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6728 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6729 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6731 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6732 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6733 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6734 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6735 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6736 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6737 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6738 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6739 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6742 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6743 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6745 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6746 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6747 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6748 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6749 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6750 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6751 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6752 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6753 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6756 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6757 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6758 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6763 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6764 // payments are being processed.
6765 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6766 push_forward_event = true;
6768 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6769 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6776 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6777 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6780 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6781 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6782 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6784 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6788 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6789 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6790 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6791 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6792 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6794 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6795 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6796 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6797 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6798 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6799 // real by taking more time.
6800 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6801 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6802 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6807 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6808 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6809 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6810 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6811 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6812 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6813 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6815 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6816 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6817 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6818 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6819 channel_funding_outpoint,
6820 counterparty_node_id,
6825 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6826 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6827 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6829 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6830 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6831 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6832 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6834 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6835 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6836 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6842 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6843 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6844 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6845 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6847 debug_assert!(false);
6848 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6849 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6850 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6851 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6852 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6853 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6854 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6855 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6856 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6857 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6858 *counterparty_node_id)
6860 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6861 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6862 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6863 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6864 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6865 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6866 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6870 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6871 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6874 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6877 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6881 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6882 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6883 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6885 debug_assert!(false);
6886 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6888 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6889 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6890 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6891 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6892 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6893 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6895 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6896 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6899 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6904 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6905 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6906 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6908 debug_assert!(false);
6909 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6911 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6912 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6913 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6914 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6915 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6916 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6917 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6920 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6921 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6922 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6923 msg, &self.default_configuration
6924 ), chan_phase_entry),
6925 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6926 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6927 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6930 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6931 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6934 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6939 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6940 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6941 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6942 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6944 // It's not a local channel
6945 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6948 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6949 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6950 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6951 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6953 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6954 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6955 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6956 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6957 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6958 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6959 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6960 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6961 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6962 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6963 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6965 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6967 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6968 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6969 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6970 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6972 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
6973 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6974 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
6977 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6981 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6982 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6985 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6987 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6990 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6992 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6993 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6995 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6997 debug_assert!(false);
6998 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6999 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7003 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7004 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7005 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7006 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7007 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7008 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7009 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7010 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7011 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7012 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7013 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7014 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7015 let mut channel_update = None;
7016 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7017 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7018 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7021 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7022 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7023 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7024 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7025 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7026 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7027 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7032 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7033 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7034 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7035 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7036 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7037 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7041 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7042 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7045 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7046 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7047 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id.0));
7048 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7049 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7050 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7051 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7052 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7053 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7055 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7056 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7057 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7058 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7059 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7060 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7061 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7062 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7063 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7064 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7065 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7066 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7067 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7068 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7069 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7070 next_funding_txid: None,
7073 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7074 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7075 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7081 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7082 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7083 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7084 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7087 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7088 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7093 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7094 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7095 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7097 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7098 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7099 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7100 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7101 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7102 match monitor_event {
7103 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7104 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7105 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7106 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7108 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7109 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7110 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7111 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7114 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7115 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7116 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7118 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7119 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
7120 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7121 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
7124 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7125 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7126 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7127 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7128 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7129 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7130 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7131 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7132 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
7133 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7134 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7138 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7139 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7140 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7141 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7142 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7150 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7151 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7157 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7158 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7161 has_pending_monitor_events
7164 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7165 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7166 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7168 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7169 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7170 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7173 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7174 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7175 /// update was applied.
7176 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7177 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7178 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7180 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7181 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7182 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7183 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7185 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7186 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7188 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7189 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7190 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7191 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7193 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7194 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7195 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7196 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
7197 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7198 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7200 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7201 has_monitor_update = true;
7203 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7204 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7205 continue 'peer_loop;
7214 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7215 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7216 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7222 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7223 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7224 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7225 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7226 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7227 let mut has_update = false;
7228 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7230 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7232 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7233 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7234 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7235 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7236 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7238 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7239 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
7240 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
7241 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
7242 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7244 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7245 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7248 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7249 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7250 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7251 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7252 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7257 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7259 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7260 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7261 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7262 shutdown_results.push((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
7268 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7269 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7274 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7280 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7281 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7284 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7285 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7291 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7292 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7294 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7295 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7296 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7297 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7298 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7299 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7300 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7301 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7302 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7303 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
7304 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7305 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7306 assert!(should_broadcast);
7307 } else { unreachable!(); }
7308 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7309 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7310 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7313 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7317 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7318 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7319 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7323 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the
7324 /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently,
7325 /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction
7326 /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7328 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7329 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7330 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7331 &self, description: String
7332 ) -> OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
7333 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7334 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7335 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7336 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7337 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7339 OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx)
7340 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7344 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7345 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7349 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7350 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7352 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7353 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7354 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7357 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7358 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7359 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7363 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as
7364 /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7365 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7366 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7370 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7371 /// or if `amount_msats` is invalid.
7373 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7374 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7375 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7376 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7377 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7378 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7379 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7380 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7381 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7382 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7383 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7385 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7386 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7388 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7389 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7392 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7393 self.pending_outbound_payments
7394 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7395 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7397 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7402 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7403 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7404 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7406 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7407 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7408 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7409 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7410 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7411 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7412 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7416 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7417 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7420 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7421 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7422 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7426 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7427 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7428 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7429 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7433 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7434 /// or if the provided parameters are invalid for the offer.
7436 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7437 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7438 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7439 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7440 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7441 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7442 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7443 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7444 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7445 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7446 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7447 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7448 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7449 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7452 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7453 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7454 let builder = match quantity {
7456 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7458 let builder = match amount_msats {
7460 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7462 let builder = match payer_note {
7464 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7467 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7468 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7470 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7471 self.pending_outbound_payments
7472 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7473 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7475 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7477 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7478 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7479 let message = PendingOnionMessage {
7480 contents: OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7481 destination: Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7482 reply_path: Some(reply_path),
7484 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7486 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7487 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7488 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7489 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7490 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7491 let message = PendingOnionMessage {
7492 contents: OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7493 destination: Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7494 reply_path: Some(reply_path.clone()),
7496 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7503 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7506 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7507 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7508 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7510 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7511 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7512 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7513 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7514 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7516 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7517 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7519 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7520 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7521 let payment_paths = vec![
7522 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
7524 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7525 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7526 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7528 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7529 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7530 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7532 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7533 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7534 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7536 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7537 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7539 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7540 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7541 let message = PendingOnionMessage {
7542 contents: OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7543 destination: Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7544 reply_path: Some(reply_path),
7546 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7548 for path in refund.paths() {
7549 let message = PendingOnionMessage {
7550 contents: OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7551 destination: Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7552 reply_path: Some(reply_path.clone()),
7554 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7560 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7564 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7567 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7568 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7570 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7571 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7572 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7573 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7575 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7577 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7578 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7582 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7583 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7585 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7587 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7588 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7590 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7591 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7592 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7593 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7594 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7595 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7596 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7597 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7598 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7599 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7600 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7603 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7604 /// stored external to LDK.
7606 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7607 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7608 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7610 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7611 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7614 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7615 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7616 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7617 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7619 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7620 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7621 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7622 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7623 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7625 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7626 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7627 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7628 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7629 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7631 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7632 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7634 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7635 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7639 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7640 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7642 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7644 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7645 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7647 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7648 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7649 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7650 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7651 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7652 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7653 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7656 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7657 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7659 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7660 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7661 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7664 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7666 fn create_one_hop_blinded_path(&self) -> BlindedPath {
7667 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7668 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7669 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap()
7672 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7674 fn create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(
7675 &self, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7676 ) -> (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath) {
7677 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7678 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7680 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7681 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7682 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7684 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7686 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7689 // TODO: Err for overflow?
7690 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_payment(
7691 payee_node_id, payee_tlvs, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7695 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7696 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7698 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7699 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7700 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7701 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7703 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7704 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7705 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7706 Some(_) => continue,
7707 None => return scid_candidate
7712 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7714 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7715 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7717 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7718 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7719 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7723 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7724 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7725 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7727 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7728 /// times to get a unique scid.
7729 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7730 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7731 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7733 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7734 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7735 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7736 return scid_candidate
7740 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7741 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7742 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7743 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7745 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7746 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7747 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7748 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7749 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7750 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7752 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7753 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7754 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7763 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7764 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7765 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7766 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7767 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7771 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7772 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7773 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7774 events.push_back((event, None));
7778 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7779 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7780 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7784 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7785 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7789 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7790 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7793 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7794 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7795 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7796 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7797 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7799 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7800 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7801 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7802 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7804 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7805 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7806 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7807 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7809 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7813 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7814 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7815 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7816 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7817 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7818 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7819 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7823 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7824 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7825 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7826 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7827 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7828 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7829 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7830 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7831 if further_update_exists {
7832 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7837 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7838 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7843 log_debug!(self.logger,
7844 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7845 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7851 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7852 for action in actions {
7854 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7855 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7857 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7863 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7864 /// using the given event handler.
7866 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7867 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7871 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7875 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7877 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7878 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7879 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7880 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7881 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7882 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7886 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
7887 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
7888 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
7889 /// is always placed next to each other.
7891 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
7892 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
7893 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
7894 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
7896 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
7897 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
7898 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
7899 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
7900 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7901 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7902 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
7904 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
7905 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
7906 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
7907 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7910 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
7911 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7913 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
7914 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7917 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
7918 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7919 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7920 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7921 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7922 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
7923 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7927 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
7928 events.replace(pending_events);
7937 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7939 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7940 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7941 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7942 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7943 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7944 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7948 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
7950 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
7951 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
7952 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
7954 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
7958 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7960 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7961 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7962 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7963 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7964 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7965 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7969 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7971 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7972 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
7973 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
7974 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
7975 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
7978 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
7979 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
7982 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7983 let _persistence_guard =
7984 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7985 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7986 let new_height = height - 1;
7988 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
7989 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
7990 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
7991 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
7992 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
7993 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
7996 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8000 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8002 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8003 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8004 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8005 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8006 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8007 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8011 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8012 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8013 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8014 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8016 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8017 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8019 let _persistence_guard =
8020 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8021 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8022 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
8023 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8025 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8026 if height < last_best_block_height {
8027 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8028 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8032 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
8033 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8034 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8035 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8037 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8038 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8040 let _persistence_guard =
8041 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8042 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8043 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8045 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8047 macro_rules! max_time {
8048 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8050 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8051 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8052 // having an explicit local time source.
8053 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8054 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8055 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8056 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8057 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8063 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8064 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8065 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8066 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8070 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8071 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8072 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8073 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8074 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8075 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8076 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
8077 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
8084 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8085 let _persistence_guard =
8086 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8087 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8088 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8089 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8090 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8091 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8092 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8093 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8098 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8100 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8101 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8102 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8103 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8104 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8105 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8109 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8110 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8112 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8113 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8114 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8115 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8116 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8118 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8119 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8121 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8122 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8123 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8124 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8125 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8126 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8128 // Retain unfunded channels.
8129 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8130 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8131 let res = f(channel);
8132 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8133 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8134 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8135 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8136 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8138 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8139 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8140 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8141 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8142 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8143 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8144 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8149 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8154 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8155 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8158 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8159 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8160 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8161 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8162 msg: announcement_sigs,
8164 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8165 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8166 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8168 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8169 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8170 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8175 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8176 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8177 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8178 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8179 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8180 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8181 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8182 // is always consistent.
8183 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8184 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8185 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8186 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8187 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8190 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8191 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8192 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8193 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8194 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
8195 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8196 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8200 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8201 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
8202 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8203 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8204 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8205 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8206 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8207 data: reason_message,
8220 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8221 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8222 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8223 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8224 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8225 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8226 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8227 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8228 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8229 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8231 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8232 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8233 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8237 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8240 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8241 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8242 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8243 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8244 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8245 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8246 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8247 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8248 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8249 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8252 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8253 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8254 _ => unreachable!(),
8256 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8257 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8258 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8259 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8265 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8267 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8268 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8272 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8273 /// may have events that need processing.
8275 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8276 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8278 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8279 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8280 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8281 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8284 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8285 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8286 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8289 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8290 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8291 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8294 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8295 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8296 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8297 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8300 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8301 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8302 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8303 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8306 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8307 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8309 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8310 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8311 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8312 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8313 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8316 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8317 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8318 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8319 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8322 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8323 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8324 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8325 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8328 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8329 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8330 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8331 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8334 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8335 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8336 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8337 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8341 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8342 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8344 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8345 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8346 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8347 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8348 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8349 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8353 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8354 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8355 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8356 // change to the contents.
8357 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8358 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8359 let persist = match &res {
8360 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8361 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8362 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8364 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8366 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8371 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8372 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8373 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8374 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8377 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8378 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8379 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8380 // change to the contents.
8381 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8382 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8383 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8387 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8388 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8389 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8390 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8393 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8394 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8395 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8398 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8399 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8400 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8403 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8404 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8405 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8406 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8407 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8408 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8409 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8410 let persist = match &res {
8411 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8412 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8414 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8419 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8420 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8421 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8424 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8425 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8426 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8429 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8430 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8431 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8432 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8433 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8434 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8435 let persist = match &res {
8436 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8437 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8438 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8440 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8445 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8446 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8447 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8450 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8451 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8452 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8453 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8454 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8455 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8456 let persist = match &res {
8457 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8458 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8459 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8461 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8466 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8467 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8468 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8469 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8470 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8471 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8472 let persist = match &res {
8473 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8474 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8475 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8477 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8482 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8483 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8484 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8487 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8488 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8489 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8492 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8493 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8494 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8495 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8496 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8497 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8498 let persist = match &res {
8499 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8500 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8501 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8503 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8508 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8509 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8510 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8513 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8514 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8515 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8518 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8523 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8524 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8525 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8526 let persist = match &res {
8527 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8528 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8529 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8531 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8536 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8537 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8538 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8539 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8540 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8542 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8543 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8544 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8545 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8546 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8547 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8548 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8549 let context = match phase {
8550 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8551 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger).is_ok() {
8552 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8557 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8558 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8561 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8565 // Clean up for removal.
8566 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8567 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8568 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8571 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8572 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8573 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8574 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8576 // V1 Channel Establishment
8577 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8578 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8579 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8580 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8581 // V2 Channel Establishment
8582 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8583 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8584 // Common Channel Establishment
8585 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8586 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8587 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8588 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8589 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8590 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8591 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8592 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8593 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8594 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8595 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8596 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8597 // Channel Operations
8598 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8599 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8600 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8601 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8602 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8603 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8605 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8606 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8607 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8608 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8609 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8610 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8611 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8612 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8613 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8616 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8617 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8618 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8619 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8622 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8624 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8626 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8627 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8631 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8632 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8633 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8637 let mut res = Ok(());
8639 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8640 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8641 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8642 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8643 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8644 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8645 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8648 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8649 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8650 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8651 if inbound_peer_limited {
8653 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8655 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8656 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8657 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8658 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8659 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8660 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8661 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8662 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8666 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8667 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8668 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8670 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8671 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8672 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8673 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8676 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8679 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8680 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8685 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8687 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8688 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8689 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8690 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8691 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8693 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8694 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8695 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8696 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8697 // worry about closing and removing them.
8698 debug_assert!(false);
8702 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8703 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8704 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
8709 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8710 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8715 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8716 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8718 match &msg.data as &str {
8719 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8720 "link failed to shutdown" =>
8722 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8723 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8724 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8725 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8726 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8727 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8728 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8729 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8730 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8731 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8732 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8733 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8734 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8735 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8736 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8737 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8741 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8742 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8743 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8744 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8745 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8746 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8748 log_level: Level::Trace,
8758 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8759 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8760 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8761 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8762 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8763 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8764 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8765 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8766 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8767 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8768 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8770 for channel_id in channel_ids {
8771 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8772 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8776 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8777 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8778 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8779 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8780 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8781 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8782 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8783 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8784 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8785 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8793 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8794 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8798 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8799 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8802 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8803 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8806 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8807 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
8810 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8811 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8812 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8813 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8816 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8817 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8818 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8819 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8822 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
8823 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8824 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8825 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8828 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
8829 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8830 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8831 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8834 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
8835 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8836 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8837 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8840 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
8841 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8842 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8843 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8846 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
8847 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8848 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8849 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8852 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
8853 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8854 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8855 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8858 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
8859 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8860 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8861 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8865 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8866 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8868 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8869 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8870 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8871 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8872 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8873 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8877 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
8878 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8879 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8882 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
8883 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
8886 Ok(amount_msats) => Some(amount_msats),
8887 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
8889 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
8890 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
8892 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
8893 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
8896 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8898 match self.create_inbound_payment(amount_msats, relative_expiry, None) {
8899 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) if invoice_request.keys.is_some() => {
8900 let payment_paths = vec![
8901 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
8903 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
8904 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
8905 payment_paths, payment_hash
8907 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8908 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8909 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8911 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8912 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8913 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
8915 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
8916 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
8917 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
8920 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8921 let payment_paths = vec![
8922 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
8924 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
8925 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
8926 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8927 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8928 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8930 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8931 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
8932 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
8934 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
8935 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
8937 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
8938 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
8939 Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
8940 InvoiceError::from_str("Failed signing invoice")
8942 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
8943 InvoiceError::from_str("Failed invoice signature verification")
8947 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
8948 Err(error) => Some(error),
8952 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount.into()))
8956 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
8957 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
8959 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_str("Unrecognized invoice")))
8961 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
8962 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
8965 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
8966 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
8967 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_str(&format!("{:?}", e))))
8974 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
8975 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
8981 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
8982 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
8986 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8987 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8988 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
8989 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
8990 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
8994 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8995 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8997 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8998 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8999 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9000 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9001 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9004 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9005 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9006 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9007 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9010 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9011 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9012 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9013 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9016 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9017 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9018 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9019 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9022 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9023 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9024 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9025 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9026 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9027 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9028 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9029 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9030 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9031 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9032 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9033 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9034 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9035 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9036 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9037 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9038 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9039 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9040 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9041 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9046 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9047 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9049 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9050 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9051 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9052 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9055 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9056 (2, node_id, required),
9057 (4, features, required),
9058 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9059 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9060 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9061 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9064 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9065 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9066 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9067 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9068 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9069 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9070 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9071 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9072 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9073 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9074 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9075 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9076 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9077 (7, self.config, option),
9078 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9079 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9080 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9081 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9082 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9083 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9084 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9085 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9086 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9087 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9088 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9089 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9090 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9091 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9092 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9093 (32, self.is_public, required),
9094 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9095 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9096 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9097 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9098 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9104 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9105 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9106 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9107 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9108 (2, channel_id, required),
9109 (3, channel_type, option),
9110 (4, counterparty, required),
9111 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9112 (6, funding_txo, option),
9113 (7, config, option),
9114 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9115 (9, confirmations, option),
9116 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9117 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9118 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9119 (16, balance_msat, required),
9120 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9121 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9122 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9123 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9124 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9125 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9126 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9127 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9128 (26, is_outbound, required),
9129 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9130 (30, is_usable, required),
9131 (32, is_public, required),
9132 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9133 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9134 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9135 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9136 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9139 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9140 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9141 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9142 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9143 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9147 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9149 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9150 outbound_scid_alias,
9154 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9155 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9157 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9158 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9159 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9160 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9161 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9162 confirmations_required,
9164 force_close_spend_delay,
9165 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9166 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9167 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9168 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9169 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9170 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9171 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9172 channel_shutdown_state,
9177 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9178 (2, channels, required_vec),
9179 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9180 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9183 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9185 (0, onion_packet, required),
9186 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9189 (0, payment_data, required),
9190 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9191 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9192 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9193 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9195 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9196 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9197 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9198 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9199 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9200 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9204 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9205 (0, routing, required),
9206 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9207 (4, payment_hash, required),
9208 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9209 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9210 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9211 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9215 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9216 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9218 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9220 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9221 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9222 reason.write(writer)?;
9224 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9225 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9228 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9229 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9230 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9231 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9238 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9239 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9240 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9243 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9244 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9245 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9246 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9250 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9251 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9252 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9253 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9254 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9257 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9258 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9259 // messages contained in the variants.
9260 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9261 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9262 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9264 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9265 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9266 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9267 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9268 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9271 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9272 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9273 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9274 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9275 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9277 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9282 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9287 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9288 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9289 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9290 (2, outpoint, required),
9291 (4, htlc_id, required),
9292 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9293 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9296 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9297 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9298 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9299 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9300 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9302 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9303 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9304 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9305 (2, self.value, required),
9306 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9307 (4, payment_data, option),
9308 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9309 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9310 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9311 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9317 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9318 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9319 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9320 (0, prev_hop, required),
9321 (1, total_msat, option),
9322 (2, value_ser, required),
9323 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9324 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9325 (5, total_value_received, option),
9326 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9327 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9328 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9330 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9331 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9332 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9334 if payment_data.is_some() {
9335 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9337 if total_msat.is_none() {
9338 total_msat = Some(value);
9340 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9343 if total_msat.is_none() {
9344 if payment_data.is_none() {
9345 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9347 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9349 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9353 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9356 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9357 total_value_received,
9358 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9360 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9361 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9366 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9367 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9368 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9371 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9372 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9373 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9374 let mut payment_id = None;
9375 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9376 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9377 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9378 (0, session_priv, required),
9379 (1, payment_id, option),
9380 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9381 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9382 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9383 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9385 if payment_id.is_none() {
9386 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9388 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9390 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9391 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9392 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9394 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9395 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9396 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9397 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9401 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9402 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9403 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9405 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9408 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9409 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9414 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9415 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9417 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9419 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9420 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9421 (0, session_priv, required),
9422 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9423 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9424 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9425 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9426 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9427 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9430 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9432 field.write(writer)?;
9439 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9440 (0, forward_info, required),
9441 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9442 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9443 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9444 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9447 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
9449 (0, htlc_id, required),
9450 (2, err_packet, required),
9455 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9456 (0, payment_secret, required),
9457 (2, expiry_time, required),
9458 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9459 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9460 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9463 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9465 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9466 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9467 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9468 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9469 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9470 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9474 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9475 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9477 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9479 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9481 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9482 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9483 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9486 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9488 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9489 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9490 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9491 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9492 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9493 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9494 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9497 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9498 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9502 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9504 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9505 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9506 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9507 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9508 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9509 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9512 channel.write(writer)?;
9518 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9519 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9520 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9521 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9522 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9523 for forward in pending_forwards {
9524 forward.write(writer)?;
9529 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9531 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9532 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9533 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9535 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9536 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9537 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9538 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9539 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9540 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9541 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9542 htlc.write(writer)?;
9544 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9545 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9548 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9549 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9550 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9551 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9552 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9553 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9554 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9557 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9558 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9559 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9560 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9561 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9563 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9564 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9565 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9566 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9567 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9568 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9569 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9574 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9575 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9576 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9577 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9578 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9579 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9580 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9581 // well save the space and not write any events here.
9582 0u64.write(writer)?;
9584 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9585 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9586 event.write(writer)?;
9590 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9591 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9592 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9593 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9594 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9595 0u64.write(writer)?;
9597 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9598 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9599 // likely to be identical.
9600 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9601 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9603 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9604 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9605 hash.write(writer)?;
9606 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9609 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9610 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9611 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9612 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9613 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9616 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9617 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9619 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9620 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9621 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9622 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9625 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9626 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9627 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9628 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9632 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9633 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9634 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9636 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9637 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9638 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9644 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9645 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9646 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9647 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9650 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9651 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9652 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9653 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9654 pending_claiming_payments = None;
9657 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9658 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9659 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9660 if !updates.is_empty() {
9661 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9662 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9667 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9668 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9669 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9670 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9671 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9672 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9673 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9674 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9675 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9676 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9677 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9678 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9679 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9686 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9687 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9688 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9689 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9692 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9693 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9694 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9695 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9696 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9697 // check that the event is sane here.
9698 let event_encoded = event.encode();
9699 let event_read: Option<Event> =
9700 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
9701 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
9707 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9708 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9709 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9710 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
9711 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
9712 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
9715 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
9716 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
9717 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
9718 events.push_back((ev, action));
9719 } else if action.is_some() {
9720 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9727 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
9728 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
9729 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
9730 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
9731 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
9732 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
9735 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
9737 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
9739 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9740 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
9741 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
9742 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
9743 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
9744 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
9745 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
9746 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
9747 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9748 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
9749 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
9750 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
9751 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
9753 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
9754 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
9756 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
9757 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
9759 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
9760 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
9761 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
9762 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
9763 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
9764 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
9766 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
9767 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9769 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9770 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9771 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9772 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9773 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9774 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9778 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9779 pub entropy_source: ES,
9781 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9782 pub node_signer: NS,
9784 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9785 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9787 pub signer_provider: SP,
9789 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9791 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9792 pub fee_estimator: F,
9793 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9795 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9796 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9797 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9798 pub chain_monitor: M,
9800 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9801 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9802 /// force-closed during deserialization.
9803 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9804 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
9805 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
9807 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
9809 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
9810 /// deserialization.
9812 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
9813 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
9814 pub default_config: UserConfig,
9816 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
9817 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
9819 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
9820 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
9821 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
9822 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
9824 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
9827 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
9828 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
9831 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9832 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9834 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9835 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9836 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9837 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9838 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9839 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9843 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
9844 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
9845 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
9846 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
9847 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
9849 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
9850 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
9855 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
9856 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
9857 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9858 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
9860 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9861 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9862 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9863 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9864 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9865 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9869 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9870 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
9871 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
9875 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9876 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
9878 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9879 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9880 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9881 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9882 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9883 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9887 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9888 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9890 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9891 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9892 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9894 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
9896 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9897 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9898 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9899 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9900 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9901 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
9902 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
9903 for _ in 0..channel_count {
9904 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
9905 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
9907 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9908 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
9909 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
9910 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
9911 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
9912 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
9913 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9914 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
9915 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
9916 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
9917 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9918 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
9919 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
9921 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
9922 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
9923 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
9925 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
9926 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
9927 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9929 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
9930 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
9931 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9933 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs, batch_funding_txid) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
9934 if batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
9935 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9937 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
9938 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9939 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
9942 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
9943 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9944 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9945 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9946 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
9947 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9948 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9950 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9951 let mut found_htlc = false;
9952 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9953 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
9956 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
9957 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
9958 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
9959 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
9960 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
9961 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
9962 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
9963 log_info!(args.logger,
9964 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
9965 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
9966 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9970 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
9971 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
9972 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9973 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9974 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9976 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
9977 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
9979 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
9980 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9981 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
9982 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9984 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9985 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
9986 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9987 entry.insert(by_id_map);
9991 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
9992 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
9993 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
9994 // safely discard the channel.
9995 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
9996 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9997 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9998 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9999 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10000 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10001 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10004 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10005 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10006 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10007 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10008 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10009 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10013 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10014 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10015 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10016 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10017 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10018 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10019 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10021 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10025 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10026 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10027 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10028 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10029 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10030 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10031 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10032 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10033 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10035 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10038 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10039 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10040 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10041 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10042 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10043 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10044 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10045 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10047 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10050 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10053 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10054 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10055 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10056 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10057 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10058 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10059 is_connected: false,
10063 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10064 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10065 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10066 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10067 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10068 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10069 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10070 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10073 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10074 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10075 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10076 for _ in 0..event_count {
10077 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10078 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10083 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10084 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10085 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10087 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10088 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10089 // on-startup monitor updates.
10090 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10091 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10093 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10097 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10098 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10100 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10101 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10102 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10103 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10104 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10108 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10109 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10110 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10111 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10112 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10113 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10114 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10116 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10117 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10121 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10122 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10123 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10124 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10125 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10126 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10127 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10128 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10129 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10130 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10131 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10132 let mut events_override = None;
10133 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10134 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10135 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10136 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10137 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10138 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10139 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10140 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10141 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10142 (8, events_override, option),
10143 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10144 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10145 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10146 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10148 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10149 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10152 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10153 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10156 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10157 pending_events_read = events;
10160 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10161 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10164 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10165 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10166 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10167 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10168 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10169 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10171 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10173 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10174 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10175 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10178 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10179 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10180 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10181 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10182 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10184 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10185 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10186 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10188 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10189 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10190 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10191 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10192 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10194 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10195 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10196 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10197 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10198 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10199 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10200 pending_background_events.push(
10201 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10202 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10203 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10204 update: update.clone(),
10207 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10208 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10209 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10210 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10211 pending_background_events.push(
10212 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10213 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10214 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10217 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10218 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10219 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10221 max_in_flight_update_id
10225 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10226 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10227 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10228 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10229 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10230 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10232 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10233 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10234 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10235 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10236 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10237 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10238 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10239 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10240 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
10243 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10244 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10245 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10246 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10247 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10248 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10249 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10250 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10251 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10252 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10253 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10256 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10257 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10258 debug_assert!(false);
10259 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10264 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10265 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10266 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10267 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10268 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10269 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10270 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10271 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10273 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10274 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10275 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
10277 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10278 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10279 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10280 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10281 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10282 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10283 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10284 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10289 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10290 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10292 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10293 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10294 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10295 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10298 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10299 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10300 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10301 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10302 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10303 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10304 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10306 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10307 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10308 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10309 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10310 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10311 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10312 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10313 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10316 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10317 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10318 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10319 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10320 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10321 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10322 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10323 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
10325 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10326 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10327 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10328 retry_strategy: None,
10329 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10330 payment_params: None,
10331 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10332 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10333 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10334 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10335 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10336 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10337 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10338 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10339 total_msat: path_amt,
10340 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10341 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10343 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10344 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10349 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10350 match htlc_source {
10351 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10352 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10353 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10354 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10356 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10357 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10358 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10359 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10360 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10361 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10362 forwards.retain(|forward| {
10363 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10364 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10365 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10366 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10371 !forwards.is_empty()
10373 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10374 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10375 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10376 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10377 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10378 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10379 intercepted_id != ev_id
10386 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10387 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10388 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10389 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10390 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10391 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10392 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10393 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10394 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10395 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10396 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10398 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10399 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10400 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10402 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10403 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
10404 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10411 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10412 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10414 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10416 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10417 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10418 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10419 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10420 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10421 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10422 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10423 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10424 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10425 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10428 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10429 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10430 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10431 // channel still live case here.
10435 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10436 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10441 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10442 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10443 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10444 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10445 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10446 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10447 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10448 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10452 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10453 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10455 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10456 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10457 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10458 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10460 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10461 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10462 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10464 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10465 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10467 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10468 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10470 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10473 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10474 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10475 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10477 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10481 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10482 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10483 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10484 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10485 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10487 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10488 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10489 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10490 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10491 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10492 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10493 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10494 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10496 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10497 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10501 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10503 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10505 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10506 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10508 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10509 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10514 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10515 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10517 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10519 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10521 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10522 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10523 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10524 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10528 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10529 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10530 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10531 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10532 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10533 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10534 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10535 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10537 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10538 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10539 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10541 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10542 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10543 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10544 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10545 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10546 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10548 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10549 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10550 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10551 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10552 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10553 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10557 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10558 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10559 debug_assert!(false);
10560 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10565 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10567 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10568 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10569 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10570 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10571 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10572 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10573 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10574 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10575 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10576 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10577 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10579 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10580 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10582 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10583 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10584 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10585 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10587 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10588 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10589 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10590 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10592 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10593 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10594 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10595 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10597 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10598 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
10599 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10600 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10601 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10602 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10603 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
10606 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10607 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
10610 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10613 purpose: payment.purpose,
10614 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10615 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10616 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10622 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10623 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10624 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10625 for action in actions.iter() {
10626 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10627 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10628 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10630 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10631 log_trace!(args.logger,
10632 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
10633 blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
10634 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10635 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10636 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10638 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10639 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10640 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10641 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10645 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
10646 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
10650 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
10652 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
10653 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10657 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10659 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10660 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10661 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10662 router: args.router,
10664 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10666 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10667 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10668 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10669 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10671 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10672 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10673 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10674 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10675 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10676 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10678 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10680 our_network_pubkey,
10683 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10685 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10687 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10688 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10689 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10690 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10691 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10693 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10694 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10696 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10698 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
10700 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
10701 node_signer: args.node_signer,
10702 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
10704 logger: args.logger,
10705 default_configuration: args.default_config,
10708 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
10709 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
10710 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
10711 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
10712 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
10715 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
10716 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
10717 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
10718 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
10719 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
10720 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
10723 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
10724 //connection or two.
10726 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
10732 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10733 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10734 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
10735 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
10736 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
10737 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
10738 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
10739 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
10740 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10741 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
10742 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
10743 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
10744 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
10745 use crate::util::test_utils;
10746 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
10747 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
10750 fn test_notify_limits() {
10751 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
10752 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
10753 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10754 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10755 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10756 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10758 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
10759 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
10760 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10761 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10762 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10764 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10766 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
10767 // to connect messages with new values
10768 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10769 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10770 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10771 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10772 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10773 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10775 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
10776 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10777 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10778 // ... but the last node should not.
10779 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10780 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
10781 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10782 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10784 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
10785 // about the channel.
10786 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10787 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10788 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10790 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10792 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10793 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10794 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10795 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10796 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10797 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10799 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
10800 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10801 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10803 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
10804 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
10805 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
10806 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
10807 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
10808 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
10810 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
10811 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
10812 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10813 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10814 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10815 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10816 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10817 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10819 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
10820 // the channel info has updated.
10821 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10822 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10823 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10824 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10825 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10826 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10830 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
10831 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
10833 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10834 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10835 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10836 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10837 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10839 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
10840 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
10841 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
10842 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
10844 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10845 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
10846 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
10847 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
10848 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
10849 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
10850 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
10851 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
10852 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10853 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10854 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10855 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10857 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
10858 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10859 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10860 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10861 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10862 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10863 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10864 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10865 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10866 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10867 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10868 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10869 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
10870 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10871 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10872 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10873 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10874 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10875 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10876 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10877 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10878 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10879 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
10881 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
10882 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
10883 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
10884 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10885 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10886 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10887 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
10889 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
10890 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
10891 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
10892 // lightning messages manually.
10893 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10894 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
10895 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
10897 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10898 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10899 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
10900 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
10901 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10902 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10903 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
10904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10905 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10906 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
10907 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10908 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10909 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10910 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10911 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10912 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10913 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
10914 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10916 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
10917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10918 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10919 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10920 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10921 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
10922 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10924 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
10925 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
10926 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10927 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10929 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10930 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10931 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10932 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10934 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10937 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10938 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10939 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10940 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10942 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10947 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
10948 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
10949 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
10952 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
10953 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
10954 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
10955 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
10956 // fails as expected.
10957 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
10958 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
10959 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
10960 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
10961 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
10962 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
10963 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10964 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10965 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10966 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
10967 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10968 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10969 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10970 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10971 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10973 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
10974 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
10975 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
10977 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10978 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10979 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
10980 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
10981 let route = find_route(
10982 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10983 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10985 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10986 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10988 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10989 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10990 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10991 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10992 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10993 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10994 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10995 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
10996 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
10997 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10998 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10999 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11000 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11001 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11002 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11003 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11004 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11005 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11006 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11007 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11008 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11010 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11011 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11013 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11014 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11015 let route = find_route(
11016 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11017 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11019 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11020 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11021 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11022 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11023 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11024 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11025 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11026 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11028 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11029 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11030 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11031 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11032 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11033 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11034 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11035 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11036 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11037 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11038 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11039 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11040 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11041 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11042 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11043 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11044 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11045 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11046 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11047 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11048 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11049 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11050 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11051 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11053 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11054 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11056 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11057 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11058 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11059 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11060 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11061 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11062 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11063 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11064 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11065 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11067 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11068 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11069 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11072 let route = find_route(
11073 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11074 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11076 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11077 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11078 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11079 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11080 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11081 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11082 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11083 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11084 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11086 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11087 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11088 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11090 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11091 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11092 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11093 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11094 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11095 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11096 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11097 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11098 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11100 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11101 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11105 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11106 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11107 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11108 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11109 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11110 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11111 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11113 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11114 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11116 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11117 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11118 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11119 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
11120 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11121 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11122 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11123 let route = find_route(
11124 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11125 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11128 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11129 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11130 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11131 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11132 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11133 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11136 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11137 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11138 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11139 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11140 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11141 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11142 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11144 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11148 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11149 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11150 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11151 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11152 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11153 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11154 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11155 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11156 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11158 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11159 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11161 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11162 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11163 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11164 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
11165 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11166 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11167 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11168 let route = find_route(
11169 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11170 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11173 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11174 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11175 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
11176 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11177 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11178 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11179 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11180 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11181 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11183 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11184 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11185 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11186 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11187 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11188 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11189 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11191 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11195 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11196 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11197 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11198 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11199 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11201 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11202 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11203 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11204 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11206 // Marshall an MPP route.
11207 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11208 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11209 route.paths.push(path);
11210 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11211 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11212 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11213 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11214 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11215 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11217 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11218 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11220 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11221 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11223 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11228 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11229 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11230 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11231 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11232 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11234 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11236 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11237 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11239 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11240 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11241 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11242 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11245 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11246 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11247 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11248 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11249 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11250 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11253 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11256 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11257 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11262 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11263 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11264 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11265 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11266 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11267 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11269 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11270 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11272 total_msat: 100_000,
11275 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11276 // payment verification fails as expected.
11277 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11278 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11279 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11280 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11282 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11286 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11287 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11291 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
11292 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11293 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11294 // the channel is successfully closed.
11295 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11296 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11297 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11298 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11300 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
11301 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11302 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11303 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11304 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11306 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11307 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
11309 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11310 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11311 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11312 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11315 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11317 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11318 // as it has the funding transaction.
11319 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11320 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11321 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11324 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11326 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11328 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11330 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11331 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11332 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11334 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11337 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11338 // as it has the funding transaction.
11339 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11340 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11341 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11344 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11345 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11346 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11347 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11348 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11349 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11350 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11352 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11353 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11354 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11355 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11357 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11358 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11360 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11361 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11362 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11363 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11364 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11365 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11366 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11370 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11371 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11372 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11373 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
11374 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11375 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11376 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11379 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11381 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11382 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11383 // closing transaction).
11384 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
11385 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11386 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11388 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11389 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11390 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11391 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11392 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11395 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11397 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11399 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
11400 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11401 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11403 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11405 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11406 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11409 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11410 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11411 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11414 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11415 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11416 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11419 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11420 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11421 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11424 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11425 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11426 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11429 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11431 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11432 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11434 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11435 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11437 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11438 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11443 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11444 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11445 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11446 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11447 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11448 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11449 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11450 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11453 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11454 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11455 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11457 // Test the API functions.
11458 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
11460 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11462 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11464 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11466 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11468 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11470 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11474 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11475 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11476 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11477 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11478 // the given `channel_id`.
11479 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11480 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11481 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11482 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11484 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11487 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11489 // Test the API functions.
11490 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11492 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11494 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11496 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11498 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11500 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11504 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11505 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11506 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11507 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11508 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11509 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11511 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11513 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11514 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11516 let mut funding_tx = None;
11517 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11518 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11519 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11522 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11523 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11524 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11525 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11526 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11528 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11530 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11532 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11534 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11535 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11536 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11538 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11541 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11542 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11543 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11544 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11545 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11547 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11548 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11550 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11551 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11552 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11553 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11554 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11555 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11556 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11559 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11560 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11561 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11562 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11563 }, true).unwrap_err();
11565 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11566 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11567 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11568 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11569 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11570 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11571 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11573 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11574 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11576 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11577 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11578 }, true).unwrap_err();
11580 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11581 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11582 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11583 }, false).unwrap();
11584 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11586 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11587 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11589 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11590 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11591 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11592 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11593 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11595 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11596 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11597 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11599 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11600 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11601 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11603 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11604 // "protected" and can connect again.
11605 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11606 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11607 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11609 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11611 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11613 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11614 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11618 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11619 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11620 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11621 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11622 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11623 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11625 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11627 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11628 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11630 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11631 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11632 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11633 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11636 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11638 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11639 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11640 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11642 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11643 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11644 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11646 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
11647 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11648 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11649 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11653 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
11654 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11655 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11656 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11657 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11658 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
11659 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11660 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
11661 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11663 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11665 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11666 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11668 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11669 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11670 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11671 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11672 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11673 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11676 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11677 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11679 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11680 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11682 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11684 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11685 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11688 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11689 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11690 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11691 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11692 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11694 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11695 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11697 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11698 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
11699 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
11700 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
11704 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11706 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11707 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11709 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
11710 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11711 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11713 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11714 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11716 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11718 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11722 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
11723 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11724 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11725 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11726 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11727 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
11728 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
11729 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11731 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11732 payment_metadata: None,
11733 keysend_preimage: None,
11734 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11735 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11737 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11739 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
11740 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
11741 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
11742 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11743 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
11745 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
11746 } else { panic!(); }
11748 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
11749 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
11751 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11752 payment_metadata: None,
11753 keysend_preimage: None,
11754 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11755 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11757 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11759 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11760 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
11764 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
11765 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11766 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11767 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11768 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11770 let result = node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11772 outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
11773 payment_metadata: None,
11774 keysend_preimage: None,
11775 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11776 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
11778 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11779 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None);
11781 // Should not return an error as this condition:
11782 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
11783 // is not satisfied.
11784 assert!(result.is_ok());
11788 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
11789 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11790 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11791 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11792 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11794 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
11795 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11797 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11798 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11799 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
11800 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
11801 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11803 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11804 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11806 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11807 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11808 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11809 match &msg_events[0] {
11810 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
11811 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11813 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
11814 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
11815 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
11818 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11821 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11822 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11824 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
11825 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
11826 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11828 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11832 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
11833 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
11834 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
11835 // the channel without the anchors feature.
11836 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11837 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11838 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
11839 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11840 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11841 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
11842 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11844 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
11845 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11846 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11848 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11849 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11851 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11852 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11854 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11857 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11858 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
11860 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11861 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11863 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
11864 // not have generated any events.
11865 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11869 fn test_update_channel_config() {
11870 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11871 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11872 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11873 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11874 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11875 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11876 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
11878 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11879 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11880 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11882 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
11883 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11884 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
11885 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11886 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11888 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11889 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11892 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
11893 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11894 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11896 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
11897 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11898 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
11899 ..Default::default()
11901 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11902 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11903 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11905 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11906 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11909 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
11910 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11911 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11912 ..Default::default()
11914 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11915 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
11916 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11917 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11919 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11920 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11923 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
11924 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
11925 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
11926 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
11927 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
11930 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11931 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11932 ..Default::default()
11934 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
11937 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
11938 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
11939 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11940 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11944 fn test_payment_display() {
11945 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11946 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11947 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
11948 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11949 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11950 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11954 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
11955 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11956 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11957 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11958 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11959 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11961 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
11962 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11963 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11964 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11965 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11966 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
11967 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
11968 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11970 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
11971 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
11972 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
11975 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
11976 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
11978 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11979 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11981 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11982 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11983 }, false).unwrap();
11984 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
11985 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
11986 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
11988 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
11990 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
11991 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
11992 // close even if it was an lnd node.
11993 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11994 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
11995 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
11996 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11997 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
11998 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
11999 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12000 } else { panic!() };
12001 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12002 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12003 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12004 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12006 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12008 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12009 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12010 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12017 use crate::chain::Listen;
12018 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12019 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12020 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12021 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12022 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12023 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12024 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12025 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12026 use crate::util::test_utils;
12027 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12029 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12030 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12031 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
12033 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12035 use criterion::Criterion;
12037 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12038 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12039 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12040 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12041 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12042 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12043 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12045 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12046 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12048 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12049 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12051 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12053 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12056 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12057 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12060 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12061 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12062 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12064 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12065 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12067 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12068 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12069 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12070 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12071 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
12073 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12074 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12075 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12077 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12078 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12079 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12080 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12082 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12083 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12084 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12086 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12087 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12088 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12089 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12090 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12092 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12093 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12094 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12096 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12097 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12099 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12100 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12101 }, false).unwrap();
12102 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
12103 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12104 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12107 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12108 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12109 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12111 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12112 } else { panic!(); }
12114 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12115 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12116 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12117 match events_b[0] {
12118 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12119 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12121 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12124 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12125 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12126 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12127 match events_a[0] {
12128 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12129 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12131 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12134 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12136 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12137 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12138 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12140 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12141 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12142 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12143 match msg_events[0] {
12144 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12145 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12146 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12150 match msg_events[1] {
12151 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12155 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12156 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12157 match events_a[0] {
12158 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12159 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12161 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12164 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12165 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12166 match events_b[0] {
12167 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12168 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12170 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12173 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12174 macro_rules! send_payment {
12175 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12176 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12177 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12178 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12179 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12180 payment_count += 1;
12181 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
12182 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12184 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12185 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12186 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12187 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12188 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12189 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12190 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12191 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12192 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12193 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12194 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12196 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12197 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12198 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12199 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12201 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12202 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12203 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12204 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12205 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12207 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12210 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12211 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12212 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12213 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12215 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12219 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12220 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12221 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);