1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
114 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
117 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
118 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
119 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
120 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
121 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
122 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
129 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
130 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
131 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
133 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
134 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
135 /// may overshoot this in either case)
136 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
137 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
138 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
139 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
140 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
145 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
146 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
149 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
150 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
151 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
152 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
153 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
156 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
157 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
159 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
160 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
161 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
164 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
165 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
167 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
168 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
171 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
172 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
175 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
179 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
180 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
181 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
182 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
183 short_channel_id: u64,
185 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
186 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
188 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
189 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
194 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
196 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
197 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
198 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
200 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
201 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
204 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
205 struct ClaimableHTLC {
206 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
208 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
210 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
211 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
212 sender_intended_value: u64,
213 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
215 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
216 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
217 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
218 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
220 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
221 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
224 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
226 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
227 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
228 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
230 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
231 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
236 impl Readable for PaymentId {
237 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
238 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
243 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
245 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
246 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
247 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
249 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
250 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
255 impl Readable for InterceptId {
256 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
257 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
262 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
263 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
264 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
265 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
266 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
269 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
271 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
272 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
273 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
275 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
276 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
280 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
281 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
282 (0, short_channel_id, required),
283 (2, htlc_id, required),
285 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
286 (0, session_priv, required),
291 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
292 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
293 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
294 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
295 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
298 session_priv: SecretKey,
299 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
300 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
301 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
302 payment_id: PaymentId,
305 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
306 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
307 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
309 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
311 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
313 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
316 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
317 payment_id.hash(hasher);
318 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
324 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
326 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
327 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
328 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
329 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
330 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
331 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
335 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
336 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
337 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
338 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
339 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
340 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
342 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
348 struct InboundOnionErr {
354 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
355 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
357 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
358 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
359 pub enum FailureCode {
360 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
361 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
362 TemporaryNodeFailure,
363 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
364 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
365 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
366 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
367 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
368 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
369 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
370 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
371 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
372 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
374 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
375 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
376 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
379 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
380 fn into(self) -> u16 {
382 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
383 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
384 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
385 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
390 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
391 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
392 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
393 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
394 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
396 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
397 err: msgs::LightningError,
398 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
399 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
400 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
402 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
404 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
406 err: LightningError {
408 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
409 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
416 shutdown_finish: None,
417 channel_capacity: None,
421 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
422 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
425 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
427 err: LightningError {
429 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
430 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
436 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
437 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
438 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
442 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
445 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
447 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
448 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
452 log_level: Level::Warn,
455 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
457 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
459 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
461 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
462 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
470 shutdown_finish: None,
471 channel_capacity: None,
476 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
477 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
478 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
479 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
480 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
482 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
483 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
484 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
485 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
486 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
487 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
488 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
490 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
494 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
495 struct ClaimingPayment {
497 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
498 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
500 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
501 (0, amount_msat, required),
502 (2, payment_purpose, required),
503 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
506 struct ClaimablePayment {
507 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
508 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
509 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
512 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
513 struct ClaimablePayments {
514 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
515 /// failed/claimed by the user.
517 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
518 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
520 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
521 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
522 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
524 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
525 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
526 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
527 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
530 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
531 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
532 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
533 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
534 enum BackgroundEvent {
535 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
536 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
537 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
538 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
540 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
541 /// are regenerated on startup.
542 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
543 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
544 /// channel to continue normal operation.
546 /// In general this should be used rather than
547 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
548 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
549 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
551 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
552 /// are regenerated on startup.
553 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
554 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
555 funding_txo: OutPoint,
556 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
558 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
559 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
561 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
562 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
563 channel_id: [u8; 32],
568 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
569 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
570 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
571 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
572 /// event can be generated.
573 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
574 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
575 /// operation of another channel.
577 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
578 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
579 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
580 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
582 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
583 event: events::Event,
584 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
588 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
589 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
590 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
591 (0, event, upgradable_required),
592 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
593 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
594 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
595 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
596 // downgrades to prior versions.
597 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
601 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
602 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
603 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
604 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
605 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
608 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
609 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
610 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
611 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
615 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
616 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
617 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
618 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
619 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
620 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
622 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
623 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
624 channel_id: [u8; 32],
625 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
630 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
632 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
633 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
634 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
635 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
640 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
641 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
645 /// State we hold per-peer.
646 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
647 /// `channel_id` -> `Channel`.
649 /// Holds all funded channels where the peer is the counterparty.
650 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
651 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `OutboundV1Channel`.
653 /// Holds all outbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an outbound channel has
654 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
656 pub(super) outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], OutboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
657 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundV1Channel`.
659 /// Holds all inbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an inbound channel has
660 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
662 pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
663 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
665 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
666 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
667 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
668 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
669 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundChannelRequest>,
670 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
671 latest_features: InitFeatures,
672 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
673 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
674 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
675 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
676 /// user but which have not yet completed.
678 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
679 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
680 /// for a missing channel.
681 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
682 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
683 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
685 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
686 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
687 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
688 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
690 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
691 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
692 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
693 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
694 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
695 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
696 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
697 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
698 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
699 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
700 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
701 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
702 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
703 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
704 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
708 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
709 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
710 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
711 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
712 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
713 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
716 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
717 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
720 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
721 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
722 self.channel_by_id.len() +
723 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
724 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
725 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
728 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
729 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
730 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
731 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
732 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
733 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
737 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
738 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
739 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
740 /// The original OpenChannel message.
741 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
742 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
743 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
746 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
747 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
748 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
750 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
751 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
753 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
756 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
757 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
758 struct PendingInboundPayment {
759 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
760 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
761 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
762 /// this payment being removed.
764 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
765 user_payment_id: u64,
766 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
767 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
768 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
771 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
772 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
773 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
774 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
775 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
776 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
777 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
778 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
780 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
781 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
789 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
791 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
792 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
793 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
798 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
799 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
800 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
801 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
802 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
803 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
804 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
805 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
806 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
808 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
809 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
818 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
820 &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
821 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
822 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
827 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
828 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
829 $vis trait AChannelManager {
830 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
831 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
832 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
833 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
834 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
835 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
836 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
837 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
838 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
839 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
840 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
841 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
842 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
843 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
844 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
845 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
846 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
847 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
850 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
851 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
852 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
853 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
854 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
855 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
857 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
858 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
859 ES::Target: EntropySource,
860 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
861 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
862 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
866 type Watch = M::Target;
868 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
870 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
872 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
874 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
875 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
877 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
879 type Router = R::Target;
881 type Logger = L::Target;
883 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
886 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
887 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
889 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
890 /// to individual Channels.
892 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
893 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
894 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
895 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
897 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
898 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
899 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
900 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
901 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
902 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
903 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
905 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
906 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
907 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
909 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
910 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
911 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
912 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
913 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
915 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
916 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
917 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
918 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
920 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
921 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
922 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
924 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
925 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
926 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
927 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
928 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
930 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
931 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
932 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
933 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
934 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
935 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
936 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
937 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
940 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
941 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
942 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
943 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
944 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
948 // `total_consistency_lock`
950 // |__`forward_htlcs`
952 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
954 // |__`per_peer_state`
956 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
958 // | |__`claimable_payments`
960 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
966 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
968 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
972 // | |__`pending_events`
974 // | |__`pending_background_events`
976 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
978 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
979 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
980 ES::Target: EntropySource,
981 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
982 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
983 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
987 default_configuration: UserConfig,
988 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
989 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
995 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
997 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
999 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1000 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1002 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1003 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1004 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1005 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1007 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1008 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1010 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1011 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1012 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1013 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1014 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1015 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1016 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1017 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1019 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1021 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1022 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1024 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1026 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1027 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1028 /// and via the classic SCID.
1030 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1031 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1033 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1035 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1037 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1038 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1039 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1041 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1042 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1044 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1045 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1047 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1048 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1050 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1051 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1052 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1053 /// active channel list on load.
1055 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1056 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1058 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1060 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1061 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1062 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1064 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1065 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1066 /// the handling of the events.
1068 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1069 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1072 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1073 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1074 /// would break backwards compatability.
1075 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1076 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1077 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1079 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1080 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
1082 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1084 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1085 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1086 /// confirmation depth.
1088 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1089 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1090 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1092 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1094 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1096 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1098 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1100 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1102 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1103 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1104 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1106 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1107 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1109 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1110 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1111 /// keeping additional state.
1112 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1114 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1115 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1116 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1117 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1119 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1120 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1122 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1123 /// are currently open with that peer.
1125 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1126 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1129 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1131 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1132 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1133 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1134 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1135 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1137 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1138 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1139 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1140 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1141 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1143 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1144 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1146 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1147 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1148 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1149 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1151 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1152 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1153 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1154 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1155 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1157 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1159 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1161 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1162 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1163 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1164 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1165 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1166 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1167 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1168 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1169 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1171 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1173 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1177 signer_provider: SP,
1182 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1184 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1185 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1186 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1187 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1188 pub struct ChainParameters {
1189 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1190 pub network: Network,
1192 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1194 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1195 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1198 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1205 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1206 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1207 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1208 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1209 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1210 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1212 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1213 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1214 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1215 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1216 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1218 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1219 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1222 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1223 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1224 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1225 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1227 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1228 persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1229 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1230 _read_guard: read_guard,
1235 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1236 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1237 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1238 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1240 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1241 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1242 should_persist: persist_check,
1243 _read_guard: read_guard,
1248 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1249 fn drop(&mut self) {
1250 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1251 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1256 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1257 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1259 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1261 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1262 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1263 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1264 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1265 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1267 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1268 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1270 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1272 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1273 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1274 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1275 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1276 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1277 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1278 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1279 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1280 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1281 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1282 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1283 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1284 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1286 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1287 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1289 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1290 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1291 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1292 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1294 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1295 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1296 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1297 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1298 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1299 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1302 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1304 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1305 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1308 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1310 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1311 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1313 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1314 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1315 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1316 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1318 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1319 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1320 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1322 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1323 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1324 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1326 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1327 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1328 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1329 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1331 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1332 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1333 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1335 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1336 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1337 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1339 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1340 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1341 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1342 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1343 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1344 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1345 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1346 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1347 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1348 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1349 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1352 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1353 /// to better separate parameters.
1354 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1355 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1356 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1357 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1358 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1359 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1360 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1361 pub features: InitFeatures,
1362 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1363 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1364 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1366 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1368 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1369 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1370 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1371 /// payments to us through this channel.
1372 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1373 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1374 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1375 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1376 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1377 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1378 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1381 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1383 /// Balances of a channel are available through [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] and
1384 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`], calculated with respect to the corresponding on-chain
1387 /// [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances
1388 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1389 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1390 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1391 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1392 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1393 /// lifetime of the channel.
1394 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1395 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1396 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1397 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1398 /// our counterparty already.
1400 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1401 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1402 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1403 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1405 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1406 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1407 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1408 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1410 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1411 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1413 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1414 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1416 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1417 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1418 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1419 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1420 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1421 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1422 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1423 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1424 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1427 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1429 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1430 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1431 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1432 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1433 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1434 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1435 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1437 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1438 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1440 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1441 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1442 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1443 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1444 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1445 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1446 /// this value on chain.
1448 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1450 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1452 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1453 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1454 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1455 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1456 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1457 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1458 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1460 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1461 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1462 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1463 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1464 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1465 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1467 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1468 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1469 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1470 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1471 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1472 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1474 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1475 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1476 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1477 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1478 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1479 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1480 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1481 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1483 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`] and
1484 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1485 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1486 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1487 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1488 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1489 /// route which is valid.
1490 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1491 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1492 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1493 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1494 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1495 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1497 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1498 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1499 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1500 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1501 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1502 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1503 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1504 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1505 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1507 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1509 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1510 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1511 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1512 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1513 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1515 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1516 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1517 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1518 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1519 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1520 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1521 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1523 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1524 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1525 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1526 pub is_outbound: bool,
1527 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1528 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1529 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1530 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1531 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1533 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1534 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1535 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1536 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1537 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1538 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1539 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1541 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1542 pub is_usable: bool,
1543 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1544 pub is_public: bool,
1545 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1546 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1547 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1548 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1549 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1550 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1552 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1553 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1556 impl ChannelDetails {
1557 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1558 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1559 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1561 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1562 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1563 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1564 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1567 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1568 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1569 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1571 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1572 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1573 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1574 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1577 fn from_channel_context<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, F: Deref>(
1578 context: &ChannelContext<Signer>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1579 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1581 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1583 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1584 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1585 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1587 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1588 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1589 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1590 features: latest_features,
1591 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1592 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1593 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1594 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1595 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1596 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1597 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1598 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1599 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1600 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1602 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1603 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1604 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1605 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1606 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1607 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1608 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1609 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1610 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1611 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1612 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1613 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1614 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1615 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1616 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1617 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1618 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1619 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1620 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1621 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1622 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1623 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1624 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1625 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1626 config: Some(context.config()),
1627 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1632 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1633 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1634 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1635 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1636 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1637 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1638 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1639 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1640 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1642 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1644 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1645 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1647 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1648 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1649 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1650 /// to drop the channel.
1654 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1655 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1656 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1657 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1658 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1660 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1662 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1663 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1664 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1667 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1668 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1669 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1671 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1672 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1673 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1675 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1676 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1677 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1679 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1680 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1684 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1686 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1688 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1689 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1690 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1691 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1693 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1694 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1695 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1698 macro_rules! handle_error {
1699 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1700 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1701 // entering the macro.
1702 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1703 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1707 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1708 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1710 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1711 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1712 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1713 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1717 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1718 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1719 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1720 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1721 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1722 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1727 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1728 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1730 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1731 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1732 action: err.action.clone()
1736 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1737 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1738 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1739 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1740 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1744 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1749 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1752 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1753 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1754 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1760 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1761 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1762 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1763 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1764 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1765 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1767 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1768 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1769 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1770 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1771 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1773 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1774 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1776 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1780 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1781 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1782 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1784 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1785 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1787 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1788 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1790 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1791 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1792 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel.context);
1793 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1794 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1795 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok(), $channel.context.get_value_satoshis()))
1799 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_context: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED) => {
1801 // We should only ever have `ChannelError::Close` when unfunded channels error.
1802 // In any case, just close the channel.
1803 ChannelError::Warn(msg) | ChannelError::Ignore(msg) | ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1804 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing unfunded channel {} due to an error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1805 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel_context);
1806 let shutdown_res = $channel_context.force_shutdown(false);
1807 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel_context.get_user_id(),
1808 shutdown_res, None, $channel_context.get_value_satoshis()))
1814 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1815 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1819 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1821 $entry.remove_entry();
1829 macro_rules! try_v1_outbound_chan_entry {
1830 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1834 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut().context, $entry.key(), UNFUNDED);
1836 $entry.remove_entry();
1844 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1845 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1849 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1851 $entry.remove_entry();
1859 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1860 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1862 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1863 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context);
1869 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1870 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1871 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1872 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1873 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1875 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1876 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1877 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1878 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1879 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1880 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1881 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1882 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1883 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1884 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1889 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1890 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1891 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1892 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1893 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1894 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1895 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1896 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1897 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1899 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1904 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1905 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1906 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1907 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1908 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1909 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1910 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1911 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1912 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1914 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1919 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1920 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1921 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1922 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1923 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1924 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1925 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
1926 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1927 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1928 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1929 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1931 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1932 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1933 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1939 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1940 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1942 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1943 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1944 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1945 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1946 updates.announcement_sigs);
1947 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1948 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1951 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
1952 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1953 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1955 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1957 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1958 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1960 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1961 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1962 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1963 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1968 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1969 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $remove: expr, $completed: expr) => { {
1970 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1971 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1972 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1973 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
1975 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1976 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1977 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1980 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1981 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1982 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1983 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
1984 let res = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1985 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
1986 $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
1987 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok(), $chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
1991 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1997 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $remove: expr) => {
1998 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
1999 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2000 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2002 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2003 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
2005 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
2006 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2007 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2008 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2009 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2010 // filter for uniqueness here.
2011 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2012 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2013 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2014 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2016 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2017 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2018 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2020 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2021 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2022 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2026 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
2027 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $funding_txo, $update, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
2031 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2032 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2033 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2034 while !processed_all_events {
2035 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2039 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2042 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2043 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2044 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2046 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2047 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2048 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2050 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2051 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2052 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2053 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2057 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2058 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2059 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2060 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2063 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2065 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2066 $event_to_handle = event;
2068 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2069 post_event_actions.push(action);
2074 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2075 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2076 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2077 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2078 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2079 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2082 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2083 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2084 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2085 processed_all_events = false;
2088 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
2089 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
2095 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2097 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2098 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2099 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2100 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2101 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2102 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2106 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2108 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2110 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2111 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2113 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2115 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2116 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2117 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2120 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2121 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2122 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2124 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2125 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2126 current_timestamp: u32,
2128 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2129 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2130 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2131 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2133 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2134 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2135 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2140 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2142 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2143 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2144 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2145 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2146 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2147 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2148 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2149 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2151 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2154 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2155 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2157 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2159 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2161 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2163 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2164 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2165 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2166 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2167 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2168 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2178 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2179 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2180 &self.default_configuration
2183 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2184 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2185 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2188 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2189 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2191 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2193 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2197 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2202 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2204 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2205 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2206 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2207 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2208 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2210 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2211 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2213 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2214 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2215 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2217 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2218 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2219 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2221 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2222 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2223 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2224 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2225 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2226 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2228 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2229 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2230 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2231 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
2232 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2233 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2236 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2237 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2238 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2240 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2242 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2243 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2245 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2247 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2248 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2249 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2250 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2251 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2252 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2256 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2261 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2263 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2264 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2265 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2267 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2269 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2272 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
2275 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2276 node_id: their_network_key,
2279 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2282 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2283 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2284 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2285 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2286 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2287 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2288 // the same channel.
2289 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2291 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2292 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2293 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2294 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2295 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2296 // Only `Channels` in the channel_by_id map can be considered funded.
2297 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
2298 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2299 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2307 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2308 /// more information.
2309 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2310 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2311 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2312 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2313 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2314 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2315 // the same channel.
2316 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2318 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2319 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2320 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2321 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2322 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2323 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
2324 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2325 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2328 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2329 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2330 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2333 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2334 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2335 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2343 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2344 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2346 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2347 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2349 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2350 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2351 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2352 // really wanted anyway.
2353 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2356 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2357 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2358 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2359 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2361 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2362 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2363 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2364 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2365 let chan_context_to_details = |context| {
2366 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2368 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2370 .map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context)
2371 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
2372 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
2373 .map(chan_context_to_details)
2379 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2380 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2382 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2383 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2384 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2386 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2387 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2388 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2389 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2390 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2391 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2392 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2393 total_msat: *total_msat,
2396 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2397 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2399 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2400 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2402 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2407 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2408 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2409 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2410 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2411 Some(transaction) => {
2412 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2413 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2418 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2419 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2420 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2421 reason: closure_reason,
2422 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2423 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2427 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2428 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2430 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2431 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2433 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2435 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2436 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2438 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2439 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2441 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2442 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2443 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
2444 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2445 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2446 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2447 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2449 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2450 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2451 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2452 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2453 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2457 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2458 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2459 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2460 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
2463 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2464 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2465 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2466 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2470 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2474 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (),
2477 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2478 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2480 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2481 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2482 // TODO(dunxen): This is still not ideal as we're doing some extra lookups.
2483 // Fix this with https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
2486 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2487 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2488 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2489 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2492 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2496 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2497 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2498 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2500 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2501 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2503 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2504 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2505 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2506 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2508 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2510 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2511 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2512 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2515 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2516 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2517 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2518 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2519 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2520 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2523 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2524 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2525 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2527 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2528 /// the channel being closed or not:
2529 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2530 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2531 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2532 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2533 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2534 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2535 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2537 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2538 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2539 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2540 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2542 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2544 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2545 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2546 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2549 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2550 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2551 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2552 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2553 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2554 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2558 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2559 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2560 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2561 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2562 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2563 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2564 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2565 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2567 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2568 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2569 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2570 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2571 // ignore the result here.
2572 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2576 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2577 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2578 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2579 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2580 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2581 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2582 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2583 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2584 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2585 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2586 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2587 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2589 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2591 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2592 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2593 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2594 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2595 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2596 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2597 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2598 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2599 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2600 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2601 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2602 // Unfunded channel has no update
2603 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2604 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2605 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2606 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2607 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2608 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2609 // Unfunded channel has no update
2610 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2611 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2612 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2613 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2614 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2616 (None, *peer_node_id)
2618 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2621 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2622 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2623 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2628 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2631 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2632 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2633 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2634 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2635 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2636 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2637 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2638 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2639 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2640 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2641 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2642 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2653 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2654 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2655 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2657 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2658 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2659 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2662 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2663 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2664 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2666 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2667 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2668 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2669 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2670 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2673 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2674 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2675 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2676 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2677 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2681 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2682 /// local transaction(s).
2683 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2684 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2685 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2689 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2690 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2691 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2692 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2693 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2694 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2695 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2697 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2698 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2702 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2703 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2704 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2705 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } =>
2706 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2707 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2708 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2709 err_data: Vec::new(),
2713 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2714 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2715 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2718 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2719 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2720 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2721 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2722 outgoing_cltv_value,
2723 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2727 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2728 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2729 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2730 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2731 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2732 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2733 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2734 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2736 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2738 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2739 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2740 err_data: Vec::new(),
2741 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2744 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2745 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2746 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2747 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2749 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2752 // final_expiry_too_soon
2753 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2754 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2756 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2757 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2758 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2759 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2760 if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2761 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2762 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2763 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2764 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2765 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2766 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2769 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2770 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2771 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2773 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2775 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2776 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2780 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2781 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2782 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2783 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2784 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2785 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2786 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2787 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2788 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2789 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2790 err_data: Vec::new(),
2791 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2794 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2795 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2796 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2797 err_data: Vec::new(),
2798 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2801 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2805 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2808 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2809 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2812 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2813 phantom_shared_secret,
2817 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2818 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2819 err_data: Vec::new(),
2820 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2823 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2826 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2827 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2828 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
2829 outgoing_cltv_value,
2830 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
2834 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2835 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2836 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
2837 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2838 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2840 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2841 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2842 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2843 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2844 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2845 failure_code: $err_code,
2851 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2852 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2855 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2856 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2857 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2859 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2860 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2861 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2862 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2863 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2864 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2865 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2866 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2868 macro_rules! return_err {
2869 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2871 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2872 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2873 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2874 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2875 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2876 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2882 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2884 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2885 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2887 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2888 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2891 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
2892 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2893 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
2894 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
2897 let next_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
2898 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
2899 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_pk))
2901 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
2902 // inbound channel's state.
2903 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2904 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } => {
2905 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
2909 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2910 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2911 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2912 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2913 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2914 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2915 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2916 // phantom or an intercept.
2917 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2918 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2919 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
2923 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2926 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2928 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2929 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2930 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2931 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2932 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2934 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2935 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2936 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2938 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2939 // have no consistency guarantees.
2940 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2944 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2945 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2946 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2947 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2948 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2950 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
2951 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2952 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2953 // we don't have the channel here.
2954 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2956 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
2958 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2959 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2960 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2961 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2962 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2963 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2964 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2965 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2966 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2967 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2968 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2970 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2973 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2974 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2976 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
2977 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2981 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2982 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2983 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2984 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2986 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2993 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2994 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2995 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2996 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2997 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2998 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3000 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3001 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3003 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3004 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3005 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3006 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3007 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3008 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3009 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3010 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3011 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3012 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3018 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3019 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3020 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3021 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3023 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3024 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3026 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3027 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3028 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3030 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3031 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3032 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3033 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3034 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3035 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3036 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3040 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3042 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3045 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3046 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3047 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3048 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3049 macro_rules! return_err {
3050 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3052 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3053 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3054 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3055 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3056 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3057 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3063 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3065 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3066 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3069 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3070 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3071 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3072 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3073 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3075 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3078 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3079 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3080 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3081 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3082 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3088 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3089 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3090 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3092 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3093 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3094 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3096 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3097 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3098 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3099 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3100 return Err(LightningError {
3101 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3102 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3105 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3106 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3108 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3109 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3112 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3113 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3114 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3115 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3117 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3118 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3119 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3121 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3122 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3123 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3124 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3125 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3126 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3130 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3133 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3134 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3135 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3137 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3138 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3139 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3140 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3141 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3144 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3145 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3147 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3148 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3149 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3150 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3151 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3152 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3153 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3154 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3156 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3157 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3158 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3160 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3162 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3169 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3170 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3171 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3172 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3177 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3178 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3179 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3182 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3183 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3185 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3186 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3187 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3189 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3190 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3191 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3193 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3194 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3196 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3197 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3198 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3199 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3202 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3203 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3204 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3205 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3206 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3207 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3208 if !chan.get().context.is_live() {
3209 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3211 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3212 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3213 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3215 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3216 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3218 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3219 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
3220 Some(monitor_update) => {
3221 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3222 Err(e) => break Err(e),
3224 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3225 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3226 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3227 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3228 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3229 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3230 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3238 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3239 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3240 // `channel_by_id` map.
3241 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3242 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3247 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3248 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3250 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3255 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3257 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3258 /// fields for more info.
3260 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3261 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3263 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3265 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3266 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3267 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3268 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3269 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3271 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3272 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3273 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3274 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3275 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3277 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3278 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3279 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3280 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3282 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3284 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3285 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3286 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3288 /// In general, a path may raise:
3289 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3290 /// node public key) is specified.
3291 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3292 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3294 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3295 /// relevant updates.
3297 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3298 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3299 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3301 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3302 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3303 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3304 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3305 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3306 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3307 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3308 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3309 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3310 self.pending_outbound_payments
3311 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3312 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3313 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3316 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3317 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3318 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3319 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3320 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3321 self.pending_outbound_payments
3322 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3323 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3324 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3325 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3329 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3330 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3331 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3332 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3333 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3334 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3338 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3339 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3340 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3344 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3345 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3349 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3350 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3351 /// retries are exhausted.
3353 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3354 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3356 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3357 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3358 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3360 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
3361 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3363 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3364 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3365 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3366 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3367 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3370 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3371 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3372 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3373 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3374 /// never reach the recipient.
3376 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3377 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3379 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3380 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3382 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3383 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3384 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3385 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3386 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3387 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3388 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3391 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3392 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3394 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3397 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3398 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3399 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3400 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3401 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3402 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3403 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3404 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3407 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3408 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3409 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3410 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3411 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3412 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3413 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3414 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3415 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3418 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3421 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3422 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3425 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3426 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3427 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3428 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3429 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3430 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3431 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3432 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3434 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3435 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3436 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3438 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3440 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3441 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3442 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3443 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3444 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3445 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3446 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3447 } else { unreachable!(); });
3449 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3450 Err((chan, err)) => {
3451 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3452 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3454 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3455 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3456 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3462 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3464 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3465 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3470 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3471 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3474 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3475 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3476 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3478 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3479 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3480 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3481 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3490 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3491 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3492 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3496 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3498 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3499 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3501 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3502 /// across the p2p network.
3504 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3505 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3507 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3508 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3509 /// keys per-channel).
3511 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3512 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3513 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3515 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3516 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3517 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3519 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3520 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3521 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3522 /// for more details.
3524 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3525 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3526 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3527 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3529 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3530 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3531 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3532 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3537 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3538 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3539 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3540 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3541 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3542 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3543 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3544 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3548 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3549 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3550 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3551 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3555 let mut output_index = None;
3556 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3557 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3558 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3559 if output_index.is_some() {
3560 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3561 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3564 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3567 if output_index.is_none() {
3568 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3569 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3572 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3576 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3578 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3579 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3580 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3581 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3583 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3584 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3586 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3587 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3589 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3591 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3592 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3593 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3594 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3595 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3596 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3597 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3598 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3599 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3600 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3601 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3602 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3603 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3607 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3608 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3609 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3610 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3611 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3612 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3613 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3614 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3615 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3616 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3620 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3621 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3622 let mut config = channel.context.config();
3623 config.apply(config_update);
3624 if !channel.context.update_config(&config) {
3627 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3628 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3629 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3630 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3631 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3638 let context = if let Some(channel) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3639 &mut channel.context
3640 } else if let Some(channel) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3641 &mut channel.context
3643 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3644 debug_assert!(false);
3645 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3647 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3648 log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3651 let mut config = context.config();
3652 config.apply(config_update);
3653 // We update the config, but we MUST NOT broadcast a `channel_update` before `channel_ready`
3654 // which would be the case for pending inbound/outbound channels.
3655 context.update_config(&config);
3660 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3662 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3663 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3664 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3665 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3667 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3668 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3670 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3671 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3673 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3675 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3676 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3677 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3678 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3679 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3680 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3681 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3682 pub fn update_channel_config(
3683 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3684 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3685 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3688 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3689 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3691 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3692 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3694 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3695 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3696 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3697 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3698 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3700 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3701 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3702 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3705 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3708 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3709 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3710 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3711 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3712 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3713 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3714 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3716 let next_hop_scid = {
3717 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3718 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3719 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3720 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3721 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3722 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3724 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3725 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3726 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3729 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3731 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3732 err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.",
3733 log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3738 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3739 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3740 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3743 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3744 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3745 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3747 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3749 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3750 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
3751 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3752 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
3753 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3756 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3757 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3758 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3759 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3760 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3762 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3766 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3767 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3769 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3772 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3773 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3774 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3776 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3777 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3778 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3781 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3782 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3783 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3784 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3785 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3786 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3787 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3790 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3791 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3792 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3793 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3798 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3800 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3801 /// Will likely generate further events.
3802 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3803 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3805 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3806 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3807 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3809 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3810 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3812 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3813 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3814 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3816 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3817 match forward_info {
3818 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3819 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3820 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3821 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3822 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
3825 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3826 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3827 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3829 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3830 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3831 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3832 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3833 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3834 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3837 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3838 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3840 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3843 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3844 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3850 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3851 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3853 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3857 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3858 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3860 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3864 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3865 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3866 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3867 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3868 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3870 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3871 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3872 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3873 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3874 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3876 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3878 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3879 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3883 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3884 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
3885 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3886 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
3888 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3889 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3895 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3898 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3901 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3902 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3903 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3904 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3905 // problem, not ours.
3911 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3912 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3914 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3918 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3919 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3920 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3921 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3924 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3925 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3926 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3927 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3928 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3931 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3932 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3933 match forward_info {
3934 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3935 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3936 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3937 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3938 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3941 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3942 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3943 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3944 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3945 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3946 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3947 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3948 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3950 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3951 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3952 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
3955 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3956 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3958 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3960 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3961 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3962 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3963 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3968 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3969 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3971 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3972 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3973 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3974 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3976 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3977 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3979 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3981 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3982 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3983 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3992 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3993 match forward_info {
3994 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3995 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3996 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3997 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
3998 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4001 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4002 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4003 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4004 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4005 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4006 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4007 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4009 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4010 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4011 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4015 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4016 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4019 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4022 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4023 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4024 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4025 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4026 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4027 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4028 phantom_shared_secret,
4030 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4031 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4032 // if routing nodes overpay
4033 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4034 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4036 total_value_received: None,
4037 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4040 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4043 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4045 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4046 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4047 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4048 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4049 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4050 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4052 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4053 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4054 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4055 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4056 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4057 phantom_shared_secret,
4059 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4060 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4062 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4065 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4066 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4067 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4068 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4069 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4072 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4073 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4074 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4075 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4076 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4077 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4079 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4080 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4081 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4083 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4084 .entry(payment_hash)
4085 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4086 .or_insert_with(|| {
4087 committed_to_claimable = true;
4089 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4092 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4093 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4094 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4095 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4097 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4098 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4099 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4101 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4102 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4103 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4106 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4108 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4109 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4110 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4111 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4112 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4113 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4114 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4115 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4116 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4117 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4119 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4121 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4122 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4123 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4124 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4125 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4126 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4127 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4128 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4129 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4130 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4131 committed_to_claimable = true;
4133 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4134 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4135 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4136 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4137 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4138 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4139 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4140 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4141 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4142 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4146 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4147 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4148 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4149 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4150 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4152 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4154 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4155 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4157 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4158 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4159 committed_to_claimable = true;
4162 payment_claimable_generated
4166 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4167 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4168 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4169 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4170 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4171 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4172 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4173 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4174 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4175 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4176 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4177 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4178 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4179 Ok(result) => result,
4181 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4182 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4185 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4186 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4187 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4188 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4189 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4190 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4193 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4194 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4195 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4197 check_total_value!(purpose);
4199 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4200 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4201 check_total_value!(purpose);
4205 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4206 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4207 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4208 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4210 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4211 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4212 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4213 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4214 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4215 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4216 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4217 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4219 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4220 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4221 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4223 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4224 if payment_claimable_generated {
4225 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4231 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4232 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4240 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4241 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4242 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4243 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4245 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4246 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4248 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4250 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4251 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4252 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4254 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4256 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4257 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4258 events.append(&mut new_events);
4261 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4263 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4264 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4265 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4267 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4269 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4270 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4271 if background_events.is_empty() {
4272 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4275 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4277 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4278 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4279 // monitor updating completing.
4280 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4282 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4283 let mut updated_chan = false;
4285 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4286 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4287 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4288 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4289 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4290 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4291 updated_chan = true;
4292 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4293 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
4295 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
4300 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4301 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4303 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
4304 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
4305 // however, ensure that.
4307 log_error!(self.logger,
4308 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
4310 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4312 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4313 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4314 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4315 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4316 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4317 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4318 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4320 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4321 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4322 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4323 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4324 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4330 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4333 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4334 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4335 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4336 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4337 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4340 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4341 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
4342 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4343 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4344 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4345 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4346 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4348 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4349 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4350 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4351 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4353 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4354 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4356 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4357 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4361 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4362 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4363 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4364 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4365 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4366 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4367 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4369 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4370 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4372 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4373 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4374 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4375 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4376 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
4377 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4382 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4383 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4391 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4393 /// This currently includes:
4394 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4395 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4396 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4398 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4399 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4400 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4401 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4403 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4404 /// estimate fetches.
4406 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4407 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4408 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4409 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4410 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4412 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4413 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4415 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4416 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4417 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4419 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4420 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4421 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4422 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4423 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4424 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4425 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
4426 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4431 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4432 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4434 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4435 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
4436 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4437 if needs_close { return false; }
4440 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4441 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4442 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4443 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4444 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4445 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4446 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4447 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4449 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4450 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4451 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4452 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4456 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4458 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4461 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4463 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4464 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4465 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4466 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4470 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4472 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4478 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4480 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4481 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4482 counterparty_node_id, log_bytes!(*chan_id));
4483 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4484 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4485 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4486 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4487 channel_id: *chan_id,
4488 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4497 let process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4499 chan_context: &mut ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
4500 unfunded_chan_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4501 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4503 chan_context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4504 if unfunded_chan_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4505 log_error!(self.logger,
4506 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner",
4507 log_bytes!(&chan_id[..]));
4508 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan_context);
4509 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4510 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan_context.force_shutdown(false));
4511 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4512 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4513 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4514 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4515 channel_id: *chan_id,
4516 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4525 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(
4526 chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context, pending_msg_events));
4527 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(
4528 chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context, pending_msg_events));
4530 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4531 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4532 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", log_bytes!(&chan_id[..]));
4533 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4534 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4535 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4536 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4537 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4543 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4545 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4546 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4551 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4552 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4553 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4554 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4555 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4556 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4557 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4558 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4559 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4560 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4561 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4562 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4563 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4564 // have no channels to the peer.
4565 let remove_entry = {
4566 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4567 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4570 entry.remove_entry();
4573 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4578 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4579 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4580 // This should be unreachable
4581 debug_assert!(false);
4584 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4585 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4586 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4587 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4588 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4589 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4590 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4593 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4594 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4595 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4597 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4598 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4605 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4606 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4607 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4608 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4609 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4612 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4613 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4616 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4618 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4619 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4620 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4621 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4622 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4629 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4630 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4631 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4633 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4634 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4635 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4636 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4638 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4639 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4640 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4641 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4642 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4643 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4646 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4647 /// reason for the failure.
4649 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4650 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4651 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4653 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4654 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4655 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4656 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4657 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4658 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4659 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4664 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4665 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4666 match failure_code {
4667 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4668 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4669 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4670 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4671 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4672 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
4674 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
4675 let fail_data = match data {
4676 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
4679 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
4684 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4685 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4687 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4689 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4690 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4691 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4692 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4693 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4694 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4695 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4697 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4699 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4700 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4702 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4707 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4708 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4709 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4710 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4711 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4712 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4713 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4714 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4715 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4716 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4718 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4719 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4720 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4721 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4723 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4724 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4725 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4726 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4727 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4731 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4732 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4733 // be surfaced to the user.
4734 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4735 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4736 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4738 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4739 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4740 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4741 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4742 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4743 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4744 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4745 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4747 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4749 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4752 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4753 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4754 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4755 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4759 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4760 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4761 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4762 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4763 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4764 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4765 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4766 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4767 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4770 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4771 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4772 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4775 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4776 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4777 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4779 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4780 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4781 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4782 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4783 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4785 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4786 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4787 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4789 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4790 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4791 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4792 push_forward_ev = true;
4794 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4795 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4796 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4798 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4799 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4802 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4803 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4804 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4805 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4806 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4807 failed_next_destination: destination,
4813 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4814 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4816 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4817 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4818 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4819 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4821 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4822 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4823 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4824 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4826 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
4827 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
4828 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
4830 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4831 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4832 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4833 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4834 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4835 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4836 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
4837 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4838 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
4841 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
4842 /// even type numbers.
4846 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
4847 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
4849 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4850 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4851 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
4854 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
4855 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4857 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4860 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4861 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4862 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4863 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4864 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4865 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4866 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4867 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4872 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4873 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4874 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4876 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4877 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4878 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4879 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4882 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
4883 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
4884 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
4885 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
4886 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4887 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
4888 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4889 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
4890 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4891 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4892 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4901 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4903 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4904 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4905 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4906 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4907 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4908 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4909 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4910 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4911 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4912 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4913 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4914 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4915 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4916 debug_assert!(false);
4920 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4922 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4923 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4924 debug_assert!(false);
4928 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4929 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4931 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4932 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4933 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4934 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4937 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4938 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4939 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4940 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4944 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4945 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4946 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4947 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4949 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4950 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4951 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4952 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4953 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4958 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4959 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4960 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4961 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4962 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4963 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4964 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4966 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4969 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4970 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4971 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4972 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4976 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4977 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4978 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4979 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4981 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
4982 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
4983 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
4984 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4987 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4988 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4989 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4990 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4994 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4995 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4996 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4999 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5000 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5001 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5002 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5003 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5004 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5006 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
5007 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
5008 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5009 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
5010 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5013 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5014 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5015 if let Err(e) = res {
5016 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
5017 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
5018 // update over and over again until morale improves.
5019 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
5020 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
5023 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5024 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5025 // monitor update as a background event.
5026 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5027 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5028 counterparty_node_id,
5029 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5030 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5038 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5039 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5040 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5046 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5047 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5048 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5049 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5050 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5051 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5052 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5053 // again on restart.
5054 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5055 payment_preimage, update_res);
5058 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5059 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5061 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5062 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5063 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5064 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5065 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5066 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5067 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5068 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5069 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5070 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5073 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5074 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5075 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5076 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5077 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5078 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
5082 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5083 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5086 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
5088 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5089 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5090 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5091 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
5093 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5094 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5095 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5096 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
5097 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5098 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5099 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5102 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5103 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5105 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5106 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5107 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
5108 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5110 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
5114 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5115 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5116 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5122 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5123 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5124 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5127 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5128 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5130 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5131 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5132 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
5133 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5134 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5138 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5139 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5141 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5142 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5143 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5150 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5151 /// update completion.
5152 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5153 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5154 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5155 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5156 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5157 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5158 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5159 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()),
5160 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5161 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5162 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5163 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5164 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5166 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5168 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5169 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5170 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5171 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5174 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5175 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5177 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5178 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5179 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5184 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5185 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5186 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5187 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5192 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5193 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5194 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5195 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5196 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5201 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5205 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5211 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5212 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5213 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5217 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5218 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5219 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5225 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5226 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5228 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5229 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5231 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5232 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5233 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5234 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5235 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5240 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5241 let mut peer_state_lock;
5242 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5243 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5244 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5245 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5247 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5250 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5251 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5252 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5253 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5254 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5257 let remaining_in_flight =
5258 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5259 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5262 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5263 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5264 remaining_in_flight);
5265 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5268 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5271 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5273 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5274 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5277 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5278 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5279 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5281 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5282 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5283 /// used to accept such channels.
5285 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5286 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5287 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5288 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5291 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5292 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5294 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5295 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5296 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5298 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5299 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5301 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5302 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5304 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5305 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5307 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5308 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5309 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5310 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5313 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5314 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5316 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5317 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5318 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5319 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5320 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5321 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5322 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5323 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5325 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5326 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5327 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5329 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5330 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5331 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5332 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5333 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5334 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5335 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5337 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5341 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5342 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5343 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5344 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5345 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5346 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5347 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5350 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5351 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5353 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5354 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5355 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5356 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5357 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5358 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5359 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5360 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5363 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5364 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5368 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5369 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5370 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5372 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5373 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5374 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5377 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), channel);
5382 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5383 /// or 0-conf channels.
5385 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5386 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5387 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5388 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
5389 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5390 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5392 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5393 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5394 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5395 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5396 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5397 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5398 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5402 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5405 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5406 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
5408 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5409 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5410 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5411 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5412 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5413 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5415 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5418 for (_, chan) in peer.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
5419 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5420 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5423 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5426 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5427 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5428 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5431 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5432 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5435 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5436 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5437 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5438 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5439 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5441 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5442 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5444 debug_assert!(false);
5445 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5447 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5448 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5450 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5451 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5452 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5453 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5454 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5455 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5457 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5458 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5459 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5462 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5463 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5464 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5465 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5466 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5469 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
5470 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5472 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5475 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
5476 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5477 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5478 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5479 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5480 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5481 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5482 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5483 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
5485 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
5486 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
5487 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
5492 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
5493 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5494 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5495 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5496 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5497 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5498 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
5501 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5506 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5507 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5508 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5510 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5511 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5514 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5515 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5517 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5518 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5519 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5521 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, channel);
5525 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5526 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5527 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5528 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5530 debug_assert!(false);
5531 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5533 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5534 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5535 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5536 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5537 try_v1_outbound_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
5538 (chan.get().context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().context.get_user_id())
5540 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5543 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5544 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5545 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5546 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5547 channel_value_satoshis: value,
5549 user_channel_id: user_id,
5554 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5555 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5557 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5558 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5560 debug_assert!(false);
5561 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5564 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5565 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5566 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5567 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5568 Some(inbound_chan) => {
5569 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5571 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5572 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5573 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5574 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5575 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5576 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5577 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5578 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5579 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
5583 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5586 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5587 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5588 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5590 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5591 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5592 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5593 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5594 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5595 funding_msg.channel_id))
5597 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5598 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5602 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5603 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5604 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5605 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5606 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5607 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5608 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5612 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5614 let chan = e.insert(chan);
5615 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5616 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR,
5617 { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5619 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5620 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5621 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5622 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5623 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5624 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5625 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5626 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5634 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5635 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5636 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5637 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5639 debug_assert!(false);
5640 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5643 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5644 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5645 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5646 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5647 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
5648 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
5649 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5650 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
5651 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5652 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5653 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5654 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5655 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5656 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5661 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5665 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5666 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5667 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5669 debug_assert!(false);
5670 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5672 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5673 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5674 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5675 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5676 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5677 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
5678 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5679 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5680 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5681 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5682 msg: announcement_sigs,
5684 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5685 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5686 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5687 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5688 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5689 // announcement_signatures.
5690 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5691 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5692 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5693 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5700 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5701 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
5706 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5710 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5711 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5712 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5713 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5714 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5716 debug_assert!(false);
5717 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5719 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5720 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5721 // TODO(dunxen): Fix this duplication when we switch to a single map with enums as per
5722 // https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
5723 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5724 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", log_bytes!(&msg.channel_id[..]));
5725 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5726 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5727 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5729 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5730 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", log_bytes!(&msg.channel_id[..]));
5731 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5732 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5733 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5735 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5736 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5737 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5738 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5739 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5742 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5743 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
5744 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5745 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5747 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5748 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5749 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5750 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5751 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5752 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5757 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5758 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5759 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5760 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
5764 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5767 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5768 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5769 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5770 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5776 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5777 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5778 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5780 debug_assert!(false);
5781 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5783 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5784 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5785 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5786 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5787 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5788 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5789 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5790 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5791 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5796 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5797 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5798 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5799 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5800 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5801 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5802 } else { (tx, None) }
5804 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5807 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5808 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5809 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5811 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5812 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5813 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5814 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5815 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5819 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5824 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5825 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5826 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5827 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5829 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5830 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5831 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5832 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5834 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5835 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5836 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5838 debug_assert!(false);
5839 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5841 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5842 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5843 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5844 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5846 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
5847 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
5848 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
5849 chan.get().context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
5850 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
5852 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5853 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5854 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5855 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5856 match pending_forward_info {
5857 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5858 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5859 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5860 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5862 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5863 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5864 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5865 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5866 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5869 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5871 _ => pending_forward_info
5874 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
5876 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5881 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5882 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5883 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5884 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5886 debug_assert!(false);
5887 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5889 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5890 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5891 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5892 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5893 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5895 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5898 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5902 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5903 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5904 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5906 debug_assert!(false);
5907 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5909 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5910 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5911 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5912 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5913 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5915 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5920 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5921 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5922 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5924 debug_assert!(false);
5925 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5927 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5928 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5929 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5930 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5931 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5932 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5933 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5935 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5938 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5942 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5943 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5944 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5946 debug_assert!(false);
5947 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5949 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5950 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5951 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5952 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5953 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5954 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5955 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5956 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5957 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
5960 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5965 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5966 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5967 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5968 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5969 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5970 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5971 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5972 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5973 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5974 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5975 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5977 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5978 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5980 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5981 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5982 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5983 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5984 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5985 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5987 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5988 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5989 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5991 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5992 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5993 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5994 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5995 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5996 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5997 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5998 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5999 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6002 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6003 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6005 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6006 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6007 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6008 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6009 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6010 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6011 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6012 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6015 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6016 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6017 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6022 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6023 // payments are being processed.
6024 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6025 push_forward_event = true;
6027 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6028 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6035 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6036 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6039 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6040 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6041 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6043 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6047 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6048 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6049 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6050 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6051 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6053 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6054 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6055 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6056 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6057 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6058 // real by taking more time.
6059 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6060 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6061 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6066 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6067 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6068 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6069 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6070 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6071 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6072 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6074 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6075 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6076 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6077 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6078 channel_funding_outpoint,
6079 counterparty_node_id,
6084 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6085 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
6086 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6087 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6089 debug_assert!(false);
6090 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6091 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6092 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6093 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6094 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6095 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
6096 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
6097 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6098 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6099 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
6101 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
6103 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6106 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6110 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6111 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6112 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6114 debug_assert!(false);
6115 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6117 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6118 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6119 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6120 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6121 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
6123 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6128 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6129 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6130 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6132 debug_assert!(false);
6133 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6135 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6136 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6137 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6138 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6139 if !chan.get().context.is_usable() {
6140 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6143 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6144 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
6145 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6146 msg, &self.default_configuration
6148 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6149 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6150 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
6153 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6158 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
6159 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6160 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6161 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6163 // It's not a local channel
6164 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6167 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6168 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6169 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6170 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6172 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6173 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6174 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6175 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6176 if chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6177 if chan.get().context.should_announce() {
6178 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6179 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6180 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6181 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6183 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6185 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6186 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6187 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6188 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6190 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
6191 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
6194 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6196 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6199 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6201 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6202 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6204 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6206 debug_assert!(false);
6207 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6209 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6210 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6211 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6212 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6213 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6214 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6215 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6216 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6217 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
6218 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
6219 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
6220 let mut channel_update = None;
6221 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6222 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6223 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6226 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
6227 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6228 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6229 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6230 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
6231 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6232 node_id: chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6237 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6238 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6239 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6240 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6241 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6242 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6246 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6250 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6251 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6254 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6255 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6260 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6261 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6262 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6264 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6265 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6266 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6267 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6268 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6269 match monitor_event {
6270 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6271 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6272 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
6273 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
6275 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
6276 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6277 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6278 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6281 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
6282 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
6283 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6284 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6286 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6287 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6288 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6289 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6292 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6293 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6294 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6295 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6296 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6297 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6298 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6299 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
6300 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6301 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6302 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6306 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
6307 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
6309 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
6311 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
6312 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6313 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6314 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
6315 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
6322 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6323 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6329 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6330 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6333 has_pending_monitor_events
6336 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6337 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6338 /// update events as a separate process method here.
6340 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6341 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6342 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6345 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6346 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6347 /// update was applied.
6348 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6349 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6350 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6351 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
6353 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6354 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6355 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6356 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6358 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6359 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6361 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6362 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6363 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
6364 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6365 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6366 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6367 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
6368 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6369 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6371 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6372 has_monitor_update = true;
6374 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
6375 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6376 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
6377 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
6379 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
6381 continue 'peer_loop;
6390 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
6391 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6392 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
6395 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6396 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6402 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
6403 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
6404 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
6405 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
6406 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6407 let mut has_update = false;
6409 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6411 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6412 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6413 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6414 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6415 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
6416 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6417 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6418 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
6420 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6421 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
6424 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
6425 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
6426 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6427 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6428 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6433 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6435 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
6436 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6437 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6443 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
6444 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
6452 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6453 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6459 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
6460 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
6462 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
6463 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6464 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
6465 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
6466 // reorganized out of the main chain.
6467 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
6468 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
6469 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
6470 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
6471 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
6472 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
6473 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
6474 assert!(should_broadcast);
6475 } else { unreachable!(); }
6476 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6477 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6478 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6481 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6485 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6488 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6489 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6491 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6492 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6493 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6494 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6496 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6498 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6499 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6503 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6504 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6506 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6508 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6509 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6511 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6512 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6513 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6514 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6515 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6516 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6517 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6518 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6519 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6520 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6521 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6524 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6525 /// stored external to LDK.
6527 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6528 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6529 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6531 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6532 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6535 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6536 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6537 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6538 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6540 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6541 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6542 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6543 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6544 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6546 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6547 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6548 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6549 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6550 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6552 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6553 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6555 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6556 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6560 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6561 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6563 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6565 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6566 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6568 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6569 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6570 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6571 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6572 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6573 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6574 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6577 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6578 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6580 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6581 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6582 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6585 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6586 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6588 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6589 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6590 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6591 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6593 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6594 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6595 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6596 Some(_) => continue,
6597 None => return scid_candidate
6602 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6604 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6605 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6607 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6608 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6609 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6613 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6614 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6615 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6617 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6618 /// times to get a unique scid.
6619 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6620 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6621 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6623 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6624 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6625 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6626 return scid_candidate
6630 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6631 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6632 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6633 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6635 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6636 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6637 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6638 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6639 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6640 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6641 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6642 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6651 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6652 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6653 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6654 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6655 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6659 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6660 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6661 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6662 events.push_back((event, None));
6666 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6667 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6668 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6672 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6673 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6677 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6678 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6681 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6682 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6683 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6684 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6685 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6686 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6688 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6689 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6690 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6691 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6693 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6694 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6695 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6696 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6698 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6702 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6703 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6704 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6705 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6706 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6707 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6708 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6712 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6713 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6714 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6715 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6716 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6717 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
6718 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6720 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6722 if further_update_exists {
6723 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6728 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6729 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6733 log_debug!(self.logger,
6734 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6735 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6739 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6740 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6741 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6745 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6746 for action in actions {
6748 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6749 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6751 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
6757 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6758 /// using the given event handler.
6760 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6761 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6765 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6769 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6771 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6772 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6773 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6774 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6775 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6776 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6780 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6781 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6782 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6783 /// is always placed next to each other.
6785 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6786 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6787 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6788 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6790 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6791 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6792 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6793 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6794 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6795 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6796 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
6798 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6799 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6800 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6801 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6804 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6805 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6807 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6808 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6811 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6812 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6813 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6814 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6815 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6816 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6817 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6821 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6822 events.replace(pending_events);
6831 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6833 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6834 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6835 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6836 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6837 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6838 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6842 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6844 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6845 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6846 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6848 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6852 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6854 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6855 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6856 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6857 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6858 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6859 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6863 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6865 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6866 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6867 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6868 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6869 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6872 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6873 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6876 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6877 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6878 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6879 let new_height = height - 1;
6881 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6882 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6883 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6884 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6885 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6886 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6889 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6893 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6895 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6896 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6897 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6898 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6899 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6900 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6904 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6905 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6906 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6907 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6909 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6910 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6912 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6913 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6914 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6915 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6917 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6918 if height < last_best_block_height {
6919 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6920 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6924 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6925 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6926 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6927 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6929 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6930 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6932 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6933 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6934 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6936 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6938 macro_rules! max_time {
6939 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6941 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6942 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6943 // having an explicit local time source.
6944 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6945 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6946 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6947 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6948 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6954 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6955 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6956 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6957 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6961 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6962 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6963 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6964 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6965 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6966 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6967 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6968 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6975 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6976 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6977 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6978 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6979 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
6980 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6981 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6982 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6983 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6988 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6990 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6991 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6992 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6993 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6994 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6995 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6999 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
7000 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
7002 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
7003 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
7004 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7005 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7006 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7008 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7009 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
7011 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7012 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7013 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7014 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7015 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7016 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
7017 let res = f(channel);
7018 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
7019 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
7020 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
7021 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
7022 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
7024 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
7025 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
7026 if channel.context.is_usable() {
7027 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
7028 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
7029 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7030 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7035 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
7040 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7041 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
7044 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
7045 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
7046 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7047 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7048 msg: announcement_sigs,
7050 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7051 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
7052 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7054 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7055 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7056 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
7061 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
7062 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
7063 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
7064 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
7065 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
7066 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
7067 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
7068 // is always consistent.
7069 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
7070 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
7071 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
7072 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
7073 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
7076 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
7077 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
7078 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
7079 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
7080 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
7081 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
7082 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7086 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
7087 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
7088 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7089 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7090 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
7091 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7092 data: reason_message,
7102 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7103 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
7104 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
7105 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
7106 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
7107 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
7108 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
7109 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7110 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7111 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
7113 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
7114 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
7115 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
7119 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
7122 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7123 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
7124 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7125 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7126 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
7127 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
7128 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7129 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7130 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
7133 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
7134 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7135 _ => unreachable!(),
7137 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
7138 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
7139 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
7140 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
7146 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
7148 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
7149 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
7153 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
7155 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
7156 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
7158 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
7159 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
7162 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7163 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
7164 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
7167 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
7168 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
7169 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
7170 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
7173 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7174 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7175 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7176 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7179 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7180 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7182 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7183 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7184 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7185 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7186 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
7189 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7190 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7191 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
7192 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
7195 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7196 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7197 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7198 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
7201 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7202 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7203 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
7204 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7208 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7209 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7211 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7212 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7213 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7214 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7215 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7216 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7220 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
7221 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7222 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7225 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
7226 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7227 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7228 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7231 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
7232 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7233 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7236 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
7237 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7238 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7239 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7242 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
7243 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7244 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7247 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
7248 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7249 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7252 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
7253 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7254 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7257 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
7258 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7259 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7262 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
7263 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7264 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7267 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
7268 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7269 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7272 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
7273 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7274 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7277 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
7278 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7279 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7282 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
7283 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7284 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7287 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
7288 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7289 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7292 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
7293 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7294 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7297 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
7298 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7299 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7302 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
7303 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7304 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7307 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
7308 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
7309 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
7310 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
7311 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
7313 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
7318 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
7319 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7320 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7323 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
7324 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7325 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7326 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7328 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
7329 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7330 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7331 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7332 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7333 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7334 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7335 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
7336 if chan.is_shutdown() {
7337 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7338 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7343 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7344 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7345 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7348 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7349 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7350 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7353 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
7354 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
7355 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
7356 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
7358 // V1 Channel Establishment
7359 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
7360 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
7361 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
7362 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
7363 // V2 Channel Establishment
7364 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7365 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7366 // Common Channel Establishment
7367 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
7368 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
7369 // Interactive Transaction Construction
7370 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
7371 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
7372 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
7373 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
7374 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
7375 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
7376 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
7377 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
7378 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
7379 // Channel Operations
7380 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
7381 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
7382 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
7383 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
7384 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
7385 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
7387 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
7388 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7389 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
7390 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7391 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
7392 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
7393 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
7394 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
7395 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
7398 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
7399 peer_state.is_connected = false;
7400 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
7401 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
7404 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
7406 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7408 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7409 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
7413 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
7414 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
7415 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7419 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7421 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
7422 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
7423 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
7424 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
7425 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
7426 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
7429 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7430 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
7431 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7432 if inbound_peer_limited {
7435 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
7436 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7437 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7438 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7439 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7440 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
7441 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7442 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7443 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7444 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7448 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
7449 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
7450 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
7452 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7453 if inbound_peer_limited &&
7454 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
7455 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
7460 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
7461 peer_state.is_connected = true;
7466 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7468 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7469 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7470 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7471 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7472 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7474 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
7475 // (so won't be recovered after a crash) we don't need to bother closing unfunded channels and
7476 // clearing their maps here. Instead we can just send queue channel_reestablish messages for
7477 // channels in the channel_by_id map.
7478 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().for_each(|(_, chan)| {
7479 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7480 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7481 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7485 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7489 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
7490 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7492 match &msg.data as &str {
7493 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
7494 "link failed to shutdown" =>
7496 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
7497 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
7498 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
7499 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
7500 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
7501 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
7502 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
7503 if msg.channel_id != [0; 32] {
7504 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7505 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7506 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7507 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7508 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
7509 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
7510 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7511 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7515 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7516 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7517 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
7518 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
7519 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7520 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
7522 log_level: Level::Trace,
7532 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
7533 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
7534 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7535 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7536 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7537 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7538 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7539 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
7540 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
7541 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
7542 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned()
7543 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned())
7544 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned()).collect()
7546 for channel_id in channel_ids {
7547 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7548 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7552 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
7553 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7554 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7555 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7556 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7557 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7558 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
7559 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
7560 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
7561 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7569 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7570 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7574 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7575 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7578 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
7579 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7582 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
7583 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
7586 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
7587 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7588 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7589 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7592 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7593 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7594 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7595 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7598 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7599 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7600 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7601 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7604 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7605 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7606 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7607 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7610 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7611 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7612 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7613 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7616 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7617 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7618 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7619 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7622 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7623 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7624 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7625 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7628 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7629 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7630 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7631 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7634 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7635 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7636 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7637 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7641 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7642 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7643 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7644 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
7645 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
7649 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7650 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7652 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7653 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7654 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7655 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7656 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7659 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7660 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7661 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7662 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7665 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7666 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7667 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7668 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7671 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7672 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7673 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7674 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7675 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7676 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
7677 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
7678 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
7679 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
7680 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
7681 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
7682 features.set_payment_secret_required();
7683 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
7684 features.set_wumbo_optional();
7685 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
7686 features.set_channel_type_optional();
7687 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
7688 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
7689 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
7690 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
7695 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7696 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7698 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7699 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7700 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7701 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7704 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7705 (2, node_id, required),
7706 (4, features, required),
7707 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7708 (8, forwarding_info, option),
7709 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7710 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7713 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7714 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7715 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7716 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7717 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7718 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7719 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7720 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7721 (2, self.channel_id, required),
7722 (3, self.channel_type, option),
7723 (4, self.counterparty, required),
7724 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
7725 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
7726 (7, self.config, option),
7727 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
7728 (9, self.confirmations, option),
7729 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
7730 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7731 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7732 (16, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required), // Forwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
7733 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7734 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
7735 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7736 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
7737 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7738 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7739 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7740 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7741 (30, self.is_usable, required),
7742 (32, self.is_public, required),
7743 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7744 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7745 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7746 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7747 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
7753 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7754 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7755 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7756 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7757 (2, channel_id, required),
7758 (3, channel_type, option),
7759 (4, counterparty, required),
7760 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7761 (6, funding_txo, option),
7762 (7, config, option),
7763 (8, short_channel_id, option),
7764 (9, confirmations, option),
7765 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7766 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7767 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7768 (16, _balance_msat, option), // Backwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
7769 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7770 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7771 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7772 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7773 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7774 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
7775 (22, confirmations_required, option),
7776 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7777 (26, is_outbound, required),
7778 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7779 (30, is_usable, required),
7780 (32, is_public, required),
7781 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7782 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7783 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7784 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7785 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
7788 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7789 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7790 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7791 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7792 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7794 let _balance_msat: Option<u64> = _balance_msat;
7798 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7800 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7801 outbound_scid_alias,
7805 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7806 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7808 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7809 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7810 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
7811 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7812 confirmations_required,
7814 force_close_spend_delay,
7815 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7816 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7817 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7818 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7819 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7820 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7821 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7822 channel_shutdown_state,
7827 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7828 (2, channels, required_vec),
7829 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7830 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7833 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7835 (0, onion_packet, required),
7836 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7839 (0, payment_data, required),
7840 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7841 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7842 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7843 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
7845 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7846 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7847 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7848 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7849 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
7850 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
7854 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7855 (0, routing, required),
7856 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7857 (4, payment_hash, required),
7858 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7859 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7860 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7861 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7865 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7866 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7868 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7870 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7871 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7872 reason.write(writer)?;
7874 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7875 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7878 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7879 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7880 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7881 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7888 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7889 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7890 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7893 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7894 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7895 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7896 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7900 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7901 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7902 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7903 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7904 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7907 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7908 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7909 // messages contained in the variants.
7910 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7911 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7912 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7914 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7915 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7916 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7917 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7918 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7921 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7922 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7923 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7924 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7925 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7927 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7932 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7937 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7938 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7939 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7940 (2, outpoint, required),
7941 (4, htlc_id, required),
7942 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7945 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7946 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7947 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7948 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7949 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7951 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7952 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7953 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7954 (2, self.value, required),
7955 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7956 (4, payment_data, option),
7957 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7958 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7959 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7960 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7966 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7967 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7968 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7969 (0, prev_hop, required),
7970 (1, total_msat, option),
7971 (2, value_ser, required),
7972 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7973 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
7974 (5, total_value_received, option),
7975 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7976 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7977 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7979 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
7980 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
7981 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7983 if payment_data.is_some() {
7984 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7986 if total_msat.is_none() {
7987 total_msat = Some(value);
7989 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7992 if total_msat.is_none() {
7993 if payment_data.is_none() {
7994 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7996 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7998 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
8002 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
8005 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
8006 total_value_received,
8007 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
8009 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
8010 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
8015 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
8016 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8017 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8020 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
8021 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
8022 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
8023 let mut payment_id = None;
8024 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
8025 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
8026 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8027 (0, session_priv, required),
8028 (1, payment_id, option),
8029 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8030 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
8031 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
8032 (6, blinded_tail, option),
8034 if payment_id.is_none() {
8035 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
8037 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
8039 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
8040 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
8041 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8043 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
8044 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
8045 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
8046 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8050 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8051 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
8052 first_hop_htlc_msat,
8054 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
8057 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8058 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8063 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
8064 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
8066 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
8068 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
8069 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8070 (0, session_priv, required),
8071 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
8072 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8073 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
8074 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
8075 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
8076 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
8079 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
8081 field.write(writer)?;
8088 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
8089 (0, forward_info, required),
8090 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
8091 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
8092 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
8093 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
8096 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
8098 (0, htlc_id, required),
8099 (2, err_packet, required),
8104 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
8105 (0, payment_secret, required),
8106 (2, expiry_time, required),
8107 (4, user_payment_id, required),
8108 (6, payment_preimage, required),
8109 (8, min_value_msat, required),
8112 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8114 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8115 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8116 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8117 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8118 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8119 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8123 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8124 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
8126 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8128 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
8130 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8131 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
8132 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
8135 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
8137 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8138 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
8139 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
8140 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8141 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8142 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8143 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8144 serializable_peer_count += 1;
8146 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
8147 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8148 if !channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8149 unfunded_channels += 1;
8154 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
8156 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8157 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8158 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8159 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8160 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8161 channel.write(writer)?;
8168 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8169 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8170 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
8171 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8172 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8173 for forward in pending_forwards {
8174 forward.write(writer)?;
8179 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8181 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8182 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
8183 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8185 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
8186 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
8187 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8188 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
8189 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8190 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8191 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
8192 htlc.write(writer)?;
8194 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
8195 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
8198 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
8199 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
8200 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8201 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
8202 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
8203 // per_peer_state lock at all.
8204 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
8207 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
8208 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8209 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
8210 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
8211 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
8213 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8214 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
8215 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
8216 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
8217 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
8218 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
8219 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
8224 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8225 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
8226 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
8227 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
8228 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
8229 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
8230 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
8231 // well save the space and not write any events here.
8232 0u64.write(writer)?;
8234 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8235 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
8236 event.write(writer)?;
8240 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
8241 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
8242 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
8243 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
8244 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
8245 0u64.write(writer)?;
8247 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
8248 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
8249 // likely to be identical.
8250 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8251 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8253 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8254 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
8255 hash.write(writer)?;
8256 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
8259 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
8260 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
8261 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8262 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
8263 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
8266 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
8267 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8269 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8270 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8271 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
8272 session_priv.write(writer)?;
8275 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
8276 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
8280 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
8281 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
8282 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8284 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8285 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8286 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
8292 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
8293 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8294 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
8295 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
8298 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
8299 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
8300 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
8301 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
8302 pending_claiming_payments = None;
8305 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8306 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8307 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
8308 if !updates.is_empty() {
8309 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
8310 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
8315 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8316 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
8317 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8318 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
8319 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8320 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
8321 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8322 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
8323 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
8324 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
8325 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8326 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
8327 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8334 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8335 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8336 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
8337 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
8340 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
8341 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
8342 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
8343 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
8344 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
8345 // check that the event is sane here.
8346 let event_encoded = event.encode();
8347 let event_read: Option<Event> =
8348 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
8349 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
8355 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8356 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8357 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8358 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
8359 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
8360 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
8363 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
8364 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
8365 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
8366 events.push_back((ev, action));
8367 } else if action.is_some() {
8368 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8375 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
8376 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
8377 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
8378 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
8379 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
8380 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
8383 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
8385 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
8387 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8388 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
8389 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
8390 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
8391 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
8392 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
8393 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
8394 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
8395 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8396 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
8397 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
8398 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
8399 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
8401 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
8402 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
8404 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
8405 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
8407 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
8408 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
8409 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
8410 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
8411 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
8412 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
8414 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
8415 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8417 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8418 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8419 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8420 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8421 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8422 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8426 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
8427 pub entropy_source: ES,
8429 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
8430 pub node_signer: NS,
8432 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
8433 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
8435 pub signer_provider: SP,
8437 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8439 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
8440 pub fee_estimator: F,
8441 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8443 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
8444 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
8445 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
8446 pub chain_monitor: M,
8448 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
8449 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
8450 /// force-closed during deserialization.
8451 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
8452 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
8453 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
8455 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
8457 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
8458 /// deserialization.
8460 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
8461 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
8462 pub default_config: UserConfig,
8464 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
8465 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
8467 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
8468 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
8469 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
8470 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
8472 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
8475 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
8476 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
8479 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8480 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8482 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8483 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8484 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8485 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8486 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8487 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8491 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
8492 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
8493 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
8494 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
8495 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
8497 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
8498 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
8503 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
8504 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
8505 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8506 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
8508 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8509 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8510 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8511 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8512 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8513 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8517 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8518 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
8519 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
8523 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8524 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
8526 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8527 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8528 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8529 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8530 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8531 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8535 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8536 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8538 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8539 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8540 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8542 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8544 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8545 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8546 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8547 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8548 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8549 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
8550 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
8551 for _ in 0..channel_count {
8552 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
8553 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
8555 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8556 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
8557 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
8558 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
8559 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
8560 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
8561 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8562 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
8563 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
8564 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
8565 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8566 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
8567 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
8568 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
8569 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8570 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
8573 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
8574 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8575 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8576 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8577 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
8578 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
8579 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
8581 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8582 let mut found_htlc = false;
8583 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8584 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
8587 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
8588 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
8589 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
8590 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
8591 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
8592 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
8593 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
8594 log_info!(args.logger,
8595 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
8596 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8597 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8601 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
8602 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
8603 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8604 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8605 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8607 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8608 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
8610 match peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8611 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8612 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8613 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8615 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8616 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8617 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8618 entry.insert(by_id_map);
8622 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
8623 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
8624 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
8625 // safely discard the channel.
8626 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
8627 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8628 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8629 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8630 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8631 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
8632 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
8635 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
8636 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8637 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8638 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8639 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8640 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8644 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8645 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8646 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8647 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8648 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8649 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8650 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8652 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8656 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8657 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8658 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8659 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8660 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8661 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8662 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
8663 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
8664 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
8666 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
8669 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8670 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8671 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
8672 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8673 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8674 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
8675 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
8676 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
8678 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
8681 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
8684 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8685 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8686 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8687 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
8688 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8689 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8690 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8691 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8692 is_connected: false,
8696 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8697 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
8698 for _ in 0..peer_count {
8699 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8700 let peer_chans = peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
8701 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
8702 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
8703 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
8706 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8707 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
8708 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
8709 for _ in 0..event_count {
8710 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
8711 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
8716 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8717 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
8718 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8720 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
8721 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
8722 // on-startup monitor updates.
8723 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
8724 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
8726 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8730 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
8731 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8733 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8734 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
8735 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
8736 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
8737 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8741 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8742 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
8743 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
8744 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
8745 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
8746 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
8747 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
8749 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
8750 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8754 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
8755 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
8756 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
8757 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
8758 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
8759 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8760 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8761 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
8762 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
8763 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
8764 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
8765 let mut events_override = None;
8766 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8767 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8768 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
8769 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8770 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
8771 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8772 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
8773 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8774 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
8775 (8, events_override, option),
8776 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
8777 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8778 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
8779 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8781 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
8782 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8785 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
8786 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8789 if let Some(events) = events_override {
8790 pending_events_read = events;
8793 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
8794 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
8797 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
8798 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
8799 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
8800 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
8801 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
8802 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
8804 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
8806 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
8807 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8808 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8811 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
8812 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
8813 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
8814 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
8815 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
8817 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
8818 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
8819 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
8821 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
8822 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
8823 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
8824 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
8825 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
8827 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
8828 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8829 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
8830 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
8831 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, log_bytes!($funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8832 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
8833 pending_background_events.push(
8834 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8835 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8836 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
8837 update: update.clone(),
8840 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
8841 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
8842 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
8843 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
8844 pending_background_events.push(
8845 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
8846 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8847 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
8850 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
8851 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
8852 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8854 max_in_flight_update_id
8858 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8859 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8860 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8861 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8862 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
8864 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8865 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
8866 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
8867 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
8868 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
8869 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
8870 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
8871 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
8872 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
8875 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
8876 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
8877 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8878 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
8879 log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
8880 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
8881 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8882 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8883 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8884 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8885 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8890 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
8891 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
8892 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
8893 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
8894 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
8895 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
8896 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
8897 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
8899 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8900 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
8901 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
8903 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8904 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
8905 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8906 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8907 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8908 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8909 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8910 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8915 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
8916 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
8918 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
8919 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
8920 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
8921 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
8924 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8925 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8926 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8927 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8928 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8929 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8930 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8932 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8933 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
8934 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
8935 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8936 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8937 if path.hops.is_empty() {
8938 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8939 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8942 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
8943 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
8944 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
8945 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
8946 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8947 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
8948 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
8949 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
8951 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8952 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
8953 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
8954 retry_strategy: None,
8955 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
8956 payment_params: None,
8957 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
8958 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
8959 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8960 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8961 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8962 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8963 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
8964 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
8965 total_msat: path_amt,
8966 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
8968 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
8969 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
8974 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8976 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
8977 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
8978 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
8979 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
8981 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
8982 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
8983 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
8984 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
8985 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
8986 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
8987 forwards.retain(|forward| {
8988 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
8989 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8990 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8991 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8996 !forwards.is_empty()
8998 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
8999 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9000 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9001 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
9002 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
9003 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
9004 intercepted_id != ev_id
9011 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
9012 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
9013 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
9014 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
9015 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
9016 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
9017 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
9018 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
9019 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
9020 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
9021 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
9022 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
9023 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
9030 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
9031 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
9033 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
9035 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
9036 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
9037 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
9038 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
9039 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
9040 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
9041 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
9042 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
9043 monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()))
9046 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
9047 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
9048 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
9049 // channel still live case here.
9053 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
9054 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
9059 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
9060 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
9061 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
9062 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
9063 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
9064 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
9065 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
9066 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
9070 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
9071 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
9073 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
9074 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
9075 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9076 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9078 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
9079 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9080 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9082 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
9083 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
9085 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9086 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
9088 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9091 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
9092 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9093 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9095 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9099 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
9100 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
9101 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
9102 if htlcs.is_empty() {
9103 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9105 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
9106 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
9107 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
9108 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
9109 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
9110 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
9111 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
9112 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
9114 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
9115 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9119 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
9121 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9123 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
9124 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
9126 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9127 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9132 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9133 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9135 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
9137 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9139 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
9140 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
9141 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
9142 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9146 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
9147 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9148 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9149 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9150 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9151 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
9152 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
9154 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
9155 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
9156 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
9158 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
9159 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
9160 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9161 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9162 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9163 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9165 if chan.context.is_usable() {
9166 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
9167 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9168 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9169 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9170 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9176 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
9178 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9179 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
9180 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
9181 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
9182 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
9183 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
9184 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
9185 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
9186 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
9187 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
9188 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
9190 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
9191 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
9193 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
9194 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
9195 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
9196 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
9198 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
9199 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
9200 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
9201 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
9203 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
9204 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
9205 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
9206 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
9208 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
9209 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
9210 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
9211 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9212 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9213 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
9214 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
9217 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
9218 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
9221 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
9224 purpose: payment.purpose,
9225 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
9231 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
9232 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
9233 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
9234 for action in actions.iter() {
9235 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
9236 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
9237 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
9239 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
9240 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9241 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
9242 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
9244 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
9245 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
9246 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
9247 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
9253 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
9255 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
9256 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9260 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
9262 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
9263 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
9264 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
9265 router: args.router,
9267 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
9269 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
9270 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
9271 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
9272 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
9274 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
9275 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
9276 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
9277 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
9278 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
9279 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
9281 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
9286 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
9288 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
9290 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
9291 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
9292 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
9293 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
9294 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
9295 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
9297 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
9298 node_signer: args.node_signer,
9299 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
9301 logger: args.logger,
9302 default_configuration: args.default_config,
9305 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
9306 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
9307 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
9308 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
9309 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
9312 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_chan_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
9313 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
9314 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
9315 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
9316 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
9317 downstream_closed, downstream_chan_id);
9320 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
9321 //connection or two.
9323 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
9329 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9330 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9331 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
9332 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
9333 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
9334 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
9335 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
9336 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9337 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
9338 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
9339 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
9340 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9341 use crate::util::test_utils;
9342 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
9343 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
9346 fn test_notify_limits() {
9347 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
9348 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
9349 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9350 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9351 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9352 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9354 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
9355 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
9356 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9357 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9358 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9360 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9362 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
9363 // to connect messages with new values
9364 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9365 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9366 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9367 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9368 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9369 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9371 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
9372 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9373 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9374 // ... but the last node should not.
9375 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9376 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
9377 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9378 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9380 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
9381 // about the channel.
9382 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9383 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9384 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9386 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
9388 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9389 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9390 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9391 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9392 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9393 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9395 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
9396 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9397 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9399 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
9400 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
9401 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
9402 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
9403 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
9404 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
9406 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
9407 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
9408 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9409 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9410 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9411 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9412 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9413 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9415 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
9416 // the channel info has updated.
9417 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9418 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9419 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9420 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9421 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9422 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9426 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
9427 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
9429 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9430 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9431 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9432 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9433 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9435 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
9436 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9437 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
9438 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
9440 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9441 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
9442 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
9443 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
9444 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9445 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
9446 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9447 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9448 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9449 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9450 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9451 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9453 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
9454 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9455 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9457 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9458 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9459 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9460 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9461 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9462 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9463 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9464 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9465 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9467 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9468 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9469 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9470 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9471 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9472 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9473 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9474 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9475 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9477 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
9478 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9479 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9480 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9481 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9482 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9483 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
9485 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
9486 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
9487 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
9488 // lightning messages manually.
9489 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9490 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
9491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9493 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9494 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9495 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
9496 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9497 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9498 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
9499 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9500 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9501 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
9502 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9503 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9504 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9505 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9506 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9507 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9508 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
9509 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9510 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9511 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
9512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9513 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9514 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9515 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9516 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
9517 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9519 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
9520 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
9521 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9522 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
9524 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
9525 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
9526 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
9527 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
9529 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9532 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9533 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9534 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9535 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9537 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9540 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9541 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9542 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9543 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9545 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9550 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
9551 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
9552 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
9555 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
9556 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
9557 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
9558 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
9559 // fails as expected.
9560 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
9561 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
9562 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
9563 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
9564 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
9565 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
9566 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9567 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9568 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9569 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
9570 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9571 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9572 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9573 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9574 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9576 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
9577 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
9578 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
9580 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9581 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9582 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9583 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9585 let route = find_route(
9586 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9587 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9589 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9590 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9591 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9592 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9593 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9594 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9595 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9596 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9597 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9598 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9599 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
9600 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
9601 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9602 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9603 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9604 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9605 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9606 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9607 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9608 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9609 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9610 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9611 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9612 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9614 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9615 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9617 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9618 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9619 let route = find_route(
9620 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9621 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9623 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9624 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9626 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9627 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9628 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9629 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9630 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9632 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
9633 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9634 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9635 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9636 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9637 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9638 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9639 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9640 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9641 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9642 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9643 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9644 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9645 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9646 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9647 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9648 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9649 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9650 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9651 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9652 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9653 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9654 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9655 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9657 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
9658 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9660 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9661 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
9662 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9663 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
9664 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9665 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9666 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9667 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9668 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9669 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9671 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9672 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9673 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9674 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9676 let route = find_route(
9677 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9678 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9680 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
9681 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9682 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
9683 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9684 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9685 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9686 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9687 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9688 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9690 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9691 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9692 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9693 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9694 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9695 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9696 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9697 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9698 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9699 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9700 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9701 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9702 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9704 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9705 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9709 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
9710 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
9711 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
9712 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9713 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9714 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9715 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9717 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9718 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9720 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9721 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9722 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9723 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9725 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9726 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9727 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9728 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9729 let route = find_route(
9730 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9731 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9734 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9735 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
9736 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
9737 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9738 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
9739 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9740 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9742 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9743 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9744 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9745 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9746 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9747 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9748 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9750 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
9754 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
9755 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
9756 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
9757 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9758 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
9759 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9760 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9761 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9762 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9764 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9765 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9767 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9768 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9769 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9770 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9772 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9773 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9774 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9775 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9776 let route = find_route(
9777 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9778 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9781 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9782 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9783 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
9784 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
9785 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9786 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
9787 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
9788 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9789 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9791 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9792 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9793 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9794 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9795 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9796 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9797 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9799 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
9803 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
9804 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9805 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9806 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9807 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9809 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9810 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9811 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9812 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9814 // Marshall an MPP route.
9815 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
9816 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
9817 route.paths.push(path);
9818 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9819 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
9820 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
9821 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
9822 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
9823 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
9825 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9826 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
9828 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
9829 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
9831 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
9836 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
9837 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9838 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9839 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9840 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9842 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9844 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9845 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9847 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9848 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9849 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9850 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9853 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
9854 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
9855 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9856 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
9857 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
9858 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
9861 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9864 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
9865 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
9870 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
9871 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
9872 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9873 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9874 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9875 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9877 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
9878 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9880 total_msat: 100_000,
9883 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
9884 // payment verification fails as expected.
9885 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
9886 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
9887 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
9888 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
9890 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
9894 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
9895 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
9899 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
9900 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
9901 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
9902 // the channel is successfully closed.
9903 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9904 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9905 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9906 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9908 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9909 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9910 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9911 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9912 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9914 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9915 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
9917 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
9918 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
9919 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9920 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9923 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9925 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9926 // as it has the funding transaction.
9927 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9928 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9929 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9932 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9934 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9936 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9938 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9939 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9940 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9942 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9945 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9946 // as it has the funding transaction.
9947 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9948 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9949 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9951 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9952 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9953 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9955 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9956 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9957 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9958 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
9960 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9961 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9962 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9963 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
9965 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9966 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
9968 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
9969 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
9970 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
9971 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
9972 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9973 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9974 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9978 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
9979 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
9980 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
9981 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
9982 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9983 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9984 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9987 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9989 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
9990 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
9991 // closing transaction).
9992 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
9993 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
9994 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9996 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
9997 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
9998 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9999 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10000 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
10003 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10005 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
10007 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
10008 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
10009 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10011 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10013 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10014 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10017 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10018 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
10019 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10022 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10023 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
10024 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10027 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
10029 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10030 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10032 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
10033 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10035 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
10036 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
10041 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
10042 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
10043 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
10044 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
10045 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10046 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10047 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
10048 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10051 let channel_id = [4; 32];
10052 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10053 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
10055 // Test the API functions.
10056 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
10058 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
10060 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10062 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10064 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10066 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
10068 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
10072 fn test_connection_limiting() {
10073 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
10074 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10075 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10076 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10077 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10079 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10081 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10082 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10084 let mut funding_tx = None;
10085 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10086 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10087 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10090 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10091 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
10092 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
10093 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
10094 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10096 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10098 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10100 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10102 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10104 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10106 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10109 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
10110 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10111 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10112 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10113 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10115 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
10116 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
10118 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
10119 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
10120 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10121 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10122 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
10123 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10124 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10127 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10128 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10129 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10130 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10131 }, true).unwrap_err();
10133 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
10134 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
10135 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10136 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10137 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
10138 for ev in chan_closed_events {
10139 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
10141 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10142 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10144 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10145 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10146 }, true).unwrap_err();
10148 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
10149 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10150 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10151 }, false).unwrap();
10152 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10154 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
10155 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
10157 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
10158 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10159 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
10160 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
10161 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10163 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10164 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10165 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10167 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
10168 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10169 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
10171 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
10172 // "protected" and can connect again.
10173 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
10174 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10175 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10177 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10179 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
10181 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10182 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10186 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
10187 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
10188 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10189 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10190 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10191 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10193 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10195 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10196 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10198 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10199 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10200 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10201 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10204 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
10206 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10207 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10208 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10210 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
10211 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10212 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10214 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
10215 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10216 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10217 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10221 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
10222 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10223 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10224 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10225 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10226 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
10227 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10228 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
10229 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10231 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10233 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10234 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10236 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
10237 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10238 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10239 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10240 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10241 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10244 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10245 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10247 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10248 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10250 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10252 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
10253 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10256 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
10257 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10258 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10259 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10260 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10262 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10263 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10265 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10266 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
10267 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
10268 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
10272 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10274 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10275 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10277 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
10278 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10279 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10281 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10282 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10284 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10286 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10290 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
10291 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
10292 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
10293 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
10294 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10295 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
10296 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
10297 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
10299 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10300 payment_metadata: None,
10301 keysend_preimage: None,
10302 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10303 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10305 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10307 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
10308 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
10309 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
10310 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10311 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
10313 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
10314 } else { panic!(); }
10316 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
10317 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
10319 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10320 payment_metadata: None,
10321 keysend_preimage: None,
10322 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10323 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10325 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10327 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10328 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
10332 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
10333 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10334 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10335 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10336 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10338 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
10339 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10341 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10342 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10343 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
10344 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
10345 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10347 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10348 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10350 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10351 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10352 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10353 match &msg_events[0] {
10354 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
10355 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10357 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
10358 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
10359 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
10362 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10365 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10366 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10368 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
10369 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
10370 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10372 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10376 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
10377 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
10378 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
10379 // the channel without the anchors feature.
10380 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10381 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10382 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
10383 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10384 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10385 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
10386 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10388 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
10389 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10390 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10392 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10393 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10395 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10396 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10398 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10401 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10402 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
10404 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10405 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10407 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
10408 // not have generated any events.
10409 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10413 fn test_update_channel_config() {
10414 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10415 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10416 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
10417 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
10418 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10419 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10420 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
10422 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10423 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10424 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10426 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
10427 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10428 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
10429 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10430 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10432 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10433 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10436 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
10437 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10438 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10440 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
10441 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10442 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
10443 ..Default::default()
10445 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10446 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10447 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10449 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10450 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10453 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
10454 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10455 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10456 ..Default::default()
10458 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10459 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
10460 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10461 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10463 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10464 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10467 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
10468 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
10469 let bad_channel_id = [10; 32];
10470 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
10471 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
10474 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10475 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10476 ..Default::default()
10478 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
10481 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
10482 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
10483 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10484 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10490 use crate::chain::Listen;
10491 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
10492 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
10493 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
10494 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
10495 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10496 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
10497 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
10498 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
10499 use crate::util::test_utils;
10500 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
10502 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10503 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10504 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
10506 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
10508 use criterion::Criterion;
10510 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
10511 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
10512 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
10513 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
10514 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
10515 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
10516 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
10518 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
10519 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
10521 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
10522 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
10524 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
10526 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
10529 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
10530 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
10533 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
10534 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
10535 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
10537 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
10538 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
10540 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
10541 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
10542 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10543 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
10544 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
10546 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
10547 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
10548 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10550 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
10551 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
10552 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
10553 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10555 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10556 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10557 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
10559 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10560 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
10561 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
10562 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
10563 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10565 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10566 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10567 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
10569 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10570 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10572 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10573 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10574 }, false).unwrap();
10575 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10576 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10577 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10580 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
10581 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
10582 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
10584 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10585 } else { panic!(); }
10587 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10588 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10589 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10590 match events_b[0] {
10591 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10592 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10594 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10597 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10598 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10599 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10600 match events_a[0] {
10601 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10602 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10604 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10607 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
10609 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
10610 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
10611 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
10613 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10614 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10615 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
10616 match msg_events[0] {
10617 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
10618 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
10619 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10623 match msg_events[1] {
10624 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10628 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10629 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10630 match events_a[0] {
10631 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10632 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10634 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10637 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10638 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10639 match events_b[0] {
10640 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10641 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10643 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10646 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
10647 macro_rules! send_payment {
10648 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
10649 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
10650 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
10651 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
10652 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
10653 payment_count += 1;
10654 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
10655 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
10657 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
10658 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
10659 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
10660 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
10661 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
10662 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10663 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
10664 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
10665 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10666 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10667 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10669 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
10670 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
10671 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10672 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
10674 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
10675 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
10676 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
10677 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10678 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
10680 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
10683 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
10684 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10685 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10686 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10688 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
10692 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
10693 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
10694 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);