1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
39 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
42 // construct one themselves.
43 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
44 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
45 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
46 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
48 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
50 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
51 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
52 use util::config::UserConfig;
53 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
54 use util::{byte_utils, events};
55 use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
56 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
57 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
58 use util::errors::APIError;
63 use core::cell::RefCell;
65 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
66 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
67 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
72 use util::crypto::sign;
75 use alloc::string::ToString;
76 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
77 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
78 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
79 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
80 use chain::keysinterface::{KeyMaterial, KeysInterface, Sign};
81 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
82 use ln::channelmanager::APIError;
84 use ln::msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
85 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
86 use util::crypto::hkdf_extract_expand_thrice;
87 use util::logger::Logger;
89 use core::convert::TryInto;
92 const IV_LEN: usize = 16;
93 const METADATA_LEN: usize = 16;
94 const METADATA_KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
95 const AMT_MSAT_LEN: usize = 8;
96 // Used to shift the payment type bits to take up the top 3 bits of the metadata bytes, or to
97 // retrieve said payment type bits.
98 const METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET: usize = 5;
100 /// A set of keys that were HKDF-expanded from an initial call to
101 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
103 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
104 pub(super) struct ExpandedKey {
105 /// The key used to encrypt the bytes containing the payment metadata (i.e. the amount and
106 /// expiry, included for payment verification on decryption).
107 metadata_key: [u8; 32],
108 /// The key used to authenticate an LDK-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
109 /// registered with LDK.
110 ldk_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
111 /// The key used to authenticate a user-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
112 /// registered with LDK.
113 user_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
117 pub(super) fn new(key_material: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey {
118 let (metadata_key, ldk_pmt_hash_key, user_pmt_hash_key) =
119 hkdf_extract_expand_thrice(b"LDK Inbound Payment Key Expansion", &key_material.0);
134 fn from_bits(bits: u8) -> Result<Method, u8> {
136 bits if bits == Method::LdkPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash),
137 bits if bits == Method::UserPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash),
138 unknown => Err(unknown),
143 pub(super) fn create<Signer: Sign, K: Deref>(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, keys_manager: &K, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()>
144 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
146 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::LdkPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
148 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
149 let rand_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
150 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&rand_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
152 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
153 hmac.input(&iv_bytes);
154 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
155 let payment_preimage_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
157 let ldk_pmt_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_bytes).into_inner());
158 let payment_secret = construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key);
159 Ok((ldk_pmt_hash, payment_secret))
162 pub(super) fn create_from_hash(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
163 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::UserPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
165 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
166 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
167 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
168 let hmac_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
170 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
171 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&hmac_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
173 Ok(construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key))
176 fn construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_type: Method, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<[u8; METADATA_LEN], ()> {
177 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
181 let mut min_amt_msat_bytes: [u8; AMT_MSAT_LEN] = match min_value_msat {
182 Some(amt) => amt.to_be_bytes(),
183 None => [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN],
185 min_amt_msat_bytes[0] |= (payment_type as u8) << METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET;
187 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time - it's updated when
188 // we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in a header. It should never be more
189 // than two hours in the future. Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we
190 // absolutely never fail a payment too early.
191 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date timestamps.
192 let expiry_bytes = (highest_seen_timestamp + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200).to_be_bytes();
194 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
195 metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN].copy_from_slice(&min_amt_msat_bytes);
196 metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].copy_from_slice(&expiry_bytes);
201 fn construct_payment_secret(iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], metadata_key: &[u8; METADATA_KEY_LEN]) -> PaymentSecret {
202 let mut payment_secret_bytes: [u8; 32] = [0; 32];
203 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_slice) = payment_secret_bytes.split_at_mut(IV_LEN);
204 iv_slice.copy_from_slice(iv_bytes);
206 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(metadata_key, iv_bytes);
207 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
208 encrypted_metadata_slice[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ metadata_bytes[i];
210 PaymentSecret(payment_secret_bytes)
213 /// Check that an inbound payment's `payment_data` field is sane.
215 /// LDK does not store any data for pending inbound payments. Instead, we construct our payment
216 /// secret (and, if supplied by LDK, our payment preimage) to include encrypted metadata about the
219 /// The metadata is constructed as:
220 /// payment method (3 bits) || payment amount (8 bytes - 3 bits) || expiry (8 bytes)
221 /// and encrypted using a key derived from [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
223 /// Then on payment receipt, we verify in this method that the payment preimage and payment secret
224 /// match what was constructed.
226 /// [`create_inbound_payment`] and [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] are called by the user to
227 /// construct the payment secret and/or payment hash that this method is verifying. If the former
228 /// method is called, then the payment method bits mentioned above are represented internally as
229 /// [`Method::LdkPaymentHash`]. If the latter, [`Method::UserPaymentHash`].
231 /// For the former method, the payment preimage is constructed as an HMAC of payment metadata and
232 /// random bytes. Because the payment secret is also encoded with these random bytes and metadata
233 /// (with the metadata encrypted with a block cipher), we're able to authenticate the preimage on
236 /// For the latter, the payment secret instead contains an HMAC of the user-provided payment hash
237 /// and payment metadata (encrypted with a block cipher), allowing us to authenticate the payment
238 /// hash and metadata on payment receipt.
240 /// See [`ExpandedKey`] docs for more info on the individual keys used.
242 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
243 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment
244 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
245 pub(super) fn verify<L: Deref>(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData, highest_seen_timestamp: u64, keys: &ExpandedKey, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<PaymentPreimage>, ()>
246 where L::Target: Logger
248 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_data.payment_secret, keys);
250 let payment_type_res = Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET);
251 let mut amt_msat_bytes = [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN];
252 amt_msat_bytes.copy_from_slice(&metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN]);
253 // Zero out the bits reserved to indicate the payment type.
254 amt_msat_bytes[0] &= 0b00011111;
255 let min_amt_msat: u64 = u64::from_be_bytes(amt_msat_bytes.into());
256 let expiry = u64::from_be_bytes(metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].try_into().unwrap());
258 // Make sure to check to check the HMAC before doing the other checks below, to mitigate timing
260 let mut payment_preimage = None;
261 match payment_type_res {
262 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => {
263 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
264 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes[..]);
265 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
266 if !fixed_time_eq(&iv_bytes, &Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner().split_at_mut(IV_LEN).0) {
267 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash {}: unexpected payment_secret", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
271 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
272 match derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys) {
273 Ok(preimage) => payment_preimage = Some(preimage),
274 Err(bad_preimage_bytes) => {
275 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to mismatching preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes));
280 Err(unknown_bits) => {
281 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment hash {} due to unknown payment type {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), unknown_bits);
286 if payment_data.total_msat < min_amt_msat {
287 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to total_msat {} being less than the minimum amount of {} msat", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, min_amt_msat);
291 if expiry < highest_seen_timestamp {
292 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {}: expired payment", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
299 pub(super) fn get_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
300 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_secret, keys);
302 match Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET) {
303 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
304 derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys)
305 .map_err(|bad_preimage_bytes| APIError::APIMisuseError {
306 err: format!("Payment hash {} did not match decoded preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes))
309 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
310 err: "Expected payment type to be LdkPaymentHash, instead got UserPaymentHash".to_string()
312 Err(other) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Unknown payment type: {}", other) }),
316 fn decrypt_metadata(payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> ([u8; IV_LEN], [u8; METADATA_LEN]) {
317 let mut iv_bytes = [0; IV_LEN];
318 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_bytes) = payment_secret.0.split_at(IV_LEN);
319 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(iv_slice);
321 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(&keys.metadata_key, &iv_bytes);
322 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
323 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
324 metadata_bytes[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ encrypted_metadata_bytes[i];
327 (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes)
330 // Errors if the payment preimage doesn't match `payment_hash`. Returns the bad preimage bytes in
332 fn derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, [u8; 32]> {
333 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
334 hmac.input(iv_bytes);
335 hmac.input(metadata_bytes);
336 let decoded_payment_preimage = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
337 if !fixed_time_eq(&payment_hash.0, &Sha256::hash(&decoded_payment_preimage).into_inner()) {
338 return Err(decoded_payment_preimage);
340 return Ok(PaymentPreimage(decoded_payment_preimage))
344 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
346 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
347 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
348 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
350 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
351 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
352 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
353 // before we forward it.
355 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
356 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
357 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
358 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
359 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
361 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
362 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
364 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
365 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
368 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
369 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
370 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
373 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
374 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
378 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
379 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
380 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
381 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
382 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
383 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
384 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
387 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
388 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
389 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
390 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
393 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
394 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
395 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
396 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
397 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
400 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
402 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
404 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
405 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
406 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
408 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
410 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
414 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
418 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
419 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
420 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
421 short_channel_id: u64,
423 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
424 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
426 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
427 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
432 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
433 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
434 /// are part of the same payment.
435 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
436 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
437 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
440 struct ClaimableHTLC {
441 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
444 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
448 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
449 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
450 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
451 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
453 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
454 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
459 impl Readable for PaymentId {
460 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
461 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
465 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
466 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
467 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
468 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
469 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
472 session_priv: SecretKey,
473 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
474 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
475 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
476 payment_id: PaymentId,
477 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
478 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
481 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
482 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
483 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
485 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
487 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
489 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
492 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
493 payment_id.hash(hasher);
494 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
495 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
496 payment_params.hash(hasher);
503 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
504 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
506 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
507 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
508 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
509 payment_secret: None,
510 payment_params: None,
515 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
516 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
518 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
526 struct ReceiveError {
532 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
533 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
535 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
540 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
542 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
543 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
544 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
545 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
546 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
548 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
549 err: msgs::LightningError,
550 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
551 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
553 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
555 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
557 err: LightningError {
559 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
560 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
567 shutdown_finish: None,
571 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
573 err: LightningError {
575 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
578 shutdown_finish: None,
582 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
583 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
586 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
588 err: LightningError {
590 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
591 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
597 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
598 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
602 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
605 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
607 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
608 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
612 log_level: Level::Warn,
615 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
617 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
619 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
621 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
622 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
628 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
630 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
631 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
639 shutdown_finish: None,
644 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
645 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
646 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
647 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
648 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
650 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
651 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
652 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
653 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
654 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
655 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
656 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
658 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
662 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
663 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
664 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
665 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) to the real channel id. Outbound SCID aliases are added
666 /// here once the channel is available for normal use, with SCIDs being added once the funding
667 /// transaction is confirmed at the channel's required confirmation depth.
668 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
669 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
671 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
672 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
673 /// and via the classic SCID.
675 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
676 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
677 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
678 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
679 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
680 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
681 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
683 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
684 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
685 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
686 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
689 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
690 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
691 /// quite some time lag.
692 enum BackgroundEvent {
693 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
694 /// commitment transaction.
695 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
698 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
699 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
701 latest_features: InitFeatures,
704 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
705 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
707 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
710 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
711 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
712 struct PendingInboundPayment {
713 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
714 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
715 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
716 /// this payment being removed.
718 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
719 user_payment_id: u64,
720 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
721 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
722 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
725 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
726 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
727 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
729 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
732 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
733 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
734 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
735 pending_amt_msat: u64,
736 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
737 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
738 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
740 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
741 starting_block_height: u32,
743 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
744 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
745 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
747 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
748 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
750 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
751 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
752 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
753 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
754 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
756 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
758 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
759 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
763 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
764 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
766 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
770 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
772 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
776 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
778 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
782 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
784 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
789 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
791 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
792 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
793 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
794 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
798 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
799 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
800 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
801 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
802 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
803 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
804 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
807 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
808 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
811 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
812 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
813 let our_payment_hash;
814 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
815 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
816 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
818 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
819 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
820 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
824 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
828 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
829 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
830 let remove_res = match self {
831 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
832 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
833 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
834 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
835 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
839 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
840 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
841 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
842 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
843 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
844 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
851 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
852 let insert_res = match self {
853 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
854 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
855 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
857 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
858 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
861 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
862 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
863 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
864 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
865 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
872 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
874 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
875 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
876 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
877 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
884 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
885 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
886 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
887 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
888 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
889 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
890 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
892 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
893 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
895 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
896 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
897 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
898 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
899 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
900 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
901 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
902 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
904 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
905 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
907 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
908 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
910 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
911 /// to individual Channels.
913 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
914 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
915 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
916 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
918 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
919 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
920 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
921 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
922 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
923 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
924 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
926 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
927 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
928 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
929 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
932 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
933 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
934 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
935 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
936 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
938 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
939 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
940 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
941 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
942 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
943 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
944 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
945 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
946 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
947 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
950 default_configuration: UserConfig,
951 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
957 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
959 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
960 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
962 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
963 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
964 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
965 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
967 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
968 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
969 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
970 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
971 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
972 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
974 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
975 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
976 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
977 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
978 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
979 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
980 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
981 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
983 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
985 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
986 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
988 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
989 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
990 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
991 /// active channel list on load.
992 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
994 our_network_key: SecretKey,
995 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
997 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
999 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1000 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1001 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1003 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1004 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1006 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
1007 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
1008 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
1010 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1011 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1012 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1013 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1015 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
1016 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1017 /// are currently open with that peer.
1018 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1019 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
1022 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
1023 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
1025 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
1026 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1027 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1028 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1029 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1030 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1031 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1032 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1033 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1035 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
1042 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1044 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1045 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1046 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1047 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1048 pub struct ChainParameters {
1049 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1050 pub network: Network,
1052 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1054 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1055 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1058 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1064 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1065 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1066 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1067 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1068 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1069 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1071 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1072 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1073 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1074 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1075 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
1077 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1078 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1081 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1082 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1083 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1086 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1087 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1089 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1090 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1091 should_persist: persist_check,
1092 _read_guard: read_guard,
1097 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1098 fn drop(&mut self) {
1099 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1100 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1105 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1106 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1108 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1110 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1111 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1112 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1113 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1114 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1116 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1117 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1119 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1121 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1122 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1123 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1124 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1125 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1126 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1127 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
1129 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1130 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
1132 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1133 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1134 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1135 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
1137 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1138 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1139 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1140 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1141 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1142 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1145 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1147 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1148 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1151 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1153 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
1154 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
1155 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
1157 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1158 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1160 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1161 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1162 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1163 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1164 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1165 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1166 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1167 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1168 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1169 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1170 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1173 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1174 /// to better separate parameters.
1175 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1176 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1177 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1178 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1179 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1180 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1181 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1182 pub features: InitFeatures,
1183 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1184 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1185 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1187 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1189 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1190 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1191 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1192 /// payments to us through this channel.
1193 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1196 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1197 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1198 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1199 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1200 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1201 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1202 /// lifetime of the channel.
1203 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1204 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1205 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1206 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1207 /// our counterparty already.
1209 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1210 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1211 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1212 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1213 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1215 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1216 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1218 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1219 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1220 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1221 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1222 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1223 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1224 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1226 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1227 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1228 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1229 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1230 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1231 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1232 /// this value on chain.
1234 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1236 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1238 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1239 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1240 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1241 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1242 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1243 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1244 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1246 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1247 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1248 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1249 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1251 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1252 pub balance_msat: u64,
1253 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1254 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1255 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1256 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1258 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1260 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1261 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1262 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1263 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1264 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1265 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1266 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1267 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1268 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1270 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1271 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1272 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1273 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1274 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1275 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1276 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1277 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1278 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1280 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1282 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1283 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1284 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1285 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1286 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1287 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1288 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1289 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1290 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1292 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1293 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1294 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1295 pub is_outbound: bool,
1296 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
1297 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
1298 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1299 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1300 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1302 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1303 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
1304 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
1305 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1307 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
1308 pub is_usable: bool,
1309 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1310 pub is_public: bool,
1313 impl ChannelDetails {
1314 /// Gets the SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments. This
1315 /// should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our counterparty
1316 /// will forward a payment to us.
1317 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1318 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1322 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1323 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1324 /// states for more.
1325 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1326 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1327 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1328 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1329 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1330 ParameterError(APIError),
1331 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1332 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1333 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1334 /// payment in full.
1336 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1338 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1339 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1340 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1341 /// paths than the ones selected).
1342 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1343 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1344 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1345 /// in over-/re-payment.
1347 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1348 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1349 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1351 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1352 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1353 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1354 /// with the latest update_id.
1356 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1357 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1358 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1359 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1360 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1361 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1362 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1363 payment_id: PaymentId,
1367 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1369 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1371 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1372 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1373 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1374 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1376 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1377 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1378 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1381 macro_rules! handle_error {
1382 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1385 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1386 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1388 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1389 // entering the macro.
1390 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1391 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1394 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1396 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1397 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1398 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1399 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1403 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1404 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1405 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1406 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1411 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1412 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1414 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1415 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1416 action: err.action.clone()
1420 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1421 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1424 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1431 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1432 ($self: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1433 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1434 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1436 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1437 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1438 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1439 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1440 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1442 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1443 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1445 $short_to_id.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1449 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1450 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1451 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1453 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1454 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1456 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1457 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1459 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1460 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1461 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1462 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1463 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1464 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1466 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1467 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1468 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1469 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1470 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1471 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1477 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1478 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1482 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1484 $entry.remove_entry();
1492 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1493 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1497 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1499 $entry.remove_entry();
1507 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1508 ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1510 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1511 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_id, channel);
1517 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1518 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1520 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1521 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1522 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $chan);
1523 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1524 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1525 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1526 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1527 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1528 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1529 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1530 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1531 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1532 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1533 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1536 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1537 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1538 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1539 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1540 match $action_type {
1541 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1542 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1544 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1545 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1547 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1548 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1549 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1550 if !$resend_commitment {
1551 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1554 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1556 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1557 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1561 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1562 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1564 $entry.remove_entry();
1568 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1569 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1570 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1572 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1573 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1575 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1576 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1578 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1579 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1583 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1584 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1585 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1587 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1588 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1592 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1593 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1594 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1595 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1596 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1599 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1604 macro_rules! send_funding_locked {
1605 ($short_to_id: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $funding_locked_msg: expr) => {
1606 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1607 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1608 msg: $funding_locked_msg,
1610 // Note that we may send a funding locked multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1611 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1612 let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_id.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), $channel.channel_id());
1613 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1614 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1615 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1616 let scid_insert = $short_to_id.insert(real_scid, $channel.channel_id());
1617 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1618 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1623 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1624 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1625 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1626 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1627 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1629 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1630 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1631 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1633 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1634 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1635 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1636 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1639 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1640 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1641 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1642 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1643 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1644 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1645 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1646 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1647 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1648 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1649 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1650 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1653 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1654 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1655 // before it should be allowed to.
1656 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1657 send_funding_locked!($channel_state.short_to_id, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
1659 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1660 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1661 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1666 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1667 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1668 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1669 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1670 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1671 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1672 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1673 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1674 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1675 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1676 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1677 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1678 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1679 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1680 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1681 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1682 let mut order = $order;
1684 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1686 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1690 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1691 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1692 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1693 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1698 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1699 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1700 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1701 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1702 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1707 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1711 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1716 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1717 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1718 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1723 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1724 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1725 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1726 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1727 assert!(res.is_ok());
1730 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1734 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1735 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1736 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1738 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1740 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1741 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1746 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1747 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1748 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1749 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1750 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1753 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1755 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1756 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1758 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1760 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1762 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1763 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1764 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1765 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1766 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1767 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1768 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1769 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1771 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1772 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1773 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1777 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1779 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1780 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1781 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1782 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1783 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1784 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1786 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1787 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1788 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1790 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1791 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1794 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1795 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1797 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1798 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1800 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1802 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1803 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1804 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1805 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1813 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1814 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1815 &self.default_configuration
1818 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1819 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1820 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1823 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1824 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1826 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1828 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1832 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1837 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1839 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1840 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1841 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1842 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1843 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1846 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1847 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1849 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1850 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1851 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1853 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1854 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1855 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1856 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1857 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1858 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1860 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1861 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1862 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1863 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1864 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1865 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1869 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1870 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1871 Some(peer_state) => {
1872 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1873 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1874 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1875 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1876 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1877 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1878 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1882 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1887 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1890 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1892 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1893 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1894 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1896 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1897 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1898 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1899 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1901 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1903 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1906 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1908 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1909 node_id: their_network_key,
1912 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1915 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1916 let mut res = Vec::new();
1918 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1919 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1920 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1921 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1922 let balance_msat = channel.get_balance_msat();
1923 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1924 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1925 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1926 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1927 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1928 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1929 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1930 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1931 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1933 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1934 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1935 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1936 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1937 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1939 inbound_capacity_msat,
1940 outbound_capacity_msat,
1941 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1942 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1943 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1944 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1945 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1946 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1947 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1951 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1952 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1953 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1954 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1960 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1961 /// more information.
1962 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1963 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1966 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1967 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1969 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1970 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1972 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1973 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1974 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1975 // really wanted anyway.
1976 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1979 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1980 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1981 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1982 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1983 Some(transaction) => {
1984 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1988 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1989 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1990 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1991 reason: closure_reason
1995 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1996 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1998 let counterparty_node_id;
1999 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2000 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2001 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2002 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2003 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2004 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2005 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2006 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2007 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2008 Some(peer_state) => {
2009 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
2010 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2011 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
2013 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
2015 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2017 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2018 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
2019 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2020 let (result, is_permanent) =
2021 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
2023 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
2029 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2030 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2034 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2035 let channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
2036 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2037 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2041 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2045 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
2049 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2050 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2053 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
2057 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2058 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2059 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2061 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2062 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2064 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2065 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2066 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2067 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2069 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
2071 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2072 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2073 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2074 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2075 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
2078 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2079 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2080 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2082 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2083 /// the channel being closed or not:
2084 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2085 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2086 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2087 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2088 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2089 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2090 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2092 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
2094 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2095 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2096 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2097 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2098 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
2102 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2103 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2104 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2105 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2106 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2108 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2109 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2110 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2111 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2112 // ignore the result here.
2113 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2117 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2118 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2119 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2121 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2122 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2123 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2124 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
2125 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
2126 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2129 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
2130 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2131 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
2134 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2136 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan)
2138 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2141 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2142 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
2143 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2144 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2145 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2150 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2153 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
2154 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
2155 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2156 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2157 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
2158 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2159 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2160 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2161 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2162 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2163 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2173 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2174 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2175 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
2176 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2177 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2181 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2182 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2184 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2185 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2186 return Err(ReceiveError {
2187 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2189 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2192 // final_expiry_too_soon
2193 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2194 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2195 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2196 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2197 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2198 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2199 return Err(ReceiveError {
2201 err_data: Vec::new(),
2202 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2205 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2206 return Err(ReceiveError {
2208 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2209 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2213 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2214 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
2215 return Err(ReceiveError {
2216 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2217 err_data: Vec::new(),
2218 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2221 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2222 return Err(ReceiveError {
2223 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2224 err_data: Vec::new(),
2225 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2228 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2229 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2230 return Err(ReceiveError {
2231 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2232 err_data: Vec::new(),
2233 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2235 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2236 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2238 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2239 phantom_shared_secret,
2241 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2242 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2243 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2244 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2245 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2246 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2247 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2248 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2249 return Err(ReceiveError {
2250 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2251 err_data: Vec::new(),
2252 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2256 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2258 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2261 return Err(ReceiveError {
2262 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2263 err_data: Vec::new(),
2264 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2269 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2272 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2273 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2274 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2278 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2279 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2280 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2282 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2283 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2284 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2285 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2286 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2287 failure_code: $err_code,
2288 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2293 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2294 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2297 let shared_secret = {
2298 let mut arr = [0; 32];
2299 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
2303 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2304 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2305 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2306 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2307 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2308 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2309 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2310 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2313 let mut channel_state = None;
2314 macro_rules! return_err {
2315 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2317 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2318 if channel_state.is_none() {
2319 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2321 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2322 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2323 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2324 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2325 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2330 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2332 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2333 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2335 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2336 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2340 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2341 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2343 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2345 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2346 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2347 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2348 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2349 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2351 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2354 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2355 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2357 let blinding_factor = {
2358 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
2359 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
2360 sha.input(&shared_secret);
2361 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
2364 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
2366 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
2368 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2371 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2372 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2375 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2376 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2377 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2378 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2379 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2383 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2384 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2385 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2388 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2389 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2390 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2391 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2396 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2397 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2398 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2399 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2400 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2401 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2402 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2403 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2404 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2405 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2406 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2408 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2411 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2414 Some(id) => Some(id.clone()),
2416 let (chan_update_opt, forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta) = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2417 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2418 // Leave channel updates as None for private channels.
2419 let chan_update_opt = if chan.should_announce() {
2420 Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap()) } else { None };
2421 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2422 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2423 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2424 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2425 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2428 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2429 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2430 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2431 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2432 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2433 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2434 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2436 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2437 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2439 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2440 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2441 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2442 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2443 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, chan_update_opt));
2445 (chan_update_opt, chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta())
2446 } else { (None, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA) };
2448 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2449 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, chan_update_opt));
2451 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2452 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2453 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2454 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2455 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2456 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2458 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2459 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2461 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2462 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2463 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2464 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2465 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2466 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2467 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2468 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2469 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2470 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2476 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2477 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2478 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2479 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2481 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2482 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2484 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2485 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2486 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2488 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2490 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
2495 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2498 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2499 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2500 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2502 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2503 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2504 if !chan.should_announce() {
2505 return Err(LightningError {
2506 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2507 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2510 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2511 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2514 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2515 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2516 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2517 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2518 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2519 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2520 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2521 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2522 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2526 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2528 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2529 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2531 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2532 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2533 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2534 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2535 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2536 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2537 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2538 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2541 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2542 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2544 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2550 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2551 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2552 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2553 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2554 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2555 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2557 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2558 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2559 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2560 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2561 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2563 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2565 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2567 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2568 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2570 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2571 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2572 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2573 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2574 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2575 err: "Payment already completed"
2580 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2581 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2582 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2585 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2587 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2588 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2589 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2590 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2591 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2592 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2593 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2594 total_msat: total_value,
2596 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2600 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2601 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2603 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2604 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2606 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2607 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2609 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2610 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2612 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2613 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2615 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2616 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2617 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2618 channel_state, chan)
2620 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2621 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2622 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2623 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2624 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2625 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2626 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2627 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2628 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2629 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2631 insert_outbound_payment!();
2633 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2634 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2635 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2636 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2637 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2638 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2639 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2640 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2646 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2648 } else { unreachable!(); }
2652 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2653 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2655 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2660 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2662 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2663 /// fields for more info.
2665 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2666 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2667 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2668 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2669 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2670 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2672 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2674 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2675 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2676 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2678 /// In general, a path may raise:
2679 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2680 /// node public key) is specified.
2681 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2682 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2684 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2685 /// relevant updates.
2687 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2688 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2689 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2691 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2692 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2693 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2694 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2696 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2697 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2698 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2699 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2700 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2703 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2704 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2705 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2707 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2708 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2709 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2710 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2711 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2713 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2714 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2716 let mut total_value = 0;
2717 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2718 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2719 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2720 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2721 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2722 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2723 continue 'path_check;
2725 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2726 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2727 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2728 continue 'path_check;
2731 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2732 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2734 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2735 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2737 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2738 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2739 total_value = amt_msat;
2742 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2743 let mut results = Vec::new();
2744 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2745 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2747 let mut has_ok = false;
2748 let mut has_err = false;
2749 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2750 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2751 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2752 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2753 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2754 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2755 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2759 } else if res.is_err() {
2760 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2761 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2764 if has_err && has_ok {
2765 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2768 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2769 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2770 Some(RouteParameters {
2771 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2772 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2773 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2779 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2780 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2781 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2782 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2788 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2790 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2791 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2792 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2793 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2794 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2796 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2797 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2798 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2799 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2800 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2801 if path.len() == 0 {
2802 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2803 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2808 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2809 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2810 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2812 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2813 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2815 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2816 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2817 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2818 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2821 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2823 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2824 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2825 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2828 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2829 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2830 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2833 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2834 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2835 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2840 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2841 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2845 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2848 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2850 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2851 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2852 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2853 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2855 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2856 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2857 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2859 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2860 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2861 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2862 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2863 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2865 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2866 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2867 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2868 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2869 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2871 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2879 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2880 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2881 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2882 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2883 /// never reach the recipient.
2885 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2887 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2888 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2890 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2892 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2893 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2894 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2896 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2898 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2899 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2900 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2905 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2906 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2907 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2908 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2910 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2912 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2914 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2915 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2916 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2917 } else { unreachable!(); })
2920 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2922 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2923 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2926 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2927 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2932 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2933 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2934 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2937 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2938 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2939 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2941 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2949 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2950 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2951 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2955 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2957 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2958 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2960 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2961 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2963 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2964 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2965 /// keys per-channel).
2967 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2968 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2969 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2971 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2972 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2973 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2975 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2976 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2977 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2978 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2980 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2981 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2982 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2983 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2987 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2988 let mut output_index = None;
2989 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2990 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2991 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2992 if output_index.is_some() {
2993 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2994 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2997 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2998 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2999 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3002 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3005 if output_index.is_none() {
3006 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3007 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3010 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3015 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
3016 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
3017 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
3019 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
3022 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
3023 // smaller than 500:
3024 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
3026 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
3027 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
3028 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
3029 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
3030 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
3031 /// our network addresses.
3033 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
3034 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
3036 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
3037 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
3038 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
3039 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
3041 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
3043 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3044 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
3045 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3047 if addresses.len() > 500 {
3048 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
3051 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
3052 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
3053 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
3055 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
3056 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
3057 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
3058 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
3059 rgb, alias, addresses,
3060 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
3061 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3063 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
3064 let node_announce_sig = sign(&self.secp_ctx, &msghash, &self.our_network_key);
3066 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3067 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3069 let mut announced_chans = false;
3070 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3071 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
3072 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3074 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
3079 announced_chans = true;
3081 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
3082 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
3083 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
3087 if announced_chans {
3088 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
3089 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
3090 signature: node_announce_sig,
3091 contents: announcement
3097 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3099 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3100 /// Will likely generate further events.
3101 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3102 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3104 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3105 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3106 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3107 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3109 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3110 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3112 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
3113 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3114 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
3115 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3117 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3118 match forward_info {
3119 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3120 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3121 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3122 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3123 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3125 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3126 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3127 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3128 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3129 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3130 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3131 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3133 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3134 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data }
3140 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3141 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3142 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
3143 let phantom_shared_secret = {
3144 let mut arr = [0; 32];
3145 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap())[..]);
3148 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3150 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3151 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3152 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3153 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3154 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3156 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3158 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3159 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3163 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3164 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3165 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3166 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => fail_forward!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3172 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3175 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3178 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3179 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3180 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3181 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3182 // problem, not ours.
3189 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3190 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3191 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3192 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3193 match forward_info {
3194 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3195 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3197 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3198 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3199 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3200 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3201 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3202 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3203 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3204 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3205 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3206 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3208 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3210 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3211 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3213 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3215 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
3216 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3217 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
3223 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3225 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3226 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3227 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3228 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3229 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3230 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3231 // this channel currently :/.
3237 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3238 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3240 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3241 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3242 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3244 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3245 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3247 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3249 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3250 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3251 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3254 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3256 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3257 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3258 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3259 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3260 // messages when we can.
3261 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3262 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3263 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3270 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3271 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3274 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3275 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3276 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3277 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3278 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3279 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3281 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3282 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3283 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan);
3284 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3285 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3287 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
3289 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3293 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3294 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3297 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3298 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3299 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3300 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3301 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3302 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3303 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3304 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3305 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3307 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3315 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3316 match forward_info {
3317 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3318 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3319 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3320 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3321 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } =>
3322 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret),
3323 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3324 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None),
3326 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3329 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3330 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3331 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3332 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3333 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3334 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3335 phantom_shared_secret,
3337 value: amt_to_forward,
3343 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3345 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3346 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3347 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3349 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3350 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3351 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3352 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3353 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3354 phantom_shared_secret,
3356 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3361 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3362 ($payment_data_total_msat: expr, $payment_secret: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3363 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3364 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3365 .or_insert(Vec::new());
3366 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3367 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3368 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3369 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3373 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3374 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3375 total_value += htlc.value;
3376 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3377 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
3378 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != $payment_data_total_msat {
3379 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3380 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data_total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
3381 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3383 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3385 _ => unreachable!(),
3388 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data_total_msat {
3389 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3390 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data_total_msat);
3391 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3392 } else if total_value == $payment_data_total_msat {
3393 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3394 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3396 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3397 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3398 payment_secret: $payment_secret,
3402 payment_received_generated = true;
3404 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3405 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3407 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3409 payment_received_generated
3413 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3414 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3415 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3416 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3417 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3418 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3419 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3420 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3421 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3422 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3423 OnionPayload::Invoice(ref payment_data) => {
3424 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3425 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3427 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3431 let payment_data_total_msat = payment_data.total_msat;
3432 let payment_secret = payment_data.payment_secret.clone();
3433 check_total_value!(payment_data_total_msat, payment_secret, payment_preimage);
3435 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3436 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3437 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3438 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
3439 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3441 amt: amt_to_forward,
3442 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
3445 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3446 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3447 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3453 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3455 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3458 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3459 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3462 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3463 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3464 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3465 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3466 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3467 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3468 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3470 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data.total_msat, payment_data.payment_secret, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3471 if payment_received_generated {
3472 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3478 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3479 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3487 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3488 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3490 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3492 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3493 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3496 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3497 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3498 events.append(&mut new_events);
3501 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3503 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3504 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3506 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3507 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3508 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3509 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3510 if background_events.is_empty() {
3514 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3516 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3517 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3518 // monitor updating completing.
3519 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3526 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3527 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3528 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3529 self.process_background_events();
3532 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3533 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3534 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3535 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3536 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3537 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3538 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3540 if !chan.is_live() {
3541 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3542 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3543 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3545 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3546 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3548 let mut retain_channel = true;
3549 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3552 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3553 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3557 let ret_err = match res {
3558 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3559 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3560 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3561 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3564 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3565 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3566 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3567 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3568 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3569 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3570 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3571 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3581 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3585 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3586 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3587 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3588 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3589 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3590 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3591 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3593 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3595 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3597 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3598 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3599 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3600 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3601 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3602 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3603 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3605 handle_errors.push(err);
3615 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3617 /// This currently includes:
3618 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3619 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3620 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3623 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3624 /// estimate fetches.
3625 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3626 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3627 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3628 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3630 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3632 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3633 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3635 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3636 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3637 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3638 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3639 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3640 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3641 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3642 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3644 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3646 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3648 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3649 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3650 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3651 if needs_close { return false; }
3654 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3655 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3656 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3657 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3658 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3659 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3660 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3661 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3665 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3666 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3668 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3669 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3670 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3674 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3675 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3683 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
3684 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3685 // This should be unreachable
3686 debug_assert!(false);
3689 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref final_hop_data) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3690 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3691 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3692 if final_hop_data.total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3694 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3695 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3696 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3698 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3706 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3707 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() });
3710 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3711 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3717 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3718 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3719 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3720 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3721 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3722 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3723 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3725 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3726 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3727 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3728 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3729 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3730 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3731 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3732 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3733 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3734 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3735 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3741 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3742 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3743 // be surfaced to the user.
3744 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3745 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3747 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3748 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3749 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3750 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3751 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3752 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3754 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3757 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3759 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3760 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3761 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3763 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3764 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3765 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3766 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3767 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3768 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3769 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3770 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3771 Some(RouteParameters {
3772 payment_params: payment_params_data,
3773 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3774 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3777 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3778 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3779 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3781 rejected_by_dest: false,
3782 network_update: None,
3783 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3785 short_channel_id: None,
3792 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3793 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3795 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3801 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3808 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3809 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3810 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3811 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3812 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3813 /// still-available channels.
3814 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3815 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3816 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3817 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3820 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3821 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3822 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3824 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3825 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3826 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3827 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3828 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3829 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3830 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3831 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3832 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3835 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3836 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3839 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3840 all_paths_failed = true;
3841 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3842 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3844 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3850 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3853 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3854 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3855 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3856 Some(RouteParameters {
3857 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3858 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3859 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3862 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3864 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3865 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3867 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3869 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3870 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3871 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3872 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3873 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3874 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3875 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3876 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3883 error_code: onion_error_code,
3885 error_data: onion_error_data
3888 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3894 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3895 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3896 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3897 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3899 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3900 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3901 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3902 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3903 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3904 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3905 network_update: None,
3908 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3911 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3913 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3917 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3918 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3919 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3921 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3922 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3923 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3924 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3925 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
3926 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3927 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
3928 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
3930 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3931 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3934 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3935 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3936 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3940 let mut forward_event = None;
3941 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3942 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3944 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3945 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3946 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3948 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3949 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3952 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3953 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3954 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3955 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3956 time_forwardable: time
3963 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3964 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3966 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3967 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3968 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3969 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3971 /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
3972 /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
3974 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3975 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3976 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3977 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3978 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3979 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3981 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3983 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3984 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3985 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3986 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3988 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3989 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3990 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3991 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3993 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3994 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3995 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3996 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3997 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3999 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4000 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4001 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4007 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4008 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
4009 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4011 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
4012 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4013 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
4014 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
4015 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
4016 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
4017 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
4019 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4020 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4021 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4022 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4023 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4024 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4025 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4026 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4028 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4029 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4030 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4031 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4032 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4033 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4035 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4040 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
4041 // which were generated.
4042 channel_state.take();
4044 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4045 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4046 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4053 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4054 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4055 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4056 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4057 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4059 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
4063 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4064 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4065 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4066 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4067 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4068 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4069 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4070 payment_preimage, e);
4071 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4072 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4073 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4074 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4077 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4078 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4079 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4080 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4081 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4082 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4083 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4084 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4085 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4086 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4092 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4094 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4097 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4098 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4099 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4100 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4101 payment_preimage, e);
4103 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4104 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4106 chan.remove_entry();
4108 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4111 } else { unreachable!(); }
4114 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4115 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4116 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4117 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4118 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4119 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4120 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4121 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4122 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4123 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4124 pending_events.push(
4125 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4127 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4132 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4140 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
4142 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4143 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4144 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4145 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4146 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4147 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4148 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4149 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4150 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4151 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4152 pending_events.push(
4153 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4154 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4160 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4164 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4165 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4166 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4168 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4169 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4170 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4171 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4172 pending_events.push(
4173 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4181 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4186 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4189 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4190 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4191 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4192 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4193 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4194 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4195 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4198 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4199 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4200 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4201 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4202 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4205 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4206 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4207 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4208 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4209 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4210 payment_preimage, e);
4212 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4213 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4214 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4215 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4218 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4219 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4220 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4221 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4225 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4226 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4227 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4230 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4231 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4233 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4241 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4242 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4243 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4246 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4247 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4249 let chan_restoration_res;
4250 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
4251 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4252 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4253 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4254 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4255 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4257 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4261 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4262 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4263 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4264 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4265 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4266 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4268 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4269 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4270 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
4273 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked, updates.announcement_sigs);
4274 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4275 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4277 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4279 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4280 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4281 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4282 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4286 /// Called to accept a request to open a channel after [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`] has been
4289 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted.
4291 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: crate::util::events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4292 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4293 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4295 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4296 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4297 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4298 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4299 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4300 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4302 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4303 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4304 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(),
4307 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4308 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4314 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4315 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4316 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4319 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4320 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4323 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4324 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4325 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration,
4326 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4329 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4330 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4334 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4335 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4336 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4337 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4338 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4339 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4341 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4342 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4343 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4344 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4345 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
4348 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4349 pending_events.push(
4350 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4351 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4352 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4353 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4354 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4359 entry.insert(channel);
4365 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4366 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4367 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4368 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4369 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4370 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4371 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4372 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4374 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.peer_channel_config_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4375 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4377 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4380 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4381 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4382 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4383 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4385 user_channel_id: user_id,
4390 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4391 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
4392 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4393 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4394 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4395 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4396 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4397 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4398 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4400 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4402 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4405 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4406 // lock before watch_channel
4407 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4409 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4410 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4411 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4412 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4413 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4414 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4415 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4416 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4417 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4418 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4419 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4421 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4422 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4423 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4424 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
4425 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4426 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4430 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4431 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4432 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4433 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4434 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4436 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4437 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4438 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4447 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4449 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4450 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4451 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4452 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4453 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4454 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4455 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4457 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4458 Ok(update) => update,
4459 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4461 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4462 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
4463 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4464 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4465 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4466 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4467 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4468 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4475 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4478 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4479 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4483 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4484 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4485 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4486 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4487 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4488 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4489 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4491 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4492 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4493 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4494 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4495 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4496 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4497 msg: announcement_sigs,
4499 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4500 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4501 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4502 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4503 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4504 // announcement_signatures.
4505 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4506 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4507 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4508 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4513 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4517 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4518 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4519 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4520 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4521 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4523 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4524 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4525 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4526 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4529 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4530 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4531 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4532 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4535 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4536 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4538 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4539 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4540 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4541 let (result, is_permanent) =
4542 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4544 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4550 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4551 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4552 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4559 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4562 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4563 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4566 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4570 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4571 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4572 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4573 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4574 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4575 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4576 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4577 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4579 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4580 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4581 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4582 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4587 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4588 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4589 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4590 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4591 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4592 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry)))
4593 } else { (tx, None) }
4595 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4598 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4599 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4600 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4602 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4603 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4604 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4605 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4609 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4614 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4615 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4616 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4617 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4619 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4620 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4621 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4622 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4624 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4625 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4627 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4628 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4629 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4630 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4633 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4634 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4635 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4636 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4637 match pending_forward_info {
4638 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4639 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4640 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
4641 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
4642 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
4643 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
4644 if error_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4645 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
4647 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
4651 // The only case where we'd be unable to
4652 // successfully get a channel update is if the
4653 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
4654 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
4655 // payments over the channel back to themselves
4656 // (because no one else should know the short_id
4657 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
4658 // no problem just calling this
4659 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
4660 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
4663 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4665 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4666 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4667 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4670 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4672 _ => pending_forward_info
4675 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4677 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4682 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4683 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4684 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4685 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4686 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4687 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4688 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4689 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4691 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4693 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4696 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4700 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4701 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4702 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4703 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4704 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4705 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4706 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4708 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4710 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4715 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4716 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4717 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4718 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4719 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4720 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4721 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4723 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4724 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4725 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4727 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4730 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4734 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4735 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4736 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4737 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4738 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4739 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4740 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4742 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4743 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4744 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4745 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4746 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4747 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4748 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4753 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4754 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4756 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4757 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4758 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4760 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4761 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4762 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4763 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4764 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4765 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4766 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4767 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4769 commitment_signed: msg,
4775 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4780 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4781 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4782 let mut forward_event = None;
4783 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4784 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4785 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4786 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4788 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4789 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4790 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4791 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4792 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4794 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4795 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4796 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4798 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4799 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4800 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4805 match forward_event {
4807 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4808 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4809 time_forwardable: time
4817 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4818 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4820 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4821 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4822 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4823 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4824 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4825 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4827 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4828 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4829 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4830 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4831 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4832 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4833 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4834 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4835 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4836 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4837 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4839 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4840 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4841 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4842 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4843 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4845 } else { unreachable!(); }
4848 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4849 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4850 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4854 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4855 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4856 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4857 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4858 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4860 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4863 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4865 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4866 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4868 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4869 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4871 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4872 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4879 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4880 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4881 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4882 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4883 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4884 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4885 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4887 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4889 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4894 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4895 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4896 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4898 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4899 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4900 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4901 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4903 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4904 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4907 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4908 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4909 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4910 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4911 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4912 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4915 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4920 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4921 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4922 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4923 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4924 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4925 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4927 // It's not a local channel
4928 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4931 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4932 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4933 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4934 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4935 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4936 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4937 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4938 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4940 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4942 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4943 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4944 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4945 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4947 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4950 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4952 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4955 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4956 let chan_restoration_res;
4957 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4958 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4959 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4961 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4962 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4963 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4964 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4966 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4967 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4968 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4969 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4970 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
4971 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
4972 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
4973 let mut channel_update = None;
4974 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
4975 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4976 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4979 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4980 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4981 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4982 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4983 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4984 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4985 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4988 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4989 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
4990 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
4991 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.funding_locked, responses.announcement_sigs);
4992 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4993 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4995 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
4997 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5000 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
5001 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
5003 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5004 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
5009 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5010 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5011 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5012 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5013 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5014 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5015 match monitor_event {
5016 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5017 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5018 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5019 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
5021 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5022 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5025 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5026 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5027 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5028 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5029 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5030 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5031 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5032 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
5033 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5034 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5035 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5039 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5040 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5042 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5044 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5045 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5046 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5047 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5048 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5053 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5054 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5059 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5060 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5063 has_pending_monitor_events
5066 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5067 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5068 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5070 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5071 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5074 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5075 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5076 /// update was applied.
5078 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5079 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5080 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5081 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5082 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5083 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5084 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5085 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5087 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5088 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5089 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5090 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5091 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5093 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5094 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5095 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5096 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5097 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
5099 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5100 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5101 has_monitor_update = true;
5102 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5103 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5104 if close_channel { return false; }
5106 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5107 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5108 updates: commitment_update,
5115 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
5116 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5117 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5124 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5125 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5126 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
5129 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5130 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5136 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5137 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5138 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5139 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5140 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5141 let mut has_update = false;
5143 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5144 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5145 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5146 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5147 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5149 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5150 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5151 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5152 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5154 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5155 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5158 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5159 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5160 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5161 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5162 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5167 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5169 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5170 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5171 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5177 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
5178 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5185 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5186 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5192 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5193 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5195 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5196 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5197 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5198 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5199 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5200 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5201 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5202 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5203 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5204 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5205 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5206 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5207 assert!(should_broadcast);
5208 } else { unreachable!(); }
5209 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5211 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5215 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5216 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5218 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5219 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5222 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5224 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5225 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5226 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5227 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5228 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5229 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5230 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5231 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5232 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5233 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5234 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5235 // never fail a payment too early.
5236 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5238 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5241 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5246 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5249 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5250 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5252 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5253 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5254 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5256 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5258 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5259 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5263 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5264 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5266 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5268 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5269 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5270 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5271 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5272 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5273 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5276 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5277 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5279 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5282 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5284 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5286 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5287 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5288 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5289 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5290 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5293 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5294 /// stored external to LDK.
5296 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5297 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5298 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5300 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5301 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5304 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5305 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5306 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5307 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5309 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5310 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5311 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5312 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5313 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5315 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5316 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5317 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5318 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5319 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5321 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5322 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5324 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5325 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5329 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5330 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5332 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5334 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5335 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5336 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5337 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5340 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5341 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5343 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5346 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5348 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5350 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5351 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5354 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5355 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5357 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5358 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5359 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5362 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5363 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5365 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5366 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5367 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5368 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5370 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5371 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5372 match channel_state.short_to_id.entry(scid_candidate) {
5373 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
5374 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
5379 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5381 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5382 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5384 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5385 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5386 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5390 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5391 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5392 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5393 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5394 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5399 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5400 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5404 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5405 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5409 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5410 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5411 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5412 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5413 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5416 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5417 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5418 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5419 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5421 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5422 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5423 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5424 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5427 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5428 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5430 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5431 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5434 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5435 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5436 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5438 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5439 events.replace(pending_events);
5448 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5450 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5451 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5452 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5453 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5456 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5458 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5459 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5461 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5462 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5463 /// restarting from an old state.
5464 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5465 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5466 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5468 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5469 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5470 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5471 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5474 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5475 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5476 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5479 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5480 handler.handle_event(&event);
5488 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5490 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5491 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5492 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5493 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5496 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
5498 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5499 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
5500 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5501 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5502 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5505 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
5506 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
5507 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
5510 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5511 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5512 let new_height = height - 1;
5514 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5515 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5516 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5517 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5518 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5519 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5522 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5526 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5528 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5529 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5530 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5531 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5534 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5535 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5536 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5537 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5539 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5540 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5542 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5543 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5544 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5546 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5547 if height < last_best_block_height {
5548 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5549 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5553 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5554 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5555 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5556 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5558 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5559 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5561 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5563 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5565 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5567 macro_rules! max_time {
5568 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5570 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5571 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5572 // having an explicit local time source.
5573 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5574 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5575 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5576 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5577 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5583 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5584 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5585 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5586 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5587 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5590 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5591 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5592 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5593 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5594 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5595 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5596 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5597 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5598 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5606 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5607 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5608 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5609 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5610 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5611 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5617 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5618 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5619 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5620 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5621 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5622 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5623 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5624 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5629 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5631 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5632 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5633 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5634 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5637 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5638 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5640 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5641 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5642 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5643 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5644 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5646 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5647 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5649 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5650 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5651 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5652 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5653 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5654 let res = f(channel);
5655 if let Ok((funding_locked_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5656 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5657 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
5658 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5659 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
5663 if let Some(funding_locked) = funding_locked_opt {
5664 send_funding_locked!(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, channel, funding_locked);
5665 if channel.is_usable() {
5666 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5667 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5668 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5669 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
5672 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5675 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5676 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5677 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5678 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5679 msg: announcement_sigs,
5681 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5682 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5683 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5685 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5686 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5687 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5692 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5693 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, channel);
5694 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5695 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5696 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5697 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5698 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5702 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5703 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5704 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5705 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5706 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5707 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5708 data: reason_message,
5716 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5717 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
5718 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5719 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5720 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5721 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5722 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5723 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5724 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5725 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5726 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5727 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5728 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5733 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5738 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5740 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5741 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5745 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5746 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5747 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5750 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5751 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5752 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5753 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5756 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5757 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5759 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5760 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5763 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5764 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5765 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5766 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5767 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5771 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5772 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5773 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5774 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5778 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5779 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5780 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5781 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5782 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5783 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5786 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5787 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5788 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5791 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5792 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5793 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5796 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5797 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5798 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5801 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5802 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5803 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5806 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5807 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5808 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5811 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5812 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5813 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5816 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5817 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5818 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5821 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5822 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5823 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5826 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5827 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5828 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5831 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5832 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5833 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5836 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5837 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5838 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5841 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5842 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5843 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5846 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5847 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5848 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5851 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5852 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5853 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5856 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5857 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5858 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5861 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5862 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5863 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5866 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5871 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5872 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5873 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5876 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5877 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5878 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5879 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5881 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5882 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5883 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5884 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5885 if no_connection_possible {
5886 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5887 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5888 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5889 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5890 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5891 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5892 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5896 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5903 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5904 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5905 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5906 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5907 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5908 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5909 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5912 no_channels_remain = false;
5918 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5920 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5921 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5922 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5923 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5924 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5925 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5926 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5927 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5928 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5929 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5930 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5931 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5932 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5933 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5934 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5935 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5936 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5937 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5938 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5939 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
5943 if no_channels_remain {
5944 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5947 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5948 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5952 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5953 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5955 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5958 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5959 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5960 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5961 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5962 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5965 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5966 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5971 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5972 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5973 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5974 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5975 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5976 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5977 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5978 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5979 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5983 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5984 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5985 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5991 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5994 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5995 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5997 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5998 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5999 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6000 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6001 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
6005 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6006 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
6011 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
6012 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
6013 struct PersistenceNotifier {
6014 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
6015 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
6016 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
6019 impl PersistenceNotifier {
6022 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
6028 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
6029 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
6034 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
6035 let result = *guard;
6043 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6044 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6045 let current_time = Instant::now();
6047 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
6048 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
6053 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
6054 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
6055 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
6056 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
6057 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
6059 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
6060 let result = *guard;
6061 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
6065 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
6066 None => return result,
6072 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
6074 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
6075 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6076 *persistence_lock = true;
6077 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
6082 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6083 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6085 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6086 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6087 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6088 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6091 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6092 (2, node_id, required),
6093 (4, features, required),
6094 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6095 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6098 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
6099 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6100 (2, channel_id, required),
6101 (4, counterparty, required),
6102 (6, funding_txo, option),
6103 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6104 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6105 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6106 (14, user_channel_id, required),
6107 (16, balance_msat, required),
6108 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6109 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6110 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6111 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6112 (26, is_outbound, required),
6113 (28, is_funding_locked, required),
6114 (30, is_usable, required),
6115 (32, is_public, required),
6118 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6119 (2, channels, vec_type),
6120 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6121 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6124 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6126 (0, onion_packet, required),
6127 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6130 (0, payment_data, required),
6131 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6132 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6134 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6135 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6136 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6140 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6141 (0, routing, required),
6142 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6143 (4, payment_hash, required),
6144 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
6145 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
6149 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6150 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6152 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6154 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6155 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6156 reason.write(writer)?;
6158 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6159 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6162 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6163 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6164 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6165 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6172 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6173 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6174 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6177 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6178 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6179 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6180 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6184 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6185 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6186 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6187 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6188 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6191 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6192 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6193 // messages contained in the variants.
6194 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6195 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6196 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6198 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6199 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6200 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6201 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6202 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6205 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6206 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6207 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6208 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6209 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6211 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6216 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6221 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6222 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6223 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6224 (2, outpoint, required),
6225 (4, htlc_id, required),
6226 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6229 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6230 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6231 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
6232 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
6235 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
6236 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
6237 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
6242 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
6243 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6244 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6250 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6251 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6252 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6254 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6255 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6256 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6260 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
6261 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6262 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6264 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6266 if payment_data.is_some() {
6267 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6269 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6272 if payment_data.is_none() {
6273 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6275 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
6279 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6288 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6289 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6290 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6293 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6294 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6295 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6296 let mut payment_id = None;
6297 let mut payment_secret = None;
6298 let mut payment_params = None;
6299 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6300 (0, session_priv, required),
6301 (1, payment_id, option),
6302 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6303 (3, payment_secret, option),
6304 (4, path, vec_type),
6305 (5, payment_params, option),
6307 if payment_id.is_none() {
6308 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6310 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6312 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6313 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6314 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6315 path: path.unwrap(),
6316 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6321 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6322 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6327 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6328 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6330 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6332 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6333 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6334 (0, session_priv, required),
6335 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6336 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6337 (3, payment_secret, option),
6338 (4, path, vec_type),
6339 (5, payment_params, option),
6342 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6344 field.write(writer)?;
6351 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6352 (0, LightningError) => {
6356 (0, failure_code, required),
6357 (2, data, vec_type),
6361 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6363 (0, forward_info, required),
6364 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6365 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6366 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6369 (0, htlc_id, required),
6370 (2, err_packet, required),
6374 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6375 (0, payment_secret, required),
6376 (2, expiry_time, required),
6377 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6378 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6379 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6382 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6384 (0, session_privs, required),
6387 (0, session_privs, required),
6388 (1, payment_hash, option),
6391 (0, session_privs, required),
6392 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6393 (2, payment_hash, required),
6394 (4, payment_secret, option),
6395 (6, total_msat, required),
6396 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6397 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6400 (0, session_privs, required),
6401 (2, payment_hash, required),
6405 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6406 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6407 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6408 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6409 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6412 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6413 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6415 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6417 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6419 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6420 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6421 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6424 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6425 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6426 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6427 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6428 unfunded_channels += 1;
6431 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6432 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6433 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6434 channel.write(writer)?;
6438 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6439 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6440 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6441 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6442 for forward in pending_forwards {
6443 forward.write(writer)?;
6447 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6448 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6449 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6450 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6451 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6452 htlc.write(writer)?;
6456 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6457 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6458 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6459 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6460 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6461 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6464 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6465 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6466 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6467 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6468 for event in events.iter() {
6469 event.write(writer)?;
6472 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6473 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6474 for event in background_events.iter() {
6476 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6478 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6479 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6484 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6485 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6487 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6488 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6489 hash.write(writer)?;
6490 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6493 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6494 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6495 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6496 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6497 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6500 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6501 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6503 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6504 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6505 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6506 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6509 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6510 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6514 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6515 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6516 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6518 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6519 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6520 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6525 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6526 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6527 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6528 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6529 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6536 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6538 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6540 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6541 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6542 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6543 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6544 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6545 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6546 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6547 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6548 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6549 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6550 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6551 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6552 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6554 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6555 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6557 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6558 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6560 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6561 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6562 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6563 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6564 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6565 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6567 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6568 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6569 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6570 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6571 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6572 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6575 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6576 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6578 pub keys_manager: K,
6580 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6582 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6583 pub fee_estimator: F,
6584 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6586 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6587 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6588 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6589 pub chain_monitor: M,
6591 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6592 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6593 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6594 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6595 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6596 /// deserialization.
6598 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6599 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6600 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6602 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6603 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6605 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6606 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6607 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6608 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6610 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6613 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6614 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6617 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6618 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6619 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6620 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6621 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6622 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6625 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6626 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6627 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6628 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6629 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6631 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6632 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6637 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6638 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6639 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6640 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6641 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6642 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6643 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6644 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6647 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6648 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6649 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6653 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6654 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6655 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6656 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6657 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6658 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6661 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6662 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6664 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6665 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6666 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6668 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6670 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6671 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6672 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6673 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6674 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6675 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6676 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6677 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6678 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6679 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6680 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6681 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6682 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6683 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6684 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6685 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6686 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6687 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6688 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6689 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6690 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6691 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6692 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6693 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6694 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6695 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6696 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6697 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6698 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6699 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6700 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6701 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6702 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6703 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6704 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6705 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6706 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6707 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6708 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6711 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6712 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6713 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6715 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6718 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6719 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6720 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6721 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6722 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6723 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6727 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6728 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6729 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6730 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6734 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6735 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6736 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6737 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6738 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6739 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6740 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6741 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6742 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6744 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6747 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6748 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6749 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6750 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6751 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6752 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6753 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6754 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6756 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
6759 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6760 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6761 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6762 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6763 let peer_state = PeerState {
6764 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6766 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6769 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6770 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6771 for _ in 0..event_count {
6772 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6773 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6777 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6778 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6779 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6780 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6781 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6782 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6783 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6784 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6788 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6789 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6790 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6791 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6792 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6793 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6797 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6798 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6800 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6801 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6802 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6803 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6804 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6808 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6809 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6810 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6811 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6812 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6813 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6814 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6816 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6817 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6821 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6822 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6823 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6824 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6825 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6826 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6827 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6828 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6829 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
6830 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
6832 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
6833 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6836 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6837 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6838 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6839 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6840 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6841 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6843 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6845 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6846 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6847 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6848 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6849 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6850 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6851 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6853 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6854 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6855 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6856 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6857 if path.is_empty() {
6858 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6859 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6861 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6862 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6863 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6864 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6865 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6866 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6867 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6868 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6870 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6871 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6872 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6873 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6874 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6876 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6877 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6878 total_msat: path_amt,
6879 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6881 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6882 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6891 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6892 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6894 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6895 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6898 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
6900 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6902 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
6903 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
6904 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
6905 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
6906 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6910 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
6911 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
6912 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
6913 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
6915 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
6916 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
6917 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
6919 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6920 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
6921 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
6922 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
6923 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
6924 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6926 if chan.is_usable() {
6927 if short_to_id.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), *chan_id).is_some() {
6928 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
6929 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
6930 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
6931 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6936 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
6937 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
6938 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6940 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6941 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6942 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6944 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6946 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6951 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6953 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
6954 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6955 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6957 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
6958 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
6964 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6965 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6967 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6969 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6970 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6971 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6972 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6974 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6975 logger: args.logger,
6976 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6979 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6980 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6983 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6984 //connection or two.
6986 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6992 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6993 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6994 use core::time::Duration;
6995 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
6996 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6997 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6998 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
6999 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
7000 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7002 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7003 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7004 use util::errors::APIError;
7005 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7006 use util::test_utils;
7007 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7009 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7011 fn test_wait_timeout() {
7012 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
7014 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
7017 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
7018 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
7020 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
7021 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
7022 thread::spawn(move || {
7024 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
7025 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7026 *persistence_lock = true;
7029 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
7035 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
7036 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
7038 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
7041 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
7046 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
7048 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
7051 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
7058 fn test_notify_limits() {
7059 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7060 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7061 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7062 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7063 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7064 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7066 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7067 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7068 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7069 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7070 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7072 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7074 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7075 // to connect messages with new values
7076 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7077 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7078 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7079 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7081 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7082 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7083 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7084 // ... but the last node should not.
7085 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7086 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7087 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7088 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7090 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7091 // about the channel.
7092 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7093 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7094 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7096 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7098 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7099 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7100 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7101 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7102 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7103 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7105 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7106 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7107 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7109 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7110 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7111 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7112 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7113 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7114 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7116 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7117 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7118 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7119 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7120 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7121 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7122 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7123 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7125 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7126 // the channel info has updated.
7127 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7128 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7129 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7130 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7131 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7132 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7136 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7137 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7139 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7140 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7141 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7142 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7143 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7145 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7146 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7147 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7148 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7149 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7150 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7151 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7152 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7153 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7154 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7155 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7157 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7158 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7159 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7160 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7161 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7162 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7163 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7164 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7165 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7166 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7167 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7168 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7170 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7171 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7172 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7173 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7174 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7175 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7176 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7177 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7178 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7180 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7181 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7183 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7184 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7185 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7187 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7188 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7189 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7190 // lightning messages manually.
7191 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7193 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7194 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7195 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7196 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7197 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7198 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7200 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7201 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7203 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7204 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7205 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7206 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7207 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7208 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7209 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7210 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7211 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7213 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7214 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7215 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7216 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7217 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7219 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7220 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7221 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7222 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7224 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7225 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7226 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7227 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7229 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7232 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7233 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7234 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7235 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7237 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7240 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7241 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7242 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7243 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7245 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7250 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7251 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7252 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7253 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7254 // fails as expected.
7255 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7256 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7257 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7258 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7259 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7260 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7261 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7263 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7264 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7265 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7267 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7268 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7269 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7270 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7271 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7273 let route = find_route(
7274 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7275 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7277 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7278 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7279 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7280 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7281 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7282 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7283 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7284 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7285 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7286 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7287 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7288 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7289 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7290 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7291 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7292 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7293 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7294 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7295 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7296 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7297 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7299 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7300 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7302 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7303 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7304 let route = find_route(
7305 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7306 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7308 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7309 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7310 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7311 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7312 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7313 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7314 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7316 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7317 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7318 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7320 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7321 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7322 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7323 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7324 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7325 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7326 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7327 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7328 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7329 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7330 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7331 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7332 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7333 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7334 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7335 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7336 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7337 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7338 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7340 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7341 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7345 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7346 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7347 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7348 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7349 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7350 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7351 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7353 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7354 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7355 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7356 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7358 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7359 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7360 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7361 final_value_msat: 10000,
7362 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7364 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7365 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7366 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7367 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7368 let route = find_route(
7369 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7370 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7373 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7374 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7375 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7376 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7378 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7379 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7380 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7381 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7382 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7383 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7384 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7386 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7390 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7391 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7392 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7393 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7394 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7395 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7397 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7398 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7399 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7400 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7402 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7403 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7404 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7405 final_value_msat: 10000,
7406 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7408 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7409 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7410 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7411 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7412 let route = find_route(
7413 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7414 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7417 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7418 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7419 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7420 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7421 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7423 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7424 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7425 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7426 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7427 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7428 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7429 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7431 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7435 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7436 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7437 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7438 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7439 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7441 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7442 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7443 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7444 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7446 // Marshall an MPP route.
7447 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7448 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7449 route.paths.push(path);
7450 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7451 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7452 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7453 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7454 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7455 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7457 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7458 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7459 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7460 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7465 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7466 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7467 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7468 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7469 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7470 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7472 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7473 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7475 total_msat: 100_000,
7478 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7479 // payment verification fails as expected.
7480 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7481 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7482 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7483 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7485 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7489 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7490 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7494 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7497 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7498 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
7499 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7500 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7501 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7502 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7503 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
7504 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7505 use util::test_utils;
7506 use util::config::UserConfig;
7507 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7509 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7510 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7511 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7513 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7517 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7518 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7519 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7520 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7521 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7522 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7523 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7528 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7529 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7532 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7533 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7534 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7536 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7537 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7539 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7540 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7542 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7543 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7545 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7546 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7547 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7548 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7549 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7551 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7553 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7555 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7556 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7557 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7558 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7559 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7561 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7563 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7565 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7566 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7567 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7568 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7569 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7572 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7573 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7574 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7576 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7577 } else { panic!(); }
7579 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7580 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7582 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7585 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7588 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7589 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7591 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7592 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7593 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7594 match msg_events[0] {
7595 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
7596 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7597 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7601 match msg_events[1] {
7602 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7606 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
7608 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7609 macro_rules! send_payment {
7610 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7611 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7612 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7613 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7614 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7615 let seed = [3u8; 32];
7616 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
7617 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7618 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
7619 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7621 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7622 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7624 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7625 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7627 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7628 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7629 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7630 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7631 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7632 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7633 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7634 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7636 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7637 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7638 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7640 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7641 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7642 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7643 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7644 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7646 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7649 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7650 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7651 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7652 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7654 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7659 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7660 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);