1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure};
82 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
84 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
85 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
86 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
88 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
89 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
90 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
91 // before we forward it.
93 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
94 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
95 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
96 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
97 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
99 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
100 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
102 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
103 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
104 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
105 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
108 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
109 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
114 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
120 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
121 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
122 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
123 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
124 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
125 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
128 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
129 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
130 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
131 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
134 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
135 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
136 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
137 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
138 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
141 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
142 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
144 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
145 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
146 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
149 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
150 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
152 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
153 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
156 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
157 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
160 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
164 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
165 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
166 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
167 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
168 short_channel_id: u64,
170 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
171 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
173 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
174 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
179 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
181 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
182 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
183 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
185 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
186 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
189 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
190 struct ClaimableHTLC {
191 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
193 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
195 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
197 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
198 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
199 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
200 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
204 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
206 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
207 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
208 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
210 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
211 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
216 impl Readable for PaymentId {
217 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
218 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
223 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
225 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
226 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
227 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
229 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
230 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
235 impl Readable for InterceptId {
236 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
237 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
242 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
243 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
244 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
245 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
246 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
249 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
251 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
252 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
253 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
255 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
256 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
260 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
261 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
262 (0, short_channel_id, required),
263 (2, htlc_id, required),
265 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
266 (0, session_priv, required),
271 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
272 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
273 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
274 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
275 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
278 session_priv: SecretKey,
279 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
280 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
281 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
282 payment_id: PaymentId,
283 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
286 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
287 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
288 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
290 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
292 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
294 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
297 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
298 payment_id.hash(hasher);
299 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
300 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
305 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
308 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
309 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
311 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
312 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
313 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
314 payment_secret: None,
319 struct ReceiveError {
325 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
326 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
328 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
329 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
330 pub enum FailureCode {
331 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
332 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
333 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
334 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
335 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
336 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
337 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
338 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
339 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
340 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
341 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
344 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
346 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
347 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
348 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
349 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
350 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
352 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
353 err: msgs::LightningError,
354 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
355 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
357 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
359 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
361 err: LightningError {
363 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
364 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
371 shutdown_finish: None,
375 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
376 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
379 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
381 err: LightningError {
383 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
384 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
390 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
391 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
395 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
398 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
400 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
401 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
405 log_level: Level::Warn,
408 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
410 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
412 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
414 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
415 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
423 shutdown_finish: None,
428 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
429 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
430 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
431 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
432 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
434 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
435 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
436 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
437 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
438 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
439 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
440 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
442 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
446 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
447 struct ClaimingPayment {
449 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
450 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
452 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
453 (0, amount_msat, required),
454 (2, payment_purpose, required),
455 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
458 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
459 struct ClaimablePayments {
460 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
461 /// failed/claimed by the user.
463 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
464 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
466 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
467 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
468 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
470 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
471 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
472 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
473 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
476 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
477 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
478 /// quite some time lag.
479 enum BackgroundEvent {
480 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
481 /// commitment transaction.
482 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
486 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
487 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
488 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
489 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
490 /// event can be generated.
491 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
492 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
493 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
496 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
497 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
498 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
501 /// State we hold per-peer.
502 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
503 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
505 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
506 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
508 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
509 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
510 latest_features: InitFeatures,
511 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
512 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
513 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
514 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
515 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
517 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
518 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
519 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
520 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
522 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
523 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
524 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
525 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
526 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
527 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
528 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
529 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
530 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
531 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
535 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
536 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
537 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
538 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
539 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
540 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
543 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
547 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
548 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
550 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
553 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
554 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
555 struct PendingInboundPayment {
556 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
557 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
558 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
559 /// this payment being removed.
561 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
562 user_payment_id: u64,
563 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
564 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
565 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
568 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
569 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
570 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
571 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
572 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
573 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
574 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
575 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
577 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
578 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
586 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
588 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
593 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
594 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
595 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
596 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
597 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
598 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
599 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
600 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
601 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
603 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
604 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
606 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
607 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
609 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
610 /// to individual Channels.
612 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
613 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
614 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
615 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
617 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
618 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
619 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
620 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
621 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
622 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
623 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
625 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
626 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
627 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
629 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
630 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
631 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
632 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
633 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
635 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
636 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
637 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
638 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
640 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
641 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
642 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
644 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
645 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
646 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
647 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
648 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
650 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
651 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
652 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
653 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
654 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
655 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
656 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
657 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
660 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
661 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
662 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
663 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
664 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
668 // `total_consistency_lock`
670 // |__`forward_htlcs`
672 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
674 // |__`per_peer_state`
676 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
678 // | |__`claimable_payments`
680 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
686 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
688 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
692 // | |__`pending_events`
694 // | |__`pending_background_events`
696 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
698 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
699 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
700 ES::Target: EntropySource,
701 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
702 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
703 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
707 default_configuration: UserConfig,
708 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
709 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
715 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
717 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
719 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
720 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
722 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
723 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
724 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
725 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
727 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
728 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
730 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
731 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
732 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
733 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
734 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
735 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
736 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
737 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
739 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
741 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
742 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
744 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
746 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
747 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
748 /// and via the classic SCID.
750 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
751 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
753 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
755 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
757 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
758 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
759 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
761 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
762 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
764 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
765 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
767 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
768 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
770 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
771 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
772 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
773 /// active channel list on load.
775 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
776 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
778 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
780 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
781 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
782 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
784 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
785 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
786 /// the handling of the events.
788 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
789 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
792 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
793 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
794 /// would break backwards compatability.
795 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
796 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
797 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
799 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
800 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
802 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
804 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
805 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
806 /// confirmation depth.
808 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
809 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
810 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
812 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
814 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
816 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
818 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
820 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
822 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
823 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
824 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
826 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
827 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
829 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
830 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
831 /// keeping additional state.
832 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
834 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
835 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
836 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
837 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
839 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
840 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
842 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
843 /// are currently open with that peer.
845 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
846 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
849 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
851 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
852 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
853 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
854 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
855 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
857 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
858 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
859 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
860 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
861 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
862 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
863 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
864 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
865 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
866 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
867 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
869 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
878 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
880 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
881 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
882 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
883 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
884 pub struct ChainParameters {
885 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
886 pub network: Network,
888 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
890 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
891 pub best_block: BestBlock,
894 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
900 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
901 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
902 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
903 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
904 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
905 /// updates are ready for persistence).
907 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
908 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
909 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
910 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
911 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
913 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
914 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
917 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
918 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
919 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
922 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
923 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
925 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
926 persistence_notifier: notifier,
927 should_persist: persist_check,
928 _read_guard: read_guard,
933 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
935 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
936 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
941 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
942 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
944 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
946 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
947 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
948 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
949 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
950 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
952 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
953 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
955 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
957 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
958 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
959 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
960 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
961 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
962 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
963 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
964 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
965 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
966 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
967 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
968 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
969 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
971 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
972 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
974 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
975 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
976 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
977 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
979 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
980 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
981 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
982 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
983 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
984 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
987 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
989 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
990 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
993 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
995 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
996 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
998 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
999 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1000 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1001 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1003 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1004 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1005 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1006 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1008 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1009 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1010 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1012 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1013 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1014 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1016 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1017 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1018 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1019 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1020 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1021 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1022 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1023 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1024 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1025 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1026 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1029 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1030 /// to better separate parameters.
1031 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1032 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1033 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1034 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1035 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1036 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1037 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1038 pub features: InitFeatures,
1039 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1040 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1041 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1043 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1045 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1046 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1047 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1048 /// payments to us through this channel.
1049 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1050 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1051 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1052 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1053 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1054 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1055 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1058 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1059 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1060 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1061 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1062 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1063 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1064 /// lifetime of the channel.
1065 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1066 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1067 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1068 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1069 /// our counterparty already.
1071 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1072 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1073 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1074 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1076 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1077 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1078 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1079 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1081 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1082 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1084 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1085 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1087 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1088 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1089 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1090 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1091 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1092 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1093 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1094 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1095 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1098 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1100 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1101 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1102 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1103 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1104 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1105 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1106 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1108 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1109 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1111 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1112 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1113 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1114 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1115 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1116 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1117 /// this value on chain.
1119 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1121 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1123 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1124 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1125 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1126 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1128 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1129 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1130 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1132 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1133 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1134 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1135 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1136 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1138 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1139 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1140 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1141 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1143 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1144 pub balance_msat: u64,
1145 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1146 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1147 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1148 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1150 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1152 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1153 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1154 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1155 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1156 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1157 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1158 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1159 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1161 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1162 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1163 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1164 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1165 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1166 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1167 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1169 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1170 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1171 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1172 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1173 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1174 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1175 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1176 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1177 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1179 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1181 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1182 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1183 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1184 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1185 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1187 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1188 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1189 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1190 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1191 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1192 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1193 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1195 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1196 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1197 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1198 pub is_outbound: bool,
1199 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1200 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1201 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1202 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1203 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1205 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1206 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1207 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1208 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1210 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1211 pub is_usable: bool,
1212 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1213 pub is_public: bool,
1214 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1215 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1216 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1217 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1218 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1219 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1221 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1222 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1225 impl ChannelDetails {
1226 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1227 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1228 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1230 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1231 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1232 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1233 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1236 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1237 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1238 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1240 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1241 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1242 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1243 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1246 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1247 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1249 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1250 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1251 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1253 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1254 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1255 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1256 features: latest_features,
1257 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1258 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1259 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1260 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1261 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1262 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1263 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1264 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1265 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1266 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1268 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1269 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1270 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1271 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1272 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1273 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1274 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1275 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1276 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1277 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1278 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1279 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1280 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1281 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1282 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1283 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1284 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1285 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1286 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1287 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1288 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1289 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1290 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1291 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1292 config: Some(channel.config()),
1297 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1298 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1299 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1300 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1301 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1303 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1305 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1306 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1307 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1310 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1311 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1312 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1314 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1315 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1316 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1318 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1319 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1320 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1322 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1323 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1327 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1329 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1331 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1332 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1333 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1334 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1336 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1337 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1338 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1341 macro_rules! handle_error {
1342 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1345 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1346 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1347 // entering the macro.
1348 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1349 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1351 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1353 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1354 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1355 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1356 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1360 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1361 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1362 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1363 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1368 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1369 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1371 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1372 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1373 action: err.action.clone()
1377 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1378 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1379 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1380 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1381 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1385 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1392 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1393 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1394 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1395 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1396 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1397 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1399 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1400 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1401 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1402 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1403 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1405 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1406 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1408 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1412 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1413 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1414 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1416 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1417 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1419 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1420 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1422 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1423 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1424 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1425 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1426 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1427 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1433 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1434 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1438 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1440 $entry.remove_entry();
1448 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1449 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1453 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1455 $entry.remove_entry();
1463 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1464 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1466 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1467 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1473 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1474 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1475 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1476 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1477 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1479 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1480 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1481 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1482 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1483 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1484 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1485 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1486 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1487 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1488 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1493 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1494 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1495 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1497 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1498 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1499 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1500 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1501 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1502 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1505 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1510 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1511 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1512 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1513 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1514 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1515 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1516 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1517 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1518 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1519 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1520 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1522 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1523 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1524 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1530 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1531 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1533 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1534 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1535 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1536 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1537 updates.announcement_sigs);
1538 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1539 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1542 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1543 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1544 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1546 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1548 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1549 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1551 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1552 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1553 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1554 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1559 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1560 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1561 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1562 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1563 debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok());
1565 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1566 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1567 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1570 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1571 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1572 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1573 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1574 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1575 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1576 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1577 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1581 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1582 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1583 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1584 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1585 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1587 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1593 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1594 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1598 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1600 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1601 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1602 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1603 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1604 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1605 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1609 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1611 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1612 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1614 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1616 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1617 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1618 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1621 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1622 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1623 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1624 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1625 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1626 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1627 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1628 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1630 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1631 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1632 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1637 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1639 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1640 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1641 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1642 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1643 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1644 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1645 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1646 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1648 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1651 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1652 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1654 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1656 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1658 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1660 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1661 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1662 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1663 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1673 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1674 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1675 &self.default_configuration
1678 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1679 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1680 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1683 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1684 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1686 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1688 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1692 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1697 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1699 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1700 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1701 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1702 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1703 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1705 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1706 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1708 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1709 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1710 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1712 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1713 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1714 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1715 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1716 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1717 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1719 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1720 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1721 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1722 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1723 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1724 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1727 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1728 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1729 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1731 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1733 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1734 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1736 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1738 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1739 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1740 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1741 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1742 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1743 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1747 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1752 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1754 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1755 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1756 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1758 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1760 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1763 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1766 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1767 node_id: their_network_key,
1770 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1773 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1774 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1775 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1776 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1777 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1778 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1779 // the same channel.
1780 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1782 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1783 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1784 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1785 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1786 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1787 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1788 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1789 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1797 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
1798 /// more information.
1799 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1800 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1803 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1804 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1806 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1807 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1809 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1810 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1811 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1812 // really wanted anyway.
1813 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1816 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
1817 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1818 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1819 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1821 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
1822 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1823 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1824 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1825 return peer_state.channel_by_id
1828 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
1834 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1835 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1837 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1838 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1839 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1841 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1842 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1843 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1844 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1845 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1846 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1847 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1848 total_msat: *total_msat,
1851 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1852 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1854 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1855 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1857 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1862 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1863 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1864 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1865 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1866 Some(transaction) => {
1867 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1871 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1872 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1873 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1874 reason: closure_reason
1878 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1879 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1881 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1882 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1883 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1885 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1886 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1888 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1889 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1890 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1891 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1892 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
1893 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1894 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
1895 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1896 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1898 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
1899 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
1900 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
1901 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1902 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1906 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1907 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
1908 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1909 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
1910 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
1913 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1914 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1915 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1916 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1920 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1924 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1928 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1929 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1930 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1931 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1934 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1938 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1939 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1940 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1942 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1943 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1945 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1946 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1947 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1948 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1950 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
1952 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1953 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1954 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1955 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
1956 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1957 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1960 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1961 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1962 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1964 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1965 /// the channel being closed or not:
1966 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1967 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1968 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1969 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1970 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1971 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1972 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1974 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
1976 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1977 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1978 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1979 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
1980 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1981 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1985 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1986 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1987 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1988 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1989 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1990 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1991 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1992 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1994 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1995 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1996 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1997 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1998 // ignore the result here.
1999 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2003 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2004 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2005 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2006 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2007 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2008 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2009 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2011 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2012 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2013 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2014 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2015 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2017 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2019 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2021 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2024 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2025 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2026 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2027 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2028 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2033 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2036 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2037 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2038 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2039 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2040 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2041 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2042 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2043 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2044 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2045 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2046 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2047 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2058 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2059 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2060 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2062 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2063 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2064 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2067 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2068 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2069 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2071 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2072 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2073 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2074 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2075 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2078 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2079 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2080 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2081 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2082 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2086 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2087 /// local transaction(s).
2088 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2089 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2090 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2094 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2095 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2097 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2098 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2099 return Err(ReceiveError {
2100 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2102 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2105 // final_expiry_too_soon
2106 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2107 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2109 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2110 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2111 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2112 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2113 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2114 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2115 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2116 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2117 return Err(ReceiveError {
2118 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2119 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2122 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2123 return Err(ReceiveError {
2125 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2126 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2130 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2131 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2132 return Err(ReceiveError {
2133 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2134 err_data: Vec::new(),
2135 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2138 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2139 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2140 return Err(ReceiveError {
2141 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2142 err_data: Vec::new(),
2143 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2145 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2146 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2148 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2149 phantom_shared_secret,
2151 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2152 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2153 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2154 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2155 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2156 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2157 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2158 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2159 return Err(ReceiveError {
2160 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2161 err_data: Vec::new(),
2162 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2166 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2168 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2171 return Err(ReceiveError {
2172 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2173 err_data: Vec::new(),
2174 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2179 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2182 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2183 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2184 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2185 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2189 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2190 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2191 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2193 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2194 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2195 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2196 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2197 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2198 failure_code: $err_code,
2204 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2205 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2208 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2209 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2210 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2212 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2213 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2214 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2215 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2216 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2217 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2218 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2219 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2221 macro_rules! return_err {
2222 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2224 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2225 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2226 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2227 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2228 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2229 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2235 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2237 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2238 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2240 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2241 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2245 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2246 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2248 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2250 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2251 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2252 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2253 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2254 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2256 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2259 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2260 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2261 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2263 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2264 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2265 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2268 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2269 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2270 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2271 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2275 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2276 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2277 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2280 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2281 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2282 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2283 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2284 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2289 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2290 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2291 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2292 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2293 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2294 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2295 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2296 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2297 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2298 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2299 // phantom or an intercept.
2300 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2301 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2302 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2306 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2309 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2311 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2312 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2313 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2314 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2315 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2317 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2318 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2319 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2321 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2322 // have no consistency guarantees.
2323 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2327 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2328 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2329 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2330 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2331 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2333 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2334 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2335 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2336 // we don't have the channel here.
2337 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2339 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2341 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2342 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2343 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2344 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2345 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2346 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2347 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2349 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2350 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2352 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2353 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2357 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2358 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2359 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2360 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2362 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2369 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2370 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2371 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2372 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2373 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2374 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2376 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2377 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2379 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2380 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2381 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2382 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2383 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2384 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2385 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2386 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2387 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2388 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2394 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2395 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2396 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2397 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2399 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2400 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2402 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2403 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2404 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2406 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2407 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2408 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2409 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2410 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2411 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2412 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2416 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2421 pending_forward_info
2424 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2425 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2426 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2428 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2429 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2430 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2432 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2433 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2434 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2435 if !chan.should_announce() {
2436 return Err(LightningError {
2437 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2438 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2441 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2442 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2444 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2445 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2448 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2449 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2450 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2451 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2453 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2454 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2455 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2457 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2458 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2459 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2460 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2461 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2462 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2466 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2468 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2469 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2470 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2472 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2473 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2475 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2476 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2477 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2478 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2479 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2480 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2481 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2482 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2484 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2485 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2486 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2488 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2490 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2497 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2498 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2499 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2502 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2503 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2504 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2506 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2507 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2508 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2510 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2511 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2512 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2513 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2514 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2516 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2518 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2519 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2520 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2521 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2524 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2525 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2526 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2527 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2528 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2529 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2530 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2531 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2533 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2534 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2535 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2537 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2538 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2540 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2541 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2542 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2543 Some(monitor_update) => {
2544 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2545 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2546 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2549 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2550 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2551 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2552 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2553 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2554 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2555 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2556 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2562 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2563 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2564 // `channel_by_id` map.
2565 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2566 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2571 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2572 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2574 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2579 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2581 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2582 /// fields for more info.
2584 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2585 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2587 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2589 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2590 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2591 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2592 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2593 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2595 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2596 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2597 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2598 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2599 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2601 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2602 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2603 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2604 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2606 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2608 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2609 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2610 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2612 /// In general, a path may raise:
2613 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2614 /// node public key) is specified.
2615 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2616 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2618 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2619 /// relevant updates.
2621 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2622 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2623 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2625 /// # A caution on `payment_secret`
2627 /// `payment_secret` is unrelated to `payment_hash` (or [`PaymentPreimage`]) and exists to
2628 /// authenticate the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization)
2629 /// attacks. For newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one,
2630 /// the [`Route`] must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a
2631 /// recipient-provided `payment_secret`.
2633 /// If a `payment_secret` *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret
2634 /// feature bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the
2635 /// [`Route`], we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2637 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2638 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2639 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2640 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2641 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2642 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2643 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2644 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2645 self.pending_outbound_payments
2646 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2647 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2648 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2651 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2652 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2653 pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2654 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2655 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2656 self.pending_outbound_payments
2657 .send_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2658 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2659 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2660 &self.pending_events,
2661 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2662 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2666 fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2667 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2668 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2669 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2670 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2671 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2675 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2676 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2677 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2681 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2682 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2683 /// retries are exhausted.
2685 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2686 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2688 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2689 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2690 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2692 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2693 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2695 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2696 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2697 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2698 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2699 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events);
2702 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2703 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2704 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2705 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2706 /// never reach the recipient.
2708 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2709 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2711 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2712 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2714 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2716 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2717 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2718 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2719 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2720 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2721 route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
2723 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2724 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2727 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2728 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2730 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2733 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2734 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2735 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2736 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2737 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, payment_id,
2738 retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2739 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2740 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2741 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2742 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2745 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2746 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2747 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2748 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2749 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2750 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2751 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2752 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2753 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2756 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2759 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2760 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2763 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2764 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2765 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2766 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2767 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2768 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2769 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2770 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2772 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2773 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2776 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2778 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2780 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2781 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2782 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2783 } else { unreachable!(); })
2786 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2789 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2790 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2793 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2794 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
2799 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2800 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2803 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2804 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2805 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2807 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2808 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2809 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2810 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2819 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2820 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2821 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2825 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2827 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2828 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2830 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2831 /// across the p2p network.
2833 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2834 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2836 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2837 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2838 /// keys per-channel).
2840 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2841 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2842 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2844 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2845 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2846 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2848 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2849 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2850 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2851 /// for more details.
2853 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2854 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2855 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2856 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2858 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2859 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2860 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2861 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2866 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2867 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2868 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2869 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2870 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2871 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2872 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2876 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2877 let mut output_index = None;
2878 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2879 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2880 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2881 if output_index.is_some() {
2882 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2883 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2886 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2887 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2888 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2891 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2894 if output_index.is_none() {
2895 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2896 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2899 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2903 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2905 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2906 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2907 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2908 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2910 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2911 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2913 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2914 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2916 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2918 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2919 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2920 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2921 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2922 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2923 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2924 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2925 pub fn update_channel_config(
2926 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2927 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2928 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2929 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2930 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2934 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2935 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2937 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2938 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2939 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2940 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2941 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2942 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2943 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2944 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2945 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2949 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2950 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2951 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2954 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2955 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2956 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2957 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2958 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2966 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2967 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2969 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2970 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2972 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2973 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2974 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2975 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2976 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2978 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2979 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2981 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2984 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2985 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2986 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2987 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2988 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2989 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2991 let next_hop_scid = {
2992 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2993 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
2994 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
2995 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2996 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2997 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2999 if !chan.is_usable() {
3000 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3001 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3004 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3006 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3007 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3012 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3013 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3014 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3017 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3018 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3019 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3021 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3023 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3024 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3027 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3028 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3029 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3030 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3031 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3033 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3037 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3038 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3040 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3043 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3044 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3045 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3047 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3048 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3049 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3052 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3053 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3054 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3055 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3056 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3057 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3058 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3061 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3062 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3063 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3064 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3069 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3071 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3072 /// Will likely generate further events.
3073 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3074 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3076 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3077 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3078 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3080 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3081 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3083 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3084 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3085 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3087 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3088 match forward_info {
3089 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3090 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3091 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3092 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3093 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3096 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3097 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3098 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3100 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3101 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3102 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3103 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3104 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3105 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3108 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3109 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3111 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3114 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3115 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3121 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3122 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3124 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3128 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3129 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3131 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3135 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3136 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3137 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3138 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3139 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3141 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3142 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3143 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3144 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3145 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3147 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3149 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3150 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3154 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3155 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3156 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3157 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3163 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3166 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3169 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3170 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3171 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3172 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3173 // problem, not ours.
3179 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3180 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3182 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3186 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3187 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3188 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3189 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3192 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3193 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3194 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3195 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3196 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3199 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3200 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3201 match forward_info {
3202 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3203 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3204 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3205 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3206 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3209 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3210 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3211 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3212 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3213 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3214 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3215 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3216 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3218 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3219 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3220 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3222 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3223 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3225 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3227 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3228 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3229 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3230 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3235 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3236 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3238 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3239 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3240 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3241 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3243 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3244 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3246 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3248 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3249 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3250 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3259 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3260 match forward_info {
3261 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3262 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3263 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3264 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3267 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3268 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3269 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3270 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3272 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3273 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3275 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3278 let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3279 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3280 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3281 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3282 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3283 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3284 phantom_shared_secret,
3286 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3288 total_value_received: None,
3289 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3294 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3295 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3296 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3297 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3298 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3300 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3301 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3302 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3303 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3304 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3305 phantom_shared_secret,
3307 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3308 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3312 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3313 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3314 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3315 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3316 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3319 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3320 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3321 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3323 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3324 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3325 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3328 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3329 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3330 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3333 let (_, ref mut htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3334 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3335 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3336 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3337 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3338 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3342 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3343 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3344 total_value += htlc.value;
3345 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3346 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3347 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3348 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3349 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3350 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3352 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3354 _ => unreachable!(),
3357 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3358 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3359 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3360 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3361 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3362 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3363 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3364 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3365 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3366 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3367 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3371 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3372 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3374 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3376 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3377 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3379 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3381 payment_claimable_generated
3385 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3386 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3387 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3388 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3389 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3390 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3391 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3392 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3393 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3394 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3395 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3396 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3397 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3398 Ok(result) => result,
3400 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3401 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3405 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3406 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3407 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3408 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3409 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3410 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3414 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3416 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3417 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3418 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3419 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3422 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3423 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3424 let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
3425 claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
3426 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3427 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3428 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3429 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3430 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3432 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3434 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3435 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3438 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3439 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3440 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3446 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3447 if payment_data.is_none() {
3448 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3449 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3452 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3453 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3454 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3455 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3456 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3457 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3458 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3459 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3461 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3462 if payment_claimable_generated {
3463 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3469 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3470 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3478 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3479 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3480 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3481 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3482 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3483 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3485 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3486 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3488 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3490 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3491 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3492 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3494 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3496 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3497 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3498 events.append(&mut new_events);
3501 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3503 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3504 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3506 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3507 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3508 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3509 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3510 if background_events.is_empty() {
3514 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3516 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3517 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3518 // monitor updating completing.
3519 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3526 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3527 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3528 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3529 self.process_background_events();
3532 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3533 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3534 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3535 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3536 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3537 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3538 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3540 if !chan.is_live() {
3541 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3542 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3543 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3545 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3546 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3548 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3549 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3553 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3554 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3555 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3556 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3557 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3558 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3559 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3561 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3563 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3564 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3565 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3566 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3567 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3568 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3569 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3577 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3579 /// This currently includes:
3580 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3581 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3582 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3584 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3585 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3586 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3588 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3589 /// estimate fetches.
3591 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3592 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3593 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3594 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3595 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3596 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3598 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3600 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3601 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3602 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3604 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3605 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3606 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3607 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3608 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3609 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3610 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3611 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3612 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3614 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3615 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3616 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3617 if needs_close { return false; }
3620 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3621 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3622 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3623 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3624 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3625 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3626 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3627 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3631 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3632 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3634 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3635 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3636 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3640 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3641 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3646 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3650 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3651 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3656 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3657 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3658 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3659 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3660 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3661 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3662 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3663 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3664 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3665 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3666 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3667 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3668 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3669 // have no channels to the peer.
3670 let remove_entry = {
3671 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3672 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3675 entry.remove_entry();
3678 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3683 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3684 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3685 // This should be unreachable
3686 debug_assert!(false);
3689 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3690 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3691 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3692 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3694 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3695 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3696 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3698 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3705 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3706 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3707 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3708 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3709 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3712 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3713 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3716 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3718 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3719 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3720 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3721 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3722 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3729 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3730 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3731 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3733 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3734 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3735 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3736 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3738 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3739 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3740 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3741 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3742 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3743 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3746 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3747 /// reason for the failure.
3749 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3750 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
3751 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3753 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3754 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3755 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3756 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3757 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3758 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3759 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3764 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3765 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3766 match failure_code {
3767 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3768 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3769 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3770 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3771 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3772 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3777 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3778 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3780 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3782 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3783 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3784 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3785 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3786 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3787 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3788 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3790 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3792 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3793 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3795 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3800 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3801 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3802 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3803 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3804 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3805 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3806 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3807 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3808 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3809 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3811 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3812 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3813 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3814 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3816 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3817 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3818 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3819 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3820 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3824 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3825 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3826 // be surfaced to the user.
3827 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3828 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3829 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3831 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3832 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3833 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3834 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3835 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3836 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3837 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3838 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3840 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3842 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3845 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3846 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3847 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3848 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3852 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3853 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3854 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3855 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3856 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3857 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3858 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3859 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3860 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3863 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3864 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3865 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3868 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3869 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3870 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3872 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
3873 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
3874 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
3875 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
3876 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3878 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3879 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3880 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3882 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
3883 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3884 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3885 push_forward_ev = true;
3887 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3888 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3889 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3891 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3892 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3895 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3896 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3897 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3898 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3899 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3900 failed_next_destination: destination,
3906 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3907 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3909 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3910 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3911 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3913 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3914 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3915 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3916 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3918 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3919 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3920 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3921 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3922 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3923 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3924 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3926 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3929 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3930 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3931 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3932 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3933 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3934 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3935 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3936 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3941 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3942 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3943 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3945 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3946 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3947 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3948 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3953 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3955 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3956 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3957 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3958 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3959 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3961 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3962 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3964 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3965 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3966 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3967 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3968 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3970 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3971 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
3972 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3973 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3974 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3975 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3976 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3977 let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3978 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3985 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3986 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3991 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3992 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3994 if peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id).is_none() {
3999 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4000 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4001 debug_assert!(false);
4005 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4007 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4008 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4009 debug_assert!(false);
4013 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4015 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4016 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4017 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4018 if sources.len() != 1 {
4019 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4020 debug_assert!(false);
4026 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4028 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4029 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4030 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4031 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4034 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4035 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4036 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4037 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4041 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4042 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4043 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4044 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4046 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4047 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4048 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4049 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4050 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4055 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4056 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4057 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4058 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4059 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4060 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4061 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4063 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4066 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4067 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4068 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4069 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4073 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4074 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4075 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4076 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4078 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4079 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4080 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4081 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4085 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4086 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).map(
4087 |peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap()
4091 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4092 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4093 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4094 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4095 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4096 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4098 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4099 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4100 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4101 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4102 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4104 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4105 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4106 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4107 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4108 if let Err(e) = res {
4109 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4110 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4111 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4112 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4113 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4119 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4120 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4121 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4125 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4126 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4127 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4128 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4129 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4130 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4131 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4132 // again on restart.
4133 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4134 payment_preimage, update_res);
4136 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4137 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4138 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4139 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4140 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4141 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4145 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4146 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4149 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4151 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4152 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4154 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4155 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4156 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4157 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4158 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4159 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4160 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4163 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4164 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4166 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4168 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4174 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4175 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4176 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4182 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4183 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4184 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4187 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4188 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4190 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4191 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4192 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4193 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4194 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4198 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4199 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4205 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4206 /// update completion.
4207 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4208 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4209 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4210 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4211 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4212 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4213 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4214 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4215 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4216 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4217 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4218 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4219 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4221 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4223 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4224 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4225 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4226 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4229 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4230 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4232 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4233 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4234 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4239 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4241 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4242 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4243 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4244 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4249 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4250 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4251 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4252 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4253 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4258 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4262 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4268 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4269 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4270 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4276 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4277 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4279 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4280 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4282 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4283 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4284 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4285 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4286 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4291 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4292 let mut peer_state_lock;
4293 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4294 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4295 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4296 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4298 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4299 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4300 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4303 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4304 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4305 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4308 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4311 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4313 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4314 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4317 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4318 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4319 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4321 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4322 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4323 /// used to accept such channels.
4325 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4326 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4327 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4328 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4331 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4332 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4334 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4335 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4336 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4338 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4339 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4341 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4342 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4344 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4345 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4347 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4348 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4349 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4350 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4353 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4354 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4356 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4357 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4358 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4359 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4360 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4361 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4362 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4363 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4364 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4365 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4366 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4369 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4370 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4371 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4372 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4373 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4374 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4377 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4378 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4379 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4381 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4382 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4383 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4384 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4385 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4386 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4387 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4388 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4391 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4392 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4393 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4397 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4398 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4399 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4402 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4403 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4409 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4410 /// or 0-conf channels.
4412 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4413 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4414 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4415 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4416 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4417 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4419 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4420 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4421 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4422 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4423 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4424 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4425 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4429 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4432 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4433 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4435 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4436 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4437 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4438 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4440 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4443 num_unfunded_channels
4446 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4447 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4448 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4451 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4452 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4455 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4456 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4457 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4458 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4460 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4461 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4462 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4463 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4465 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4466 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4468 debug_assert!(false);
4469 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4471 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4472 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4474 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4475 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4476 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4477 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4478 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4479 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4481 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4482 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4483 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4486 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4487 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4488 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4489 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4490 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4493 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4494 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4495 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4498 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4499 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4503 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4504 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4505 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4506 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4508 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4509 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4510 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4511 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4513 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4514 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4515 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4518 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4519 pending_events.push(
4520 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4521 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4522 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4523 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4524 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4525 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4530 entry.insert(channel);
4536 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4537 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4538 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4539 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4541 debug_assert!(false);
4542 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4544 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4545 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4546 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4547 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4548 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4549 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4551 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4554 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4555 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4556 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4557 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4558 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4560 user_channel_id: user_id,
4565 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4566 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4568 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4569 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4571 debug_assert!(false);
4572 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4575 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4576 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4577 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4578 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4579 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4580 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4582 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4585 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4586 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4587 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4589 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4590 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4591 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4592 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4593 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4594 funding_msg.channel_id))
4596 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4597 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4601 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4602 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4603 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4604 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4605 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4606 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4607 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4611 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4613 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4614 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4615 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4617 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4618 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4619 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4620 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4621 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4622 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4623 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4624 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4632 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4633 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4634 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4635 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4637 debug_assert!(false);
4638 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4641 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4642 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4643 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4644 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4645 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4646 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4647 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4648 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4649 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4650 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4651 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4652 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4653 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4654 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4659 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4663 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4664 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4665 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4667 debug_assert!(false);
4668 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4670 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4671 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4672 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4673 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4674 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4675 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4676 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4677 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4678 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4679 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4680 msg: announcement_sigs,
4682 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4683 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4684 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4685 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4686 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4687 // announcement_signatures.
4688 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4689 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4690 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4691 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4697 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4701 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4705 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4706 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4707 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4708 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4709 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4711 debug_assert!(false);
4712 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4714 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4715 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4716 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4717 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4719 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4720 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4721 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4722 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4725 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4726 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4727 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4728 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4730 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4731 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4732 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4733 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4734 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4735 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4740 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4741 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4742 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4743 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4744 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
4748 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4751 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4752 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4753 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4754 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4760 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4761 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4762 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4764 debug_assert!(false);
4765 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4767 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4768 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4769 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4770 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4771 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4772 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4773 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4774 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4775 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4780 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4781 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4782 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4783 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4784 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4785 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4786 } else { (tx, None) }
4788 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4791 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4792 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4793 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4795 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4796 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4797 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4798 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4799 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4803 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4808 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4809 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4810 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4811 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4813 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4814 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4815 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4816 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4818 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4819 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4820 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4822 debug_assert!(false);
4823 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4825 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4826 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4827 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4828 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4830 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4831 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4832 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4833 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4834 match pending_forward_info {
4835 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4836 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4837 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4838 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4840 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4841 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4842 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4843 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4844 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4847 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4849 _ => pending_forward_info
4852 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4854 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4859 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4860 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4861 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4862 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4864 debug_assert!(false);
4865 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4867 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4868 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4869 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4870 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4871 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4873 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4876 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4880 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4881 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4882 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4884 debug_assert!(false);
4885 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4887 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4888 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4889 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4890 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4891 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4893 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4898 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4899 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4900 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4902 debug_assert!(false);
4903 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4905 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4906 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4907 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4908 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4909 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4910 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4911 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4913 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4916 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4920 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4921 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4922 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4924 debug_assert!(false);
4925 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4927 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4928 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4929 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4930 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4931 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
4932 let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4933 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4934 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4935 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4936 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
4938 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4943 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4944 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4945 let mut push_forward_event = false;
4946 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4947 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4948 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4949 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4950 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4951 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4952 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4953 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4955 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4956 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4958 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4959 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4960 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4961 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4962 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4963 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4965 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4966 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4967 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4969 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4970 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4971 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4972 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4973 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4974 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4975 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4976 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4977 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4980 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4981 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4983 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4984 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4985 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4986 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4987 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4988 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4989 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4990 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4993 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4994 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4995 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5000 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5001 // payments are being processed.
5002 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5003 push_forward_event = true;
5005 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5006 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5013 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5014 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5017 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5018 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5019 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5021 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5025 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5026 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5027 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5028 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5029 .find(|ev| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5031 if !forward_ev_exists {
5032 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5034 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5039 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5040 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5041 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5042 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5044 debug_assert!(false);
5045 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5046 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5047 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5048 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5049 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5050 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5051 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5052 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5053 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5054 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5055 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5056 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5058 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5061 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5065 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5066 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5067 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5069 debug_assert!(false);
5070 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5072 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5073 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5074 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5075 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5076 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5078 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5083 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5084 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5085 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5087 debug_assert!(false);
5088 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5090 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5091 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5092 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5093 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5094 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5095 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5098 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5099 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5100 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5101 msg, &self.default_configuration
5103 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5104 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5105 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5108 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5113 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5114 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5115 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5116 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5118 // It's not a local channel
5119 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5122 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5123 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5124 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5125 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5127 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5128 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5129 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5130 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5131 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5132 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5133 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5134 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5135 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5136 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5138 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5140 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5141 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5142 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5143 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5145 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5146 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5149 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5151 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5154 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5156 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5157 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5159 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5161 debug_assert!(false);
5162 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5164 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5165 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5166 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5167 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5168 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5169 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5170 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5171 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5172 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5173 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5174 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5175 let mut channel_update = None;
5176 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5177 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5178 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5181 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5182 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5183 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5184 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5185 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5186 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5187 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5192 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5193 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5194 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5195 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5196 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5197 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5201 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5205 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5206 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5209 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5210 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5215 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5216 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5217 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5219 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5220 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5221 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5222 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5223 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5224 match monitor_event {
5225 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5226 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5227 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5228 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5230 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5231 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5232 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5233 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5236 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5237 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5238 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5239 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5241 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5242 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5243 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5244 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5247 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5248 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5249 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5250 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5251 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5252 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5253 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5254 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5255 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5256 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5257 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5261 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5262 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5264 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5266 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5267 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5268 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5269 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5270 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5277 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5278 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5284 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5285 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5288 has_pending_monitor_events
5291 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5292 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5293 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5295 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5296 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5297 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5298 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5300 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5305 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5306 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5307 /// update was applied.
5308 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5309 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5310 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5311 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5313 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5314 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5315 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5316 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5318 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5319 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5321 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5322 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5323 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5324 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5325 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5326 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5327 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5328 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5329 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5331 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5332 has_monitor_update = true;
5334 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5335 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5336 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5337 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5338 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5339 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5340 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5342 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5344 continue 'peer_loop;
5353 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5354 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5355 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5358 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5359 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5365 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5366 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5367 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5368 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5369 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5370 let mut has_update = false;
5372 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5374 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5375 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5376 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5377 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5378 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5379 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5380 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5381 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5383 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5384 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5387 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5388 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5389 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5390 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5391 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5396 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5398 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5399 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5400 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5406 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5407 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5415 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5416 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5422 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5423 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5425 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5426 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5427 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5428 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5429 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5430 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5431 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5432 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5433 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5434 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5435 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5436 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5437 assert!(should_broadcast);
5438 } else { unreachable!(); }
5439 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5441 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5445 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5446 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5448 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5449 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5452 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5454 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5455 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5456 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5457 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5458 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5459 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5460 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5461 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5462 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5463 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5464 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5465 // never fail a payment too early.
5466 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5468 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5471 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5476 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5479 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5480 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5482 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5483 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5484 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5485 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5487 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5489 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5490 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5494 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5495 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5497 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5499 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5500 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5502 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5503 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5504 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5505 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5506 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5507 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5508 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5509 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5510 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5511 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5512 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5515 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5516 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5518 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5521 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5523 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5525 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5526 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5527 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5528 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5529 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5532 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5533 /// stored external to LDK.
5535 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5536 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5537 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5539 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5540 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5543 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5544 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5545 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5546 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5548 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5549 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5550 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5551 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5552 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5554 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5555 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5556 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5557 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5558 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5560 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5561 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5563 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5564 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5568 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5569 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5571 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5573 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5574 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5576 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5577 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5578 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5579 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5580 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5581 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5582 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5585 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5586 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5588 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5591 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5593 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5595 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5596 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5599 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5600 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5602 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5603 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5604 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5607 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5608 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5610 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5611 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5612 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5613 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5615 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5616 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5617 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5618 Some(_) => continue,
5619 None => return scid_candidate
5624 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5626 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5627 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5629 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5630 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5631 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5635 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5636 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5637 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5639 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5640 /// times to get a unique scid.
5641 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5642 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5643 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5645 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5646 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5647 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5648 return scid_candidate
5652 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5653 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5654 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5655 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5657 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5658 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5659 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5660 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5661 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5662 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5663 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5664 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5673 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5674 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5675 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5676 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5677 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5681 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5682 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5683 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5688 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5689 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5690 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5694 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5695 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5699 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5700 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5703 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5704 /// using the given event handler.
5706 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5707 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5710 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5711 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5712 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5714 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5716 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5717 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5718 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5719 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5722 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5723 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5724 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5727 for event in pending_events {
5728 handler(event).await;
5731 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5732 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5737 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5739 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5740 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5741 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5742 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5743 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5744 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5748 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5749 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5750 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5751 /// is always placed next to each other.
5753 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5754 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5755 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5756 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5758 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5759 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5760 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5761 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5762 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5763 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5764 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5766 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5767 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5768 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5769 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5772 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5773 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5775 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5776 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5779 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5780 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5781 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5782 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5783 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5784 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5785 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5789 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5790 events.replace(pending_events);
5799 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5801 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5802 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5803 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5804 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5805 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5806 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5810 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5812 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5813 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5814 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5815 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5816 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5818 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5819 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5820 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5821 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5824 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5825 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5826 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5829 for event in pending_events {
5830 handler.handle_event(event);
5838 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5840 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5841 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5842 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5843 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5844 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5845 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5849 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5851 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5852 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5853 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5854 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5855 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5858 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5859 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5862 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5863 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5864 let new_height = height - 1;
5866 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5867 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5868 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5869 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5870 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5871 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5874 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5878 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5880 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5881 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5882 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5883 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5884 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5885 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5889 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5890 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5891 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5892 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5894 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5895 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5897 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5898 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5899 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5901 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5902 if height < last_best_block_height {
5903 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5904 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5908 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5909 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5910 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5911 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5913 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5914 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5916 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5918 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5920 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5922 macro_rules! max_time {
5923 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5925 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5926 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5927 // having an explicit local time source.
5928 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5929 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5930 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5931 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5932 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5938 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5939 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5940 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5941 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5945 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5946 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5947 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5948 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5949 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5950 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5951 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5952 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
5959 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5960 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5961 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5962 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5963 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5964 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5965 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5966 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5971 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5973 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5974 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5975 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5976 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5977 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5978 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5982 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5983 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5985 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5986 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5987 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5988 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5989 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5991 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5992 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5994 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5995 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5996 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5997 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5998 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5999 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6000 let res = f(channel);
6001 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6002 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6003 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6004 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6005 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6007 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6008 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6009 if channel.is_usable() {
6010 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6011 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6012 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6013 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6018 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6022 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
6024 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6025 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6026 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6027 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6028 msg: announcement_sigs,
6030 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6031 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6032 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6034 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6035 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6036 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6041 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6042 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6043 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6044 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6045 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6046 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6047 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6048 // is always consistent.
6049 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6050 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6051 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6052 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6053 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6056 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6057 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6058 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6059 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6060 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6061 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6062 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6066 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6067 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6068 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6069 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6070 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6071 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6072 data: reason_message,
6082 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6083 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6084 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6085 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6086 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6087 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6088 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6089 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6090 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6091 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6093 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6094 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6095 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6099 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6102 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6103 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6104 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6105 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6106 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6107 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6108 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6109 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6110 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6113 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6114 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6115 _ => unreachable!(),
6117 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6118 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6119 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6120 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6126 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6128 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6129 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6133 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6134 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6135 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6136 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6138 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6140 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6141 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6142 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6143 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6144 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6145 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6148 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6149 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6150 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6152 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6153 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6154 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6155 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6158 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6159 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6160 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6161 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6162 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6165 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6166 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6167 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6170 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6171 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6172 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6173 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6176 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6177 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6178 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6179 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6182 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6183 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6185 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6186 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6187 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6188 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6189 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6192 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6193 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6194 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6195 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6198 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6199 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6200 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6201 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6204 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6205 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6206 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6207 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6211 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6212 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6214 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6215 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6216 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6217 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6218 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6219 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6223 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6224 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6225 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6228 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6229 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6230 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6233 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6234 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6235 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6238 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6239 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6240 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6243 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6244 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6245 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6248 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6249 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6250 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6253 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6254 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6255 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6258 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6259 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6260 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6263 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6264 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6265 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6268 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6269 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6270 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6273 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6274 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6275 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6278 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6279 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6280 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6283 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6284 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6285 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6288 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6289 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6290 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6293 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6294 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6295 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6298 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6299 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6300 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6303 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6308 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6309 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6310 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6313 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6314 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6315 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6316 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6318 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6319 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6320 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6321 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6322 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6323 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6324 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6325 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6326 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6327 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6328 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6333 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6335 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6336 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6337 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6338 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6339 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6340 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6341 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6342 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6343 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6344 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6345 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6346 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6347 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6348 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6349 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6350 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6351 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6352 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6353 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6354 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6355 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6358 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6359 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6360 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6361 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6364 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6366 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6368 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6369 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6373 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6374 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6375 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6379 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6381 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6382 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6383 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6384 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6385 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6386 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6389 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6390 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6391 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6392 if inbound_peer_limited {
6395 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6396 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6397 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6398 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6399 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6403 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6404 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6405 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6407 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6408 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6409 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6410 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6415 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6416 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6421 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6423 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6424 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6425 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6426 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6427 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6428 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6429 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6430 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6431 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6432 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6433 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6437 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6438 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6439 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6444 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6445 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6446 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6447 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6448 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6457 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6461 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6462 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6464 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6465 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6466 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6467 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6468 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6469 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6470 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6471 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6473 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6474 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6475 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6479 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6480 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6481 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6482 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6483 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6484 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6485 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6486 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6487 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6488 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6496 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6497 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6501 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6502 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6505 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6506 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6510 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6511 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6512 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6513 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6516 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6517 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6519 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6520 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6521 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6522 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6523 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6526 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6527 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6528 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6529 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6532 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6533 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6534 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6535 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6538 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6539 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6540 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6541 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6542 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
6543 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
6544 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6545 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6546 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6547 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6548 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6549 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6550 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6551 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6552 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6553 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6554 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6555 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6557 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6558 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6559 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6565 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6566 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6568 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6569 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6570 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6571 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6574 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6575 (2, node_id, required),
6576 (4, features, required),
6577 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6578 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6579 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6580 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6583 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6584 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6585 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6586 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6587 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6588 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6589 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6590 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6591 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6592 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6593 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6594 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6595 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6596 (7, self.config, option),
6597 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6598 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6599 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6600 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6601 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6602 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6603 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6604 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6605 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6606 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6607 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6608 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6609 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6610 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6611 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6612 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6613 (32, self.is_public, required),
6614 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6615 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6616 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6617 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6623 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6624 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6625 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6626 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6627 (2, channel_id, required),
6628 (3, channel_type, option),
6629 (4, counterparty, required),
6630 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6631 (6, funding_txo, option),
6632 (7, config, option),
6633 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6634 (9, confirmations, option),
6635 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6636 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6637 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6638 (16, balance_msat, required),
6639 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6640 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6641 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6642 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6643 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6644 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6645 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6646 (26, is_outbound, required),
6647 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6648 (30, is_usable, required),
6649 (32, is_public, required),
6650 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6651 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6652 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6653 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6656 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6657 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6658 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6659 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6660 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6664 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6666 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6667 outbound_scid_alias,
6671 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6672 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6674 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6675 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6676 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6677 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6678 confirmations_required,
6680 force_close_spend_delay,
6681 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6682 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6683 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6684 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6685 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6686 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6687 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
6692 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6693 (2, channels, vec_type),
6694 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6695 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6698 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6700 (0, onion_packet, required),
6701 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6704 (0, payment_data, required),
6705 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6706 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6708 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6709 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6710 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6714 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6715 (0, routing, required),
6716 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6717 (4, payment_hash, required),
6718 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6719 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6720 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6724 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6725 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6727 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6729 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6730 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6731 reason.write(writer)?;
6733 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6734 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6737 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6738 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6739 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6740 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6747 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6748 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6749 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6752 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6753 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6754 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6755 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6759 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6760 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6761 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6762 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6763 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6766 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6767 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6768 // messages contained in the variants.
6769 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6770 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6771 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6773 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6774 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6775 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6776 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6777 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6780 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6781 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6782 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6783 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6784 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6786 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6791 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6796 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6797 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6798 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6799 (2, outpoint, required),
6800 (4, htlc_id, required),
6801 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6804 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6805 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6806 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6807 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6808 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6810 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6811 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6812 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6813 (2, self.value, required),
6814 (4, payment_data, option),
6815 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
6816 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6817 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6823 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6824 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6825 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6827 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6828 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6829 let mut total_value_received = None;
6830 let mut total_msat = None;
6831 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6832 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6833 (0, prev_hop, required),
6834 (1, total_msat, option),
6835 (2, value, required),
6836 (4, payment_data, option),
6837 (5, total_value_received, option),
6838 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6839 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6841 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6843 if payment_data.is_some() {
6844 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6846 if total_msat.is_none() {
6847 total_msat = Some(value);
6849 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6852 if total_msat.is_none() {
6853 if payment_data.is_none() {
6854 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6856 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6858 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6862 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6865 total_value_received,
6866 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6873 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6874 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6875 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6878 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6879 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6880 let mut path: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
6881 let mut payment_id = None;
6882 let mut payment_secret = None;
6883 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
6884 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6885 (0, session_priv, required),
6886 (1, payment_id, option),
6887 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6888 (3, payment_secret, option),
6889 (4, path, vec_type),
6890 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
6892 if payment_id.is_none() {
6893 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6895 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6897 if path.is_none() || path.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6898 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6900 let path = path.unwrap();
6901 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
6902 if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
6903 params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta;
6906 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6907 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6908 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6910 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6914 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6915 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6920 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6921 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6923 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret } => {
6925 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6926 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6927 (0, session_priv, required),
6928 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6929 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6930 (3, payment_secret, option),
6931 (4, *path, vec_type),
6932 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
6935 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6937 field.write(writer)?;
6944 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6945 (0, forward_info, required),
6946 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6947 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6948 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6949 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6952 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6954 (0, htlc_id, required),
6955 (2, err_packet, required),
6960 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6961 (0, payment_secret, required),
6962 (2, expiry_time, required),
6963 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6964 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6965 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6968 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6970 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6971 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6972 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6973 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6974 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6975 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6979 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6980 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6982 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6984 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6986 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6987 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6988 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6991 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
6993 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6994 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6995 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6996 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6997 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6998 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6999 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7000 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7002 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7003 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7004 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7005 unfunded_channels += 1;
7010 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7012 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7013 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7014 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7015 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7016 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7017 channel.write(writer)?;
7024 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7025 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7026 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7027 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7028 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7029 for forward in pending_forwards {
7030 forward.write(writer)?;
7035 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7037 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7038 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7039 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7041 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7042 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7043 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
7044 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7045 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7046 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
7047 htlc.write(writer)?;
7049 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
7052 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7053 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7054 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7055 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7056 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7057 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7058 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7061 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7062 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7063 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7064 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7065 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7067 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7068 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7069 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7070 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7071 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7072 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7073 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7078 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7079 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7080 for event in events.iter() {
7081 event.write(writer)?;
7084 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7085 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7086 for event in background_events.iter() {
7088 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7090 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7091 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7096 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7097 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7098 // likely to be identical.
7099 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7100 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7102 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7103 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7104 hash.write(writer)?;
7105 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7108 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7109 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7110 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7111 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7112 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7115 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7116 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7118 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7119 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7120 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7121 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7124 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7125 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7129 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7130 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7131 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7133 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7134 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7135 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7141 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7142 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7143 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7144 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7147 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7148 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7149 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7150 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7151 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7154 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7155 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7156 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7157 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7158 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7159 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7160 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7161 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7162 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7163 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7170 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7172 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7174 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7175 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7176 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7177 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7178 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7179 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7180 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7181 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7182 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7183 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7184 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7185 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7186 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7188 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7189 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7191 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7192 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7194 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7195 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7196 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7197 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7198 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7199 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7201 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7202 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7204 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7205 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7206 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7207 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7208 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7209 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7213 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7214 pub entropy_source: ES,
7216 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7217 pub node_signer: NS,
7219 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7220 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7222 pub signer_provider: SP,
7224 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7226 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7227 pub fee_estimator: F,
7228 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7230 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7231 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7232 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7233 pub chain_monitor: M,
7235 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7236 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7237 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7238 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7239 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7240 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7242 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7244 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7245 /// deserialization.
7247 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7248 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7249 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7251 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7252 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7254 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7255 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7256 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7257 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7259 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7262 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7263 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7266 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7267 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7269 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7270 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7271 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7272 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7273 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7274 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7278 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7279 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7280 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7281 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7282 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7284 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7285 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7290 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7291 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7292 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7293 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7295 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7296 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7297 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7298 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7299 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7300 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7304 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7305 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7306 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7310 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7311 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7313 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7314 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7315 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7316 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7317 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7318 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7322 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7323 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7325 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7326 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7327 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7329 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7331 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7332 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7333 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7334 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7335 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7336 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7337 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7338 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7339 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7341 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7342 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7343 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7344 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7345 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7346 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7347 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7348 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7349 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7350 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7351 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7352 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7353 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7354 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7355 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7356 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7357 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7358 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7359 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7360 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7361 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7362 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7363 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7364 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7365 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7366 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7367 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7368 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7369 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7370 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7371 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7372 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7374 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7375 let mut found_htlc = false;
7376 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7377 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7380 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7381 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7382 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7383 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7384 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7385 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7386 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7387 log_info!(args.logger,
7388 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7389 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7390 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7394 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7395 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7396 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7398 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7399 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7401 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7402 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7403 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7404 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7406 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7407 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7408 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7409 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7413 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7414 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7415 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7416 // safely discard the channel.
7417 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7418 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7419 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7420 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7421 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7424 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7425 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7426 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7427 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7428 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7429 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7433 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7434 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7435 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7436 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7440 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7441 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7442 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7443 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7444 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7445 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7446 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7447 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7448 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7450 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7453 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7454 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7455 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7456 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7457 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7458 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7459 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7460 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7462 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7465 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7466 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7467 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7468 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7469 let peer_state = PeerState {
7470 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7471 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7472 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7473 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7474 is_connected: false,
7476 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7479 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7480 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7481 for _ in 0..event_count {
7482 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7483 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7488 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7489 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7490 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7491 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7492 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7493 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7497 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7498 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7500 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7501 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7502 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7503 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7504 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7508 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7509 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7510 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7511 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7512 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7513 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7514 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7516 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7517 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7521 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7522 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7523 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7524 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7525 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7526 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7527 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7528 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7529 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7530 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7531 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7532 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7533 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7534 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7535 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7536 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7537 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7538 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7539 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7540 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7542 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7543 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7546 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7547 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7550 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7551 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7554 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7555 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7556 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7557 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7558 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7559 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7561 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7563 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7564 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7565 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7569 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7570 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7571 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7572 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7573 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7574 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7575 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7577 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7578 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7579 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
7580 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7581 if path.is_empty() {
7582 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7583 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7586 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7587 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7588 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7589 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7590 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7591 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7592 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7593 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7595 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7596 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7597 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7598 retry_strategy: None,
7599 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7600 payment_params: None,
7601 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7602 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7604 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7605 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7606 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7607 total_msat: path_amt,
7608 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7610 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7611 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7616 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7618 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
7619 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7620 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7621 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7623 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7624 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7625 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7626 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7627 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7628 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7629 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7630 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7631 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7632 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7633 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7638 !forwards.is_empty()
7640 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7641 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7642 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7643 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7644 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7645 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7646 intercepted_id != ev_id
7653 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
7654 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
7655 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
7656 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
7657 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
7658 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
7659 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
7660 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
7661 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
7662 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
7663 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
7664 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
7665 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
7674 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
7675 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7676 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7677 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7678 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7679 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7680 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7681 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7685 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7686 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7688 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7689 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7690 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7691 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7693 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7694 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7697 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7698 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7699 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7700 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7701 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7703 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7704 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7705 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7706 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7707 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7708 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7709 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7710 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7712 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7713 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7717 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7719 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7721 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7722 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7724 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7728 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7729 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7731 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7733 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7735 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7736 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7737 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7738 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7742 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7743 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7744 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7745 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7746 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7747 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7748 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7750 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7751 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7752 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7754 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7755 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7756 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7757 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7758 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7759 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7761 if chan.is_usable() {
7762 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7763 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7764 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7765 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7766 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7772 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7774 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7775 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7776 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7777 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7778 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7779 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7780 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7781 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7782 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7783 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7784 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7786 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7787 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7789 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7790 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7791 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7792 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7794 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7795 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7796 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7797 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7799 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7800 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7801 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7802 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7804 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7805 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7806 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7807 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7808 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7809 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7810 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7813 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7814 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7817 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7820 purpose: payment_purpose,
7821 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7827 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7828 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7829 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7831 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7832 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7836 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7838 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7839 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7840 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7841 router: args.router,
7843 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7845 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7846 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7847 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
7848 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7850 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7851 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7852 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7853 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7854 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7855 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7857 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7862 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7864 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7866 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7867 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7868 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7869 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7871 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7872 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7873 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7875 logger: args.logger,
7876 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7879 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7880 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7881 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7882 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7883 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7886 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7887 //connection or two.
7889 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7895 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7896 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7897 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7898 use core::time::Duration;
7899 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7900 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7901 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7902 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId};
7903 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7904 use crate::ln::msgs;
7905 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7906 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7907 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7908 use crate::util::test_utils;
7909 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7910 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7913 fn test_notify_limits() {
7914 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7915 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7916 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7917 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7918 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7919 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7921 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7922 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7923 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7924 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7925 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7927 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7929 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7930 // to connect messages with new values
7931 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7932 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7933 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7934 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7935 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7936 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7938 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7939 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7940 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7941 // ... but the last node should not.
7942 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7943 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7944 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7945 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7947 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7948 // about the channel.
7949 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7950 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7951 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7953 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7955 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7956 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7957 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7958 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7959 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7960 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7962 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7963 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7964 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7966 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7967 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7968 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7969 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7970 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7971 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7973 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7974 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7975 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7976 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7977 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7978 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7979 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7980 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7982 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7983 // the channel info has updated.
7984 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7985 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7986 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7987 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7988 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7989 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7993 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7994 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7996 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7997 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7998 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7999 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8000 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8002 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8003 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8004 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8005 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8007 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8008 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8009 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8010 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8011 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8012 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8013 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8014 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8015 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8016 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8018 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8019 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8020 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8021 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8022 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8023 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8024 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8025 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8026 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8027 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8028 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8029 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8030 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8031 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8032 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8033 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8034 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8035 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8036 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8037 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8038 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8039 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8041 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8042 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8044 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8045 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8046 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8048 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8049 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8050 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8051 // lightning messages manually.
8052 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8053 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8054 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8056 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8057 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8058 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8059 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8060 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8061 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8062 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8063 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8064 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8065 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8066 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8067 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8068 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8069 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8070 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8071 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8072 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8073 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8074 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8075 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8076 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8078 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8079 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8082 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8083 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8084 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8085 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8087 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8088 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8089 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8090 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8092 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8095 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8096 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8097 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8098 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8100 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8103 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8104 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8105 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8106 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8108 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8113 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8114 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8115 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8116 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8117 // fails as expected.
8118 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8119 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8120 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8121 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8122 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8123 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8124 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8126 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8127 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8128 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8130 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8131 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8132 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8133 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8135 let route = find_route(
8136 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8137 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8139 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8140 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8141 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8142 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8143 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8144 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8145 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8146 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8147 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8148 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8149 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8150 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8151 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8152 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8153 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8154 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8155 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8156 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8157 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8158 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8159 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8160 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8161 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8163 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8164 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8166 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8167 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8168 let route = find_route(
8169 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8170 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8172 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8174 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8175 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8176 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8177 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8178 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8180 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8181 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8182 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8183 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8184 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8185 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8186 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8187 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8188 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8190 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8191 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8192 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8194 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8195 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8196 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8197 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8198 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8199 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8200 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8201 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8202 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8204 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8205 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8209 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8210 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8211 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8212 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8213 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8214 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8215 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8217 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8218 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8220 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8221 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8222 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8223 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8225 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8226 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8227 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8228 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8229 let route = find_route(
8230 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8231 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8234 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8235 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8236 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8237 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8238 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8240 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8241 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8242 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8243 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8244 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8245 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8246 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8248 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8252 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8253 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8254 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8255 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8256 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8257 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8259 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8260 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8262 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8263 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8264 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8265 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8267 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8268 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8269 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8270 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8271 let route = find_route(
8272 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8273 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8276 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8277 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8278 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8279 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8280 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8281 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8283 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8284 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8285 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8286 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8287 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8288 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8289 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8291 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8295 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8296 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8297 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8298 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8299 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8301 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8302 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8303 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8304 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8306 // Marshall an MPP route.
8307 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8308 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8309 route.paths.push(path);
8310 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8311 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8312 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8313 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8314 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8315 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8317 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8318 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8319 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
8321 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8326 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8327 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8328 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8329 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8330 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8332 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8334 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8335 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8337 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8338 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8339 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8340 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8343 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8344 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8345 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8346 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8347 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8348 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8351 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8354 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8355 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8360 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8361 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8362 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8363 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8364 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8365 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8367 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8368 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8370 total_msat: 100_000,
8373 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8374 // payment verification fails as expected.
8375 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8376 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8377 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8378 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8380 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
8384 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8385 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8389 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8390 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8391 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8392 // the channel is successfully closed.
8393 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8394 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8395 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8396 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8398 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8399 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8400 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8401 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8402 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8404 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8405 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8407 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8408 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8409 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8410 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8413 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8415 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8416 // as it has the funding transaction.
8417 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8418 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8419 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8422 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8424 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8426 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8428 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8429 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8430 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8434 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8435 // as it has the funding transaction.
8436 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8437 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8438 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8440 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8441 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8442 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8443 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8444 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8445 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8446 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8448 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8449 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8450 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8451 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8453 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8454 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8456 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8457 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8458 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8459 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8460 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8461 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8462 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8466 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8467 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8468 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8469 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8470 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8471 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8472 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8475 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8477 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8478 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8479 // closing transaction).
8480 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8481 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8482 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8484 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8485 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8486 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8487 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8488 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8491 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8493 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8495 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8496 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8497 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8499 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8501 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8502 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8505 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8506 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8507 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8510 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8511 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8512 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8515 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8517 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8518 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8520 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8521 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8523 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8524 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8529 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8530 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8531 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8532 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8533 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8534 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8535 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8536 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8539 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8540 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8541 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8543 // Test the API functions.
8544 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8546 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8548 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8550 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8552 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8554 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8556 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8560 fn test_connection_limiting() {
8561 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
8562 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8563 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8564 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8565 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8567 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8569 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8570 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8572 let mut funding_tx = None;
8573 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8574 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8575 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8578 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8579 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8580 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
8581 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
8582 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8584 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8585 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8586 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8588 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8591 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8594 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
8595 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8596 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8597 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8598 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8600 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
8601 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
8603 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
8604 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
8605 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8606 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8607 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
8608 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8609 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8611 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8612 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8613 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8614 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8616 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
8617 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
8618 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8619 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8620 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
8621 for ev in chan_closed_events {
8622 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
8624 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8625 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8626 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8627 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8629 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
8630 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8631 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8632 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8634 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
8635 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
8637 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
8638 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8639 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
8640 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
8641 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8643 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8644 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8645 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8647 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
8648 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8649 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
8651 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
8652 // "protected" and can connect again.
8653 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
8654 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8655 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8656 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8658 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
8660 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8661 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8665 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
8666 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
8667 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8668 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8669 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8670 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8672 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8674 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8675 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8677 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8678 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8679 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8680 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8683 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
8685 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8686 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8687 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8689 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
8690 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8691 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8693 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
8694 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8695 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8696 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8700 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
8701 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
8702 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
8703 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8704 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8705 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
8706 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8707 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
8708 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8710 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8712 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8713 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8715 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
8716 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8717 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8718 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8719 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8720 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8722 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8723 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8725 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8726 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8728 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8730 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
8731 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8734 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
8735 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8736 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8737 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8738 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8739 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8740 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8742 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8743 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
8744 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
8745 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
8749 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8751 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8752 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8754 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
8755 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8756 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8758 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8759 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8761 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8763 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8768 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8769 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8770 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8771 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8772 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8773 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8774 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8775 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8776 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8777 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8778 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8780 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8781 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8782 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8784 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8785 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8787 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8788 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8790 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8793 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8794 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8796 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8797 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8799 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8803 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8805 use crate::chain::Listen;
8806 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8807 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8808 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8809 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8810 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8811 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8812 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8813 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8814 use crate::util::test_utils;
8815 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8817 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8818 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8819 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8821 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8825 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8826 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8827 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8828 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8829 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8830 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8831 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8832 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8837 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8838 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8841 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8842 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8843 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8845 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8847 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8848 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8849 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8850 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8851 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8853 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8854 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8856 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8857 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8858 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8859 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8861 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8863 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8865 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8866 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8867 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8868 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8869 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8871 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8873 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8875 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8876 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8877 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8878 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8879 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8882 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8883 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8884 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8886 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8887 } else { panic!(); }
8889 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8890 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8892 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8895 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8898 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8899 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8901 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8902 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8903 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8904 match msg_events[0] {
8905 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8906 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8907 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8911 match msg_events[1] {
8912 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8916 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8917 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8919 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8920 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8922 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8925 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8926 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8928 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8929 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8931 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8934 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a);
8936 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8937 macro_rules! send_payment {
8938 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8939 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8940 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
8941 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
8942 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8943 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8944 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8945 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8946 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8947 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8949 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8950 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8952 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8953 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
8955 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8956 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8957 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8958 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8959 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
8960 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8961 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8962 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8964 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8965 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8966 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8967 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8969 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8970 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8971 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8972 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8973 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8975 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8978 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
8979 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8980 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8981 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8983 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8988 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8989 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);