1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
26 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
40 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
45 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
46 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
49 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
51 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
52 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
53 use util::config::UserConfig;
54 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
55 use util::{byte_utils, events};
56 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
57 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
58 use util::logger::Logger;
59 use util::errors::APIError;
62 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
63 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
64 use std::sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
65 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
66 use std::time::Duration;
67 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
68 use std::time::Instant;
69 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
71 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
73 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
75 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
76 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
77 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
79 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
80 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
81 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
82 // before we forward it.
84 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
85 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
86 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
87 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
88 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
90 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
91 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
93 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
94 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
97 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
98 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
103 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
104 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
105 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
106 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
107 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
108 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
111 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
112 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
113 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
114 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
117 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
120 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
121 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
124 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
126 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
128 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
129 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
130 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
132 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
134 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
138 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
142 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
143 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
144 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
145 short_channel_id: u64,
147 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
149 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
150 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
154 struct ClaimableHTLC {
155 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
157 /// Filled in when the HTLC was received with a payment_secret packet, which contains a
158 /// total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
159 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
160 /// are part of the same payment.
161 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
165 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
166 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
167 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
168 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
171 session_priv: SecretKey,
172 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
173 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
174 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
179 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
180 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
182 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
183 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
188 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
189 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
191 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
199 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
200 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
201 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
202 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
203 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
204 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
205 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
206 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
207 /// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together
208 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
209 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
210 pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]);
212 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
214 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
215 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
216 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
217 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
218 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
220 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
221 err: msgs::LightningError,
222 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
224 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
226 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
228 err: LightningError {
230 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
231 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
237 shutdown_finish: None,
241 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
243 err: LightningError {
245 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
247 shutdown_finish: None,
251 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
252 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
255 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
257 err: LightningError {
259 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
260 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
266 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
270 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
273 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
275 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
277 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
279 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
280 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
286 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
288 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
289 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
296 shutdown_finish: None,
301 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
302 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
303 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
304 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
305 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
307 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
308 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
309 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
310 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
311 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
312 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
313 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
315 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
319 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
320 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
321 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
322 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
323 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
324 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
325 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
326 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
327 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
328 /// (payment_hash, payment_secret) -> Vec<HTLCs> for tracking HTLCs that
329 /// were to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
330 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
331 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
333 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option<PaymentSecret>), Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
334 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
335 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
336 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
339 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
340 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_chan_freshness_every_min, so may be processed with
341 /// quite some time lag.
342 enum BackgroundEvent {
343 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
344 /// commitment transaction.
345 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
348 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
349 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
351 latest_features: InitFeatures,
354 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
355 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
357 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
358 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
359 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
360 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
361 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
362 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
363 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
364 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
366 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
367 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
368 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
369 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
370 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
371 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
372 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
373 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
374 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
376 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
377 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
379 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
380 /// to individual Channels.
382 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
383 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
384 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
385 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
387 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
388 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
389 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
390 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
391 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
392 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
393 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
395 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
396 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
397 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
398 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
401 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
402 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
403 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
404 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
405 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
407 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
408 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
409 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
410 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
411 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
412 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
413 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
414 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
415 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
416 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
419 default_configuration: UserConfig,
420 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
426 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
428 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
429 last_block_hash: RwLock<BlockHash>,
430 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
432 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
433 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
434 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
435 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
436 our_network_key: SecretKey,
437 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
439 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
440 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
441 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
443 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
444 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
445 /// are currently open with that peer.
446 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
447 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
449 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
451 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
452 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
453 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
454 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
455 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
456 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
457 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the PersistenceNotifier
458 /// the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
459 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
461 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
468 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
470 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
471 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
472 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
473 pub struct ChainParameters {
474 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
475 pub network: Network,
477 /// The hash of the latest block successfully connected.
478 pub latest_hash: BlockHash,
480 /// The height of the latest block successfully connected.
482 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
483 pub latest_height: usize,
486 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
487 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
488 /// `await_persistable_update` that new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
489 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
490 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
491 /// updates are ready for persistence).
492 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
493 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
494 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
495 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
498 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
499 fn new(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> Self {
500 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
503 persistence_notifier: notifier,
504 _read_guard: read_guard,
509 impl<'a> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
511 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
515 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
516 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
518 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
520 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
521 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
522 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
523 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
524 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
526 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
527 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly six hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
529 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
531 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
532 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
533 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
534 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
535 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
536 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 6;
537 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
539 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
540 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
541 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
542 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
543 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
544 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
547 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
549 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
550 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
553 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
555 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
557 pub struct ChannelDetails {
558 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
559 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
560 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
561 /// lifetime of the channel.
562 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
563 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
564 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
565 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
566 /// The node_id of our counterparty
567 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
568 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
569 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
570 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
571 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
572 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
573 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
574 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
576 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
577 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
578 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
579 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
580 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
581 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
582 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
583 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
584 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
585 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
586 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
587 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
588 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
591 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
592 /// payments to us through this channel.
593 pub counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
596 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
597 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
599 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
600 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
601 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
602 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
603 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
604 ParameterError(APIError),
605 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
606 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
607 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
610 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
612 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
613 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
614 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
615 /// paths than the ones selected).
616 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
617 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
618 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
619 /// in over-/re-payment.
621 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
622 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
623 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
625 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
626 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
627 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
628 /// with the latest update_id.
629 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
632 macro_rules! handle_error {
633 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
636 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
637 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
639 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
640 // entering the macro.
641 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
644 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
646 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
647 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
648 if let Some(update) = update_option {
649 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
655 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
656 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
658 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
659 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
660 action: err.action.clone()
664 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
665 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
668 // Return error in case higher-API need one
675 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
676 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
679 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
680 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
682 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
683 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
684 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
685 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
686 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
688 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
690 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
695 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
696 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
699 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
700 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
702 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
703 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
704 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
705 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
706 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
708 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
710 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg)) => {
711 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
712 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
713 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
714 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
716 let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
717 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
723 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
724 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
725 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
727 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
729 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
730 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
731 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
732 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
733 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
735 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
736 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
737 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
738 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
739 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
740 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
741 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
742 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
743 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
744 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
747 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
748 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
749 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
750 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
752 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
753 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
755 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
756 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
758 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
759 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
760 if !$resend_commitment {
761 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
764 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
766 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
767 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$entry.key()))
773 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
774 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
775 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
777 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
778 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
782 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
783 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
784 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
785 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
786 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
789 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
794 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
795 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
796 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
797 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
798 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
801 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
803 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
804 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
806 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
808 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
810 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
811 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
812 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
813 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
814 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
815 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
818 default_configuration: config.clone(),
819 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
820 fee_estimator: fee_est,
824 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(params.latest_height),
825 last_block_hash: RwLock::new(params.latest_hash),
827 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
828 by_id: HashMap::new(),
829 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
830 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
831 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
832 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
834 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
835 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
838 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
840 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
842 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
843 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
844 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
845 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
853 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
855 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
856 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
857 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
858 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
860 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
861 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
863 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
864 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
865 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
866 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
867 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
870 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
871 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
872 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
874 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
875 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
876 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
878 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
879 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
880 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
881 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
882 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
884 panic!("RNG is bad???");
887 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
889 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
890 node_id: their_network_key,
896 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
897 let mut res = Vec::new();
899 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
900 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
901 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
902 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
903 res.push(ChannelDetails {
904 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
905 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
906 remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
907 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
908 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
909 inbound_capacity_msat,
910 outbound_capacity_msat,
911 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
912 is_live: channel.is_live(),
913 counterparty_forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
917 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
918 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
919 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
920 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
926 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
927 /// more information.
928 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
929 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
932 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
933 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
935 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
936 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
937 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
938 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
939 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
940 // really wanted anyway.
941 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
944 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
945 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
946 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
948 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
949 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
950 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
952 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
953 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
954 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
955 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
956 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
957 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
958 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
959 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
962 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
963 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
964 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
966 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
967 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
969 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
972 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
973 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
975 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
976 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
981 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
982 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
983 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
992 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
993 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
994 log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
995 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
996 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
998 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
999 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1000 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1001 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1002 // ignore the result here.
1003 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1007 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1009 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1010 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1011 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1012 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1013 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1014 // Error or Ok here doesn't matter - the result is only exposed publicly
1015 // when peer_node_id is None anyway.
1019 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1020 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1022 chan.remove_entry().1
1024 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1027 log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1028 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1029 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1030 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1031 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1039 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1040 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1041 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1042 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1043 self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None)
1046 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1047 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1048 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1049 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1050 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1054 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1055 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1056 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1058 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1059 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1060 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1061 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1062 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1063 failure_code: $err_code,
1064 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1069 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1070 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1073 let shared_secret = {
1074 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1075 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1078 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1080 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1081 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1082 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1083 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1084 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1085 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1086 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1087 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1090 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1091 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1092 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1093 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1094 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1097 let mut channel_state = None;
1098 macro_rules! return_err {
1099 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1101 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1102 if channel_state.is_none() {
1103 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1105 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1106 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1107 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1108 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1109 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1114 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1115 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1116 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1117 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1119 let error_code = match err {
1120 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1121 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1122 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1123 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1124 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1126 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1129 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1130 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1131 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1138 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1141 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1142 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1143 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1144 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1145 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1146 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1147 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1148 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1149 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1150 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1151 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1152 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1156 // final_expiry_too_soon
1157 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1158 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1159 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1160 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1161 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1162 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1164 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1165 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1166 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1168 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1169 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1170 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1173 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1174 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1175 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1176 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1179 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1180 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1181 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1182 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1184 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1185 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1187 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1189 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1190 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1191 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1192 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1195 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1196 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1197 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1199 // Check two things:
1200 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1201 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1202 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1204 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1206 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1207 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1208 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1210 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1212 let blinding_factor = {
1213 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1214 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1215 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1216 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1219 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1221 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1223 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1226 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1227 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1230 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1231 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1232 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1233 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1234 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1238 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1239 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1240 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1243 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1244 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1245 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1246 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1250 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1251 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1252 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1253 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1254 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1255 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1256 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1257 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1258 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1259 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1261 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1263 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1264 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1266 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1267 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1268 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1269 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1270 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1271 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1272 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1274 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1275 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1277 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1278 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1279 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1281 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1282 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1284 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1285 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1286 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1287 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1288 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1290 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1291 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1293 // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1294 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
1295 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1296 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1302 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1303 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1304 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1305 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1307 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1308 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1310 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1311 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1312 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1314 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1316 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1321 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1324 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1325 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1326 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1327 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1328 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1332 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1334 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1335 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1337 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1338 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1339 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1340 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1341 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1342 fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1343 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1344 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1347 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1348 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1350 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1356 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1357 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1358 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1359 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1360 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1362 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1363 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1364 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1365 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1366 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1368 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1370 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1372 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1373 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1374 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1375 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1376 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1379 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1380 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1382 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1383 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1385 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1386 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1388 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1390 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1391 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1392 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1394 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1395 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1396 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1397 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1398 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1399 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1400 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1401 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1402 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1405 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1406 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1407 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1408 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1409 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1410 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1411 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1419 } else { unreachable!(); }
1423 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1424 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1426 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1431 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1433 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1434 /// fields for more info.
1436 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1437 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1438 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1439 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1440 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1441 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1443 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1445 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1446 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1447 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1449 /// In general, a path may raise:
1450 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1451 /// node public key) is specified.
1452 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1453 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1455 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1456 /// relevant updates.
1458 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1459 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1460 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1462 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1463 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1464 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1465 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1467 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1468 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1469 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1470 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1471 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1472 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1474 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1475 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1476 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1477 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1478 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1480 let mut total_value = 0;
1481 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1482 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1483 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1484 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1485 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1486 continue 'path_check;
1488 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1489 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1490 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1491 continue 'path_check;
1494 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1495 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1497 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1498 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1501 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1502 let mut results = Vec::new();
1503 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1504 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1506 let mut has_ok = false;
1507 let mut has_err = false;
1508 for res in results.iter() {
1509 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1510 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1511 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1512 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1519 if has_err && has_ok {
1520 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1522 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1528 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1530 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1531 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1533 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1535 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1536 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1537 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1538 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1541 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1543 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo, &self.logger)
1544 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1545 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1546 } else { unreachable!(); })
1551 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1552 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1555 Err(_) => { return; }
1559 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1560 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1561 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1564 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1565 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1566 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1568 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1574 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1575 if !chan.should_announce() {
1576 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1580 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1582 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1584 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1585 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1587 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1588 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1589 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1590 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1591 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1596 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1597 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1598 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1600 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1603 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1604 // smaller than 500:
1605 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1607 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1608 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
1609 /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
1611 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
1612 /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1614 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1615 /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
1616 /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
1617 /// only Tor Onion addresses.
1619 /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
1620 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
1621 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1623 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1624 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1627 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1628 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1629 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1630 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1631 rgb, alias, addresses,
1632 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1633 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1635 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1637 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1638 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1639 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1640 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1641 contents: announcement
1646 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1648 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1649 /// Will likely generate further events.
1650 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1651 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1653 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1654 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1655 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1657 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1658 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1660 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1661 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1662 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1663 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1665 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1666 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1667 match forward_info {
1668 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
1669 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1670 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1671 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1672 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1673 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1674 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1676 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
1677 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
1680 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1681 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1682 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1683 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1684 // problem, not ours.
1691 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1692 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1693 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1694 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1695 match forward_info {
1696 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1697 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1699 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
1700 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1701 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1702 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1703 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1704 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1705 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1706 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1708 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1710 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1711 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1713 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1715 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1716 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
1717 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
1723 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1725 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1726 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1727 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1728 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1729 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1730 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1731 // this channel currently :/.
1737 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1738 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1740 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1741 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1742 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1744 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1745 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1747 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1749 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1750 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1751 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1754 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1756 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1757 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1758 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1759 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1760 // messages when we can.
1761 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1762 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1763 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1770 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1771 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
1774 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1775 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1776 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1777 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1778 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1779 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1781 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1782 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1783 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1784 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1785 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1787 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1789 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1791 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
1795 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1796 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1799 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1800 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1801 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1802 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1803 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1804 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1805 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1807 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1815 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1816 match forward_info {
1817 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1818 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
1819 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
1820 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1821 let prev_hop = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1822 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1823 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1824 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1825 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1828 let mut total_value = 0;
1829 let payment_secret_opt =
1830 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data { Some(data.payment_secret.clone()) } else { None };
1831 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry((payment_hash, payment_secret_opt))
1832 .or_insert(Vec::new());
1833 htlcs.push(ClaimableHTLC {
1835 value: amt_to_forward,
1836 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
1837 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
1839 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1840 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1841 total_value += htlc.value;
1842 if htlc.payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat != data.total_msat {
1843 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
1845 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
1847 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > data.total_msat {
1848 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1849 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1850 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
1851 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1852 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire)
1856 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1857 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
1858 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1859 htlc_id: htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
1860 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
1862 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
1865 } else if total_value == data.total_msat {
1866 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1868 payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret),
1873 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1875 payment_secret: None,
1876 amt: amt_to_forward,
1880 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1881 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
1883 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1884 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1892 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1893 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
1896 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1897 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
1900 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1901 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1902 events.append(&mut new_events);
1905 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_chan_freshness_every_min.
1907 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
1908 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_chan_freshness_every_min.
1910 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
1911 fn process_background_events(&self) {
1912 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
1913 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
1914 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
1916 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
1917 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
1918 // monitor updating completing.
1919 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
1925 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1926 pub(crate) fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
1927 self.process_background_events();
1930 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1931 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1932 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1934 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1936 /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
1937 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1938 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1939 self.process_background_events();
1941 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1942 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1943 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1944 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1945 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1946 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1951 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1953 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1954 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1959 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1960 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1961 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1962 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1963 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1964 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> bool {
1965 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1967 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1968 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret));
1969 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1970 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1971 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1972 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1973 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1974 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
1976 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1977 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
1978 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
1984 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
1985 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
1986 // be surfaced to the user.
1987 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
1988 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
1990 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
1991 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
1992 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
1993 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
1994 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(&chan_entry.get()) {
1995 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
1997 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2000 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2002 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2003 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2004 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2006 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2007 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2008 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2010 rejected_by_dest: false,
2022 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2023 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2024 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2025 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2026 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2027 /// still-available channels.
2028 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2029 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2030 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2031 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2034 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2035 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2036 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2038 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
2039 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2040 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2041 match &onion_error {
2042 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2044 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2046 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2047 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2048 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2049 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2050 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2051 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2052 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2057 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2058 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2059 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2060 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2062 error_code: onion_error_code,
2064 error_data: onion_error_data
2068 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2074 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2075 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2076 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2077 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2079 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2080 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2081 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2082 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2083 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2084 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2086 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2088 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2094 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2095 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2096 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2097 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2098 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2099 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2101 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2102 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2103 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2107 let mut forward_event = None;
2108 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2109 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2111 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2112 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2113 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2115 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2116 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2119 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2120 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2121 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2122 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2123 time_forwardable: time
2130 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2131 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2132 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2134 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
2135 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
2136 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
2137 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
2138 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
2139 /// motivated attackers.
2141 /// Note that the privacy concerns in (b) are not relevant in payments with a payment_secret
2142 /// set. Thus, for such payments we will claim any payments which do not under-pay.
2144 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2145 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
2146 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2148 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2150 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2151 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret));
2152 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2153 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2155 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2156 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2157 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2158 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2160 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2161 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2162 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2163 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2164 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2167 let (is_mpp, mut valid_mpp) = if let &Some(ref data) = &sources[0].payment_data {
2168 assert!(payment_secret.is_some());
2169 (true, data.total_msat >= expected_amount)
2171 assert!(payment_secret.is_none());
2175 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2176 if !is_mpp || !valid_mpp { break; }
2177 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2182 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2183 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2184 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2185 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2186 if (is_mpp && !valid_mpp) || (!is_mpp && (htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2)) {
2187 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2188 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2189 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
2191 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2192 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2193 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2195 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2197 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2198 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2199 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2200 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2201 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2202 } else { errs.push(e); }
2204 Err(None) if is_mpp => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2206 log_warn!(self.logger, "Channel we expected to claim an HTLC from was closed.");
2208 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2213 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2214 // which were generated.
2215 channel_state.take();
2217 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2218 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2219 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2226 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2227 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2228 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2229 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2230 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2236 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2237 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2238 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2239 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2240 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2241 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2242 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2243 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2245 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2249 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2250 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2251 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2252 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2253 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2254 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2255 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2256 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2265 // TODO: Do something with e?
2266 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2267 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2268 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2269 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2270 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2271 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2272 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2276 } else { unreachable!(); }
2279 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2281 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2282 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2283 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2284 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2288 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2289 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2290 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2293 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2294 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2295 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2296 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2299 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2300 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2301 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2302 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2303 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2304 payment_preimage, e);
2308 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2310 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2311 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2312 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2318 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2319 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2320 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
2323 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2324 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2327 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2328 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2330 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2331 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2332 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2333 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2335 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2336 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2337 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2338 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2339 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2340 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2341 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2342 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2343 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2344 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2346 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
2347 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
2348 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
2349 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
2352 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2353 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2354 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2355 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2356 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2360 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2364 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2365 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2366 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), funding_txo.clone(), pending_forwards));
2368 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
2370 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
2371 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
2372 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2373 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2378 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
2379 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
2380 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2381 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2382 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2387 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2391 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2396 if needs_broadcast_safe {
2397 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2398 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
2399 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2402 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2403 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2404 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2407 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2408 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2409 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2410 msg: announcement_sigs,
2413 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2417 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
2419 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
2420 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2422 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
2424 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
2425 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
2429 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2430 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2431 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2434 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2435 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2436 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2437 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2438 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2439 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2440 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2441 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2442 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2443 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2445 entry.insert(channel);
2451 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2452 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2453 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2454 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2455 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2456 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2457 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2458 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2460 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2461 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2463 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2466 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2467 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2468 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2469 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2471 user_channel_id: user_id,
2476 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2477 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
2478 let last_block_hash = *self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap();
2479 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2480 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2481 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2482 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2483 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2484 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2486 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, last_block_hash, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2488 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2491 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2492 // lock before watch_channel
2493 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
2495 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2496 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2497 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2498 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2499 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2500 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
2501 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
2502 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
2503 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
2504 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
2505 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
2507 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2508 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2509 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2510 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2511 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2512 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2516 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2517 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2518 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2519 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2520 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
2522 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2523 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2524 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2533 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2534 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
2535 let last_block_hash = *self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap();
2536 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2537 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2538 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2539 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2540 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2541 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2543 let monitor = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, last_block_hash, &self.logger) {
2544 Ok(update) => update,
2545 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2547 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2548 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2550 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2552 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2555 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2556 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2558 user_channel_id: user_id,
2563 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2564 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2565 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2566 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2567 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2568 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2569 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2571 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2572 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2573 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2574 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2575 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2576 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2577 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2578 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2579 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2580 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2581 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2582 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2583 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2584 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2585 msg: announcement_sigs,
2590 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2594 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2595 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2596 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2597 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2599 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2600 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2601 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2602 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2604 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2605 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2606 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2607 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2611 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2612 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2613 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2617 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2618 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2619 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2621 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2622 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2624 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2627 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2628 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2630 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2631 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2632 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2633 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2641 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2642 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2643 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2644 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2645 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2646 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2647 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2648 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2650 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2651 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2652 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2653 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2658 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2659 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2660 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2661 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2662 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2663 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2664 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2666 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2667 } else { (tx, None) }
2669 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2672 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2673 log_trace!(self.logger, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2674 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2676 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2677 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2678 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2679 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2687 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2688 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2689 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2690 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2692 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2693 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2694 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2695 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2697 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2698 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2700 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2701 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2702 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2703 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2706 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
2707 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
2708 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
2709 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
2710 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2711 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2712 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2713 match pending_forward_info {
2714 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2715 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) {
2716 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
2717 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2718 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2719 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2720 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
2724 // The only case where we'd be unable to
2725 // successfully get a channel update is if the
2726 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
2727 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
2728 // payments over the channel back to themselves
2729 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
2730 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
2731 // no problem just calling this
2732 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
2733 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2735 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2736 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2737 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2740 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
2742 _ => pending_forward_info
2745 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2747 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2752 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2753 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2755 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2756 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2757 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2758 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2759 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2761 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2763 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2766 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2770 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2771 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2772 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2773 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2774 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2775 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2776 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2778 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2780 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2785 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2786 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2787 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2788 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2789 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2790 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2791 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2793 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2794 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
2795 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2797 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2800 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2804 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2805 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2806 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2807 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2808 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2809 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2810 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2812 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2813 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
2814 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2815 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
2816 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2817 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
2818 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2823 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2824 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2825 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2827 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2828 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2829 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2831 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2832 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2833 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2834 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2835 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2836 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2837 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2838 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2840 commitment_signed: msg,
2844 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2845 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2846 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2852 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2857 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2858 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2859 let mut forward_event = None;
2860 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2861 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2862 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2863 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2865 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2866 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
2867 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
2868 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
2870 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2871 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
2872 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2874 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2875 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
2876 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2881 match forward_event {
2883 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2884 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2885 time_forwardable: time
2893 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2894 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2896 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2897 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2898 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2899 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2900 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2901 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2903 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2904 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
2905 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2906 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
2907 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2908 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2909 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2910 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
2912 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
2914 } else { unreachable!(); }
2917 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2918 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2919 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2923 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2924 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2925 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2929 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
2931 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2934 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
2936 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
2937 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2938 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2940 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
2947 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2948 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2949 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2950 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2951 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2952 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2953 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2955 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2957 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2962 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2963 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2964 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2966 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2967 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2968 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2969 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2971 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2972 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2975 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2976 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2977 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2979 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2980 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2982 let their_node_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 };
2983 let their_bitcoin_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 };
2984 match (self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, their_node_key),
2985 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, their_bitcoin_key)) {
2987 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature: {:?}. Maybe using different node_secret for transport and routing msg? UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}", e, &announcement, their_node_key));
2988 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2991 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature: {:?}. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})", e, &announcement, their_bitcoin_key));
2992 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2998 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
3000 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3001 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
3002 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
3003 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
3004 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
3005 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
3006 contents: announcement,
3008 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
3011 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3016 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3017 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3018 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3019 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3020 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3022 // It's not a local channel
3026 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3027 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3028 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3029 // TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
3030 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3032 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3034 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3039 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3040 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3041 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3043 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3044 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3045 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3046 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3048 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3049 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3050 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3051 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3052 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
3053 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3054 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
3055 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3056 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
3057 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
3058 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
3059 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
3060 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3062 if commitment_update.is_none() {
3063 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
3065 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
3066 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
3069 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
3070 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3071 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3075 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
3076 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
3077 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3078 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3083 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
3084 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3085 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3086 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3092 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
3096 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
3101 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3102 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3103 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3109 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3113 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
3114 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
3115 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
3116 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
3117 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
3119 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3120 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3121 let counterparty_node_id;
3122 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3123 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3124 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3126 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3127 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
3128 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3129 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
3130 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
3132 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3133 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
3135 if !chan.get().is_live() {
3136 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3138 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3139 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
3140 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
3142 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3145 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3146 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3147 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3148 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3149 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3150 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3151 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3152 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3162 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3163 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3164 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3168 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`.
3169 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) {
3170 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3172 for monitor_event in self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events() {
3173 match monitor_event {
3174 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3175 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3176 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3177 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
3179 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3180 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3183 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3184 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3185 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3186 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3187 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3188 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3189 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3190 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3191 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3193 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3194 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3195 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3205 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3206 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3210 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
3211 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
3213 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
3214 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3215 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
3216 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
3217 // reorganized out of the main chain.
3218 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
3219 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
3220 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
3221 // timer_chan_freshness_every_min, guaranteeing we're running normally.
3222 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
3223 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
3224 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
3225 assert!(should_broadcast);
3226 } else { unreachable!(); }
3227 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
3229 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3234 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3235 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3236 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3237 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3238 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3241 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3242 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3243 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3244 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3246 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3247 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3248 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3253 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3254 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3255 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3256 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3257 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3260 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
3261 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3262 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3263 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3265 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3266 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3267 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
3272 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3274 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3275 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3276 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3277 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3280 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
3281 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
3282 ChannelManager::block_connected(self, &block.header, &txdata, height);
3285 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _height: u32) {
3286 ChannelManager::block_disconnected(self, header);
3290 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3291 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3292 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3293 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3294 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3297 /// Updates channel state based on transactions seen in a connected block.
3298 pub fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3299 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3300 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3301 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3302 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3303 log_trace!(self.logger, "Block {} at height {} connected", block_hash, height);
3305 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3307 assert_eq!(*self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap(), header.prev_blockhash,
3308 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
3309 assert_eq!(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, height as u64 - 1,
3310 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
3311 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
3312 *self.last_block_hash.write().unwrap() = block_hash;
3314 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3315 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3317 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3318 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3319 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3320 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3321 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
3322 let res = channel.block_connected(header, txdata, height);
3323 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
3324 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
3325 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3326 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3327 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
3331 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
3332 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3333 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3334 msg: funding_locked,
3336 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
3337 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3338 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3339 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3340 msg: announcement_sigs,
3343 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3345 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
3347 } else if let Err(e) = res {
3348 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3349 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3350 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
3354 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
3355 for &(_, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3356 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
3357 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
3358 log_trace!(self.logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3359 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3360 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3362 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. Close the channel.
3363 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
3364 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3365 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3377 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|&(ref payment_hash, _), htlcs| {
3378 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3379 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
3380 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
3381 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
3382 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
3383 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3384 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3385 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
3386 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3387 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
3388 data: htlc_msat_height_data
3393 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
3397 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
3399 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
3400 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
3404 // Update last_node_announcement_serial to be the max of its current value and the
3405 // block timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3406 // having an explicit local time source.
3407 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully update
3408 // last_node_announcement_serial or decide we don't need to.
3409 let old_serial = self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3410 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3411 if self.last_node_announcement_serial.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3417 /// Updates channel state based on a disconnected block.
3419 /// If necessary, the channel may be force-closed without letting the counterparty participate
3420 /// in the shutdown.
3421 pub fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
3422 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3423 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3424 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3425 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3427 assert_eq!(*self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap(), header.block_hash(),
3428 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
3429 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
3430 *self.last_block_hash.write().unwrap() = header.prev_blockhash;
3432 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3434 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3435 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3436 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3437 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3438 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
3439 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
3440 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
3441 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3443 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown(true));
3444 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
3445 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3456 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
3459 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
3460 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
3461 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3463 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
3464 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
3465 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
3466 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
3469 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
3470 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3472 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
3473 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
3476 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3477 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
3478 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
3479 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
3480 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3485 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send>
3486 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3487 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3488 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3489 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3490 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3493 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
3494 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3495 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3498 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
3499 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3500 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3503 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
3504 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3505 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3508 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
3509 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3510 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3513 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
3514 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3515 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3518 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
3519 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3520 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3523 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
3524 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3525 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3528 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
3529 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3530 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3533 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
3534 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3535 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3538 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
3539 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3540 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3543 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
3544 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3545 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3548 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
3549 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3550 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3553 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
3554 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3555 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3558 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
3559 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3560 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3563 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
3564 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3565 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3568 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3569 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3570 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3573 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
3574 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3575 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3578 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
3579 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3580 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3581 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
3582 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
3584 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3585 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3586 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3587 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3588 if no_connection_possible {
3589 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3590 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3591 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3592 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3593 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3595 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
3596 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3597 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3607 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3608 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3609 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3610 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are no
3611 // holding cell add-HTLCs, so if in the future we stop removing uncommitted HTLCs
3612 // on peer disconnect here, there will need to be corresponding changes in
3613 // reestablish logic.
3614 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
3615 chan.to_disabled_marked();
3616 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3617 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3618 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3620 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3621 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3622 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3626 no_channels_remain = false;
3632 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3634 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3635 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3636 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3637 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3638 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3639 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3640 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3641 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3642 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3643 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3644 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3645 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3646 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3647 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3648 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3649 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3650 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
3651 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
3652 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
3656 if no_channels_remain {
3657 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
3660 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3661 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3663 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3664 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3665 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3670 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3671 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3673 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3676 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3677 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
3678 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3679 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3680 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3683 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3684 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3689 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3690 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3691 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3692 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3693 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3694 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3695 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3696 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3697 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3701 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3702 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3703 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
3709 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3712 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3713 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3715 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3716 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3717 if chan.remote_network_id == *counterparty_node_id {
3718 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
3719 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
3723 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
3724 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
3729 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
3730 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
3731 struct PersistenceNotifier {
3732 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
3733 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
3734 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
3737 impl PersistenceNotifier {
3740 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
3746 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
3747 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3748 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
3749 let result = *guard;
3757 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
3758 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
3759 let current_time = Instant::now();
3761 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
3762 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3763 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
3764 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
3765 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
3766 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
3767 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
3769 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
3770 let result = *guard;
3771 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
3775 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
3776 None => return result,
3782 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
3784 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
3785 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
3786 *persistence_lock = true;
3787 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
3792 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3793 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3795 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3796 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3797 match &self.routing {
3798 &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
3800 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3801 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3803 &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3805 payment_data.write(writer)?;
3806 incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3809 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3810 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3811 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3812 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3817 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3818 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3819 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3820 routing: match Readable::read(reader)? {
3821 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3822 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3823 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3825 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3826 payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3827 incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3829 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3831 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3832 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3833 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3834 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3839 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3840 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3842 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3844 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3846 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3848 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3855 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3856 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3857 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3858 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3859 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3860 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3865 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3866 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3868 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3870 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3872 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3874 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3881 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3882 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3883 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3884 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3885 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3886 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3891 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3895 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3898 impl_writeable!(ClaimableHTLC, 0, {
3905 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3906 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3908 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3910 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3912 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3914 path.write(writer)?;
3915 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3916 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3923 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
3924 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3925 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3926 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3927 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3928 path: Readable::read(reader)?,
3929 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3930 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3932 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3937 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3938 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3940 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3944 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3946 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3947 data.write(writer)?;
3954 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
3955 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3956 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3957 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3958 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3959 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3960 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3962 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3967 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3968 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3970 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_funding_outpoint, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3972 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3973 prev_funding_outpoint.write(writer)?;
3974 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3975 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3977 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3979 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3980 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3987 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3988 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3989 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3990 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3991 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3992 prev_funding_outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?,
3993 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3994 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3996 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3997 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3998 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4000 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4005 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4006 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4007 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4008 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4009 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4012 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4013 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
4015 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4016 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4018 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
4019 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4020 self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap().write(writer)?;
4022 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4023 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
4024 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4025 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4026 unfunded_channels += 1;
4029 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4030 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4031 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4032 channel.write(writer)?;
4036 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4037 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
4038 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4039 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4040 for forward in pending_forwards {
4041 forward.write(writer)?;
4045 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4046 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
4047 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4048 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4049 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
4050 htlc.write(writer)?;
4054 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4055 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4056 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4057 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4058 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4059 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
4062 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4063 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4064 for event in events.iter() {
4065 event.write(writer)?;
4068 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
4069 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4070 for event in background_events.iter() {
4072 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
4074 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4075 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
4080 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4086 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
4088 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
4090 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
4091 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
4092 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
4093 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
4094 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
4095 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
4096 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
4097 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
4098 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
4099 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
4100 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
4102 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
4103 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
4105 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
4106 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
4107 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
4108 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
4109 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
4110 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
4111 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4112 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4113 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4114 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4115 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4118 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
4119 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
4121 pub keys_manager: K,
4123 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4125 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
4126 pub fee_estimator: F,
4127 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4129 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
4130 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
4131 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
4132 pub chain_monitor: M,
4134 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
4135 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
4136 /// force-closed during deserialization.
4137 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
4138 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
4139 /// deserialization.
4141 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
4142 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
4143 pub default_config: UserConfig,
4145 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
4146 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
4148 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
4149 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
4150 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
4151 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
4153 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
4156 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
4157 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4160 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4161 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4162 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4163 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4164 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4165 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4168 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
4169 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
4170 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
4171 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
4172 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
4174 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
4175 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
4180 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
4181 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
4182 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4183 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
4184 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4185 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4186 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4187 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4190 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4191 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
4192 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
4196 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4197 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
4198 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4199 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4200 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4201 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4204 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4205 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4206 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4207 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4208 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4211 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4212 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4213 let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4215 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4217 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4218 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4219 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4220 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4221 for _ in 0..channel_count {
4222 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
4223 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
4224 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
4225 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
4226 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4227 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4228 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4229 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4230 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
4231 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4232 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4233 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4234 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4235 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4236 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
4237 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
4238 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
4239 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4241 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4242 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
4244 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
4247 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4251 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
4252 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
4253 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4257 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
4258 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4259 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4260 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
4261 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4262 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4263 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
4264 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
4265 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4267 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
4270 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4271 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4272 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
4273 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4274 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4275 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
4276 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
4277 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4279 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
4282 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4283 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
4284 for _ in 0..peer_count {
4285 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4286 let peer_state = PeerState {
4287 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
4289 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
4292 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4293 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
4294 for _ in 0..event_count {
4295 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4296 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
4301 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4302 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
4303 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
4304 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4305 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
4306 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4310 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4312 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4313 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4315 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
4317 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
4318 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
4319 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
4321 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
4322 last_block_hash: RwLock::new(last_block_hash),
4324 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
4329 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
4331 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
4332 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
4335 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
4337 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
4339 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
4340 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
4341 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
4342 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
4344 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
4345 logger: args.logger,
4346 default_configuration: args.default_config,
4349 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4350 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4353 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
4354 //connection or two.
4356 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
4362 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
4364 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
4366 use std::time::Duration;
4369 fn test_wait_timeout() {
4370 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
4371 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
4373 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
4374 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
4375 thread::spawn(move || {
4377 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
4378 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4379 *persistence_lock = true;
4382 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
4388 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
4389 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
4391 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
4394 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4399 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
4401 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
4404 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4411 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
4414 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
4415 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
4416 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
4417 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4418 use ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
4419 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
4420 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
4421 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
4422 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
4423 use routing::router::get_route;
4424 use util::test_utils;
4425 use util::config::UserConfig;
4426 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
4428 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4429 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4430 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
4432 use std::sync::Mutex;
4436 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
4437 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
4438 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
4439 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
4440 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
4441 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
4442 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
4447 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
4448 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
4451 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
4452 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
4453 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
4455 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
4456 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
4458 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())};
4459 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
4461 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
4462 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
4464 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
4465 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
4466 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
4467 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
4468 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
4470 latest_hash: genesis_hash,
4473 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
4475 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
4476 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
4477 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
4478 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
4479 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
4481 latest_hash: genesis_hash,
4484 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
4486 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
4487 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4488 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4491 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
4492 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
4493 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
4495 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
4496 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_outpoint);
4497 } else { panic!(); }
4499 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4500 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4502 get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingBroadcastSafe);
4505 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4508 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
4509 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
4511 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4512 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4514 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
4516 macro_rules! send_payment {
4517 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
4518 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
4519 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), None, Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
4521 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
4522 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
4524 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap();
4525 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
4526 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4527 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
4528 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
4529 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
4530 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
4531 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4533 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
4534 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
4535 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage, &None, 10_000));
4537 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
4538 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
4539 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
4540 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4541 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
4543 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
4546 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
4547 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
4548 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
4549 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4551 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
4556 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
4557 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);