1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
114 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
117 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
118 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
119 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
120 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
121 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
122 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
129 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
130 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
131 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
133 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
134 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
135 /// may overshoot this in either case)
136 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
137 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
138 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
139 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
140 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
145 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
146 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
149 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
150 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
151 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
152 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
153 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
156 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
157 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
159 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
160 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
161 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
164 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
165 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
167 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
168 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
171 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
172 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
175 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
179 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
180 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
181 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
182 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
183 short_channel_id: u64,
184 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
186 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
187 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
189 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
190 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
195 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
197 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
198 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
199 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
201 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
202 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
205 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
206 struct ClaimableHTLC {
207 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
209 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
211 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
212 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
213 sender_intended_value: u64,
214 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
216 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
217 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
218 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
219 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
221 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
222 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
225 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
226 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
227 events::ClaimedHTLC {
228 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
229 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
230 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
231 value_msat: val.value,
236 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
237 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
239 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
240 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
241 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
244 /// Number of bytes in the id.
245 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
248 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
249 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
254 impl Readable for PaymentId {
255 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
256 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
261 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
262 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
263 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
267 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
269 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
270 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
271 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
273 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
274 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
279 impl Readable for InterceptId {
280 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
281 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
286 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
287 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
288 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
289 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
290 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
293 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
295 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
296 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
297 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
299 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
300 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
304 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
305 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
306 (0, short_channel_id, required),
307 (2, htlc_id, required),
309 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
310 (0, session_priv, required),
315 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
316 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
317 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
318 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
319 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
322 session_priv: SecretKey,
323 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
324 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
325 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
326 payment_id: PaymentId,
329 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
330 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
331 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
333 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
335 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
337 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
340 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
341 payment_id.hash(hasher);
342 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
348 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
350 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
351 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
352 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
353 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
354 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
355 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
359 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
360 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
361 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
362 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
363 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
364 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
366 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
372 struct InboundOnionErr {
378 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
379 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
381 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
382 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
383 pub enum FailureCode {
384 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
385 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
386 TemporaryNodeFailure,
387 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
388 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
389 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
390 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
391 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
392 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
393 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
394 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
395 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
396 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
398 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
399 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
400 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
403 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
404 fn into(self) -> u16 {
406 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
407 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
408 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
409 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
414 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
415 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
416 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
417 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
418 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
420 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
421 err: msgs::LightningError,
422 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
423 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
424 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
426 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
428 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
430 err: LightningError {
432 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
433 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
440 shutdown_finish: None,
441 channel_capacity: None,
445 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
446 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
449 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
451 err: LightningError {
453 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
454 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
460 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
461 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
462 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
466 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
469 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
471 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
472 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
476 log_level: Level::Warn,
479 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
481 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
483 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
485 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
486 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
494 shutdown_finish: None,
495 channel_capacity: None,
499 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
500 self.chan_id.is_some()
504 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
505 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
506 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
507 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
508 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
510 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
511 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
512 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
513 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
514 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
515 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
516 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
518 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
522 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
523 struct ClaimingPayment {
525 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
526 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
527 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
528 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
530 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
531 (0, amount_msat, required),
532 (2, payment_purpose, required),
533 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
534 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
535 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
538 struct ClaimablePayment {
539 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
540 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
541 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
544 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
545 struct ClaimablePayments {
546 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
547 /// failed/claimed by the user.
549 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
550 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
552 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
553 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
554 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
556 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
557 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
558 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
559 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
562 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
563 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
564 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
565 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
567 enum BackgroundEvent {
568 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
569 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
570 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
571 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
573 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
574 /// are regenerated on startup.
575 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
576 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
577 /// channel to continue normal operation.
579 /// In general this should be used rather than
580 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
581 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
582 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
584 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
585 /// are regenerated on startup.
586 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
587 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
588 funding_txo: OutPoint,
589 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
591 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
592 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
594 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
595 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
596 channel_id: ChannelId,
601 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
602 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
603 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
604 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
605 /// event can be generated.
606 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
607 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
608 /// operation of another channel.
610 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
611 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
612 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
613 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
615 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
616 event: events::Event,
617 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
619 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
620 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
621 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
623 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
624 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
625 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
626 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
627 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
629 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
630 /// stored for later processing.
631 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
632 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
633 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
634 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
638 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
639 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
640 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
641 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
642 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
643 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
644 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
645 (4, blocking_action, required),
647 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
648 (0, event, upgradable_required),
649 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
650 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
651 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
652 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
653 // downgrades to prior versions.
654 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
658 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
659 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
660 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
661 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
662 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
665 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
666 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
667 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
668 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
672 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
673 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
674 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
675 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
676 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
677 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
679 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
680 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
681 channel_id: ChannelId,
682 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
687 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
688 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
689 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
690 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
691 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
696 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
697 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
701 /// State we hold per-peer.
702 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
703 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
705 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
706 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
707 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
709 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
710 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
711 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
712 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
713 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
714 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
715 latest_features: InitFeatures,
716 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
717 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
718 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
719 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
720 /// user but which have not yet completed.
722 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
723 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
724 /// for a missing channel.
725 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
726 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
727 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
729 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
730 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
731 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
732 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
734 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
735 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
736 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
737 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
738 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
739 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
740 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
741 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
742 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
743 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
744 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
745 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
746 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
747 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
748 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
752 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
753 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
754 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
755 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
756 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
757 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
760 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
761 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
762 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
765 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
766 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
767 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
770 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
771 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
772 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
773 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
777 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
778 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
779 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
780 /// The original OpenChannel message.
781 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
782 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
783 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
786 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
787 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
788 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
790 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
791 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
793 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
796 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
797 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
798 struct PendingInboundPayment {
799 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
800 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
801 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
802 /// this payment being removed.
804 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
805 user_payment_id: u64,
806 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
807 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
808 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
811 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
812 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
813 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
814 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
815 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
816 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
817 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
818 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
820 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
821 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
829 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
831 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
832 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
833 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
838 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
839 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
840 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
841 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
842 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
843 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
844 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
845 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
846 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
848 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
849 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
858 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
860 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
861 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
862 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
867 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
869 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
871 pub trait AChannelManager {
872 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
873 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
874 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
875 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
876 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
877 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
878 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
879 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
880 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
881 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
882 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
883 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
884 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
885 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
886 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
887 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
888 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
889 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
890 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
891 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
892 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
893 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
894 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
895 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
896 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
897 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
898 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
899 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
900 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
901 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
902 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
903 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
904 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
905 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
906 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
907 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
910 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
911 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
913 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
914 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
915 ES::Target: EntropySource,
916 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
917 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
918 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
922 type Watch = M::Target;
924 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
926 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
928 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
930 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
931 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
933 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
935 type Router = R::Target;
937 type Logger = L::Target;
939 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
942 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
943 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
945 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
946 /// to individual Channels.
948 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
949 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
950 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
951 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
953 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
954 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
955 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
956 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
957 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
958 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
959 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
960 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
961 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
963 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
964 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
965 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
967 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
968 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
969 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
970 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
971 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
973 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
974 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
975 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
976 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
978 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
979 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
980 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
982 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
983 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
984 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
985 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
986 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
988 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
989 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
990 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
991 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
992 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
993 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
994 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
995 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
998 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
999 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1000 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1001 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1002 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1006 // `total_consistency_lock`
1008 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1010 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1012 // |__`per_peer_state`
1014 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1016 // | |__`claimable_payments`
1018 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1020 // | |__`peer_state`
1022 // | |__`id_to_peer`
1024 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
1026 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1028 // | |__`best_block`
1030 // | |__`pending_events`
1032 // | |__`pending_background_events`
1034 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1036 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1037 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1038 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1039 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1040 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1041 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1045 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1046 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
1047 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1053 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1055 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1057 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1058 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1060 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1061 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1062 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1063 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1065 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1066 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1068 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1069 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1070 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1071 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1072 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1073 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1074 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1075 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1077 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1079 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1080 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1082 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1084 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1085 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1086 /// and via the classic SCID.
1088 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1089 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1091 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1093 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1095 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1096 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1097 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1099 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1100 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1102 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1103 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1105 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1106 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1108 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1109 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1110 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1111 /// active channel list on load.
1113 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1114 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1116 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1118 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1119 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1120 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1122 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1123 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1124 /// the handling of the events.
1126 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1127 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1130 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1131 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1132 /// would break backwards compatability.
1133 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1134 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1135 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1137 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1138 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1140 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1142 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1143 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1144 /// confirmation depth.
1146 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1147 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1148 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1150 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1152 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1154 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1156 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1158 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1160 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1161 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1162 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1164 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1165 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1167 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1168 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1169 /// keeping additional state.
1170 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1172 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1173 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1174 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1175 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1177 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1178 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1180 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1181 /// are currently open with that peer.
1183 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1184 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1187 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1189 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1190 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1191 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1192 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1193 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1195 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1196 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1197 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1198 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1199 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1201 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1202 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1204 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1205 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1206 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1207 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1208 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1210 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1211 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1213 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1214 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1215 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1216 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1217 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1219 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1221 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1223 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1224 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1225 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1226 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1227 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1228 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1229 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1230 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1231 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1232 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1233 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1235 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1236 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1237 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1239 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1241 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1242 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1246 signer_provider: SP,
1251 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1253 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1254 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1255 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1256 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1257 pub struct ChainParameters {
1258 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1259 pub network: Network,
1261 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1263 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1264 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1267 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1271 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1272 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1275 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1276 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1277 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1278 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1279 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1280 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1282 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1283 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1284 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1285 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1286 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1287 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1289 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1290 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1293 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1294 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1295 /// events to handle.
1297 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1298 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1300 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1301 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1304 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1305 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1306 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1307 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1309 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1310 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1311 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1312 should_persist: move || {
1313 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1314 // processing and return that.
1315 let notify = persist_check();
1316 match (notify, force_notify) {
1317 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1318 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1319 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1320 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1321 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1324 _read_guard: read_guard,
1328 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1329 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1330 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1331 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1332 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1333 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1335 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1336 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1337 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1338 should_persist: persist_check,
1339 _read_guard: read_guard,
1344 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1345 fn drop(&mut self) {
1346 match (self.should_persist)() {
1347 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1348 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1349 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1351 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1352 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1353 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1358 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1359 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1361 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1363 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1364 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1365 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1366 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1367 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1369 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1370 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1372 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1374 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1375 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1376 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1377 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1378 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1379 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1380 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1381 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1382 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1383 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1384 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1385 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1386 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1388 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1389 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1391 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1392 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1393 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1394 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1396 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1397 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1398 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1399 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1400 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1401 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1404 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1406 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1407 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1410 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1412 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1413 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1415 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1416 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1417 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1419 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1420 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1421 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1423 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1424 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1425 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1426 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1428 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1429 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1430 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1432 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1433 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1434 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1436 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1437 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1438 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1439 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1440 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1441 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1442 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1443 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1444 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1445 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1446 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1449 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1450 /// to better separate parameters.
1451 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1452 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1453 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1454 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1455 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1456 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1457 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1458 pub features: InitFeatures,
1459 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1460 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1461 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1463 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1465 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1466 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1467 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1468 /// payments to us through this channel.
1469 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1470 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1471 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1472 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1473 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1474 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1475 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1478 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1479 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1480 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1481 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1482 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1483 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1484 /// lifetime of the channel.
1485 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1486 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1487 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1488 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1489 /// our counterparty already.
1491 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1492 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1493 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1494 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1496 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1497 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1498 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1499 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1501 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1502 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1504 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1505 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1507 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1508 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1509 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1510 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1511 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1512 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1513 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1514 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1515 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1518 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1520 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1521 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1522 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1523 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1524 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1525 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1526 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1528 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1529 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1531 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1532 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1533 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1534 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1535 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1536 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1537 /// this value on chain.
1539 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1541 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1543 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1544 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1545 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1546 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1547 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1548 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1549 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1551 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1552 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1553 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1554 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1555 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1556 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1558 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1559 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1560 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1561 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1562 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1564 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1565 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1566 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1567 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1569 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1570 pub balance_msat: u64,
1571 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1572 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1573 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1574 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1576 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1578 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1579 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1580 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1581 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1582 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1583 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1584 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1585 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1587 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1588 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1589 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1590 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1591 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1592 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1593 /// route which is valid.
1594 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1595 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1596 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1597 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1598 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1599 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1601 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1602 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1603 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1604 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1605 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1606 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1607 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1608 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1609 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1611 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1613 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1614 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1615 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1616 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1617 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1619 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1620 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1621 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1622 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1623 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1624 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1625 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1627 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1628 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1629 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1630 pub is_outbound: bool,
1631 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1632 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1633 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1634 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1635 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1637 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1638 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1639 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1640 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1641 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1642 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1643 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1645 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1646 pub is_usable: bool,
1647 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1648 pub is_public: bool,
1649 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1650 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1651 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1652 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1653 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1654 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1656 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1657 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1660 impl ChannelDetails {
1661 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1662 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1663 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1665 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1666 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1667 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1668 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1671 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1672 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1673 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1675 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1676 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1677 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1678 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1681 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1682 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1683 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1686 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1687 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1689 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1690 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1691 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1693 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1694 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1695 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1696 features: latest_features,
1697 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1698 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1699 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1700 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1701 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1702 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1703 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1704 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1705 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1706 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1708 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1709 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1710 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1711 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1712 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1713 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1714 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1715 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1716 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1717 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1718 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1719 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1720 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1721 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1722 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1723 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1724 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1725 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1726 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1727 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1728 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1729 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1730 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1731 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1732 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1733 config: Some(context.config()),
1734 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1739 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1740 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1741 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1742 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1743 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1744 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1745 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1746 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1747 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1749 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1751 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1752 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1754 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1755 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1756 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1757 /// to drop the channel.
1761 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1762 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1763 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1764 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1765 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1767 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1768 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1769 payment_id: PaymentId,
1771 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1773 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1774 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1775 payment_id: PaymentId,
1776 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1778 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1779 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1780 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1783 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1784 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1785 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1787 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1788 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1789 payment_id: PaymentId,
1790 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1791 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1792 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1794 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1795 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1796 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1798 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1799 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1800 payment_id: PaymentId,
1801 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1802 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1806 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1808 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1810 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1811 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1812 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1813 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1815 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1816 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1817 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1820 macro_rules! handle_error {
1821 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1822 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1823 // entering the macro.
1824 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1825 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1829 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1830 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1832 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1833 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1834 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1835 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1839 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1840 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1841 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1842 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1843 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1844 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1849 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1850 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1852 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1853 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1854 action: err.action.clone()
1858 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1859 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1860 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1861 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1862 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1866 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1871 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1874 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1875 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1876 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1882 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1883 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1884 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1885 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1886 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1887 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1889 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1890 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1891 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1892 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1893 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1895 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1896 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1898 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1902 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1903 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1904 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1906 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1907 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1909 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1910 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1912 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1913 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1914 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1915 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1916 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1917 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1919 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1920 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1924 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1925 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1927 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1928 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1930 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1931 match $channel_phase {
1932 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1933 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1935 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1936 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1938 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1939 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1945 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1946 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1950 let key = *$entry.key();
1951 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1953 $entry.remove_entry();
1961 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
1962 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1966 let key = *$entry.key();
1967 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1969 $entry.remove_entry();
1977 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
1978 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1980 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1981 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
1987 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1988 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1989 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1990 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1991 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1993 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1994 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1995 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1996 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1997 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1998 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1999 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2000 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2001 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2002 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2007 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2008 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2009 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2010 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2011 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2012 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2013 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2014 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2015 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2017 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2022 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2023 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2024 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2025 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2026 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2027 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2028 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2029 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2030 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2032 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2037 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2038 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2039 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
2040 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2041 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2042 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2043 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2044 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2045 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2046 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2047 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2049 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2050 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2051 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2057 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2058 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2060 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2061 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2062 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2063 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2064 updates.announcement_sigs);
2065 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2066 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2069 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2070 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2071 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2072 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2074 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2075 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2076 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2077 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2078 let mut batch_completed = false;
2079 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2080 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2081 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2082 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2084 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2085 channel_state.2 = true;
2087 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2089 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2091 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2094 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2095 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2096 if batch_completed {
2097 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2098 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2099 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2100 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2101 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2102 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2103 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2104 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2105 chan.set_batch_ready();
2106 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2107 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2111 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2112 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2113 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2118 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2120 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2121 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2123 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2124 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2125 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2126 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2131 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2132 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2133 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2135 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2136 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2137 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
2138 panic!("{}", err_str);
2140 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2141 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2142 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2145 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2151 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2152 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2153 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2155 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2156 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2157 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2158 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2159 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2160 // filter for uniqueness here.
2161 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2162 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2163 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2164 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2166 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2167 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2169 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2170 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2171 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2177 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2178 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2179 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2180 while !processed_all_events {
2181 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2188 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2189 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2190 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2192 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2193 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2194 result = $self.process_background_events();
2196 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2197 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2198 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2199 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2203 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2204 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2205 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2206 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2209 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2211 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2212 $event_to_handle = event;
2214 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2215 post_event_actions.push(action);
2220 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2221 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2222 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2223 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2224 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2225 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2228 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2229 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2230 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2231 processed_all_events = false;
2235 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2236 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2237 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2239 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2240 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2241 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2247 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2249 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2250 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2251 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2252 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2253 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2254 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2258 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2260 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2262 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2263 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2265 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2267 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2268 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2269 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2272 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2273 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2274 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2276 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2277 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2278 current_timestamp: u32,
2280 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2281 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2282 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2283 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2285 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2286 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2287 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2292 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2294 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2295 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2296 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2297 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2298 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2299 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2300 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2301 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2303 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2306 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2307 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2309 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2311 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2313 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2315 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2316 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2317 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2318 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2319 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2320 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2321 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2322 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2332 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2333 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2334 &self.default_configuration
2337 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2338 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2339 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2342 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2343 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2345 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2347 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2351 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2356 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2358 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2359 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2360 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2361 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2362 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2364 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2365 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2367 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2368 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2369 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2371 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2372 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2373 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2375 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2376 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2377 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2378 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2379 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2380 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2382 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2383 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2384 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2385 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2386 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2387 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2390 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2391 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2392 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2394 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2396 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2397 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2399 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2401 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2402 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2403 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2404 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2405 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2406 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2410 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2415 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2417 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2418 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2419 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2421 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2423 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2426 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2429 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2430 node_id: their_network_key,
2433 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2436 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2437 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2438 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2439 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2440 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2441 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2442 // the same channel.
2443 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2445 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2446 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2447 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2448 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2449 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2450 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2451 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2452 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2453 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2457 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2458 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2459 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2467 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2468 /// more information.
2469 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2470 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2471 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2472 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2473 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2474 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2475 // the same channel.
2476 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2478 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2479 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2480 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2481 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2482 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2483 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2484 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2485 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2493 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2494 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2496 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2497 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2499 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2500 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2501 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2502 // really wanted anyway.
2503 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2506 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2507 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2508 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2509 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2511 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2512 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2513 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2514 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2515 let context_to_details = |context| {
2516 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2518 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2520 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2521 .map(context_to_details)
2527 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2528 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2530 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2531 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2532 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2534 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2535 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2536 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2537 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2538 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2539 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2541 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2542 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2543 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2545 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2546 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2547 payment_id: *payment_id,
2548 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2549 total_msat: *total_msat,
2552 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2553 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2555 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2556 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2558 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2563 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2564 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2565 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2566 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2567 Some(transaction) => {
2568 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2569 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2574 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2575 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2576 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2577 reason: closure_reason,
2578 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2579 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2583 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2584 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2586 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2587 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2589 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2591 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2592 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2594 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2595 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2597 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2598 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2599 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2600 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2601 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2602 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2603 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2604 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2605 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2607 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2608 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2609 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2610 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2611 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2615 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2616 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2618 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2619 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2620 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2621 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2625 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2626 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2627 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2628 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2632 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2633 shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
2639 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2640 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2641 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2643 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2644 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2645 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2646 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2651 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2652 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2653 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2654 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2657 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2658 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2664 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2665 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2666 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2668 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2669 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2671 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2672 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2673 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2674 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2676 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2678 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2679 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2680 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2683 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2684 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2685 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2686 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2687 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2688 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2691 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2692 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2693 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2695 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2696 /// the channel being closed or not:
2697 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2698 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2699 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2700 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2701 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2702 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2703 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2705 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2706 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2707 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2708 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2710 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2712 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2713 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2714 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2717 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2718 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2719 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2720 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2721 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2722 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2725 fn finish_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2726 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2727 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2728 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2729 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2732 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs, unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid) = shutdown_res;
2733 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2734 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2735 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2736 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2737 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2738 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2740 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2741 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2742 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2743 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2744 // ignore the result here.
2745 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2747 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2748 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2749 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2750 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2751 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2752 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2753 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2754 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2755 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2756 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2757 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2758 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2759 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2762 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2765 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2766 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2769 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2770 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2774 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2775 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2776 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2777 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2778 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2779 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2780 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2781 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2782 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2783 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2784 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2786 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2788 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2789 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2790 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2791 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2792 mem::drop(peer_state);
2793 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2795 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2796 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2797 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2799 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2800 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2801 // Unfunded channel has no update
2802 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2805 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2806 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2807 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2808 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2810 (None, *peer_node_id)
2812 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2815 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2816 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2817 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2818 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2819 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2820 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2821 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2822 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2823 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2829 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2832 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2833 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2834 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2835 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2836 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2837 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2838 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2839 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2840 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2841 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2842 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2843 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2854 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2855 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2856 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2858 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2859 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2860 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2863 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2864 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2865 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2867 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2868 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2869 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2870 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2871 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2874 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2875 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2876 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2877 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2878 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2882 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2883 /// local transaction(s).
2884 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2885 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2886 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2890 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2891 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2892 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2893 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2894 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2895 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2896 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2898 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2899 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2903 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2904 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2905 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2906 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } =>
2907 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2908 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2909 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2910 err_data: Vec::new(),
2914 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2915 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2916 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2919 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2920 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2921 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2922 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2923 outgoing_cltv_value,
2924 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2928 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2929 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2930 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2931 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2932 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2933 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2934 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2935 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2937 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2938 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
2939 amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, ..
2941 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
2942 (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None)
2944 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => {
2945 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2946 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2947 err_data: Vec::new(),
2948 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2952 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2953 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2954 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2955 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2957 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2960 // final_expiry_too_soon
2961 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2962 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2964 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2965 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2966 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2967 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2968 if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2969 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2970 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2971 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2972 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2973 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2974 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2977 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2978 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2979 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2981 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2983 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2984 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2988 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2989 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2990 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2991 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2992 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2993 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2994 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2995 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2996 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2997 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2998 err_data: Vec::new(),
2999 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
3002 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
3003 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3004 err_code: 0x4000|22,
3005 err_data: Vec::new(),
3006 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
3009 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
3013 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
3016 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
3017 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3020 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
3021 phantom_shared_secret,
3025 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3026 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
3027 err_data: Vec::new(),
3028 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
3031 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3034 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
3035 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
3036 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
3037 outgoing_cltv_value,
3038 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
3042 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3043 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
3044 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
3045 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
3046 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
3048 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3049 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3050 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3051 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3052 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
3053 failure_code: $err_code,
3059 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
3060 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
3063 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
3064 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
3065 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3067 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
3068 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
3069 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
3070 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
3071 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
3072 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
3073 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
3074 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
3076 macro_rules! return_err {
3077 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3079 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3080 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3081 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3082 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3083 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3084 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3090 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
3091 shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
3092 msg.payment_hash, &self.node_signer
3095 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3096 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
3098 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3099 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
3102 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
3103 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3104 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
3105 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
3108 let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
3109 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
3110 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
3112 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
3113 // inbound channel's state.
3114 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3115 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } |
3116 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } =>
3118 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
3122 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3123 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3124 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3125 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3126 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3127 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3128 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3129 // phantom or an intercept.
3130 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3131 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
3132 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
3136 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3139 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3141 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3142 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3143 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3144 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3145 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3147 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3148 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3149 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3150 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3153 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3154 // have no consistency guarantees.
3155 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3159 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3160 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3161 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3162 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3163 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3165 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3166 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3167 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3168 // we don't have the channel here.
3169 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3171 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3173 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3174 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3175 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3176 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3177 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3178 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3179 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3180 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3181 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3182 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3183 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3185 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3188 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3189 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3191 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3192 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3196 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3197 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3198 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3199 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3201 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3208 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3209 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3210 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3211 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3212 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3213 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3215 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3216 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3218 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3219 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3220 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3221 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3222 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3223 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3224 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3225 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3226 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3227 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3233 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3234 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3235 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3236 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3238 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3239 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3241 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3242 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3243 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3245 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3246 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3247 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3248 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3249 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3250 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3251 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3255 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3257 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3260 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3261 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3262 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3263 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3264 macro_rules! return_err {
3265 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3267 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3268 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3269 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3270 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3271 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3272 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3278 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3280 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3281 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3284 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3285 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3286 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3287 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3288 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3290 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3293 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3294 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3295 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3296 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3297 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3303 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3304 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3305 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3307 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3308 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3309 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3311 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3312 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3313 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3314 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3315 return Err(LightningError {
3316 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3317 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3320 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3321 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3323 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3324 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3327 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3328 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3329 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3330 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3332 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3333 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3334 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3336 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3337 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3338 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3339 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3340 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3341 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3345 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3348 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3349 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3350 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3352 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3353 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3354 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3355 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3356 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3359 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3360 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3362 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3363 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3364 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3365 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3366 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3367 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3368 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3369 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3371 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3372 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3373 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3375 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3377 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3384 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3385 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3386 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3387 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3392 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3393 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3394 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3397 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3398 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3400 log_trace!(self.logger,
3401 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3402 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3403 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3404 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3406 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3407 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3408 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3410 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3411 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3413 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3414 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3415 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3416 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3419 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3420 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3421 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3422 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3423 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3424 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3425 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3426 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3427 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3428 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3430 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3431 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3432 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3434 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3435 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3437 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3438 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3439 Some(monitor_update) => {
3440 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3442 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3443 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3444 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3445 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3446 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3447 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3448 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3456 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3459 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3460 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3461 // `channel_by_id` map.
3462 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3463 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3468 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3469 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3471 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3476 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3478 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3479 /// fields for more info.
3481 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3482 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3484 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3486 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3487 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3488 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3489 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3490 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3492 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3493 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3494 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3495 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3496 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3498 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3499 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3500 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3501 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3503 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3505 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3506 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3507 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3509 /// In general, a path may raise:
3510 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3511 /// node public key) is specified.
3512 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3513 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3514 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3515 /// relevant updates.
3517 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3518 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3519 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3521 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3522 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3523 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3524 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3525 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3526 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3527 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3528 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3529 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3530 self.pending_outbound_payments
3531 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3532 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3533 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3536 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3537 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3538 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3539 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3540 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3541 self.pending_outbound_payments
3542 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3543 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3544 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3545 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3549 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3550 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3551 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3552 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3553 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3554 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3558 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3559 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3560 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3564 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3565 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3569 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3570 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3571 /// retries are exhausted.
3573 /// # Event Generation
3575 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3576 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3578 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3579 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3580 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3582 /// # Restart Behavior
3584 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3585 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3586 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3587 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3588 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3591 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3592 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3593 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3594 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3595 /// never reach the recipient.
3597 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3598 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3600 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3601 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3603 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3604 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3605 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3606 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3607 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3608 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3609 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3612 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3613 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3615 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3618 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3619 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3620 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3621 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3622 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3623 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3624 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3625 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3628 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3629 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3630 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3631 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3632 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3633 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3634 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3635 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3636 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3639 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3642 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3643 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3646 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3647 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3649 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3650 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3651 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3652 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3653 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3654 let payment_params =
3655 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3657 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3659 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3662 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3663 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3665 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3666 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3667 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3668 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3670 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3671 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3672 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3673 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3674 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3675 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3676 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3677 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3678 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3679 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3681 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3682 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3683 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3684 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3688 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3690 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3691 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3694 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3696 let mut res = Vec::new();
3698 for mut path in route.paths {
3699 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3700 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3701 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3702 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3703 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3706 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3709 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3710 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3712 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3714 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3715 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3720 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3723 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3728 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3729 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3730 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3732 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3733 let used_liquidity =
3734 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3736 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3737 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3739 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3742 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3747 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3748 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3749 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3756 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3757 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3758 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3759 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3760 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3761 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3762 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3763 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3764 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3766 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3767 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3768 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3769 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3770 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3772 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &self.logger)
3773 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3774 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3775 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3776 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3777 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3778 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3779 } else { unreachable!(); });
3781 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3782 Err((chan, err)) => {
3783 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3784 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3786 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3787 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3788 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3794 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3795 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3797 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3798 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3801 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3802 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3803 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3807 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3808 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3811 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3812 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3813 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3815 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3816 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3817 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3818 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3820 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3827 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3828 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3829 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3833 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3835 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3836 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3838 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3839 /// across the p2p network.
3841 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3842 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3844 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3845 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3846 /// keys per-channel).
3848 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3849 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3850 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3852 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3853 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3854 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3856 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3857 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3858 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3859 /// for more details.
3861 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3862 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3863 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3864 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3867 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3869 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3870 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3872 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transcaction
3873 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3874 /// signature for each channel.
3876 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3877 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3878 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3879 let mut result = Ok(());
3881 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3882 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3883 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3884 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3885 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3890 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3891 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3892 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3896 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3897 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3898 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3899 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3900 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3901 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3902 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3903 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3908 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3909 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3910 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3911 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3915 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3916 match states.entry(txid) {
3917 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3918 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3919 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3923 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3926 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels.iter() {
3927 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3928 temporary_channel_id,
3929 counterparty_node_id,
3930 funding_transaction.clone(),
3933 let mut output_index = None;
3934 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3935 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3936 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3937 if output_index.is_some() {
3938 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3939 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3942 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3945 if output_index.is_none() {
3946 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3947 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3950 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3951 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3952 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3958 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3959 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3960 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3961 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3962 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3963 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3964 .into_iter().flatten()
3965 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3967 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3968 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3970 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3972 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3973 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3974 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3975 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3976 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3978 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3979 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
3980 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
3984 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3985 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3991 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3993 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3994 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3995 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3996 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3998 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3999 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4001 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4002 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4004 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4006 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4007 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4008 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4009 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4010 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4011 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4012 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4013 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4014 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4015 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4016 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4017 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4018 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4022 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4023 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4024 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4025 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4026 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4027 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4028 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4029 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4030 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4031 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4035 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4036 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4037 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4038 config.apply(config_update);
4039 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4042 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4043 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4044 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4045 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4046 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4047 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4054 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4055 debug_assert!(false);
4056 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4058 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4059 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4066 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4068 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4069 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4070 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4071 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4073 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4074 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4076 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4077 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4079 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4081 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4082 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4083 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4084 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4085 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4086 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4087 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4088 pub fn update_channel_config(
4089 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4090 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4091 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4094 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4095 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4097 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4098 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4100 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4101 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4102 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4103 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4104 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4106 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4107 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4108 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4111 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4114 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4115 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4116 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4117 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4118 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4119 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4120 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4122 let next_hop_scid = {
4123 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4124 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4125 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4126 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4127 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4128 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4129 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4130 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4131 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4132 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4135 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4137 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4138 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4139 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4141 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4142 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4143 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4148 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4149 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4150 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4153 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4154 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
4155 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
4157 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4159 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4160 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4161 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4162 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4163 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4166 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4167 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4168 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4169 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4170 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4172 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4176 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4177 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4179 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4182 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4183 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4184 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4186 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4187 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4188 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4191 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4192 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4193 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4194 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4195 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4196 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4197 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4198 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4201 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4202 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4203 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4204 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4209 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4211 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4212 /// Will likely generate further events.
4213 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4214 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4216 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4217 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4218 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4220 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4221 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4223 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4224 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4225 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4227 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4228 match forward_info {
4229 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4230 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4231 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4232 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4233 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4236 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4237 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4238 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4240 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4241 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4242 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4243 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4244 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4245 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4246 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4249 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4250 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4252 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4255 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4256 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4262 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4263 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4265 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4269 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4270 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4272 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4276 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4277 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4278 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
4279 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4280 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4281 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4282 payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4285 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4286 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
4287 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4288 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4289 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4291 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4293 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4294 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4298 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4299 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4300 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4301 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
4303 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4304 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4310 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4313 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4316 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4317 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4318 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4319 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4320 // problem, not ours.
4326 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
4327 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4329 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4333 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4334 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4335 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4336 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4339 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4340 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4341 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4342 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4343 match forward_info {
4344 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4345 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4346 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4347 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4348 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4351 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4352 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4353 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4354 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4355 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4356 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4357 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4358 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4359 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4361 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4362 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4363 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4366 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4367 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4369 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4371 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4372 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4373 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4374 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4379 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4380 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4382 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4383 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4384 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4385 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4387 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4388 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4390 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4392 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4393 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4394 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4401 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4405 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4406 match forward_info {
4407 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4408 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4409 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4410 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4411 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4414 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4415 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4416 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4417 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4418 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4419 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4420 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4422 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4423 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4424 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4428 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4429 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4432 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4435 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4436 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4437 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4438 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4439 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4440 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4441 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4442 phantom_shared_secret,
4444 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4445 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4446 // if routing nodes overpay
4447 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4448 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4450 total_value_received: None,
4451 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4454 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4457 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4459 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4460 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4461 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4462 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4463 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4464 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4466 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4467 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4468 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4469 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4470 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4471 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4472 phantom_shared_secret,
4474 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4475 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4477 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4480 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4481 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4482 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4483 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4484 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4487 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4488 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4489 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4490 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4491 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4492 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4494 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4495 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4496 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4498 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4499 .entry(payment_hash)
4500 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4501 .or_insert_with(|| {
4502 committed_to_claimable = true;
4504 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4507 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4508 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4509 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4510 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4512 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4513 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4514 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4516 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4517 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4518 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4521 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4523 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4524 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4525 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4526 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4527 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4528 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4529 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4530 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4531 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4532 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4534 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4536 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4537 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4538 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4539 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4540 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4541 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4543 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4544 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4545 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4546 committed_to_claimable = true;
4548 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4549 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4550 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4551 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4552 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4553 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4554 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4555 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4556 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4557 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4561 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4562 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4563 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4564 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4565 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4567 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4569 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4570 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4572 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4573 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4574 committed_to_claimable = true;
4577 payment_claimable_generated
4581 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4582 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4583 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4584 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4585 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4586 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4587 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4588 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4589 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4590 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4591 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4592 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4593 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4594 Ok(result) => result,
4596 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4597 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4600 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4601 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4602 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4603 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4604 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4605 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4608 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4609 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4610 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4612 check_total_value!(purpose);
4614 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4615 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4616 check_total_value!(purpose);
4620 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4621 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4622 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4623 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4625 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4626 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4627 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4628 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4629 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4630 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4631 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4632 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4634 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4635 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4636 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4638 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4639 if payment_claimable_generated {
4640 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4646 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4647 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4655 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4656 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4657 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4658 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4660 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4661 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4663 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4665 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4666 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4667 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4669 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4671 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4672 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4673 events.append(&mut new_events);
4676 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4678 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4679 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4680 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4682 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4684 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4685 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4686 if background_events.is_empty() {
4687 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4690 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4692 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4693 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4694 // monitor updating completing.
4695 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4697 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4698 let mut updated_chan = false;
4700 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4701 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4702 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4703 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4704 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4705 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4706 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4707 updated_chan = true;
4708 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4709 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4711 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4714 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4719 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4720 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4723 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4724 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4725 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4726 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4727 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4728 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4729 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4731 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4732 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4733 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4734 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4735 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4741 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4744 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4745 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4746 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4747 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4748 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4751 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4752 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4753 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4754 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4755 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4756 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4757 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4759 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4761 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4762 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4763 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4764 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4766 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4767 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4769 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4770 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4774 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4775 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4776 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4777 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4778 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4779 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4780 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4782 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4783 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4785 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4786 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4787 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4788 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4789 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4790 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4792 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4797 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4798 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4806 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4808 /// This currently includes:
4809 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4810 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4811 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4813 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4814 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4815 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4816 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4818 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4819 /// estimate fetches.
4821 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4822 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4823 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4824 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4825 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4827 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4828 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4830 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4831 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4832 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4833 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4835 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4836 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4837 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4838 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4839 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4840 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4842 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4843 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4844 log_error!(self.logger,
4845 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4846 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4847 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4848 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4849 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4850 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4851 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4852 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4853 channel_id: *chan_id,
4854 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4865 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4866 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4867 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4868 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4869 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4870 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4871 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4873 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4874 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4879 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4880 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4882 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4883 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4884 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4885 if needs_close { return false; }
4888 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4889 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4890 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4891 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4892 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4893 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4894 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4895 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4897 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4898 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4899 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4900 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4904 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4906 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4909 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4911 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4912 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4913 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4914 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4918 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4920 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4926 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4928 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4929 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4930 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4931 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4932 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4933 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4934 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4935 channel_id: *chan_id,
4936 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4944 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4945 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4946 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4948 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4949 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4950 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4955 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4956 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4957 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4958 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4959 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4960 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4961 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4962 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4968 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4970 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4971 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4976 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4977 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4978 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4979 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4980 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4981 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4982 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4983 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4984 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4985 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4986 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4987 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4988 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4989 // have no channels to the peer.
4990 let remove_entry = {
4991 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4992 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4995 entry.remove_entry();
4998 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5003 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5004 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5005 // This should be unreachable
5006 debug_assert!(false);
5009 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5010 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5011 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5012 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5013 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5014 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5015 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5018 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5019 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5020 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5022 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5023 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5030 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5031 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5032 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5033 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5034 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5037 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5038 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5041 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5042 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5045 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(&self.pending_events);
5047 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5048 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5049 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5050 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5051 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5058 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5059 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5060 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5062 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5063 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5064 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5065 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5067 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5068 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5069 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5070 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5071 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5072 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5075 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5076 /// reason for the failure.
5078 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5079 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5080 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5082 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5083 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5084 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5085 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5086 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5087 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5088 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5093 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5094 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5095 match failure_code {
5096 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5097 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5098 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5099 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5100 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5101 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5103 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5104 let fail_data = match data {
5105 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5108 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5113 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5114 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5116 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5118 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5119 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5120 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5121 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5122 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5123 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5124 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5126 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5128 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5129 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5131 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5136 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5137 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5138 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5139 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5140 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5141 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5142 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5143 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5144 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5145 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5147 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5148 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5149 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5150 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5152 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5153 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5154 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5155 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5156 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5160 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5161 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5162 // be surfaced to the user.
5163 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5164 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5165 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5167 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5168 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5169 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5170 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5171 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5172 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5173 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5174 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5175 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5177 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5178 debug_assert!(false);
5179 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5182 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5184 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5187 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5188 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5189 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5190 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5194 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5195 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5196 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5197 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5198 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5199 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5200 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5201 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5202 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5203 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5206 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5207 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5208 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5211 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5212 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5213 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5215 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5216 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5217 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5218 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5219 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5221 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
5222 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
5223 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
5225 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5226 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5227 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5228 push_forward_ev = true;
5230 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5231 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5232 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5234 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5235 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5238 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5239 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5240 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5241 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5242 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5243 failed_next_destination: destination,
5249 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5250 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5252 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5253 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5254 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5255 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5257 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5258 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5259 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5260 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5262 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5263 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5264 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5266 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5267 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5268 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5269 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5270 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5271 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5272 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5273 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5274 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5277 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5278 /// even type numbers.
5282 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5283 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5285 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5286 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5287 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5290 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5291 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5293 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5296 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5297 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5298 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5299 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5300 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5301 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5302 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5303 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5308 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5309 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5310 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5311 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5312 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5314 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5315 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5316 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5320 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5321 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5322 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5323 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5324 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5325 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5326 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5327 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5328 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5329 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5330 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5339 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5341 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5342 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5343 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5344 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5345 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5346 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5347 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5348 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5349 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5350 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5351 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5352 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5353 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5354 debug_assert!(false);
5358 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5360 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5361 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5362 debug_assert!(false);
5366 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5367 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5369 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5370 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5371 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5372 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5375 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5376 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5377 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5378 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5382 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5383 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5384 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5385 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5386 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5387 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5390 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5391 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5392 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5393 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5394 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5399 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5400 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5401 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5402 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5403 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5404 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5405 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5407 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5410 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5411 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5412 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5413 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5417 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5418 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5419 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5420 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5422 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5423 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5424 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5425 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5427 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5428 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5429 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5430 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5433 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5434 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5435 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5436 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5440 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5441 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5442 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5445 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5446 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5447 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5448 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5449 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5450 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5451 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5454 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5455 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5456 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5458 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5461 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5462 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5464 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5465 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5466 // monitor update as a background event.
5467 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5468 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5469 counterparty_node_id,
5470 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5471 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5475 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5476 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5481 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5483 log_trace!(self.logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5485 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5486 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5487 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5488 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5489 blocking_action: blocker,
5491 (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5493 debug_assert!(false,
5494 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5497 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5498 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5499 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5500 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5501 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5503 let mut found_blocker = false;
5504 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5505 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5506 // which case we need to only remove the one
5507 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5508 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5509 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5510 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5512 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5515 debug_assert!(false);
5524 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5525 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5526 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5532 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5533 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5534 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5535 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5536 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5537 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5538 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5539 // again on restart.
5540 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5541 payment_preimage, update_res);
5544 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5545 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5547 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5548 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5549 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5550 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5551 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5552 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5553 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5554 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5555 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5556 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5559 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5560 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5561 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5562 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5563 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5564 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5568 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5569 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5572 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5573 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5574 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5577 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5578 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5579 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5580 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5581 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5583 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5584 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5585 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5587 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5588 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5591 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5592 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5593 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5594 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5595 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5596 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5597 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5598 let chan_to_release =
5599 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5600 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5602 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5603 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5604 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5605 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5610 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5611 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5612 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5613 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5614 // in the background.
5615 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5616 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5617 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5618 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5620 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5621 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5622 funding_txo, update, ..
5624 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5625 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5626 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5627 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5629 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5635 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5636 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5637 (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5639 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5640 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5642 monitor_update.updates[0],
5643 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5648 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5649 // immediately once we get going.
5650 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5653 *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5655 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5658 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5659 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5660 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5661 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5662 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5663 blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5667 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5668 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5669 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5672 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5673 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5675 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5676 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5677 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5678 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5680 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5684 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5685 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5686 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5692 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5693 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5694 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5697 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5698 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5699 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5700 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5702 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5704 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5705 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5706 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5708 payment_purpose: purpose,
5711 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5713 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5717 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5719 sender_intended_total_msat,
5723 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5724 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5726 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5727 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5728 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5731 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5732 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5734 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5735 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5736 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5737 Some(blocking_action),
5744 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5745 /// update completion.
5746 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5747 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5748 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5749 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5750 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5751 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5752 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5753 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5754 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5755 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5756 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5757 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5758 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5760 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5762 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5763 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5764 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5765 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5768 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5769 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5771 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5772 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5773 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5778 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5779 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5780 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5781 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5786 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5787 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5788 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5789 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5790 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5795 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5799 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5805 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5806 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5807 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5811 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5812 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5813 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5819 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5820 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5822 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5823 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5825 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5826 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5827 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5828 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5829 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5834 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5835 let mut peer_state_lock;
5836 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5837 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5838 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5839 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5841 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5844 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5845 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5846 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5847 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5848 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5851 let remaining_in_flight =
5852 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5853 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5856 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5857 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5858 remaining_in_flight);
5859 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5862 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5865 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5867 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5868 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5871 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5872 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5873 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5875 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5876 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5877 /// used to accept such channels.
5879 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5880 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5881 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5882 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5885 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5886 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5888 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5889 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5890 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5892 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5893 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5895 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5896 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5898 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5899 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5901 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5902 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5903 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5904 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5907 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5908 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5910 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5911 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5912 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5913 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5914 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5915 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5916 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5917 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5919 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5920 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5921 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5923 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5924 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5925 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5926 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5927 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5928 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5929 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5931 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5935 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5936 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5937 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5938 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5939 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5940 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5941 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5944 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5945 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5947 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5948 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5949 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5950 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5951 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5952 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5953 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5954 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5957 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5958 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5962 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5963 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5964 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5966 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5967 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5968 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5971 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5976 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5977 /// or 0-conf channels.
5979 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5980 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5981 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5982 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
5983 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5984 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5986 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5987 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5988 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5989 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5990 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5991 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5992 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5996 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5999 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6000 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6002 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6003 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6005 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6006 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6007 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6008 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6009 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6011 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6014 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6015 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6016 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6019 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6020 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6025 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6028 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6029 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6030 // likely to be lost on restart!
6031 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
6032 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6035 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6036 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6039 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6040 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6041 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6042 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6043 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6045 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6046 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6048 debug_assert!(false);
6049 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6051 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6052 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6054 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6055 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6056 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6057 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6058 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6059 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6061 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6062 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6063 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6066 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6067 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6068 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6069 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6070 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6073 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6074 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6076 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6079 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6080 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6081 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6082 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6083 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6084 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6085 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6086 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6087 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
6089 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6090 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6091 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6096 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6097 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6098 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6099 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6100 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6101 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6102 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6105 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6110 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6111 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6112 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6114 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6115 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6118 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6119 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6121 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6122 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6123 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6125 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6129 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6130 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6131 // likely to be lost on restart!
6132 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6133 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6134 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6136 debug_assert!(false);
6137 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6139 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6140 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6141 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6142 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6143 match phase.get_mut() {
6144 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6145 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6146 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6149 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6153 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6156 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6157 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6158 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6159 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6160 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6162 user_channel_id: user_id,
6167 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6168 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6170 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6171 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6173 debug_assert!(false);
6174 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6177 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6178 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6179 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
6180 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6181 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6182 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
6184 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6185 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6186 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6187 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6188 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6189 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6190 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6191 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6192 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6196 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6197 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6199 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6202 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
6203 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6204 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
6206 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6207 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6208 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6209 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6210 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6211 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6212 funding_msg.channel_id))
6214 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6215 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6216 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6217 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6218 mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6220 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6221 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6222 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6223 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6224 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6225 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6229 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6230 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6231 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6233 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6237 log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6238 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6239 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6240 funding_msg.channel_id));
6248 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6249 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6250 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6251 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6253 debug_assert!(false);
6254 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6257 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6258 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6259 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6260 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6261 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6262 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
6263 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6264 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6265 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6266 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6269 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
6273 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6277 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6281 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6282 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6283 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6284 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6285 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6287 debug_assert!(false);
6288 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6290 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6291 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6292 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6293 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6294 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6295 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6296 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6297 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6298 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6299 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6300 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6301 msg: announcement_sigs,
6303 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6304 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6305 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6306 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6307 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6308 // announcement_signatures.
6309 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6310 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6311 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6312 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6319 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6320 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6325 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6326 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6329 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6330 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6335 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6336 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6337 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6339 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6340 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6342 debug_assert!(false);
6343 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6345 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6346 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6347 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6348 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6350 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6351 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6352 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6354 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6357 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6358 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6359 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6360 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6362 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6363 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6364 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6365 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6366 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6367 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6371 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6372 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6373 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6374 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6377 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6378 let context = phase.context_mut();
6379 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6380 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6381 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6382 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6386 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6389 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6390 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6391 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6392 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6394 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6395 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6401 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6402 let mut shutdown_result = None;
6403 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid;
6404 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6405 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6407 debug_assert!(false);
6408 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6410 let (tx, chan_option) = {
6411 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6412 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6413 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6414 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6415 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6416 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
6417 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6418 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6419 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6420 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6425 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6426 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6427 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6428 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6429 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6430 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)))
6431 } else { (tx, None) }
6433 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6434 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6437 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6440 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6441 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6442 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6444 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6445 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6446 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6447 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6448 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6452 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6453 shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
6455 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6456 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6457 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6462 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6463 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6464 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6465 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6467 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6468 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6469 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6470 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6472 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6473 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6475 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6476 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6477 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6479 debug_assert!(false);
6480 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6482 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6483 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6484 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6485 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6486 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6487 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6488 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6489 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6490 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6491 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6493 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6494 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6495 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6496 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6497 match pending_forward_info {
6498 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6499 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6500 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6501 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6503 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6504 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6505 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6506 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6507 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6510 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6512 _ => pending_forward_info
6515 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6517 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6518 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6521 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6526 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6528 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6529 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6530 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6532 debug_assert!(false);
6533 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6535 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6536 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6537 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6538 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6539 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6540 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6541 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6542 log_trace!(self.logger,
6543 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6545 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6546 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6547 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6549 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6550 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6551 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6552 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6553 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6554 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6555 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6558 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6559 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6562 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6565 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6569 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6570 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6571 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6572 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6573 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6575 debug_assert!(false);
6576 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6578 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6579 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6580 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6581 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6582 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6583 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6585 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6586 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6589 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6594 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6595 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6596 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6597 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6598 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6600 debug_assert!(false);
6601 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6603 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6604 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6605 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6606 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6607 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6608 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6609 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6611 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6612 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6614 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6615 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6619 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6623 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6624 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6625 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6627 debug_assert!(false);
6628 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6630 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6631 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6632 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6633 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6634 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6635 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6636 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6637 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6638 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6639 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6643 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6644 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6647 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6652 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6653 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6654 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6655 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6656 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6657 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6658 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6659 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6660 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6661 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6662 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6664 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6665 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6667 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6668 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6669 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6670 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6671 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6672 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6674 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6675 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6676 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
6678 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6679 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6680 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6681 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6682 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6683 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6684 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6685 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6686 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6689 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6690 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6692 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6693 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6694 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6695 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6696 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6697 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6698 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6699 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6700 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6703 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6704 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6705 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6710 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6711 // payments are being processed.
6712 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6713 push_forward_event = true;
6715 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6716 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6723 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6724 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6727 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6728 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6729 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6731 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6735 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6736 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6737 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6738 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6739 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6741 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6742 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6743 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6744 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6745 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6746 // real by taking more time.
6747 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6748 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6749 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6754 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6755 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6756 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6757 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6758 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6759 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6760 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6762 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6763 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6764 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6765 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6766 channel_funding_outpoint,
6767 counterparty_node_id,
6772 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6773 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6774 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6776 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6777 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6778 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6779 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6781 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6782 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6783 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6789 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6790 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6791 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6792 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6794 debug_assert!(false);
6795 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6796 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6797 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6798 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6799 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6800 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6801 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6802 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6803 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6804 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6805 *counterparty_node_id)
6807 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6808 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6809 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6810 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6811 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6812 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6813 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6817 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6818 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6821 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6824 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6828 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6829 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6830 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6832 debug_assert!(false);
6833 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6835 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6836 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6837 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6838 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6839 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6840 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6842 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6843 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6846 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6851 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6852 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6853 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6855 debug_assert!(false);
6856 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6858 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6859 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6860 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6861 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6862 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6863 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6864 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6867 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6868 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6869 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6870 msg, &self.default_configuration
6871 ), chan_phase_entry),
6872 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6873 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6874 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6877 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6878 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6881 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6886 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6887 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6888 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6889 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6891 // It's not a local channel
6892 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6895 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6896 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6897 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6898 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6900 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6901 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6902 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6903 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6904 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6905 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6906 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6907 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6908 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6909 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6910 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6912 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6914 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6915 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6916 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6917 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6919 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
6920 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6921 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
6924 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6928 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6929 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6932 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6934 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6937 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6939 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6940 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6942 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6944 debug_assert!(false);
6945 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6947 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6948 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6949 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6950 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6951 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6952 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6953 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6954 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6955 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6956 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
6957 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
6958 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
6959 let mut channel_update = None;
6960 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6961 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6962 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6965 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6966 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6967 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6968 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6969 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6970 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6971 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6976 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6977 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6978 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6979 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6980 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6981 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6985 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6986 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6989 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6993 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
6994 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6995 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6996 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6999 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7000 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7005 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7006 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7007 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7009 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7010 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7011 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7012 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7013 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7014 match monitor_event {
7015 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7016 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7017 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7018 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7020 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7021 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7022 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7023 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7026 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7027 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7028 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7030 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7031 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
7032 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7033 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
7036 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7037 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7038 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7039 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7040 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7041 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7042 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7043 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7044 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
7045 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7046 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7050 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7051 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7052 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7053 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
7054 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
7062 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7063 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7069 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7070 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7073 has_pending_monitor_events
7076 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7077 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7078 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7080 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7081 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7082 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7085 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7086 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7087 /// update was applied.
7088 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7089 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7090 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7092 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7093 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7094 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7095 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7097 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7098 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7100 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7101 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7102 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7103 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7105 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7106 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7107 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7108 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
7109 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7110 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7112 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7113 has_monitor_update = true;
7115 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7116 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7117 continue 'peer_loop;
7126 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7127 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7128 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7134 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7135 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7136 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7137 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7138 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7139 let mut has_update = false;
7140 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7142 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7144 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7145 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7146 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7147 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7148 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7150 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7151 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
7152 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
7153 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
7154 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7156 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7157 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7160 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7161 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7162 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7163 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7164 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7169 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7171 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7172 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7173 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7174 shutdown_results.push((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
7180 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7181 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7186 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7192 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7193 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7196 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7197 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7203 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7204 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7206 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7207 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7208 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7209 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7210 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7211 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7212 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7213 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7214 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7215 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
7216 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7217 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7218 assert!(should_broadcast);
7219 } else { unreachable!(); }
7220 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7221 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7222 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7225 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7229 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7232 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7233 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7235 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7236 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7237 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7238 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7240 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7242 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7243 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7247 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7248 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7250 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7252 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7253 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7255 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7256 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7257 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7258 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7259 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7260 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7261 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7262 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7263 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7264 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7265 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7268 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7269 /// stored external to LDK.
7271 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7272 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7273 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7275 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7276 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7279 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7280 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7281 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7282 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7284 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7285 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7286 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7287 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7288 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7290 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7291 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7292 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7293 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7294 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7296 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7297 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7299 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7300 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7304 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7305 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7307 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7309 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7310 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7312 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7313 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7314 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7315 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7316 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7317 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7318 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7321 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7322 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7324 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7325 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7326 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7329 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7330 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7332 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7333 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7334 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7335 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7337 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7338 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7339 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7340 Some(_) => continue,
7341 None => return scid_candidate
7346 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7348 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7349 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7351 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7352 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7353 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7357 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7358 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7359 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7361 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7362 /// times to get a unique scid.
7363 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7364 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7365 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7367 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7368 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7369 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7370 return scid_candidate
7374 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7375 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7376 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7377 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7379 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7380 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7381 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7382 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7383 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7384 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7386 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7387 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7388 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7397 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7398 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7399 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7400 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7401 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7405 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7406 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7407 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7408 events.push_back((event, None));
7412 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7413 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7414 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7418 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7419 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7423 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7424 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7427 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7428 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7429 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7430 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7431 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7433 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7434 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7435 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7436 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7438 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7439 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7440 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7441 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7443 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7447 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7448 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7449 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7450 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7451 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7452 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7453 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7457 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7458 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7459 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7460 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7461 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7462 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7463 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7464 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7465 if further_update_exists {
7466 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7471 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7472 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7477 log_debug!(self.logger,
7478 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7479 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7485 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7486 for action in actions {
7488 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7489 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7491 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7497 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7498 /// using the given event handler.
7500 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7501 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7505 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7509 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7511 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7512 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7513 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7514 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7515 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7516 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7520 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
7521 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
7522 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
7523 /// is always placed next to each other.
7525 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
7526 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
7527 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
7528 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
7530 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
7531 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
7532 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
7533 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
7534 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7535 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7536 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
7538 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
7539 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
7540 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
7541 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7544 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
7545 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7547 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
7548 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7551 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
7552 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7553 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7554 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7555 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7556 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
7557 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7561 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
7562 events.replace(pending_events);
7571 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7573 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7574 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7575 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7576 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7577 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7578 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7582 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
7584 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
7585 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
7586 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
7588 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
7592 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7594 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7595 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7596 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7597 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7598 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7599 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7603 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7605 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7606 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
7607 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
7608 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
7609 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
7612 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
7613 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
7616 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7617 let _persistence_guard =
7618 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7619 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7620 let new_height = height - 1;
7622 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
7623 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
7624 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
7625 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
7626 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
7627 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
7630 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7634 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7636 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7637 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7638 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7639 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7640 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7641 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7645 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7646 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7647 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7648 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7650 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7651 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
7653 let _persistence_guard =
7654 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7655 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7656 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
7657 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
7659 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7660 if height < last_best_block_height {
7661 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7662 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7666 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7667 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7668 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7669 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7671 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7672 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
7674 let _persistence_guard =
7675 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7676 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7677 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
7679 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7681 macro_rules! max_time {
7682 ($timestamp: expr) => {
7684 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
7685 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
7686 // having an explicit local time source.
7687 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
7688 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
7689 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7690 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
7691 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
7697 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
7698 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7699 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
7700 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
7704 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
7705 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
7706 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
7707 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7708 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7709 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
7710 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
7711 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
7718 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
7719 let _persistence_guard =
7720 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7721 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7722 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
7723 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
7724 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
7725 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
7726 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7727 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7732 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7734 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7735 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7736 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7737 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7738 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7739 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7743 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
7744 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
7746 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
7747 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
7748 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7749 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7750 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7752 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7753 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
7755 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7756 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7757 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7758 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7759 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7760 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
7762 // Retain unfunded channels.
7763 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
7764 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
7765 let res = f(channel);
7766 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
7767 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
7768 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
7769 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
7770 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
7772 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
7773 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
7774 if channel.context.is_usable() {
7775 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7776 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
7777 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7778 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7783 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7788 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7789 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
7792 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
7793 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7794 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7795 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7796 msg: announcement_sigs,
7798 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7799 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
7800 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7802 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7803 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7804 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
7809 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
7810 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
7811 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
7812 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
7813 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
7814 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
7815 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
7816 // is always consistent.
7817 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
7818 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
7819 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
7820 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
7821 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
7824 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
7825 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
7826 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
7827 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
7828 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
7829 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
7830 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7834 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
7835 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
7836 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7837 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7838 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
7839 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7840 data: reason_message,
7852 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7853 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
7854 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
7855 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
7856 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
7857 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
7858 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
7859 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7860 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7861 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
7863 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
7864 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
7865 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
7869 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
7872 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7873 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
7874 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7875 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7876 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
7877 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
7878 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
7879 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7880 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7881 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
7884 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
7885 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7886 _ => unreachable!(),
7888 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
7889 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
7890 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
7891 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
7897 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
7899 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
7900 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
7904 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
7905 /// may have events that need processing.
7907 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
7908 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
7910 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
7911 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
7912 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
7913 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
7916 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
7917 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
7918 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
7921 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7922 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
7923 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
7926 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
7927 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
7928 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
7929 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
7932 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7933 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7934 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7935 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7938 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7939 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7941 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7942 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7943 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7944 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7945 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
7948 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7949 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7950 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
7951 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
7954 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7955 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7956 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7957 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
7960 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7961 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7962 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
7963 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7967 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7968 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7970 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7971 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7972 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7973 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7974 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7975 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7979 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
7980 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7981 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
7982 // change to the contents.
7983 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7984 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7985 let persist = match &res {
7986 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
7987 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
7988 NotifyOption::DoPersist
7990 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7992 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7997 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
7998 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7999 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8000 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8003 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8004 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8005 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8006 // change to the contents.
8007 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8008 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8009 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8013 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8014 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8015 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8016 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8019 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8020 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8021 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8024 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8025 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8026 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8029 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8030 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8031 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8032 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8033 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8034 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8035 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8036 let persist = match &res {
8037 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8038 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8040 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8045 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8046 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8047 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8050 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8051 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8052 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8055 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8056 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8057 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8058 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8059 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8060 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8061 let persist = match &res {
8062 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8063 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8064 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8066 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8071 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8072 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8073 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8076 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8077 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8078 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8079 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8080 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8081 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8082 let persist = match &res {
8083 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8084 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8085 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8087 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8092 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8093 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8094 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8095 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8096 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8097 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8098 let persist = match &res {
8099 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8100 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8101 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8103 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8108 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8109 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8110 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8113 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8114 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8115 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8118 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8119 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8120 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8121 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8122 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8123 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8124 let persist = match &res {
8125 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8126 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8127 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8129 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8134 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8135 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8136 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8139 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8140 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8141 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8144 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8149 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8150 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8151 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8152 let persist = match &res {
8153 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8154 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8155 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8157 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8162 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8163 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8164 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8165 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8166 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8168 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8169 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8170 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8171 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8172 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8173 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8174 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8175 let context = match phase {
8176 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8177 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger).is_ok() {
8178 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8183 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8184 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8187 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8191 // Clean up for removal.
8192 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8193 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8194 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8197 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8198 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8199 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8200 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8202 // V1 Channel Establishment
8203 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8204 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8205 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8206 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8207 // V2 Channel Establishment
8208 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8209 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8210 // Common Channel Establishment
8211 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8212 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8213 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8214 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8215 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8216 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8217 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8218 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8219 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8220 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8221 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8222 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8223 // Channel Operations
8224 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8225 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8226 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8227 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8228 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8229 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8231 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8232 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8233 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8234 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8235 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8236 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8237 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8238 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8239 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8242 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8243 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8244 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8245 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8248 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8250 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8252 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8253 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8257 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8258 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8259 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8263 let mut res = Ok(());
8265 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8266 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8267 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8268 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8269 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8270 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8271 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8274 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8275 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8276 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8277 if inbound_peer_limited {
8279 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8281 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8282 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8283 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8284 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8285 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8286 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8287 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8288 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8292 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8293 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8294 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8296 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8297 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8298 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8299 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8302 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8305 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8306 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8311 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8313 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8314 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8315 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8316 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8317 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8319 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8320 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8321 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8322 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8323 // worry about closing and removing them.
8324 debug_assert!(false);
8328 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8329 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8330 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
8335 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8336 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8341 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8342 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8344 match &msg.data as &str {
8345 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8346 "link failed to shutdown" =>
8348 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8349 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8350 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8351 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8352 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8353 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8354 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8355 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8356 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8357 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8358 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8359 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8360 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8361 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8362 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8363 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8367 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8368 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8369 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8370 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8371 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8372 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8374 log_level: Level::Trace,
8384 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8385 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8386 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8387 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8388 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8389 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8390 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8391 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8392 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8393 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8394 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8396 for channel_id in channel_ids {
8397 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8398 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8402 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8403 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8404 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8405 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8406 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8407 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8408 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8409 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8410 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8411 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8419 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8420 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8424 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8425 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8428 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8429 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8432 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8433 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
8436 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8437 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8438 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8439 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8442 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8443 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8444 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8445 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8448 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
8449 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8450 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8451 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8454 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
8455 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8456 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8457 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8460 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
8461 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8462 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8463 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8466 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
8467 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8468 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8469 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8472 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
8473 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8474 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8475 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8478 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
8479 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8480 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8481 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8484 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
8485 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8486 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8487 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8491 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8492 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8493 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
8494 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
8495 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
8499 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8500 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8502 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8503 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8504 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8505 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8506 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8509 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8510 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8511 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
8512 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8515 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8516 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8517 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8518 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
8521 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8522 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8523 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
8524 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
8525 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
8526 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
8527 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
8528 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
8529 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
8530 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
8531 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
8532 features.set_payment_secret_required();
8533 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
8534 features.set_wumbo_optional();
8535 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
8536 features.set_channel_type_optional();
8537 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
8538 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
8539 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
8540 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
8545 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8546 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8548 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
8549 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
8550 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
8551 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
8554 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
8555 (2, node_id, required),
8556 (4, features, required),
8557 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
8558 (8, forwarding_info, option),
8559 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8560 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8563 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
8564 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8565 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8566 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8567 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
8568 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
8569 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8570 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
8571 (2, self.channel_id, required),
8572 (3, self.channel_type, option),
8573 (4, self.counterparty, required),
8574 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
8575 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
8576 (7, self.config, option),
8577 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
8578 (9, self.confirmations, option),
8579 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
8580 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8581 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8582 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
8583 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8584 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
8585 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8586 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
8587 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
8588 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
8589 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
8590 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
8591 (30, self.is_usable, required),
8592 (32, self.is_public, required),
8593 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8594 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8595 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8596 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8597 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
8603 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
8604 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8605 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8606 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
8607 (2, channel_id, required),
8608 (3, channel_type, option),
8609 (4, counterparty, required),
8610 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8611 (6, funding_txo, option),
8612 (7, config, option),
8613 (8, short_channel_id, option),
8614 (9, confirmations, option),
8615 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
8616 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8617 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8618 (16, balance_msat, required),
8619 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8620 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
8621 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
8622 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
8623 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8624 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
8625 (22, confirmations_required, option),
8626 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
8627 (26, is_outbound, required),
8628 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
8629 (30, is_usable, required),
8630 (32, is_public, required),
8631 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8632 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8633 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8634 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8635 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
8638 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8639 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8640 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
8641 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
8642 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
8646 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
8648 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
8649 outbound_scid_alias,
8653 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
8654 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
8656 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
8657 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8658 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
8659 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
8660 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8661 confirmations_required,
8663 force_close_spend_delay,
8664 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
8665 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
8666 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
8667 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
8668 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
8669 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
8670 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8671 channel_shutdown_state,
8676 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
8677 (2, channels, required_vec),
8678 (4, phantom_scid, required),
8679 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
8682 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
8684 (0, onion_packet, required),
8685 (2, short_channel_id, required),
8688 (0, payment_data, required),
8689 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8690 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8691 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8692 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8694 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
8695 (0, payment_preimage, required),
8696 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8697 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8698 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
8699 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8703 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
8704 (0, routing, required),
8705 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
8706 (4, payment_hash, required),
8707 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
8708 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
8709 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
8710 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8714 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8715 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8717 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
8719 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8720 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8721 reason.write(writer)?;
8723 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8724 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
8727 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8728 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8729 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
8730 failure_code.write(writer)?;
8737 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8738 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8739 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8742 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
8743 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8744 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8745 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
8749 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8750 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8751 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8752 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
8753 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
8756 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
8757 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
8758 // messages contained in the variants.
8759 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
8760 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
8761 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
8763 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8764 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8765 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8766 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8767 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
8770 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8771 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8772 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8773 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8774 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
8776 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8781 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
8786 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
8787 (0, short_channel_id, required),
8788 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8789 (2, outpoint, required),
8790 (4, htlc_id, required),
8791 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
8792 (7, user_channel_id, option),
8795 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
8796 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8797 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
8798 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
8799 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
8801 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8802 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
8803 (1, self.total_msat, required),
8804 (2, self.value, required),
8805 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
8806 (4, payment_data, option),
8807 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
8808 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
8809 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8810 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8816 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
8817 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8818 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8819 (0, prev_hop, required),
8820 (1, total_msat, option),
8821 (2, value_ser, required),
8822 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
8823 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
8824 (5, total_value_received, option),
8825 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
8826 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8827 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8829 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
8830 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
8831 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
8833 if payment_data.is_some() {
8834 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8836 if total_msat.is_none() {
8837 total_msat = Some(value);
8839 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
8842 if total_msat.is_none() {
8843 if payment_data.is_none() {
8844 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8846 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
8848 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
8852 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
8855 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
8856 total_value_received,
8857 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
8859 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
8860 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
8865 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
8866 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8867 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8870 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
8871 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
8872 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
8873 let mut payment_id = None;
8874 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
8875 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
8876 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8877 (0, session_priv, required),
8878 (1, payment_id, option),
8879 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8880 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
8881 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
8882 (6, blinded_tail, option),
8884 if payment_id.is_none() {
8885 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
8887 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
8889 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
8890 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
8891 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8893 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
8894 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
8895 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
8896 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8900 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8901 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
8902 first_hop_htlc_msat,
8904 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
8907 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8908 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8913 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
8914 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
8916 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
8918 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
8919 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8920 (0, session_priv, required),
8921 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
8922 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8923 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
8924 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
8925 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
8926 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
8929 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
8931 field.write(writer)?;
8938 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
8939 (0, forward_info, required),
8940 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
8941 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
8942 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
8943 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
8946 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
8948 (0, htlc_id, required),
8949 (2, err_packet, required),
8954 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
8955 (0, payment_secret, required),
8956 (2, expiry_time, required),
8957 (4, user_payment_id, required),
8958 (6, payment_preimage, required),
8959 (8, min_value_msat, required),
8962 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8964 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8965 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8966 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8967 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8968 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8969 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8973 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8974 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
8976 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8978 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
8980 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8981 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
8982 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
8985 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
8987 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8988 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
8989 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8990 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8991 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8992 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8993 serializable_peer_count += 1;
8996 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
8997 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9001 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9003 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9004 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9005 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9006 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9007 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9008 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9011 channel.write(writer)?;
9017 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9018 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9019 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9020 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9021 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9022 for forward in pending_forwards {
9023 forward.write(writer)?;
9028 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9030 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9031 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9032 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9034 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9035 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9036 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9037 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9038 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9039 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9040 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9041 htlc.write(writer)?;
9043 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9044 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9047 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9048 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9049 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9050 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9051 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9052 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9053 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9056 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9057 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9058 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9059 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9060 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9062 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9063 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9064 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9065 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9066 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9067 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9068 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9073 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9074 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9075 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9076 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9077 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9078 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9079 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9080 // well save the space and not write any events here.
9081 0u64.write(writer)?;
9083 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9084 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9085 event.write(writer)?;
9089 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9090 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9091 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9092 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9093 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9094 0u64.write(writer)?;
9096 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9097 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9098 // likely to be identical.
9099 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9100 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9102 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9103 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9104 hash.write(writer)?;
9105 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9108 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9109 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9110 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9111 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9112 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9115 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9116 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9118 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9119 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9120 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9121 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9124 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9125 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9126 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9127 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9131 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9132 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9133 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9135 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9136 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9137 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9143 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9144 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9145 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9146 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9149 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9150 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9151 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9152 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9153 pending_claiming_payments = None;
9156 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9157 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9158 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9159 if !updates.is_empty() {
9160 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9161 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9166 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9167 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9168 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9169 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9170 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9171 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9172 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9173 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9174 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9175 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9176 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9177 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9178 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9185 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9186 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9187 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9188 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9191 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9192 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9193 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9194 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9195 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9196 // check that the event is sane here.
9197 let event_encoded = event.encode();
9198 let event_read: Option<Event> =
9199 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
9200 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
9206 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9207 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9208 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9209 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
9210 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
9211 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
9214 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
9215 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
9216 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
9217 events.push_back((ev, action));
9218 } else if action.is_some() {
9219 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9226 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
9227 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
9228 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
9229 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
9230 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
9231 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
9234 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
9236 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
9238 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9239 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
9240 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
9241 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
9242 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
9243 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
9244 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
9245 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
9246 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9247 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
9248 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
9249 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
9250 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
9252 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
9253 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
9255 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
9256 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
9258 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
9259 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
9260 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
9261 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
9262 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
9263 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
9265 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
9266 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9268 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9269 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9270 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9271 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9272 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9273 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9277 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9278 pub entropy_source: ES,
9280 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9281 pub node_signer: NS,
9283 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9284 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9286 pub signer_provider: SP,
9288 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9290 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9291 pub fee_estimator: F,
9292 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9294 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9295 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9296 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9297 pub chain_monitor: M,
9299 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9300 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9301 /// force-closed during deserialization.
9302 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9303 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
9304 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
9306 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
9308 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
9309 /// deserialization.
9311 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
9312 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
9313 pub default_config: UserConfig,
9315 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
9316 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
9318 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
9319 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
9320 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
9321 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
9323 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
9326 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
9327 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
9330 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9331 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9333 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9334 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9335 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9336 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9337 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9338 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9342 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
9343 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
9344 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
9345 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
9346 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
9348 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
9349 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
9354 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
9355 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
9356 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9357 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
9359 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9360 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9361 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9362 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9363 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9364 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9368 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9369 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
9370 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
9374 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9375 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
9377 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9378 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9379 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9380 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9381 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9382 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9386 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9387 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9389 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9390 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9391 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9393 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
9395 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9396 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9397 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9398 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9399 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9400 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
9401 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
9402 for _ in 0..channel_count {
9403 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
9404 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
9406 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9407 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
9408 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
9409 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
9410 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
9411 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
9412 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9413 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
9414 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
9415 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
9416 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9417 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
9418 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
9420 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
9421 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
9422 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
9424 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
9425 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
9426 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9428 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
9429 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
9430 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9432 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs, batch_funding_txid) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
9433 if batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
9434 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9436 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
9437 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9438 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
9441 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
9442 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9443 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9444 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9445 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
9446 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9447 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9449 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9450 let mut found_htlc = false;
9451 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9452 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
9455 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
9456 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
9457 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
9458 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
9459 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
9460 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
9461 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
9462 log_info!(args.logger,
9463 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
9464 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
9465 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9469 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
9470 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
9471 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9472 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9473 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9475 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
9476 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
9478 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
9479 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9480 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
9481 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9483 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9484 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
9485 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9486 entry.insert(by_id_map);
9490 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
9491 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
9492 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
9493 // safely discard the channel.
9494 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
9495 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9496 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9497 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9498 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
9499 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9500 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9503 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
9504 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9505 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9506 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9507 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9508 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9512 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9513 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
9514 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
9515 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9516 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
9517 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
9518 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
9520 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
9524 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
9525 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9526 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9527 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
9528 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9529 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9530 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
9531 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
9532 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
9534 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
9537 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9538 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9539 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
9540 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9541 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9542 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
9543 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
9544 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
9546 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
9549 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
9552 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
9553 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
9554 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9555 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9556 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9557 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9558 is_connected: false,
9562 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9563 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
9564 for _ in 0..peer_count {
9565 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
9566 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
9567 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
9568 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
9569 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
9572 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9573 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
9574 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
9575 for _ in 0..event_count {
9576 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
9577 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
9582 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9583 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
9584 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9586 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
9587 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
9588 // on-startup monitor updates.
9589 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
9590 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
9592 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9596 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
9597 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9599 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9600 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
9601 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
9602 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
9603 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9607 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9608 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
9609 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
9610 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
9611 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
9612 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
9613 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
9615 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
9616 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9620 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
9621 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
9622 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
9623 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
9624 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9625 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9626 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9627 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
9628 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
9629 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
9630 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
9631 let mut events_override = None;
9632 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9633 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9634 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
9635 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9636 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
9637 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9638 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
9639 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9640 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
9641 (8, events_override, option),
9642 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
9643 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9644 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
9645 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9647 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
9648 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9651 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
9652 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9655 if let Some(events) = events_override {
9656 pending_events_read = events;
9659 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
9660 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
9663 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
9664 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
9665 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
9666 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
9667 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
9668 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
9670 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
9672 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
9673 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
9674 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
9677 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
9678 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
9679 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
9680 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
9681 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
9683 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
9684 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
9685 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
9687 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
9688 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
9689 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
9690 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
9691 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
9693 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
9694 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9695 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
9696 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
9697 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9698 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
9699 pending_background_events.push(
9700 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9701 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9702 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
9703 update: update.clone(),
9706 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
9707 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
9708 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
9709 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
9710 pending_background_events.push(
9711 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
9712 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9713 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
9716 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
9717 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
9718 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9720 max_in_flight_update_id
9724 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9725 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
9726 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9727 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
9728 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9729 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
9731 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9732 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
9733 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
9734 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
9735 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
9736 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
9737 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
9738 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
9739 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
9742 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
9743 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
9744 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9745 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
9746 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
9747 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
9748 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9749 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9750 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9751 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9752 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9755 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9756 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9757 debug_assert!(false);
9758 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9763 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
9764 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
9765 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
9766 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
9767 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
9768 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
9769 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
9770 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
9772 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9773 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
9774 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
9776 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9777 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
9778 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9779 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9780 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9781 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9782 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9783 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9788 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
9789 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
9791 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
9792 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
9793 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
9794 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
9797 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
9798 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
9799 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
9800 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
9801 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
9802 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
9803 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
9805 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9806 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9807 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
9808 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
9809 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
9810 if path.hops.is_empty() {
9811 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
9812 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9815 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
9816 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
9817 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
9818 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
9819 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9820 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
9821 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
9822 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
9824 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9825 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
9826 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
9827 retry_strategy: None,
9828 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
9829 payment_params: None,
9830 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
9831 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
9832 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9833 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9834 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9835 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9836 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
9837 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
9838 total_msat: path_amt,
9839 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
9840 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9842 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
9843 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
9848 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9850 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
9851 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
9852 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
9853 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
9855 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
9856 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
9857 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
9858 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
9859 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
9860 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
9861 forwards.retain(|forward| {
9862 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
9863 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9864 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9865 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9870 !forwards.is_empty()
9872 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
9873 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9874 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9875 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9876 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
9877 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
9878 intercepted_id != ev_id
9885 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
9886 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
9887 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
9888 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
9889 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
9890 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
9891 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
9892 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
9893 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
9894 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
9895 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
9897 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9898 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
9899 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
9901 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
9902 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
9903 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
9910 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
9911 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
9913 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
9915 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
9916 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
9917 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
9918 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
9919 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
9920 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
9921 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
9922 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
9923 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9924 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
9927 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
9928 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
9929 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
9930 // channel still live case here.
9934 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
9935 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
9940 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
9941 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
9942 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
9943 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
9944 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
9945 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
9946 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
9947 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
9951 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
9952 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
9954 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
9955 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
9956 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9957 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9959 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
9960 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9961 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9963 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
9964 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
9966 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9967 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
9969 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9972 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
9973 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9974 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9976 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9980 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
9981 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
9982 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
9983 if htlcs.is_empty() {
9984 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9986 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
9987 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
9988 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
9989 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
9990 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
9991 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
9992 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
9993 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
9995 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
9996 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10000 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10002 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10004 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10005 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10007 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10008 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10013 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10014 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10016 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10018 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10020 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10021 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10022 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10023 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10027 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10028 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10029 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10030 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10031 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10032 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10033 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10034 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10036 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10037 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10038 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10040 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10041 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10042 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10043 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10044 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10045 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10047 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10048 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10049 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10050 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10051 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10052 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10056 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10057 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10058 debug_assert!(false);
10059 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10064 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10066 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10067 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10068 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10069 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10070 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10071 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10072 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10073 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10074 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10075 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10076 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10078 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10079 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10081 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10082 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10083 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10084 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10086 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10087 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10088 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10089 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10091 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10092 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10093 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10094 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10096 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10097 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
10098 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10099 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10100 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10101 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10102 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
10105 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10106 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
10109 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10112 purpose: payment.purpose,
10113 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10114 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10115 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10121 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10122 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10123 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10124 for action in actions.iter() {
10125 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10126 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10127 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10129 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10130 log_trace!(args.logger,
10131 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
10132 blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
10133 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10134 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10135 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10137 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10138 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10139 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10140 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10144 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
10145 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
10149 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
10151 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
10152 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10156 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10158 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10159 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10160 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10161 router: args.router,
10163 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10165 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10166 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10167 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10168 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10170 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10171 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10172 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10173 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10174 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10175 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10177 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10179 our_network_pubkey,
10182 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10184 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10186 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10187 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10188 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10189 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10190 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10192 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10193 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10195 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10197 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
10198 node_signer: args.node_signer,
10199 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
10201 logger: args.logger,
10202 default_configuration: args.default_config,
10205 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
10206 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
10207 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
10208 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
10209 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
10212 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
10213 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
10214 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
10215 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
10216 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
10217 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
10220 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
10221 //connection or two.
10223 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
10229 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10230 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10231 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
10232 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
10233 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
10234 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
10235 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
10236 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
10237 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10238 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
10239 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
10240 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
10241 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
10242 use crate::util::test_utils;
10243 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
10244 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
10247 fn test_notify_limits() {
10248 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
10249 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
10250 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10251 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10252 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10253 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10255 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
10256 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
10257 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10258 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10259 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10261 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10263 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
10264 // to connect messages with new values
10265 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10266 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10267 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10268 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10269 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10270 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10272 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
10273 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10274 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10275 // ... but the last node should not.
10276 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10277 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
10278 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10279 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10281 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
10282 // about the channel.
10283 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10284 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10285 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10287 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10289 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10290 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10291 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10292 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10293 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10294 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10296 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
10297 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10298 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10300 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
10301 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
10302 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
10303 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
10304 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
10305 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
10307 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
10308 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
10309 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10310 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10311 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10312 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10313 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10314 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10316 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
10317 // the channel info has updated.
10318 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10319 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10320 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10321 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10322 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10323 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10327 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
10328 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
10330 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10331 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10332 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10333 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10334 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10336 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
10337 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
10338 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
10339 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
10341 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10342 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
10343 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
10344 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
10345 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
10346 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
10347 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
10348 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
10349 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10350 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10351 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10352 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10354 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
10355 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10356 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10357 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10358 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10359 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10360 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10361 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10362 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10363 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10364 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10365 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10366 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
10367 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10368 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10369 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10370 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10371 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10372 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10373 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10374 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10375 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10376 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
10378 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
10379 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
10380 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
10381 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10382 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10383 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10384 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
10386 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
10387 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
10388 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
10389 // lightning messages manually.
10390 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10391 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
10392 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
10394 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10395 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10396 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
10397 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
10398 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10399 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10400 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
10401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10402 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10403 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
10404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10405 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10406 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10407 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10408 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10409 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10410 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
10411 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10412 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10413 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
10414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10415 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10416 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10417 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10418 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
10419 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10421 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
10422 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
10423 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10424 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10426 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10427 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10428 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10429 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10431 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10434 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10435 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10436 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10437 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10439 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10444 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
10445 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
10446 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
10449 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
10450 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
10451 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
10452 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
10453 // fails as expected.
10454 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
10455 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
10456 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
10457 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
10458 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
10459 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
10460 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10461 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10462 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10463 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
10464 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10465 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10466 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10467 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10468 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10470 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
10471 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
10472 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
10474 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10475 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10476 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
10477 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
10478 let route = find_route(
10479 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10480 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10482 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10483 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10485 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10486 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10487 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10488 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10489 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10490 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10491 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10492 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
10493 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
10494 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10495 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10496 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10497 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10498 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10499 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10500 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10501 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10502 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10503 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10504 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10505 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10507 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10508 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10510 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10511 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10512 let route = find_route(
10513 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10514 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10516 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10517 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10518 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10519 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10520 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10521 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10522 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10523 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10525 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
10526 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10527 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10528 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10530 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10531 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10532 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10533 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10534 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10535 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10536 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10537 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10538 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10540 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10541 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10542 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10543 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10544 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10545 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10546 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10547 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10548 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10550 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
10551 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10553 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10554 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
10555 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10556 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
10557 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10558 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10559 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10560 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10561 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10562 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10564 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10565 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10566 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
10569 let route = find_route(
10570 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10571 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10573 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
10574 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10575 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
10576 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10577 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10578 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10579 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10580 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10581 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10582 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10583 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10584 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10585 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10586 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10587 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10588 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10589 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10590 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10591 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10592 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10593 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10594 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10595 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10597 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10598 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10602 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
10603 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
10604 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
10605 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10606 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10607 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10608 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10610 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10611 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10613 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10614 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10615 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10616 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10617 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10618 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10619 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10620 let route = find_route(
10621 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10622 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10625 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10626 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
10627 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
10628 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10629 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
10630 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10631 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10633 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10634 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10635 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10636 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10637 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10638 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10639 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10641 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
10645 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
10646 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
10647 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
10648 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10649 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
10650 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10651 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10652 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10653 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10655 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10656 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10658 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10659 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10660 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10661 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10662 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10663 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10664 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10665 let route = find_route(
10666 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10667 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10670 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10671 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10672 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
10673 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
10674 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10675 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
10676 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
10677 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10678 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10680 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10681 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10682 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10683 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10684 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10685 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10686 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10688 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
10692 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
10693 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10694 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10695 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10696 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10698 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10699 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10700 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10701 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10703 // Marshall an MPP route.
10704 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
10705 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
10706 route.paths.push(path);
10707 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10708 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
10709 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
10710 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
10711 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
10712 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
10714 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10715 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
10717 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
10718 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
10720 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
10725 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
10726 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10727 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10728 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10729 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10731 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10733 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10734 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10736 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10737 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
10738 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10739 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10742 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
10743 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
10744 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10745 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
10746 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
10747 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
10750 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10753 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
10754 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
10759 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
10760 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
10761 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10762 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10763 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10764 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10766 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
10767 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10769 total_msat: 100_000,
10772 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
10773 // payment verification fails as expected.
10774 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
10775 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
10776 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
10777 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
10779 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
10783 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
10784 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
10788 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
10789 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
10790 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
10791 // the channel is successfully closed.
10792 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10793 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10794 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10795 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10797 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10798 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10799 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
10800 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10801 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10803 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10804 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
10806 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
10807 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
10808 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10809 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10812 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10814 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10815 // as it has the funding transaction.
10816 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10817 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10818 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10821 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10823 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10825 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10827 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10828 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10829 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10831 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10834 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10835 // as it has the funding transaction.
10836 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10837 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10838 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10840 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10841 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10842 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10843 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10844 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10845 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10846 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10847 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
10849 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10850 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10851 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10852 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
10854 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10855 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
10857 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
10858 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
10859 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
10860 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
10861 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10862 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10863 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10867 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
10868 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
10869 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
10870 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
10871 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10872 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10873 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10876 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10878 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
10879 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
10880 // closing transaction).
10881 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
10882 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
10883 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10885 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
10886 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
10887 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10888 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10889 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10892 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10894 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
10896 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
10897 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
10898 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10900 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10902 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10903 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10906 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10907 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
10908 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10911 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10912 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
10913 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10916 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
10917 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
10918 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10921 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
10922 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
10923 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10926 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
10928 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10929 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10931 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
10932 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10934 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
10935 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
10940 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
10941 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
10942 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
10943 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
10944 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10945 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10946 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
10947 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10950 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
10951 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10952 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
10954 // Test the API functions.
10955 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
10957 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
10959 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10961 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10963 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10965 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
10967 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
10971 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
10972 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
10973 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
10974 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
10975 // the given `channel_id`.
10976 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10977 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10978 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
10979 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10981 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10984 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
10986 // Test the API functions.
10987 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
10989 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
10991 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
10993 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
10995 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
10997 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11001 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11002 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11003 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11004 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11005 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11006 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11008 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11010 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11011 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11013 let mut funding_tx = None;
11014 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11015 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11016 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11019 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11020 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11021 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11022 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11023 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11025 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11026 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11027 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11029 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11031 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11032 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11033 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11035 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11038 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11039 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11040 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11041 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11042 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11044 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11045 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11047 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11048 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11049 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11050 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11051 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11052 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11053 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11056 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11057 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11058 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11059 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11060 }, true).unwrap_err();
11062 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11063 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11064 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11065 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11066 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11067 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11068 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11070 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11071 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11073 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11074 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11075 }, true).unwrap_err();
11077 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11078 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11079 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11080 }, false).unwrap();
11081 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11083 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11084 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11086 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11087 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11088 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11089 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11090 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11092 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11093 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11094 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11096 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11097 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11098 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11100 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11101 // "protected" and can connect again.
11102 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11103 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11104 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11106 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11108 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11110 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11111 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11115 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11116 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11117 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11118 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11119 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11120 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11122 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11124 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11125 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11127 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11128 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11129 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11130 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11133 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11135 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11136 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11137 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11139 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11140 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11141 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11143 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
11144 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11145 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11146 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11150 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
11151 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11152 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11153 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11154 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11155 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
11156 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11157 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
11158 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11160 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11162 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11163 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11165 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11166 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11167 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11168 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11169 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11170 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11173 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11174 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11176 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11177 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11179 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11181 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11182 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11185 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11186 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11187 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11188 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11189 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11191 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11192 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11194 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11195 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
11196 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
11197 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
11201 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11203 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11204 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11206 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
11207 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11208 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11210 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11211 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11213 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11215 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11219 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
11220 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11221 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11222 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11223 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11224 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
11225 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
11226 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11228 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11229 payment_metadata: None,
11230 keysend_preimage: None,
11231 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11232 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11234 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11236 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
11237 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
11238 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
11239 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11240 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
11242 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
11243 } else { panic!(); }
11245 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
11246 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
11248 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11249 payment_metadata: None,
11250 keysend_preimage: None,
11251 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11252 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11254 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11256 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11257 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
11261 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
11262 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11263 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11264 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11265 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11267 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
11268 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11270 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11271 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11272 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
11273 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
11274 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11276 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11277 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11279 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11280 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11281 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11282 match &msg_events[0] {
11283 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
11284 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11286 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
11287 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
11288 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
11291 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11294 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11295 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11297 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
11298 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
11299 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11301 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11305 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
11306 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
11307 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
11308 // the channel without the anchors feature.
11309 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11310 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11311 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
11312 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11313 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11314 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
11315 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11317 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
11318 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11319 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11321 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11322 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11324 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11325 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11327 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11330 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11331 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
11333 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11334 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11336 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
11337 // not have generated any events.
11338 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11342 fn test_update_channel_config() {
11343 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11344 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11345 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11346 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11347 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11348 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11349 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
11351 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11352 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11353 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11355 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
11356 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11357 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
11358 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11359 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11361 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11362 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11365 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
11366 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11367 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11369 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
11370 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11371 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
11372 ..Default::default()
11374 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11375 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11376 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11378 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11379 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11382 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
11383 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11384 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11385 ..Default::default()
11387 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11388 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
11389 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11390 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11392 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11393 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11396 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
11397 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
11398 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
11399 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
11400 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
11403 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11404 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11405 ..Default::default()
11407 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
11410 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
11411 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
11412 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11413 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11417 fn test_payment_display() {
11418 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11419 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11420 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
11421 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11422 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11423 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11429 use crate::chain::Listen;
11430 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
11431 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
11432 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
11433 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
11434 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11435 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
11436 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
11437 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
11438 use crate::util::test_utils;
11439 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
11441 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11442 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11443 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
11445 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
11447 use criterion::Criterion;
11449 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
11450 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
11451 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
11452 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
11453 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
11454 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
11455 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
11457 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
11458 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
11460 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
11461 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
11463 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
11465 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
11468 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
11469 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
11472 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
11473 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
11474 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
11476 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
11477 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
11479 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
11480 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
11481 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
11482 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
11483 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
11485 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
11486 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
11487 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
11489 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
11490 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
11491 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
11492 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
11494 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
11495 }, genesis_block.header.time);
11496 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
11498 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
11499 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
11500 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
11501 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
11502 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
11504 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
11505 }, genesis_block.header.time);
11506 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
11508 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
11509 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11511 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
11512 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11513 }, false).unwrap();
11514 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
11515 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11516 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11519 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
11520 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
11521 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
11523 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11524 } else { panic!(); }
11526 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11527 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11528 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
11529 match events_b[0] {
11530 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11531 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11533 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11536 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11537 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11538 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
11539 match events_a[0] {
11540 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11541 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11543 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11546 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
11548 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
11549 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
11550 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
11552 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11553 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11554 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
11555 match msg_events[0] {
11556 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
11557 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
11558 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11562 match msg_events[1] {
11563 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11567 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11568 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
11569 match events_a[0] {
11570 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11571 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11573 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11576 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11577 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
11578 match events_b[0] {
11579 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11580 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11582 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11585 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
11586 macro_rules! send_payment {
11587 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
11588 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
11589 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
11590 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
11591 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
11592 payment_count += 1;
11593 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
11594 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
11596 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
11597 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
11598 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
11599 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
11600 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
11601 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11602 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
11603 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
11604 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11605 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11606 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11608 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
11609 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
11610 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11611 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
11613 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
11614 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
11615 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
11616 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11617 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
11619 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
11622 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
11623 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11624 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11625 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11627 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
11631 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
11632 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
11633 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);