1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
33 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
34 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
36 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
46 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
50 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
51 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
53 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
55 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
57 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
59 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
60 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
61 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
62 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
63 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
65 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
66 use crate::onion_message::{Destination, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
67 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
68 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
69 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
70 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
71 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
72 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
73 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
74 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
76 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
79 use crate::prelude::*;
81 use core::cell::RefCell;
83 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
84 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
85 use core::time::Duration;
88 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
89 pub(crate) use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
90 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
92 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
94 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
95 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
96 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
98 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
99 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
100 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
101 // before we forward it.
103 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
104 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
105 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
106 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
107 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
109 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
110 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
112 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
113 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
114 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
115 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
118 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
119 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
120 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
121 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
122 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
126 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
127 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
128 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
129 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
130 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
131 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
132 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
136 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
137 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
138 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
139 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
140 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
142 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
143 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
144 /// may overshoot this in either case)
145 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
146 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
147 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
148 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
149 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
152 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
153 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
154 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
155 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
158 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
159 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
160 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
161 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
162 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
165 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
166 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
168 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
169 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
170 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
173 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
174 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
176 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
177 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
180 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
181 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
184 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
188 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
189 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
190 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
191 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
192 short_channel_id: u64,
193 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
195 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
196 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
198 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
199 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
204 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
206 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
207 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
208 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
210 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
211 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
214 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
215 struct ClaimableHTLC {
216 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
218 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
220 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
221 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
222 sender_intended_value: u64,
223 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
225 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
226 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
227 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
228 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
230 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
231 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
234 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
235 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
236 events::ClaimedHTLC {
237 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
238 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
239 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
240 value_msat: val.value,
245 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
246 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
248 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
249 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
250 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
253 /// Number of bytes in the id.
254 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
257 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
258 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
263 impl Readable for PaymentId {
264 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
265 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
270 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
271 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
272 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
276 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
278 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
279 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
280 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
282 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
283 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
288 impl Readable for InterceptId {
289 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
290 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
295 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
296 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
297 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
298 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
299 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
302 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
304 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
305 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
306 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
308 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
309 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
313 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
314 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
315 (0, short_channel_id, required),
316 (2, htlc_id, required),
318 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
319 (0, session_priv, required),
324 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
325 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
326 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
327 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
328 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
331 session_priv: SecretKey,
332 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
333 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
334 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
335 payment_id: PaymentId,
338 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
339 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
340 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
342 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
344 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
346 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
349 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
350 payment_id.hash(hasher);
351 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
357 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
359 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
360 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
361 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
362 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
363 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
364 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
368 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
369 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
370 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
371 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
372 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
373 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
375 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
381 struct InboundOnionErr {
387 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
388 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
390 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
391 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
392 pub enum FailureCode {
393 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
394 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
395 TemporaryNodeFailure,
396 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
397 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
398 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
399 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
400 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
401 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
402 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
403 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
404 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
405 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
407 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
408 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
409 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
412 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
413 fn into(self) -> u16 {
415 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
416 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
417 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
418 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
423 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
424 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
425 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
426 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
427 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
429 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
430 err: msgs::LightningError,
431 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
432 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
433 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
435 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
437 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
439 err: LightningError {
441 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
442 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
449 shutdown_finish: None,
450 channel_capacity: None,
454 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
455 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
458 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
459 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
460 let action = if let (Some(_), ..) = &shutdown_res {
461 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
462 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
463 // commitment upon reconnecting.
464 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
466 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
469 err: LightningError { err, action },
470 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
471 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
472 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
476 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
479 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
481 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
482 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
486 log_level: Level::Warn,
489 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
491 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
493 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
495 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
496 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
504 shutdown_finish: None,
505 channel_capacity: None,
509 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
510 self.chan_id.is_some()
514 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
515 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
516 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
517 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
518 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
520 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
521 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
522 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
523 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
524 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
525 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
526 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
528 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
532 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
533 struct ClaimingPayment {
535 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
536 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
537 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
538 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
540 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
541 (0, amount_msat, required),
542 (2, payment_purpose, required),
543 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
544 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
545 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
548 struct ClaimablePayment {
549 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
550 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
551 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
554 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
555 struct ClaimablePayments {
556 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
557 /// failed/claimed by the user.
559 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
560 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
562 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
563 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
564 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
566 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
567 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
568 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
569 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
572 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
573 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
574 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
575 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
577 enum BackgroundEvent {
578 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
579 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
580 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
581 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
583 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
584 /// are regenerated on startup.
585 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
586 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
587 /// channel to continue normal operation.
589 /// In general this should be used rather than
590 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
591 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
592 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
594 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
595 /// are regenerated on startup.
596 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
597 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
598 funding_txo: OutPoint,
599 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
601 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
602 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
604 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
605 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
606 channel_id: ChannelId,
611 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
612 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
613 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
614 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
615 /// event can be generated.
616 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
617 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
618 /// operation of another channel.
620 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
621 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
622 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
623 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
625 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
626 event: events::Event,
627 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
629 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
630 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
631 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
633 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
634 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
635 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
636 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
637 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
639 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
640 /// stored for later processing.
641 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
642 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
643 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
644 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
648 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
649 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
650 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
651 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
652 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
653 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
654 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
655 (4, blocking_action, required),
657 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
658 (0, event, upgradable_required),
659 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
660 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
661 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
662 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
663 // downgrades to prior versions.
664 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
668 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
669 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
670 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
671 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
672 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
675 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
676 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
677 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
678 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
682 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
683 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
684 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
685 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
686 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
687 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
689 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
690 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
691 channel_id: ChannelId,
692 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
697 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
698 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
699 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
700 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
701 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
706 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
707 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
711 /// State we hold per-peer.
712 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
713 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
715 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
716 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
717 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
719 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
720 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
721 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
722 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
723 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
724 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
725 latest_features: InitFeatures,
726 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
727 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
728 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
729 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
730 /// user but which have not yet completed.
732 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
733 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
734 /// for a missing channel.
735 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
736 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
737 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
739 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
740 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
741 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
742 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
744 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
745 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
746 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
747 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
748 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
749 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
750 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
751 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
752 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
753 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
754 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
755 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
756 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
757 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
758 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
762 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
763 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
764 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
765 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
766 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
767 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
770 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
771 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
772 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
775 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
776 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
777 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
780 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
781 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
782 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
783 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
787 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
788 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
789 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
790 /// The original OpenChannel message.
791 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
792 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
793 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
796 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
797 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
798 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
800 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
801 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
803 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
806 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
807 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
808 struct PendingInboundPayment {
809 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
810 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
811 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
812 /// this payment being removed.
814 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
815 user_payment_id: u64,
816 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
817 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
818 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
821 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
822 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
823 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
824 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
825 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
826 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
827 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
828 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
830 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
831 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
832 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
840 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
842 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
847 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
848 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
849 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
850 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
851 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
852 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
853 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
854 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
855 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
857 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
858 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
859 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
868 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
870 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
875 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
877 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
879 pub trait AChannelManager {
880 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
881 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
882 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
883 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
884 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
885 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
886 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
887 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
888 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
889 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
890 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
891 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
892 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
893 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
894 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
895 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
896 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
897 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
898 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
899 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
900 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
901 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
902 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
903 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
904 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
905 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
906 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
907 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
908 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
909 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
910 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
911 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
912 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
913 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
914 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
915 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
918 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
919 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
921 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
922 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
923 ES::Target: EntropySource,
924 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
925 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
926 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
930 type Watch = M::Target;
932 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
934 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
936 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
938 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
939 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
941 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
943 type Router = R::Target;
945 type Logger = L::Target;
947 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
950 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
951 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
953 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
954 /// to individual Channels.
956 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
957 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
958 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
959 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
961 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
962 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
963 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
964 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
965 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
966 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
967 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
968 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
969 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
971 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
972 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
973 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
975 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
976 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
977 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
978 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
979 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
981 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
982 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
983 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
984 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
986 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
987 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
988 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
990 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
991 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
992 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
993 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
994 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
996 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
997 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
998 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
999 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1000 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1001 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1002 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1003 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1006 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1007 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1008 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1009 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1010 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1014 // `pending_offers_messages`
1016 // `total_consistency_lock`
1018 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1020 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1022 // |__`per_peer_state`
1024 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1026 // |__`claimable_payments`
1028 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1034 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1036 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1040 // |__`pending_events`
1042 // |__`pending_background_events`
1044 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1046 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1047 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1048 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1049 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1050 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1051 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1055 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1056 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1057 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1063 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1065 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1067 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1068 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1070 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1071 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1072 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1073 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1075 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1076 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1078 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1079 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1080 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1081 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1082 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1083 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1084 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1085 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1087 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1089 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1090 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1092 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1094 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1095 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1096 /// and via the classic SCID.
1098 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1099 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1101 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1103 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1105 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1106 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1107 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1109 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1110 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1112 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1113 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1115 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1116 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1118 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1119 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1120 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1121 /// active channel list on load.
1123 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1124 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1126 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1128 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1129 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1130 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1132 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1133 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1134 /// the handling of the events.
1136 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1137 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1140 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1141 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1142 /// would break backwards compatability.
1143 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1144 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1145 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1147 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1148 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1150 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1152 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1153 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1154 /// confirmation depth.
1156 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1157 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1158 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1160 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1162 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1164 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1166 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1168 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1170 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1171 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1172 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1174 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1175 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1177 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1178 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1179 /// keeping additional state.
1180 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1182 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1183 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1184 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1185 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1187 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1188 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1190 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1191 /// are currently open with that peer.
1193 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1194 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1197 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1199 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1200 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1201 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1202 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1203 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1205 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1206 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1207 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1208 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1209 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1211 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1212 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1214 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1215 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1216 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1217 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1218 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1220 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1221 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1223 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1224 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1225 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1226 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1227 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1229 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1231 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1233 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1234 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1235 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1236 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1237 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1238 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1239 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1240 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1241 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1242 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1243 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1245 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1246 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1247 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1249 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1251 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1252 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1254 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1258 signer_provider: SP,
1263 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1265 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1266 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1267 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1268 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1269 pub struct ChainParameters {
1270 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1271 pub network: Network,
1273 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1275 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1276 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1279 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1283 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1284 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1287 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1288 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1289 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1290 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1291 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1292 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1294 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1295 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1296 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1297 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1298 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1299 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1301 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1302 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1305 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1306 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1307 /// events to handle.
1309 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1310 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1312 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1313 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1316 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1317 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1318 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1319 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1321 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1322 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1323 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1324 should_persist: move || {
1325 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1326 // processing and return that.
1327 let notify = persist_check();
1328 match (notify, force_notify) {
1329 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1330 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1331 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1332 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1333 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1336 _read_guard: read_guard,
1340 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1341 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1342 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1343 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1344 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1345 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1347 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1348 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1349 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1350 should_persist: persist_check,
1351 _read_guard: read_guard,
1356 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1357 fn drop(&mut self) {
1358 match (self.should_persist)() {
1359 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1360 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1361 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1363 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1364 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1365 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1370 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1371 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1373 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1375 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1376 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1377 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1378 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1379 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1381 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1382 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1384 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1386 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1387 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1388 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1389 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1390 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1391 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1392 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1393 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1394 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1395 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1396 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1397 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1398 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1400 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1401 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1403 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1404 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1405 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1406 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1408 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1409 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1410 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1411 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1412 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1413 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1416 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1418 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1419 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1422 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1424 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1425 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1427 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1428 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1429 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1431 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1432 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1433 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1435 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1436 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1437 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1438 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1440 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1441 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1442 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1444 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1445 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1446 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1448 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1449 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1450 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1451 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1452 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1453 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1454 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1455 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1456 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1457 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1458 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1461 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1462 /// to better separate parameters.
1463 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1464 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1465 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1466 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1467 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1468 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1469 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1470 pub features: InitFeatures,
1471 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1472 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1473 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1475 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1477 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1478 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1479 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1480 /// payments to us through this channel.
1481 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1482 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1483 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1484 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1485 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1486 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1487 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1490 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1491 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1492 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1493 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1494 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1495 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1496 /// lifetime of the channel.
1497 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1498 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1499 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1500 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1501 /// our counterparty already.
1503 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1504 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1505 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1506 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1508 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1509 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1510 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1511 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1513 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1514 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1516 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1517 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1519 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1520 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1521 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1522 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1523 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1524 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1525 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1526 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1527 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1530 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1532 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1533 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1534 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1535 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1536 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1537 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1538 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1540 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1541 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1543 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1544 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1545 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1546 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1547 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1548 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1549 /// this value on chain.
1551 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1553 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1555 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1556 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1557 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1558 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1559 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1560 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1561 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1563 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1564 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1565 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1566 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1567 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1568 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1570 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1571 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1572 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1573 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1574 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1576 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1577 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1578 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1579 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1581 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1582 pub balance_msat: u64,
1583 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1584 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1585 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1586 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1588 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1590 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1591 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1592 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1593 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1594 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1595 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1596 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1597 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1599 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1600 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1601 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1602 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1603 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1604 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1605 /// route which is valid.
1606 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1607 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1608 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1609 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1610 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1611 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1613 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1614 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1615 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1616 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1617 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1618 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1619 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1620 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1621 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1623 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1625 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1626 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1627 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1628 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1629 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1631 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1632 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1633 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1634 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1635 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1636 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1637 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1639 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1640 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1641 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1642 pub is_outbound: bool,
1643 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1644 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1645 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1646 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1647 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1649 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1650 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1651 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1652 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1653 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1654 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1655 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1657 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1658 pub is_usable: bool,
1659 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1660 pub is_public: bool,
1661 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1662 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1663 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1664 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1665 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1666 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1668 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1669 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1672 impl ChannelDetails {
1673 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1674 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1675 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1677 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1678 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1679 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1680 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1683 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1684 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1685 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1687 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1688 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1689 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1690 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1693 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1694 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1695 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1698 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1699 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1701 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1702 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1703 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1705 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1706 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1707 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1708 features: latest_features,
1709 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1710 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1711 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1712 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1713 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1714 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1715 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1716 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1717 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1718 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1720 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1721 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1722 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1723 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1724 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1725 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1726 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1727 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1728 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1729 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1730 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1731 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1732 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1733 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1734 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1735 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1736 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1737 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1738 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1739 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1740 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1741 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1742 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1743 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1744 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1745 config: Some(context.config()),
1746 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1751 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1752 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1753 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1754 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1755 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1756 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1757 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1758 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1759 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1761 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1763 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1764 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1766 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1767 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1768 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1769 /// to drop the channel.
1773 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1774 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1775 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1776 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1777 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1779 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1780 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1781 payment_id: PaymentId,
1783 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1785 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1786 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1787 payment_id: PaymentId,
1788 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1790 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1791 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1792 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1795 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1796 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1797 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1799 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1800 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1801 payment_id: PaymentId,
1802 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1803 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1804 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1806 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1807 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1808 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1810 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1811 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1812 payment_id: PaymentId,
1813 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1814 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1818 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1820 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1822 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1823 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1824 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1825 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1827 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1828 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1829 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1832 macro_rules! handle_error {
1833 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1834 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1835 // entering the macro.
1836 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1837 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1841 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1842 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1844 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1845 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1846 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1847 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1851 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1852 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1853 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1854 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1855 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1856 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1861 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1862 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1864 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1865 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1866 action: err.action.clone()
1870 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1871 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1872 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1873 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1874 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1878 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1883 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1886 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1887 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1888 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1894 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1895 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1896 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1897 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1898 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1899 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1901 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1902 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1903 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1904 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1905 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1907 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1908 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1910 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1914 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1915 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1916 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1918 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1919 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1921 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1922 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1924 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1925 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1926 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1927 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1928 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1929 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1931 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1932 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1936 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1937 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1939 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1940 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1942 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1943 match $channel_phase {
1944 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1945 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1947 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1948 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1950 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1951 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1957 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1958 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1962 let key = *$entry.key();
1963 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1965 $entry.remove_entry();
1973 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
1974 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1978 let key = *$entry.key();
1979 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1981 $entry.remove_entry();
1989 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
1990 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1992 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1993 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
1999 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2000 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2001 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2002 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2003 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2005 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2006 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2007 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2008 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2009 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2010 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2011 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2012 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2013 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2014 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2019 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2020 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2021 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2022 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2023 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2024 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2025 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2026 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2027 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2029 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2034 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2035 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2036 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2037 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2038 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2039 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2040 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2041 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2042 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2044 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2049 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2050 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2051 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
2052 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2053 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2054 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2055 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2056 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2057 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2058 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2059 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2061 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2062 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2063 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2069 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2070 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2072 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2073 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2074 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2075 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2076 updates.announcement_sigs);
2077 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2078 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2081 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2082 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2083 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2084 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2086 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2087 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2088 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2089 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2090 let mut batch_completed = false;
2091 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2092 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2093 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2094 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2096 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2097 channel_state.2 = true;
2099 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2101 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2103 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2106 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2107 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2108 if batch_completed {
2109 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2110 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2111 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2112 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2113 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2114 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2115 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2116 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2117 chan.set_batch_ready();
2118 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2119 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2123 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2124 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2125 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2130 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2132 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2133 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2135 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2136 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2137 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2138 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2143 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2144 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2145 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2147 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2148 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2149 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
2150 panic!("{}", err_str);
2152 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2153 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2154 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2157 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2163 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2164 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2165 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2167 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2168 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2169 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2170 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2171 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2172 // filter for uniqueness here.
2173 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2174 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2175 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2176 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2178 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2179 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2181 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2182 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2183 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2189 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2190 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2191 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2192 while !processed_all_events {
2193 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2200 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2201 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2202 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2204 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2205 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2206 result = $self.process_background_events();
2208 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2209 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2210 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2211 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2215 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2216 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2217 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2218 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2221 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2223 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2224 $event_to_handle = event;
2226 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2227 post_event_actions.push(action);
2232 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2233 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2234 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2235 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2236 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2237 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2240 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2241 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2242 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2243 processed_all_events = false;
2247 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2248 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2249 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2251 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2252 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2253 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2259 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2261 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2262 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2263 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2264 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2265 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2266 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2270 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2272 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2274 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2275 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2277 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2279 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2280 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2281 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2284 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2285 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2286 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2288 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2289 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2290 current_timestamp: u32,
2292 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2293 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2294 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2295 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2297 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2298 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2299 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2304 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2306 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2307 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2308 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2309 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2310 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2311 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2312 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2313 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2315 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2318 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2319 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2321 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2323 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2325 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2327 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2328 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2329 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2330 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2331 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2332 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2333 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2334 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2336 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2346 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2347 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2348 &self.default_configuration
2351 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2352 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2353 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2356 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2357 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2359 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2361 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2365 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2370 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2372 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2373 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2374 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2375 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2376 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2378 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2379 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2381 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2382 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2383 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2385 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2386 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2387 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2389 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2390 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2391 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2392 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2393 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2394 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2396 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2397 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2398 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2399 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2400 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2401 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2404 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2405 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2406 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2408 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2410 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2411 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2413 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2415 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2416 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2417 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2418 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2419 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2420 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2424 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2429 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2431 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2432 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2433 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2435 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2437 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2440 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2443 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2444 node_id: their_network_key,
2447 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2450 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2451 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2452 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2453 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2454 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2455 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2456 // the same channel.
2457 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2459 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2460 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2461 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2462 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2463 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2464 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2465 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2466 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2467 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2471 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2472 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2473 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2481 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2482 /// more information.
2483 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2484 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2485 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2486 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2487 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2488 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2489 // the same channel.
2490 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2492 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2493 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2494 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2495 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2496 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2497 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2498 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2499 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2507 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2508 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2510 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2511 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2513 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2514 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2515 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2516 // really wanted anyway.
2517 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2520 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2521 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2522 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2523 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2525 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2526 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2527 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2528 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2529 let context_to_details = |context| {
2530 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2532 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2534 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2535 .map(context_to_details)
2541 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2542 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2544 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2545 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2546 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2548 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2549 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2550 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2551 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2552 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2553 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2555 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2556 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2557 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2559 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2560 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2561 payment_id: *payment_id,
2562 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2563 total_msat: *total_msat,
2566 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2567 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2569 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2570 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2572 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2577 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2578 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2579 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2580 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2581 Some(transaction) => {
2582 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2583 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2588 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2589 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2590 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2591 reason: closure_reason,
2592 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2593 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2597 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2598 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2600 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2601 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2603 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2605 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2606 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2608 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2609 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2611 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2612 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2613 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2614 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2615 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2616 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2617 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2618 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2619 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2621 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2622 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2623 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2624 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2625 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2629 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2630 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2632 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2633 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2634 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2635 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2639 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2640 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2641 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2642 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2646 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2647 shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
2653 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2654 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2655 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2657 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2658 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2659 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2660 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2665 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2666 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2667 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2668 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2671 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2672 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2678 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2679 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2680 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2682 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2683 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2685 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2686 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2687 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2688 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2690 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2692 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2693 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2694 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2697 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2698 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2699 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2700 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2701 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2702 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2705 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2706 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2707 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2709 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2710 /// the channel being closed or not:
2711 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2712 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2713 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2714 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2715 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2716 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2717 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2719 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2720 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2721 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2722 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2724 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2726 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2727 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2728 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2731 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2732 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2733 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2734 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2735 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2738 fn finish_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2739 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2740 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2741 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2742 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2745 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs, unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid) = shutdown_res;
2746 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2747 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2748 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2749 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2750 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2751 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2753 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2754 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2755 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2756 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2757 // ignore the result here.
2758 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2760 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2761 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2762 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2763 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2764 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2765 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2766 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2767 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2768 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2769 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2770 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2771 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2772 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2775 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2778 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2779 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2782 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2783 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2787 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2788 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2789 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2790 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2791 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2792 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2793 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2794 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2795 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2796 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2797 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2799 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2801 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2802 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2803 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2804 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2805 mem::drop(peer_state);
2806 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2808 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2809 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2810 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2812 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2813 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2814 // Unfunded channel has no update
2815 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2818 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2819 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2820 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2821 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2823 (None, *peer_node_id)
2825 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2828 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2829 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2830 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2831 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2832 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2833 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2834 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2835 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2836 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2842 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2845 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2846 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2847 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2848 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2849 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2850 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2851 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2852 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2853 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2854 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2855 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2856 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2867 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2868 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2869 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2871 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2872 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2873 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2876 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2877 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2878 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2880 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2881 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2882 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2883 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2884 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2887 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2888 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2889 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2890 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2891 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2895 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2896 /// local transaction(s).
2897 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2898 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2899 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2903 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2904 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2905 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2906 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2907 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2908 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2909 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2911 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2912 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2916 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2917 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2918 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2919 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } =>
2920 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2921 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2922 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2923 err_data: Vec::new(),
2927 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2928 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2929 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2932 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2933 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2934 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2935 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2936 outgoing_cltv_value,
2937 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2941 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2942 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2943 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2944 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2945 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2946 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2947 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2948 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2950 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2951 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
2952 amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, ..
2954 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
2955 (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None)
2957 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => {
2958 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2959 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2960 err_data: Vec::new(),
2961 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2965 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2966 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2967 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2968 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2970 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2973 // final_expiry_too_soon
2974 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2975 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2977 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2978 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2979 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2980 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2981 if cltv_expiry <= current_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 {
2982 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2983 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2984 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2985 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2986 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2987 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2990 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2991 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2992 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2994 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2996 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2997 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
3001 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
3002 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
3003 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
3004 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
3005 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
3006 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
3007 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3008 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
3009 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3010 err_code: 0x4000|22,
3011 err_data: Vec::new(),
3012 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
3015 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
3016 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3017 err_code: 0x4000|22,
3018 err_data: Vec::new(),
3019 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
3022 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
3026 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
3029 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
3030 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3033 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
3034 phantom_shared_secret,
3038 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3039 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
3040 err_data: Vec::new(),
3041 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
3044 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3047 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
3048 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
3049 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
3050 outgoing_cltv_value,
3051 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
3055 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3056 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
3057 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
3058 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
3059 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
3061 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3062 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3063 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3064 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3065 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
3066 failure_code: $err_code,
3072 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
3073 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
3076 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
3077 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
3078 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3080 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
3081 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
3082 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
3083 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
3084 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
3085 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
3086 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
3087 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
3089 macro_rules! return_err {
3090 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3092 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3093 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3094 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3095 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3096 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3097 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3103 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
3104 shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
3105 msg.payment_hash, &self.node_signer
3108 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3109 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
3111 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3112 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
3115 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
3116 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3117 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
3118 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
3121 let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
3122 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
3123 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
3125 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
3126 // inbound channel's state.
3127 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3128 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } |
3129 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } =>
3131 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
3135 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3136 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3137 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3138 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3139 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3140 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3141 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3142 // phantom or an intercept.
3143 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3144 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3145 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3149 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3152 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3154 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3155 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3156 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3157 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3158 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3160 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3161 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3162 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3163 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3166 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3167 // have no consistency guarantees.
3168 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3172 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3173 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3174 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3175 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3176 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3178 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3179 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3180 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3181 // we don't have the channel here.
3182 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3184 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3186 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3187 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3188 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3189 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3190 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3191 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3192 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3193 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3194 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3195 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3196 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3198 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3201 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3202 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3204 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3205 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3209 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3210 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3211 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3212 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3214 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3221 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3222 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3223 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3224 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3225 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3226 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3228 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3229 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3231 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3232 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3233 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3234 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3235 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3236 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3237 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3238 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3239 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3240 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3246 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3247 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3248 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3249 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3251 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3252 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3254 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3255 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3256 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3258 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3259 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3260 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3261 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3262 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3263 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3264 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3268 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3270 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3273 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3274 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3275 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3276 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3277 macro_rules! return_err {
3278 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3280 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3281 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3282 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3283 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3284 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3285 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3291 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3293 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3294 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3297 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3298 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3299 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3300 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3301 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3303 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3306 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3307 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3308 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3309 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3310 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3316 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3317 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3318 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3320 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3321 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3322 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3324 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3325 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3326 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3327 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3328 return Err(LightningError {
3329 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3330 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3333 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3334 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3336 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3337 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3340 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3341 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3342 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3343 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3345 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3346 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3347 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3349 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3350 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3351 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3352 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3353 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3354 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3358 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3361 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3362 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3363 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3365 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3366 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3367 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3368 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3369 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3372 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3373 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3375 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3376 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3377 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3378 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3379 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3380 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3381 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3382 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3384 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3385 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3386 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3388 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(unsigned.clone())).unwrap();
3390 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3397 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3398 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3399 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3400 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3405 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3406 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3407 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3410 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3411 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3413 log_trace!(self.logger,
3414 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3415 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3416 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3417 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3419 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3420 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3421 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3423 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3424 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3426 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3427 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3428 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3429 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3432 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3433 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3434 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3435 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3436 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3437 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3438 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3439 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3440 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3441 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3443 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3444 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3445 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3447 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3448 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3450 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3451 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3452 Some(monitor_update) => {
3453 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3455 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3456 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3457 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3458 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3459 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3460 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3461 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3469 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3472 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3473 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3474 // `channel_by_id` map.
3475 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3476 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3481 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3482 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3484 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3489 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3491 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3492 /// fields for more info.
3494 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3495 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3497 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3499 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3500 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3501 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3502 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3503 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3505 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3506 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3507 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3508 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3509 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3511 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3512 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3513 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3514 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3516 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3518 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3519 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3520 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3522 /// In general, a path may raise:
3523 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3524 /// node public key) is specified.
3525 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3526 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3527 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3528 /// relevant updates.
3530 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3531 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3532 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3534 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3535 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3536 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3537 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3538 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3539 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3540 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3541 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3542 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3543 self.pending_outbound_payments
3544 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3545 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3546 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3549 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3550 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3551 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3552 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3553 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3554 self.pending_outbound_payments
3555 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3556 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3557 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3558 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3562 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3563 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3564 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3565 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3566 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3567 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3571 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3572 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3573 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3577 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3578 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3581 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3582 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3583 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3584 self.pending_outbound_payments
3585 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3586 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3587 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3588 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3589 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3593 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3594 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3595 /// retries are exhausted.
3597 /// # Event Generation
3599 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3600 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3602 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3603 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3604 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3606 /// # Requested Invoices
3608 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3609 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3610 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3611 /// once the invoice has been received.
3613 /// # Restart Behavior
3615 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3616 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3617 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3619 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3620 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3621 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3622 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3625 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3626 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3627 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3628 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3629 /// never reach the recipient.
3631 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3632 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3634 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3635 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3637 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3638 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3639 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3640 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3641 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3642 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3643 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3646 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3647 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3649 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3652 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3653 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3654 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3655 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3656 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3657 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3658 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3659 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3662 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3663 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3664 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3665 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3666 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3667 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3668 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3669 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3670 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3673 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3676 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3677 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3680 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3681 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3683 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3684 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3685 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3686 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3687 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3688 let payment_params =
3689 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3691 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3693 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3696 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3697 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3699 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3700 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3701 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3702 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3704 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3705 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3706 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3707 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3708 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3709 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3710 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3711 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3712 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3713 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3715 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3716 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3717 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3718 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3722 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3724 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3725 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3728 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3730 let mut res = Vec::new();
3732 for mut path in route.paths {
3733 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3734 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3735 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3736 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3737 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3740 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3743 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3744 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3746 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3748 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3749 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3754 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3757 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3762 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3763 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3764 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3766 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3767 let used_liquidity =
3768 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3770 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3771 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3773 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3776 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3781 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3782 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3783 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3790 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3791 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3792 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3793 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3794 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3795 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3796 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3797 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3798 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3800 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3801 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3802 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3803 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3804 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3806 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &self.logger)
3807 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3808 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3809 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3810 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3811 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3812 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3813 } else { unreachable!(); });
3815 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3816 Err((chan, err)) => {
3817 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3818 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3820 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3821 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3822 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3828 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3829 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3831 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3832 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3835 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3836 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3837 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3841 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3842 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3845 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3846 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3847 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3849 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3850 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3851 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3852 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3854 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3861 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3862 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3863 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3867 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3869 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3870 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3872 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3873 /// across the p2p network.
3875 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3876 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3878 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3879 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3880 /// keys per-channel).
3882 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3883 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3884 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3886 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3887 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3888 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3890 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3891 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3892 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3893 /// for more details.
3895 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3896 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3897 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3898 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3901 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3903 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3904 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3906 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transcaction
3907 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3908 /// signature for each channel.
3910 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3911 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3912 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3913 let mut result = Ok(());
3915 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3916 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3917 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3918 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3919 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3924 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3925 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3926 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3930 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3931 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3932 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3933 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3934 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3935 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3936 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3937 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3942 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3943 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3944 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3945 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3949 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3950 match states.entry(txid) {
3951 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3952 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3953 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3957 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3960 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels.iter() {
3961 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3962 temporary_channel_id,
3963 counterparty_node_id,
3964 funding_transaction.clone(),
3967 let mut output_index = None;
3968 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3969 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3970 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3971 if output_index.is_some() {
3972 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3973 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3976 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3979 if output_index.is_none() {
3980 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3981 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3984 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3985 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3986 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3992 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3993 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3994 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3995 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3996 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3997 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3998 .into_iter().flatten()
3999 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4001 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4002 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4004 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4006 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4007 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4008 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4009 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4010 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
4012 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4013 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
4014 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
4018 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4019 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4025 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4027 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4028 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4029 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4030 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4032 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4033 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4035 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4036 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4038 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4040 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4041 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4042 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4043 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4044 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4045 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4046 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4047 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4048 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4049 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4050 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4051 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4052 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4056 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4057 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4058 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4059 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4060 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4061 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4062 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4063 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4064 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4065 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4069 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4070 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4071 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4072 config.apply(config_update);
4073 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4076 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4077 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4078 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4079 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4080 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4081 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4088 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4089 debug_assert!(false);
4090 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4092 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4093 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4100 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4102 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4103 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4104 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4105 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4107 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4108 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4110 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4111 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4113 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4115 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4116 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4117 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4118 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4119 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4120 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4121 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4122 pub fn update_channel_config(
4123 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4124 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4125 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4128 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4129 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4131 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4132 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4134 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4135 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4136 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4137 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4138 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4140 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4141 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4142 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4145 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4148 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4149 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4150 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4151 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4152 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4153 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4154 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4156 let next_hop_scid = {
4157 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4158 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4159 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4160 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4161 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4162 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4163 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4164 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4165 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4166 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4169 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4171 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4172 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4173 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4175 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4176 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4177 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4182 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4183 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4184 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4187 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4188 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
4189 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
4191 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4193 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4194 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4195 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4196 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4197 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4200 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4201 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4202 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4203 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4204 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4206 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4210 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4211 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4213 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4216 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4217 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4218 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4220 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4221 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4222 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4225 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4226 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4227 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4228 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4229 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4230 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4231 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4232 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4235 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4236 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4237 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4238 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4243 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4245 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4246 /// Will likely generate further events.
4247 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4248 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4250 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4251 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4252 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4254 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4255 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4257 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4258 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4259 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4261 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4262 match forward_info {
4263 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4264 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4265 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4266 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4267 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4270 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4271 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4272 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4274 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4275 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4276 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4277 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4278 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4279 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4280 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4283 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4284 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4286 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4289 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4290 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4296 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4297 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4299 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4303 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4304 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4306 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4310 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4311 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4312 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4313 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4314 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4315 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4316 payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4319 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4320 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
4321 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4322 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4323 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4325 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4327 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4328 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4332 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4333 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4334 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4335 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
4337 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4338 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4344 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4347 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4350 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4351 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4352 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4353 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4354 // problem, not ours.
4360 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4361 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4362 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4364 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4368 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4369 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4370 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4371 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4374 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4375 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4376 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4377 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4378 match forward_info {
4379 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4380 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4381 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4382 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4383 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4386 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4387 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4388 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4389 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4390 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4391 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4392 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4393 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4394 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4396 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4397 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4398 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4401 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4402 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4404 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4406 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4407 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4408 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4409 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4414 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4415 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4417 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4418 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4419 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4420 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4422 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4423 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4425 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4427 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4428 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4429 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4436 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4440 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4441 match forward_info {
4442 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4443 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4444 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4445 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4446 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4449 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4450 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4451 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4452 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4453 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4454 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4455 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4457 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4458 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4459 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4463 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4464 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4467 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4470 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4471 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4472 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4473 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4474 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4475 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4476 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4477 phantom_shared_secret,
4479 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4480 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4481 // if routing nodes overpay
4482 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4483 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4485 total_value_received: None,
4486 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4489 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4492 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4494 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4495 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4496 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4497 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4498 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4499 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4501 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4502 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4503 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4504 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4505 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4506 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4507 phantom_shared_secret,
4509 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4510 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4512 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4515 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4516 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4517 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4518 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4519 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4522 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4523 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4524 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4525 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4526 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4527 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4529 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4530 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4531 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4533 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4534 .entry(payment_hash)
4535 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4536 .or_insert_with(|| {
4537 committed_to_claimable = true;
4539 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4542 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4543 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4544 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4545 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4547 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4548 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4549 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4551 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4552 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4553 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4556 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4558 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4559 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4560 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4561 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4562 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4563 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4564 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4565 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4566 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4567 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4569 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4571 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4572 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4573 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4574 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4575 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4576 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4578 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4579 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4580 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4581 committed_to_claimable = true;
4583 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4584 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4585 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4586 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4587 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4588 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4589 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4590 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4591 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4592 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4596 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4597 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4598 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4599 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4600 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4602 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4604 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4605 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4607 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4608 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4609 committed_to_claimable = true;
4612 payment_claimable_generated
4616 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4617 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4618 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4619 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4620 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4621 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4622 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4623 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4624 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4625 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4626 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4627 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4628 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4629 Ok(result) => result,
4631 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4632 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4635 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4636 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4637 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4638 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4639 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4640 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4643 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4644 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4645 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4647 check_total_value!(purpose);
4649 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4650 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4651 check_total_value!(purpose);
4655 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4656 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4657 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4658 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4660 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4661 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4662 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4663 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4664 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4665 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4666 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4667 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4669 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4670 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4671 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4673 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4674 if payment_claimable_generated {
4675 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4681 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4682 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4690 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4691 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4692 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4693 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4695 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4696 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4698 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4700 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4701 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4702 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4704 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4706 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4707 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4708 events.append(&mut new_events);
4711 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4713 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4714 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4715 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4717 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4719 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4720 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4721 if background_events.is_empty() {
4722 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4725 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4727 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4728 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4729 // monitor updating completing.
4730 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4732 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4733 let mut updated_chan = false;
4735 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4736 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4737 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4738 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4739 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4740 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4741 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4742 updated_chan = true;
4743 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4744 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4746 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4749 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4754 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4755 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4758 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4759 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4760 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4761 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4762 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4763 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4764 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4766 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4767 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4768 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4769 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4770 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4776 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4779 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4780 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4781 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4782 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4783 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4786 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4787 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4788 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4789 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4790 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4791 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4792 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4794 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4796 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4797 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4798 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4799 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4801 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4802 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4804 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4805 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4809 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4810 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4811 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4812 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4813 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4814 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4815 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4817 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4818 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4820 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4821 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4822 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4823 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4824 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4825 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4827 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4832 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4833 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4841 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4843 /// This currently includes:
4844 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4845 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4846 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4848 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4849 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4850 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4851 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4852 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4853 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4854 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4855 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4857 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4858 /// estimate fetches.
4860 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4861 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4862 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4863 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4864 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4866 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4867 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4869 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4870 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4871 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4872 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4874 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4875 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4876 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4877 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4878 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4879 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4881 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4882 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4883 log_error!(self.logger,
4884 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4885 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4886 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4887 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4888 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4889 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4890 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4891 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4892 channel_id: *chan_id,
4893 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4904 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4905 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4906 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4907 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4908 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4909 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4910 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4912 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4913 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4918 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4919 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4921 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4922 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4923 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4924 if needs_close { return false; }
4927 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4928 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4929 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4930 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4931 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4932 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4933 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4934 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4936 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4937 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4938 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4939 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4943 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4945 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4948 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4950 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4951 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4952 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4953 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4957 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4959 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4965 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4967 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4968 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4969 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4970 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4971 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4972 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4973 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4974 channel_id: *chan_id,
4975 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4983 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4984 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4985 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4987 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4988 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4989 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4994 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4995 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4996 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4997 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4998 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4999 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5000 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5001 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5007 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5009 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5010 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5015 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5016 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5017 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5018 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5019 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5020 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5021 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5022 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5023 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5024 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5025 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5026 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5027 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5028 // have no channels to the peer.
5029 let remove_entry = {
5030 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5031 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5034 entry.remove_entry();
5037 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5042 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5043 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5044 // This should be unreachable
5045 debug_assert!(false);
5048 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5049 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5050 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5051 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5052 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5053 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5054 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5057 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5058 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5059 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5061 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5062 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5069 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5070 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5071 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5072 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5073 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5076 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5077 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5080 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5081 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5084 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5085 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5086 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5087 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5088 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5089 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5090 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5093 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5094 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5097 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5098 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5099 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5100 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5101 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5108 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5109 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5110 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5112 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5113 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5114 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5115 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5117 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5118 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5119 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5120 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5121 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5122 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5125 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5126 /// reason for the failure.
5128 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5129 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5130 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5132 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5133 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5134 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5135 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5136 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5137 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5138 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5143 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5144 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5145 match failure_code {
5146 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5147 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5148 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5149 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5150 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5151 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5153 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5154 let fail_data = match data {
5155 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5158 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5163 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5164 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5166 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5168 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5169 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5170 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5171 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5172 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5173 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5174 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5176 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5178 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5179 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5181 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5186 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5187 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5188 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5189 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5190 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5191 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5192 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5193 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5194 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5195 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5197 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5198 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5199 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5200 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5202 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5203 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5204 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5205 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5206 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5210 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5211 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5212 // be surfaced to the user.
5213 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5214 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5215 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5217 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5218 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5219 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5220 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5221 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5222 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5223 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5224 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5225 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5227 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5228 debug_assert!(false);
5229 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5232 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5234 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5237 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5238 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5239 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5240 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5244 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5245 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5246 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5247 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5248 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5249 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5250 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5251 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5252 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5253 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5256 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5257 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5258 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5261 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5262 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5263 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5265 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5266 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5267 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5268 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5269 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5271 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
5272 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
5273 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
5275 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5276 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5277 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5278 push_forward_ev = true;
5280 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5281 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5282 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5284 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5285 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5288 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5289 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5290 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5291 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5292 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5293 failed_next_destination: destination,
5299 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5300 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5302 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5303 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5304 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5305 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5307 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5308 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5309 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5310 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5312 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5313 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5314 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5316 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5317 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5318 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5319 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5320 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5321 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5322 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5323 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5324 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5327 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5328 /// even type numbers.
5332 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5333 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5335 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5336 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5337 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5340 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5341 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5343 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5346 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5347 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5348 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5349 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5350 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5351 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5352 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5353 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5358 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5359 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5360 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5361 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5362 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5364 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5365 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5366 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5370 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5371 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5372 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5373 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5374 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5375 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5376 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5377 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5378 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5379 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5380 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5389 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5391 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5392 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5393 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5394 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5395 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5396 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5397 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5398 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5399 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5400 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5401 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5402 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5403 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5404 debug_assert!(false);
5408 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5410 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5411 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5412 debug_assert!(false);
5416 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5417 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5419 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5420 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5421 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5422 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5425 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5426 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5427 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5428 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5432 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5433 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5434 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5435 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5436 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5437 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5440 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5441 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5442 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5443 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5444 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5449 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5450 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5451 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5452 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5453 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5454 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5455 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5457 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5460 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5461 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5462 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5463 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5467 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5468 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5469 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5470 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5472 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5473 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5474 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5475 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5477 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5478 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5479 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5480 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5483 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5484 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5485 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5486 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5490 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5491 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5492 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5495 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5496 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5497 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5498 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5499 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5500 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5501 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5504 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5505 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5506 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5508 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5511 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5512 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5514 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5515 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5516 // monitor update as a background event.
5517 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5518 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5519 counterparty_node_id,
5520 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5521 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5525 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5526 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5531 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5533 log_trace!(self.logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5535 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5536 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5537 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5538 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5539 blocking_action: blocker,
5541 (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5543 debug_assert!(false,
5544 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5547 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5548 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5549 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5550 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5551 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5553 let mut found_blocker = false;
5554 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5555 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5556 // which case we need to only remove the one
5557 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5558 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5559 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5560 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5562 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5565 debug_assert!(false);
5574 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5575 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5576 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5582 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5583 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5584 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5585 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5586 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5587 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5588 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5589 // again on restart.
5590 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5591 payment_preimage, update_res);
5594 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5595 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5597 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5598 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5599 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5600 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5601 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5602 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5603 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5604 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5605 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5606 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5609 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5610 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5611 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5612 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5613 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5614 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5618 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5619 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5622 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5623 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5624 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5627 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5628 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5629 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5630 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5631 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5633 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5634 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5635 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5637 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5638 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5641 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5642 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5643 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5644 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5645 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5646 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5647 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5648 let chan_to_release =
5649 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5650 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5652 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5653 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5654 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5655 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5660 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5661 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5662 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5663 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5664 // in the background.
5665 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5666 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5667 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5668 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5670 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5671 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5672 funding_txo, update, ..
5674 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5675 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5676 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5677 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5679 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5685 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5686 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5687 (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5689 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5690 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5692 monitor_update.updates[0],
5693 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5698 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5699 // immediately once we get going.
5700 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5703 *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5705 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5708 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5709 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5710 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5711 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5712 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5713 blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5717 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5718 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5719 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5722 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5723 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5725 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5726 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5727 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5728 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5730 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5734 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5735 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5736 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5742 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5743 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5744 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5747 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5748 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5749 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5750 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5752 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5754 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5755 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5756 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5758 payment_purpose: purpose,
5761 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5763 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5767 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5769 sender_intended_total_msat,
5773 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5774 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5776 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5777 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5778 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5781 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5782 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5784 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5785 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5786 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5787 Some(blocking_action),
5794 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5795 /// update completion.
5796 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5797 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5798 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5799 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5800 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5801 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5802 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5803 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5804 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5805 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5806 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5807 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5808 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5810 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5812 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5813 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5814 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5815 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5818 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5819 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5821 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5822 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5823 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5828 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5829 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5830 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5831 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5836 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5837 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5838 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5839 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5840 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5845 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5849 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5855 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5856 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5857 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5861 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5862 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5863 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5869 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5870 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5872 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5873 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5875 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5876 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5877 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5878 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5879 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5884 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5885 let mut peer_state_lock;
5886 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5887 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5888 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5889 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5891 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5894 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5895 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5896 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5897 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5898 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5901 let remaining_in_flight =
5902 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5903 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5906 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5907 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5908 remaining_in_flight);
5909 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5912 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5915 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5917 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5918 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5921 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5922 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5923 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5925 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5926 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5927 /// used to accept such channels.
5929 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5930 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5931 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5932 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5935 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5936 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5938 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5939 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5940 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5942 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5943 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5945 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5946 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5948 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5949 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5951 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5952 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5953 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5954 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5957 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5958 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5960 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5961 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5962 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5963 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5964 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5965 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5966 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5967 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5969 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5970 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5971 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5973 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5974 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5975 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5976 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5977 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5978 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5979 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5981 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5985 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5986 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5987 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5988 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5989 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5990 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5991 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5994 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5995 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5997 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5998 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5999 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6000 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6001 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6002 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6003 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6004 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6007 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6008 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
6012 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6013 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6014 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6016 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6017 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6018 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6021 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6026 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6027 /// or 0-conf channels.
6029 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6030 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6031 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6032 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6033 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6034 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6036 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6037 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6038 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6039 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6040 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6041 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6042 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6046 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6049 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6050 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6052 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6053 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6055 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6056 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6057 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6058 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6059 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6061 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6064 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6065 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6066 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6069 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6070 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6075 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6078 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6079 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6080 // likely to be lost on restart!
6081 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6082 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6085 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6086 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6089 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6090 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6091 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6092 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6093 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6095 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6096 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6098 debug_assert!(false);
6099 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6101 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6102 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6104 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6105 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6106 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6107 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6108 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6109 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6111 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6112 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6113 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6116 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6117 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6118 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6119 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6120 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6123 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6124 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6126 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6129 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6130 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6131 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6132 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6133 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6134 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6135 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6136 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6137 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
6139 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6140 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6141 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6146 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6147 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6148 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6149 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6150 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6151 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6152 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6155 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6160 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6161 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6162 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6164 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6165 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6168 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6169 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6171 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6172 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6173 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6175 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6179 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6180 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6181 // likely to be lost on restart!
6182 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6183 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6184 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6186 debug_assert!(false);
6187 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6189 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6190 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6191 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6192 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6193 match phase.get_mut() {
6194 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6195 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6196 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6199 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6203 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6206 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6207 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6208 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6209 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6210 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6212 user_channel_id: user_id,
6217 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6218 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6220 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6221 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6223 debug_assert!(false);
6224 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6227 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6228 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6229 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
6230 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6231 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6232 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
6234 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6235 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6236 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6237 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6238 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6239 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6240 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6241 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6242 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6246 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6247 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6249 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6252 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
6253 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6254 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
6256 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6257 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6258 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6259 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6260 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6261 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6262 funding_msg.channel_id))
6264 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6265 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6266 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6267 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6268 mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6270 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6271 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6272 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6273 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6274 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6275 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6279 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6280 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6281 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6283 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6287 log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6288 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6289 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6290 funding_msg.channel_id));
6298 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6299 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6300 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6301 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6303 debug_assert!(false);
6304 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6307 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6308 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6309 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6310 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6311 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6312 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
6313 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6314 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6315 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6316 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6319 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
6323 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6327 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6331 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6332 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6333 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6334 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6335 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6337 debug_assert!(false);
6338 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6340 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6341 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6342 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6343 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6344 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6345 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6346 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6347 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6348 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6349 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6350 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6351 msg: announcement_sigs,
6353 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6354 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6355 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6356 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6357 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6358 // announcement_signatures.
6359 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6360 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6361 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6362 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6369 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6370 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6375 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6376 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6379 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6380 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6385 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6386 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6387 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6389 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6390 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6392 debug_assert!(false);
6393 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6395 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6396 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6397 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6398 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6400 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6401 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6402 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6404 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6407 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6408 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6409 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6410 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6412 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6413 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6414 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6415 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6416 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6417 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6421 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6422 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6423 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6424 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6427 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6428 let context = phase.context_mut();
6429 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6430 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6431 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6432 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6436 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6439 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6440 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6441 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6442 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6444 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6445 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6451 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6452 let mut shutdown_result = None;
6453 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid;
6454 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6455 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6457 debug_assert!(false);
6458 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6460 let (tx, chan_option) = {
6461 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6462 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6463 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6464 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6465 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6466 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
6467 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6468 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6469 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6470 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6475 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6476 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6477 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6478 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6479 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6480 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)))
6481 } else { (tx, None) }
6483 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6484 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6487 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6490 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6491 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6492 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6494 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6495 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6496 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6497 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6498 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6502 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6503 shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
6505 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6506 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6507 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6512 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6513 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6514 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6515 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6517 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6518 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6519 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6520 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6522 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6523 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6525 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6526 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6527 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6529 debug_assert!(false);
6530 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6532 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6533 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6534 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6535 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6536 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6537 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6538 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6539 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6540 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6541 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6543 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6544 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6545 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6546 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6547 match pending_forward_info {
6548 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6549 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6550 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6551 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6553 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6554 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6555 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6556 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6557 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6560 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6562 _ => pending_forward_info
6565 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6567 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6568 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6571 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6576 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6578 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6579 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6580 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6582 debug_assert!(false);
6583 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6585 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6586 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6587 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6588 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6589 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6590 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6591 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6592 log_trace!(self.logger,
6593 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6595 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6596 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6597 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6599 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6600 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6601 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6602 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6603 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6604 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6605 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6608 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6609 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6612 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6615 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6619 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6620 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6621 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6622 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6623 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6625 debug_assert!(false);
6626 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6628 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6629 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6630 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6631 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6632 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6633 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6635 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6636 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6639 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6644 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6645 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6646 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6647 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6648 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6650 debug_assert!(false);
6651 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6653 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6654 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6655 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6656 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6657 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6658 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6659 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6661 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6662 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6664 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6665 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6669 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6673 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6674 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6675 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6677 debug_assert!(false);
6678 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6680 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6681 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6682 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6683 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6684 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6685 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6686 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6687 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6688 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6689 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6693 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6694 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6697 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6702 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6703 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6704 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6705 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6706 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6707 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6708 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6709 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6710 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6711 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6712 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6714 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6715 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6717 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6718 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6719 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6720 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6721 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6722 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6724 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6725 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6726 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6728 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6729 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6730 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6731 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6732 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6733 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6734 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6735 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6736 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6739 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6740 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6742 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6743 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6744 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6745 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6746 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6747 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6748 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6749 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6750 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6753 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6754 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6755 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6760 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6761 // payments are being processed.
6762 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6763 push_forward_event = true;
6765 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6766 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6773 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6774 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6777 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6778 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6779 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6781 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6785 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6786 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6787 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6788 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6789 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6791 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6792 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6793 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6794 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6795 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6796 // real by taking more time.
6797 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6798 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6799 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6804 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6805 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6806 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6807 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6808 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6809 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6810 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6812 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6813 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6814 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6815 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6816 channel_funding_outpoint,
6817 counterparty_node_id,
6822 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6823 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6824 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6826 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6827 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6828 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6829 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6831 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6832 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6833 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6839 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6840 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6841 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6842 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6844 debug_assert!(false);
6845 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6846 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6847 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6848 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6849 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6850 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6851 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6852 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6853 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6854 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6855 *counterparty_node_id)
6857 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6858 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6859 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6860 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6861 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6862 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6863 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6867 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6868 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6871 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6874 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6878 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6879 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6880 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6882 debug_assert!(false);
6883 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6885 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6886 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6887 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6888 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6889 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6890 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6892 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6893 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6896 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6901 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6902 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6903 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6905 debug_assert!(false);
6906 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6908 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6909 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6910 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6911 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6912 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6913 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6914 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6917 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6918 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6919 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6920 msg, &self.default_configuration
6921 ), chan_phase_entry),
6922 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6923 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6924 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6927 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6928 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6931 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6936 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6937 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6938 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6939 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6941 // It's not a local channel
6942 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6945 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6946 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6947 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6948 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6950 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6951 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6952 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6953 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6954 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6955 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6956 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6957 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6958 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6959 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6960 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6962 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6964 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6965 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6966 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6967 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6969 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
6970 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6971 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
6974 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6978 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6979 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6982 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6984 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6987 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6989 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6990 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6992 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6994 debug_assert!(false);
6995 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6996 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7000 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7001 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7002 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7003 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7004 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7005 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7006 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7007 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7008 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7009 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7010 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7011 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7012 let mut channel_update = None;
7013 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7014 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7015 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7018 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7019 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7020 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7021 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7022 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7023 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7024 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7029 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7030 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7031 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7032 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7033 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7034 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7038 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7039 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7042 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7043 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7044 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id.0));
7045 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7046 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7047 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7048 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7049 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7050 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7052 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7053 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7054 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7055 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7056 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7057 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7058 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7059 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7060 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7061 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7062 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7063 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7064 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7065 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7066 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7067 next_funding_txid: None,
7070 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7071 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7072 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7078 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7079 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7080 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7081 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7084 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7085 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7090 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7091 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7092 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7094 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7095 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7096 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7097 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7098 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7099 match monitor_event {
7100 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7101 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7102 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7103 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7105 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7106 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7107 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7108 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7111 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7112 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7113 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7115 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7116 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
7117 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7118 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
7121 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7122 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7123 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7124 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7125 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7126 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7127 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7128 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7129 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
7130 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7131 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7135 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7136 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7137 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7138 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7139 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7147 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7148 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7154 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7155 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7158 has_pending_monitor_events
7161 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7162 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7163 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7165 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7166 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7167 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7170 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7171 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7172 /// update was applied.
7173 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7174 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7175 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7177 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7178 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7179 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7180 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7182 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7183 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7185 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7186 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7187 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7188 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7190 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7191 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7192 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7193 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
7194 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7195 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7197 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7198 has_monitor_update = true;
7200 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7201 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7202 continue 'peer_loop;
7211 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7212 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7213 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7219 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7220 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7221 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7222 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7223 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7224 let mut has_update = false;
7225 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7227 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7229 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7230 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7231 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7232 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7233 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7235 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7236 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
7237 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
7238 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
7239 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7241 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7242 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7245 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7246 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7247 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7248 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7249 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7254 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7256 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7257 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7258 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7259 shutdown_results.push((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
7265 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7266 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7271 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7277 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7278 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7281 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7282 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7288 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7289 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7291 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7292 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7293 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7294 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7295 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7296 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7297 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7298 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7299 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7300 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
7301 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7302 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7303 assert!(should_broadcast);
7304 } else { unreachable!(); }
7305 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7306 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7307 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7310 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7314 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7315 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7316 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7320 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the
7321 /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently,
7322 /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction
7323 /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7327 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7330 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7332 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7333 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7334 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7335 &self, description: String
7336 ) -> OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
7337 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7338 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7339 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7340 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7341 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7343 OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx)
7344 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7348 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7349 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7353 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7354 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7356 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7357 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7358 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7361 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7362 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7363 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7365 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7366 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7370 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as
7371 /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7372 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7373 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7377 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7378 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7382 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7383 /// or if `amount_msats` is invalid.
7385 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7387 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7388 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7389 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7390 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7391 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7392 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7393 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7394 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7395 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7396 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7397 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7398 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7400 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7401 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7403 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7404 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7407 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7408 self.pending_outbound_payments
7409 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7410 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7412 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7417 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7418 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7419 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7421 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7422 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7423 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7424 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7425 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7426 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7427 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7429 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7430 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7434 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7435 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7438 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7439 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7440 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7444 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7445 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7446 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7447 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7451 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7452 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7453 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7457 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7458 /// or if the provided parameters are invalid for the offer.
7460 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7461 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7462 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7463 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7464 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7465 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7466 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7467 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7468 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7469 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7470 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7471 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7472 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7473 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7474 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7477 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7478 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7479 let builder = match quantity {
7481 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7483 let builder = match amount_msats {
7485 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7487 let builder = match payer_note {
7489 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7492 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7493 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7495 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7496 self.pending_outbound_payments
7497 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7498 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7500 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7502 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7503 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7504 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7505 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7506 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7509 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7511 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7512 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7513 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7514 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7515 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7516 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7517 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7518 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7519 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7521 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7528 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7531 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7532 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7533 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7537 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7538 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7539 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7540 /// received and no retries will be made.
7542 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7543 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7544 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7545 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7546 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7548 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7549 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7551 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7552 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7553 let payment_paths = vec![
7554 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
7556 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7557 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7558 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7560 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7561 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7562 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7564 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7565 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7566 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7568 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7569 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7571 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7572 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7573 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7574 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7575 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7578 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7580 for path in refund.paths() {
7581 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7582 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7583 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7584 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7586 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7592 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7596 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7599 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7600 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7602 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7603 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7604 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7605 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7607 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7609 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7610 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7614 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7615 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7617 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7619 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7620 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7622 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7623 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7624 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7625 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7626 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7627 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7628 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7629 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7630 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7631 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7632 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7635 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7636 /// stored external to LDK.
7638 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7639 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7640 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7642 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7643 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7646 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7647 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7648 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7649 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7651 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7652 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7653 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7654 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7655 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7657 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7658 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7659 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7660 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7661 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7663 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7664 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7666 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7667 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7671 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7672 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7674 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7676 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7677 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7679 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7680 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7681 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7682 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7683 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7684 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7685 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7688 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7689 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7691 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7692 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7693 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7696 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7698 fn create_one_hop_blinded_path(&self) -> BlindedPath {
7699 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7700 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7701 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap()
7704 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7706 fn create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(
7707 &self, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7708 ) -> (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath) {
7709 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7710 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7712 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7713 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7714 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7716 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7718 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7721 // TODO: Err for overflow?
7722 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_payment(
7723 payee_node_id, payee_tlvs, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7727 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7728 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7730 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7731 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7732 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7733 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7735 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7736 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7737 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7738 Some(_) => continue,
7739 None => return scid_candidate
7744 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7746 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7747 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7749 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7750 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7751 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7755 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7756 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7757 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7759 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7760 /// times to get a unique scid.
7761 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7762 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7763 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7765 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7766 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7767 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7768 return scid_candidate
7772 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7773 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7774 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7775 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7777 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7778 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7779 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7780 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7781 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7782 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7784 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7785 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7786 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7795 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7796 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7797 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7798 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7799 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7803 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7804 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7805 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7806 events.push_back((event, None));
7810 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7811 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7812 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7816 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7817 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7821 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7822 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7825 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7826 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7827 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7828 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7829 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7831 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7832 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7833 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7834 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7836 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7837 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7838 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7839 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7841 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7845 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7846 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7847 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7848 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7849 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7850 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7851 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7855 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7856 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7857 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7858 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7859 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7860 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7861 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7862 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7863 if further_update_exists {
7864 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7869 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7870 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7875 log_debug!(self.logger,
7876 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7877 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7883 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7884 for action in actions {
7886 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7887 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7889 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7895 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7896 /// using the given event handler.
7898 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7899 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7903 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7907 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7909 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7910 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7911 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7912 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7913 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7914 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7918 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
7919 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
7920 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
7921 /// is always placed next to each other.
7923 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
7924 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
7925 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
7926 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
7928 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
7929 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
7930 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
7931 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
7932 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7933 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7934 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
7936 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
7937 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
7938 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
7939 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7942 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
7943 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7945 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
7946 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7949 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
7950 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7951 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7952 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7953 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7954 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
7955 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7959 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
7960 events.replace(pending_events);
7969 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7971 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7972 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7973 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7974 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7975 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7976 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7980 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
7982 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
7983 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
7984 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
7986 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
7990 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7992 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7993 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7994 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7995 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7996 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7997 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8001 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8003 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8004 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
8005 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8006 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
8007 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8010 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8011 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8014 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
8015 let _persistence_guard =
8016 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8017 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8018 let new_height = height - 1;
8020 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8021 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8022 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8023 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8024 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8025 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8028 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8032 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8034 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8035 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8036 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8037 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8038 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8039 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8043 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8044 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8045 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8046 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8048 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8049 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8051 let _persistence_guard =
8052 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8053 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8054 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
8055 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8057 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8058 if height < last_best_block_height {
8059 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8060 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8064 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
8065 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8066 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8067 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8069 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8070 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8072 let _persistence_guard =
8073 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8074 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8075 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8077 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8079 macro_rules! max_time {
8080 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8082 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8083 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8084 // having an explicit local time source.
8085 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8086 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8087 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8088 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8089 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8095 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8096 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8097 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8098 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8102 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8103 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8104 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8105 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8106 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8107 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8108 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
8109 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
8116 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8117 let _persistence_guard =
8118 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8119 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8120 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8121 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8122 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8123 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8124 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8125 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8130 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8132 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8133 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8134 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8135 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8136 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8137 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8141 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8142 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8144 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8145 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8146 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8147 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8148 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8150 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8151 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8153 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8154 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8155 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8156 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8157 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8158 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8160 // Retain unfunded channels.
8161 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8162 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8163 let res = f(channel);
8164 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8165 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8166 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8167 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8168 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8170 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8171 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8172 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8173 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8174 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8175 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8176 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8181 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8186 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8187 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8190 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8191 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8192 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8193 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8194 msg: announcement_sigs,
8196 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8197 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8198 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8200 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8201 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8202 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8207 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8208 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8209 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8210 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8211 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8212 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8213 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8214 // is always consistent.
8215 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8216 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8217 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8218 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8219 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8222 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8223 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8224 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8225 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8226 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
8227 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8228 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8232 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8233 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
8234 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8235 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8236 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8237 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8238 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8239 data: reason_message,
8252 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8253 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8254 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8255 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8256 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8257 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8258 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8259 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8260 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8261 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8263 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8264 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8265 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8269 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8272 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8273 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8274 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8275 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8276 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8277 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8278 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8279 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8280 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8281 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8284 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8285 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8286 _ => unreachable!(),
8288 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8289 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8290 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8291 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8297 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8299 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8300 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8304 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8305 /// may have events that need processing.
8307 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8308 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8310 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8311 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8312 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8313 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8316 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8317 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8318 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8321 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8322 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8323 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8326 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8327 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8328 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8329 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8332 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8333 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8334 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8335 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8338 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8339 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8341 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8342 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8343 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8344 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8345 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8348 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8349 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8350 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8351 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8354 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8355 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8356 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8357 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8360 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8361 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8362 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8363 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8366 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8367 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8368 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8369 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8373 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8374 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8376 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8377 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8378 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8379 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8380 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8381 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8385 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8386 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8387 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8388 // change to the contents.
8389 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8390 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8391 let persist = match &res {
8392 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8393 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8394 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8396 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8398 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8403 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8404 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8405 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8406 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8409 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8410 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8411 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8412 // change to the contents.
8413 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8414 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8415 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8419 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8420 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8421 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8422 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8425 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8426 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8427 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8430 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8431 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8432 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8435 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8436 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8437 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8438 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8439 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8440 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8441 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8442 let persist = match &res {
8443 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8444 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8446 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8451 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8452 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8453 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8456 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8457 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8458 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8461 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8462 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8463 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8464 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8465 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8466 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8467 let persist = match &res {
8468 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8469 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8470 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8472 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8477 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8478 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8479 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8482 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8483 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8484 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8485 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8486 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8487 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8488 let persist = match &res {
8489 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8490 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8491 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8493 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8498 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8499 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8500 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8501 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8502 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8503 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8504 let persist = match &res {
8505 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8506 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8507 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8509 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8514 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8515 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8516 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8519 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8520 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8521 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8524 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8525 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8526 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8527 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8528 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8529 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8530 let persist = match &res {
8531 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8532 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8533 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8535 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8540 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8541 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8542 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8545 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8546 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8547 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8550 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8555 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8556 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8557 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8558 let persist = match &res {
8559 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8560 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8561 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8563 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8568 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8569 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8570 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8571 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8572 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8574 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8575 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8576 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8577 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8578 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8579 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8580 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8581 let context = match phase {
8582 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8583 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger).is_ok() {
8584 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8589 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8590 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8593 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8597 // Clean up for removal.
8598 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8599 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8600 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8603 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8604 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8605 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8606 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8608 // V1 Channel Establishment
8609 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8610 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8611 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8612 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8613 // V2 Channel Establishment
8614 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8615 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8616 // Common Channel Establishment
8617 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8618 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8619 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8620 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8621 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8622 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8623 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8624 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8625 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8626 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8627 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8628 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8629 // Channel Operations
8630 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8631 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8632 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8633 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8634 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8635 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8637 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8638 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8639 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8640 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8641 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8642 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8643 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8644 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8645 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8648 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8649 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8650 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8651 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8654 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8656 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8658 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8659 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8663 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8664 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8665 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8669 let mut res = Ok(());
8671 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8672 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8673 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8674 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8675 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8676 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8677 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8680 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8681 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8682 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8683 if inbound_peer_limited {
8685 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8687 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8688 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8689 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8690 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8691 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8692 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8693 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8694 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8698 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8699 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8700 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8702 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8703 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8704 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8705 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8708 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8711 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8712 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8717 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8719 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8720 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8721 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8722 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8723 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8725 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8726 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8727 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8728 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8729 // worry about closing and removing them.
8730 debug_assert!(false);
8734 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8735 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8736 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
8741 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8742 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8747 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8748 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8750 match &msg.data as &str {
8751 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8752 "link failed to shutdown" =>
8754 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8755 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8756 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8757 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8758 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8759 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8760 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8761 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8762 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8763 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8764 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8765 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8766 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8767 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8768 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8769 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8773 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8774 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8775 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8776 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8777 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8778 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8780 log_level: Level::Trace,
8790 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8791 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8792 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8793 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8794 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8795 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8796 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8797 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8798 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8799 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8800 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8802 for channel_id in channel_ids {
8803 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8804 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8808 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8809 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8810 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8811 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8812 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8813 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8814 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8815 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8816 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8817 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8825 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8826 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8830 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8831 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8834 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8835 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8838 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8839 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
8842 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8843 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8844 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8845 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8848 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8849 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8850 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8851 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8854 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
8855 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8856 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8857 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8860 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
8861 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8862 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8863 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8866 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
8867 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8868 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8869 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8872 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
8873 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8874 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8875 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8878 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
8879 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8880 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8881 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8884 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
8885 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8886 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8887 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8890 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
8891 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8892 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8893 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8897 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8898 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8900 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8901 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8902 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8903 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8904 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8905 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8909 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
8910 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8911 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8914 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
8915 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
8918 Ok(amount_msats) => Some(amount_msats),
8919 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
8921 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
8922 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
8924 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
8925 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
8928 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8930 match self.create_inbound_payment(amount_msats, relative_expiry, None) {
8931 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) if invoice_request.keys.is_some() => {
8932 let payment_paths = vec![
8933 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
8935 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
8936 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
8937 payment_paths, payment_hash
8939 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8940 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8941 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8943 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8944 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8945 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
8947 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
8948 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
8949 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
8952 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8953 let payment_paths = vec![
8954 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
8956 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
8957 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
8958 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8959 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8960 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8962 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8963 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
8964 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
8966 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
8967 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
8969 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
8970 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
8971 Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
8972 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
8974 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
8975 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
8979 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
8980 Err(error) => Some(error),
8984 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount.into()))
8988 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
8989 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
8991 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
8993 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
8994 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
8997 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
8998 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
8999 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9006 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9007 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9013 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9014 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9018 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9019 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9020 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9021 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9022 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9026 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9027 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9029 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9030 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9031 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9032 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9033 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9036 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9037 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9038 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9039 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9042 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9043 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9044 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9045 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9048 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9049 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9050 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9051 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9054 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9055 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9056 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9057 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9058 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9059 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9060 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9061 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9062 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9063 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9064 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9065 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9066 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9067 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9068 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9069 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9070 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9071 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9072 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9073 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9078 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9079 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9081 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9082 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9083 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9084 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9087 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9088 (2, node_id, required),
9089 (4, features, required),
9090 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9091 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9092 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9093 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9096 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9097 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9098 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9099 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9100 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9101 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9102 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9103 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9104 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9105 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9106 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9107 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9108 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9109 (7, self.config, option),
9110 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9111 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9112 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9113 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9114 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9115 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9116 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9117 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9118 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9119 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9120 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9121 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9122 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9123 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9124 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9125 (32, self.is_public, required),
9126 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9127 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9128 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9129 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9130 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9136 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9137 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9138 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9139 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9140 (2, channel_id, required),
9141 (3, channel_type, option),
9142 (4, counterparty, required),
9143 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9144 (6, funding_txo, option),
9145 (7, config, option),
9146 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9147 (9, confirmations, option),
9148 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9149 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9150 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9151 (16, balance_msat, required),
9152 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9153 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9154 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9155 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9156 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9157 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9158 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9159 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9160 (26, is_outbound, required),
9161 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9162 (30, is_usable, required),
9163 (32, is_public, required),
9164 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9165 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9166 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9167 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9168 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9171 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9172 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9173 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9174 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9175 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9179 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9181 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9182 outbound_scid_alias,
9186 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9187 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9189 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9190 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9191 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9192 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9193 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9194 confirmations_required,
9196 force_close_spend_delay,
9197 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9198 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9199 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9200 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9201 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9202 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9203 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9204 channel_shutdown_state,
9209 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9210 (2, channels, required_vec),
9211 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9212 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9215 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9217 (0, onion_packet, required),
9218 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9221 (0, payment_data, required),
9222 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9223 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9224 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9225 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9227 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9228 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9229 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9230 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9231 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9232 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9236 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9237 (0, routing, required),
9238 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9239 (4, payment_hash, required),
9240 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9241 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9242 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9243 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9247 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9248 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9250 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9252 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9253 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9254 reason.write(writer)?;
9256 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9257 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9260 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9261 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9262 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9263 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9270 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9271 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9272 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9275 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9276 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9277 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9278 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9282 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9283 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9284 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9285 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9286 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9289 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9290 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9291 // messages contained in the variants.
9292 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9293 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9294 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9296 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9297 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9298 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9299 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9300 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9303 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9304 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9305 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9306 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9307 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9309 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9314 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9319 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9320 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9321 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9322 (2, outpoint, required),
9323 (4, htlc_id, required),
9324 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9325 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9328 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9329 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9330 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9331 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9332 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9334 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9335 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9336 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9337 (2, self.value, required),
9338 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9339 (4, payment_data, option),
9340 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9341 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9342 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9343 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9349 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9350 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9351 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9352 (0, prev_hop, required),
9353 (1, total_msat, option),
9354 (2, value_ser, required),
9355 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9356 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9357 (5, total_value_received, option),
9358 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9359 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9360 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9362 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9363 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9364 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9366 if payment_data.is_some() {
9367 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9369 if total_msat.is_none() {
9370 total_msat = Some(value);
9372 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9375 if total_msat.is_none() {
9376 if payment_data.is_none() {
9377 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9379 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9381 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9385 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9388 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9389 total_value_received,
9390 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9392 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9393 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9398 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9399 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9400 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9403 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9404 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9405 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9406 let mut payment_id = None;
9407 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9408 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9409 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9410 (0, session_priv, required),
9411 (1, payment_id, option),
9412 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9413 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9414 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9415 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9417 if payment_id.is_none() {
9418 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9420 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9422 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9423 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9424 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9426 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9427 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9428 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9429 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9433 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9434 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9435 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9437 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9440 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9441 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9446 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9447 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9449 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9451 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9452 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9453 (0, session_priv, required),
9454 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9455 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9456 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9457 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9458 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9459 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9462 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9464 field.write(writer)?;
9471 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9472 (0, forward_info, required),
9473 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9474 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9475 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9476 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9479 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
9481 (0, htlc_id, required),
9482 (2, err_packet, required),
9487 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9488 (0, payment_secret, required),
9489 (2, expiry_time, required),
9490 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9491 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9492 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9495 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9497 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9498 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9499 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9500 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9501 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9502 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9506 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9507 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9509 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9511 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9513 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9514 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9515 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9518 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9520 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9521 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9522 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9523 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9524 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9525 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9526 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9529 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9530 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9534 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9536 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9537 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9538 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9539 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9540 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9541 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9544 channel.write(writer)?;
9550 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9551 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9552 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9553 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9554 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9555 for forward in pending_forwards {
9556 forward.write(writer)?;
9561 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9563 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9564 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9565 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9567 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9568 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9569 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9570 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9571 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9572 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9573 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9574 htlc.write(writer)?;
9576 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9577 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9580 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9581 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9582 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9583 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9584 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9585 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9586 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9589 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9590 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9591 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9592 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9593 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9595 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9596 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9597 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9598 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9599 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9600 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9601 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9606 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9607 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9608 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9609 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9610 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9611 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9612 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9613 // well save the space and not write any events here.
9614 0u64.write(writer)?;
9616 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9617 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9618 event.write(writer)?;
9622 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9623 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9624 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9625 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9626 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9627 0u64.write(writer)?;
9629 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9630 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9631 // likely to be identical.
9632 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9633 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9635 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9636 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9637 hash.write(writer)?;
9638 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9641 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9642 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9643 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9644 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9645 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9648 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9649 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9651 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9652 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9653 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9654 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9657 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9658 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9659 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9660 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9664 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9665 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9666 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9668 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9669 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9670 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9676 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9677 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9678 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9679 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9682 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9683 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9684 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9685 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9686 pending_claiming_payments = None;
9689 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9690 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9691 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9692 if !updates.is_empty() {
9693 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9694 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9699 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9700 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9701 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9702 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9703 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9704 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9705 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9706 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9707 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9708 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9709 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9710 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9711 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9718 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9719 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9720 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9721 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9724 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9725 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9726 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9727 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9728 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9729 // check that the event is sane here.
9730 let event_encoded = event.encode();
9731 let event_read: Option<Event> =
9732 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
9733 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
9739 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9740 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9741 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9742 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
9743 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
9744 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
9747 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
9748 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
9749 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
9750 events.push_back((ev, action));
9751 } else if action.is_some() {
9752 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9759 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
9760 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
9761 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
9762 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
9763 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
9764 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
9767 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
9769 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
9771 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9772 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
9773 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
9774 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
9775 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
9776 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
9777 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
9778 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
9779 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9780 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
9781 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
9782 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
9783 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
9785 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
9786 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
9788 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
9789 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
9791 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
9792 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
9793 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
9794 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
9795 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
9796 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
9798 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
9799 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9801 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9802 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9803 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9804 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9805 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9806 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9810 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9811 pub entropy_source: ES,
9813 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9814 pub node_signer: NS,
9816 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9817 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9819 pub signer_provider: SP,
9821 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9823 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9824 pub fee_estimator: F,
9825 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9827 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9828 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9829 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9830 pub chain_monitor: M,
9832 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9833 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9834 /// force-closed during deserialization.
9835 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9836 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
9837 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
9839 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
9841 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
9842 /// deserialization.
9844 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
9845 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
9846 pub default_config: UserConfig,
9848 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
9849 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
9851 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
9852 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
9853 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
9854 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
9856 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
9859 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
9860 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
9863 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9864 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9866 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9867 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9868 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9869 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9870 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9871 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9875 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
9876 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
9877 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
9878 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
9879 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
9881 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
9882 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
9887 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
9888 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
9889 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9890 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
9892 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9893 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9894 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9895 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9896 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9897 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9901 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9902 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
9903 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
9907 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9908 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
9910 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9911 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9912 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9913 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9914 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9915 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9919 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9920 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9922 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9923 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9924 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9926 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
9928 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9929 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9930 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9931 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9932 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9933 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
9934 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
9935 for _ in 0..channel_count {
9936 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
9937 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
9939 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9940 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
9941 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
9942 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
9943 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
9944 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
9945 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9946 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
9947 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
9948 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
9949 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9950 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
9951 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
9953 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
9954 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
9955 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
9957 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
9958 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
9959 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9961 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
9962 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
9963 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9965 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs, batch_funding_txid) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
9966 if batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
9967 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9969 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
9970 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9971 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
9974 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
9975 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9976 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9977 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9978 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
9979 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9980 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9982 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9983 let mut found_htlc = false;
9984 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9985 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
9988 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
9989 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
9990 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
9991 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
9992 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
9993 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
9994 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
9995 log_info!(args.logger,
9996 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
9997 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
9998 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10002 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10003 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10004 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10005 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10006 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10008 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
10009 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10011 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10012 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10013 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10014 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10016 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10017 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10018 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10019 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10023 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10024 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10025 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10026 // safely discard the channel.
10027 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
10028 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10029 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10030 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10031 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10032 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10033 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10036 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10037 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10038 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10039 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10040 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10041 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10045 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10046 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10047 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10048 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10049 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10050 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10051 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10053 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10057 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10058 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10059 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10060 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10061 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10062 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10063 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10064 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10065 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10067 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10070 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10071 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10072 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10073 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10074 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10075 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10076 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10077 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10079 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10082 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10085 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10086 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10087 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10088 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10089 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10090 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10091 is_connected: false,
10095 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10096 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10097 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10098 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10099 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10100 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10101 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10102 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10105 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10106 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10107 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10108 for _ in 0..event_count {
10109 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10110 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10115 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10116 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10117 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10119 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10120 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10121 // on-startup monitor updates.
10122 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10123 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10125 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10129 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10130 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10132 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10133 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10134 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10135 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10136 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10140 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10141 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10142 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10143 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10144 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10145 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10146 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10148 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10149 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10153 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10154 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10155 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10156 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10157 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10158 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10159 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10160 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10161 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10162 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10163 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10164 let mut events_override = None;
10165 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10166 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10167 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10168 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10169 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10170 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10171 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10172 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10173 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10174 (8, events_override, option),
10175 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10176 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10177 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10178 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10180 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10181 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10184 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10185 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10188 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10189 pending_events_read = events;
10192 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10193 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10196 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10197 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10198 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10199 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10200 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10201 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10203 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10205 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10206 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10207 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10210 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10211 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10212 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10213 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10214 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10216 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10217 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10218 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10220 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10221 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10222 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10223 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10224 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10226 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10227 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10228 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10229 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10230 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10231 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10232 pending_background_events.push(
10233 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10234 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10235 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10236 update: update.clone(),
10239 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10240 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10241 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10242 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10243 pending_background_events.push(
10244 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10245 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10246 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10249 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10250 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10251 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10253 max_in_flight_update_id
10257 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10258 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10259 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10260 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10261 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10262 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10264 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10265 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10266 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10267 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10268 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10269 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10270 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10271 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10272 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
10275 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10276 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10277 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10278 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10279 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10280 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10281 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10282 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10283 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10284 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10285 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10288 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10289 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10290 debug_assert!(false);
10291 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10296 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10297 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10298 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10299 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10300 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10301 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10302 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10303 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10305 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10306 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10307 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
10309 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10310 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10311 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10312 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10313 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10314 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10315 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10316 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10321 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10322 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10324 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10325 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10326 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10327 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10330 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10331 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10332 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10333 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10334 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10335 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10336 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10338 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10339 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10340 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10341 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10342 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10343 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10344 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10345 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10348 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10349 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10350 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10351 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10352 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10353 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10354 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10355 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
10357 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10358 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10359 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10360 retry_strategy: None,
10361 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10362 payment_params: None,
10363 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10364 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10365 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10366 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10367 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10368 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10369 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10370 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10371 total_msat: path_amt,
10372 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10373 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10375 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10376 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10381 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10382 match htlc_source {
10383 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10384 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10385 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10386 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10388 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10389 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10390 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10391 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10392 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10393 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10394 forwards.retain(|forward| {
10395 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10396 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10397 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10398 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10403 !forwards.is_empty()
10405 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10406 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10407 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10408 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10409 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10410 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10411 intercepted_id != ev_id
10418 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10419 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10420 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10421 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10422 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10423 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10424 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10425 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10426 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10427 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10428 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10430 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10431 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10432 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10434 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10435 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
10436 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10443 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10444 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10446 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10448 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10449 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10450 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10451 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10452 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10453 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10454 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10455 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10456 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10457 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10460 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10461 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10462 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10463 // channel still live case here.
10467 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10468 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10473 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10474 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10475 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10476 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10477 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10478 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10479 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10480 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10484 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10485 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10487 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10488 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10489 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10490 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10492 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10493 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10494 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10496 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10497 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10499 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10500 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10502 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10505 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10506 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10507 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10509 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10513 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10514 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10515 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10516 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10517 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10519 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10520 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10521 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10522 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10523 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10524 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10525 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10526 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10528 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10529 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10533 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10535 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10537 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10538 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10540 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10541 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10546 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10547 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10549 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10551 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10553 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10554 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10555 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10556 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10560 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10561 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10562 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10563 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10564 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10565 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10566 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10567 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10569 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10570 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10571 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10573 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10574 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10575 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10576 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10577 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10578 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10580 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10581 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10582 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10583 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10584 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10585 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10589 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10590 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10591 debug_assert!(false);
10592 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10597 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10599 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10600 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10601 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10602 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10603 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10604 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10605 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10606 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10607 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10608 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10609 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10611 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10612 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10614 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10615 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10616 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10617 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10619 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10620 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10621 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10622 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10624 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10625 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10626 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10627 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10629 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10630 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
10631 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10632 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10633 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10634 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10635 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
10638 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10639 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
10642 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10645 purpose: payment.purpose,
10646 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10647 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10648 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10654 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10655 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10656 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10657 for action in actions.iter() {
10658 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10659 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10660 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10662 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10663 log_trace!(args.logger,
10664 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
10665 blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
10666 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10667 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10668 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10670 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10671 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10672 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10673 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10677 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
10678 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
10682 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
10684 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
10685 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10689 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10691 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10692 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10693 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10694 router: args.router,
10696 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10698 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10699 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10700 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10701 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10703 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10704 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10705 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10706 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10707 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10708 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10710 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10712 our_network_pubkey,
10715 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10717 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10719 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10720 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10721 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10722 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10723 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10725 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10726 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10728 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10730 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
10732 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
10733 node_signer: args.node_signer,
10734 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
10736 logger: args.logger,
10737 default_configuration: args.default_config,
10740 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
10741 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
10742 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
10743 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
10744 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
10747 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
10748 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
10749 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
10750 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
10751 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
10752 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
10755 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
10756 //connection or two.
10758 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
10764 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10765 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10766 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
10767 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
10768 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
10769 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
10770 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
10771 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
10772 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10773 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
10774 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
10775 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
10776 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
10777 use crate::util::test_utils;
10778 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
10779 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
10782 fn test_notify_limits() {
10783 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
10784 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
10785 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10786 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10787 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10788 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10790 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
10791 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
10792 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10793 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10794 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10796 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10798 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
10799 // to connect messages with new values
10800 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10801 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10802 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10803 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10804 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10805 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10807 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
10808 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10809 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10810 // ... but the last node should not.
10811 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10812 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
10813 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10814 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10816 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
10817 // about the channel.
10818 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10819 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10820 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10822 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10824 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10825 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10826 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10827 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10828 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10829 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10831 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
10832 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10833 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10835 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
10836 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
10837 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
10838 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
10839 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
10840 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
10842 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
10843 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
10844 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10845 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10846 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10847 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10848 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10849 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10851 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
10852 // the channel info has updated.
10853 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10854 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10855 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10856 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10857 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10858 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10862 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
10863 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
10865 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10866 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10867 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10868 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10869 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10871 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
10872 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
10873 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
10874 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
10876 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10877 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
10878 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
10879 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
10880 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
10881 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
10882 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
10883 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
10884 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10885 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10886 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10887 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10889 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
10890 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10891 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10892 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10893 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10894 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10895 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10896 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10897 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10898 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10899 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10900 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10901 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
10902 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10903 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10904 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10905 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10906 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10907 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10908 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10909 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10910 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10911 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
10913 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
10914 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
10915 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
10916 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10917 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10918 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10919 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
10921 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
10922 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
10923 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
10924 // lightning messages manually.
10925 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10926 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
10927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
10929 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10930 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10931 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
10932 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
10933 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10934 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10935 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
10936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10937 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10938 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
10939 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10940 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10941 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10942 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10944 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10945 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
10946 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10947 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10948 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
10949 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10950 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10951 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10952 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10953 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
10954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10956 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
10957 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
10958 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10959 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10961 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10962 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10963 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10964 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10966 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10969 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10970 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10971 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10972 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10974 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10979 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
10980 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
10981 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
10984 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
10985 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
10986 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
10987 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
10988 // fails as expected.
10989 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
10990 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
10991 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
10992 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
10993 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
10994 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
10995 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10996 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10997 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10998 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
10999 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11000 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11001 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11002 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11003 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11005 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11006 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11007 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11009 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11010 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11011 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11012 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11013 let route = find_route(
11014 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11015 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11017 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11018 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11019 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11020 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11021 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11022 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11023 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11024 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11025 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11026 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11027 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11028 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11029 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11030 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11031 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11032 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11033 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11034 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11035 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11036 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11037 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11038 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11039 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11040 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11042 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11043 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11045 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11046 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11047 let route = find_route(
11048 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11049 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11051 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11052 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11053 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11054 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11055 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11056 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11057 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11058 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11060 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11061 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11062 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11063 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11064 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11065 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11066 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11067 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11068 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11069 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11070 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11071 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11072 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11073 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11074 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11075 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11076 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11077 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11078 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11079 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11080 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11081 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11082 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11083 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11085 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11086 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11088 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11089 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11090 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11091 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11092 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11093 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11094 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11095 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11096 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11097 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11099 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11100 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11101 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11104 let route = find_route(
11105 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11106 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11108 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11109 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11110 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11112 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11113 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11114 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11115 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11116 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11118 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11119 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11120 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11122 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11123 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11124 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11125 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11126 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11127 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11128 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11129 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11130 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11132 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11133 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11137 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11138 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11139 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11140 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11141 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11142 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11143 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11145 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11146 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11148 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11149 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11150 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11151 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
11152 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11153 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11154 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11155 let route = find_route(
11156 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11157 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11160 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11161 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11162 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11163 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11164 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11165 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11166 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11168 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11169 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11170 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11171 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11172 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11173 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11174 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11176 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11180 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11181 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11182 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11183 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11184 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11185 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11186 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11187 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11188 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11190 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11191 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11193 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11194 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11195 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11196 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
11197 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11198 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11199 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11200 let route = find_route(
11201 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11202 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11205 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11206 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11207 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
11208 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11209 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11210 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11211 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11212 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11215 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11216 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11217 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11218 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11219 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11220 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11221 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11223 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11227 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11228 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11229 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11230 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11231 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11233 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11234 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11235 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11236 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11238 // Marshall an MPP route.
11239 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11240 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11241 route.paths.push(path);
11242 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11243 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11244 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11245 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11246 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11247 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11249 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11250 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11252 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11253 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11255 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11260 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11261 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11262 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11263 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11264 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11266 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11268 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11269 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11271 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11272 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11274 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11277 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11278 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11279 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11280 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11281 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11282 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11285 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11288 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11289 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11294 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11295 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11296 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11297 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11298 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11299 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11301 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11302 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11304 total_msat: 100_000,
11307 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11308 // payment verification fails as expected.
11309 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11310 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11311 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11312 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11314 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11318 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11319 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11323 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
11324 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11325 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11326 // the channel is successfully closed.
11327 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11328 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11329 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11330 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11332 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
11333 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11334 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11335 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11336 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11338 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11339 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
11341 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11342 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11343 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11344 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11347 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11349 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11350 // as it has the funding transaction.
11351 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11352 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11353 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11356 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11358 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11360 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11362 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11363 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11364 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11366 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11369 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11370 // as it has the funding transaction.
11371 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11372 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11373 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11375 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11376 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11377 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11378 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11379 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11380 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11381 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11382 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11384 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11385 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11386 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11387 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11389 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11390 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11392 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11393 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11394 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11395 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11396 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11397 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11398 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11402 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11403 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11404 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11405 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
11406 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11407 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11408 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11411 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11413 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11414 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11415 // closing transaction).
11416 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
11417 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11418 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11420 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11421 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11422 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11423 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11424 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11427 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11429 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11431 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
11432 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11433 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11435 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11437 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11438 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11441 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11442 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11443 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11446 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11447 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11448 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11451 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11452 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11453 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11456 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11457 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11458 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11461 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11463 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11464 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11466 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11467 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11469 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11470 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11475 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11476 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11477 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11478 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11479 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11480 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11481 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11482 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11485 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11486 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11487 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11489 // Test the API functions.
11490 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
11492 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11494 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11496 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11498 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11500 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11502 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11506 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11507 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11508 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11509 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11510 // the given `channel_id`.
11511 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11512 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11513 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11514 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11516 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11519 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11521 // Test the API functions.
11522 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11524 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11526 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11528 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11530 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11532 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11536 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11537 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11538 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11539 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11540 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11541 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11543 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11545 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11546 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11548 let mut funding_tx = None;
11549 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11550 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11551 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11554 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11555 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11556 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11557 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11558 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11560 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11561 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11562 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11564 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11566 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11567 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11568 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11570 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11573 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11574 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11575 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11576 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11577 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11579 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11580 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11582 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11583 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11584 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11585 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11586 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11587 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11588 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11591 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11592 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11593 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11594 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11595 }, true).unwrap_err();
11597 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11598 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11599 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11600 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11601 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11602 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11603 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11605 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11606 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11608 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11609 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11610 }, true).unwrap_err();
11612 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11613 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11614 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11615 }, false).unwrap();
11616 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11618 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11619 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11621 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11622 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11623 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11624 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11625 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11627 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11628 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11629 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11631 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11632 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11633 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11635 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11636 // "protected" and can connect again.
11637 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11638 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11639 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11641 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11643 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11645 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11646 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11650 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11651 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11652 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11653 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11654 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11655 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11657 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11659 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11660 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11662 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11663 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11664 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11665 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11668 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11670 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11671 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11672 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11674 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11675 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11676 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11678 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
11679 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11680 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11681 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11685 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
11686 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11687 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11688 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11689 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11690 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
11691 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11692 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
11693 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11695 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11697 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11698 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11700 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11701 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11702 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11703 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11704 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11705 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11708 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11709 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11711 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11712 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11714 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11716 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11717 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11720 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11721 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11722 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11723 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11724 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11726 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11727 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11729 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11730 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
11731 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
11732 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
11736 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11738 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11739 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11741 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
11742 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11743 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11745 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11746 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11748 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11750 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11754 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
11755 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11756 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11757 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11758 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11759 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
11760 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
11761 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11763 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11764 payment_metadata: None,
11765 keysend_preimage: None,
11766 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11767 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11769 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11771 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
11772 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
11773 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
11774 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11775 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
11777 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
11778 } else { panic!(); }
11780 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
11781 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
11783 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11784 payment_metadata: None,
11785 keysend_preimage: None,
11786 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11787 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11789 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11791 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11792 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
11796 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
11797 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11798 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11799 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11800 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11802 let result = node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11804 outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
11805 payment_metadata: None,
11806 keysend_preimage: None,
11807 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11808 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
11810 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11811 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None);
11813 // Should not return an error as this condition:
11814 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
11815 // is not satisfied.
11816 assert!(result.is_ok());
11820 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
11821 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11822 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11823 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11824 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11826 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
11827 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11829 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11830 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11831 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
11832 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
11833 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11835 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11836 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11838 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11839 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11840 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11841 match &msg_events[0] {
11842 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
11843 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11845 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
11846 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
11847 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
11850 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11853 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11854 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11856 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
11857 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
11858 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11860 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11864 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
11865 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
11866 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
11867 // the channel without the anchors feature.
11868 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11869 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11870 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
11871 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11872 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11873 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
11874 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11876 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
11877 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11878 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11880 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11881 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11883 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11884 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11886 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11889 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11890 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
11892 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11893 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11895 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
11896 // not have generated any events.
11897 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11901 fn test_update_channel_config() {
11902 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11903 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11904 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11905 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11906 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11907 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11908 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
11910 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11911 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11912 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11914 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
11915 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11916 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
11917 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11918 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11920 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11921 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11924 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
11925 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11926 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11928 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
11929 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11930 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
11931 ..Default::default()
11933 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11934 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11935 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11937 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11938 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11941 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
11942 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11943 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11944 ..Default::default()
11946 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11947 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
11948 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11949 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11951 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11952 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11955 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
11956 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
11957 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
11958 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
11959 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
11962 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11963 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11964 ..Default::default()
11966 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
11969 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
11970 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
11971 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11972 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11976 fn test_payment_display() {
11977 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11978 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11979 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
11980 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11981 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11982 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11986 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
11987 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11988 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11989 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11990 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11991 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11993 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
11994 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11995 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11996 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11997 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11998 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
11999 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12000 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12002 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12003 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12004 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12007 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12008 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12010 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12011 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12013 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12014 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12015 }, false).unwrap();
12016 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12017 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12018 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12020 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12022 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12023 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12024 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12025 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12026 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12027 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12028 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12029 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12030 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12031 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12032 } else { panic!() };
12033 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12034 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12035 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12036 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12038 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12040 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12041 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12042 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12049 use crate::chain::Listen;
12050 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12051 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12052 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12053 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12054 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12055 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12056 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12057 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12058 use crate::util::test_utils;
12059 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12061 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12062 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12063 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
12065 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12067 use criterion::Criterion;
12069 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12070 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12071 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12072 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12073 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12074 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12075 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12077 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12078 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12080 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12081 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12083 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12085 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12088 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12089 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12092 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12093 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12094 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12096 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12097 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12099 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12100 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12101 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12102 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12103 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
12105 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12106 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12107 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12109 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12110 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12111 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12112 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12114 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12115 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12116 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12118 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12119 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12120 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12121 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12122 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12124 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12125 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12126 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12128 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12129 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12131 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12132 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12133 }, false).unwrap();
12134 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
12135 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12136 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12139 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12140 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12141 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12143 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12144 } else { panic!(); }
12146 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12147 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12148 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12149 match events_b[0] {
12150 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12151 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12153 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12156 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12157 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12158 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12159 match events_a[0] {
12160 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12161 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12163 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12166 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12168 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12169 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12170 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12172 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12173 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12174 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12175 match msg_events[0] {
12176 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12177 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12178 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12182 match msg_events[1] {
12183 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12187 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12188 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12189 match events_a[0] {
12190 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12191 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12193 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12196 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12197 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12198 match events_b[0] {
12199 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12200 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12202 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12205 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12206 macro_rules! send_payment {
12207 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12208 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12209 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12210 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12211 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12212 payment_count += 1;
12213 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
12214 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12216 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12217 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12218 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12219 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12220 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12221 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12222 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12223 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12224 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12225 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12226 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12228 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12229 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12230 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12231 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12233 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12234 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12235 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12236 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12237 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12239 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12242 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12243 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12244 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12245 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12247 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12251 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12252 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12253 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);