1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
115 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
116 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
117 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
121 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
122 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
123 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
124 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
125 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
127 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
128 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
129 /// may overshoot this in either case)
130 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
131 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
134 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
135 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
136 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
137 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
140 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
141 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
142 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
143 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
144 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
147 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
148 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
150 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
151 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
152 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
155 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
156 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
158 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
159 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
162 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
163 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
166 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
170 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
171 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
172 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
173 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
174 short_channel_id: u64,
176 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
177 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
179 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
180 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
185 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
187 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
188 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
189 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
191 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
192 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
195 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
196 struct ClaimableHTLC {
197 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
199 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
201 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
202 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
203 sender_intended_value: u64,
204 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
206 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
207 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
208 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
209 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
213 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
215 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
216 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
217 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
219 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
220 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
225 impl Readable for PaymentId {
226 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
227 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
232 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
234 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
235 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
236 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
238 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
239 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
244 impl Readable for InterceptId {
245 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
246 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
251 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
252 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
253 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
254 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
255 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
258 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
260 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
261 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
262 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
264 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
265 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
269 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
270 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
271 (0, short_channel_id, required),
272 (2, htlc_id, required),
274 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
275 (0, session_priv, required),
280 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
281 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
282 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
283 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
284 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
287 session_priv: SecretKey,
288 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
289 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
290 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
291 payment_id: PaymentId,
294 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
295 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
296 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
298 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
300 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
302 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
305 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
306 payment_id.hash(hasher);
307 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
313 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
315 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
316 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
317 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
318 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
319 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
320 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
324 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
325 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
326 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
327 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
328 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
329 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
331 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
337 struct ReceiveError {
343 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
344 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
346 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
347 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
348 pub enum FailureCode {
349 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
350 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
351 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
352 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
353 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
354 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
355 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
356 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
357 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
358 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
359 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
362 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
363 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
364 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
365 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
366 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
368 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
369 err: msgs::LightningError,
370 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
371 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
373 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
375 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
377 err: LightningError {
379 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
380 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
387 shutdown_finish: None,
391 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
392 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
395 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
397 err: LightningError {
399 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
400 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
406 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
407 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
411 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
414 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
416 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
417 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
421 log_level: Level::Warn,
424 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
426 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
428 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
430 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
431 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
439 shutdown_finish: None,
444 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
445 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
446 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
447 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
448 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
450 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
451 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
452 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
453 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
454 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
455 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
456 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
458 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
462 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
463 struct ClaimingPayment {
465 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
466 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
468 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
469 (0, amount_msat, required),
470 (2, payment_purpose, required),
471 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
474 struct ClaimablePayment {
475 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
476 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
477 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
480 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
481 struct ClaimablePayments {
482 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
483 /// failed/claimed by the user.
485 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
486 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
488 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
489 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
490 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
492 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
493 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
494 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
495 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
498 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
499 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
500 /// quite some time lag.
501 enum BackgroundEvent {
502 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel. This is only separated from
503 /// [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the non-closing variant needs a public key
504 /// to handle channel resumption, whereas if the channel has been force-closed we do not need
505 /// the counterparty node_id.
507 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
508 /// are regenerated on startup.
509 ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
510 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel. In general this
511 /// should be used rather than [`Self::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in
512 /// cases where the `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a
513 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] error the other variant is acceptable.
515 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
516 /// are regenerated on startup.
517 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
518 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
519 funding_txo: OutPoint,
520 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
525 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
526 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
527 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
528 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
529 /// event can be generated.
530 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
531 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
532 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
535 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
536 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
537 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
540 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
541 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
542 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
543 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
544 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
547 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
548 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
549 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
550 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
554 /// State we hold per-peer.
555 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
556 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
558 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
559 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
561 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
562 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
563 latest_features: InitFeatures,
564 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
565 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
566 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
567 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
568 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
570 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
571 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
572 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
573 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
575 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
576 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
577 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
578 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
579 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
580 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
581 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
582 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
583 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
584 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
588 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
589 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
590 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
591 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
592 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
593 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
596 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
600 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
601 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
603 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
606 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
607 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
608 struct PendingInboundPayment {
609 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
610 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
611 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
612 /// this payment being removed.
614 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
615 user_payment_id: u64,
616 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
617 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
618 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
621 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
622 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
623 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
624 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
625 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
626 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
627 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
628 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
630 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
631 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
639 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
641 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
646 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
647 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
648 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
649 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
650 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
651 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
652 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
653 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
654 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
656 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
657 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
659 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
660 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
661 $vis trait AChannelManager {
662 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
663 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
664 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
665 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
666 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
667 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
668 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
669 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
670 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
671 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
672 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
673 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
674 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
675 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
676 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
677 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
678 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
679 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
682 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
683 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
684 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
685 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
686 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
687 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
689 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
690 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
691 ES::Target: EntropySource,
692 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
693 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
694 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
698 type Watch = M::Target;
700 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
702 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
704 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
706 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
707 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
709 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
711 type Router = R::Target;
713 type Logger = L::Target;
715 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
718 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
719 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
721 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
722 /// to individual Channels.
724 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
725 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
726 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
727 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
729 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
730 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
731 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
732 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
733 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
734 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
735 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
737 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
738 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
739 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
741 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
742 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
743 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
744 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
745 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
747 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
748 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
749 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
750 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
752 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
753 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
754 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
756 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
757 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
758 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
759 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
760 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
762 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
763 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
764 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
765 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
766 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
767 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
768 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
769 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
772 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
773 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
774 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
775 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
776 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
780 // `total_consistency_lock`
782 // |__`forward_htlcs`
784 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
786 // |__`per_peer_state`
788 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
790 // | |__`claimable_payments`
792 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
798 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
800 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
804 // | |__`pending_events`
806 // | |__`pending_background_events`
808 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
810 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
811 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
812 ES::Target: EntropySource,
813 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
814 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
815 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
819 default_configuration: UserConfig,
820 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
821 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
827 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
829 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
831 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
832 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
834 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
835 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
836 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
837 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
839 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
840 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
842 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
843 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
844 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
845 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
846 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
847 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
848 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
849 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
851 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
853 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
854 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
856 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
858 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
859 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
860 /// and via the classic SCID.
862 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
863 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
865 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
867 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
869 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
870 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
871 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
873 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
874 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
876 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
877 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
879 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
880 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
882 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
883 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
884 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
885 /// active channel list on load.
887 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
888 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
890 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
892 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
893 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
894 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
896 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
897 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
898 /// the handling of the events.
900 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
901 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
904 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
905 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
906 /// would break backwards compatability.
907 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
908 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
909 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
911 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
912 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
914 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
916 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
917 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
918 /// confirmation depth.
920 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
921 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
922 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
924 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
926 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
928 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
930 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
932 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
934 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
935 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
936 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
938 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
939 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
941 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
942 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
943 /// keeping additional state.
944 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
946 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
947 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
948 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
949 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
951 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
952 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
954 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
955 /// are currently open with that peer.
957 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
958 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
961 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
963 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
964 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
965 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
966 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
967 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
969 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
970 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
971 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
972 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
973 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
975 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
976 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
978 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
979 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
980 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
981 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
982 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
983 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
984 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
985 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
986 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
987 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
988 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
989 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
990 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
992 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1001 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1003 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1004 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1005 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1006 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1007 pub struct ChainParameters {
1008 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1009 pub network: Network,
1011 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1013 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1014 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1017 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1023 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1024 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1025 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1026 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1027 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1028 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1030 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1031 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1032 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1033 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1034 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1036 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1037 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1040 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1041 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1042 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1045 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1046 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1048 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1049 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1050 should_persist: persist_check,
1051 _read_guard: read_guard,
1056 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1057 fn drop(&mut self) {
1058 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1059 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1064 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1065 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1067 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1069 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1070 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1071 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1072 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1073 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1075 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1076 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1078 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1080 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1081 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1082 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1083 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1084 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1085 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1086 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1087 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1088 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1089 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1090 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1091 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1092 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1094 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1095 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1097 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1098 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1099 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1100 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1102 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1103 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1104 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1105 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1106 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1107 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1110 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1112 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1113 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1116 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1118 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1119 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1121 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1122 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1123 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1124 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1126 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1127 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1128 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1130 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1131 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1132 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1134 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1135 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1136 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1137 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1139 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1140 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1141 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1143 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1144 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1145 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1147 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1148 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1149 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1150 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1151 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1152 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1153 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1154 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1155 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1156 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1157 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1160 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1161 /// to better separate parameters.
1162 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1163 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1164 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1165 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1166 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1167 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1168 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1169 pub features: InitFeatures,
1170 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1171 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1172 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1174 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1176 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1177 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1178 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1179 /// payments to us through this channel.
1180 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1181 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1182 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1183 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1184 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1185 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1186 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1189 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1190 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1191 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1192 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1193 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1194 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1195 /// lifetime of the channel.
1196 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1197 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1198 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1199 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1200 /// our counterparty already.
1202 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1203 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1204 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1205 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1207 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1208 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1209 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1210 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1212 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1213 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1215 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1216 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1218 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1219 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1220 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1221 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1222 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1223 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1224 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1225 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1226 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1229 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1231 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1232 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1233 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1234 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1235 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1236 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1237 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1239 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1240 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1242 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1243 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1244 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1245 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1246 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1247 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1248 /// this value on chain.
1250 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1252 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1254 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1255 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1256 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1257 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1259 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1260 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1261 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1263 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1264 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1265 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1266 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1267 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1269 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1270 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1271 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1272 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1274 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1275 pub balance_msat: u64,
1276 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1277 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1278 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1279 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1281 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1283 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1284 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1285 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1286 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1287 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1288 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1289 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1290 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1292 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1293 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1294 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1295 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1296 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1297 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1298 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1300 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1301 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1302 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1303 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1304 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1305 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1306 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1307 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1308 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1310 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1312 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1313 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1314 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1315 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1316 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1318 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1319 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1320 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1321 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1322 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1323 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1324 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1326 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1327 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1328 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1329 pub is_outbound: bool,
1330 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1331 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1332 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1333 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1334 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1336 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1337 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1338 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1339 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1341 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1342 pub is_usable: bool,
1343 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1344 pub is_public: bool,
1345 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1346 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1347 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1348 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1349 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1350 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1352 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1353 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1356 impl ChannelDetails {
1357 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1358 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1359 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1361 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1362 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1363 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1364 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1367 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1368 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1369 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1371 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1372 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1373 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1374 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1377 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1378 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1380 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1381 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1382 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1384 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1385 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1386 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1387 features: latest_features,
1388 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1389 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1390 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1391 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1392 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1393 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1394 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1395 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1396 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1397 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1399 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1400 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1401 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1402 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1403 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1404 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1405 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1406 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1407 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1408 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1409 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1410 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1411 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1412 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1413 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1414 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1415 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1416 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1417 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1418 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1419 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1420 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1421 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1422 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1423 config: Some(channel.config()),
1428 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1429 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1430 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1431 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1432 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1434 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1436 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1437 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1438 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1441 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1442 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1443 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1445 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1446 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1447 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1449 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1450 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1451 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1453 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1454 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1458 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1460 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1462 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1463 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1464 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1465 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1467 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1468 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1469 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1472 macro_rules! handle_error {
1473 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1474 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1475 // entering the macro.
1476 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1477 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1481 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1482 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1484 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1485 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1486 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1487 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1491 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1492 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1493 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1494 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1499 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1500 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1502 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1503 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1504 action: err.action.clone()
1508 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1509 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1510 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1511 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1512 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1516 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1523 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1524 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1525 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1526 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1527 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1528 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1530 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1531 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1532 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1533 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1534 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1536 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1537 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1539 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1543 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1544 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1545 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1547 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1548 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1550 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1551 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1553 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1554 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1555 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1556 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1557 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1558 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1564 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1565 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1569 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1571 $entry.remove_entry();
1579 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1580 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1584 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1586 $entry.remove_entry();
1594 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1595 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1597 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1598 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1604 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1605 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1606 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1607 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1608 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1610 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1611 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1612 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1613 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1614 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1615 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1616 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1617 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1618 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1619 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1624 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1625 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1626 if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1627 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1628 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1629 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
1630 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1631 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1632 funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1634 $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1639 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1640 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1641 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1642 debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1643 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1644 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1645 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1646 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1647 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1649 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1654 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1655 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1656 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1657 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1658 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1659 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1660 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1661 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1662 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1663 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1664 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1666 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1667 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1668 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1674 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1675 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1677 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1678 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1679 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1680 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1681 updates.announcement_sigs);
1682 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1683 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1686 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1687 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1688 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1690 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1692 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1693 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1695 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1696 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1697 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1698 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1703 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1704 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1705 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1706 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1707 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1709 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1710 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1711 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1714 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1715 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1716 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1717 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1718 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1719 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1720 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1721 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1725 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1726 $chan.complete_one_mon_update($update_id);
1727 if $chan.no_monitor_updates_pending() {
1728 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1734 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1735 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1739 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1740 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1741 let mut processed_all_events = false;
1742 while !processed_all_events {
1743 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
1747 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1750 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
1751 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
1752 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1754 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
1755 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
1756 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
1757 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1761 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
1762 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1763 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
1764 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1767 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
1769 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
1770 $event_to_handle = event;
1772 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
1773 post_event_actions.push(action);
1778 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1779 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1780 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
1781 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
1784 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
1785 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
1786 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
1787 processed_all_events = false;
1790 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1791 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1797 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1799 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1800 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1801 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1802 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1803 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1804 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1808 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1810 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1811 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1813 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1815 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1816 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1817 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1820 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1821 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1822 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1823 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1824 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1825 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1826 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1827 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1829 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1830 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1831 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1836 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1838 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1839 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1840 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1841 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1842 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1843 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1844 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1845 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1847 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1850 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1851 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1853 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1855 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1857 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1859 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
1860 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
1861 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1862 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1863 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1873 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1874 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1875 &self.default_configuration
1878 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1879 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1880 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1883 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1884 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1886 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1888 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1892 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1897 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1899 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1900 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1901 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1902 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1903 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1905 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1906 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1908 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
1909 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
1910 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
1912 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1913 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1914 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1916 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1917 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1918 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1919 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1920 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1921 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1923 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1924 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1925 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1926 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1927 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1928 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1931 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1932 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1933 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1935 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1937 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1938 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1940 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1942 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1943 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1944 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1945 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1946 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1947 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1951 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1956 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1958 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1959 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1960 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1962 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1964 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1967 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1970 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1971 node_id: their_network_key,
1974 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1977 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1978 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1979 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1980 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1981 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1982 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1983 // the same channel.
1984 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1986 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1987 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1988 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1989 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1990 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1991 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1992 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1993 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2001 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2002 /// more information.
2003 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2004 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
2007 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2008 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2010 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2011 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2013 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2014 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2015 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2016 // really wanted anyway.
2017 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
2020 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2021 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2022 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2023 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2025 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2026 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2027 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2028 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2029 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2032 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
2038 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2039 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2041 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2042 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2043 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2045 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2046 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2047 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2048 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2049 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2050 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2051 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2052 total_msat: *total_msat,
2055 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2056 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2058 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2059 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2061 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2066 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2067 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2068 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2069 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2070 Some(transaction) => {
2071 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2072 channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction
2077 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2078 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
2079 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2080 reason: closure_reason
2084 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2085 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2087 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2088 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2089 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2091 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2092 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2094 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2095 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2096 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2097 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2098 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
2099 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2100 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2101 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2102 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2104 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2105 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2106 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2107 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2108 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2112 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2113 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2114 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2115 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
2116 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
2119 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2120 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2121 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2122 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2126 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2130 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
2134 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2135 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2136 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2137 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2140 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2144 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2145 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2146 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2148 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2149 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2151 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2152 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2153 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2154 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2156 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2158 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2159 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2160 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2163 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2164 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2165 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2166 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2167 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2168 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2171 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2172 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2173 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2175 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2176 /// the channel being closed or not:
2177 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2178 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2179 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2180 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2181 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2182 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2183 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2185 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2186 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2187 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2188 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2190 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2192 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2193 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2194 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2197 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2198 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2199 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2200 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2201 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2202 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2206 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2207 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2208 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2209 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2210 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2211 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2212 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2213 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2215 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2216 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2217 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2218 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2219 // ignore the result here.
2220 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2224 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2225 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2226 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2227 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2228 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2229 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2230 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2232 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2233 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2234 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2235 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2236 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2238 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2240 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2242 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2245 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2246 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2247 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2248 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2249 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2254 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2257 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2258 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2259 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2260 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2261 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2262 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2263 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2264 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2265 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2266 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2267 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2268 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2279 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2280 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2281 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2283 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2284 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2285 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2288 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2289 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2290 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2292 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2293 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2294 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2295 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2296 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2299 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2300 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2301 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2302 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2303 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2307 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2308 /// local transaction(s).
2309 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2310 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2311 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2315 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2316 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2318 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2319 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2320 return Err(ReceiveError {
2321 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2323 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2326 // final_expiry_too_soon
2327 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2328 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2330 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2331 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2332 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2333 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2334 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2335 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2336 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2337 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2338 return Err(ReceiveError {
2339 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2340 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2343 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2344 return Err(ReceiveError {
2346 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2347 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2351 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2352 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2353 return Err(ReceiveError {
2354 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2355 err_data: Vec::new(),
2356 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2359 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
2360 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2361 return Err(ReceiveError {
2362 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2363 err_data: Vec::new(),
2364 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2366 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2367 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2370 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2371 phantom_shared_secret,
2373 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2374 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2375 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2376 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2377 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2378 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2379 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2380 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2381 return Err(ReceiveError {
2382 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2383 err_data: Vec::new(),
2384 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2388 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2391 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2394 return Err(ReceiveError {
2395 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2396 err_data: Vec::new(),
2397 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2402 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2405 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2406 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2407 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2408 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2412 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2413 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2414 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2416 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2417 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2418 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2419 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2420 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2421 failure_code: $err_code,
2427 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2428 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2431 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2432 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2433 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2435 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2436 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2437 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2438 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2439 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2440 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2441 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2442 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2444 macro_rules! return_err {
2445 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2447 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2448 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2449 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2450 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2451 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2452 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2458 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2460 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2461 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2463 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2464 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2468 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2469 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2471 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2473 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2474 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2475 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2476 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2477 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2479 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2482 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2483 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2484 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2486 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2487 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2488 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2491 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2492 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2493 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2494 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2498 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2499 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2500 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2503 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2504 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2505 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2506 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2507 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2512 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2513 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2514 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2515 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2516 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2517 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2518 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2519 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2520 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2521 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2522 // phantom or an intercept.
2523 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2524 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2525 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2529 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2532 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2534 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2535 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2536 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2537 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2538 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2540 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2541 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2542 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2544 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2545 // have no consistency guarantees.
2546 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2550 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2551 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2552 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2553 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2554 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2556 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2557 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2558 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2559 // we don't have the channel here.
2560 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2562 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2564 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2565 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2566 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2567 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2568 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2569 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2570 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2571 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2572 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2573 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2574 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2576 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2579 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2580 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2582 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2583 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2587 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2588 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2589 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2590 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2592 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2599 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2600 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2601 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2602 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2603 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2604 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2606 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2607 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2609 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2610 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2611 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2612 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2613 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2614 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2615 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2616 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2617 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2618 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2624 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2625 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2626 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2627 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2629 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2630 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2632 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2633 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2634 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2636 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2637 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2638 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2639 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2640 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2641 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2642 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2646 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2651 pending_forward_info
2654 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2655 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2656 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2658 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2659 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2660 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2662 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2663 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2664 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2665 if !chan.should_announce() {
2666 return Err(LightningError {
2667 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2668 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2671 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2672 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2674 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2675 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2678 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2679 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2680 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2681 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2683 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2684 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2685 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2687 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2688 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2689 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2690 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2691 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2692 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2696 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2698 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2699 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2700 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2702 let enabled = chan.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
2703 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
2704 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
2705 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
2706 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
2709 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2710 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2712 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2713 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
2714 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2715 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2716 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2717 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2718 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2719 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2721 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2722 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2723 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2725 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2727 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2734 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2735 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2736 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2739 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2740 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2741 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2743 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2744 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2745 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2747 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2748 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2749 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2750 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2751 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2753 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2755 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2756 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2757 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2758 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2761 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2762 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2763 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2764 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2765 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2766 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2767 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2768 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2770 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2771 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2772 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2774 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2775 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2777 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2778 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2779 Some(monitor_update) => {
2780 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2781 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2782 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2785 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2786 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2787 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2788 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2789 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2790 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2791 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2792 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2798 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2799 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2800 // `channel_by_id` map.
2801 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2802 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2807 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2808 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2810 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2815 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2817 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2818 /// fields for more info.
2820 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2821 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2823 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2825 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2826 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2827 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2828 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2829 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2831 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2832 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2833 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2834 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2835 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2837 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2838 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2839 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2840 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2842 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2844 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2845 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2846 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2848 /// In general, a path may raise:
2849 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2850 /// node public key) is specified.
2851 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2852 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2854 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2855 /// relevant updates.
2857 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2858 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2859 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2861 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2862 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2863 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2864 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2865 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2866 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2867 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2868 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2869 self.pending_outbound_payments
2870 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2871 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2872 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2875 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2876 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2877 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2878 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2879 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2880 self.pending_outbound_payments
2881 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2882 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2883 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2884 &self.pending_events,
2885 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2886 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2890 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2891 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2892 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2893 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2894 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2895 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2899 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2900 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2901 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2905 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
2906 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
2910 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2911 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2912 /// retries are exhausted.
2914 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2915 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2917 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2918 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2919 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2921 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2922 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2924 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2925 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2926 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2927 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2928 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
2931 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2932 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2933 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2934 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2935 /// never reach the recipient.
2937 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2938 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2940 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2941 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2943 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2945 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2946 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2947 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2948 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2949 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2950 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
2951 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2952 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2953 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2956 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2957 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2959 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2962 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2963 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2964 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2965 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2966 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
2967 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2968 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2969 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2970 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2971 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2974 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2975 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2976 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2977 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2978 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2979 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2980 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2981 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2982 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2985 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2988 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2989 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2992 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2993 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2994 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2995 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2996 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2997 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2998 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2999 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3001 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3002 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3003 let (msg, chan) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3005 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3007 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3008 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3009 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
3010 } else { unreachable!(); });
3012 Ok(funding_msg) => (funding_msg, chan),
3014 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3015 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3017 let _ = handle_error!(self, funding_res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
3018 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3019 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3025 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3027 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3028 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3033 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3034 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3037 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
3038 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3039 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3041 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3042 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3043 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3044 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3053 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3054 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3055 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3059 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3061 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3062 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3064 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3065 /// across the p2p network.
3067 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3068 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3070 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3071 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3072 /// keys per-channel).
3074 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3075 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3076 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3078 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3079 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3080 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3082 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3083 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3084 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3085 /// for more details.
3087 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3088 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3089 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3090 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3092 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3093 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3094 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3095 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3100 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3101 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3102 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3103 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3104 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3105 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3106 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3107 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3111 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3112 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3113 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3114 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3118 let mut output_index = None;
3119 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3120 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3121 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
3122 if output_index.is_some() {
3123 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3124 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3127 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3130 if output_index.is_none() {
3131 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3132 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3135 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3139 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3141 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3142 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3143 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3144 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3146 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3147 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3149 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3150 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3152 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3154 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3155 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3156 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3157 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3158 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3159 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3160 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3161 pub fn update_channel_config(
3162 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3163 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3164 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3165 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3166 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3170 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3171 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3173 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3174 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3175 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3176 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3177 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3178 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3179 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
3180 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3181 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3185 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3186 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3187 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3190 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3191 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3192 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3193 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3194 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3202 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3203 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3205 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3206 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3208 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3209 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3210 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3211 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3212 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3214 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3215 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3217 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3220 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3221 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3222 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3223 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3224 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3225 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3227 let next_hop_scid = {
3228 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3229 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3230 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3231 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3232 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3233 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3235 if !chan.is_usable() {
3236 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3237 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3240 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3242 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3243 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3248 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3249 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3250 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3253 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3254 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3255 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3257 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3259 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3260 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3263 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3264 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3265 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3266 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3267 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3269 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3273 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3274 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3276 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3279 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3280 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3281 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3283 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3284 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3285 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3288 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3289 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3290 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3291 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3292 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3293 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3294 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3297 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3298 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3299 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3300 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3305 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3307 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3308 /// Will likely generate further events.
3309 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3310 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3312 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3313 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3314 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3316 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3317 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3319 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3320 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3321 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3323 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3324 match forward_info {
3325 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3326 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3327 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3328 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3329 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3332 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3333 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3334 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3336 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3337 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3338 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3339 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3340 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3341 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3344 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3345 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3347 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3350 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3351 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3357 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3358 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3360 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3364 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3365 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3367 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3371 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3372 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3373 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3374 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3375 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3377 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3378 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3379 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3380 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3381 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3383 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3385 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3386 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3390 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3391 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3392 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3393 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3399 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3402 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3405 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3406 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3407 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3408 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3409 // problem, not ours.
3415 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3416 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3418 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3422 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3423 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3424 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3425 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3428 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3429 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3430 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3431 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3432 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3435 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3436 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3437 match forward_info {
3438 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3439 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3440 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3441 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3442 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3445 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3446 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3447 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3448 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3449 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3450 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3451 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3452 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3454 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3455 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3456 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3458 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3459 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3461 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3463 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3464 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3465 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3466 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3471 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3472 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3474 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3475 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3476 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3477 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3479 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3480 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3482 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3484 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3485 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3486 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3495 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3496 match forward_info {
3497 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3498 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3499 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3500 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3503 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3504 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3505 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3507 RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3508 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3509 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3511 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3512 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: None, payment_metadata };
3513 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3514 None, None, onion_fields)
3517 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3520 let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3521 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3522 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3523 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3524 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3525 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3526 phantom_shared_secret,
3528 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3529 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3530 // if routing nodes overpay
3531 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3532 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3534 total_value_received: None,
3535 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3540 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3542 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3543 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3544 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3545 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3546 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3547 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3549 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3550 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3551 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3552 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3553 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3554 phantom_shared_secret,
3556 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3557 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3559 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3562 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3563 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3564 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3565 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3566 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3569 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3570 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3571 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3573 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3574 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3575 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3578 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3579 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3580 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3582 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3583 .entry(payment_hash)
3584 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3585 .or_insert_with(|| {
3586 committed_to_claimable = true;
3588 purpose: purpose(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
3591 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
3592 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
3593 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3596 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
3598 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3599 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3600 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3601 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3602 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3605 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3606 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3607 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3608 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3609 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3610 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3611 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3612 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3613 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3614 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3615 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3617 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3619 _ => unreachable!(),
3622 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3623 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3624 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3625 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3626 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3627 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3628 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3629 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3630 } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3631 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3632 committed_to_claimable = true;
3634 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3635 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3636 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3637 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3638 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3639 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3643 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3644 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3645 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3646 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
3648 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3650 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3651 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3653 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3654 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3655 committed_to_claimable = true;
3658 payment_claimable_generated
3662 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3663 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3664 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3665 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3666 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3667 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3668 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3669 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3670 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3671 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3672 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3673 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3674 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3675 Ok(result) => result,
3677 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3678 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3681 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3682 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3683 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3684 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3685 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3686 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3689 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3691 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3692 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3693 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3694 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3696 match claimable_payments.claimable_payments.entry(payment_hash) {
3697 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3698 let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
3699 claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
3700 let claim_deadline = Some(claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER);
3701 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3702 e.insert(ClaimablePayment {
3703 purpose: purpose.clone(),
3704 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields.clone()),
3705 htlcs: vec![claimable_htlc],
3707 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3708 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3709 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3713 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3714 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3716 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields),
3719 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3720 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3721 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3727 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3728 if payment_data.is_none() {
3729 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3730 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3732 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3733 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3734 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3735 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3736 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3737 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3738 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3739 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3741 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3742 if payment_claimable_generated {
3743 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3749 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3750 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3758 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3759 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3760 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3761 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3762 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3763 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3765 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3766 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3768 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3770 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3771 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3772 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3774 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3776 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3777 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3778 events.append(&mut new_events);
3781 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3783 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3784 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3786 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3787 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3788 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3789 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3790 if background_events.is_empty() {
3794 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3796 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
3797 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3798 // monitor updating completing.
3799 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3801 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { funding_txo, update, .. } => {
3802 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3803 // monitor updating completing.
3804 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3811 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3812 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3813 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3814 self.process_background_events();
3817 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3818 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3819 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3820 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3821 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3822 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3823 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3825 if !chan.is_live() {
3826 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3827 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3828 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3830 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3831 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3833 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3834 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3838 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3839 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3840 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3841 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3842 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3843 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3844 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3846 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3848 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3849 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3850 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3851 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3852 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3853 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3854 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3862 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3864 /// This currently includes:
3865 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3866 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3867 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3869 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3870 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3871 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3873 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3874 /// estimate fetches.
3876 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3877 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3878 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3879 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3880 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3881 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3883 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3885 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3886 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3887 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3889 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3890 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3891 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3892 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3893 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3894 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3895 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3896 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3897 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3899 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3900 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3901 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3902 if needs_close { return false; }
3905 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3906 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
3907 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
3908 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.is_live()
3909 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3910 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.is_live()
3911 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3912 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.is_live() => {
3914 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
3915 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3916 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3917 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3921 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3923 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
3926 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.is_live() => {
3928 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
3929 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3930 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3931 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3935 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3937 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
3943 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3947 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3948 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3953 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3954 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3955 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3956 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3957 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3958 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3959 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3960 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3961 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3962 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3963 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3964 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3965 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3966 // have no channels to the peer.
3967 let remove_entry = {
3968 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3969 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3972 entry.remove_entry();
3975 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3980 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
3981 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
3982 // This should be unreachable
3983 debug_assert!(false);
3986 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3987 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3988 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3989 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
3990 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
3991 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
3992 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
3995 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
3996 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3997 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3999 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4000 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4007 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4008 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4009 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4010 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4011 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4014 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4015 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4018 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4020 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4021 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4022 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4023 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4024 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4031 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4032 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4033 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4035 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4036 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4037 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4038 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4040 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4041 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4042 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4043 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4044 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4045 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4048 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4049 /// reason for the failure.
4051 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4052 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4053 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4055 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4056 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4057 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4058 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4059 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4060 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4061 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4066 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4067 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4068 match failure_code {
4069 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4070 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4071 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4072 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4073 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4074 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
4079 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4080 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4082 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4084 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4085 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4086 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4087 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4088 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4089 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
4090 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4092 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
4094 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4095 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4097 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4102 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4103 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4104 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4105 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4106 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4107 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4108 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4109 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4110 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4111 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4113 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4114 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4115 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4116 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4118 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4119 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4120 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4121 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4122 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4126 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4127 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4128 // be surfaced to the user.
4129 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4130 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4131 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4133 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4134 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4135 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4136 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4137 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4138 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4139 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4140 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4142 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4144 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4147 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4148 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4149 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4150 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4154 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4155 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4156 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4157 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4158 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4159 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4160 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4161 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4162 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4165 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4166 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4167 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4170 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4171 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4172 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4174 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4175 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4176 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4177 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4178 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4180 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4181 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4182 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4184 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4185 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4186 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4187 push_forward_ev = true;
4189 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4190 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4191 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4193 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4194 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4197 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4198 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4199 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4200 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4201 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4202 failed_next_destination: destination,
4208 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4209 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4211 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4212 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4213 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4214 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4216 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4217 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4218 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4219 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4221 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4222 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4223 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4224 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4225 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4226 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4227 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4228 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4230 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4233 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4234 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4235 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4236 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4237 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4238 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4239 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4240 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4245 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4246 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4247 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4249 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4250 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4251 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4252 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4257 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4259 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4260 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4261 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4262 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4263 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4264 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4265 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4266 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4267 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4268 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4269 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4270 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4271 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4272 debug_assert!(false);
4276 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4278 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4279 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4280 debug_assert!(false);
4284 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4286 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4287 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4288 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4289 if sources.len() != 1 {
4290 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4291 debug_assert!(false);
4297 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4299 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4300 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4301 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4302 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4305 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4306 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4307 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4308 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4312 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4313 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4314 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4315 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4317 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4318 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4319 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4320 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4321 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4326 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4327 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4328 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4329 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4330 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4331 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4332 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4334 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4337 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4338 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4339 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4340 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4344 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4345 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4346 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4347 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4350 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4351 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4352 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4353 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4357 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4358 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4359 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4362 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4363 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4364 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4365 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4366 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4367 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4369 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4370 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4371 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4372 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4373 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4375 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4376 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4377 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4378 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4379 if let Err(e) = res {
4380 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4381 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4382 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4383 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4384 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4391 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4392 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4393 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4397 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4398 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4399 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4400 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4401 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4402 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4403 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4404 // again on restart.
4405 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4406 payment_preimage, update_res);
4408 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4409 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4410 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4411 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4412 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4413 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4417 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4418 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4421 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4423 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4424 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4426 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4427 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4428 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4429 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4430 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4431 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4432 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4435 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4436 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4438 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4440 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4443 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4447 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4448 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4449 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4455 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4456 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4457 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4460 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4461 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4463 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4464 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4465 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4466 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4467 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4471 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4472 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
4478 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4479 /// update completion.
4480 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4481 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4482 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4483 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4484 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4485 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4486 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4487 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4488 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4489 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4490 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4491 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4492 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4494 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4496 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4497 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4498 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4499 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4502 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4503 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4505 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4506 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4507 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4512 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4513 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4514 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4515 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4520 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4521 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4522 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4523 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4524 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4529 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4533 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4539 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4540 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4541 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4545 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4546 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4547 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4553 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4554 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4556 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4557 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4559 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4560 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4561 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4562 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4563 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4568 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4569 let mut peer_state_lock;
4570 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4571 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4572 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4573 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4575 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4576 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4577 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4580 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4581 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4582 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4585 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4588 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4590 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4591 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4594 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4595 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4596 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4598 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4599 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4600 /// used to accept such channels.
4602 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4603 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4604 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4605 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4608 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4609 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4611 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4612 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4613 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4615 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4616 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4618 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4619 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4621 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4622 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4624 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4625 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4626 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4627 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4630 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4631 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4633 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4634 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4635 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4636 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4637 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4638 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4639 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4640 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4641 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4642 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4643 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4646 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4647 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4648 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4649 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4650 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4651 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4654 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4655 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4656 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4658 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4659 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4660 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4661 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4662 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4663 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4664 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4665 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4668 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4669 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4670 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4674 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4675 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4676 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4679 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4680 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4686 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4687 /// or 0-conf channels.
4689 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4690 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4691 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4692 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4693 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4694 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4696 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4697 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4698 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4699 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4700 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4701 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4702 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4706 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4709 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4710 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4712 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4713 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4714 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4715 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4717 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4720 num_unfunded_channels
4723 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4724 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4725 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4728 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4729 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4732 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4733 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4734 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4735 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4737 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4738 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4739 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4740 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4742 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4743 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4745 debug_assert!(false);
4746 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4748 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4749 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4751 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4752 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4753 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4754 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4755 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4756 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4758 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4759 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4760 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4763 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4764 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4765 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4766 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4767 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4770 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4771 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4772 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4775 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4776 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4780 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4781 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4782 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4783 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4785 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4786 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4787 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4788 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4790 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4791 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4792 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4795 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4796 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4797 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4798 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4799 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4800 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4801 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4805 entry.insert(channel);
4811 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4812 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4813 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4814 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4816 debug_assert!(false);
4817 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4819 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4820 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4821 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4822 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4823 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4824 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4826 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4829 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4830 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4831 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4832 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4833 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4835 user_channel_id: user_id,
4840 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4841 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4843 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4844 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4846 debug_assert!(false);
4847 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4850 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4851 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4852 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4853 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4854 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4855 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4857 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4860 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4861 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4862 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4864 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4865 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4866 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4867 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4868 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4869 funding_msg.channel_id))
4871 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4872 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4876 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4877 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4878 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4879 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4880 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4881 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4882 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4886 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4888 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4889 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4890 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4892 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4893 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4894 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4895 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4896 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4897 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4898 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4899 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4907 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4908 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4909 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4910 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4912 debug_assert!(false);
4913 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4916 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4917 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4918 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4919 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4920 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4921 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4922 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4923 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4924 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4925 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4926 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4927 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4928 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4929 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4934 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4938 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4939 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4940 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4942 debug_assert!(false);
4943 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4945 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4946 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4947 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4948 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4949 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4950 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4951 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4952 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4953 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4954 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4955 msg: announcement_sigs,
4957 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4958 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4959 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4960 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4961 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4962 // announcement_signatures.
4963 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4964 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4965 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4966 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4973 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4974 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
4979 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4983 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4984 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4985 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4986 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4987 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4989 debug_assert!(false);
4990 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4992 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4993 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4994 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4995 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4997 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4998 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4999 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5000 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5003 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
5004 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
5005 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5006 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5008 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5009 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5010 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5011 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5012 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5013 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5018 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5019 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5020 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5021 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5022 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
5026 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5029 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5030 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5031 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5032 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5038 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5039 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5040 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5042 debug_assert!(false);
5043 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5045 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5046 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5047 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5048 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5049 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5050 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5051 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5052 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5053 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5058 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5059 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5060 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5061 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5062 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5063 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5064 } else { (tx, None) }
5066 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5069 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5070 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5071 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
5073 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5074 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5075 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5076 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5077 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5081 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5086 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5087 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5088 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5089 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5091 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5092 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5093 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5094 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5096 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5097 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5098 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5100 debug_assert!(false);
5101 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5103 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5104 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5105 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5106 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5108 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5109 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5110 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5111 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5112 match pending_forward_info {
5113 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5114 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5115 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5116 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5118 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5119 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5120 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5121 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5122 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5125 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5127 _ => pending_forward_info
5130 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5132 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5137 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5138 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5139 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5140 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5142 debug_assert!(false);
5143 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5145 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5146 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5147 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5148 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5149 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5151 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5154 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5158 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5159 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5160 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5162 debug_assert!(false);
5163 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5165 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5166 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5167 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5168 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5169 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5171 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5176 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5177 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5178 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5180 debug_assert!(false);
5181 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5183 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5184 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5185 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5186 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5187 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5188 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5189 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5191 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5194 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5198 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5199 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5200 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5202 debug_assert!(false);
5203 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5205 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5206 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5207 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5208 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5209 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5210 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5211 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5212 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5213 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5214 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
5215 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5218 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5223 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5224 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5225 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5226 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5227 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5228 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5229 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5230 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5231 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5232 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5233 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5235 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5236 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5238 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5239 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5240 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5241 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5242 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5243 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5245 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5246 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5247 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5249 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5250 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5251 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5252 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5253 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5254 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5255 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5256 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5257 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5260 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5261 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5263 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5264 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5265 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5266 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5267 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5268 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5269 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5270 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5273 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5274 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5275 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5280 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5281 // payments are being processed.
5282 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5283 push_forward_event = true;
5285 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5286 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5293 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5294 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5297 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5298 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5299 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5301 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5305 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5306 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5307 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5308 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5309 .find(|(ev, _)| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5311 if !forward_ev_exists {
5312 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5314 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5319 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5320 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5321 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5322 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5324 debug_assert!(false);
5325 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5326 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5327 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5328 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5329 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5330 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5331 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5332 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5333 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5334 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5335 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5336 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5338 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5340 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5343 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5347 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5348 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5349 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5351 debug_assert!(false);
5352 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5354 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5355 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5356 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5357 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5358 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5360 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5365 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5366 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5367 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5369 debug_assert!(false);
5370 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5372 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5373 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5374 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5375 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5376 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5377 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5380 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5381 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5382 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5383 msg, &self.default_configuration
5385 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5386 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5387 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5390 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5395 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5396 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5397 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5398 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5400 // It's not a local channel
5401 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5404 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5405 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5406 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5407 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5409 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5410 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5411 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5412 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5413 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5414 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5415 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5416 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5417 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5418 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5420 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5422 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5423 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5424 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5425 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5427 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5428 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5431 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5433 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5436 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5438 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5439 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5441 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5443 debug_assert!(false);
5444 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5446 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5447 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5448 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5449 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5450 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5451 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5452 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5453 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5454 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5455 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5456 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5457 let mut channel_update = None;
5458 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5459 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5460 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5463 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5464 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5465 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5466 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5467 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5468 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5469 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5474 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5475 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5476 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5477 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5478 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5479 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5483 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5487 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5488 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5491 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5492 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5497 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5498 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5499 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5501 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5502 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5503 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5504 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5505 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5506 match monitor_event {
5507 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5508 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5509 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5510 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5512 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5513 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5514 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5515 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5518 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5519 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5520 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5521 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5523 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5524 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5525 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5526 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5529 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5530 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5531 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5532 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5533 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5534 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5535 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5536 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5537 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5538 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5539 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5543 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5544 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5546 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5548 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5549 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5550 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5551 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5552 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5559 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5560 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5566 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5567 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5570 has_pending_monitor_events
5573 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5574 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5575 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5577 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5578 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5579 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5580 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5582 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5587 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5588 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5589 /// update was applied.
5590 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5591 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5592 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5593 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5595 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5596 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5597 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5598 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5600 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5601 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5603 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5604 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5605 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5606 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5607 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5608 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5609 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5610 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5611 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5613 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5614 has_monitor_update = true;
5616 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5617 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5618 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5619 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5620 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5621 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5622 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5624 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5626 continue 'peer_loop;
5635 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5636 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5637 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5640 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5641 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5647 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5648 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5649 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5650 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5651 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5652 let mut has_update = false;
5654 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5656 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5657 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5658 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5659 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5660 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5661 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5662 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5663 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5665 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5666 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5669 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5670 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5671 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5672 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5673 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5678 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5680 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5681 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5682 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5688 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5689 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5697 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5698 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5704 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5705 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5707 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5708 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5709 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5710 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5711 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5712 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5713 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5714 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5715 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5716 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5717 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5718 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5719 assert!(should_broadcast);
5720 } else { unreachable!(); }
5721 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5722 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5723 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
5726 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5730 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5731 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5733 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5734 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5737 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5739 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5740 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5741 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5742 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5743 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5744 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5745 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5746 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5747 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5748 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5749 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5750 // never fail a payment too early.
5751 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5753 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5756 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5761 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5764 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5765 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5767 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5768 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5769 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5770 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5772 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5774 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5775 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5779 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5780 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5782 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5784 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5785 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5787 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5788 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5789 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5790 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5791 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5792 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5793 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5794 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5795 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5796 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5797 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5800 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5801 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5803 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5806 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5808 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5810 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5811 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5812 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5813 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5814 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5817 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5818 /// stored external to LDK.
5820 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5821 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5822 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5824 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5825 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5828 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5829 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5830 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5831 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5833 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5834 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5835 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5836 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5837 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5839 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5840 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5841 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5842 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5843 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5845 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5846 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5848 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5849 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5853 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5854 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5856 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5858 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5859 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5861 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5862 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5863 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5864 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5865 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5866 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5867 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5870 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5871 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5873 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5876 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5878 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5880 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5881 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5884 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5885 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5887 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5888 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5889 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5892 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5893 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5895 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
5896 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5897 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5898 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5900 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5901 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5902 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5903 Some(_) => continue,
5904 None => return scid_candidate
5909 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5911 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
5912 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5914 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5915 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5916 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5920 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5921 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5922 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5924 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5925 /// times to get a unique scid.
5926 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5927 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5928 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5930 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5931 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5932 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5933 return scid_candidate
5937 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5938 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5939 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5940 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5942 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5943 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5944 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5945 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5946 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5947 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5948 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5949 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5958 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5959 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5960 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5961 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5962 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5966 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5967 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5968 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5969 events.push_back((event, None));
5973 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5974 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5975 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
5979 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5980 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5984 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5985 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5988 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint) {
5989 let mut errors = Vec::new();
5991 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5992 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5993 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5994 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
5995 if self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter()
5996 .any(|(_ev, action_opt)| action_opt == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5997 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6000 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have another event
6001 // blocking any monitor updates for this channel. If we do, let those
6002 // events be the ones that ultimately release the monitor update(s).
6003 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another event is pending",
6004 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6007 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6008 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6009 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6010 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6011 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6012 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update);
6013 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
6014 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
6015 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6017 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6019 if further_update_exists {
6020 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6025 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6026 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6030 log_debug!(self.logger,
6031 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6032 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6036 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6037 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6038 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6042 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6043 for action in actions {
6045 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6046 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6048 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint);
6054 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6055 /// using the given event handler.
6057 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6058 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6062 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6066 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6068 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6069 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6070 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6071 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6072 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6073 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6077 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6078 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6079 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6080 /// is always placed next to each other.
6082 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6083 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6084 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6085 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6087 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6088 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6089 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6090 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6091 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6092 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6093 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
6095 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6096 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6097 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6098 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6101 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6102 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6104 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6105 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6108 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6109 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6110 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6111 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6112 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6113 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6114 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6118 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6119 events.replace(pending_events);
6128 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6130 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6131 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6132 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6133 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6134 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6135 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6139 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6141 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6142 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6143 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6145 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6149 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6151 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6152 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6153 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6154 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6155 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6156 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6160 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6162 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6163 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6164 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6165 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6166 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6169 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6170 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6173 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6174 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6175 let new_height = height - 1;
6177 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6178 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6179 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6180 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6181 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6182 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6185 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6189 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6191 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6192 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6193 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6194 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6195 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6196 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6200 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6201 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6202 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6203 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6205 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6206 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6208 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6209 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6210 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6212 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6213 if height < last_best_block_height {
6214 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6215 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6219 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6220 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6221 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6222 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6224 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6225 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6227 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6229 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6231 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6233 macro_rules! max_time {
6234 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6236 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6237 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6238 // having an explicit local time source.
6239 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6240 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6241 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6242 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6243 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6249 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6250 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6251 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6252 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6256 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6257 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6258 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6259 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6260 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6261 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6262 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6263 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6270 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6271 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6272 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6273 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
6274 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6275 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6276 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6277 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6282 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6284 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6285 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6286 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6287 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6288 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6289 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6293 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6294 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6296 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6297 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6298 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6299 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6300 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6302 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6303 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6305 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6306 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6307 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6308 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6309 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6310 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6311 let res = f(channel);
6312 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6313 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6314 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6315 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6316 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6318 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6319 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6320 if channel.is_usable() {
6321 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6322 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6323 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6324 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6329 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6334 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6335 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6338 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6339 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6340 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6341 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6342 msg: announcement_sigs,
6344 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6345 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6346 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6348 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6349 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6350 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6355 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6356 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6357 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6358 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6359 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6360 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6361 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6362 // is always consistent.
6363 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6364 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6365 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6366 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6367 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6370 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6371 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6372 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6373 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6374 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6375 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6376 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6380 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6381 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6382 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6383 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6384 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6385 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6386 data: reason_message,
6396 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6397 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6398 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6399 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6400 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6401 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6402 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6403 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6404 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6405 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6407 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6408 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6409 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6413 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6416 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6417 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6418 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6419 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6420 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6421 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6422 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6423 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6424 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6427 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6428 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6429 _ => unreachable!(),
6431 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6432 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6433 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6434 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6440 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6442 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6443 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6447 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6449 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6450 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6452 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6453 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6456 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6457 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6458 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6461 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6462 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6463 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6464 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6467 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6468 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6469 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6470 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6473 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6474 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6476 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6477 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6478 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6479 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6480 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6483 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6484 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6485 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6486 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6489 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6490 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6491 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6492 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6495 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6496 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6497 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6498 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6502 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6503 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6505 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6506 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6507 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6508 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6509 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6510 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6514 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6515 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6516 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6519 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
6520 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6521 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6522 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6525 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6526 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6527 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6530 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
6531 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6532 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6533 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6536 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6537 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6538 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6541 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6542 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6543 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6546 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6547 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6548 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6551 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6552 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6553 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6556 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6557 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6558 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6561 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6562 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6563 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6566 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6567 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6568 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6571 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6572 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6573 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6576 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6577 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6578 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6581 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6582 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6583 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6586 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6587 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6588 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6591 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6592 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6593 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6596 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6597 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6598 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6601 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6602 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6603 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6606 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6611 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6612 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6613 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6616 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6617 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6618 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6619 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6621 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6622 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6623 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6624 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6625 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6626 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6627 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6628 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6629 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6630 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6631 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6636 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6638 // V1 Channel Establishment
6639 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6640 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6641 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6642 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6643 // V2 Channel Establishment
6644 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6645 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6646 // Common Channel Establishment
6647 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6648 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6649 // Interactive Transaction Construction
6650 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
6651 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
6652 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
6653 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
6654 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
6655 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
6656 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
6657 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
6658 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
6659 // Channel Operations
6660 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6661 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6662 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6663 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6664 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6665 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6667 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6668 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6669 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6670 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6671 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6672 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6673 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6674 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6675 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6678 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6679 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6680 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6681 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6684 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6686 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6688 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6689 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6693 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6694 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6695 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6699 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6701 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6702 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6703 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6704 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6705 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6706 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6709 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6710 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6711 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6712 if inbound_peer_limited {
6715 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6716 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6717 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6718 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6719 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6723 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6724 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6725 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6727 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6728 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6729 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6730 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6735 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6736 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6741 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6743 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6744 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6745 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6746 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6747 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6748 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6749 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6750 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6751 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6752 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6753 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6757 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6758 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6759 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6764 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6765 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6766 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6767 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6768 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6777 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6781 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6782 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6784 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6785 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6786 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6787 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6788 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6789 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6790 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6791 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6793 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6794 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6795 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6799 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6800 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6801 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6802 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6803 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6804 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6805 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6806 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6807 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6808 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6816 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6817 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6821 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6822 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6825 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6826 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6829 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
6830 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6831 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6832 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6835 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
6836 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6837 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6838 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6841 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
6842 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6843 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6844 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6847 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
6848 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6849 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6850 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6853 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
6854 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6855 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6856 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6859 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
6860 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6861 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6862 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6865 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
6866 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6867 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6868 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6871 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
6872 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6873 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6874 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6877 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
6878 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6879 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6880 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6884 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6885 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6886 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6887 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6890 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6891 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6893 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6894 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6895 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6896 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6897 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6900 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6901 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6902 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6903 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6906 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6907 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6908 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6909 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6912 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6913 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6914 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6915 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6916 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
6917 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
6918 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6919 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
6920 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6921 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6922 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6923 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6924 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6925 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6926 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6927 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6928 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6929 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6931 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6932 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6933 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6939 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6940 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6942 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6943 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6944 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6945 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6948 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6949 (2, node_id, required),
6950 (4, features, required),
6951 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6952 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6953 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6954 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6957 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6958 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6959 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6960 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6961 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6962 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6963 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6964 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6965 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6966 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6967 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6968 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6969 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6970 (7, self.config, option),
6971 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6972 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6973 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6974 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6975 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6976 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6977 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6978 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6979 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6980 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6981 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6982 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6983 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6984 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6985 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6986 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6987 (32, self.is_public, required),
6988 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6989 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6990 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6991 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6997 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6998 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6999 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7000 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7001 (2, channel_id, required),
7002 (3, channel_type, option),
7003 (4, counterparty, required),
7004 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7005 (6, funding_txo, option),
7006 (7, config, option),
7007 (8, short_channel_id, option),
7008 (9, confirmations, option),
7009 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7010 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7011 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7012 (16, balance_msat, required),
7013 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7014 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7015 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7016 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7017 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7018 (22, confirmations_required, option),
7019 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7020 (26, is_outbound, required),
7021 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7022 (30, is_usable, required),
7023 (32, is_public, required),
7024 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7025 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7026 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7027 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7030 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7031 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7032 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7033 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7034 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7038 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7040 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7041 outbound_scid_alias,
7045 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7046 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7048 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
7049 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7050 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7051 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7052 confirmations_required,
7054 force_close_spend_delay,
7055 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7056 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7057 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7058 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7059 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7060 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7061 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7066 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7067 (2, channels, vec_type),
7068 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7069 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7072 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7074 (0, onion_packet, required),
7075 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7078 (0, payment_data, required),
7079 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7080 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7081 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7083 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7084 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7085 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7086 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7090 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7091 (0, routing, required),
7092 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7093 (4, payment_hash, required),
7094 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7095 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7096 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7100 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7101 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7103 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7105 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7106 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7107 reason.write(writer)?;
7109 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7110 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7113 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7114 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7115 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7116 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7123 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7124 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7125 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7128 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7129 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7130 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7131 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7135 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7136 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7137 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7138 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7139 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7142 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7143 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7144 // messages contained in the variants.
7145 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7146 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7147 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7149 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7150 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7151 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7152 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7153 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7156 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7157 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7158 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7159 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7160 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7162 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7167 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7172 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7173 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7174 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7175 (2, outpoint, required),
7176 (4, htlc_id, required),
7177 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7180 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7181 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7182 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7183 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7184 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7186 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7187 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7188 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7189 (2, self.value, required),
7190 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7191 (4, payment_data, option),
7192 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7193 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7194 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7200 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7201 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7202 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7204 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
7205 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
7206 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
7207 let mut total_value_received = None;
7208 let mut total_msat = None;
7209 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7210 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7211 (0, prev_hop, required),
7212 (1, total_msat, option),
7213 (2, value, required),
7214 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7215 (4, payment_data, option),
7216 (5, total_value_received, option),
7217 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7218 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
7220 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7222 if payment_data.is_some() {
7223 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7225 if total_msat.is_none() {
7226 total_msat = Some(value);
7228 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7231 if total_msat.is_none() {
7232 if payment_data.is_none() {
7233 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7235 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7237 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7241 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7244 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7245 total_value_received,
7246 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7253 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7254 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7255 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7258 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7259 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7260 let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
7261 let mut payment_id = None;
7262 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7263 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7264 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7265 (0, session_priv, required),
7266 (1, payment_id, option),
7267 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7268 (4, path_hops, vec_type),
7269 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7270 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7272 if payment_id.is_none() {
7273 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7275 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7277 let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
7278 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7279 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7281 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7282 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
7283 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
7284 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7288 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7289 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7290 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7292 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7295 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7296 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7301 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7302 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7304 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7306 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7307 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7308 (0, session_priv, required),
7309 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7310 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7311 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7312 (4, path.hops, vec_type),
7313 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7314 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7317 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7319 field.write(writer)?;
7326 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7327 (0, forward_info, required),
7328 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7329 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7330 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7331 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7334 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7336 (0, htlc_id, required),
7337 (2, err_packet, required),
7342 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7343 (0, payment_secret, required),
7344 (2, expiry_time, required),
7345 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7346 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7347 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7350 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7352 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7353 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7354 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7355 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7356 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7357 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7361 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7362 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7364 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7366 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7368 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7369 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7370 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7373 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7375 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7376 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7377 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7378 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7379 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7380 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7381 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7382 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7384 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7385 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7386 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7387 unfunded_channels += 1;
7392 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7394 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7395 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7396 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7397 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7398 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7399 channel.write(writer)?;
7406 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7407 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7408 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7409 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7410 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7411 for forward in pending_forwards {
7412 forward.write(writer)?;
7417 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7419 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7420 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7421 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7423 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7424 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7425 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7426 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7427 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7428 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7429 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7430 htlc.write(writer)?;
7432 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7433 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7436 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7437 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7438 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7439 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7440 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7441 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7442 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7445 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7446 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7447 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7448 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7449 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7451 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7452 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7453 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7454 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7455 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7456 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7457 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7462 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7463 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
7464 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
7465 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
7466 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
7467 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
7468 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
7469 // well save the space and not write any events here.
7470 0u64.write(writer)?;
7472 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7473 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
7474 event.write(writer)?;
7478 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
7479 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
7480 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
7481 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
7482 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
7483 0u64.write(writer)?;
7485 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7486 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7487 // likely to be identical.
7488 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7489 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7491 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7492 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7493 hash.write(writer)?;
7494 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7497 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7498 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7499 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7500 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7501 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7504 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7505 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7507 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7508 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7509 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7510 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7513 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7514 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7518 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7519 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7520 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7522 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7523 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7524 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7530 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7531 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7532 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7533 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7536 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7537 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7538 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7539 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7540 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7543 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7544 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7545 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7546 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7547 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7548 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7549 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7550 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7551 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
7552 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7553 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7554 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7561 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7562 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7563 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
7564 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
7567 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
7568 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
7569 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
7570 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
7571 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
7572 // check that the event is sane here.
7573 let event_encoded = event.encode();
7574 let event_read: Option<Event> =
7575 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
7576 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
7582 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7583 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7584 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7585 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
7586 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
7587 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
7590 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
7591 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
7592 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
7593 events.push_back((ev, action));
7594 } else if action.is_some() {
7595 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7602 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7604 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7606 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7607 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7608 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7609 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7610 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7611 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7612 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7613 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7614 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7615 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7616 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7617 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7618 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7620 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7621 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7623 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7624 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7626 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7627 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7628 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7629 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7630 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7631 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7633 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7634 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7636 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7637 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7638 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7639 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7640 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7641 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7645 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7646 pub entropy_source: ES,
7648 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7649 pub node_signer: NS,
7651 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7652 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7654 pub signer_provider: SP,
7656 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7658 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7659 pub fee_estimator: F,
7660 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7662 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7663 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7664 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7665 pub chain_monitor: M,
7667 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7668 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7669 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7670 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7671 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7672 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7674 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7676 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7677 /// deserialization.
7679 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7680 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7681 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7683 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7684 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7686 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7687 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7688 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7689 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7691 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7694 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7695 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7698 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7699 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7701 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7702 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7703 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7704 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7705 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7706 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7710 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7711 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7712 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7713 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7714 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7716 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7717 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7722 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7723 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7724 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7725 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7727 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7728 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7729 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7730 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7731 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7732 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7736 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7737 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7738 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7742 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7743 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7745 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7746 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7747 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7748 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7749 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7750 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7754 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7755 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7757 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7758 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7759 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7761 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7763 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7764 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7765 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7766 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7767 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7768 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
7769 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
7770 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7771 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7772 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7774 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7775 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7776 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7777 if channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7778 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7779 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7780 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7781 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id());
7782 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7783 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7784 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7785 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7786 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7787 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7788 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7789 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7790 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7791 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7792 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7793 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7794 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7795 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7796 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7797 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
7798 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7799 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7802 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7803 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7804 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7805 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7806 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7808 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7809 let mut found_htlc = false;
7810 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7811 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7814 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7815 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7816 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7817 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7818 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7819 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7820 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7821 log_info!(args.logger,
7822 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7823 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7824 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7828 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7829 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7830 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7832 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7833 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7835 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7836 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7837 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7838 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7840 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7841 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7842 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7843 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7847 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7848 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7849 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7850 // safely discard the channel.
7851 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7852 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7853 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7854 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7855 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7858 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7859 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7860 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7861 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7862 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7863 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7867 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7868 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7869 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
7870 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7871 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7872 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
7873 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
7875 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7879 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7880 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7881 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7882 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7883 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7884 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7885 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7886 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7887 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7889 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7892 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7893 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7894 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7895 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7896 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7897 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7898 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7899 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7901 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7904 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7905 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7906 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7907 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7908 let peer_state = PeerState {
7909 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7910 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7911 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7912 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7913 is_connected: false,
7915 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7918 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7919 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
7920 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
7921 for _ in 0..event_count {
7922 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7923 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
7928 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7929 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7930 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7932 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
7933 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
7934 // on-startup monitor updates.
7935 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
7936 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
7938 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7942 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7943 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7945 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7946 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7947 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7948 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7949 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7953 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7954 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7955 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7956 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7957 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7958 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7959 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7961 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7962 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7966 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7967 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7968 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7969 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7970 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7971 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7972 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7973 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7974 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
7975 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7976 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7977 let mut events_override = None;
7978 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7979 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7980 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7981 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7982 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7983 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7984 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7985 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7986 (8, events_override, option),
7987 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7988 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7989 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7991 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7992 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7995 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7996 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7999 if let Some(events) = events_override {
8000 pending_events_read = events;
8003 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
8004 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
8007 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
8008 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
8009 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
8010 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
8011 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
8012 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
8014 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
8016 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
8017 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8018 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8022 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8023 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8024 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8025 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8026 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8027 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8028 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8030 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8031 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
8032 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8033 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8034 if path.hops.is_empty() {
8035 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8036 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8039 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
8040 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
8041 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
8042 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
8043 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8044 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
8045 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
8046 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
8048 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8049 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
8050 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
8051 retry_strategy: None,
8052 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
8053 payment_params: None,
8054 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
8055 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
8056 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8057 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8058 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8059 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
8060 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
8061 total_msat: path_amt,
8062 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
8064 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
8065 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
8070 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8072 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
8073 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
8074 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
8075 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
8077 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
8078 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
8079 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
8080 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
8081 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
8082 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
8083 forwards.retain(|forward| {
8084 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
8085 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8086 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8087 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8092 !forwards.is_empty()
8094 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
8095 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8096 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8097 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8098 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
8099 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
8100 intercepted_id != ev_id
8107 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
8108 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
8109 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
8110 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
8111 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
8112 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
8113 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
8114 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
8115 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
8116 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
8117 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
8118 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
8119 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
8128 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
8129 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
8130 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
8131 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
8132 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
8133 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
8134 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
8135 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
8139 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
8140 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
8142 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
8143 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
8144 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8145 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8147 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
8148 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8149 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8151 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
8152 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
8154 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8155 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
8157 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8160 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
8161 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8162 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8164 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8168 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
8169 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
8170 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
8171 if htlcs.is_empty() {
8172 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8174 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
8175 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
8176 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
8177 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
8178 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
8179 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
8180 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
8181 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
8183 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8184 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8188 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
8190 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8192 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
8193 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
8195 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8196 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8201 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8202 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8204 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
8206 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8208 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
8209 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
8210 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
8211 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8215 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
8216 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8217 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8218 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8219 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8220 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
8221 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
8223 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
8224 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
8225 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
8227 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
8228 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
8229 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8230 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8231 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
8232 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8234 if chan.is_usable() {
8235 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
8236 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8237 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8238 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
8239 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8245 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
8247 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8248 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
8249 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
8250 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8251 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
8252 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
8253 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
8254 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
8255 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
8256 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
8257 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
8259 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
8260 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
8262 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
8263 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
8264 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
8265 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
8267 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
8268 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
8269 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
8270 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
8272 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
8273 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
8274 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
8275 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
8277 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
8278 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
8279 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
8280 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8281 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8282 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
8283 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
8286 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
8287 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
8290 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
8293 purpose: payment.purpose,
8294 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
8300 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
8301 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
8302 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
8304 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
8305 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8309 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
8311 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
8312 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
8313 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
8314 router: args.router,
8316 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
8318 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
8319 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
8320 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
8321 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
8323 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
8324 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
8325 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
8326 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
8327 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
8328 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
8330 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
8335 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
8337 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
8339 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
8340 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
8341 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
8342 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
8343 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
8345 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
8346 node_signer: args.node_signer,
8347 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
8349 logger: args.logger,
8350 default_configuration: args.default_config,
8353 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8354 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
8355 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
8356 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8357 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8360 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
8361 //connection or two.
8363 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
8369 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8370 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8371 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
8372 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
8373 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
8374 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
8375 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
8376 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8377 use crate::ln::msgs;
8378 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
8379 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
8380 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8381 use crate::util::test_utils;
8382 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
8383 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
8386 fn test_notify_limits() {
8387 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
8388 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
8389 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8390 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8391 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8392 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8394 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
8395 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
8396 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8397 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8398 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8400 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8402 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
8403 // to connect messages with new values
8404 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8405 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8406 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8407 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8408 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8409 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8411 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
8412 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8413 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8414 // ... but the last node should not.
8415 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8416 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
8417 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8418 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8420 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
8421 // about the channel.
8422 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8423 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8424 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8426 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8428 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8429 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8430 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8431 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8432 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8433 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8435 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8436 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8437 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8439 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8440 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8441 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8442 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8443 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8444 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8446 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8447 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8448 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8449 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8450 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8451 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8452 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8453 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8455 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8456 // the channel info has updated.
8457 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8458 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8459 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8460 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8461 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8462 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8466 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8467 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8469 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8470 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8471 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8472 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8473 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8475 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8476 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8477 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8478 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8480 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8481 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8482 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8483 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8484 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8485 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8486 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8487 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8488 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8489 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8490 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8491 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8493 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8494 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8495 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8496 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8497 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8498 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8499 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8500 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8501 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8502 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8503 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8504 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8505 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8506 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8507 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8508 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8509 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8510 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8511 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8512 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8513 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8514 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8515 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8517 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8518 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8519 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8520 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8521 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8522 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8523 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8525 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8526 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8527 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8528 // lightning messages manually.
8529 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8530 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8531 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8533 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8534 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8535 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8536 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8537 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8538 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8540 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8541 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8542 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8543 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8544 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8545 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8546 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8547 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8548 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8549 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8550 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8551 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8552 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8553 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8554 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8555 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8556 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8557 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8559 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8560 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8561 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8562 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8564 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8565 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8566 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8567 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8569 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8572 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8573 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8574 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8575 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8577 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8580 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8581 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8582 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8583 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8585 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8590 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8591 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8592 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8593 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8594 // fails as expected.
8595 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8596 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8597 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8598 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8599 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8600 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8601 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8603 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8604 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8605 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8607 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8608 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8609 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8610 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8612 let route = find_route(
8613 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8614 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8616 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8617 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8618 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8619 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8620 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8621 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8622 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8623 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8624 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8625 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8626 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8627 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8628 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8629 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8630 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8631 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8632 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8633 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8634 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8635 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8636 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8637 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8638 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8639 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8641 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8642 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8644 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8645 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8646 let route = find_route(
8647 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8648 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8650 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8651 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8652 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8653 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8654 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8655 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8656 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8657 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8659 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8660 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8661 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8662 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8663 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8664 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8665 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8666 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8667 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8668 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8669 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8670 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8671 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8672 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8673 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8674 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8675 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8676 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8677 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8678 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8679 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8680 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8681 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8682 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8684 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8685 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8689 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8690 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8691 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8692 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8693 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8694 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8695 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8697 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8698 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8700 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8701 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8702 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8703 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8705 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8706 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8707 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8708 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8709 let route = find_route(
8710 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8711 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8714 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8715 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8716 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
8717 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8718 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
8719 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8720 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8722 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8723 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8724 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8725 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8726 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8727 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8728 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8730 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8734 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8735 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8736 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8737 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8738 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8739 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8741 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8742 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8744 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8745 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8746 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8747 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8749 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8750 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8751 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8752 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8753 let route = find_route(
8754 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8755 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8758 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8759 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8760 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8761 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
8762 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8763 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
8764 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
8765 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8766 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8768 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8769 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8770 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8771 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8772 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8773 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8774 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8776 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8780 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8781 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8782 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8783 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8784 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8786 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8787 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8788 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8789 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8791 // Marshall an MPP route.
8792 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8793 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8794 route.paths.push(path);
8795 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8796 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8797 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8798 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8799 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8800 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8802 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8803 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
8805 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8806 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
8808 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8813 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8814 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8815 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8816 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8817 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8819 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8821 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8822 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8824 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8825 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8826 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8827 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8830 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8831 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8832 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8833 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8834 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8835 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8838 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8841 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8842 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8847 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8848 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8849 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8850 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8851 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8852 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8854 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8855 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8857 total_msat: 100_000,
8860 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8861 // payment verification fails as expected.
8862 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8863 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8864 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8865 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8867 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
8871 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8872 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8876 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8877 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8878 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8879 // the channel is successfully closed.
8880 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8881 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8882 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8883 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8885 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8886 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8887 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8888 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8889 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8891 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8892 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8894 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8895 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8896 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8897 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8900 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8902 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8903 // as it has the funding transaction.
8904 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8905 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8906 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8909 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8911 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8913 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8915 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8916 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8917 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8919 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8922 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8923 // as it has the funding transaction.
8924 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8925 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8926 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8928 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8929 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8930 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8931 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8932 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8933 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8934 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8935 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8937 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8938 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8939 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8940 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8942 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8943 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8945 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8946 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8947 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8948 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8949 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8950 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8951 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8955 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8956 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8957 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8958 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8959 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8960 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8961 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8964 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8966 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8967 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8968 // closing transaction).
8969 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8970 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8971 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8973 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8974 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8975 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8976 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8977 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8980 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8982 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8984 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8985 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8986 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8988 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8990 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8991 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8994 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8995 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8996 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8999 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9000 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
9001 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9004 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
9006 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9007 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9009 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
9010 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9012 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
9013 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
9018 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
9019 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
9020 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
9021 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
9022 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9023 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9024 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
9025 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9028 let channel_id = [4; 32];
9029 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9030 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
9032 // Test the API functions.
9033 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
9035 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
9037 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9039 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9041 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9043 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
9045 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
9049 fn test_connection_limiting() {
9050 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
9051 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9052 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9053 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9054 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9056 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9058 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9059 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9061 let mut funding_tx = None;
9062 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9063 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9064 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9067 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9068 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9069 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
9070 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
9071 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9073 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9074 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9075 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9077 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9079 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9081 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9083 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9086 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
9087 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9088 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9089 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9090 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9092 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
9093 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
9095 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
9096 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
9097 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9098 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9099 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
9100 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9101 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9103 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9104 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9105 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9106 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
9108 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
9109 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
9110 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9111 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9112 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
9113 for ev in chan_closed_events {
9114 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
9116 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9117 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9118 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9119 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
9121 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
9122 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9123 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
9124 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9126 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
9127 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
9129 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
9130 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9131 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
9132 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
9133 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9135 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9136 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9137 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9139 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
9140 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9141 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
9143 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
9144 // "protected" and can connect again.
9145 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
9146 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9147 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9148 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9150 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
9152 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9153 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9157 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
9158 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
9159 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9160 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9161 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9162 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9164 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9166 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9167 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9169 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9170 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9171 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9172 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9175 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
9177 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9178 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9179 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9181 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
9182 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9183 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9185 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
9186 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9187 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9188 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9192 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
9193 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
9194 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
9195 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9196 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9197 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
9198 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9199 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
9200 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9202 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9204 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9205 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9207 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
9208 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9209 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9210 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9211 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9212 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9214 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9215 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9217 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9218 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9220 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9222 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
9223 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9226 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
9227 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9228 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9229 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9230 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9231 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9232 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9234 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9235 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
9236 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
9237 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
9241 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9243 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9244 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9246 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
9247 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9248 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9250 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9251 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9253 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9255 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9260 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
9261 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
9262 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
9263 // the channel without the anchors feature.
9264 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9265 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9266 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
9267 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9268 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9269 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
9270 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9272 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
9273 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9274 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9276 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9277 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9279 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9280 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9282 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9285 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9286 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
9288 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9289 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9291 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9295 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
9297 use crate::chain::Listen;
9298 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
9299 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
9300 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
9301 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
9302 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9303 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
9304 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
9305 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
9306 use crate::util::test_utils;
9307 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9309 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9310 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9311 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
9313 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
9317 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
9318 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
9319 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
9320 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
9321 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
9322 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
9323 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
9325 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
9326 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
9328 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
9329 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
9331 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
9333 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
9338 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
9339 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
9342 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
9343 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
9344 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
9346 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
9348 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
9349 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
9350 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9351 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
9352 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
9354 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
9355 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
9357 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
9358 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
9359 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
9360 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9362 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9364 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
9366 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9367 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
9368 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
9369 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
9370 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9372 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9374 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
9376 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9377 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
9378 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9379 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9380 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9383 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
9384 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9385 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
9387 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9388 } else { panic!(); }
9390 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9391 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9392 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9394 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9395 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9397 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9400 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9401 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9402 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9404 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9405 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9407 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9410 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
9413 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
9416 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
9417 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
9419 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9420 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9421 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
9422 match msg_events[0] {
9423 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
9424 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
9425 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9429 match msg_events[1] {
9430 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9434 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9435 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9437 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9438 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9440 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9443 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9444 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9446 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9447 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9449 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9452 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
9453 macro_rules! send_payment {
9454 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
9455 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9456 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9457 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
9458 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
9460 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
9461 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
9463 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
9464 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
9465 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
9466 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
9467 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
9468 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9469 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
9470 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
9471 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9472 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9473 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9475 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
9476 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
9477 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9478 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9480 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9481 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9482 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9483 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9484 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9486 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9489 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9490 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9491 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9492 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9494 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9499 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9500 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);