1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::{BlindedPath, NodeIdLookUp};
35 use crate::blinded_path::message::ForwardNode;
36 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{Bolt12OfferContext, Bolt12RefundContext, PaymentConstraints, PaymentContext, ReceiveTlvs};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
44 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
45 // construct one themselves.
46 use crate::ln::inbound_payment;
47 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
48 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
49 pub use crate::ln::channel_state::{ChannelCounterparty, ChannelDetails, ChannelShutdownState, CounterpartyForwardingInfo};
50 pub use crate::ln::channel_state::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
51 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
52 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
53 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
54 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
55 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
57 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
58 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
59 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
61 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
62 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
63 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
64 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
65 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
66 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
67 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
68 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
69 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
70 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{new_pending_onion_message, Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, Responder, ResponseInstruction};
71 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
72 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
73 use crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner;
74 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
75 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
76 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
77 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
78 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
79 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
80 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
82 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
84 crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
85 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
86 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
87 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
88 crate::sign::KeysManager,
92 crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
93 crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
96 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
99 use crate::prelude::*;
100 use core::{cmp, mem};
101 use core::cell::RefCell;
103 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
104 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
105 use core::time::Duration;
106 use core::ops::Deref;
108 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
109 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
110 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
112 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
114 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
115 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
116 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
118 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
119 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
120 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
121 // before we forward it.
123 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
124 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
125 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
126 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
127 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
129 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
130 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
131 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
132 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
133 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
135 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
136 /// do with the HTLC.
137 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
138 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
140 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
141 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
142 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
143 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
144 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
145 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
147 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
149 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
150 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
152 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
153 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
154 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
155 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
156 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
158 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
159 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
160 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
161 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
162 /// The context of the payment included by the recipient in a blinded path, or `None` if a
163 /// blinded path was not used.
165 /// Used in part to determine the [`events::PaymentPurpose`].
166 payment_context: Option<PaymentContext>,
167 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
169 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
170 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
171 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
172 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
174 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
175 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
177 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
178 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
179 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
180 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
181 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
182 requires_blinded_error: bool,
184 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
185 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
186 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
188 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
189 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
191 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
192 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
193 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
194 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
195 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
196 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
197 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
199 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
200 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
201 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
202 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
204 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
205 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
206 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
208 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
209 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
210 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
211 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
212 requires_blinded_error: bool,
216 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
217 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
218 pub struct BlindedForward {
219 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
220 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
221 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
222 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
223 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
224 /// the introduction node.
225 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
228 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
229 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
230 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
232 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
233 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
234 Self::ReceiveKeysend { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
240 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
242 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
243 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
244 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
245 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
246 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
247 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
249 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
250 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
251 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
252 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
253 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
255 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
257 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
258 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
259 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
261 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
262 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
263 /// it along another path).
265 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
266 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
267 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
268 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
269 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
270 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
271 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
272 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
273 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
275 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
278 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
280 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
282 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
285 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
286 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
287 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
288 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
291 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
292 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
293 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
294 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
295 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
298 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
299 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
300 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
302 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
303 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
304 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
307 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
308 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
310 prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
311 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
312 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
315 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
316 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
317 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
320 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
325 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
329 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
330 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
331 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
332 pub enum BlindedFailure {
333 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
334 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
335 FromIntroductionNode,
336 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
337 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
341 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
342 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
343 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
344 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
345 short_channel_id: u64,
346 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
348 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
349 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
350 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
351 channel_id: ChannelId,
353 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
354 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
359 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
361 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
362 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
363 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
365 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
366 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
369 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
370 struct ClaimableHTLC {
371 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
373 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
375 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
376 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
377 sender_intended_value: u64,
378 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
380 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
381 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
382 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
383 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
385 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
386 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
389 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
390 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
391 events::ClaimedHTLC {
392 channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
393 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
394 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
395 value_msat: val.value,
396 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
401 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
402 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
404 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
405 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
406 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
409 /// Number of bytes in the id.
410 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
413 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
414 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
419 impl Readable for PaymentId {
420 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
421 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
426 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
427 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
428 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
432 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
434 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
435 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
436 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
438 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
439 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
444 impl Readable for InterceptId {
445 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
446 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
451 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
452 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
453 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
454 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
455 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
458 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
460 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
461 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
462 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
464 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
465 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
469 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
470 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
471 (0, short_channel_id, required),
472 (2, htlc_id, required),
474 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
475 (0, session_priv, required),
480 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
481 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
482 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
483 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
484 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
487 session_priv: SecretKey,
488 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
489 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
490 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
491 payment_id: PaymentId,
494 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
495 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
496 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
498 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
500 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
502 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
505 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
506 payment_id.hash(hasher);
507 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
513 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
515 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
516 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
517 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
518 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
519 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
520 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
524 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
525 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
526 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
527 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
528 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
529 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
531 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
537 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
538 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
540 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
541 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
542 pub enum FailureCode {
543 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
544 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
545 TemporaryNodeFailure,
546 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
547 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
548 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
549 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
550 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
551 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
552 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
553 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
554 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
555 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
557 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
558 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
559 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
562 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
563 fn into(self) -> u16 {
565 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
566 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
567 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
568 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
573 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
574 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
575 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
576 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
577 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
579 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
580 err: msgs::LightningError,
581 closes_channel: bool,
582 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
584 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
586 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
588 err: LightningError {
590 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
591 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
597 closes_channel: false,
598 shutdown_finish: None,
602 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
603 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
606 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
607 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
608 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
609 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
610 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
611 // commitment upon reconnecting.
612 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
614 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
617 err: LightningError { err, action },
618 closes_channel: true,
619 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
623 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
626 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
628 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
629 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
633 log_level: Level::Warn,
636 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
638 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
640 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
642 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
643 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
650 closes_channel: false,
651 shutdown_finish: None,
655 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
660 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
661 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
662 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
663 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
664 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
666 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
667 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
668 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
669 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
670 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
671 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
672 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
674 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
678 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
679 struct ClaimingPayment {
681 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
682 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
683 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
684 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
685 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
687 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
688 (0, amount_msat, required),
689 (2, payment_purpose, required),
690 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
691 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
692 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
693 (9, onion_fields, option),
696 struct ClaimablePayment {
697 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
698 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
699 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
702 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
703 struct ClaimablePayments {
704 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
705 /// failed/claimed by the user.
707 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
708 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
710 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
711 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
712 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
714 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
715 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
716 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
717 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
720 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
721 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
722 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
723 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
725 enum BackgroundEvent {
726 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
727 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
728 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
729 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
731 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
732 /// are regenerated on startup.
733 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
734 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
735 /// channel to continue normal operation.
737 /// In general this should be used rather than
738 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
739 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
740 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
742 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
743 /// are regenerated on startup.
744 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
745 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
746 funding_txo: OutPoint,
747 channel_id: ChannelId,
748 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
750 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
751 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
753 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
754 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
755 channel_id: ChannelId,
760 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
761 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
762 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
763 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
764 /// event can be generated.
765 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
766 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
767 /// operation of another channel.
769 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
770 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
771 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
772 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
774 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
775 event: events::Event,
776 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
778 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
779 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
780 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
782 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
783 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
784 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
785 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
786 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
788 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
789 /// stored for later processing.
790 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
791 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
792 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
793 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
794 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
798 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
799 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
800 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
801 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
802 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
803 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
804 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
805 (4, blocking_action, required),
806 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
807 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
808 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
810 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
811 (0, event, upgradable_required),
812 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
813 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
814 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
815 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
816 // downgrades to prior versions.
817 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
821 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
822 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
823 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
824 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
825 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
826 channel_id: ChannelId,
829 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
830 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
831 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
832 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
833 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
834 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
835 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
839 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
840 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
841 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
842 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
843 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
844 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
846 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
847 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
848 channel_id: ChannelId,
849 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
854 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
855 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
856 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
857 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
858 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
863 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
864 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
868 /// State we hold per-peer.
869 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
870 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
872 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
873 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
874 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
876 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
877 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
878 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
879 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
880 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
881 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
882 latest_features: InitFeatures,
883 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
884 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
885 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
886 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
887 /// user but which have not yet completed.
889 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
890 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
891 /// for a missing channel.
892 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
893 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
894 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
896 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
897 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
898 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
899 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
901 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
902 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
903 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
904 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
905 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
906 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
907 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
908 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
909 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
910 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
911 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
912 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
913 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
914 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
915 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
916 pub is_connected: bool,
919 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
920 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
921 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
922 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
923 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
924 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
927 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
929 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
930 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
931 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
932 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
933 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
934 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
937 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
938 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
941 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
942 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
943 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
946 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
947 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
948 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
949 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
953 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
954 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
955 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
956 /// The original OpenChannel message.
957 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
958 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
959 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
962 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
963 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
964 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
966 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
967 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
969 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
972 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
973 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
974 struct PendingInboundPayment {
975 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
976 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
977 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
978 /// this payment being removed.
980 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
981 user_payment_id: u64,
982 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
983 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
984 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
987 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
988 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
989 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
990 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
991 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
992 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
993 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
994 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
996 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
997 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
998 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
1006 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
1009 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
1010 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1011 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1016 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1017 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1018 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1019 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1020 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1021 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1022 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1023 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1024 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1026 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1027 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1028 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1037 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1040 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1041 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1042 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1047 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1049 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1051 pub trait AChannelManager {
1052 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1053 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1054 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1055 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1056 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1057 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1058 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1059 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1060 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1061 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1062 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1063 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1064 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1065 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1066 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1067 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1068 /// A type implementing [`EcdsaChannelSigner`].
1069 type Signer: EcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1070 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1071 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1072 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1073 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1074 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1075 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1076 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1077 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1078 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1079 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1080 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1081 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1082 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1083 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1084 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1085 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1086 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1087 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1090 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1091 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1093 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1094 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1095 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1096 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1097 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1098 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1102 type Watch = M::Target;
1104 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1106 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1108 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1110 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1111 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1113 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1115 type Router = R::Target;
1117 type Logger = L::Target;
1119 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1122 /// A lightning node's channel state machine and payment management logic, which facilitates
1123 /// sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through lightning channels.
1125 /// [`ChannelManager`] is parameterized by a number of components to achieve this.
1126 /// - [`chain::Watch`] (typically [`ChainMonitor`]) for on-chain monitoring and enforcement of each
1128 /// - [`BroadcasterInterface`] for broadcasting transactions related to opening, funding, and
1129 /// closing channels
1130 /// - [`EntropySource`] for providing random data needed for cryptographic operations
1131 /// - [`NodeSigner`] for cryptographic operations scoped to the node
1132 /// - [`SignerProvider`] for providing signers whose operations are scoped to individual channels
1133 /// - [`FeeEstimator`] to determine transaction fee rates needed to have a transaction mined in a
1135 /// - [`Router`] for finding payment paths when initiating and retrying payments
1136 /// - [`Logger`] for logging operational information of varying degrees
1138 /// Additionally, it implements the following traits:
1139 /// - [`ChannelMessageHandler`] to handle off-chain channel activity from peers
1140 /// - [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] to similarly send such messages to peers
1141 /// - [`OffersMessageHandler`] for BOLT 12 message handling and sending
1142 /// - [`EventsProvider`] to generate user-actionable [`Event`]s
1143 /// - [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for notification of on-chain activity
1145 /// Thus, [`ChannelManager`] is typically used to parameterize a [`MessageHandler`] and an
1146 /// [`OnionMessenger`]. The latter is required to support BOLT 12 functionality.
1148 /// # `ChannelManager` vs `ChannelMonitor`
1150 /// It's important to distinguish between the *off-chain* management and *on-chain* enforcement of
1151 /// lightning channels. [`ChannelManager`] exchanges messages with peers to manage the off-chain
1152 /// state of each channel. During this process, it generates a [`ChannelMonitor`] for each channel
1153 /// and a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] for each relevant change, notifying its parameterized
1154 /// [`chain::Watch`] of them.
1156 /// An implementation of [`chain::Watch`], such as [`ChainMonitor`], is responsible for aggregating
1157 /// these [`ChannelMonitor`]s and applying any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to them. It then monitors
1158 /// for any pertinent on-chain activity, enforcing claims as needed.
1160 /// This division of off-chain management and on-chain enforcement allows for interesting node
1161 /// setups. For instance, on-chain enforcement could be moved to a separate host or have added
1162 /// redundancy, possibly as a watchtower. See [`chain::Watch`] for the relevant interface.
1164 /// # Initialization
1166 /// Use [`ChannelManager::new`] with the most recent [`BlockHash`] when creating a fresh instance.
1167 /// Otherwise, if restarting, construct [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] with the necessary parameters and
1168 /// references to any deserialized [`ChannelMonitor`]s that were previously persisted. Use this to
1169 /// deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] and feed it any new chain data since it was last online, as
1170 /// detailed in the [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] documentation.
1173 /// use bitcoin::BlockHash;
1174 /// use bitcoin::network::Network;
1175 /// use lightning::chain::BestBlock;
1176 /// # use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1177 /// use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
1178 /// # use lightning::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
1179 /// use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
1180 /// use lightning::util::ser::ReadableArgs;
1182 /// # fn read_channel_monitors() -> Vec<ChannelMonitor<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>> { vec![] }
1185 /// # L: lightning::util::logger::Logger,
1186 /// # ES: lightning::sign::EntropySource,
1187 /// # S: for <'b> lightning::routing::scoring::LockableScore<'b, ScoreLookUp = SL>,
1188 /// # SL: lightning::routing::scoring::ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP>,
1190 /// # R: lightning::io::Read,
1192 /// # fee_estimator: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::FeeEstimator,
1193 /// # chain_monitor: &dyn lightning::chain::Watch<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>,
1194 /// # tx_broadcaster: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface,
1195 /// # router: &lightning::routing::router::DefaultRouter<&NetworkGraph<&'a L>, &'a L, &ES, &S, SP, SL>,
1197 /// # entropy_source: &ES,
1198 /// # node_signer: &dyn lightning::sign::NodeSigner,
1199 /// # signer_provider: &lightning::sign::DynSignerProvider,
1200 /// # best_block: lightning::chain::BestBlock,
1201 /// # current_timestamp: u32,
1202 /// # mut reader: R,
1203 /// # ) -> Result<(), lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError> {
1204 /// // Fresh start with no channels
1205 /// let params = ChainParameters {
1206 /// network: Network::Bitcoin,
1209 /// let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1210 /// let channel_manager = ChannelManager::new(
1211 /// fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, entropy_source, node_signer,
1212 /// signer_provider, default_config, params, current_timestamp
1215 /// // Restart from deserialized data
1216 /// let mut channel_monitors = read_channel_monitors();
1217 /// let args = ChannelManagerReadArgs::new(
1218 /// entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster,
1219 /// router, logger, default_config, channel_monitors.iter_mut().collect()
1221 /// let (block_hash, channel_manager) =
1222 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<_, _, _, _, _, _, _, _>)>::read(&mut reader, args)?;
1224 /// // Update the ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors with the latest chain data
1227 /// // Move the monitors to the ChannelManager's chain::Watch parameter
1228 /// for monitor in channel_monitors {
1229 /// chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
1237 /// The following is required for [`ChannelManager`] to function properly:
1238 /// - Handle messages from peers using its [`ChannelMessageHandler`] implementation (typically
1239 /// called by [`PeerManager::read_event`] when processing network I/O)
1240 /// - Send messages to peers obtained via its [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] implementation
1241 /// (typically initiated when [`PeerManager::process_events`] is called)
1242 /// - Feed on-chain activity using either its [`chain::Listen`] or [`chain::Confirm`] implementation
1243 /// as documented by those traits
1244 /// - Perform any periodic channel and payment checks by calling [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly
1246 /// - Persist to disk whenever [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`] returns `true` using a
1247 /// [`Persister`] such as a [`KVStore`] implementation
1248 /// - Handle [`Event`]s obtained via its [`EventsProvider`] implementation
1250 /// The [`Future`] returned by [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] is useful in determining
1251 /// when the last two requirements need to be checked.
1253 /// The [`lightning-block-sync`] and [`lightning-transaction-sync`] crates provide utilities that
1254 /// simplify feeding in on-chain activity using the [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] traits,
1255 /// respectively. The remaining requirements can be met using the [`lightning-background-processor`]
1256 /// crate. For languages other than Rust, the availability of similar utilities may vary.
1260 /// [`ChannelManager`]'s primary function involves managing a channel state. Without channels,
1261 /// payments can't be sent. Use [`list_channels`] or [`list_usable_channels`] for a snapshot of the
1262 /// currently open channels.
1265 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1267 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1268 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1269 /// let channels = channel_manager.list_usable_channels();
1270 /// for details in channels {
1271 /// println!("{:?}", details);
1276 /// Each channel is identified using a [`ChannelId`], which will change throughout the channel's
1277 /// life cycle. Additionally, channels are assigned a `user_channel_id`, which is given in
1278 /// [`Event`]s associated with the channel and serves as a fixed identifier but is otherwise unused
1279 /// by [`ChannelManager`].
1281 /// ## Opening Channels
1283 /// To an open a channel with a peer, call [`create_channel`]. This will initiate the process of
1284 /// opening an outbound channel, which requires self-funding when handling
1285 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1288 /// # use bitcoin::{ScriptBuf, Transaction};
1289 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1290 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1291 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1293 /// # trait Wallet {
1294 /// # fn create_funding_transaction(
1295 /// # &self, _amount_sats: u64, _output_script: ScriptBuf
1296 /// # ) -> Transaction;
1299 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager, W: Wallet>(channel_manager: T, wallet: W, peer_id: PublicKey) {
1300 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1301 /// let value_sats = 1_000_000;
1302 /// let push_msats = 10_000_000;
1303 /// match channel_manager.create_channel(peer_id, value_sats, push_msats, 42, None, None) {
1304 /// Ok(channel_id) => println!("Opening channel {}", channel_id),
1305 /// Err(e) => println!("Error opening channel: {:?}", e),
1308 /// // On the event processing thread once the peer has responded
1309 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1310 /// Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1311 /// temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script,
1312 /// user_channel_id, ..
1314 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1315 /// let funding_transaction = wallet.create_funding_transaction(
1316 /// channel_value_satoshis, output_script
1318 /// match channel_manager.funding_transaction_generated(
1319 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction
1321 /// Ok(()) => println!("Funding channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1322 /// Err(e) => println!("Error funding channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1325 /// Event::ChannelPending { channel_id, user_channel_id, former_temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
1326 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1328 /// "Channel {} now {} pending (funding transaction has been broadcasted)", channel_id,
1329 /// former_temporary_channel_id.unwrap()
1332 /// Event::ChannelReady { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1333 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1334 /// println!("Channel {} ready", channel_id);
1342 /// ## Accepting Channels
1344 /// Inbound channels are initiated by peers and are automatically accepted unless [`ChannelManager`]
1345 /// has [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] set. In that case, the channel may be
1346 /// either accepted or rejected when handling [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
1349 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1350 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1351 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1353 /// # fn is_trusted(counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> bool {
1355 /// # unimplemented!()
1358 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1359 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1360 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1361 /// Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
1362 /// if !is_trusted(counterparty_node_id) {
1363 /// match channel_manager.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(
1364 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id
1366 /// Ok(()) => println!("Rejecting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1367 /// Err(e) => println!("Error rejecting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1372 /// let user_channel_id = 43;
1373 /// match channel_manager.accept_inbound_channel(
1374 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, user_channel_id
1376 /// Ok(()) => println!("Accepting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1377 /// Err(e) => println!("Error accepting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1386 /// ## Closing Channels
1388 /// There are two ways to close a channel: either cooperatively using [`close_channel`] or
1389 /// unilaterally using [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]. The former is ideal as it makes for
1390 /// lower fees and immediate access to funds. However, the latter may be necessary if the
1391 /// counterparty isn't behaving properly or has gone offline. [`Event::ChannelClosed`] is generated
1392 /// once the channel has been closed successfully.
1395 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1396 /// # use lightning::ln::types::ChannelId;
1397 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1398 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1400 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1401 /// # channel_manager: T, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
1403 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1404 /// match channel_manager.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id) {
1405 /// Ok(()) => println!("Closing channel {}", channel_id),
1406 /// Err(e) => println!("Error closing channel {}: {:?}", channel_id, e),
1409 /// // On the event processing thread
1410 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1411 /// Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1412 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1413 /// println!("Channel {} closed", channel_id);
1423 /// [`ChannelManager`] is responsible for sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through its
1424 /// channels. A payment is typically initiated from a [BOLT 11] invoice or a [BOLT 12] offer, though
1425 /// spontaneous (i.e., keysend) payments are also possible. Incoming payments don't require
1426 /// maintaining any additional state as [`ChannelManager`] can reconstruct the [`PaymentPreimage`]
1427 /// from the [`PaymentSecret`]. Sending payments, however, require tracking in order to retry failed
1430 /// After a payment is initiated, it will appear in [`list_recent_payments`] until a short time
1431 /// after either an [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is handled. Failed HTLCs
1432 /// for a payment will be retried according to the payment's [`Retry`] strategy or until
1433 /// [`abandon_payment`] is called.
1435 /// ## BOLT 11 Invoices
1437 /// The [`lightning-invoice`] crate is useful for creating BOLT 11 invoices. Specifically, use the
1438 /// functions in its `utils` module for constructing invoices that are compatible with
1439 /// [`ChannelManager`]. These functions serve as a convenience for building invoices with the
1440 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentSecret`] returned from [`create_inbound_payment`]. To provide your
1441 /// own [`PaymentHash`], use [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] or the corresponding functions in
1442 /// the [`lightning-invoice`] `utils` module.
1444 /// [`ChannelManager`] generates an [`Event::PaymentClaimable`] once the full payment has been
1445 /// received. Call [`claim_funds`] to release the [`PaymentPreimage`], which in turn will result in
1446 /// an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`].
1449 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1450 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1452 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1453 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1454 /// // Or use utils::create_invoice_from_channelmanager
1455 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.create_inbound_payment(
1456 /// Some(10_000_000), 3600, None
1458 /// Ok((payment_hash, _payment_secret)) => {
1459 /// println!("Creating inbound payment {}", payment_hash);
1462 /// Err(()) => panic!("Error creating inbound payment"),
1465 /// // On the event processing thread
1466 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1467 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1468 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1469 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1470 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1471 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1473 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1474 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1476 /// PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(payment_preimage) => {
1477 /// assert_ne!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1478 /// println!("Claiming spontaneous payment {}", payment_hash);
1479 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1484 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1485 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1486 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1494 /// For paying an invoice, [`lightning-invoice`] provides a `payment` module with convenience
1495 /// functions for use with [`send_payment`].
1498 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1499 /// # use lightning::ln::types::PaymentHash;
1500 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
1501 /// # use lightning::routing::router::RouteParameters;
1503 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1504 /// # channel_manager: T, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields,
1505 /// # route_params: RouteParameters, retry: Retry
1507 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1508 /// // let (payment_hash, recipient_onion, route_params) =
1509 /// // payment::payment_parameters_from_invoice(&invoice);
1510 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1511 /// match channel_manager.send_payment(
1512 /// payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route_params, retry
1514 /// Ok(()) => println!("Sending payment with hash {}", payment_hash),
1515 /// Err(e) => println!("Failed sending payment with hash {}: {:?}", payment_hash, e),
1518 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1519 /// let expected_payment_hash = payment_hash;
1521 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1523 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1524 /// payment_id: expected_payment_id,
1525 /// payment_hash: expected_payment_hash,
1531 /// // On the event processing thread
1532 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1533 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_hash),
1534 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_hash),
1541 /// ## BOLT 12 Offers
1543 /// The [`offers`] module is useful for creating BOLT 12 offers. An [`Offer`] is a precursor to a
1544 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`], which must first be requested by the payer. The interchange of these messages
1545 /// as defined in the specification is handled by [`ChannelManager`] and its implementation of
1546 /// [`OffersMessageHandler`]. However, this only works with an [`Offer`] created using a builder
1547 /// returned by [`create_offer_builder`]. With this approach, BOLT 12 offers and invoices are
1548 /// stateless just as BOLT 11 invoices are.
1551 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1552 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1553 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1555 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1556 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1557 /// let offer = channel_manager
1558 /// .create_offer_builder()?
1560 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1561 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::offer::OfferBuilder<_, _> = offer.into();
1562 /// # let offer = builder
1563 /// .description("coffee".to_string())
1564 /// .amount_msats(10_000_000)
1566 /// let bech32_offer = offer.to_string();
1568 /// // On the event processing thread
1569 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1570 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1571 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12OfferPayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1572 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1573 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1575 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12OfferPayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1576 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1581 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1582 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1591 /// Use [`pay_for_offer`] to initiated payment, which sends an [`InvoiceRequest`] for an [`Offer`]
1592 /// and pays the [`Bolt12Invoice`] response. In addition to success and failure events,
1593 /// [`ChannelManager`] may also generate an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
1596 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1597 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1598 /// # use lightning::offers::offer::Offer;
1600 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1601 /// # channel_manager: T, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
1602 /// # payer_note: Option<String>, retry: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1604 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1605 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1606 /// match channel_manager.pay_for_offer(
1607 /// offer, quantity, amount_msats, payer_note, payment_id, retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat
1609 /// Ok(()) => println!("Requesting invoice for offer"),
1610 /// Err(e) => println!("Unable to request invoice for offer: {:?}", e),
1613 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1614 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1616 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1618 /// RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1622 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1624 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1626 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, .. }
1630 /// // On the event processing thread
1631 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1632 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1633 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1634 /// Event::InvoiceRequestFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1641 /// ## BOLT 12 Refunds
1643 /// A [`Refund`] is a request for an invoice to be paid. Like *paying* for an [`Offer`], *creating*
1644 /// a [`Refund`] involves maintaining state since it represents a future outbound payment.
1645 /// Therefore, use [`create_refund_builder`] when creating one, otherwise [`ChannelManager`] will
1646 /// refuse to pay any corresponding [`Bolt12Invoice`] that it receives.
1649 /// # use core::time::Duration;
1650 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1651 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1652 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1654 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1655 /// # channel_manager: T, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration, retry: Retry,
1656 /// # max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1657 /// # ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1658 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1659 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1660 /// let refund = channel_manager
1661 /// .create_refund_builder(
1662 /// amount_msats, absolute_expiry, payment_id, retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat
1665 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1666 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::refund::RefundBuilder<_> = refund.into();
1667 /// # let refund = builder
1668 /// .description("coffee".to_string())
1669 /// .payer_note("refund for order 1234".to_string())
1671 /// let bech32_refund = refund.to_string();
1673 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1674 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1676 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1678 /// RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1682 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1684 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1686 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, .. }
1690 /// // On the event processing thread
1691 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1692 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1693 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1701 /// Use [`request_refund_payment`] to send a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for receiving the refund. Similar to
1702 /// *creating* an [`Offer`], this is stateless as it represents an inbound payment.
1705 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1706 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1707 /// # use lightning::offers::refund::Refund;
1709 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T, refund: &Refund) {
1710 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1711 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.request_refund_payment(refund) {
1712 /// Ok(invoice) => {
1713 /// let payment_hash = invoice.payment_hash();
1714 /// println!("Requesting refund payment {}", payment_hash);
1717 /// Err(e) => panic!("Unable to request payment for refund: {:?}", e),
1720 /// // On the event processing thread
1721 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1722 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1723 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12RefundPayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1724 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1725 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1726 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1728 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12RefundPayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1729 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1734 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1735 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1736 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1746 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1747 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1748 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1749 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1751 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1752 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1753 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1754 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1755 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1756 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1757 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1758 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1759 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1761 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1762 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1763 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1765 /// # `ChannelUpdate` Messages
1767 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1768 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1769 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1770 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1771 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1773 /// # DoS Mitigation
1775 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1776 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1777 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1778 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1780 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1781 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1782 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1786 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1787 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1788 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1789 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1790 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1792 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1793 /// [`MessageHandler`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::MessageHandler
1794 /// [`OnionMessenger`]: crate::onion_message::messenger::OnionMessenger
1795 /// [`PeerManager::read_event`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::read_event
1796 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
1797 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1798 /// [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`]: Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence
1799 /// [`Persister`]: crate::util::persist::Persister
1800 /// [`KVStore`]: crate::util::persist::KVStore
1801 /// [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`]: Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future
1802 /// [`lightning-block-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_block_sync/latest/lightning_block_sync
1803 /// [`lightning-transaction-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_transaction_sync/latest/lightning_transaction_sync
1804 /// [`lightning-background-processor`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_background_processor/lightning_background_processor
1805 /// [`list_channels`]: Self::list_channels
1806 /// [`list_usable_channels`]: Self::list_usable_channels
1807 /// [`create_channel`]: Self::create_channel
1808 /// [`close_channel`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1809 /// [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1810 /// [BOLT 11]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/11-payment-encoding.md
1811 /// [BOLT 12]: https://github.com/rustyrussell/lightning-rfc/blob/guilt/offers/12-offer-encoding.md
1812 /// [`list_recent_payments`]: Self::list_recent_payments
1813 /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
1814 /// [`lightning-invoice`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_invoice/latest/lightning_invoice
1815 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
1816 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
1817 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
1818 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
1819 /// [`offers`]: crate::offers
1820 /// [`create_offer_builder`]: Self::create_offer_builder
1821 /// [`pay_for_offer`]: Self::pay_for_offer
1822 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
1823 /// [`create_refund_builder`]: Self::create_refund_builder
1824 /// [`request_refund_payment`]: Self::request_refund_payment
1825 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1826 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1827 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1828 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1829 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1830 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1831 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1834 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1835 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1836 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1837 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1838 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1842 // `pending_offers_messages`
1844 // `total_consistency_lock`
1846 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1848 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1850 // |__`decode_update_add_htlcs`
1852 // |__`per_peer_state`
1854 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1856 // |__`claimable_payments`
1858 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1862 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1864 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1866 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1870 // |__`pending_events`
1872 // |__`pending_background_events`
1874 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1876 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1877 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1878 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1879 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1880 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1881 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1885 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1886 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1887 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1893 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1895 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1897 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1898 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1900 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1901 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1902 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1903 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1905 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1906 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1908 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1909 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1910 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1911 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1912 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1913 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1914 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1915 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1917 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1919 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1920 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1922 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1924 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1925 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1926 /// and via the classic SCID.
1928 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1929 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1931 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1933 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1935 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1936 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1937 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1939 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1940 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1942 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> pending `update_add_htlc`s to decode.
1944 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1945 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1946 /// and via the classic SCID.
1948 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1949 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `channel_id` in `UpdateAddHTLC`!
1951 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1952 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>>,
1954 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1955 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1957 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1958 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1960 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1961 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1962 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1963 /// active channel list on load.
1965 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1966 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1968 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1970 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1971 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1972 /// the handling of the events.
1974 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1975 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1978 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1979 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1980 /// would break backwards compatability.
1981 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1982 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1983 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1985 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1987 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1989 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1991 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1993 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1994 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1995 /// confirmation depth.
1997 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1998 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1999 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
2001 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2003 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
2005 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
2007 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
2009 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
2011 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
2012 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
2013 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
2015 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
2016 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
2018 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
2019 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
2020 /// keeping additional state.
2021 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
2023 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
2024 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
2025 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
2026 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
2028 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
2029 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
2031 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
2032 /// are currently open with that peer.
2034 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
2035 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
2038 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
2040 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2041 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2042 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2043 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2044 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2046 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
2047 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
2048 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
2049 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
2050 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
2052 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
2053 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
2055 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2056 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2057 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2058 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2059 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2061 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
2062 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
2064 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
2065 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
2066 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
2067 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
2068 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
2070 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
2072 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2074 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
2075 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
2076 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
2077 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
2078 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
2079 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
2080 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
2081 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
2082 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
2083 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
2084 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
2086 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
2087 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
2088 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
2090 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
2092 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
2093 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
2095 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
2097 /// Tracks the message events that are to be broadcasted when we are connected to some peer.
2098 pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
2102 signer_provider: SP,
2107 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
2109 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
2110 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
2111 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
2112 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
2113 pub struct ChainParameters {
2114 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
2115 pub network: Network,
2117 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
2119 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
2120 pub best_block: BestBlock,
2123 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
2127 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2128 SkipPersistNoEvents,
2131 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
2132 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
2133 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
2134 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
2135 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
2136 /// updates are ready for persistence).
2138 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
2139 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
2140 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
2141 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2142 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
2143 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
2145 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
2146 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
2149 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
2150 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
2151 /// events to handle.
2153 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
2154 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
2156 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2157 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
2160 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
2161 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2162 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2163 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
2165 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2166 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2167 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2168 should_persist: move || {
2169 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
2170 // processing and return that.
2171 let notify = persist_check();
2172 match (notify, force_notify) {
2173 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2174 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2175 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2176 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2177 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
2180 _read_guard: read_guard,
2184 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
2185 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
2186 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
2187 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
2188 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2189 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2191 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2192 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2193 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2194 should_persist: persist_check,
2195 _read_guard: read_guard,
2200 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2201 fn drop(&mut self) {
2202 match (self.should_persist)() {
2203 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2204 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2205 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
2207 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2208 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2209 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2214 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
2215 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
2217 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
2219 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
2220 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
2221 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
2222 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
2223 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
2225 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
2226 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
2228 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
2230 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2231 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
2232 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
2233 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
2234 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
2235 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
2236 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
2237 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
2238 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
2239 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
2240 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
2241 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
2242 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
2244 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
2245 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
2247 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
2248 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
2249 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
2250 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
2252 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
2253 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
2254 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
2255 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
2256 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
2257 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
2259 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
2261 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
2262 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
2264 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
2266 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
2267 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
2269 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
2270 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
2271 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
2273 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
2274 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
2275 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
2277 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
2278 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
2279 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
2280 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
2282 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
2283 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
2284 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
2286 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
2287 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
2288 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
2290 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
2291 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2292 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
2293 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
2294 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
2296 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2297 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2298 payment_id: PaymentId,
2300 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
2302 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2303 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2304 payment_id: PaymentId,
2305 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
2307 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2308 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
2309 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
2312 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
2313 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
2314 /// payment is removed from tracking.
2316 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2317 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2318 payment_id: PaymentId,
2319 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
2320 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
2321 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
2323 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
2324 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
2325 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
2327 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2328 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2329 payment_id: PaymentId,
2330 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
2331 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2335 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
2337 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
2339 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
2340 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
2341 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
2342 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
2344 pub phantom_scid: u64,
2345 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
2346 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
2349 macro_rules! handle_error {
2350 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
2351 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
2352 // entering the macro.
2353 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2354 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2358 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2359 let mut msg_event = None;
2361 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2362 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2363 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2364 let logger = WithContext::from(
2365 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id), None
2367 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2369 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2370 if let Some(update) = update_option {
2371 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = $self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
2372 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2377 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2380 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2382 msg_event = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2383 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2384 action: err.action.clone()
2388 if let Some(msg_event) = msg_event {
2389 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2390 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2391 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2392 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(msg_event);
2396 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2403 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2404 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2405 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2406 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2408 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2409 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2410 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2412 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2413 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2414 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2415 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2416 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2418 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2419 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2421 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2425 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2426 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2427 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2429 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2430 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2432 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2433 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2435 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2436 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context, None);
2437 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2438 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2439 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2440 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2442 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2447 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2448 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2450 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2451 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2453 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2454 match $channel_phase {
2455 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2456 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2458 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2459 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2461 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2462 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2464 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
2465 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2466 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2468 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
2469 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2470 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2476 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2477 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2481 let key = *$entry.key();
2482 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2484 $entry.remove_entry();
2492 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2493 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2497 let key = *$entry.key();
2498 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2500 $entry.remove_entry();
2508 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2509 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2511 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2512 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2518 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2519 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2520 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2521 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2522 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2524 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2525 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2526 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2527 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2528 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2529 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2530 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2531 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2532 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2533 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2538 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2539 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2540 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2541 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2542 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2543 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2544 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2545 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2546 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2547 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2549 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2554 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2555 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2556 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2557 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2558 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2559 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2560 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2561 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2562 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2564 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2569 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2570 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2571 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context, None);
2572 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2573 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2574 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2575 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2576 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2577 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2578 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2579 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2580 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2582 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2583 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2584 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2590 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2591 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2593 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2594 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2595 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.pending_update_adds,
2596 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2597 updates.announcement_sigs);
2598 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2599 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2602 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2603 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2604 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2605 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2607 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2608 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2609 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2610 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2611 let mut batch_completed = false;
2612 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2613 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2614 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2615 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2617 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2618 channel_state.2 = true;
2620 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2622 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2624 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2627 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2628 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2629 if batch_completed {
2630 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2631 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2632 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2633 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2634 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2635 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2636 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2637 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2638 chan.set_batch_ready();
2639 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2640 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2644 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2645 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2646 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2651 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2653 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2654 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2656 if let Some(decode) = decode_update_add_htlcs {
2657 $self.push_decode_update_add_htlcs(decode);
2659 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2660 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2661 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2662 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2667 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2668 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2669 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2670 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context, None);
2672 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2673 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2674 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2675 panic!("{}", err_str);
2677 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2678 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2679 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2682 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2688 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2689 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2690 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2692 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2693 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2694 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2695 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2696 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2697 // filter for uniqueness here.
2698 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2699 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2700 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2701 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2703 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2704 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2706 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2707 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2708 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2714 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2715 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2716 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2717 while !processed_all_events {
2718 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2725 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2726 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2727 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2729 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2730 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2731 result = $self.process_background_events();
2733 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2734 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2735 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2736 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2740 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2741 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2742 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2743 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2746 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2748 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2749 $event_to_handle = event;
2751 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2752 post_event_actions.push(action);
2757 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2758 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2759 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2760 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2761 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2762 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2765 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2766 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2767 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2768 processed_all_events = false;
2772 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2773 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2774 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2776 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2777 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2778 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2784 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2786 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2787 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2788 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2789 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2790 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2791 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2795 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2797 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2799 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2800 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2802 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2804 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2805 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2806 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2809 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2810 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2811 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2813 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2814 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2815 current_timestamp: u32,
2817 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2818 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2819 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2820 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2822 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2823 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2824 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2829 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2831 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
2832 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2833 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2834 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2835 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2836 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
2837 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2838 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2839 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2841 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2844 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2845 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2847 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2849 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2851 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2853 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2854 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2855 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2856 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2857 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2858 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2859 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2860 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2862 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2863 pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2873 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2874 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2875 &self.default_configuration
2878 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2879 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2880 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2883 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2884 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2886 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2888 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2892 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2897 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2899 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2900 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2901 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2902 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2903 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2905 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2906 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2908 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2909 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2910 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2912 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2913 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2914 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2916 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2917 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2919 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2920 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2921 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2922 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2923 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2924 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2926 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2927 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2928 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2929 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2930 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2931 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2934 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2935 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2936 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2938 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2940 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2941 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2943 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2945 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2946 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2947 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2952 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2953 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2954 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2955 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2956 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2957 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2961 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2966 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2968 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2969 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2970 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2972 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2974 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2977 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2980 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2981 node_id: their_network_key,
2984 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2987 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2988 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2989 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2990 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2991 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2992 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2993 // the same channel.
2994 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2996 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2997 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2998 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2999 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3000 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3001 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
3002 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
3003 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
3004 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
3008 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
3009 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
3010 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3018 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
3019 /// more information.
3020 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3021 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3022 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3023 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3024 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3025 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3026 // the same channel.
3027 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3029 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3030 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3031 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3032 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3033 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3034 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
3035 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
3036 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
3044 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
3045 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
3047 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
3048 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
3050 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3051 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
3052 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
3053 // really wanted anyway.
3054 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
3057 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
3058 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3059 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3060 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3062 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3063 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3064 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3065 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3066 let context_to_details = |context| {
3067 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3069 return peer_state.channel_by_id
3071 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
3072 .map(context_to_details)
3078 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
3079 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
3081 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
3082 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
3083 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
3085 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3086 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
3087 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
3088 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
3089 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
3090 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3092 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
3093 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
3094 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3096 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
3097 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
3098 payment_id: *payment_id,
3099 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
3100 total_msat: *total_msat,
3103 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
3104 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3106 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
3107 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3109 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
3114 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3115 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3117 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
3118 let mut shutdown_result = None;
3121 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3123 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3124 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3126 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3127 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3129 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3130 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
3131 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3132 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
3133 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3134 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
3135 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
3136 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
3138 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
3139 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
3140 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
3141 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3142 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3146 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
3147 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
3149 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3150 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
3151 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
3152 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
3155 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3156 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
3159 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3160 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3162 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3163 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
3170 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3171 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3172 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
3173 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3176 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
3177 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3183 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3184 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3185 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3187 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
3188 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3190 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
3191 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
3192 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
3193 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
3195 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3197 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3198 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3199 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3202 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3203 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
3204 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3205 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3206 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3207 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
3210 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3211 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3212 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3214 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
3215 /// the channel being closed or not:
3216 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
3217 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
3218 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3219 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
3220 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
3221 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
3222 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
3224 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
3225 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
3226 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
3227 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
3229 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3231 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3232 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3233 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3236 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3237 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3238 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3239 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3240 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
3243 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
3244 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3245 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3246 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3247 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3250 let logger = WithContext::from(
3251 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id), None
3254 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
3255 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
3256 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3257 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
3258 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3259 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
3260 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3262 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
3263 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
3264 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
3265 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
3266 // ignore the result here.
3267 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
3269 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3270 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
3271 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
3272 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
3273 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3274 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
3275 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
3276 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3277 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3278 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
3279 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3280 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
3283 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
3286 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
3287 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
3292 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3293 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
3294 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
3295 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
3296 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
3297 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
3298 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
3299 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
3302 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
3303 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
3304 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
3308 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3309 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3313 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
3314 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
3315 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
3316 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
3317 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3318 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3319 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
3320 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
3321 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3322 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
3323 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
3325 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
3327 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id), None);
3328 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3329 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
3330 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3331 mem::drop(peer_state);
3332 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3334 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
3335 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
3336 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
3338 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
3339 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3340 // Unfunded channel has no update
3341 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3343 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
3344 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3345 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
3346 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3347 // Unfunded channel has no update
3348 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3351 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
3352 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
3353 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
3354 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
3356 (None, *peer_node_id)
3358 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3361 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3362 // If we have some Channel Update to broadcast, we cache it and broadcast it later.
3363 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
3364 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3369 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3372 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3373 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3374 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3375 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3376 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3377 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3378 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3379 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3380 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3381 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3382 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
3383 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
3394 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
3395 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
3396 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
3398 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3399 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3400 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3403 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3404 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3405 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3407 /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3408 /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3409 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3410 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3411 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3414 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3415 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3416 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3417 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3418 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3422 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3423 /// local transaction(s).
3424 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3425 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3426 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3430 fn can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(
3431 &self, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet: &NextPacketDetails
3432 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3433 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3434 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3435 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3436 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3437 return Err(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3439 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && next_packet.outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3440 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3441 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3442 // we don't have the channel here.
3443 return Err(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3446 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3447 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3448 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3449 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3450 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3451 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3452 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3453 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3454 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3455 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3456 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3457 return Err(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3459 return Err(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3462 if next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3463 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3464 return Err(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3466 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(msg, next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat, next_packet.outgoing_cltv_value) {
3467 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3468 return Err((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3474 /// Executes a callback `C` that returns some value `X` on the channel found with the given
3475 /// `scid`. `None` is returned when the channel is not found.
3476 fn do_funded_channel_callback<X, C: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> X>(
3477 &self, scid: u64, callback: C,
3479 let (counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&scid).cloned() {
3480 None => return None,
3481 Some((cp_id, id)) => (cp_id, id),
3483 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3484 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3485 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3488 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3489 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3490 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).and_then(
3491 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3494 Some(chan) => Some(callback(chan)),
3498 fn can_forward_htlc(
3499 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet_details: &NextPacketDetails
3500 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3501 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3502 self.can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(chan, msg, next_packet_details)
3505 Some(Err(e)) => return Err(e),
3507 // If we couldn't find the channel info for the scid, it may be a phantom or
3508 // intercept forward.
3509 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3510 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3511 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3513 return Err(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3518 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3519 if let Err((err_msg, err_code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3520 cur_height, next_packet_details.outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3522 let chan_update_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3523 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
3525 return Err((err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt));
3531 fn htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3532 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, err_msg: &'static str,
3533 mut err_code: u16, chan_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, is_intro_node_blinded_forward: bool,
3534 shared_secret: &[u8; 32]
3535 ) -> HTLCFailureMsg {
3536 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3537 if chan_update.is_some() && err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3538 let chan_update = chan_update.unwrap();
3539 if err_code == 0x1000 | 11 || err_code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3540 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3542 else if err_code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3543 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3545 else if err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3546 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3547 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3549 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3550 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3551 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3552 } else if err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3553 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3554 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3555 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3557 err_code = 0x2000 | 2;
3561 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id), Some(msg.payment_hash)),
3562 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", err_msg
3564 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3565 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3566 return HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3567 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3568 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3569 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3570 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3574 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_blinded_forward {
3575 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3577 (err_code, &res.0[..])
3579 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3580 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3581 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3582 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3583 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(shared_secret, &None),
3587 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3588 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3590 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3592 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3593 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3596 let next_packet_details = match next_packet_details_opt {
3597 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3598 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3599 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3602 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3603 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3604 self.can_forward_htlc(&msg, &next_packet_details).map_err(|e| {
3605 let (err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt) = e;
3606 self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3607 msg, counterparty_node_id, err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt,
3608 next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward(), &shared_secret
3612 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_details.next_packet_pubkey)))
3615 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3616 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3617 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3618 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3619 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3620 macro_rules! return_err {
3621 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3623 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id), Some(msg.payment_hash));
3624 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3625 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3626 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3627 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3628 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3629 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3630 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3631 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3635 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3636 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3637 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3638 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3639 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3645 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3647 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3648 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3649 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3650 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3653 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3654 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3655 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3656 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3657 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3659 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3662 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3663 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3664 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3665 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3666 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3672 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3673 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3674 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3676 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3677 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3678 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3680 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3681 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3682 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3683 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3684 return Err(LightningError {
3685 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3686 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3689 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3690 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3692 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
3693 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3694 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3697 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3698 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3699 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3700 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3702 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3703 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3704 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3706 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3707 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3708 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3709 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
3710 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3711 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3712 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3716 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3719 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3720 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
3721 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3722 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3724 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3725 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3726 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3727 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3728 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3731 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3732 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3734 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3735 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3736 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3737 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3738 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3739 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3740 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3741 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3743 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3744 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3745 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3747 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3749 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3756 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3757 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3758 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3759 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion: &recipient_onion, total_value,
3760 cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes
3764 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3765 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3766 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3769 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3770 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3771 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3772 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3774 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3775 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3776 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3778 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None, Some(*payment_hash));
3779 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3783 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3784 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3786 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None, Some(*payment_hash));
3787 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3788 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3790 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3793 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id), Some(*payment_hash));
3795 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3796 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3798 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3799 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3800 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3801 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3802 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3803 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3804 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3805 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3806 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3807 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3809 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3810 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(*payment_hash));
3811 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3812 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3814 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3815 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3817 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3818 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3819 Some(monitor_update) => {
3820 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3822 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3823 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3824 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3825 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3826 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3827 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3828 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3836 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3839 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3840 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3841 // `channel_by_id` map.
3842 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3843 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3847 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3848 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3850 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3855 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3857 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3858 /// fields for more info.
3860 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3861 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3863 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3865 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3866 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3867 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3868 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3869 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3871 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3872 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3873 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3874 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3875 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3877 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3878 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3879 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3880 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3882 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3884 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3885 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3886 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3888 /// In general, a path may raise:
3889 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3890 /// node public key) is specified.
3891 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3892 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3893 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3894 /// relevant updates.
3896 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3897 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3898 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3900 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3901 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3902 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3903 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3904 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3905 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3906 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3907 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3908 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3909 self.pending_outbound_payments
3910 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3911 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3912 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3915 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3916 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3917 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3918 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3919 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3920 self.pending_outbound_payments
3921 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3922 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3923 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3924 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3928 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3929 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3930 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3931 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3932 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3933 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3937 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3938 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3939 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3943 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3944 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3947 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3948 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3949 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3950 self.pending_outbound_payments
3951 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3952 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3953 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3954 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3955 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3959 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3960 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3961 /// retries are exhausted.
3963 /// # Event Generation
3965 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3966 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3968 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3969 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3970 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3972 /// # Requested Invoices
3974 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3975 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3976 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3977 /// once the invoice has been received.
3979 /// # Restart Behavior
3981 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3982 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3983 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3985 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3986 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3987 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3988 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3991 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3992 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3993 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3994 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3995 /// never reach the recipient.
3997 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3998 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
4000 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
4001 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
4003 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
4004 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
4005 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4006 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4007 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
4008 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
4009 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4012 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
4013 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
4015 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
4018 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
4019 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
4020 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4021 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4022 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
4023 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4024 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4025 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4028 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
4029 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
4030 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
4031 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
4032 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4033 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4034 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
4035 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4036 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4039 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
4042 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
4043 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
4046 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
4047 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
4049 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
4050 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
4051 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
4052 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4053 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4054 let payment_params =
4055 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
4057 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
4059 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
4062 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
4063 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
4065 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
4066 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
4067 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
4068 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
4070 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
4071 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
4072 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
4073 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
4074 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
4075 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
4076 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
4077 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4078 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4079 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
4081 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
4082 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
4083 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
4084 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
4088 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
4090 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
4091 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
4094 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
4096 let mut res = Vec::new();
4098 for mut path in route.paths {
4099 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
4100 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
4101 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
4102 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
4103 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
4106 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
4109 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
4110 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
4112 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
4114 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
4115 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
4120 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
4123 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
4128 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
4129 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
4130 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
4132 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
4133 let used_liquidity =
4134 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
4136 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
4137 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
4139 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
4142 *used_liquidity += path_value;
4147 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
4148 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
4149 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
4156 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
4157 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
4158 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, &'static str>>(
4159 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
4160 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
4161 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4162 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4163 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4164 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4166 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4167 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4169 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
4170 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
4171 macro_rules! close_chan { ($err: expr, $api_err: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
4173 let err = if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = $err {
4174 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
4175 counterparty = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4176 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
4177 let shutdown_res = $chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
4178 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None)
4179 } else { unreachable!(); };
4181 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4182 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4183 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), counterparty);
4186 match find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction) {
4187 Ok(found_funding_txo) => funding_txo = found_funding_txo,
4189 let chan_err = ChannelError::Close(err.to_owned());
4190 let api_err = APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err.to_owned() };
4191 return close_chan!(chan_err, api_err, chan);
4195 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
4196 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger);
4198 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
4199 Err((mut chan, chan_err)) => {
4200 let api_err = APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned() };
4201 return close_chan!(chan_err, api_err, chan);
4206 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
4207 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4209 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
4210 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4213 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
4214 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4215 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4219 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4220 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
4221 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4225 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
4226 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4227 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
4229 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4230 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4231 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
4232 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
4233 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
4235 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
4236 funding_txo, o.get()
4238 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
4239 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4240 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4241 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
4242 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
4243 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
4246 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
4253 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4254 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
4255 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
4259 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
4261 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
4262 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
4264 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
4265 /// across the p2p network.
4267 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
4268 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
4270 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
4271 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
4272 /// keys per-channel).
4274 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
4275 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
4276 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
4278 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
4279 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
4280 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
4282 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
4283 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
4284 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
4285 /// for more details.
4287 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
4288 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
4289 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4290 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
4293 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
4295 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
4296 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
4298 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
4299 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
4300 /// signature for each channel.
4302 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
4303 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4304 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4305 let mut result = Ok(());
4307 if !funding_transaction.is_coinbase() {
4308 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
4309 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
4310 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4311 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
4316 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
4317 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4318 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
4322 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4323 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
4324 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
4325 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
4326 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
4327 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
4328 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
4329 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
4331 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4332 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
4337 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
4338 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
4339 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
4340 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
4344 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
4345 match states.entry(txid) {
4346 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4347 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4348 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
4352 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
4355 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
4356 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
4357 temporary_channel_id,
4358 counterparty_node_id,
4359 funding_transaction.clone(),
4362 let mut output_index = None;
4363 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_p2wsh();
4364 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4365 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value.to_sat() == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
4366 if output_index.is_some() {
4367 return Err("Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value");
4369 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4372 if output_index.is_none() {
4373 return Err("No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event");
4375 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4376 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4377 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4378 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4379 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4380 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4386 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4387 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4388 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4389 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4390 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4391 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4392 .into_iter().flatten()
4393 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4395 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4396 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4398 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4400 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4401 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4402 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4403 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4404 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id).map(|chan| (chan, peer_state)))
4405 .map(|(mut chan, mut peer_state)| {
4406 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4407 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4408 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4409 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4410 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4411 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4412 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4414 data: "Failed to fund channel".to_owned(),
4421 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4422 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4423 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4429 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4431 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4432 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4433 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4434 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4436 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4437 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4439 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4440 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4442 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4444 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4445 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4446 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4447 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4448 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4449 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4450 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4451 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4452 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4453 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4454 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4455 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4456 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4460 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4461 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4462 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4463 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4464 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4465 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4467 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4468 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4469 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4470 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4474 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4475 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4476 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4477 config.apply(config_update);
4478 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4481 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4482 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4483 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
4484 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4485 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4486 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4487 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4494 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4495 debug_assert!(false);
4496 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4498 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4499 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4506 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4508 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4509 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4510 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4511 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4513 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4514 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4516 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4517 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4519 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4521 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4522 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4523 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4524 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4525 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4526 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4527 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4528 pub fn update_channel_config(
4529 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4530 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4531 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4534 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4535 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4537 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4538 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4540 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4541 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4542 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4543 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4544 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4546 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4547 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4548 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4551 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4554 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4555 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4556 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4557 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4558 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4559 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4560 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4562 let next_hop_scid = {
4563 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4564 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4565 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4566 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4567 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4568 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4569 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4570 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4571 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4572 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4575 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4577 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4578 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4579 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4582 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4583 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4584 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id), None);
4585 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4586 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4593 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4594 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4595 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4598 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4599 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4600 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4601 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4604 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4606 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4607 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4608 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4609 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4610 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4613 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4614 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4615 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4616 payment.prev_channel_id,
4617 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4618 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4620 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4624 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4625 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4627 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4630 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4631 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4632 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4634 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4635 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4636 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4639 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4640 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4641 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4642 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4643 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4644 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4645 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4646 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4647 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4648 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4651 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4652 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4653 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4654 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4659 fn process_pending_update_add_htlcs(&self) {
4660 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4661 mem::swap(&mut decode_update_add_htlcs, &mut self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4663 let get_failed_htlc_destination = |outgoing_scid_opt: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash| {
4664 if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt {
4665 match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid) {
4666 Some((outgoing_counterparty_node_id, outgoing_channel_id)) =>
4667 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
4668 node_id: Some(*outgoing_counterparty_node_id),
4669 channel_id: *outgoing_channel_id,
4671 None => HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop {
4672 requested_forward_scid: outgoing_scid,
4676 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }
4680 'outer_loop: for (incoming_scid, update_add_htlcs) in decode_update_add_htlcs {
4681 let incoming_channel_details_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
4682 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4683 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
4684 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
4685 let user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
4686 let accept_underpaying_htlcs = chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs;
4687 (counterparty_node_id, channel_id, funding_txo, user_channel_id, accept_underpaying_htlcs)
4690 incoming_counterparty_node_id, incoming_channel_id, incoming_funding_txo,
4691 incoming_user_channel_id, incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs
4692 ) = if let Some(incoming_channel_details) = incoming_channel_details_opt {
4693 incoming_channel_details
4695 // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
4699 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
4700 let mut htlc_fails = Vec::new();
4701 for update_add_htlc in &update_add_htlcs {
4702 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = match decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
4703 &update_add_htlc, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
4705 Ok(decoded_onion) => decoded_onion,
4707 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, HTLCDestination::InvalidOnion));
4712 let is_intro_node_blinded_forward = next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward();
4713 let outgoing_scid_opt = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref().map(|d| d.outgoing_scid);
4715 // Process the HTLC on the incoming channel.
4716 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
4717 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(update_add_htlc.payment_hash));
4718 chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(
4719 update_add_htlc, &self.fee_estimator, &logger,
4723 Some(Err((err, code))) => {
4724 let outgoing_chan_update_opt = if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt.as_ref() {
4725 self.do_funded_channel_callback(*outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
4726 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
4731 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
4732 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
4733 outgoing_chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
4735 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
4736 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
4739 // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
4740 None => continue 'outer_loop,
4743 // Now process the HTLC on the outgoing channel if it's a forward.
4744 if let Some(next_packet_details) = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref() {
4745 if let Err((err, code, chan_update_opt)) = self.can_forward_htlc(
4746 &update_add_htlc, next_packet_details
4748 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
4749 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
4750 chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
4752 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
4753 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
4758 match self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
4759 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
4760 incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_details_opt.map(|d| d.next_packet_pubkey),
4762 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(htlc_forward) => {
4763 htlc_forwards.push((htlc_forward, update_add_htlc.htlc_id));
4765 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(htlc_fail) => {
4766 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
4767 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
4772 // Process all of the forwards and failures for the channel in which the HTLCs were
4773 // proposed to as a batch.
4774 let pending_forwards = (incoming_scid, incoming_funding_txo, incoming_channel_id,
4775 incoming_user_channel_id, htlc_forwards.drain(..).collect());
4776 self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&mut [pending_forwards]);
4777 for (htlc_fail, htlc_destination) in htlc_fails.drain(..) {
4778 let failure = match htlc_fail {
4779 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(fail_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
4780 htlc_id: fail_htlc.htlc_id,
4781 err_packet: fail_htlc.reason,
4783 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(fail_malformed_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
4784 htlc_id: fail_malformed_htlc.htlc_id,
4785 sha256_of_onion: fail_malformed_htlc.sha256_of_onion,
4786 failure_code: fail_malformed_htlc.failure_code,
4789 self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().entry(incoming_scid).or_insert(vec![]).push(failure);
4790 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4791 prev_channel_id: incoming_channel_id,
4792 failed_next_destination: htlc_destination,
4798 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4800 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4801 /// Will likely generate further events.
4802 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4803 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4805 self.process_pending_update_add_htlcs();
4807 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4808 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4809 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4811 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4812 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4814 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4815 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4816 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4817 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4819 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4820 match forward_info {
4821 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4822 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4823 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4824 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4825 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4828 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4829 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4830 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id), Some(payment_hash));
4831 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4833 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4834 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4835 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4836 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4837 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4838 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4839 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4840 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4841 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4844 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4845 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4847 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4850 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4851 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4857 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4858 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4860 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4864 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4865 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4867 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4871 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4872 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4873 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4874 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4875 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4876 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4877 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4880 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4881 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4882 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4883 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4884 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4886 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4888 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4889 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4893 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4894 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4895 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4896 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4897 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4898 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4900 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4901 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4907 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4910 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4913 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4914 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4915 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4916 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4917 // problem, not ours.
4923 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4924 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4925 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4927 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4931 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4932 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4933 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4934 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4935 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4938 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4939 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4940 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4941 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
4942 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4943 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
4944 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4945 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4946 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4947 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4948 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4949 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4950 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4953 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(payment_hash));
4954 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4955 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4956 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4957 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4958 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4959 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4960 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4961 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4962 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4963 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4964 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
4966 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4967 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4968 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4969 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4970 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4971 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4974 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4975 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4976 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4979 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4980 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4982 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4984 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4985 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4986 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4987 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4993 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4994 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4996 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4997 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4998 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
5000 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
5001 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5002 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
5003 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
5005 Some((res, htlc_id))
5008 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5009 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5010 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5011 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
5013 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
5015 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
5016 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
5017 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
5023 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5027 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5028 match forward_info {
5029 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5030 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5031 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5032 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
5033 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5036 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
5037 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, payment_context, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
5038 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
5039 payment_data, payment_metadata, payment_context,
5040 incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs,
5041 requires_blinded_error: _
5043 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
5044 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
5045 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
5046 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
5047 Some(payment_data), payment_context, phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
5049 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
5050 payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata,
5051 incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
5053 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
5054 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
5058 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
5059 payment_data, None, None, onion_fields)
5062 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
5065 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
5066 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
5067 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5068 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5069 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5070 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5071 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5072 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5073 phantom_shared_secret,
5076 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
5077 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
5078 // if routing nodes overpay
5079 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
5080 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
5082 total_value_received: None,
5083 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
5086 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
5089 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
5091 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
5092 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
5093 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
5094 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5095 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
5096 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
5098 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5099 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
5100 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
5101 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5102 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5103 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
5104 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5105 phantom_shared_secret,
5108 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5109 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
5111 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
5114 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
5115 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5116 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5117 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5118 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5121 macro_rules! check_total_value {
5122 ($purpose: expr) => {{
5123 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
5124 let is_keysend = $purpose.is_keysend();
5125 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5126 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
5127 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5129 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
5130 .entry(payment_hash)
5131 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
5132 .or_insert_with(|| {
5133 committed_to_claimable = true;
5135 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
5138 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
5139 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
5140 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
5141 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5143 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5144 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
5145 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5147 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
5148 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
5149 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5152 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
5154 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
5155 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
5156 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
5157 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
5158 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
5159 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
5160 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5161 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
5162 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
5163 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
5165 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
5167 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
5168 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
5169 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5170 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5171 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5172 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
5174 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5175 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5176 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5177 committed_to_claimable = true;
5179 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5180 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
5181 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
5182 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
5183 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
5184 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
5185 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
5186 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
5187 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5191 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
5192 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
5193 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5194 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
5195 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
5197 payment_claimable_generated = true;
5199 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
5200 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
5202 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5203 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5204 committed_to_claimable = true;
5207 payment_claimable_generated
5211 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
5212 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
5213 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
5214 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
5215 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
5216 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
5217 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5218 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5219 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5220 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5221 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
5222 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5223 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
5224 Ok(result) => result,
5226 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
5227 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5230 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
5231 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
5232 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
5233 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
5234 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
5235 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5238 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::from_parts(
5240 payment_data.payment_secret,
5243 check_total_value!(purpose);
5245 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
5246 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
5247 check_total_value!(purpose);
5251 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
5252 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5253 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
5254 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5256 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5257 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
5258 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
5259 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5260 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
5261 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
5262 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
5263 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5265 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::from_parts(
5266 inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
5267 payment_data.payment_secret,
5270 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
5271 if payment_claimable_generated {
5272 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
5278 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
5279 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
5287 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
5288 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
5289 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
5290 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
5292 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
5293 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5295 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
5297 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
5298 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
5299 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
5301 self.check_free_holding_cells();
5303 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
5304 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5305 events.append(&mut new_events);
5308 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
5310 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
5311 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
5312 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
5314 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
5316 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
5317 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
5318 if background_events.is_empty() {
5319 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5322 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
5324 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
5325 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
5326 // monitor updating completing.
5327 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5329 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
5330 let mut updated_chan = false;
5332 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5333 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5334 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5335 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5336 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5337 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
5338 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
5339 updated_chan = true;
5340 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
5341 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5343 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
5346 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
5351 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
5352 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5355 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
5356 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5357 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5358 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5359 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5360 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
5361 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5363 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5364 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5365 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5366 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5367 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5373 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5376 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5377 /// Process background events, for functional testing
5378 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
5379 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5380 let _ = self.process_background_events();
5383 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
5384 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
5386 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
5388 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
5389 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
5390 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5392 if !chan.context.is_live() {
5393 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
5394 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5395 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5397 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
5398 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5400 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
5401 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5405 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
5406 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
5407 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
5408 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
5409 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
5410 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5411 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5413 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5414 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5416 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5417 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5418 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5419 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5420 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
5421 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
5423 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5428 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5429 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5437 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
5439 /// This currently includes:
5440 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
5441 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
5442 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
5444 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
5445 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
5446 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
5447 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
5448 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
5449 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
5450 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
5451 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
5453 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
5454 /// estimate fetches.
5456 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
5457 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
5458 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
5459 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5460 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5462 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5463 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5465 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
5466 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
5467 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
5468 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
5470 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
5471 chan_id: &ChannelId,
5472 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
5473 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
5474 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5475 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
5477 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5478 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
5479 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context, None);
5481 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
5482 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
5483 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
5484 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5485 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5486 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5487 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5488 channel_id: *chan_id,
5489 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
5500 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5501 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5502 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5503 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5504 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5505 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
5506 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
5508 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5509 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5514 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5515 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5517 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
5518 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
5519 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
5520 if needs_close { return false; }
5523 match chan.channel_update_status() {
5524 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5525 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5526 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5527 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5528 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5529 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5530 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5532 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5533 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5534 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5535 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5536 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5540 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5542 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5545 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5547 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5548 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5549 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5550 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5551 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5555 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5557 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5563 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5565 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5566 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
5567 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5568 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5569 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5570 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5571 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5572 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5573 channel_id: *chan_id,
5574 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5582 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5583 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5584 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5586 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5587 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5588 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5590 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
5591 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5592 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5593 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5595 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
5596 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5597 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5598 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5603 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5604 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5605 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id), None);
5606 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5607 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5608 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5609 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5610 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5611 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5617 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5619 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5620 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5625 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5626 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5627 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5628 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5629 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5630 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5631 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5632 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5633 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5634 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5635 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5636 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5637 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5638 // have no channels to the peer.
5639 let remove_entry = {
5640 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5641 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5644 entry.remove_entry();
5647 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5652 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5653 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5654 // This should be unreachable
5655 debug_assert!(false);
5658 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5659 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5660 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5661 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5662 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5663 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5664 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5667 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5668 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5669 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5671 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5672 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5679 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5680 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5681 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5682 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5683 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5686 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5687 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5690 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5691 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5694 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5695 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5696 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5697 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5698 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5699 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5700 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5703 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5704 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5707 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5708 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5709 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5710 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5711 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5718 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5719 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5720 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5722 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5723 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5724 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5725 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5727 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5728 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5729 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5730 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5731 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5732 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5735 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5736 /// reason for the failure.
5738 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5739 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5740 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5742 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5743 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5744 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5745 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5746 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5747 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5748 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5753 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5754 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5755 match failure_code {
5756 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5757 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5758 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5759 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5760 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5761 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5763 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5764 let fail_data = match data {
5765 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5768 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5773 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5774 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5776 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5778 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5779 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5780 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5781 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5782 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5783 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5784 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5786 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5788 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5789 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5791 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5796 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5797 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5798 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5799 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5800 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5801 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5802 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5803 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5804 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5805 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5807 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5808 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5809 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5810 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5812 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5813 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5814 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5815 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5816 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5820 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5821 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5822 // be surfaced to the user.
5823 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5824 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5825 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5827 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5828 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5829 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5830 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5831 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5832 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5833 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5834 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5835 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5837 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5838 debug_assert!(false);
5839 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5842 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5844 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5847 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5848 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5849 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5850 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5854 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5855 let push_forward_event = self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(source, payment_hash, onion_error, destination);
5856 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5859 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5860 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5861 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) -> bool {
5862 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5863 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5864 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5865 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5866 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5867 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5868 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5871 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5872 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5873 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5876 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5877 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5878 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5879 let mut push_forward_event;
5881 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5882 push_forward_event = self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5883 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5884 &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
5886 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5887 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5888 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
5891 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id), Some(*payment_hash)),
5892 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5893 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5895 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5896 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5897 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5898 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5899 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5901 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5903 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5904 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5906 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5907 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5911 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5912 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5914 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5918 push_forward_event = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
5919 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5920 push_forward_event &= forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5921 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5922 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5923 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5925 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5926 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5929 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5930 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5931 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5932 prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
5933 failed_next_destination: destination,
5940 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5941 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5943 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5944 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5945 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5946 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5948 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5949 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5950 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5951 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5953 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5954 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5955 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5957 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5958 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5959 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5960 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5961 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5962 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5963 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5964 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5965 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5968 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5969 /// even type numbers.
5973 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5974 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5976 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5977 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5978 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5981 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5982 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5984 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5987 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5988 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5989 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5990 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5991 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5992 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5993 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5994 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5999 let claiming_payment = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments
6000 .entry(payment_hash)
6002 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
6003 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
6006 .or_insert_with(|| {
6007 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
6008 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
6010 amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
6011 payment_purpose: payment.purpose,
6014 sender_intended_value,
6015 onion_fields: payment.onion_fields,
6019 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = claiming_payment.onion_fields {
6020 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
6021 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
6022 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
6023 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6024 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
6025 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
6026 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
6027 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6028 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6029 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6038 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
6040 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
6041 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
6042 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
6043 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
6044 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
6045 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
6046 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
6047 let mut valid_mpp = true;
6048 let mut errs = Vec::new();
6049 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6050 for htlc in sources.iter() {
6051 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
6052 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6053 debug_assert!(false);
6057 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
6059 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
6060 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6061 debug_assert!(false);
6065 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
6066 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
6068 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6069 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
6070 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6071 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
6074 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
6075 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6076 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
6077 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
6081 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6082 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
6083 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
6084 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
6085 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
6086 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
6087 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
6090 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
6091 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
6092 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
6093 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id), Some(payment_hash));
6094 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
6095 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
6100 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6101 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6102 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
6103 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6104 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
6105 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6106 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6108 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6111 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
6112 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
6113 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6114 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6118 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
6119 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
6120 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
6121 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
6123 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
6124 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
6125 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
6126 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6128 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
6129 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
6130 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6131 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6134 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6135 let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
6136 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
6137 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
6141 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
6142 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6143 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
6146 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
6147 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
6148 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6149 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6150 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6151 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6152 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
6153 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
6156 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
6157 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
6158 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
6160 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
6163 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6164 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6166 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
6167 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
6168 // monitor update as a background event.
6169 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6170 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6171 counterparty_node_id,
6172 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
6173 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
6174 update: monitor_update.clone(),
6178 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
6179 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
6184 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6186 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
6188 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
6189 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6190 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
6191 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
6192 blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
6194 (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
6196 debug_assert!(false,
6197 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
6200 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
6201 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6202 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
6203 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6204 .get_mut(&channel_id)
6206 let mut found_blocker = false;
6207 blockers.retain(|iter| {
6208 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
6209 // which case we need to only remove the one
6210 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
6211 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
6212 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
6213 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
6215 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
6218 debug_assert!(false);
6227 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6228 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
6229 counterparty_node_id: None,
6230 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6233 channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
6237 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
6238 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
6239 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
6240 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
6241 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
6242 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
6243 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
6244 // again on restart.
6245 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id), None),
6246 "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
6247 payment_preimage, update_res);
6250 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
6251 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
6253 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
6254 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
6255 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
6256 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
6257 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
6258 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
6259 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
6260 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6261 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
6262 prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
6265 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
6266 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
6267 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
6268 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
6269 // `PaymentForwarded`).
6270 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
6274 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
6275 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
6278 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
6279 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
6280 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
6281 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId, next_user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
6284 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
6285 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
6286 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
6287 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6288 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
6290 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6291 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
6292 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
6294 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
6295 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
6298 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
6299 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
6300 let prev_user_channel_id = hop_data.user_channel_id;
6301 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
6302 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6303 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
6304 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
6305 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
6306 let chan_to_release =
6307 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6308 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
6310 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
6311 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
6312 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
6313 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
6318 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
6319 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
6320 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
6321 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
6322 // in the background.
6323 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
6324 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6325 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
6326 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
6328 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
6329 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6330 funding_txo, update, ..
6332 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
6333 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
6334 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6335 payment_preimage: update_preimage
6337 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
6343 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
6344 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
6345 (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
6347 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
6348 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
6350 monitor_update.updates[0],
6351 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
6356 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
6357 // immediately once we get going.
6358 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
6361 *channel_id == prev_channel_id,
6363 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
6366 } else if definitely_duplicate {
6367 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
6368 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6369 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
6370 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
6371 downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
6372 blocking_action: other_chan.3,
6376 let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
6377 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
6378 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
6381 debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
6382 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
6383 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6384 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
6385 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
6386 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
6387 prev_user_channel_id,
6388 next_user_channel_id,
6389 total_fee_earned_msat,
6391 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
6392 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
6394 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
6398 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
6399 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6400 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
6406 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
6407 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
6408 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
6411 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
6412 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6413 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6414 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6416 for action in actions.into_iter() {
6418 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
6419 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6420 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
6422 payment_purpose: purpose,
6425 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
6428 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
6432 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
6434 sender_intended_total_msat,
6439 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6440 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
6442 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
6443 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
6444 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
6447 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6448 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
6450 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
6451 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
6452 downstream_funding_outpoint,
6453 downstream_channel_id,
6454 Some(blocking_action),
6461 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
6462 /// update completion.
6463 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
6464 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
6465 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
6466 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
6467 funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
6468 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
6469 -> (Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)>, Option<(u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)>) {
6470 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
6471 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {} pending update_add_htlcs, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
6472 &channel.context.channel_id(),
6473 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
6474 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
6475 pending_forwards.len(), pending_update_adds.len(),
6476 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
6477 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
6478 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
6480 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6481 let short_channel_id = channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias());
6483 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
6484 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6485 htlc_forwards = Some((short_channel_id, channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
6486 channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
6488 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = None;
6489 if !pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
6490 decode_update_add_htlcs = Some((short_channel_id, pending_update_adds));
6493 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
6494 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
6496 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
6497 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6498 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6503 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
6504 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
6505 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
6506 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6511 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
6512 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
6513 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
6514 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6515 msg: revoke_and_ack,
6520 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
6524 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
6530 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
6531 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
6532 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6536 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6537 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
6538 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6541 (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs)
6544 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
6545 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6547 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6548 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6550 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6551 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6552 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6553 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6554 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6559 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6560 let mut peer_state_lock;
6561 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6562 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6563 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6564 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6566 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6569 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6570 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6571 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6572 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6573 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6576 let remaining_in_flight =
6577 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6578 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6581 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
6582 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6583 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6584 remaining_in_flight);
6585 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
6588 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6591 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6593 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6594 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6597 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6598 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6599 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6601 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6602 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6603 /// used to accept such channels.
6605 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6606 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6607 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6608 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6611 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6612 /// it as confirmed immediately.
6614 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6615 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6616 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6618 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6619 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6621 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6622 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6624 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6625 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6627 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6628 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6629 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6630 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6633 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6635 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id), None);
6636 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6638 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6639 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6640 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6641 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6643 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6644 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6646 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6648 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6649 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6650 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6652 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6653 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6654 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6656 let res = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6657 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6658 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6659 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6660 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6661 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6662 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|err| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(err, *temporary_channel_id))
6665 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6666 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6668 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6674 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6675 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6676 match handle_error!(self, Result::<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>::Err(err), *counterparty_node_id) {
6677 Ok(_) => unreachable!("`handle_error` only returns Err as we've passed in an Err"),
6679 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err });
6683 Ok(mut channel) => {
6685 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6686 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6687 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6688 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6689 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6690 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6691 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6694 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6695 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6696 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6698 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6700 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6701 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6702 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6703 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6704 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6705 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6706 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6707 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6710 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6711 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6712 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6714 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6718 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6719 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6720 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6722 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6723 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6724 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6727 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6734 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6735 /// or 0-conf channels.
6737 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6738 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6739 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6740 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6741 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6742 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6744 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6745 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6746 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6747 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6748 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6749 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6750 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6754 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6757 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6758 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6760 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6761 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6763 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6764 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6765 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6766 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6767 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6769 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6772 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6773 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6774 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6777 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
6778 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
6779 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
6780 // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
6781 // included in the unfunded count.
6782 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6783 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
6784 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6787 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6788 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6791 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
6792 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
6793 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6794 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6799 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6802 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6803 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6804 // likely to be lost on restart!
6805 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6806 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
6807 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6810 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6811 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
6812 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6815 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6816 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6817 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6818 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6819 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6821 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6822 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6824 debug_assert!(false);
6825 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6826 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6827 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6829 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6830 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6832 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6833 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6834 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6835 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6836 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6837 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6839 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6840 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6841 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6844 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6845 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6846 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6847 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6848 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6851 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
6852 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6854 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6855 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
6856 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6859 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6860 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6861 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6862 &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6864 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6866 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6867 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6868 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6869 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6870 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
6871 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6874 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6875 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6876 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6881 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6882 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6883 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6884 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6885 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6886 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6887 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6890 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6895 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6896 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6897 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6898 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
6899 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6901 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6902 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6903 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
6904 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6907 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6908 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6910 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6911 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6912 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6914 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6918 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6919 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6920 // likely to be lost on restart!
6921 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6922 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6923 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6925 debug_assert!(false);
6926 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6928 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6929 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6930 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
6931 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6932 match phase.get_mut() {
6933 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6934 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6935 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6938 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6942 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
6945 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6946 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6947 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
6948 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6949 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6951 user_channel_id: user_id,
6956 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6957 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6959 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6960 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6962 debug_assert!(false);
6963 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6966 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6967 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6968 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6969 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6970 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6971 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context, None);
6972 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6974 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
6975 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6976 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6977 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6978 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
6979 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
6980 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
6981 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
6982 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6986 Some(mut phase) => {
6987 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6988 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
6989 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6991 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6994 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
6996 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
6997 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
6998 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
6999 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
7000 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
7001 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
7003 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
7004 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
7005 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
7008 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
7009 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7010 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
7012 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7013 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7014 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
7015 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7016 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
7018 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
7019 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
7020 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
7021 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
7022 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
7024 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
7025 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
7026 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
7027 // until we have persisted our monitor.
7028 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
7029 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7030 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7035 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
7036 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
7037 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7039 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
7043 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7044 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
7045 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
7053 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7054 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7055 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7056 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7058 debug_assert!(false);
7059 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7062 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7063 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7064 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7065 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
7066 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
7067 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
7068 let logger = WithContext::from(
7070 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
7071 Some(chan.context.channel_id()),
7075 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
7077 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
7078 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
7079 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
7080 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
7081 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
7082 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
7083 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
7084 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7085 } else { unreachable!(); }
7088 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
7089 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
7090 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
7091 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
7092 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
7093 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
7094 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7098 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
7099 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
7100 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
7101 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
7102 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7103 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7107 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
7110 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
7114 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7115 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7116 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7117 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7118 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7120 debug_assert!(false);
7121 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7123 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7124 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7125 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7126 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7127 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7128 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7129 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
7130 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7131 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
7132 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7133 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7134 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7135 msg: announcement_sigs,
7137 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7138 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
7139 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
7140 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
7141 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
7142 // announcement_signatures.
7143 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7144 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7145 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7146 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7153 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7154 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
7159 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7160 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
7163 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7164 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7169 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7170 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
7171 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
7173 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7174 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7176 debug_assert!(false);
7177 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7179 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7180 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7181 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7182 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
7184 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7185 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
7186 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7187 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
7189 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
7192 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7193 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7194 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7195 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
7197 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
7198 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
7199 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
7200 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
7201 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7202 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7206 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
7207 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7208 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7209 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7212 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
7213 let context = phase.context_mut();
7214 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context, None);
7215 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7216 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7217 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7219 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
7220 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7221 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
7222 let context = phase.context_mut();
7223 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7224 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7225 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7229 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7232 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
7233 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
7234 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7235 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
7237 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
7238 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
7244 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7245 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7246 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7248 debug_assert!(false);
7249 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7251 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
7252 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7253 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7254 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7255 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7256 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7257 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7258 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7259 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
7260 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7261 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7266 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
7267 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
7268 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
7269 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
7270 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
7271 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
7272 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
7274 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7275 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7278 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7281 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
7282 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
7283 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id, None), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
7284 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
7286 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
7287 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7288 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
7289 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7294 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7295 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
7296 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7301 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7302 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
7303 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
7304 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
7306 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
7307 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
7308 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
7309 //but we should prevent it anyway.
7311 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7312 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7314 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
7315 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7316 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7318 debug_assert!(false);
7319 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7321 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7322 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7323 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7324 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7325 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7326 let mut pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
7327 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
7328 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
7329 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
7330 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
7332 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
7334 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(msg.payment_hash));
7335 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
7336 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
7337 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
7338 if let Err((_, error_code)) = chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &logger) {
7339 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
7340 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
7341 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7342 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7343 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7344 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
7345 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
7349 match pending_forward_info {
7350 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
7351 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
7353 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
7354 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
7355 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
7356 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
7357 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
7359 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
7360 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
7361 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7362 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7363 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7366 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg));
7372 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, &self.fee_estimator), chan_phase_entry);
7374 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7375 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7378 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7383 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7385 let next_user_channel_id;
7386 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
7387 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7388 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7390 debug_assert!(false);
7391 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7393 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7394 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7395 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7396 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7397 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7398 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7399 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
7400 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7402 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
7404 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
7405 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7406 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
7408 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
7409 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
7410 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
7411 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
7412 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
7413 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
7414 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
7415 next_user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
7418 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7419 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7422 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7425 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
7426 Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
7427 funding_txo, msg.channel_id, Some(next_user_channel_id),
7433 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7434 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7435 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7436 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7437 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7439 debug_assert!(false);
7440 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7442 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7443 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7444 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7445 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7446 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7447 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
7449 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7450 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7453 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7458 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7459 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7460 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7461 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7462 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7464 debug_assert!(false);
7465 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7467 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7468 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7469 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7470 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7471 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
7472 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
7473 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
7475 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7476 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
7478 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7479 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7483 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7487 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7488 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7489 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7491 debug_assert!(false);
7492 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7494 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7495 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7496 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7497 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7498 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7499 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7500 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7501 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7502 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7503 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
7504 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7508 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7509 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7512 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7516 fn push_decode_update_add_htlcs(&self, mut update_add_htlcs: (u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)) {
7517 let mut push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7518 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7519 push_forward_event &= decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty();
7520 let scid = update_add_htlcs.0;
7521 match decode_update_add_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7522 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => { e.get_mut().append(&mut update_add_htlcs.1); },
7523 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(update_add_htlcs.1); },
7525 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
7529 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
7530 let push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(per_source_pending_forwards);
7531 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7535 fn forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) -> bool {
7536 let mut push_forward_event = false;
7537 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
7538 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
7539 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
7540 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
7541 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
7542 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
7543 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7544 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
7545 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
7547 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
7548 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
7550 let decode_update_add_htlcs_empty = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7551 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7552 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
7553 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7554 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7555 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7556 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
7558 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7559 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
7560 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
7562 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
7563 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7564 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
7565 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7566 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
7567 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
7568 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
7569 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
7570 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
7573 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7574 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
7576 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7577 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id), Some(forward_info.payment_hash));
7578 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7579 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7580 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7581 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7582 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7583 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7584 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7585 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7586 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7587 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7590 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7591 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7592 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7597 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7598 // payments are being processed.
7599 push_forward_event |= forward_htlcs_empty && decode_update_add_htlcs_empty;
7600 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7601 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7608 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7609 push_forward_event |= self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7612 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7613 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7614 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7620 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7621 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7622 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7623 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7624 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7626 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7627 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7628 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7629 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7630 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7631 // real by taking more time.
7632 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7633 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7634 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7639 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7640 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7641 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7642 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7643 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7644 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7645 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7647 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7648 .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7649 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7650 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7651 channel_funding_outpoint,
7653 counterparty_node_id,
7658 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7659 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7660 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7662 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7663 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7664 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7665 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7667 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7668 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7669 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7675 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7676 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7677 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7678 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7680 debug_assert!(false);
7681 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7682 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7683 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7684 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7685 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7686 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7687 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7688 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7689 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7690 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7691 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
7692 *counterparty_node_id)
7694 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7695 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7696 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7697 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7698 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7699 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7700 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7704 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7705 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7708 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7711 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7715 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7716 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7717 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7719 debug_assert!(false);
7720 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7722 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7723 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7724 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7725 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7726 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7727 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7728 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7730 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7731 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7734 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7739 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7740 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7741 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7743 debug_assert!(false);
7744 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7746 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7747 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7748 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7749 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7750 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7751 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7752 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7755 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7756 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7757 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
7758 msg, &self.default_configuration
7759 ), chan_phase_entry),
7760 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7761 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7762 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7765 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7766 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7769 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7774 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7775 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7776 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7777 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7779 // It's not a local channel
7780 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7783 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7784 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7785 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7786 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7788 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7789 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7790 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7791 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7792 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7793 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7794 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7795 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7796 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7797 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7798 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7800 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7802 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7803 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7804 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7805 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7807 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7808 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7809 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7810 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7813 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7817 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7818 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7821 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7823 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7826 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7827 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7828 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7830 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7832 debug_assert!(false);
7833 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7834 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7838 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id), None);
7839 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7840 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7841 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7842 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7843 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7844 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7845 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7846 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7847 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7848 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7849 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7850 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7851 let mut channel_update = None;
7852 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7853 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7854 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7857 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7858 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7859 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7860 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7861 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7862 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7863 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7868 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7869 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7870 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7871 Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7872 debug_assert!(htlc_forwards.is_none());
7873 debug_assert!(decode_update_add_htlcs.is_none());
7874 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7875 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7879 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7880 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7883 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7884 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7886 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7887 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7888 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7889 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7890 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7891 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7893 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7894 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7895 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7896 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7897 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7898 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7899 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7900 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7901 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7902 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7903 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7904 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7905 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7906 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7907 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7908 next_funding_txid: None,
7911 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7912 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7913 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7919 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7920 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7922 Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents)
7925 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7926 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7927 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7929 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7930 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7931 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7932 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7933 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7934 match monitor_event {
7935 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7936 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id), Some(htlc_update.payment_hash));
7937 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7938 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7939 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
7940 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
7941 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
7943 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7944 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
7945 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7946 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7949 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) | MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => {
7950 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7951 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7953 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7954 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7955 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7956 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7959 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7960 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7961 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7962 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7963 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7964 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7965 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
7966 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7967 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
7970 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
7972 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
7973 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7974 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
7975 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7979 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7980 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7981 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7982 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: reason.to_string() })
7990 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
7991 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7997 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7998 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8001 has_pending_monitor_events
8004 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
8005 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
8006 /// update events as a separate process method here.
8008 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
8009 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8010 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
8013 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
8014 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
8015 /// update was applied.
8016 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
8017 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
8018 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8020 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
8021 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
8022 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
8023 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
8025 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8026 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8028 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8029 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8030 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
8031 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
8033 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
8034 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8035 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
8036 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None));
8037 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
8038 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
8040 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
8041 has_monitor_update = true;
8043 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
8044 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8045 continue 'peer_loop;
8054 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
8055 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8056 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
8062 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
8063 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
8065 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
8066 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
8068 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
8069 #[cfg(async_signing)]
8070 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
8071 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8073 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
8074 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
8076 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8077 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
8078 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
8079 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
8084 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
8085 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
8090 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
8091 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
8094 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8095 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
8096 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
8102 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
8106 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8107 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
8108 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8109 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8110 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8111 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
8112 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8116 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8117 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8118 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8119 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8120 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8126 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
8127 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
8128 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
8129 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
8130 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
8131 let mut has_update = false;
8132 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
8134 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8136 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8137 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8138 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8139 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8140 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
8142 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8143 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
8144 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
8145 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
8146 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
8148 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
8149 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
8152 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
8153 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
8154 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
8156 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
8157 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
8158 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
8159 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8160 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8161 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8166 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
8167 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
8168 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
8174 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
8175 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
8180 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
8186 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
8187 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
8190 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
8191 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
8197 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
8198 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
8200 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
8201 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8202 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
8203 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
8204 // reorganized out of the main chain.
8205 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
8206 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
8207 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
8208 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
8209 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
8210 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
8211 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
8212 assert!(should_broadcast);
8213 } else { unreachable!(); }
8214 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
8215 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8216 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
8219 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8224 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8225 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
8226 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
8227 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
8231 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
8232 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
8233 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
8234 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
8235 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
8237 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
8241 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
8246 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
8248 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
8249 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8250 pub fn create_offer_builder(&$self) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8251 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8252 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8253 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8254 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8256 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8257 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
8258 node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
8260 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8267 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8268 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
8269 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
8273 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
8274 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
8276 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
8277 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
8278 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
8281 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8282 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
8283 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8285 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8286 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8290 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
8291 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
8292 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
8293 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
8294 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8296 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
8300 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
8301 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8306 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8307 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
8308 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
8310 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
8311 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8312 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8313 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8314 pub fn create_refund_builder(
8315 &$self, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration, payment_id: PaymentId,
8316 retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8317 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8318 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8319 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8320 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8321 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8323 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8324 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
8325 node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
8327 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8328 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
8331 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
8333 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
8334 $self.pending_outbound_payments
8335 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8336 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
8338 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8344 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8346 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8347 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8348 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8349 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8350 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8351 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8355 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8356 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
8357 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8358 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
8361 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8363 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8365 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
8366 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
8367 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
8369 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
8370 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
8371 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
8372 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
8373 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
8374 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
8375 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
8377 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8378 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8382 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
8383 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
8386 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8387 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
8388 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8392 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
8393 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
8394 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
8395 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8399 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
8400 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
8401 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8406 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8407 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
8408 /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
8409 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
8412 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8413 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
8414 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
8415 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
8416 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8417 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8418 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8419 pub fn pay_for_offer(
8420 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
8421 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
8422 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8423 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8424 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8425 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8426 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8428 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
8429 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
8431 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
8433 let builder = match quantity {
8435 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
8437 let builder = match amount_msats {
8439 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
8441 let builder = match payer_note {
8443 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
8445 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
8446 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8448 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8450 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
8451 self.pending_outbound_payments
8452 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8453 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
8455 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8457 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8458 if !offer.paths().is_empty() {
8459 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
8460 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
8461 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
8462 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
8463 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
8464 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8465 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
8466 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8467 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8469 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8471 } else if let Some(signing_pubkey) = offer.signing_pubkey() {
8472 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8473 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
8474 Destination::Node(signing_pubkey),
8477 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8479 debug_assert!(false);
8480 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::MissingSigningPubkey);
8486 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
8489 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
8490 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
8491 /// [`PaymentPreimage`]. It is returned purely for informational purposes.
8495 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
8496 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
8497 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
8498 /// received and no retries will be made.
8503 /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
8504 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
8507 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8508 pub fn request_refund_payment(
8509 &self, refund: &Refund
8510 ) -> Result<Bolt12Invoice, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8511 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8512 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8513 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8515 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
8516 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8518 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
8519 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
8522 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8524 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
8525 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8526 let payment_context = PaymentContext::Bolt12Refund(Bolt12RefundContext {});
8527 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8528 amount_msats, payment_secret, payment_context
8530 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8532 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8533 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
8534 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
8536 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8537 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8538 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8540 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8541 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8542 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
8544 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
8545 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
8546 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
8547 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8549 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8550 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
8551 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8552 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8553 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
8556 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8558 for path in refund.paths() {
8559 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8560 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8561 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8562 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8564 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8570 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
8574 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
8577 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
8578 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
8580 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`] event, which
8581 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] return `Some` for [`PaymentPurpose::preimage`]. That
8582 /// should then be passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8584 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8586 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8587 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8591 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8592 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8594 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8596 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8597 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8599 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8600 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8601 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8602 /// [`PaymentPurpose::preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::preimage
8603 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8604 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8605 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8606 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8607 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8608 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8611 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8612 /// stored external to LDK.
8614 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8615 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8616 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8618 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8619 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8622 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8623 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8624 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8625 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8627 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8628 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8629 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8630 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8631 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8633 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8634 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8635 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8636 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8637 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8639 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8640 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8642 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8643 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8647 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8648 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8650 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8652 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8653 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8655 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8656 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8657 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8658 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8659 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8660 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8661 min_final_cltv_expiry)
8664 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8665 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8667 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8668 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
8669 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
8672 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
8674 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8675 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8676 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8677 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8679 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8681 .map(|(node_id, peer_state)| (node_id, peer_state.lock().unwrap()))
8682 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8683 .map(|(node_id, peer)| ForwardNode {
8685 short_channel_id: peer.channel_by_id
8687 .filter(|(_, channel)| channel.context().is_usable())
8688 .min_by_key(|(_, channel)| channel.context().channel_creation_height)
8689 .and_then(|(_, channel)| channel.context().get_short_channel_id()),
8691 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8694 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8695 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8698 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
8699 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
8700 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
8701 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, payment_context: PaymentContext
8702 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
8703 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8705 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
8706 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
8707 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
8708 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8709 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
8711 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
8713 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
8717 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8718 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
8722 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
8723 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
8725 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8726 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8727 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8728 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8730 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8731 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8732 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
8733 Some(_) => continue,
8734 None => return scid_candidate
8739 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
8741 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8742 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
8744 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
8745 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
8746 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
8750 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
8751 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8752 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8754 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8755 /// times to get a unique scid.
8756 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8757 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8758 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8760 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8761 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8762 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8763 return scid_candidate
8767 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8768 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8769 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8770 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8772 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8773 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8774 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8775 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8776 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8777 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8779 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8780 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8781 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8790 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8791 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8792 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8793 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8794 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8798 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8799 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8800 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8801 events.push_back((event, None));
8805 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8806 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8807 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8811 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8812 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8816 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8817 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8820 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8821 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8822 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8823 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8824 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
8825 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
8826 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8828 let logger = WithContext::from(
8829 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id), None
8832 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8833 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8834 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8835 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8836 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8837 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8838 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8839 .get_mut(&channel_id)
8841 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8845 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8846 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
8847 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8848 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8849 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8850 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8855 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
8857 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8858 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8859 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8860 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8862 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8863 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8864 if further_update_exists {
8865 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8870 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8877 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8878 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8884 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8885 for action in actions {
8887 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8888 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
8890 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8896 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8897 /// using the given event handler.
8899 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8900 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8904 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8908 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8910 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8911 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8912 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8913 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8914 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8915 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8919 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8920 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8921 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8922 /// is always placed next to each other.
8924 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8925 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8926 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8927 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8929 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8930 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be placed among
8931 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8932 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8933 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8934 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8935 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8937 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8938 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8939 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8940 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8943 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8944 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8946 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8947 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8950 let mut is_any_peer_connected = false;
8951 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8952 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8953 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8954 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8955 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8956 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8957 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8959 if peer_state.is_connected {
8960 is_any_peer_connected = true
8964 // Ensure that we are connected to some peers before getting broadcast messages.
8965 if is_any_peer_connected {
8966 let mut broadcast_msgs = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8967 pending_events.append(&mut broadcast_msgs);
8970 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8971 events.replace(pending_events);
8980 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8982 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8983 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8984 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8985 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8986 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8987 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8991 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8993 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8994 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8995 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8997 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
9001 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9003 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9004 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9005 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9006 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9007 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9008 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9012 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9014 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9015 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
9016 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
9017 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
9018 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
9021 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
9022 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
9025 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9026 let _persistence_guard =
9027 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9028 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9029 let new_height = height - 1;
9031 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
9032 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
9033 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
9034 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
9035 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
9036 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
9039 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)));
9043 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9045 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9046 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9047 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9048 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9049 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9050 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9054 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9055 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9056 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9057 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9059 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9060 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
9062 let _persistence_guard =
9063 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9064 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9065 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None))
9066 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
9068 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9069 if height < last_best_block_height {
9070 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9071 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)));
9075 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9076 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9077 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9078 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9080 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9081 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
9083 let _persistence_guard =
9084 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9085 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9086 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
9088 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)));
9090 macro_rules! max_time {
9091 ($timestamp: expr) => {
9093 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
9094 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
9095 // having an explicit local time source.
9096 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
9097 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
9098 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9099 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
9100 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
9106 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
9107 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9108 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
9109 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
9113 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
9114 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
9115 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
9116 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9117 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9118 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
9119 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
9120 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
9121 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
9122 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
9123 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
9130 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
9131 let _persistence_guard =
9132 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9133 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9134 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
9135 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
9136 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
9137 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
9138 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9139 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9144 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9146 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9147 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9148 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9149 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9150 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9151 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9155 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
9156 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
9158 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
9159 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
9160 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9161 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9162 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9164 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9165 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
9167 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9168 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9169 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9170 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9171 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9173 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9175 // Retain unfunded channels.
9176 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
9177 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
9178 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9179 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
9180 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
9181 let res = f(channel);
9182 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
9183 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
9184 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
9185 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
9186 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
9188 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
9189 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
9190 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
9191 if channel.context.is_usable() {
9192 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9193 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
9194 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
9195 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9200 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9205 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9206 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
9209 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
9210 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9211 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
9212 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9213 msg: announcement_sigs,
9215 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9216 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
9217 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
9219 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
9220 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
9221 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
9226 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
9227 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9228 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
9229 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
9230 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
9231 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
9232 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
9233 // is always consistent.
9234 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
9235 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9236 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
9237 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
9238 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
9241 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
9242 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
9243 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
9244 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
9245 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
9246 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
9247 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
9248 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
9249 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
9253 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9254 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9255 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
9256 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
9257 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9258 data: reason_message,
9271 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9272 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
9273 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
9274 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
9275 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
9276 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
9277 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
9278 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9279 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
9280 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
9282 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
9283 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
9284 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
9288 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
9291 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9292 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
9293 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9294 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
9295 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
9296 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
9297 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
9298 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
9299 phantom_shared_secret: None,
9300 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
9301 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
9302 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
9305 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
9306 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
9307 _ => unreachable!(),
9309 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
9310 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
9311 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
9312 let logger = WithContext::from(
9313 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id), Some(htlc.forward_info.payment_hash)
9315 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
9321 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
9323 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
9324 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
9328 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
9329 /// may have events that need processing.
9331 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
9332 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
9334 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
9335 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
9336 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
9337 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
9340 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
9342 /// See [`Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] for retrieving a [`Future`] that
9343 /// indicates this should be checked.
9344 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
9345 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
9348 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
9349 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
9350 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
9353 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
9354 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
9355 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
9356 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
9359 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9360 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9361 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9362 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9365 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9366 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9368 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9369 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9370 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9371 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9372 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9375 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9376 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9377 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9378 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9381 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9382 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9383 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
9384 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
9387 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9388 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9389 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9390 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
9393 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9394 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9395 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
9396 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9400 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9401 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9403 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9404 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9405 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9406 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9407 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9408 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9412 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
9413 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9414 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9415 // change to the contents.
9416 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9417 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9418 let persist = match &res {
9419 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
9420 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
9421 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9423 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9425 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9430 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
9431 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9432 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9433 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9436 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
9437 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9438 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9439 // change to the contents.
9440 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9441 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9442 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
9446 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
9447 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9448 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9449 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9452 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
9453 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9454 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9457 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
9458 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9459 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9462 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
9463 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9464 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
9465 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
9466 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
9467 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9468 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9469 let persist = match &res {
9470 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9471 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9473 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9478 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
9479 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9480 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
9481 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9485 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
9486 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9487 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
9488 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9492 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
9493 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9494 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
9495 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9499 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
9500 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9501 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
9502 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9505 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
9506 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9507 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9510 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
9511 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9512 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9515 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
9516 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9517 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9518 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9519 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9520 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9521 let persist = match &res {
9522 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9523 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9524 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9526 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9531 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
9532 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9533 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9536 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
9537 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9538 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9539 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9540 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9541 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9542 let persist = match &res {
9543 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9544 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9545 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9547 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9552 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
9553 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9554 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
9555 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9556 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9557 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9558 let persist = match &res {
9559 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9560 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9561 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9563 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9568 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
9569 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9570 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9573 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
9574 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9575 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9578 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
9579 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9580 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9581 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9582 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9583 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9584 let persist = match &res {
9585 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9586 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9587 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9589 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9594 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
9595 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9596 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9599 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
9600 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9601 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
9604 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9609 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9610 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9611 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9612 let persist = match &res {
9613 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9614 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9615 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9617 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9622 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9623 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9624 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9625 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9626 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9629 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None, None),
9630 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9631 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9633 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9634 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9635 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9636 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9637 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9638 let context = match phase {
9639 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9640 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
9641 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9642 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9647 // If we get disconnected and haven't yet committed to a funding
9648 // transaction, we can replay the `open_channel` on reconnection, so don't
9649 // bother dropping the channel here. However, if we already committed to
9650 // the funding transaction we don't yet support replaying the funding
9651 // handshake (and bailing if the peer rejects it), so we force-close in
9653 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) if chan.is_resumable() => return true,
9654 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &mut chan.context,
9655 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9656 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9659 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9660 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9663 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9664 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9668 // Clean up for removal.
9669 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
9670 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
9673 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9674 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9675 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9676 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
9678 // V1 Channel Establishment
9679 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
9680 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
9681 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
9682 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
9683 // V2 Channel Establishment
9684 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9685 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9686 // Common Channel Establishment
9687 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
9688 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
9690 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
9692 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
9693 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
9694 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
9695 // Interactive Transaction Construction
9696 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
9697 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
9698 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
9699 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
9700 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
9701 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
9702 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
9703 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
9704 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
9705 // Channel Operations
9706 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
9707 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
9708 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
9709 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
9710 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
9711 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
9713 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
9714 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9715 // [`ChannelManager::pending_broadcast_events`] holds the [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]
9716 // This check here is to ensure exhaustivity.
9717 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {
9718 debug_assert!(false, "This event shouldn't have been here");
9721 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9722 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
9723 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
9724 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
9725 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
9726 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
9729 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
9730 peer_state.is_connected = false;
9731 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
9732 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
9735 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
9737 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
9739 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
9740 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
9744 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
9745 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None, None);
9746 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
9747 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9751 let mut res = Ok(());
9753 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9754 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
9755 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
9756 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
9757 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
9758 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
9759 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
9762 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9763 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
9764 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
9765 if inbound_peer_limited {
9767 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9769 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
9770 channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9771 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9772 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
9773 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9774 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9775 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9776 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9780 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
9781 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
9782 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
9784 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9785 if inbound_peer_limited &&
9786 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
9787 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
9790 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9793 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
9794 peer_state.is_connected = true;
9799 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9801 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9802 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9803 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9804 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9805 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9807 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9809 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9810 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
9811 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9812 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9813 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9817 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9818 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9819 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9820 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
9824 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
9825 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9826 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9827 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9828 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9829 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
9833 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
9834 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9835 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9836 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9837 debug_assert!(false);
9840 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
9841 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9842 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
9843 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9844 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9845 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9846 debug_assert!(false);
9852 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9853 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9858 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9859 match &msg.data as &str {
9860 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9861 "link failed to shutdown" =>
9863 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9864 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9865 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9866 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9867 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9868 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9869 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9870 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9871 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9873 || -> NotifyOption {
9874 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9875 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9876 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
9877 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9878 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9879 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9880 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9881 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9885 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9886 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9887 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9888 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9889 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9890 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9892 log_level: Level::Trace,
9895 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
9896 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
9897 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9899 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
9908 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9910 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9911 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9912 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9913 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9914 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9915 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9916 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9917 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9918 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9919 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9920 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9922 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9923 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9924 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9928 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9929 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9930 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9931 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9932 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9933 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9934 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9935 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
9936 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9937 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9938 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9944 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9945 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
9946 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9947 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9948 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9954 None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
9955 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9956 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
9960 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9961 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9965 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9966 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9969 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9970 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9973 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9974 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9977 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9978 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9979 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9980 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9983 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9984 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9985 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9986 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9989 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9990 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9991 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9992 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9995 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9996 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9997 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9998 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10001 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
10002 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10003 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10004 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10007 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
10008 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10009 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10010 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10013 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
10014 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10015 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10016 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10019 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
10020 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10021 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10022 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10025 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
10026 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10027 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10028 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10032 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10033 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10035 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10036 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10037 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10038 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10039 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10040 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10044 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage, responder: Option<Responder>) -> ResponseInstruction<OffersMessage> {
10045 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
10046 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
10049 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
10050 let responder = match responder {
10051 Some(responder) => responder,
10052 None => return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse,
10054 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
10057 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
10058 Err(error) => return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10060 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
10061 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
10063 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
10064 return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10068 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
10069 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
10070 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
10072 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
10074 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
10075 return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10079 let payment_context = PaymentContext::Bolt12Offer(Bolt12OfferContext {
10080 offer_id: invoice_request.offer_id,
10081 invoice_request: invoice_request.fields(),
10083 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
10084 amount_msats, payment_secret, payment_context
10086 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
10088 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
10089 return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10093 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10094 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
10095 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
10098 let response = if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
10099 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10100 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
10101 payment_paths, payment_hash
10103 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10104 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
10105 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10108 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::from)
10109 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx))
10110 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10112 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10113 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
10114 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10115 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
10116 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10119 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<ExplicitSigningPubkey>::from)
10120 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
10121 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10122 .and_then(|invoice| {
10124 let mut invoice = invoice;
10126 .sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
10127 self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
10129 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10134 Ok(invoice) => return responder.respond(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
10135 Err(error) => return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10138 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
10139 let response = invoice
10140 .verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx)
10141 .map_err(|()| InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned()))
10142 .and_then(|payment_id| {
10143 let features = self.bolt12_invoice_features();
10144 if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&features) {
10145 Err(InvoiceError::from(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures))
10147 self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id)
10149 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
10150 InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))
10155 match (responder, response) {
10156 (Some(responder), Err(e)) => responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e)),
10157 (None, Err(_)) => {
10160 "A response was generated, but there is no reply_path specified for sending the response."
10162 return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse;
10164 _ => return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse,
10167 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
10168 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
10169 return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse;
10174 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
10175 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
10179 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10180 NodeIdLookUp for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10182 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10183 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10184 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10185 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10186 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10187 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10191 fn next_node_id(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<PublicKey> {
10192 self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).map(|(pubkey, _)| *pubkey)
10196 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10197 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10198 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
10199 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
10200 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
10204 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10205 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10207 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
10208 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
10209 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
10210 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
10211 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10214 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10215 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10216 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
10217 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10220 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10221 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10222 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
10223 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10226 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10227 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10228 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
10229 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
10232 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10233 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10234 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
10235 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
10236 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
10237 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
10238 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
10239 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
10240 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
10241 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
10242 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
10243 features.set_payment_secret_required();
10244 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
10245 features.set_wumbo_optional();
10246 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
10247 features.set_channel_type_optional();
10248 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
10249 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
10250 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
10251 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
10252 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
10257 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10258 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10260 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
10261 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
10262 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
10263 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
10266 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
10267 (2, node_id, required),
10268 (4, features, required),
10269 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
10270 (8, forwarding_info, option),
10271 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10272 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10275 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
10276 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10277 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
10278 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
10279 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
10280 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
10281 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10282 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
10283 (2, self.channel_id, required),
10284 (3, self.channel_type, option),
10285 (4, self.counterparty, required),
10286 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
10287 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
10288 (7, self.config, option),
10289 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
10290 (9, self.confirmations, option),
10291 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
10292 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
10293 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
10294 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
10295 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
10296 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
10297 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
10298 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
10299 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
10300 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
10301 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
10302 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
10303 (30, self.is_usable, required),
10304 (32, self.is_public, required),
10305 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10306 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10307 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
10308 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
10309 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
10310 (43, self.pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10311 (45, self.pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10317 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
10318 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10319 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10320 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
10321 (2, channel_id, required),
10322 (3, channel_type, option),
10323 (4, counterparty, required),
10324 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
10325 (6, funding_txo, option),
10326 (7, config, option),
10327 (8, short_channel_id, option),
10328 (9, confirmations, option),
10329 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
10330 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
10331 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
10332 (16, balance_msat, required),
10333 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
10334 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
10335 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10336 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
10337 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
10338 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
10339 (22, confirmations_required, option),
10340 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
10341 (26, is_outbound, required),
10342 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
10343 (30, is_usable, required),
10344 (32, is_public, required),
10345 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10346 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10347 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
10348 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
10349 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
10350 (43, pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10351 (45, pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10354 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
10355 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
10356 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
10357 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
10358 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
10361 inbound_scid_alias,
10362 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
10364 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
10365 outbound_scid_alias,
10369 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
10370 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
10372 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
10373 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
10374 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
10375 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
10376 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
10377 confirmations_required,
10379 force_close_spend_delay,
10380 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
10381 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
10382 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
10383 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
10384 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
10385 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
10386 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
10387 channel_shutdown_state,
10388 pending_inbound_htlcs: pending_inbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
10389 pending_outbound_htlcs: pending_outbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
10394 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
10395 (2, channels, required_vec),
10396 (4, phantom_scid, required),
10397 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
10400 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
10401 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
10402 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
10405 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
10407 (0, onion_packet, required),
10408 (1, blinded, option),
10409 (2, short_channel_id, required),
10412 (0, payment_data, required),
10413 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10414 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10415 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10416 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10417 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10418 (9, payment_context, option),
10420 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
10421 (0, payment_preimage, required),
10422 (1, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10423 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10424 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10425 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
10426 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10430 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
10431 (0, routing, required),
10432 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
10433 (4, payment_hash, required),
10434 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
10435 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
10436 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
10437 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10441 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10442 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10444 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
10445 0u8.write(writer)?;
10446 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10447 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10448 reason.write(writer)?;
10450 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10451 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
10453 1u8.write(writer)?;
10454 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10455 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10456 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
10457 failure_code.write(writer)?;
10464 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10465 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10466 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10469 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
10470 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10471 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10472 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
10476 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10477 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10478 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10479 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
10480 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
10483 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
10484 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
10485 // messages contained in the variants.
10486 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
10487 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
10488 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
10490 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10491 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10492 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10493 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10494 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
10497 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10498 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10499 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10500 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10501 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
10503 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10508 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
10513 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
10514 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
10515 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
10518 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
10519 (0, short_channel_id, required),
10520 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10521 (2, outpoint, required),
10522 (3, blinded_failure, option),
10523 (4, htlc_id, required),
10524 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
10525 (7, user_channel_id, option),
10526 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
10527 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10528 (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10531 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
10532 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10533 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
10534 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10535 (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None)
10537 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
10539 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10540 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
10541 (1, self.total_msat, required),
10542 (2, self.value, required),
10543 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
10544 (4, payment_data, option),
10545 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
10546 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
10547 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10548 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10554 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
10555 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10556 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10557 (0, prev_hop, required),
10558 (1, total_msat, option),
10559 (2, value_ser, required),
10560 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
10561 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
10562 (5, total_value_received, option),
10563 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
10564 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10565 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10567 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
10568 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
10569 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
10571 if payment_data.is_some() {
10572 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10574 if total_msat.is_none() {
10575 total_msat = Some(value);
10577 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
10580 if total_msat.is_none() {
10581 if payment_data.is_none() {
10582 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10584 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
10586 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
10590 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
10593 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
10594 total_value_received,
10595 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
10597 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
10598 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
10603 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
10604 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10605 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10608 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
10609 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
10610 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
10611 let mut payment_id = None;
10612 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
10613 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
10614 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10615 (0, session_priv, required),
10616 (1, payment_id, option),
10617 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10618 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
10619 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
10620 (6, blinded_tail, option),
10622 if payment_id.is_none() {
10623 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
10625 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
10627 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
10628 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
10629 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10631 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
10632 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
10633 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
10634 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10638 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10639 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
10640 first_hop_htlc_msat,
10642 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
10645 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
10646 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10651 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10652 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10654 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10655 0u8.write(writer)?;
10656 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10657 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10658 (0, session_priv, required),
10659 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10660 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10661 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10662 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10663 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10664 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10667 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10668 1u8.write(writer)?;
10669 field.write(writer)?;
10676 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
10677 (0, forward_info, required),
10678 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
10679 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
10680 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
10681 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
10682 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
10683 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10684 (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10687 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10688 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10689 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
10691 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
10695 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
10696 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10697 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10698 (0, htlc_id, required),
10699 (2, err_packet, required),
10702 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
10703 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
10704 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
10705 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
10706 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10707 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
10708 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10709 (0, htlc_id, required),
10710 (1, failure_code, required),
10711 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
10712 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
10720 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10721 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10722 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
10724 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
10726 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
10727 (0, htlc_id, required),
10728 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
10729 (2, err_packet, required),
10730 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
10732 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
10733 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
10734 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10736 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
10740 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10741 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
10745 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10750 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
10751 (0, payment_secret, required),
10752 (2, expiry_time, required),
10753 (4, user_payment_id, required),
10754 (6, payment_preimage, required),
10755 (8, min_value_msat, required),
10758 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10760 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10761 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10762 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10763 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10764 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10765 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10769 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10770 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
10772 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10774 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
10776 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
10777 best_block.height.write(writer)?;
10778 best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
10781 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10783 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
10785 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
10786 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10787 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10788 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10789 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10790 serializable_peer_count += 1;
10793 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
10794 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
10798 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
10800 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10801 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10802 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10803 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
10804 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
10805 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
10808 channel.write(writer)?;
10814 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10815 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10816 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
10817 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
10818 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10819 for forward in pending_forwards {
10820 forward.write(writer)?;
10825 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = None;
10826 let decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10827 if !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() {
10828 decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = Some(decode_update_add_htlcs);
10831 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10832 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
10833 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10835 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
10836 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
10837 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10838 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
10839 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
10840 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10841 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
10842 htlc.write(writer)?;
10844 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
10845 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
10848 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
10849 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
10850 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10851 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
10852 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
10853 // per_peer_state lock at all.
10854 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
10857 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
10858 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10859 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
10860 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
10861 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
10863 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10864 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
10865 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
10866 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
10867 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
10868 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
10869 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
10874 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
10875 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
10876 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
10877 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
10878 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
10879 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
10880 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
10881 // well save the space and not write any events here.
10882 0u64.write(writer)?;
10884 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10885 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
10886 event.write(writer)?;
10890 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
10891 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
10892 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
10893 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
10894 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
10895 0u64.write(writer)?;
10897 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
10898 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
10899 // likely to be identical.
10900 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10901 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10903 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10904 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
10905 hash.write(writer)?;
10906 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
10909 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
10910 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
10911 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10912 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
10913 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
10916 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
10917 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10919 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10920 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10921 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10922 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10925 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10926 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10927 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10928 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10932 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10933 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
10934 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10936 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10937 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10938 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10944 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10945 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10946 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10947 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10950 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10951 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10952 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10953 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10954 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10957 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10958 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10959 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10960 if !updates.is_empty() {
10961 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
10962 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10967 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10968 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10969 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10970 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10971 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10972 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10973 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10974 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10975 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10976 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10977 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10978 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10979 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10980 (14, decode_update_add_htlcs_opt, option),
10987 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10988 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10989 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10990 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10993 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10994 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10995 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10996 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10997 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10998 // check that the event is sane here.
10999 let event_encoded = event.encode();
11000 let event_read: Option<Event> =
11001 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
11002 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
11008 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
11009 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11010 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11011 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
11012 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
11013 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
11016 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
11017 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
11018 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
11019 events.push_back((ev, action));
11020 } else if action.is_some() {
11021 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11028 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
11029 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
11030 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
11031 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
11032 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
11033 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
11036 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
11038 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
11040 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11041 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
11042 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
11043 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
11044 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
11045 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
11046 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
11047 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
11048 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11049 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
11050 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
11051 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
11052 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
11054 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
11055 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
11057 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
11058 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
11060 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
11061 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
11062 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
11063 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
11064 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
11065 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
11067 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
11068 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11070 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11071 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11072 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11073 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11074 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11075 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11079 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
11080 pub entropy_source: ES,
11082 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
11083 pub node_signer: NS,
11085 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
11086 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
11088 pub signer_provider: SP,
11090 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11092 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
11093 pub fee_estimator: F,
11094 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11096 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
11097 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
11098 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
11099 pub chain_monitor: M,
11101 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
11102 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
11103 /// force-closed during deserialization.
11104 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
11105 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
11106 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
11108 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
11110 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
11111 /// deserialization.
11113 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
11114 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
11115 pub default_config: UserConfig,
11117 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
11118 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
11120 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
11121 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
11122 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
11123 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
11125 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
11128 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
11129 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
11132 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11133 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
11135 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11136 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11137 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11138 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11139 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11140 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11144 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
11145 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
11146 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
11147 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
11148 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
11150 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
11151 channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
11152 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
11158 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
11159 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
11160 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11161 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
11163 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11164 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11165 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11166 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11167 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11168 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11172 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11173 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
11174 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
11178 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11179 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
11181 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11182 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11183 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11184 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11185 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11186 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11190 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11191 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
11193 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11194 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11195 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11197 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
11199 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11200 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11201 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11202 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11203 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11204 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
11205 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
11206 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
11207 for _ in 0..channel_count {
11208 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
11209 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
11211 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context, None);
11212 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11213 funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
11214 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
11215 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
11216 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
11217 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
11218 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
11219 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11220 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
11221 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
11222 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
11223 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11224 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
11225 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
11227 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
11228 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
11229 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
11231 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
11232 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
11233 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11235 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
11236 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
11237 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11239 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
11240 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
11241 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11243 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
11244 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11245 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
11248 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
11249 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11250 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11251 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11252 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
11253 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11254 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11255 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11257 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
11258 let mut found_htlc = false;
11259 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11260 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
11263 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
11264 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
11265 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
11266 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
11267 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
11268 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
11269 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
11270 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context, Some(*payment_hash));
11272 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
11273 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
11274 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11278 channel.on_startup_drop_completed_blocked_mon_updates_through(&logger, monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11279 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {} with {} blocked updates",
11280 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
11281 monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.blocked_monitor_updates_pending());
11282 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
11283 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11285 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
11286 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
11288 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
11289 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11290 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
11291 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11293 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11294 let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
11295 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11296 entry.insert(by_id_map);
11300 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
11301 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
11302 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
11303 // safely discard the channel.
11304 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
11305 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11306 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11307 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11308 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
11309 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11310 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11311 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11314 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
11315 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11316 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11317 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11318 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11319 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11323 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11324 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
11325 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor, None);
11326 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
11327 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
11329 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
11330 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
11331 counterparty_node_id: None,
11332 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
11333 channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
11335 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
11339 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
11340 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11341 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11342 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
11343 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
11344 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11345 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
11346 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
11347 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
11349 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
11352 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11353 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11354 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
11355 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11356 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11357 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
11358 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
11359 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
11361 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
11364 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
11367 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
11368 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
11369 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
11370 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11371 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
11372 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11373 is_connected: false,
11377 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11378 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
11379 for _ in 0..peer_count {
11380 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
11381 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
11382 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
11383 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
11384 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
11387 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11388 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
11389 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
11390 for _ in 0..event_count {
11391 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
11392 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
11397 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11398 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
11399 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
11401 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
11402 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
11403 // on-startup monitor updates.
11404 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
11405 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
11407 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
11411 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
11412 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11414 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11415 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
11416 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
11417 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
11418 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11422 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11423 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
11424 hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
11425 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
11426 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
11427 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
11428 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
11430 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
11431 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11435 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
11436 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
11437 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
11438 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
11439 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
11440 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11441 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11442 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
11443 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
11444 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
11445 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
11446 let mut events_override = None;
11447 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11448 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs: Option<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>> = None;
11449 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
11450 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
11451 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11452 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
11453 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11454 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
11455 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11456 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
11457 (8, events_override, option),
11458 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
11459 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11460 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
11461 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11462 (14, decode_update_add_htlcs, option),
11464 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = decode_update_add_htlcs.unwrap_or_else(|| new_hash_map());
11465 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
11466 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11469 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
11470 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11473 if let Some(events) = events_override {
11474 pending_events_read = events;
11477 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
11478 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
11481 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
11482 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
11483 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
11484 let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
11485 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
11486 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
11488 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
11490 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
11491 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
11492 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
11495 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
11496 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
11497 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
11498 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
11499 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
11501 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
11502 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
11503 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
11505 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
11506 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
11507 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
11508 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
11509 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
11511 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
11512 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11513 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
11514 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
11515 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
11516 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
11517 pending_background_events.push(
11518 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11519 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11520 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
11521 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11522 update: update.clone(),
11525 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
11526 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
11527 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
11528 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
11529 pending_background_events.push(
11530 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
11531 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11532 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11535 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
11536 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
11537 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11539 max_in_flight_update_id
11543 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11544 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
11545 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11546 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
11547 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11548 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context, None);
11550 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
11552 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11553 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
11554 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
11555 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
11556 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
11557 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
11558 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
11559 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
11560 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
11563 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
11564 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return DangerousValue:
11565 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11566 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
11567 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
11568 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
11569 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11570 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11571 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11572 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11573 return Err(DecodeError::DangerousValue);
11576 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11577 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11578 debug_assert!(false);
11579 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11584 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
11585 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
11586 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
11587 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id, None);
11588 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
11589 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
11590 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
11591 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
11592 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
11593 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
11595 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11596 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
11597 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
11599 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11600 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
11601 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
11602 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11603 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11604 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11605 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11606 log_error!(logger, " Pending in-flight updates are: {:?}", chan_in_flight_updates);
11607 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11612 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
11613 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
11615 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
11616 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
11617 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
11618 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
11621 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
11622 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
11623 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
11624 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
11625 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
11626 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
11627 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
11629 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11630 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
11631 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
11632 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
11633 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor, Some(htlc.payment_hash));
11634 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
11635 if path.hops.is_empty() {
11636 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
11637 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11640 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
11641 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
11642 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
11643 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
11644 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11645 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
11646 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
11647 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
11649 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11650 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
11651 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
11652 retry_strategy: None,
11653 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
11654 payment_params: None,
11655 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
11656 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
11657 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11658 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11659 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11660 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11661 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11662 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11663 total_msat: path_amt,
11664 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11665 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11667 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11668 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
11673 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11674 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor, Some(htlc.payment_hash));
11675 match htlc_source {
11676 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
11677 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
11678 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
11679 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
11681 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
11682 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
11683 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
11684 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
11685 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
11686 decode_update_add_htlcs.retain(|scid, update_add_htlcs| {
11687 update_add_htlcs.retain(|update_add_htlc| {
11688 let matches = *scid == prev_hop_data.short_channel_id &&
11689 update_add_htlc.htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id;
11691 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-decode HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11692 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11696 !update_add_htlcs.is_empty()
11698 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
11699 forwards.retain(|forward| {
11700 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
11701 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11702 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11703 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11708 !forwards.is_empty()
11710 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
11711 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11712 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11713 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11714 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
11715 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
11716 intercepted_id != ev_id
11723 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
11724 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
11725 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
11726 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
11727 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
11728 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
11729 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
11730 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
11731 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
11732 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
11733 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
11735 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
11736 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
11737 channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
11738 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
11740 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
11741 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
11742 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
11749 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
11750 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
11752 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
11754 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
11755 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
11756 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
11757 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
11758 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
11759 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
11760 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
11761 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
11762 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11763 monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
11766 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
11767 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
11768 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
11769 // channel still live case here.
11773 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
11774 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
11779 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
11780 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
11781 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
11782 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
11783 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
11784 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
11785 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
11786 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
11790 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
11791 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
11793 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
11794 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
11795 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11796 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11798 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
11799 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11800 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11802 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
11803 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
11805 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11806 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
11808 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11811 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
11812 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11813 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11815 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11819 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
11820 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
11821 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
11822 if htlcs.is_empty() {
11823 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11825 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
11826 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
11827 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
11828 events::PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment {
11829 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
11830 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
11831 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
11832 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
11834 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
11835 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11839 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
11841 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11843 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
11844 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
11846 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11847 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11852 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11853 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11855 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
11857 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11859 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
11860 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
11861 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
11862 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11866 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
11867 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11868 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11869 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11870 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
11871 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11872 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context, None);
11873 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
11874 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
11876 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
11877 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
11878 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
11880 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
11881 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
11882 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11883 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11884 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11885 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11887 if chan.context.is_usable() {
11888 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
11889 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11890 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11891 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11892 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11896 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11897 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11898 debug_assert!(false);
11899 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11904 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
11906 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11907 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
11908 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
11909 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
11910 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
11911 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
11912 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
11913 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
11914 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
11915 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
11916 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
11918 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
11919 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
11921 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
11922 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
11923 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
11924 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
11926 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
11927 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
11928 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
11929 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
11931 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
11932 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
11933 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
11934 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
11936 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
11937 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11938 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
11939 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11940 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11941 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
11942 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context, Some(payment_hash));
11943 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
11946 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11947 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
11950 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11953 purpose: payment.purpose,
11954 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11955 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11956 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11957 onion_fields: payment.onion_fields,
11963 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11964 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11965 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11966 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id), None);
11967 for action in actions.iter() {
11968 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11969 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11970 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
11972 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
11974 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11975 blocked_channel_id);
11976 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11977 .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
11978 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11980 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11981 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11982 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11983 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11987 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11988 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11992 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11994 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None, None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11995 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11999 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
12001 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
12002 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
12003 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
12004 router: args.router,
12006 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
12008 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
12009 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
12010 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
12011 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
12013 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
12014 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(decode_update_add_htlcs),
12015 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
12016 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
12017 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
12018 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
12019 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
12021 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
12023 our_network_pubkey,
12026 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
12028 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
12030 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
12031 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
12032 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
12033 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
12034 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
12036 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
12037 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
12039 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
12041 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
12043 pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
12045 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
12046 node_signer: args.node_signer,
12047 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
12049 logger: args.logger,
12050 default_configuration: args.default_config,
12053 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
12054 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
12055 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
12056 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
12057 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
12060 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
12061 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
12062 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
12063 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
12064 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
12065 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding,
12066 downstream_channel_id, None
12070 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
12071 //connection or two.
12073 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
12079 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12080 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12081 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
12082 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
12083 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
12084 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
12085 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
12086 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12087 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
12088 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
12089 use crate::prelude::*;
12090 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
12091 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
12092 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
12093 use crate::util::test_utils;
12094 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
12095 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
12098 fn test_notify_limits() {
12099 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
12100 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
12101 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12102 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12103 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12104 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12106 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
12107 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
12108 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12109 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12110 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12112 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12114 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
12115 // to connect messages with new values
12116 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12117 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12118 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12119 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12120 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12121 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12123 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
12124 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12125 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12126 // ... but the last node should not.
12127 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12128 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
12129 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12130 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12132 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
12133 // about the channel.
12134 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12135 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12136 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12138 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
12140 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12141 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12142 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12143 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12144 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12145 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12147 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
12148 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12149 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12151 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
12152 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
12153 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
12154 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
12155 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
12156 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
12158 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
12159 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
12160 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12161 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12162 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12163 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12164 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12165 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12167 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
12168 // the channel info has updated.
12169 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12170 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12171 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12172 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12173 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12174 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12178 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
12179 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
12181 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12182 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12183 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12184 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12185 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12187 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
12188 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
12189 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
12190 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
12192 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12193 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
12194 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
12195 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
12196 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
12197 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
12198 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
12199 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
12200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12201 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12202 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12203 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
12205 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
12206 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12207 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12208 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12209 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12210 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12211 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12212 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12213 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12214 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12215 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12216 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12217 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
12218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12219 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12220 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12221 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12222 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12223 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12224 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12225 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12226 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12227 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
12229 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
12230 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
12231 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
12232 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12233 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12234 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12235 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
12237 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
12238 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
12239 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
12240 // lightning messages manually.
12241 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12242 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
12243 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
12245 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12246 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12247 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
12248 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
12249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12250 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12251 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
12252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12253 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12254 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
12255 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12256 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12257 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12258 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12260 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12261 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
12262 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12263 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12264 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
12265 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12266 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12268 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12269 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
12270 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12272 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
12273 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
12274 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12275 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
12277 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12278 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12279 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12280 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12282 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12285 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12286 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12287 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12288 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12290 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12295 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
12296 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
12297 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
12300 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
12301 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
12302 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
12303 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
12304 // fails as expected.
12305 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
12306 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
12307 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
12308 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
12309 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
12310 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
12311 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12312 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12313 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12314 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
12315 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12316 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12317 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12318 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12319 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12321 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
12322 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
12323 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
12325 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12326 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12327 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
12328 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
12329 let route = find_route(
12330 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12331 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12333 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12334 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12335 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12336 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12337 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12338 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12339 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12340 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12341 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12342 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12343 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
12344 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
12345 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12346 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12347 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12348 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12349 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12350 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12351 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12352 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12353 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12354 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12355 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12356 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12358 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12359 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12361 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12362 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12363 let route = find_route(
12364 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12365 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12367 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12368 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12369 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12370 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12371 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12372 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12373 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12374 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12376 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
12377 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12378 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12379 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
12380 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12381 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12382 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12383 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12384 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12385 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12386 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12387 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12388 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12389 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12390 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12391 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12392 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12393 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12394 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12395 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12396 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12397 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12398 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12399 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12401 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
12402 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12404 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12405 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
12406 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12407 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
12408 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12409 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12410 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12411 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12412 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12413 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12415 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12416 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12417 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
12420 let route = find_route(
12421 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12422 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12424 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
12425 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12426 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
12427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12428 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12429 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12430 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12431 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12432 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12433 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12434 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12435 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12436 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12437 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12438 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12439 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12440 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12441 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12442 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12443 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12444 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12445 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12446 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12448 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12449 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12453 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
12454 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
12455 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
12456 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12457 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12458 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12459 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12461 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12462 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12464 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12465 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12466 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12467 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12468 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12469 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12470 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12471 let route = find_route(
12472 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12473 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12476 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12477 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
12478 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
12479 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12480 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
12481 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12484 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12485 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12486 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12487 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12488 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12489 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12490 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12492 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
12496 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
12497 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
12498 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
12499 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12500 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
12501 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12502 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12503 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12504 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12506 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12507 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12509 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12510 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12511 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12512 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12513 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12514 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12515 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12516 let route = find_route(
12517 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12518 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12521 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12522 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12523 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
12524 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
12525 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12526 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
12527 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
12528 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12531 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12532 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12533 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12534 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12535 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12536 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12537 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12539 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
12543 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
12544 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
12545 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
12546 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
12547 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12549 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12550 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12551 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12552 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12554 // Marshall an MPP route.
12555 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
12556 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
12557 route.paths.push(path);
12558 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12559 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
12560 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
12561 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
12562 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
12563 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
12565 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12566 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
12568 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
12569 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
12571 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
12576 fn test_channel_update_cached() {
12577 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12578 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12579 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12580 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12582 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12584 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, true).unwrap();
12585 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12586 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12588 // Confirm that the channel_update was not sent immediately to node[1] but was cached.
12589 let node_1_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12590 assert_eq!(node_1_events.len(), 0);
12593 // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been added to node[0] pending broadcast messages
12594 let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12595 assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 1);
12598 // Test that we do not retrieve the pending broadcast messages when we are not connected to any peer
12599 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12600 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12602 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
12603 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12605 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12606 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 0);
12608 // Now we reconnect to a peer
12609 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12610 features: nodes[2].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12612 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12613 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12614 }, false).unwrap();
12616 // Confirm that get_and_clear_pending_msg_events correctly captures pending broadcast messages
12617 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12618 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 1);
12619 match &node_0_events[0] {
12620 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => (),
12621 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12624 // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been cleared from nodes[0] pending broadcast messages
12625 let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12626 assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 0);
12631 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
12632 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12633 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12634 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12635 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12637 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12639 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12640 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12642 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12643 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
12644 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12645 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12648 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
12649 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
12650 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
12651 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
12652 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
12653 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
12656 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
12659 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
12660 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
12665 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
12666 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
12667 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12668 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12669 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12670 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12672 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
12673 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12675 total_msat: 100_000,
12678 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
12679 // payment verification fails as expected.
12680 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
12681 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
12682 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
12683 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
12685 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
12689 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
12690 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
12694 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
12695 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
12696 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
12697 // the channel is successfully closed.
12698 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12699 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12700 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12701 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12703 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12704 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12705 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
12706 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12707 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12709 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
12710 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
12712 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
12713 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
12714 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12715 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12718 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12720 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
12721 // as it has the funding transaction.
12722 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12723 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12724 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12727 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12729 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12731 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12733 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12734 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12735 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12737 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12740 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
12741 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
12742 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12743 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12744 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12746 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12747 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12748 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12749 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12750 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12751 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
12752 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
12753 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
12755 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12756 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
12757 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12758 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
12760 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12761 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
12763 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
12764 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
12765 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
12766 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
12767 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12768 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12769 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12773 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
12774 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
12775 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
12776 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
12777 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12778 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12779 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12782 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
12784 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
12785 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
12786 // closing transaction).
12787 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
12788 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
12789 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12791 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
12792 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
12793 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12794 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12795 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12798 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12800 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
12802 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
12803 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
12804 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12806 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12808 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12809 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12812 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12813 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
12814 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12817 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12818 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
12819 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12822 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
12823 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
12824 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12827 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12828 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
12829 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12832 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12834 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
12835 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12837 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
12838 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12840 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
12841 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
12846 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
12847 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
12848 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
12849 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
12850 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12851 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12852 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12853 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12856 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12857 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
12858 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
12860 // Test the API functions.
12861 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
12863 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
12865 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12867 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12869 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12871 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
12873 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
12877 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
12878 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
12879 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
12880 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
12881 // the given `channel_id`.
12882 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12883 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12884 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12885 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12887 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12890 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12892 // Test the API functions.
12893 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
12895 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12897 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12899 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12901 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12903 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12907 fn test_connection_limiting() {
12908 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
12909 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12910 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12911 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12912 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12914 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12916 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12917 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12919 let mut funding_tx = None;
12920 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12921 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12922 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12925 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12926 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
12927 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
12928 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
12929 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12931 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12932 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12933 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12935 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12937 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12938 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12939 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12941 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12944 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
12945 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
12946 &nodes[0].keys_manager);
12947 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12948 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12949 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12951 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
12952 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
12954 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
12955 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
12956 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12957 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12958 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
12959 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12960 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12963 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12964 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12965 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12966 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12967 }, true).unwrap_err();
12969 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
12970 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
12971 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12972 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12973 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
12974 for ev in chan_closed_events {
12975 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
12977 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12978 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12980 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12981 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12982 }, true).unwrap_err();
12984 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
12985 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12986 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12987 }, false).unwrap();
12988 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12990 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
12991 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
12993 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
12994 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12995 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
12996 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
12997 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12999 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13000 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13001 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13003 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
13004 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13005 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
13007 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
13008 // "protected" and can connect again.
13009 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
13010 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13011 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13013 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13015 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
13017 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13018 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13022 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
13023 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
13024 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13025 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13026 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
13027 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13029 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13031 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13032 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13034 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
13035 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13036 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13037 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13040 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
13042 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13043 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13044 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13046 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
13047 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13048 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13050 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
13051 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13052 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13053 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13057 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
13058 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13059 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13060 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13061 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13062 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
13063 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13064 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
13065 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13067 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13069 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13070 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13072 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
13073 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
13074 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13075 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13076 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13077 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13080 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13081 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13083 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13084 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13086 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13088 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
13089 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13092 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
13093 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13094 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13095 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13096 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13098 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13099 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13101 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13102 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
13103 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
13104 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
13108 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13110 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13111 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13113 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
13114 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13115 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13117 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13118 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13120 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13122 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13126 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
13127 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13128 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13129 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13130 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13131 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
13132 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
13133 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13134 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13135 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13136 payment_metadata: None,
13137 keysend_preimage: None,
13138 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13139 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13141 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13143 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
13144 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
13145 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13146 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
13147 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13148 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13149 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
13151 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
13152 } else { panic!(); }
13154 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
13155 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
13156 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13157 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13158 payment_metadata: None,
13159 keysend_preimage: None,
13160 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13161 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13163 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13165 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13166 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13167 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13168 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
13172 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
13173 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13174 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13175 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13176 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13178 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13179 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13180 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13181 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
13182 payment_metadata: None,
13183 keysend_preimage: None,
13184 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13185 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
13187 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13188 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
13189 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
13191 // Should not return an error as this condition:
13192 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
13193 // is not satisfied.
13194 assert!(result.is_ok());
13198 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
13199 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13200 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13201 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
13202 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13204 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
13205 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13207 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
13208 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
13209 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
13210 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
13211 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13213 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13214 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13216 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13217 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13218 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13219 match &msg_events[0] {
13220 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
13221 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13223 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
13224 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
13225 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
13228 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13231 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13232 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13234 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
13235 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
13236 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13238 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13242 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
13243 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
13244 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
13245 // the channel without the anchors feature.
13246 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13247 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13248 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
13249 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13250 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13251 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
13252 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13254 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
13255 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13256 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13258 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13259 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13261 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13262 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13264 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13267 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13268 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
13270 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13271 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13273 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
13274 // not have generated any events.
13275 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13279 fn test_update_channel_config() {
13280 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13281 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13282 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13283 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13284 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13285 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13286 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
13288 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13289 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13290 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13292 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
13293 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13294 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
13295 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13296 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13298 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13299 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13302 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
13303 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13304 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13306 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
13307 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13308 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
13309 ..Default::default()
13311 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13312 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13313 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13315 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13316 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13319 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
13320 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13321 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13322 ..Default::default()
13324 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13325 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
13326 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13327 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13329 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13330 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13333 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
13334 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
13335 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
13336 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
13337 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
13340 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13341 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13342 ..Default::default()
13344 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
13347 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
13348 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
13349 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13350 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13354 fn test_payment_display() {
13355 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
13356 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13357 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
13358 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13359 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
13360 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13364 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
13365 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13366 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13367 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13368 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13369 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13371 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
13372 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13373 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13374 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13375 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13376 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
13377 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
13378 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13380 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13381 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13382 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13385 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
13386 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
13388 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13389 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13391 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13392 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13393 }, false).unwrap();
13394 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
13395 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
13396 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
13398 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
13400 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
13401 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
13402 // close even if it was an lnd node.
13403 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13404 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13405 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
13406 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13407 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
13408 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
13409 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
13410 } else { panic!() };
13411 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
13412 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
13413 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
13414 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
13416 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13418 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13419 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13420 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13425 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
13426 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
13427 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13428 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13431 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13432 let deserialized_chanmgr;
13433 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
13435 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13436 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
13438 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13439 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
13442 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13443 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
13444 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13446 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13450 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13451 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
13452 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13454 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13459 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
13460 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
13461 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
13462 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
13464 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13465 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
13466 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
13468 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
13470 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13471 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
13472 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
13473 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
13475 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
13476 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
13478 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
13484 use crate::chain::Listen;
13485 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
13486 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
13487 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
13488 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
13489 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
13490 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
13491 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
13492 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
13493 use crate::util::test_utils;
13494 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
13496 use bitcoin::amount::Amount;
13497 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
13498 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
13499 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
13500 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
13501 use bitcoin::transaction::Version;
13503 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
13505 use criterion::Criterion;
13507 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
13508 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
13509 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
13510 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
13511 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
13512 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
13513 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
13515 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
13516 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
13518 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
13519 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
13521 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
13523 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
13526 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
13527 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
13530 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
13531 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
13532 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
13534 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
13535 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
13537 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
13538 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
13539 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13540 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
13541 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
13543 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
13544 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
13545 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
13547 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
13548 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
13549 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
13550 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13552 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13553 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13554 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
13556 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13557 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
13558 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
13559 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
13560 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13562 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13563 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13564 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
13566 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13567 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13569 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13570 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13571 }, false).unwrap();
13572 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13573 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13574 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13577 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
13578 tx = Transaction { version: Version::TWO, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
13579 value: Amount::from_sat(8_000_000), script_pubkey: output_script,
13581 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
13582 } else { panic!(); }
13584 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13585 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13586 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13587 match events_b[0] {
13588 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13589 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13591 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13594 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13595 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13596 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13597 match events_a[0] {
13598 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13599 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13601 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13604 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
13606 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
13607 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
13608 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
13610 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13611 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13612 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13613 match msg_events[0] {
13614 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
13615 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
13616 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13620 match msg_events[1] {
13621 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13625 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13626 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13627 match events_a[0] {
13628 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13629 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13631 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13634 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13635 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13636 match events_b[0] {
13637 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13638 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13640 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13643 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
13644 macro_rules! send_payment {
13645 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
13646 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
13647 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
13648 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
13649 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
13650 payment_count += 1;
13651 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
13652 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
13654 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
13655 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
13656 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
13657 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
13658 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
13659 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
13660 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
13661 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
13662 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13663 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13664 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13666 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
13667 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
13668 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
13669 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
13671 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
13672 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
13673 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
13674 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
13675 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
13677 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
13680 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
13681 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13682 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13683 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13685 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
13689 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
13690 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
13691 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);