1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
98 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
99 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
103 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
107 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
108 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
109 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
110 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
111 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
112 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
113 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
116 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
117 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
118 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
119 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
122 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
125 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
126 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
129 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
131 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
133 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
134 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
135 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
137 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
139 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
143 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
147 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
148 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
149 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
150 short_channel_id: u64,
152 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
154 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
155 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
160 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
161 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
162 /// are part of the same payment.
163 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
164 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
165 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
168 struct ClaimableHTLC {
169 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
172 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
175 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
176 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
177 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
178 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
180 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
181 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
186 impl Readable for PaymentId {
187 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
188 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
192 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
193 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
194 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
195 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
196 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
199 session_priv: SecretKey,
200 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
201 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
202 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
203 payment_id: PaymentId,
204 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
205 payee: Option<Payee>,
208 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
209 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
210 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
212 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
214 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
216 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payee } => {
219 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
220 payment_id.hash(hasher);
221 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
222 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
230 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
231 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
233 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
234 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
235 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
236 payment_secret: None,
242 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
243 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
245 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
253 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
254 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
256 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
261 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
263 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
264 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
265 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
266 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
267 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
269 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
270 err: msgs::LightningError,
271 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
272 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
274 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
276 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
278 err: LightningError {
280 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
281 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
288 shutdown_finish: None,
292 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
294 err: LightningError {
296 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
299 shutdown_finish: None,
303 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
304 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
307 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
309 err: LightningError {
311 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
312 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
318 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
319 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
323 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
326 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
328 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
330 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
332 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
334 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
336 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
337 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
343 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
345 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
346 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
354 shutdown_finish: None,
359 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
360 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
361 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
362 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
363 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
365 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
366 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
367 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
368 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
369 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
370 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
371 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
373 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
377 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
378 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
379 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
380 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
381 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
382 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
383 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
384 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
385 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
386 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
387 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
388 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
390 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
391 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
392 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
393 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
396 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
397 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
398 /// quite some time lag.
399 enum BackgroundEvent {
400 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
401 /// commitment transaction.
402 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
405 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
406 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
408 latest_features: InitFeatures,
411 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
412 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
414 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
417 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
418 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
419 struct PendingInboundPayment {
420 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
421 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
422 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
423 /// this payment being removed.
425 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
426 user_payment_id: u64,
427 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
428 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
429 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
432 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
433 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
434 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
436 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
439 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
440 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
441 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
442 pending_amt_msat: u64,
443 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
444 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
445 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
447 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
448 starting_block_height: u32,
450 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
451 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
452 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
454 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
455 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
457 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
458 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
459 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
460 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
461 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
463 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
465 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
466 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
470 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
471 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
473 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
477 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
479 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
483 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
485 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
489 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
491 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
496 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
498 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
499 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
500 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
501 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
505 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
506 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
507 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
508 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
509 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
510 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
511 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
514 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
515 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
518 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
519 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
520 let our_payment_hash;
521 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
522 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
523 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
525 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
526 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
527 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
531 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
535 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
536 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
537 let remove_res = match self {
538 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
539 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
540 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
541 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
542 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
546 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
547 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
548 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
549 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
550 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
551 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
558 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
559 let insert_res = match self {
560 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
561 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
562 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
564 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
565 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
568 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
569 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
570 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
571 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
572 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
579 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
581 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
582 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
583 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
584 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
591 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
592 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
593 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
594 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
595 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
596 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
597 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
598 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
600 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
601 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
602 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
603 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
604 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
605 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
606 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
607 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
608 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
610 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
611 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
613 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
614 /// to individual Channels.
616 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
617 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
618 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
619 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
621 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
622 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
623 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
624 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
625 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
626 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
627 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
629 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
630 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
631 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
632 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
635 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
636 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
637 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
638 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
639 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
641 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
642 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
643 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
644 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
645 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
646 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
647 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
648 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
649 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
650 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
653 default_configuration: UserConfig,
654 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
660 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
662 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
663 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
665 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
666 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
667 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
668 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
670 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
671 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
672 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
673 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
674 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
675 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
677 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
678 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
679 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
680 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
681 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
682 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
683 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
684 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
686 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
688 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
689 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
691 our_network_key: SecretKey,
692 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
694 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
695 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
696 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
698 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
699 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
700 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
701 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
703 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
704 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
705 /// are currently open with that peer.
706 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
707 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
710 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
711 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
713 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
714 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
715 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
716 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
717 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
718 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
719 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
720 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
721 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
723 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
730 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
732 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
733 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
734 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
735 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
736 pub struct ChainParameters {
737 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
738 pub network: Network,
740 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
742 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
743 pub best_block: BestBlock,
746 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
752 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
753 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
754 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
755 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
756 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
757 /// updates are ready for persistence).
759 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
760 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
761 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
762 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
763 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
765 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
766 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
769 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
770 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
771 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
774 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
775 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
777 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
778 persistence_notifier: notifier,
779 should_persist: persist_check,
780 _read_guard: read_guard,
785 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
787 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
788 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
793 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
794 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
796 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
798 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
799 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
800 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
801 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
802 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
804 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
805 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
807 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
809 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
810 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
811 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
812 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
813 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
814 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
815 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
817 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
818 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
820 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
821 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
822 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
823 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
825 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
826 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
827 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
828 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
829 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
830 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
833 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
835 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
836 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
839 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
841 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
842 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
843 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
844 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
845 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
846 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
847 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
848 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
849 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
850 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
851 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
854 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
855 /// to better separate parameters.
856 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
857 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
858 /// The node_id of our counterparty
859 pub node_id: PublicKey,
860 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
861 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
862 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
863 pub features: InitFeatures,
864 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
865 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
866 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
868 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
870 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
871 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
872 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
873 /// payments to us through this channel.
874 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
877 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
878 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
879 pub struct ChannelDetails {
880 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
881 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
882 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
883 /// lifetime of the channel.
884 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
885 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
886 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
887 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
888 /// our counterparty already.
890 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
891 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
892 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
893 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
894 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
895 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
896 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
897 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
898 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
899 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
900 /// this value on chain.
902 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
904 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
906 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
907 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
908 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
909 pub user_channel_id: u64,
910 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
911 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
912 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
913 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
915 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
916 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
917 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
918 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
919 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
920 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
921 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
922 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
923 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
925 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
926 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
927 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
928 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
929 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
930 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
931 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
932 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
933 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
935 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
937 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
938 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
939 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
940 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
941 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
942 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
943 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
944 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
945 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
947 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
948 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
949 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
950 pub is_outbound: bool,
951 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
952 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
953 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
954 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
955 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
957 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
958 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
959 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
960 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
962 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
964 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
968 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
969 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
971 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
972 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
973 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
974 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
975 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
976 ParameterError(APIError),
977 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
978 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
979 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
982 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
984 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
985 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
986 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
987 /// paths than the ones selected).
988 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
989 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
990 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
991 /// in over-/re-payment.
993 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
994 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
995 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
997 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
998 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
999 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1000 /// with the latest update_id.
1002 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1003 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1004 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1005 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1006 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1007 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1008 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1009 payment_id: PaymentId,
1013 macro_rules! handle_error {
1014 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1017 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1018 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1020 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1021 // entering the macro.
1022 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1023 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1026 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1028 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1029 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1030 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1031 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1035 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1036 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1037 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1038 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1043 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1044 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1046 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1047 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1048 action: err.action.clone()
1052 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1053 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1056 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1063 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1064 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1065 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1067 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1068 //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
1070 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1072 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1073 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1075 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1076 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1077 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1078 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1080 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1081 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1082 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1084 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1085 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1086 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1087 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1089 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1090 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1091 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1097 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1098 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1102 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1104 $entry.remove_entry();
1112 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1113 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1117 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1119 $entry.remove_entry();
1127 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1128 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1130 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1131 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1132 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1139 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1140 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1141 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1143 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1145 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1146 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1147 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1148 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1150 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1151 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1152 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1153 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1154 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1155 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1156 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1157 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1158 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1159 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1160 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1163 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1164 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1165 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1166 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1167 match $action_type {
1168 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1169 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1171 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1172 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1174 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1175 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1176 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1177 if !$resend_commitment {
1178 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1181 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1183 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1184 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1188 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1189 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1191 $entry.remove_entry();
1195 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1196 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1200 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1201 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1202 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1204 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1205 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1209 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1210 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1211 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1212 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1213 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1216 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1221 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1222 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1223 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1224 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
1225 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1226 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1228 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1229 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1231 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1232 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1233 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1234 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1237 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1238 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1239 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1240 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1241 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1242 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1243 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1244 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1245 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1246 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1247 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1248 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1251 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1252 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1253 // before it should be allowed to.
1254 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1255 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1256 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1259 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1260 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1261 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1262 msg: announcement_sigs,
1265 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1268 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1269 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1270 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1271 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1272 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1273 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1274 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1275 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1276 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1277 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1278 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1279 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1280 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1281 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1282 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1283 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1284 let mut order = $order;
1286 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1288 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1292 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1293 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1294 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1295 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1300 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1301 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1302 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1303 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1304 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1309 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1313 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1318 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1319 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1320 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1325 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1326 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1327 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1328 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1329 assert!(res.is_ok());
1332 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1336 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1337 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1338 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1340 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1342 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1343 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1348 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1349 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1350 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1351 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1352 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1355 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1357 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1358 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1360 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1362 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1364 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1365 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1366 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1367 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1368 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1369 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1372 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1373 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1374 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1378 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1380 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1381 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1382 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1383 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1384 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1385 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1387 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1388 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1390 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1391 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1394 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1395 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1397 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1399 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1400 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1401 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1402 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1410 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1411 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1412 &self.default_configuration
1415 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1417 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1418 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1419 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1420 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1421 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1424 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1425 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1427 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1428 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1429 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1431 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1432 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1433 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1434 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1435 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1436 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1438 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1439 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1440 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1441 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1442 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1443 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1447 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1448 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1449 Some(peer_state) => {
1450 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1451 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1452 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1453 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features,
1454 channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())?
1456 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1459 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1461 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1462 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1463 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1465 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1466 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1467 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1468 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1469 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1470 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1472 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1475 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1477 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1478 node_id: their_network_key,
1481 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1484 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1485 let mut res = Vec::new();
1487 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1488 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1489 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1490 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1491 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1492 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1493 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1494 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1495 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1496 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1497 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1498 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1499 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1501 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1502 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1503 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1504 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1505 inbound_capacity_msat,
1506 outbound_capacity_msat,
1507 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1508 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1509 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1510 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1511 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1512 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1513 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1517 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1518 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1519 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1520 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1526 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1527 /// more information.
1528 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1529 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1532 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1533 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1535 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1536 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1538 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1539 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1540 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1541 // really wanted anyway.
1542 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1545 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1546 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1547 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1548 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1549 Some(transaction) => {
1550 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1554 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1555 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1556 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1557 reason: closure_reason
1561 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1562 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1564 let counterparty_node_id;
1565 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1566 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1567 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1568 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1569 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1570 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1571 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1572 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1573 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1574 Some(peer_state) => {
1575 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1576 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1577 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1579 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1581 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1583 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1584 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1585 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1586 let (result, is_permanent) =
1587 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1589 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1595 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1596 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1600 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1601 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1602 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1603 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1607 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1611 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1615 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1616 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1619 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1623 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1624 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1625 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1627 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1628 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1630 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1631 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1632 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1633 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1635 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1637 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1638 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1639 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1640 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1641 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1644 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1645 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1646 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1648 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1649 /// the channel being closed or not:
1650 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1651 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1652 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1653 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1654 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1655 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1656 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1658 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1660 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1661 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1662 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1663 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1664 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1668 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1669 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1670 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1671 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1672 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1674 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1675 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1676 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1677 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1678 // ignore the result here.
1679 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1683 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1684 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1685 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1687 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1688 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1689 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1690 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1691 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1692 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1695 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1696 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1698 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
1699 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1700 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1703 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1705 chan.remove_entry().1
1707 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1710 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1711 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1712 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1713 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1714 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1719 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1722 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1723 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1724 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1725 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1726 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
1727 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1728 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1729 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1730 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1731 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1732 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1742 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1743 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1744 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1745 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1746 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1750 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1751 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1752 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1754 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1755 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1756 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1757 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1758 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1759 failure_code: $err_code,
1760 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1765 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1766 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1769 let shared_secret = {
1770 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1771 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1774 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1776 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1777 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1778 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1779 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1780 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1781 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1782 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1783 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1786 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1787 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1788 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1789 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1790 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1793 let mut channel_state = None;
1794 macro_rules! return_err {
1795 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1797 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1798 if channel_state.is_none() {
1799 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1801 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1802 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1803 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1804 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1805 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1810 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1811 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1812 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
1813 match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1815 let error_code = match err {
1816 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1817 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1818 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1819 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1820 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1822 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1825 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1826 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1827 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1834 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1837 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1838 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1839 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1840 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1841 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1842 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1843 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1844 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1845 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1846 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1847 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1848 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1852 // final_expiry_too_soon
1853 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1854 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1855 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1856 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1857 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1858 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1859 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1861 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1862 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1863 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1865 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1866 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1867 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1870 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1871 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1872 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1873 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1874 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1875 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1876 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1877 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1879 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1881 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1882 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1883 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1884 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1885 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1886 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1887 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1888 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1889 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1892 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1894 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1897 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1902 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1903 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1904 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1905 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1907 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1909 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1910 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1911 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1912 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1915 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1916 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1917 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1919 // Check two things:
1920 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1921 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1922 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1924 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1926 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1927 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1928 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1930 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1932 let blinding_factor = {
1933 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1934 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1935 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1936 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1939 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1941 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1943 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1946 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1947 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1950 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1951 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1952 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1953 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1954 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1958 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1959 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1960 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1963 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1964 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1965 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1966 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1970 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1971 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1972 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1973 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1974 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1975 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1976 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1977 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1978 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1979 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1980 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1982 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1985 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1987 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1988 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1989 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1990 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1991 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1994 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1995 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1996 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1997 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1998 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1999 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2000 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2002 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2003 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2005 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2006 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2007 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2008 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2009 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2011 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2012 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2014 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2015 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2016 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2017 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2018 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2019 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2021 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2022 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2024 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2025 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2026 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2027 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2028 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2029 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2030 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2031 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2032 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2033 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2039 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2040 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2041 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2042 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2044 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2045 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2047 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2048 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2049 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2051 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2053 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
2058 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2061 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2062 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2063 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2065 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2066 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2067 if !chan.should_announce() {
2068 return Err(LightningError {
2069 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2070 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2073 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2074 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2077 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2078 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2079 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2080 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2081 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2082 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2083 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2084 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2085 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2089 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2091 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2092 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2094 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2095 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2096 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2097 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2098 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2099 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2100 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2101 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2104 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2105 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2107 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2113 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2114 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payee: &Option<Payee>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2115 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2116 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2117 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2118 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2120 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2121 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2122 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2123 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2124 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2126 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2128 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2130 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2131 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2133 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2134 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2135 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2136 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2137 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2138 err: "Payment already completed"
2143 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2144 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2145 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2148 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2150 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2151 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2152 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2153 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2154 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2155 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2156 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2157 total_msat: total_value,
2159 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2163 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2164 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2166 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2167 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2169 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2170 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2172 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2173 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2175 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2176 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2178 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2179 payee: payee.clone(),
2180 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2181 channel_state, chan)
2183 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2184 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2185 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2186 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2187 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2188 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2189 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2190 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2191 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2192 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2194 insert_outbound_payment!();
2196 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2197 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2198 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2199 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2200 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2201 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2202 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2203 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2209 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2211 } else { unreachable!(); }
2215 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2216 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2218 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2223 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2225 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2226 /// fields for more info.
2228 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2229 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2230 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2231 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2232 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2233 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2235 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2237 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2238 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2239 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2241 /// In general, a path may raise:
2242 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2243 /// node public key) is specified.
2244 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2245 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2247 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2248 /// relevant updates.
2250 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2251 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2252 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2254 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2255 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2256 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2257 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2259 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2260 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2261 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2262 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2263 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2266 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2267 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2268 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2270 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2271 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2272 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2273 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2274 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2276 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2277 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2279 let mut total_value = 0;
2280 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2281 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2282 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2283 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2284 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2285 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2286 continue 'path_check;
2288 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2289 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2290 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2291 continue 'path_check;
2294 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2295 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2297 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2298 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2300 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2301 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2302 total_value = amt_msat;
2305 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2306 let mut results = Vec::new();
2307 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2308 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payee, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2310 let mut has_ok = false;
2311 let mut has_err = false;
2312 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2313 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2314 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2315 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2316 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2317 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2318 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2322 } else if res.is_err() {
2323 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2324 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2327 if has_err && has_ok {
2328 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2331 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2332 if let Some(payee) = &route.payee {
2333 Some(RouteParameters {
2334 payee: payee.clone(),
2335 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2336 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2342 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2343 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2344 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2345 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2351 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2353 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2354 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2355 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2356 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2357 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2359 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2360 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2361 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2362 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2363 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2364 if path.len() == 0 {
2365 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2366 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2371 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2372 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2373 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2375 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2376 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2378 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2379 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2380 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2381 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2384 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2386 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2387 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2388 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2391 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2392 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError {
2393 err: "Payment already completed"
2396 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2397 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2398 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2403 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2404 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2408 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2411 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2413 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2414 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`].
2416 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2417 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2418 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2420 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2421 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2422 let _ = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned();
2426 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2427 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2428 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2429 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2430 /// never reach the recipient.
2432 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2434 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2435 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2437 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2439 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2440 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2441 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2443 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2445 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2446 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2447 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2452 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2453 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2454 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2455 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2457 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2459 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2461 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2462 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2463 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2464 } else { unreachable!(); })
2467 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2469 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2470 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2473 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2474 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2479 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2480 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2481 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2484 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2485 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2486 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2488 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2496 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2497 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2498 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2502 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2504 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2505 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2507 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2508 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2510 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2511 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2512 /// keys per-channel).
2514 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2515 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2516 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2518 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2519 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2520 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2522 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2523 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2524 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2525 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2527 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2528 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2529 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2530 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2534 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2535 let mut output_index = None;
2536 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2537 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2538 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2539 if output_index.is_some() {
2540 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2541 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2544 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2545 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2546 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2549 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2552 if output_index.is_none() {
2553 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2554 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2557 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2561 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2562 if !chan.should_announce() {
2563 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2567 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2569 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2571 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2572 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2574 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2575 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2576 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2577 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2578 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2583 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2584 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2585 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2587 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2590 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2591 // smaller than 500:
2592 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2594 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2595 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2596 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2597 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2598 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2599 /// our network addresses.
2601 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2602 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2604 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2605 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2606 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2607 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2609 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2611 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2612 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2613 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2615 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2616 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2619 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2620 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2621 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2623 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2624 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2625 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2626 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2627 rgb, alias, addresses,
2628 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2629 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2631 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2632 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2634 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2635 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2637 let mut announced_chans = false;
2638 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2639 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2640 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2642 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2647 announced_chans = true;
2649 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2650 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2651 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2655 if announced_chans {
2656 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2657 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2658 signature: node_announce_sig,
2659 contents: announcement
2665 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2667 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2668 /// Will likely generate further events.
2669 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2670 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2672 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2673 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2674 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2676 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2677 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2679 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2680 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2681 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2682 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2684 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2685 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2686 match forward_info {
2687 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2688 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2689 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2690 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2691 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2692 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2693 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2695 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2696 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2699 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2700 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2701 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2702 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2703 // problem, not ours.
2710 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2711 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2712 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2713 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2714 match forward_info {
2715 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2716 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2718 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2719 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2720 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2721 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2722 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2723 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2724 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2725 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2727 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
2729 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2730 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2732 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2734 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2735 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2736 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2742 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2744 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2745 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2746 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2747 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2748 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2749 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2750 // this channel currently :/.
2756 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2757 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2759 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2760 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2761 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2763 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2764 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2766 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2768 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2769 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2770 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2773 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2775 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2776 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2777 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2778 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2779 // messages when we can.
2780 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2781 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2782 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2789 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2790 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2793 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2794 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2795 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2796 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2797 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
2798 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2800 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2801 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2802 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2803 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2804 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2806 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
2807 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2809 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2811 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2815 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2816 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2819 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2820 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2821 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2822 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2823 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2824 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2825 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2826 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2827 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2829 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2837 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2838 match forward_info {
2839 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2840 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2841 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2842 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2843 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2844 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2845 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2846 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2848 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2851 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2852 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2853 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2854 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2855 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2856 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2858 value: amt_to_forward,
2863 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2865 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2866 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2867 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2869 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2870 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2871 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2872 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2873 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2875 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2880 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2881 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2882 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2883 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2884 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2885 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2886 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2887 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2888 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2889 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2890 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2891 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2892 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2894 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2895 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2896 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2897 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2898 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2900 amt: amt_to_forward,
2901 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2904 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2905 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2906 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2912 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2914 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2917 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2918 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2921 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2922 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2923 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2924 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2925 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2926 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2927 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2929 let mut total_value = 0;
2930 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2931 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2932 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2933 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2934 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2935 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2939 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2940 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2941 total_value += htlc.value;
2942 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2943 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2944 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2945 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2946 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2947 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2949 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2951 _ => unreachable!(),
2954 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2955 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2956 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2957 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2960 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2961 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2963 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2964 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2965 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2969 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2970 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2972 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2974 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2975 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2982 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2983 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2991 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2992 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2995 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2996 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2999 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3000 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3001 events.append(&mut new_events);
3004 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3006 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3007 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3009 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3010 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3011 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3012 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3013 if background_events.is_empty() {
3017 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3019 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3020 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3021 // monitor updating completing.
3022 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3029 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3030 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3031 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3032 self.process_background_events();
3035 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3036 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3037 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3038 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3039 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3040 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3041 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3043 if !chan.is_live() {
3044 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3045 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3046 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3048 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3049 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3051 let mut retain_channel = true;
3052 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3055 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3056 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3060 let ret_err = match res {
3061 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3062 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3063 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
3064 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3067 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3068 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3069 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3070 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3071 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3072 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3073 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3074 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3084 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3088 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3089 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3090 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3091 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3092 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3093 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3094 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3096 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3098 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3100 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3101 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3102 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3103 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3104 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3105 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3106 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3108 handle_errors.push(err);
3118 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3120 /// This currently includes:
3121 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3122 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3123 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3126 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3127 /// estimate fetches.
3128 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3129 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3130 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3131 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3133 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3135 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3137 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3138 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3139 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3140 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3141 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3142 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3143 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3144 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3146 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3148 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3150 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3151 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3152 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3153 if needs_close { return false; }
3156 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3157 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3158 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3159 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3160 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3161 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3162 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3163 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3167 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3168 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3170 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3171 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3172 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3176 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3177 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3186 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3187 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3193 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3194 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3195 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3196 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3197 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3198 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3199 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3201 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3202 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3203 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3204 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3205 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3206 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3207 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3208 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3209 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3210 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3211 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3217 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3218 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3219 // be surfaced to the user.
3220 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3221 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3223 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3224 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3225 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3226 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3227 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3228 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3230 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3233 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3235 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3236 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3237 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3239 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payee, .. } => {
3240 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3241 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3242 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3243 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3244 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3245 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3246 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3247 Some(RouteParameters {
3249 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3250 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3253 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3254 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3255 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3257 rejected_by_dest: false,
3258 network_update: None,
3259 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3261 short_channel_id: None,
3271 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3278 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3279 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3280 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3281 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3282 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3283 /// still-available channels.
3284 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3285 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3286 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3287 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3290 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3291 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3292 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3294 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payee, .. } => {
3295 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3296 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3297 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3298 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3299 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3300 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3301 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3304 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3305 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3308 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3309 all_paths_failed = true;
3312 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3315 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3316 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3317 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3318 Some(RouteParameters {
3319 payee: payee_data.clone(),
3320 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3321 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3324 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3325 match &onion_error {
3326 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3328 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3330 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3331 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3332 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3333 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3334 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3335 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3336 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3337 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3338 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3345 error_code: onion_error_code,
3347 error_data: onion_error_data
3351 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3357 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3358 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3359 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3360 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3362 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3363 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3364 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3365 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3366 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3367 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3368 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3369 network_update: None,
3372 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3375 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3377 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3383 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3384 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3385 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3386 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3387 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3388 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3390 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3391 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3392 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3396 let mut forward_event = None;
3397 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3398 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3400 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3401 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3402 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3404 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3405 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3408 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3409 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3410 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3411 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3412 time_forwardable: time
3419 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3420 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3422 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3423 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3424 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3425 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3427 /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
3428 /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
3430 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3431 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3432 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3433 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3434 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3435 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3437 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3439 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3440 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3441 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3442 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3444 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3445 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3446 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3447 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3449 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3450 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3451 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3452 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3453 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3455 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3456 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3457 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3463 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3464 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3465 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3467 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3468 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3469 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3470 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3471 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3472 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3473 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3475 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3476 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3477 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3478 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3479 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3480 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3481 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3482 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3484 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3485 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3486 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3487 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3488 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3489 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3491 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3496 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3497 // which were generated.
3498 channel_state.take();
3500 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3501 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3502 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3509 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3510 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3511 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3512 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3513 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3515 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3519 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3520 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3521 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3522 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3523 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3524 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3525 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3526 payment_preimage, e);
3527 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3528 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3529 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3530 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3533 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3534 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3535 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3536 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3537 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3538 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3539 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3540 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3541 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3542 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3548 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3550 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3553 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3554 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3555 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3556 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3557 payment_preimage, e);
3559 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3560 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3562 chan.remove_entry();
3564 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3567 } else { unreachable!(); }
3570 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3571 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3572 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3573 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
3574 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3575 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3576 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3577 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3578 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3579 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
3580 pending_events.push(
3581 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3583 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
3588 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3596 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3598 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3599 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3600 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3601 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3602 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3603 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3604 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3605 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3606 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3607 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
3608 pending_events.push(
3609 events::Event::PaymentSent {
3610 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3616 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3620 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
3621 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
3622 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
3624 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
3625 // irrevocably fulfilled.
3626 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3627 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
3628 pending_events.push(
3629 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3637 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3642 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3645 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3646 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3647 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3648 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3649 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3650 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3651 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3654 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3655 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3656 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3657 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3658 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3661 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3662 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3663 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3664 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3665 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3666 payment_preimage, e);
3668 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3669 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3670 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3671 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3674 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3675 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3676 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3677 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3681 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3682 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3683 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3686 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3687 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3689 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3697 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3698 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3699 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3702 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3703 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3705 let chan_restoration_res;
3706 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
3707 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3708 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3709 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3710 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3711 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3713 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3717 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
3718 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
3719 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3720 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
3721 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3722 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3723 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3724 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3725 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3728 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked);
3729 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3730 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3732 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
3734 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3735 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
3736 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3737 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3741 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3742 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3743 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3746 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
3747 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3750 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3751 &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger)
3752 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3753 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3754 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3755 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3756 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3757 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3758 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3759 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3760 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3762 entry.insert(channel);
3768 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3769 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3770 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3771 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3772 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3773 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3774 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3775 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3777 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
3778 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3780 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3783 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3784 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3785 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3786 channel_value_satoshis: value,
3788 user_channel_id: user_id,
3793 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3794 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3795 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3796 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3797 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3798 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3799 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3800 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3801 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3803 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3805 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3808 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3809 // lock before watch_channel
3810 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3812 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3813 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3814 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3815 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3816 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3817 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3818 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3819 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3820 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3821 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3822 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3824 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3825 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3826 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3827 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3828 // until we have persisted our monitor.
3829 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3833 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3834 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3835 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3836 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3837 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3839 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3840 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3841 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3850 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3852 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3853 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3854 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3855 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3856 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3857 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3858 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3860 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3861 Ok(update) => update,
3862 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3864 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3865 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3866 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
3867 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
3868 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
3869 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
3870 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
3871 shutdown_finish.0.take();
3878 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3881 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3882 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3886 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3887 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3888 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3889 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3890 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3891 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3892 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3894 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3895 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3896 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3897 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3898 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3899 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3900 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3901 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3902 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3903 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3904 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3905 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3906 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3907 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3908 msg: announcement_sigs,
3910 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3911 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3912 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3913 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3918 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3922 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3923 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
3924 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
3925 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3926 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3928 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3929 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3930 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3931 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3934 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
3935 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
3936 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
3937 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
3940 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3941 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
3943 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3944 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
3945 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3946 let (result, is_permanent) =
3947 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
3949 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
3955 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3956 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3957 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3964 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3967 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3968 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3971 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
3975 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3976 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3977 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3978 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3979 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3980 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3981 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3982 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3984 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3985 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3986 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3987 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3992 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3993 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3994 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3995 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3996 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3997 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3998 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4000 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
4001 } else { (tx, None) }
4003 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4006 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4007 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4008 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4010 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4011 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4012 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4013 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4017 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4022 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4023 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4024 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4025 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4027 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4028 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4029 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4030 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4032 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4033 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4035 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4036 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4037 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4038 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4041 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4042 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4043 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4044 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4045 match pending_forward_info {
4046 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4047 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4048 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
4049 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
4050 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
4051 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
4052 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
4053 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
4057 // The only case where we'd be unable to
4058 // successfully get a channel update is if the
4059 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
4060 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
4061 // payments over the channel back to themselves
4062 // (because no one else should know the short_id
4063 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
4064 // no problem just calling this
4065 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
4066 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
4069 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4071 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4072 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4073 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4076 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4078 _ => pending_forward_info
4081 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4083 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4088 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4089 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4090 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4091 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4092 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4093 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4094 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4095 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4097 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4099 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4102 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4106 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4107 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4108 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4109 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4110 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4111 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4112 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4114 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4116 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4121 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4122 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4123 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4124 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4125 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4126 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4127 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4129 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4130 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4131 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4133 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4136 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4140 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4141 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4142 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4143 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4144 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4145 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4146 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4148 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4149 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4150 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4151 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4152 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4153 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4154 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4159 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4160 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4162 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4163 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4164 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4166 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4167 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4168 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4169 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4170 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4171 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4172 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4173 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4175 commitment_signed: msg,
4181 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4186 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4187 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4188 let mut forward_event = None;
4189 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4190 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4191 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4192 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4194 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4195 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4196 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4197 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4198 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4200 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4201 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4202 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4204 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4205 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4206 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4211 match forward_event {
4213 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4214 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4215 time_forwardable: time
4223 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4224 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4226 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4227 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4228 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4229 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4230 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4231 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4233 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4234 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4235 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4236 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4237 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4238 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4239 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4240 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4241 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4242 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4243 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4245 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4246 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4247 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4248 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4249 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4251 } else { unreachable!(); }
4254 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4255 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4256 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4260 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4261 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4262 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4263 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4264 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4266 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4269 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4271 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4272 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4274 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4275 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4277 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4278 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4285 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4286 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4287 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4288 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4289 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4290 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4291 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4293 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4295 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4300 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4301 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4302 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4304 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4305 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4306 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4307 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4309 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4310 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4313 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4314 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4315 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4316 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4317 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4320 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4325 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4326 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4327 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4328 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4329 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4330 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4332 // It's not a local channel
4333 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4336 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4337 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4338 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4339 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4340 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4341 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4342 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4343 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4345 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4347 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4348 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4349 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4350 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4352 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4355 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4357 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4360 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4361 let chan_restoration_res;
4362 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4363 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4364 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4366 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4367 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4368 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4369 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4371 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4372 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4373 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4374 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4375 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
4376 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4377 let mut channel_update = None;
4378 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4379 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4380 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4383 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4384 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4385 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4386 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4387 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4388 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4389 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4392 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4393 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
4394 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4395 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4397 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
4399 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4402 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4403 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4405 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4406 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4411 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4412 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4413 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4414 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4415 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4416 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4417 match monitor_event {
4418 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4419 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4420 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4421 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4423 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4424 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4427 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4428 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4429 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4430 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4431 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4432 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4433 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4434 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4435 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4436 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4438 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4439 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4440 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4444 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4445 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4447 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4449 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4450 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4451 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4452 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4453 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4458 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4459 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4464 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4465 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4468 has_pending_monitor_events
4471 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4472 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4473 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4474 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
4475 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4476 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4479 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4480 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4481 /// update was applied.
4483 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4484 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4485 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4486 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4487 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4488 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4489 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4490 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4492 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4493 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4494 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4495 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4496 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4498 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4499 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4500 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4501 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4502 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4504 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4505 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4506 has_monitor_update = true;
4507 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4508 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4509 if close_channel { return false; }
4511 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4512 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4513 updates: commitment_update,
4520 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4521 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4522 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4529 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4530 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4531 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4534 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4535 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4541 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4542 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4543 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4544 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4545 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4546 let mut has_update = false;
4548 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4549 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4550 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4551 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4552 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4554 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4555 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4556 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4557 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4559 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4560 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4563 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4564 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4565 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4566 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4567 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4570 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4571 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4576 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4578 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4579 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4585 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4586 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4593 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4594 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4600 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4601 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4603 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4604 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4605 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4606 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4607 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4608 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4609 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4610 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4611 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4612 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4613 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4614 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4615 assert!(should_broadcast);
4616 } else { unreachable!(); }
4617 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4619 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4623 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4624 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4626 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4628 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4629 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4630 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4631 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4632 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4633 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
4634 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
4635 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4636 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4637 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4638 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4639 // never fail a payment too early.
4640 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4642 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4645 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4650 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4653 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4654 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
4656 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4657 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4658 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4660 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4662 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4663 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4664 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
4665 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4666 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
4667 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4668 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4671 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
4672 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
4675 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
4676 /// stored external to LDK.
4678 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
4679 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
4680 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
4682 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
4683 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
4685 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
4686 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
4687 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
4688 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
4690 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
4691 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
4692 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
4693 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
4694 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
4696 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
4697 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
4698 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
4699 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
4700 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
4702 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
4703 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
4704 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
4706 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
4708 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
4709 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
4711 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4712 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4713 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4714 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
4717 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
4718 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
4719 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4720 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
4721 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
4726 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
4727 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
4731 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
4732 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
4736 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4737 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4738 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4739 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4740 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4743 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
4744 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4745 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4746 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4748 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4749 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4750 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4751 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4754 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4755 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4757 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
4758 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4761 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
4762 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4763 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
4765 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4766 events.replace(pending_events);
4775 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4777 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4778 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4779 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4780 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4783 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4785 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4786 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4788 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4789 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4790 /// restarting from an old state.
4791 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4792 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4793 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4795 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4796 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4797 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4798 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4801 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4802 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4803 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4806 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4807 handler.handle_event(&event);
4815 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4817 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4818 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4819 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4820 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4823 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4825 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4826 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4827 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4828 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4829 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4832 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4833 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4834 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4837 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4838 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4839 let new_height = height - 1;
4841 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4842 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4843 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4844 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4845 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4846 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4849 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4853 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4855 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4856 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4857 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4858 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4861 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4862 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4863 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4864 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4866 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4867 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4869 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4870 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4873 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4874 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4875 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4876 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4878 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4879 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4881 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4883 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4885 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4887 macro_rules! max_time {
4888 ($timestamp: expr) => {
4890 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4891 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4892 // having an explicit local time source.
4893 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4894 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4895 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4896 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4897 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4903 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4904 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4905 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4906 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4907 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4910 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4911 outbounds.retain(|_, payment| {
4912 const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
4913 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
4914 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, .. } = payment {
4915 return *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS > height
4921 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4922 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4923 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4924 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4925 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4926 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4932 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4933 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4934 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4935 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4936 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4937 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4938 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4939 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4944 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4946 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4947 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4948 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4949 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4952 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4953 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4955 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ClosureReason>>
4956 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4957 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4958 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4959 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4961 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4962 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4964 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4965 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4966 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4967 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4968 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4969 let res = f(channel);
4970 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4971 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4972 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4973 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4974 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4978 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4979 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4980 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4981 msg: funding_locked,
4983 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4984 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4985 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4986 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4987 msg: announcement_sigs,
4989 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4990 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4991 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4992 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4993 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4996 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4998 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
5000 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5001 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5002 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5004 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5005 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5006 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5007 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5008 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5012 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5013 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5014 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5015 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5016 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5017 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5018 data: reason_message,
5026 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5027 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
5028 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5029 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5030 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5031 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5032 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5033 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5034 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5035 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5036 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5037 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5038 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5043 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5048 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5050 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5051 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5055 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5056 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5057 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5059 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
5060 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
5061 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5062 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5065 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5066 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5068 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5069 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5072 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5073 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5074 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5075 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5076 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5080 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5081 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5082 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5083 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5087 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5088 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5089 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5090 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5091 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5092 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5095 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5096 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5097 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5100 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5101 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5102 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5105 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5106 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5107 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5110 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5111 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5112 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5115 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5116 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5117 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5120 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5121 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5122 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5125 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5126 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5127 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5130 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5131 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5132 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5135 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5136 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5137 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5140 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5141 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5142 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5145 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5146 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5147 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5150 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5151 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5152 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5155 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5156 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5157 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5160 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5161 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5162 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5165 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5166 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5167 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5170 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5171 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5172 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5175 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5180 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5181 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5182 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5185 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5186 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5187 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5188 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5190 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5191 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5192 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5193 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5194 if no_connection_possible {
5195 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5196 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5197 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5198 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5199 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5201 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5202 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5203 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5207 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5214 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5215 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5216 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5217 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5218 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5219 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5220 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5222 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5225 no_channels_remain = false;
5231 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5233 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5234 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5235 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5236 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5237 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5238 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5239 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5240 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5241 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5242 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5243 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5244 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5245 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5246 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5247 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5248 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5249 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5250 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5251 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5255 if no_channels_remain {
5256 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5259 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5260 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5264 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5265 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5267 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5270 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5271 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5272 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5273 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5274 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5277 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5278 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5283 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5284 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5285 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5286 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5287 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5288 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5289 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5290 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5291 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5295 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5296 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5297 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5303 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5306 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5307 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5309 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5310 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5311 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5312 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5313 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5317 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5318 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5323 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5324 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5325 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5326 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5327 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5328 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5331 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5334 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5340 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5341 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5346 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5347 let result = *guard;
5355 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
5356 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5357 let current_time = Instant::now();
5359 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5360 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5365 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5366 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5367 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5368 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5369 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5371 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5372 let result = *guard;
5373 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5377 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5378 None => return result,
5384 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5386 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5387 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5388 *persistence_lock = true;
5389 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5394 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5395 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5397 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5399 (0, onion_packet, required),
5400 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5403 (0, payment_data, required),
5404 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5406 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5407 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5408 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5412 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5413 (0, routing, required),
5414 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5415 (4, payment_hash, required),
5416 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5417 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5421 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5422 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5424 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5426 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5427 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5428 reason.write(writer)?;
5430 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5431 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
5434 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5435 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5436 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
5437 failure_code.write(writer)?;
5444 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5445 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5446 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5449 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5450 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5451 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5452 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
5456 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5457 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5458 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5459 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
5460 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
5463 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
5464 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
5465 // messages contained in the variants.
5466 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
5467 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
5468 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
5470 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5471 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5472 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5473 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5474 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
5477 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5478 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5479 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5480 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5481 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
5483 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5488 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
5493 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
5494 (0, short_channel_id, required),
5495 (2, outpoint, required),
5496 (4, htlc_id, required),
5497 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
5500 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
5501 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5502 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
5503 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
5506 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
5507 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
5508 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
5513 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
5514 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
5515 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
5521 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
5522 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5523 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5525 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
5526 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
5527 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5531 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
5532 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
5533 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
5535 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
5537 if payment_data.is_some() {
5538 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5540 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
5543 if payment_data.is_none() {
5544 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5546 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
5550 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
5558 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
5559 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5560 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5563 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5564 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
5565 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
5566 let mut payment_id = None;
5567 let mut payment_secret = None;
5568 let mut payee = None;
5569 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5570 (0, session_priv, required),
5571 (1, payment_id, option),
5572 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5573 (3, payment_secret, option),
5574 (4, path, vec_type),
5577 if payment_id.is_none() {
5578 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
5580 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
5582 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5583 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
5584 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
5585 path: path.unwrap(),
5586 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
5591 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5592 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5597 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
5598 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
5600 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payee } => {
5602 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
5603 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5604 (0, session_priv, required),
5605 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
5606 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5607 (3, payment_secret, option),
5608 (4, path, vec_type),
5612 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
5614 field.write(writer)?;
5621 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
5622 (0, LightningError) => {
5626 (0, failure_code, required),
5627 (2, data, vec_type),
5631 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
5633 (0, forward_info, required),
5634 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
5635 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
5636 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
5639 (0, htlc_id, required),
5640 (2, err_packet, required),
5644 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
5645 (0, payment_secret, required),
5646 (2, expiry_time, required),
5647 (4, user_payment_id, required),
5648 (6, payment_preimage, required),
5649 (8, min_value_msat, required),
5652 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
5654 (0, session_privs, required),
5657 (0, session_privs, required),
5658 (1, payment_hash, option),
5661 (0, session_privs, required),
5662 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
5663 (2, payment_hash, required),
5664 (4, payment_secret, option),
5665 (6, total_msat, required),
5666 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
5667 (10, starting_block_height, required),
5670 (0, session_privs, required),
5671 (2, payment_hash, required),
5675 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5676 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5677 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5678 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5679 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5682 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5683 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
5685 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5687 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
5689 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5690 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
5691 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
5694 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5695 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
5696 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5697 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5698 unfunded_channels += 1;
5701 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
5702 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5703 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5704 channel.write(writer)?;
5708 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5709 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
5710 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5711 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5712 for forward in pending_forwards {
5713 forward.write(writer)?;
5717 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5718 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
5719 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5720 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5721 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
5722 htlc.write(writer)?;
5726 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5727 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5728 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5729 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
5730 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5731 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
5734 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5735 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5736 for event in events.iter() {
5737 event.write(writer)?;
5740 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5741 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5742 for event in background_events.iter() {
5744 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
5746 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
5747 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
5752 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5753 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5755 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5756 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5757 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
5758 hash.write(writer)?;
5759 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
5762 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5763 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
5764 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
5765 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5766 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
5767 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
5770 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
5771 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5773 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5774 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5775 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
5776 session_priv.write(writer)?;
5779 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
5780 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
5784 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
5785 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
5786 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5788 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5789 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5790 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
5795 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5796 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
5797 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
5804 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
5806 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
5808 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5809 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
5810 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
5811 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
5812 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
5813 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
5814 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
5815 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
5816 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5817 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
5818 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
5819 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
5820 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
5822 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
5823 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
5825 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
5826 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
5828 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
5829 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
5830 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
5831 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
5832 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
5833 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
5835 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
5836 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5837 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5838 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5839 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5840 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5843 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
5844 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
5846 pub keys_manager: K,
5848 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5850 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
5851 pub fee_estimator: F,
5852 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5854 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
5855 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
5856 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
5857 pub chain_monitor: M,
5859 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
5860 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
5861 /// force-closed during deserialization.
5862 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
5863 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
5864 /// deserialization.
5866 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
5867 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
5868 pub default_config: UserConfig,
5870 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
5871 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
5873 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
5874 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
5875 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
5876 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
5878 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
5881 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
5882 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
5885 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5886 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5887 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5888 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5889 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5890 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5893 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
5894 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
5895 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
5896 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
5897 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
5899 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
5900 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
5905 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
5906 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
5907 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5908 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
5909 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5910 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5911 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5912 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5915 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5916 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
5917 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
5921 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5922 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
5923 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5924 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5925 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5926 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5929 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5930 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5932 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5933 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5934 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5936 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5938 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5939 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5940 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5941 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5942 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
5943 for _ in 0..channel_count {
5944 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
5945 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
5946 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
5947 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
5948 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5949 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5950 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5951 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5952 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
5953 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
5954 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5955 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5956 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5957 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5958 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5959 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5960 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5961 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5962 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5963 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5964 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5965 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
5966 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
5967 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
5968 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5969 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5970 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
5971 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
5972 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5973 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
5974 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5975 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
5976 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
5979 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5980 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5981 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
5983 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
5986 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5987 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5988 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5989 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5990 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5991 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5995 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
5996 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
5997 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
5998 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6002 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6003 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6004 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6005 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6006 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6007 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6008 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6009 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6010 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6012 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6015 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6016 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6017 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6018 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6019 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6020 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6021 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6022 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6024 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
6027 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6028 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6029 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6030 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6031 let peer_state = PeerState {
6032 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6034 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6037 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6038 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6039 for _ in 0..event_count {
6040 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6041 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6045 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6046 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6047 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6048 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6049 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6050 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6051 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6052 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6056 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6057 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6058 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6059 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6060 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6061 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6065 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6066 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6068 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6069 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6070 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6071 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6072 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6076 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6077 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6078 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6079 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6080 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6081 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6082 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6084 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6085 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6089 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6090 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6091 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6092 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6093 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6094 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6096 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6097 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6098 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6099 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6100 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6101 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6103 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6105 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6106 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6107 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6108 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6109 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6110 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6111 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6113 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6114 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6115 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6116 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6117 if path.is_empty() {
6118 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6119 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6121 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6122 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6123 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6124 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6125 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6126 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6127 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6128 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6130 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6131 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6132 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6133 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6134 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6136 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6137 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6138 total_msat: path_amt,
6139 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6141 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6142 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6151 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6152 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6154 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6155 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6158 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6160 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6161 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6162 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6164 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6166 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6171 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6173 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6174 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6176 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
6177 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
6180 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6181 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6183 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6185 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6186 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6187 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6188 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6190 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6191 logger: args.logger,
6192 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6195 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6196 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6199 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6200 //connection or two.
6202 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6208 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6209 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6210 use core::time::Duration;
6211 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6212 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6213 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6214 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6216 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6217 use routing::router::{Payee, RouteParameters, find_route};
6218 use util::errors::APIError;
6219 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6220 use util::test_utils;
6222 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6224 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6225 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6227 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
6230 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6231 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6233 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6234 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6235 thread::spawn(move || {
6237 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6238 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6239 *persistence_lock = true;
6242 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6248 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6249 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6251 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6254 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6259 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6261 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6264 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6271 fn test_notify_limits() {
6272 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6273 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6274 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6275 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6276 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6277 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6279 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6280 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6281 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6282 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6283 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6285 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6287 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6288 // to connect messages with new values
6289 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6290 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6291 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6292 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6294 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6295 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6296 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6297 // ... but the last node should not.
6298 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6299 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6300 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6301 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6303 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6304 // about the channel.
6305 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6306 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6307 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6309 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6311 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6312 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6313 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6314 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6315 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6316 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6318 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6319 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6320 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6322 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6323 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6324 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6325 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6326 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6327 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6329 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6330 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6331 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6332 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6333 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6334 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6335 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6336 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6338 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6339 // the channel info has updated.
6340 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6341 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6342 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6343 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6344 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6345 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6349 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6350 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6352 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6353 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6354 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6355 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6356 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6358 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6359 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6360 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6361 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6362 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6363 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6364 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6365 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6366 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6367 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6368 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
6370 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
6371 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6372 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6373 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6374 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6375 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6376 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6377 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6378 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6379 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6380 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6381 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6382 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6383 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6384 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6385 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6386 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6387 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6388 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6389 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6390 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6391 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
6393 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
6394 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6395 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6396 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6397 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6398 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
6400 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
6401 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
6402 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
6403 // lightning messages manually.
6404 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6405 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6406 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6407 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6408 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
6409 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6410 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6411 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
6412 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6413 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6414 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
6415 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6416 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6417 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6418 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6419 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6420 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6421 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
6422 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6423 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6424 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
6425 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6426 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6428 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6429 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
6430 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6432 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
6433 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
6434 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6435 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
6437 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
6438 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
6439 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
6440 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
6442 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6445 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6446 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6447 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6448 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6450 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6453 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6454 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6455 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6456 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6458 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6463 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
6464 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
6465 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
6466 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
6467 // fails as expected.
6468 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6469 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6470 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6471 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6472 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6473 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6475 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
6476 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
6477 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
6479 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
6480 let params = RouteParameters {
6481 payee: Payee::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
6482 final_value_msat: 100_000,
6483 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
6485 let route = find_route(
6486 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6487 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6489 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6490 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6491 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6492 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6493 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6494 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6495 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6496 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6497 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6498 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6499 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6501 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6502 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6503 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6504 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6505 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6506 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6507 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6508 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6509 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6511 // Finally, claim the original payment.
6512 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6514 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
6515 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6516 let route = find_route(
6517 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6518 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6520 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6521 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6522 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6523 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6524 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
6525 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
6526 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
6528 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
6529 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6530 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6531 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6532 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6533 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6534 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6535 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6536 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6538 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6539 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6540 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6541 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6542 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6543 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6544 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6545 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6546 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6547 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6548 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6549 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6550 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6552 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
6553 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6557 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
6558 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
6559 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
6560 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6561 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6562 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6563 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6565 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6566 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6567 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6568 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6570 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6571 let params = RouteParameters {
6572 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
6573 final_value_msat: 10000,
6574 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
6576 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
6577 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6578 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6579 let route = find_route(
6580 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
6581 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6584 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6585 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
6586 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6587 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6589 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6590 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6591 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6592 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6593 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6594 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6595 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6597 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
6601 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
6602 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
6603 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6604 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6605 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6606 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6608 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6609 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6610 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6611 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6613 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6614 let params = RouteParameters {
6615 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
6616 final_value_msat: 10000,
6617 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
6619 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
6620 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6621 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6622 let route = find_route(
6623 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
6624 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6627 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6628 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6629 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
6630 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6631 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6633 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6634 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6635 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6636 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6637 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6638 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6639 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6641 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
6645 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
6646 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
6647 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
6648 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
6649 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6651 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6652 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6653 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6654 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6656 // Marshall an MPP route.
6657 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
6658 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
6659 route.paths.push(path);
6660 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6661 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
6662 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
6663 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
6664 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
6665 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
6667 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
6668 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
6669 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
6670 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
6675 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
6678 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
6679 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
6680 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
6681 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
6682 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6683 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
6684 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
6685 use routing::router::{Payee, get_route};
6686 use routing::scoring::Scorer;
6687 use util::test_utils;
6688 use util::config::UserConfig;
6689 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
6691 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6692 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6693 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
6695 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
6699 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
6700 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
6701 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
6702 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
6703 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
6704 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
6705 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
6710 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
6711 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
6714 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
6715 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
6716 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
6718 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
6719 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
6721 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
6722 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
6724 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
6725 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
6727 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6728 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
6729 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
6730 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
6731 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6733 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6735 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
6737 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6738 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
6739 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
6740 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
6741 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6743 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6745 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
6747 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6748 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6749 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
6750 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6751 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6754 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
6755 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
6756 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
6758 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
6759 } else { panic!(); }
6761 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6762 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6764 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
6767 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6770 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
6771 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
6773 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6774 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6775 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
6776 match msg_events[0] {
6777 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
6778 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
6779 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
6783 match msg_events[1] {
6784 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6788 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
6790 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
6791 macro_rules! send_payment {
6792 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
6793 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
6794 let payee = Payee::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
6795 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
6796 let scorer = Scorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6797 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &dummy_graph,
6798 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
6800 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
6801 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
6803 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
6804 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
6806 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6807 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
6808 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6809 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
6810 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6811 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6812 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6813 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6815 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
6816 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
6817 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6819 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
6820 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
6821 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6822 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6823 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6825 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
6828 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
6829 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6830 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6831 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6833 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
6838 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
6839 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);