1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::{BlindedPath, NodeIdLookUp};
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 pub use crate::ln::channel::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
48 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
50 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
56 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
60 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
61 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
62 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
63 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
65 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
66 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
67 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
68 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
69 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
70 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
71 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
72 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
73 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
74 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
75 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
76 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
77 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
78 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
80 crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
81 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
82 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
83 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
84 crate::sign::KeysManager,
88 crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
89 crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
92 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
95 use crate::prelude::*;
97 use core::cell::RefCell;
99 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
100 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
101 use core::time::Duration;
102 use core::ops::Deref;
104 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
105 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
106 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
108 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
110 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
111 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
112 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
114 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
115 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
116 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
117 // before we forward it.
119 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
120 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
121 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
122 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
123 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
125 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
126 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
127 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
128 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
129 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
131 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
132 /// do with the HTLC.
133 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
134 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
136 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
137 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
138 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
139 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
140 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
141 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
143 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
145 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
146 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
148 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
149 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
150 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
151 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
152 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
154 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
155 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
156 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
157 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
158 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
160 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
161 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
162 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
163 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
165 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
166 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
168 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
169 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
170 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
171 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
172 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
173 requires_blinded_error: bool,
175 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
176 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
177 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
179 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
180 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
182 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
183 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
184 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
185 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
186 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
187 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
188 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
190 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
191 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
192 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
193 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
195 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
196 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
197 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
199 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
200 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
201 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
202 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
203 requires_blinded_error: bool,
207 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
208 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
209 pub struct BlindedForward {
210 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
211 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
212 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
213 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
214 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
215 /// the introduction node.
216 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
219 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
220 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
221 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
223 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
224 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
225 Self::ReceiveKeysend { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
231 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
233 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
234 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
235 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
236 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
237 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
238 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
240 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
241 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
242 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
243 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
244 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
246 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
248 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
249 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
250 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
252 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
253 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
254 /// it along another path).
256 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
257 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
258 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
259 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
260 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
261 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
262 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
263 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
264 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
266 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
269 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
271 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
273 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
276 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
277 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
278 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
279 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
282 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
283 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
284 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
285 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
286 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
289 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
290 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
291 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
293 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
294 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
295 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
298 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
299 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
301 prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
302 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
303 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
306 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
307 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
308 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
311 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
316 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
320 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
321 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
322 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
323 pub enum BlindedFailure {
324 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
325 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
326 FromIntroductionNode,
327 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
328 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
332 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
333 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
334 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
335 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
336 short_channel_id: u64,
337 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
339 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
340 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
341 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
342 channel_id: ChannelId,
344 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
345 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
350 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
352 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
353 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
354 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
356 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
357 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
360 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
361 struct ClaimableHTLC {
362 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
364 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
366 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
367 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
368 sender_intended_value: u64,
369 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
371 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
372 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
373 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
374 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
376 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
377 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
380 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
381 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
382 events::ClaimedHTLC {
383 channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
384 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
385 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
386 value_msat: val.value,
387 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
392 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
393 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
395 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
396 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
397 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
400 /// Number of bytes in the id.
401 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
404 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
405 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
410 impl Readable for PaymentId {
411 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
412 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
417 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
418 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
419 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
423 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
425 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
426 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
427 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
429 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
430 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
435 impl Readable for InterceptId {
436 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
437 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
442 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
443 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
444 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
445 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
446 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
449 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
451 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
452 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
453 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
455 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
456 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
460 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
461 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
462 (0, short_channel_id, required),
463 (2, htlc_id, required),
465 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
466 (0, session_priv, required),
471 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
472 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
473 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
474 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
475 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
478 session_priv: SecretKey,
479 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
480 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
481 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
482 payment_id: PaymentId,
485 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
486 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
487 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
489 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
491 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
493 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
496 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
497 payment_id.hash(hasher);
498 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
504 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
506 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
507 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
508 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
509 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
510 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
511 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
515 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
516 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
517 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
518 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
519 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
520 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
522 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
528 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
529 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
531 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
532 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
533 pub enum FailureCode {
534 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
535 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
536 TemporaryNodeFailure,
537 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
538 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
539 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
540 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
541 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
542 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
543 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
544 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
545 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
546 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
548 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
549 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
550 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
553 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
554 fn into(self) -> u16 {
556 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
557 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
558 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
559 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
564 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
565 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
566 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
567 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
568 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
570 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
571 err: msgs::LightningError,
572 closes_channel: bool,
573 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
575 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
577 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
579 err: LightningError {
581 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
582 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
588 closes_channel: false,
589 shutdown_finish: None,
593 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
594 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
597 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
598 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
599 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
600 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
601 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
602 // commitment upon reconnecting.
603 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
605 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
608 err: LightningError { err, action },
609 closes_channel: true,
610 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
614 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
617 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
619 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
620 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
624 log_level: Level::Warn,
627 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
629 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
631 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
633 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
634 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
641 closes_channel: false,
642 shutdown_finish: None,
646 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
651 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
652 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
653 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
654 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
655 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
657 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
658 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
659 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
660 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
661 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
662 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
663 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
665 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
669 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
670 struct ClaimingPayment {
672 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
673 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
674 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
675 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
677 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
678 (0, amount_msat, required),
679 (2, payment_purpose, required),
680 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
681 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
682 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
685 struct ClaimablePayment {
686 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
687 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
688 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
691 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
692 struct ClaimablePayments {
693 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
694 /// failed/claimed by the user.
696 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
697 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
699 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
700 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
701 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
703 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
704 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
705 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
706 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
709 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
710 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
711 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
712 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
714 enum BackgroundEvent {
715 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
716 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
717 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
718 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
720 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
721 /// are regenerated on startup.
722 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
723 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
724 /// channel to continue normal operation.
726 /// In general this should be used rather than
727 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
728 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
729 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
731 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
732 /// are regenerated on startup.
733 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
734 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
735 funding_txo: OutPoint,
736 channel_id: ChannelId,
737 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
739 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
740 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
742 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
743 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
744 channel_id: ChannelId,
749 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
750 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
751 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
752 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
753 /// event can be generated.
754 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
755 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
756 /// operation of another channel.
758 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
759 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
760 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
761 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
763 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
764 event: events::Event,
765 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
767 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
768 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
769 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
771 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
772 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
773 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
774 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
775 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
777 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
778 /// stored for later processing.
779 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
780 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
781 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
782 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
783 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
787 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
788 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
789 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
790 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
791 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
792 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
793 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
794 (4, blocking_action, required),
795 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
796 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
797 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
799 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
800 (0, event, upgradable_required),
801 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
802 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
803 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
804 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
805 // downgrades to prior versions.
806 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
810 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
811 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
812 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
813 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
814 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
815 channel_id: ChannelId,
818 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
819 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
820 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
821 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
822 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
823 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
824 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
828 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
829 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
830 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
831 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
832 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
833 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
835 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
836 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
837 channel_id: ChannelId,
838 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
843 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
844 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
845 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
846 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
847 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
852 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
853 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
857 /// State we hold per-peer.
858 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
859 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
861 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
862 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
863 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
865 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
866 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
867 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
868 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
869 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
870 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
871 latest_features: InitFeatures,
872 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
873 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
874 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
875 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
876 /// user but which have not yet completed.
878 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
879 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
880 /// for a missing channel.
881 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
882 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
883 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
885 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
886 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
887 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
888 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
890 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
891 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
892 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
893 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
894 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
895 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
896 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
897 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
898 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
899 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
900 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
901 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
902 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
903 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
904 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
905 pub is_connected: bool,
908 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
909 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
910 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
911 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
912 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
913 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
916 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
918 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
919 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
921 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
923 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
926 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
927 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
930 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
931 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
932 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
935 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
936 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
937 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
938 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
942 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
943 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
944 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
945 /// The original OpenChannel message.
946 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
947 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
948 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
951 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
952 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
953 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
955 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
956 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
958 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
961 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
962 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
963 struct PendingInboundPayment {
964 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
965 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
966 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
967 /// this payment being removed.
969 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
970 user_payment_id: u64,
971 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
972 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
973 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
976 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
977 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
978 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
979 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
980 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
981 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
982 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
983 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
985 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
986 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
987 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
995 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
998 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
999 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1000 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1005 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1006 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1007 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1008 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1009 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1010 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1011 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1012 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1013 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1015 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1016 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1017 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1026 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1029 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1030 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1031 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1036 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1038 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1040 pub trait AChannelManager {
1041 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1042 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1043 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1044 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1045 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1046 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1047 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1048 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1049 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1050 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1051 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1052 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1053 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1054 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1055 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1056 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1057 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1058 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1059 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1060 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1061 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1062 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1063 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1064 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1065 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1066 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1067 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1068 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1069 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1070 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1071 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1072 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1073 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1074 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1075 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1076 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1079 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1080 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1082 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1083 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1084 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1085 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1086 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1087 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1091 type Watch = M::Target;
1093 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1095 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1097 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1099 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1100 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1102 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1104 type Router = R::Target;
1106 type Logger = L::Target;
1108 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1111 /// A lightning node's channel state machine and payment management logic, which facilitates
1112 /// sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through lightning channels.
1114 /// [`ChannelManager`] is parameterized by a number of components to achieve this.
1115 /// - [`chain::Watch`] (typically [`ChainMonitor`]) for on-chain monitoring and enforcement of each
1117 /// - [`BroadcasterInterface`] for broadcasting transactions related to opening, funding, and
1118 /// closing channels
1119 /// - [`EntropySource`] for providing random data needed for cryptographic operations
1120 /// - [`NodeSigner`] for cryptographic operations scoped to the node
1121 /// - [`SignerProvider`] for providing signers whose operations are scoped to individual channels
1122 /// - [`FeeEstimator`] to determine transaction fee rates needed to have a transaction mined in a
1124 /// - [`Router`] for finding payment paths when initiating and retrying payments
1125 /// - [`Logger`] for logging operational information of varying degrees
1127 /// Additionally, it implements the following traits:
1128 /// - [`ChannelMessageHandler`] to handle off-chain channel activity from peers
1129 /// - [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] to similarly send such messages to peers
1130 /// - [`OffersMessageHandler`] for BOLT 12 message handling and sending
1131 /// - [`EventsProvider`] to generate user-actionable [`Event`]s
1132 /// - [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for notification of on-chain activity
1134 /// Thus, [`ChannelManager`] is typically used to parameterize a [`MessageHandler`] and an
1135 /// [`OnionMessenger`]. The latter is required to support BOLT 12 functionality.
1137 /// # `ChannelManager` vs `ChannelMonitor`
1139 /// It's important to distinguish between the *off-chain* management and *on-chain* enforcement of
1140 /// lightning channels. [`ChannelManager`] exchanges messages with peers to manage the off-chain
1141 /// state of each channel. During this process, it generates a [`ChannelMonitor`] for each channel
1142 /// and a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] for each relevant change, notifying its parameterized
1143 /// [`chain::Watch`] of them.
1145 /// An implementation of [`chain::Watch`], such as [`ChainMonitor`], is responsible for aggregating
1146 /// these [`ChannelMonitor`]s and applying any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to them. It then monitors
1147 /// for any pertinent on-chain activity, enforcing claims as needed.
1149 /// This division of off-chain management and on-chain enforcement allows for interesting node
1150 /// setups. For instance, on-chain enforcement could be moved to a separate host or have added
1151 /// redundancy, possibly as a watchtower. See [`chain::Watch`] for the relevant interface.
1153 /// # Initialization
1155 /// Use [`ChannelManager::new`] with the most recent [`BlockHash`] when creating a fresh instance.
1156 /// Otherwise, if restarting, construct [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] with the necessary parameters and
1157 /// references to any deserialized [`ChannelMonitor`]s that were previously persisted. Use this to
1158 /// deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] and feed it any new chain data since it was last online, as
1159 /// detailed in the [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] documentation.
1162 /// use bitcoin::BlockHash;
1163 /// use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1164 /// use lightning::chain::BestBlock;
1165 /// # use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1166 /// use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
1167 /// # use lightning::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
1168 /// use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
1169 /// use lightning::util::ser::ReadableArgs;
1171 /// # fn read_channel_monitors() -> Vec<ChannelMonitor<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>> { vec![] }
1174 /// # L: lightning::util::logger::Logger,
1175 /// # ES: lightning::sign::EntropySource,
1176 /// # S: for <'b> lightning::routing::scoring::LockableScore<'b, ScoreLookUp = SL>,
1177 /// # SL: lightning::routing::scoring::ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP>,
1179 /// # R: lightning::io::Read,
1181 /// # fee_estimator: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::FeeEstimator,
1182 /// # chain_monitor: &dyn lightning::chain::Watch<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>,
1183 /// # tx_broadcaster: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface,
1184 /// # router: &lightning::routing::router::DefaultRouter<&NetworkGraph<&'a L>, &'a L, &ES, &S, SP, SL>,
1186 /// # entropy_source: &ES,
1187 /// # node_signer: &dyn lightning::sign::NodeSigner,
1188 /// # signer_provider: &lightning::sign::DynSignerProvider,
1189 /// # best_block: lightning::chain::BestBlock,
1190 /// # current_timestamp: u32,
1191 /// # mut reader: R,
1192 /// # ) -> Result<(), lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError> {
1193 /// // Fresh start with no channels
1194 /// let params = ChainParameters {
1195 /// network: Network::Bitcoin,
1198 /// let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1199 /// let channel_manager = ChannelManager::new(
1200 /// fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, entropy_source, node_signer,
1201 /// signer_provider, default_config, params, current_timestamp
1204 /// // Restart from deserialized data
1205 /// let mut channel_monitors = read_channel_monitors();
1206 /// let args = ChannelManagerReadArgs::new(
1207 /// entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster,
1208 /// router, logger, default_config, channel_monitors.iter_mut().collect()
1210 /// let (block_hash, channel_manager) =
1211 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<_, _, _, _, _, _, _, _>)>::read(&mut reader, args)?;
1213 /// // Update the ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors with the latest chain data
1216 /// // Move the monitors to the ChannelManager's chain::Watch parameter
1217 /// for monitor in channel_monitors {
1218 /// chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
1226 /// The following is required for [`ChannelManager`] to function properly:
1227 /// - Handle messages from peers using its [`ChannelMessageHandler`] implementation (typically
1228 /// called by [`PeerManager::read_event`] when processing network I/O)
1229 /// - Send messages to peers obtained via its [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] implementation
1230 /// (typically initiated when [`PeerManager::process_events`] is called)
1231 /// - Feed on-chain activity using either its [`chain::Listen`] or [`chain::Confirm`] implementation
1232 /// as documented by those traits
1233 /// - Perform any periodic channel and payment checks by calling [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly
1235 /// - Persist to disk whenever [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`] returns `true` using a
1236 /// [`Persister`] such as a [`KVStore`] implementation
1237 /// - Handle [`Event`]s obtained via its [`EventsProvider`] implementation
1239 /// The [`Future`] returned by [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] is useful in determining
1240 /// when the last two requirements need to be checked.
1242 /// The [`lightning-block-sync`] and [`lightning-transaction-sync`] crates provide utilities that
1243 /// simplify feeding in on-chain activity using the [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] traits,
1244 /// respectively. The remaining requirements can be met using the [`lightning-background-processor`]
1245 /// crate. For languages other than Rust, the availability of similar utilities may vary.
1249 /// [`ChannelManager`]'s primary function involves managing a channel state. Without channels,
1250 /// payments can't be sent. Use [`list_channels`] or [`list_usable_channels`] for a snapshot of the
1251 /// currently open channels.
1254 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1256 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1257 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1258 /// let channels = channel_manager.list_usable_channels();
1259 /// for details in channels {
1260 /// println!("{:?}", details);
1265 /// Each channel is identified using a [`ChannelId`], which will change throughout the channel's
1266 /// life cycle. Additionally, channels are assigned a `user_channel_id`, which is given in
1267 /// [`Event`]s associated with the channel and serves as a fixed identifier but is otherwise unused
1268 /// by [`ChannelManager`].
1270 /// ## Opening Channels
1272 /// To an open a channel with a peer, call [`create_channel`]. This will initiate the process of
1273 /// opening an outbound channel, which requires self-funding when handling
1274 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1277 /// # use bitcoin::{ScriptBuf, Transaction};
1278 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1279 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1280 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1282 /// # trait Wallet {
1283 /// # fn create_funding_transaction(
1284 /// # &self, _amount_sats: u64, _output_script: ScriptBuf
1285 /// # ) -> Transaction;
1288 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager, W: Wallet>(channel_manager: T, wallet: W, peer_id: PublicKey) {
1289 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1290 /// let value_sats = 1_000_000;
1291 /// let push_msats = 10_000_000;
1292 /// match channel_manager.create_channel(peer_id, value_sats, push_msats, 42, None, None) {
1293 /// Ok(channel_id) => println!("Opening channel {}", channel_id),
1294 /// Err(e) => println!("Error opening channel: {:?}", e),
1297 /// // On the event processing thread once the peer has responded
1298 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1299 /// Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1300 /// temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script,
1301 /// user_channel_id, ..
1303 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1304 /// let funding_transaction = wallet.create_funding_transaction(
1305 /// channel_value_satoshis, output_script
1307 /// match channel_manager.funding_transaction_generated(
1308 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction
1310 /// Ok(()) => println!("Funding channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1311 /// Err(e) => println!("Error funding channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1314 /// Event::ChannelPending { channel_id, user_channel_id, former_temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
1315 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1317 /// "Channel {} now {} pending (funding transaction has been broadcasted)", channel_id,
1318 /// former_temporary_channel_id.unwrap()
1321 /// Event::ChannelReady { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1322 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1323 /// println!("Channel {} ready", channel_id);
1331 /// ## Accepting Channels
1333 /// Inbound channels are initiated by peers and are automatically accepted unless [`ChannelManager`]
1334 /// has [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] set. In that case, the channel may be
1335 /// either accepted or rejected when handling [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
1338 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1339 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1340 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1342 /// # fn is_trusted(counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> bool {
1344 /// # unimplemented!()
1347 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1348 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1349 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1350 /// Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
1351 /// if !is_trusted(counterparty_node_id) {
1352 /// match channel_manager.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(
1353 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id
1355 /// Ok(()) => println!("Rejecting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1356 /// Err(e) => println!("Error rejecting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1361 /// let user_channel_id = 43;
1362 /// match channel_manager.accept_inbound_channel(
1363 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, user_channel_id
1365 /// Ok(()) => println!("Accepting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1366 /// Err(e) => println!("Error accepting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1375 /// ## Closing Channels
1377 /// There are two ways to close a channel: either cooperatively using [`close_channel`] or
1378 /// unilaterally using [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]. The former is ideal as it makes for
1379 /// lower fees and immediate access to funds. However, the latter may be necessary if the
1380 /// counterparty isn't behaving properly or has gone offline. [`Event::ChannelClosed`] is generated
1381 /// once the channel has been closed successfully.
1384 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1385 /// # use lightning::ln::ChannelId;
1386 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1387 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1389 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1390 /// # channel_manager: T, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
1392 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1393 /// match channel_manager.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id) {
1394 /// Ok(()) => println!("Closing channel {}", channel_id),
1395 /// Err(e) => println!("Error closing channel {}: {:?}", channel_id, e),
1398 /// // On the event processing thread
1399 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1400 /// Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1401 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1402 /// println!("Channel {} closed", channel_id);
1412 /// [`ChannelManager`] is responsible for sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through its
1413 /// channels. A payment is typically initiated from a [BOLT 11] invoice or a [BOLT 12] offer, though
1414 /// spontaneous (i.e., keysend) payments are also possible. Incoming payments don't require
1415 /// maintaining any additional state as [`ChannelManager`] can reconstruct the [`PaymentPreimage`]
1416 /// from the [`PaymentSecret`]. Sending payments, however, require tracking in order to retry failed
1419 /// After a payment is initiated, it will appear in [`list_recent_payments`] until a short time
1420 /// after either an [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is handled. Failed HTLCs
1421 /// for a payment will be retried according to the payment's [`Retry`] strategy or until
1422 /// [`abandon_payment`] is called.
1424 /// ## BOLT 11 Invoices
1426 /// The [`lightning-invoice`] crate is useful for creating BOLT 11 invoices. Specifically, use the
1427 /// functions in its `utils` module for constructing invoices that are compatible with
1428 /// [`ChannelManager`]. These functions serve as a convenience for building invoices with the
1429 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentSecret`] returned from [`create_inbound_payment`]. To provide your
1430 /// own [`PaymentHash`], use [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] or the corresponding functions in
1431 /// the [`lightning-invoice`] `utils` module.
1433 /// [`ChannelManager`] generates an [`Event::PaymentClaimable`] once the full payment has been
1434 /// received. Call [`claim_funds`] to release the [`PaymentPreimage`], which in turn will result in
1435 /// an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`].
1438 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1439 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1441 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1442 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1443 /// // Or use utils::create_invoice_from_channelmanager
1444 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.create_inbound_payment(
1445 /// Some(10_000_000), 3600, None
1447 /// Ok((payment_hash, _payment_secret)) => {
1448 /// println!("Creating inbound payment {}", payment_hash);
1451 /// Err(()) => panic!("Error creating inbound payment"),
1454 /// // On the event processing thread
1455 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1456 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1457 /// PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1458 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1459 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1460 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1462 /// PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1463 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1465 /// PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(payment_preimage) => {
1466 /// assert_ne!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1467 /// println!("Claiming spontaneous payment {}", payment_hash);
1468 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1471 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1472 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1473 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1481 /// For paying an invoice, [`lightning-invoice`] provides a `payment` module with convenience
1482 /// functions for use with [`send_payment`].
1485 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1486 /// # use lightning::ln::PaymentHash;
1487 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
1488 /// # use lightning::routing::router::RouteParameters;
1490 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1491 /// # channel_manager: T, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields,
1492 /// # route_params: RouteParameters, retry: Retry
1494 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1495 /// // let (payment_hash, recipient_onion, route_params) =
1496 /// // payment::payment_parameters_from_invoice(&invoice);
1497 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1498 /// match channel_manager.send_payment(
1499 /// payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route_params, retry
1501 /// Ok(()) => println!("Sending payment with hash {}", payment_hash),
1502 /// Err(e) => println!("Failed sending payment with hash {}: {:?}", payment_hash, e),
1505 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1506 /// let expected_payment_hash = payment_hash;
1508 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1510 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1511 /// payment_id: expected_payment_id,
1512 /// payment_hash: expected_payment_hash,
1518 /// // On the event processing thread
1519 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1520 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_hash),
1521 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_hash),
1528 /// ## BOLT 12 Offers
1530 /// The [`offers`] module is useful for creating BOLT 12 offers. An [`Offer`] is a precursor to a
1531 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`], which must first be requested by the payer. The interchange of these messages
1532 /// as defined in the specification is handled by [`ChannelManager`] and its implementation of
1533 /// [`OffersMessageHandler`]. However, this only works with an [`Offer`] created using a builder
1534 /// returned by [`create_offer_builder`]. With this approach, BOLT 12 offers and invoices are
1535 /// stateless just as BOLT 11 invoices are.
1538 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1539 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1540 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1542 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1543 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1544 /// let offer = channel_manager
1545 /// .create_offer_builder("coffee".to_string())?
1547 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1548 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::offer::OfferBuilder<_, _> = offer.into();
1549 /// # let offer = builder
1550 /// .amount_msats(10_000_000)
1552 /// let bech32_offer = offer.to_string();
1554 /// // On the event processing thread
1555 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1556 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1557 /// PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1558 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1559 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1561 /// PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1562 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1567 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1568 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1577 /// Use [`pay_for_offer`] to initiated payment, which sends an [`InvoiceRequest`] for an [`Offer`]
1578 /// and pays the [`Bolt12Invoice`] response. In addition to success and failure events,
1579 /// [`ChannelManager`] may also generate an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
1582 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1583 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1584 /// # use lightning::offers::offer::Offer;
1586 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1587 /// # channel_manager: T, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
1588 /// # payer_note: Option<String>, retry: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1590 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1591 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1592 /// match channel_manager.pay_for_offer(
1593 /// offer, quantity, amount_msats, payer_note, payment_id, retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat
1595 /// Ok(()) => println!("Requesting invoice for offer"),
1596 /// Err(e) => println!("Unable to request invoice for offer: {:?}", e),
1599 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1600 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1602 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1604 /// RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1608 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1610 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1612 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, .. }
1616 /// // On the event processing thread
1617 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1618 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1619 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1620 /// Event::InvoiceRequestFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1627 /// ## BOLT 12 Refunds
1629 /// A [`Refund`] is a request for an invoice to be paid. Like *paying* for an [`Offer`], *creating*
1630 /// a [`Refund`] involves maintaining state since it represents a future outbound payment.
1631 /// Therefore, use [`create_refund_builder`] when creating one, otherwise [`ChannelManager`] will
1632 /// refuse to pay any corresponding [`Bolt12Invoice`] that it receives.
1635 /// # use core::time::Duration;
1636 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1637 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1638 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1640 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1641 /// # channel_manager: T, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration, retry: Retry,
1642 /// # max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1643 /// # ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1644 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1645 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1646 /// let refund = channel_manager
1647 /// .create_refund_builder(
1648 /// "coffee".to_string(), amount_msats, absolute_expiry, payment_id, retry,
1649 /// max_total_routing_fee_msat
1652 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1653 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::refund::RefundBuilder<_> = refund.into();
1654 /// # let refund = builder
1655 /// .payer_note("refund for order 1234".to_string())
1657 /// let bech32_refund = refund.to_string();
1659 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1660 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1662 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1664 /// RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1668 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1670 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1672 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, .. }
1676 /// // On the event processing thread
1677 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1678 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1679 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1687 /// Use [`request_refund_payment`] to send a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for receiving the refund. Similar to
1688 /// *creating* an [`Offer`], this is stateless as it represents an inbound payment.
1691 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1692 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1693 /// # use lightning::offers::refund::Refund;
1695 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T, refund: &Refund) {
1696 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1697 /// match channel_manager.request_refund_payment(refund) {
1698 /// Ok(()) => println!("Requesting payment for refund"),
1699 /// Err(e) => println!("Unable to request payment for refund: {:?}", e),
1702 /// // On the event processing thread
1703 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1704 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1705 /// PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1706 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1707 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1709 /// PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1710 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1715 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1716 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1726 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1727 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1728 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1729 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1731 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1732 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1733 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1734 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1735 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1736 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1737 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1738 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1739 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1741 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1742 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1743 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1745 /// # `ChannelUpdate` Messages
1747 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1748 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1749 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1750 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1751 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1753 /// # DoS Mitigation
1755 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1756 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1757 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1758 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1760 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1761 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1762 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1766 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1767 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1768 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1769 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1770 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1772 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1773 /// [`MessageHandler`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::MessageHandler
1774 /// [`OnionMessenger`]: crate::onion_message::messenger::OnionMessenger
1775 /// [`PeerManager::read_event`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::read_event
1776 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
1777 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1778 /// [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`]: Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence
1779 /// [`Persister`]: crate::util::persist::Persister
1780 /// [`KVStore`]: crate::util::persist::KVStore
1781 /// [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`]: Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future
1782 /// [`lightning-block-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_block_sync/latest/lightning_block_sync
1783 /// [`lightning-transaction-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_transaction_sync/latest/lightning_transaction_sync
1784 /// [`lightning-background-processor`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_background_processor/lightning_background_processor
1785 /// [`list_channels`]: Self::list_channels
1786 /// [`list_usable_channels`]: Self::list_usable_channels
1787 /// [`create_channel`]: Self::create_channel
1788 /// [`close_channel`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1789 /// [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1790 /// [BOLT 11]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/11-payment-encoding.md
1791 /// [BOLT 12]: https://github.com/rustyrussell/lightning-rfc/blob/guilt/offers/12-offer-encoding.md
1792 /// [`list_recent_payments`]: Self::list_recent_payments
1793 /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
1794 /// [`lightning-invoice`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_invoice/latest/lightning_invoice
1795 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
1796 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
1797 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
1798 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
1799 /// [`offers`]: crate::offers
1800 /// [`create_offer_builder`]: Self::create_offer_builder
1801 /// [`pay_for_offer`]: Self::pay_for_offer
1802 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
1803 /// [`create_refund_builder`]: Self::create_refund_builder
1804 /// [`request_refund_payment`]: Self::request_refund_payment
1805 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1806 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1807 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1808 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1809 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1810 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1811 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1814 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1815 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1816 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1817 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1818 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1822 // `pending_offers_messages`
1824 // `total_consistency_lock`
1826 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1828 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1830 // |__`decode_update_add_htlcs`
1832 // |__`per_peer_state`
1834 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1836 // |__`claimable_payments`
1838 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1842 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1844 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1846 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1850 // |__`pending_events`
1852 // |__`pending_background_events`
1854 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1856 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1857 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1858 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1859 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1860 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1861 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1865 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1866 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1867 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1873 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1875 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1877 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1878 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1880 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1881 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1882 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1883 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1885 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1886 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1888 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1889 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1890 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1891 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1892 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1893 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1894 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1895 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1897 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1899 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1900 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1902 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1904 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1905 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1906 /// and via the classic SCID.
1908 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1909 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1911 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1913 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1915 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1916 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1917 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1919 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1920 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1922 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> pending `update_add_htlc`s to decode.
1924 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1925 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1926 /// and via the classic SCID.
1928 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1929 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `channel_id` in `UpdateAddHTLC`!
1931 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1932 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>>,
1934 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1935 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1937 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1938 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1940 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1941 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1942 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1943 /// active channel list on load.
1945 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1946 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1948 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1950 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1951 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1952 /// the handling of the events.
1954 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1955 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1958 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1959 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1960 /// would break backwards compatability.
1961 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1962 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1963 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1965 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1967 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1969 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1971 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1973 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1974 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1975 /// confirmation depth.
1977 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1978 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1979 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1981 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1983 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1985 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1987 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1989 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1991 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1992 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1993 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1995 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1996 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1998 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1999 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
2000 /// keeping additional state.
2001 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
2003 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
2004 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
2005 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
2006 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
2008 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
2009 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
2011 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
2012 /// are currently open with that peer.
2014 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
2015 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
2018 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
2020 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2021 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2022 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2023 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2024 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2026 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
2027 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
2028 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
2029 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
2030 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
2032 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
2033 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
2035 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2036 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2037 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2038 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2039 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2041 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
2042 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
2044 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
2045 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
2046 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
2047 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
2048 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
2050 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
2052 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2054 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
2055 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
2056 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
2057 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
2058 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
2059 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
2060 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
2061 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
2062 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
2063 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
2064 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
2066 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
2067 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
2068 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
2070 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
2072 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
2073 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
2075 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
2077 /// Tracks the message events that are to be broadcasted when we are connected to some peer.
2078 pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
2082 signer_provider: SP,
2087 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
2089 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
2090 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
2091 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
2092 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
2093 pub struct ChainParameters {
2094 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
2095 pub network: Network,
2097 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
2099 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
2100 pub best_block: BestBlock,
2103 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
2107 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2108 SkipPersistNoEvents,
2111 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
2112 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
2113 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
2114 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
2115 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
2116 /// updates are ready for persistence).
2118 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
2119 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
2120 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
2121 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2122 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
2123 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
2125 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
2126 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
2129 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
2130 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
2131 /// events to handle.
2133 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
2134 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
2136 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2137 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
2140 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
2141 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2142 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2143 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
2145 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2146 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2147 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2148 should_persist: move || {
2149 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
2150 // processing and return that.
2151 let notify = persist_check();
2152 match (notify, force_notify) {
2153 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2154 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2155 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2156 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2157 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
2160 _read_guard: read_guard,
2164 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
2165 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
2166 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
2167 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
2168 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2169 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2171 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2172 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2173 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2174 should_persist: persist_check,
2175 _read_guard: read_guard,
2180 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2181 fn drop(&mut self) {
2182 match (self.should_persist)() {
2183 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2184 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2185 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
2187 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2188 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2189 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2194 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
2195 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
2197 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
2199 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
2200 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
2201 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
2202 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
2203 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
2205 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
2206 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
2208 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
2210 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2211 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
2212 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
2213 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
2214 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
2215 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
2216 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
2217 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
2218 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
2219 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
2220 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
2221 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
2222 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
2224 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
2225 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
2227 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
2228 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
2229 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
2230 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
2232 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
2233 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
2234 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
2235 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
2236 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
2237 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
2239 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
2241 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
2242 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
2244 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
2246 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
2247 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
2249 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
2250 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
2251 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
2253 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
2254 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
2255 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
2257 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
2258 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
2259 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
2260 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
2262 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
2263 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
2264 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
2266 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
2267 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
2268 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
2270 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
2271 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2272 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
2273 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
2274 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
2275 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
2276 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
2277 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
2278 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
2279 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
2280 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
2283 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
2284 /// to better separate parameters.
2285 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2286 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
2287 /// The node_id of our counterparty
2288 pub node_id: PublicKey,
2289 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
2290 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
2291 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
2292 pub features: InitFeatures,
2293 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
2294 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
2295 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
2297 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
2299 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
2300 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
2301 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
2302 /// payments to us through this channel.
2303 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
2304 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
2305 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
2306 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
2307 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
2308 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
2309 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
2312 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
2313 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2314 pub struct ChannelDetails {
2315 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
2316 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
2317 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
2318 /// lifetime of the channel.
2319 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
2320 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
2321 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
2322 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
2323 /// our counterparty already.
2324 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
2325 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
2327 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
2328 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
2329 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
2330 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
2332 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
2333 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
2335 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
2336 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
2338 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
2339 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
2340 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
2341 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
2342 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
2343 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
2344 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
2345 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
2346 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
2349 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
2351 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
2352 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
2353 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
2354 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
2355 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
2356 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
2357 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
2359 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
2360 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
2362 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
2363 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
2364 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
2365 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
2366 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
2367 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
2368 /// this value on chain.
2370 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
2372 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2374 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
2375 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
2376 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
2377 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
2378 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
2379 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
2380 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
2382 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
2383 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
2384 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
2385 pub user_channel_id: u128,
2386 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
2387 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
2389 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
2390 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
2391 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
2392 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
2393 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
2395 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
2396 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
2397 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
2398 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
2400 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
2401 pub balance_msat: u64,
2402 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
2403 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
2404 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
2405 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
2407 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
2409 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
2410 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
2411 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
2412 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
2413 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
2414 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
2415 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
2416 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
2418 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
2419 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
2420 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
2421 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
2422 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
2423 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
2424 /// route which is valid.
2425 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
2426 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
2427 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
2428 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
2429 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
2430 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
2432 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
2433 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
2434 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
2435 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
2436 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
2437 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
2438 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
2439 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
2440 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
2442 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2444 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
2445 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
2446 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
2447 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
2448 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
2450 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
2451 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
2452 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
2453 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
2454 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
2455 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
2456 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
2458 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2459 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
2460 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
2461 pub is_outbound: bool,
2462 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
2463 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
2464 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
2465 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
2466 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
2468 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
2469 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
2470 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
2471 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
2472 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
2473 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
2474 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
2476 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
2477 pub is_usable: bool,
2478 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
2479 pub is_public: bool,
2480 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
2481 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
2482 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
2483 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
2484 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
2485 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
2487 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
2488 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
2489 /// Pending inbound HTLCs.
2491 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
2492 pub pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCDetails>,
2493 /// Pending outbound HTLCs.
2495 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
2496 pub pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails>,
2499 impl ChannelDetails {
2500 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
2501 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
2502 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
2504 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
2505 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
2506 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2507 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
2510 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
2511 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
2512 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
2514 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
2515 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
2516 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2517 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
2520 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
2521 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
2522 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
2525 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2526 F::Target: FeeEstimator
2528 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
2529 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
2530 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
2532 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2533 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
2534 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2535 features: latest_features,
2536 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
2537 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
2538 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
2539 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
2540 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
2541 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
2542 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
2543 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
2544 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
2545 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
2547 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
2548 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
2549 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
2550 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
2551 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
2552 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
2553 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
2554 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
2555 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
2556 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
2557 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
2558 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
2559 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
2560 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
2561 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2562 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2563 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
2564 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
2565 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
2566 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
2567 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
2568 is_usable: context.is_live(),
2569 is_public: context.should_announce(),
2570 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
2571 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
2572 config: Some(context.config()),
2573 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
2574 pending_inbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(),
2575 pending_outbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(),
2580 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
2581 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
2582 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
2583 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
2584 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
2585 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
2586 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
2587 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
2588 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
2590 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
2592 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
2593 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
2595 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
2596 NegotiatingClosingFee,
2597 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
2598 /// to drop the channel.
2602 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
2603 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2604 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
2605 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
2606 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
2608 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2609 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2610 payment_id: PaymentId,
2612 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
2614 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2615 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2616 payment_id: PaymentId,
2617 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
2619 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2620 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
2621 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
2624 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
2625 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
2626 /// payment is removed from tracking.
2628 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2629 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2630 payment_id: PaymentId,
2631 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
2632 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
2633 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
2635 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
2636 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
2637 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
2639 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2640 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2641 payment_id: PaymentId,
2642 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
2643 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2647 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
2649 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
2651 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
2652 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
2653 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
2654 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
2656 pub phantom_scid: u64,
2657 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
2658 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
2661 macro_rules! handle_error {
2662 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
2663 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
2664 // entering the macro.
2665 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2666 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2670 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2671 let mut msg_event = None;
2673 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2674 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2675 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2676 let logger = WithContext::from(
2677 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
2679 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2681 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2682 if let Some(update) = update_option {
2683 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = $self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
2684 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2689 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2692 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2694 msg_event = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2695 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2696 action: err.action.clone()
2700 if let Some(msg_event) = msg_event {
2701 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2702 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2703 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2704 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(msg_event);
2708 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2715 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2716 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2717 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2718 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2720 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2721 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2722 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2724 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2725 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2726 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2727 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2728 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2730 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2731 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2733 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2737 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2738 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2739 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2741 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2742 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2744 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2745 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2747 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2748 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2749 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2750 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2751 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2752 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2754 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2759 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2760 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2762 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2763 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2765 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2766 match $channel_phase {
2767 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2768 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2770 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2771 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2773 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2774 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2776 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2777 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2778 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2780 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2781 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2782 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2788 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2789 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2793 let key = *$entry.key();
2794 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2796 $entry.remove_entry();
2804 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2805 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2809 let key = *$entry.key();
2810 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2812 $entry.remove_entry();
2820 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2821 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2823 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2824 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2830 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2831 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2832 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2833 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2834 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2836 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2837 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2838 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2839 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2840 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2841 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2842 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2843 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2844 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2845 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2850 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2851 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2852 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2853 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2854 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2855 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2856 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2857 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2858 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2859 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2861 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2866 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2867 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2868 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2869 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2870 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2871 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2872 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2873 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2874 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2876 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2881 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2882 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2883 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2884 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2885 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2886 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2887 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2888 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2889 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2890 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2891 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2892 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2894 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2895 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2896 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2902 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2903 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2905 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2906 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2907 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.pending_update_adds,
2908 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2909 updates.announcement_sigs);
2910 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2911 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2914 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2915 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2916 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2917 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2919 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2920 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2921 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2922 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2923 let mut batch_completed = false;
2924 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2925 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2926 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2927 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2929 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2930 channel_state.2 = true;
2932 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2934 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2936 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2939 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2940 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2941 if batch_completed {
2942 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2943 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2944 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2945 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2946 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2947 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2948 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2949 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2950 chan.set_batch_ready();
2951 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2952 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2956 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2957 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2958 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2963 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2965 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2966 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2968 if let Some(decode) = decode_update_add_htlcs {
2969 $self.push_decode_update_add_htlcs(decode);
2971 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2972 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2973 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2974 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2979 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2980 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2981 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2982 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2984 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2985 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2986 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2987 panic!("{}", err_str);
2989 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2990 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2991 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2994 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
3000 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
3001 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
3002 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
3004 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
3005 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
3006 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
3007 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
3008 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
3009 // filter for uniqueness here.
3010 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
3011 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
3012 in_flight_updates.push($update);
3013 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
3015 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
3016 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
3018 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
3019 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
3020 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
3026 macro_rules! process_events_body {
3027 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
3028 let mut processed_all_events = false;
3029 while !processed_all_events {
3030 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
3037 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
3038 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
3039 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3041 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
3042 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
3043 result = $self.process_background_events();
3045 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3046 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3047 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3048 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3052 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
3053 let num_events = pending_events.len();
3054 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3055 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3058 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
3060 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
3061 $event_to_handle = event;
3063 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
3064 post_event_actions.push(action);
3069 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3070 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
3071 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
3072 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
3073 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
3074 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
3077 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
3078 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
3079 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
3080 processed_all_events = false;
3084 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
3085 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
3086 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
3088 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
3089 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
3090 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
3096 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
3098 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
3099 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3100 ES::Target: EntropySource,
3101 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3102 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
3103 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3107 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
3109 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
3111 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
3112 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
3114 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
3116 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
3117 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
3118 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
3121 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
3122 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
3123 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
3125 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
3126 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
3127 current_timestamp: u32,
3129 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3130 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
3131 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
3132 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
3134 default_configuration: config.clone(),
3135 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
3136 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
3141 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
3143 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
3144 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3145 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
3146 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3147 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3148 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
3149 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3150 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3151 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
3153 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
3156 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
3157 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
3159 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
3161 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
3163 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
3165 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
3166 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
3167 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3168 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3169 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
3170 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
3171 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
3172 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
3174 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3175 pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3185 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
3186 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
3187 &self.default_configuration
3190 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
3191 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3192 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
3195 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
3196 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
3198 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
3200 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
3204 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
3209 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
3211 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
3212 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
3213 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
3214 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
3215 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
3217 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
3218 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
3220 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
3221 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3222 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
3224 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
3225 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
3226 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
3228 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
3229 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
3231 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
3232 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
3233 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
3234 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
3235 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
3236 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
3238 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
3239 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
3240 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
3241 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
3242 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
3243 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
3246 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3247 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
3248 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3250 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3252 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
3253 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
3255 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3257 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
3258 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
3259 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
3264 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
3265 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3266 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
3267 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
3268 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
3269 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
3273 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
3278 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
3280 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
3281 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
3282 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3284 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
3286 panic!("RNG is bad???");
3289 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
3292 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
3293 node_id: their_network_key,
3296 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
3299 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3300 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3301 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3302 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3303 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3304 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3305 // the same channel.
3306 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3308 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3309 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3310 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3311 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3312 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3313 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
3314 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
3315 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
3316 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
3320 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
3321 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
3322 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3330 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
3331 /// more information.
3332 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3333 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3334 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3335 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3336 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3337 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3338 // the same channel.
3339 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3341 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3342 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3343 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3344 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3345 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3346 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
3347 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
3348 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
3356 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
3357 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
3359 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
3360 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
3362 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3363 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
3364 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
3365 // really wanted anyway.
3366 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
3369 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
3370 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3371 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3372 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3374 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3375 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3376 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3377 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3378 let context_to_details = |context| {
3379 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3381 return peer_state.channel_by_id
3383 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
3384 .map(context_to_details)
3390 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
3391 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
3393 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
3394 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
3395 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
3397 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3398 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
3399 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
3400 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
3401 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
3402 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3404 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
3405 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
3406 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3408 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
3409 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
3410 payment_id: *payment_id,
3411 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
3412 total_msat: *total_msat,
3415 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
3416 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3418 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
3419 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3421 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
3426 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3427 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3429 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
3430 let mut shutdown_result = None;
3433 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3435 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3436 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3438 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3439 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3441 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3442 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
3443 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3444 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
3445 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3446 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
3447 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
3448 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
3450 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
3451 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
3452 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
3453 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3454 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3458 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
3459 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
3461 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3462 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
3463 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
3464 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
3467 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3468 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
3471 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3472 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3474 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3475 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
3482 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3483 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3484 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
3485 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3488 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
3489 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3495 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3496 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3497 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3499 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
3500 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3502 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
3503 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
3504 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
3505 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
3507 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3509 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3510 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3511 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3514 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3515 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
3516 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3517 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3518 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3519 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
3522 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3523 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3524 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3526 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
3527 /// the channel being closed or not:
3528 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
3529 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
3530 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3531 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
3532 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
3533 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
3534 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
3536 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
3537 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
3538 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
3539 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
3541 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3543 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3544 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3545 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3548 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3549 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3550 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3551 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3552 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
3555 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
3556 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3557 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3558 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3559 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3562 let logger = WithContext::from(
3563 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
3566 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
3567 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
3568 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3569 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
3570 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3571 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
3572 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3574 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
3575 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
3576 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
3577 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
3578 // ignore the result here.
3579 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
3581 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3582 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
3583 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
3584 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
3585 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3586 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
3587 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
3588 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3589 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3590 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
3591 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3592 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
3595 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
3598 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
3599 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
3604 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3605 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
3606 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
3607 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
3608 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
3609 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
3610 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
3611 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
3614 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
3615 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
3616 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
3620 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3621 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3625 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
3626 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
3627 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
3628 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
3629 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3630 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3631 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
3632 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
3633 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3634 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
3635 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
3637 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
3639 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
3640 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3641 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
3642 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3643 mem::drop(peer_state);
3644 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3646 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
3647 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
3648 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
3650 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
3651 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3652 // Unfunded channel has no update
3653 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3655 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
3656 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
3657 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
3658 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3659 // Unfunded channel has no update
3660 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3663 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
3664 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
3665 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
3666 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
3668 (None, *peer_node_id)
3670 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3673 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3674 // If we have some Channel Update to broadcast, we cache it and broadcast it later.
3675 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
3676 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3681 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3684 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3685 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3686 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3687 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3688 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3689 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3690 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3691 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3692 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3693 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3694 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
3695 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
3706 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
3707 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
3708 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
3710 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3711 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3712 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3715 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3716 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3717 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3719 /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3720 /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3721 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3722 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3723 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3726 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3727 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3728 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3729 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3730 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3734 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3735 /// local transaction(s).
3736 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3737 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3738 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3742 fn can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(
3743 &self, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet: &NextPacketDetails
3744 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3745 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3746 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3747 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3748 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3749 return Err(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3751 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && next_packet.outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3752 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3753 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3754 // we don't have the channel here.
3755 return Err(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3758 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3759 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3760 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3761 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3762 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3763 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3764 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3765 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3766 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3767 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3768 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3769 return Err(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3771 return Err(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3774 if next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3775 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3776 return Err(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3778 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(msg, next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat, next_packet.outgoing_cltv_value) {
3779 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3780 return Err((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3786 /// Executes a callback `C` that returns some value `X` on the channel found with the given
3787 /// `scid`. `None` is returned when the channel is not found.
3788 fn do_funded_channel_callback<X, C: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> X>(
3789 &self, scid: u64, callback: C,
3791 let (counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&scid).cloned() {
3792 None => return None,
3793 Some((cp_id, id)) => (cp_id, id),
3795 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3796 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3797 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3800 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3801 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3802 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).and_then(
3803 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3806 Some(chan) => Some(callback(chan)),
3810 fn can_forward_htlc(
3811 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet_details: &NextPacketDetails
3812 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3813 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3814 self.can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(chan, msg, next_packet_details)
3817 Some(Err(e)) => return Err(e),
3819 // If we couldn't find the channel info for the scid, it may be a phantom or
3820 // intercept forward.
3821 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3822 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3823 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3825 return Err(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3830 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3831 if let Err((err_msg, err_code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3832 cur_height, next_packet_details.outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3834 let chan_update_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3835 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
3837 return Err((err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt));
3843 fn htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3844 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, err_msg: &'static str,
3845 mut err_code: u16, chan_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, is_intro_node_blinded_forward: bool,
3846 shared_secret: &[u8; 32]
3847 ) -> HTLCFailureMsg {
3848 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3849 if chan_update.is_some() && err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3850 let chan_update = chan_update.unwrap();
3851 if err_code == 0x1000 | 11 || err_code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3852 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3854 else if err_code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3855 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3857 else if err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3858 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3859 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3861 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3862 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3863 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3864 } else if err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3865 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3866 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3867 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3869 err_code = 0x2000 | 2;
3873 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3874 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", err_msg
3876 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3877 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3878 return HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3879 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3880 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3881 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3882 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3886 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_blinded_forward {
3887 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3889 (err_code, &res.0[..])
3891 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3892 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3893 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3894 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3895 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(shared_secret, &None),
3899 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3900 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3902 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3904 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3905 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3908 let next_packet_details = match next_packet_details_opt {
3909 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3910 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3911 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3914 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3915 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3916 self.can_forward_htlc(&msg, &next_packet_details).map_err(|e| {
3917 let (err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt) = e;
3918 self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3919 msg, counterparty_node_id, err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt,
3920 next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward(), &shared_secret
3924 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_details.next_packet_pubkey)))
3927 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3928 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3929 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3930 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3931 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3932 macro_rules! return_err {
3933 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3935 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3936 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3937 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3938 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3939 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3940 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3941 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3942 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3943 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3947 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3948 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3949 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3950 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3951 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3957 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3959 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3960 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3961 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3962 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3965 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3966 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3967 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3968 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3969 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3971 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3974 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3975 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3976 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3977 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3978 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3984 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3985 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3986 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3988 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3989 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3990 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3992 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3993 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3994 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3995 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3996 return Err(LightningError {
3997 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3998 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
4001 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
4002 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
4004 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4005 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
4006 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
4009 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
4010 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
4011 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
4012 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
4014 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
4015 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
4016 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
4018 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4019 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
4020 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
4021 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4022 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
4023 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
4024 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
4028 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
4031 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
4032 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4033 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
4034 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4036 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
4037 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
4038 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
4039 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
4040 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
4043 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
4044 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
4046 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
4047 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
4048 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
4049 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
4050 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
4051 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
4052 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
4053 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4055 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
4056 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
4057 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
4059 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
4061 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
4068 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4069 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4070 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
4071 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
4076 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4077 let SendAlongPathArgs {
4078 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
4081 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
4082 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
4083 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
4084 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
4086 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
4087 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
4088 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
4090 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
4091 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
4095 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
4096 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
4098 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
4099 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
4100 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
4102 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4105 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
4107 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
4108 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
4110 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4111 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4112 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
4113 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4114 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4115 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
4116 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
4117 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4118 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4119 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
4121 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
4122 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4123 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
4124 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4126 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
4127 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
4129 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4130 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
4131 Some(monitor_update) => {
4132 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
4134 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
4135 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
4136 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
4137 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
4138 // which we do in the send_payment check for
4139 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
4140 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
4148 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
4151 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
4152 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
4153 // `channel_by_id` map.
4154 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
4155 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
4159 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
4160 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
4162 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
4167 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
4169 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
4170 /// fields for more info.
4172 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
4173 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
4175 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
4177 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
4178 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
4179 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
4180 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
4181 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
4183 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
4184 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
4185 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
4186 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
4187 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
4189 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
4190 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
4191 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
4192 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
4194 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
4196 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
4197 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
4198 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
4200 /// In general, a path may raise:
4201 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
4202 /// node public key) is specified.
4203 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
4204 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
4205 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
4206 /// relevant updates.
4208 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
4209 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
4210 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
4212 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
4213 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
4214 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
4215 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
4216 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
4217 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4218 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
4219 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4220 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4221 self.pending_outbound_payments
4222 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
4223 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4224 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4227 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
4228 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
4229 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
4230 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4231 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4232 self.pending_outbound_payments
4233 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
4234 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
4235 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
4236 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4240 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
4241 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4242 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4243 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
4244 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
4245 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4249 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
4250 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4251 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
4255 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
4256 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
4259 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
4260 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4261 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4262 self.pending_outbound_payments
4263 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
4264 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4265 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
4266 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
4267 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
4271 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
4272 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
4273 /// retries are exhausted.
4275 /// # Event Generation
4277 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
4278 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
4280 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
4281 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
4282 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
4284 /// # Requested Invoices
4286 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
4287 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
4288 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
4289 /// once the invoice has been received.
4291 /// # Restart Behavior
4293 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
4294 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
4295 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
4297 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
4298 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
4299 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4300 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
4303 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
4304 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
4305 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
4306 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
4307 /// never reach the recipient.
4309 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
4310 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
4312 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
4313 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
4315 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
4316 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
4317 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4318 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4319 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
4320 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
4321 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4324 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
4325 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
4327 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
4330 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
4331 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
4332 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4333 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4334 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
4335 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4336 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4337 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4340 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
4341 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
4342 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
4343 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
4344 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4345 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4346 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
4347 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4348 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4351 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
4354 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
4355 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
4358 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
4359 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
4361 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
4362 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
4363 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
4364 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4365 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4366 let payment_params =
4367 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
4369 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
4371 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
4374 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
4375 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
4377 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
4378 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
4379 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
4380 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
4382 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
4383 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
4384 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
4385 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
4386 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
4387 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
4388 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
4389 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4390 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4391 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
4393 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
4394 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
4395 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
4396 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
4400 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
4402 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
4403 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
4406 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
4408 let mut res = Vec::new();
4410 for mut path in route.paths {
4411 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
4412 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
4413 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
4414 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
4415 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
4418 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
4421 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
4422 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
4424 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
4426 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
4427 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
4432 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
4435 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
4440 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
4441 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
4442 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
4444 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
4445 let used_liquidity =
4446 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
4448 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
4449 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
4451 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
4454 *used_liquidity += path_value;
4459 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
4460 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
4461 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
4468 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
4469 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
4470 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
4471 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
4472 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
4473 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4474 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4475 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4476 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4478 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4479 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4481 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
4482 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
4483 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
4485 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4486 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
4487 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
4488 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
4489 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
4490 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
4491 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
4492 } else { unreachable!(); });
4494 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
4495 Err((chan, err)) => {
4496 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4497 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4498 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4499 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4500 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
4506 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
4507 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4509 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
4510 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4513 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
4514 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4515 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4519 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4520 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
4521 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4525 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
4526 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4527 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
4529 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4530 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4531 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
4532 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
4533 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
4535 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
4536 funding_txo, o.get()
4538 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
4539 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4540 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4541 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
4542 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
4543 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
4546 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
4553 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4554 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
4555 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
4559 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
4561 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
4562 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
4564 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
4565 /// across the p2p network.
4567 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
4568 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
4570 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
4571 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
4572 /// keys per-channel).
4574 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
4575 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
4576 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
4578 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
4579 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
4580 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
4582 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
4583 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
4584 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
4585 /// for more details.
4587 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
4588 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
4589 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4590 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
4593 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
4595 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
4596 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
4598 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
4599 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
4600 /// signature for each channel.
4602 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
4603 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4604 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4605 let mut result = Ok(());
4607 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
4608 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
4609 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
4610 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4611 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
4616 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
4617 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4618 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
4622 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4623 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
4624 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
4625 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
4626 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
4627 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
4628 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
4629 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
4631 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4632 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
4637 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
4638 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
4639 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
4640 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
4644 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
4645 match states.entry(txid) {
4646 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4647 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4648 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
4652 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
4655 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
4656 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
4657 temporary_channel_id,
4658 counterparty_node_id,
4659 funding_transaction.clone(),
4662 let mut output_index = None;
4663 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
4664 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4665 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
4666 if output_index.is_some() {
4667 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4668 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
4671 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4674 if output_index.is_none() {
4675 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4676 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
4679 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4680 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4681 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4682 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4683 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4684 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4690 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4691 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4692 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4693 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4694 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4695 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4696 .into_iter().flatten()
4697 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4699 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4700 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4702 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4704 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4705 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4706 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4707 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4708 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
4710 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4711 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4712 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4716 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4717 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4718 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4724 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4726 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4727 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4728 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4729 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4731 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4732 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4734 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4735 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4737 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4739 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4740 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4741 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4742 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4743 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4744 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4745 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4746 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4747 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4748 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4749 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4750 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4751 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4755 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4756 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4757 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4758 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4759 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4760 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4762 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4763 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4764 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4765 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4769 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4770 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4771 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4772 config.apply(config_update);
4773 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4776 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4777 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4778 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
4779 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4780 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4781 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4782 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4789 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4790 debug_assert!(false);
4791 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4793 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4794 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4801 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4803 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4804 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4805 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4806 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4808 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4809 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4811 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4812 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4814 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4816 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4817 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4818 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4819 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4820 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4821 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4822 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4823 pub fn update_channel_config(
4824 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4825 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4826 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4829 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4830 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4832 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4833 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4835 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4836 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4837 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4838 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4839 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4841 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4842 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4843 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4846 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4849 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4850 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4851 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4852 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4853 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4854 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4855 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4857 let next_hop_scid = {
4858 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4859 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4860 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4861 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4862 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4863 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4864 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4865 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4866 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4867 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4870 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4872 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4873 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4874 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4877 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4878 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4879 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4880 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4881 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4888 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4889 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4890 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4893 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4894 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4895 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4896 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4899 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4901 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4902 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4903 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4904 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4905 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4908 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4909 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4910 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4911 payment.prev_channel_id,
4912 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4913 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4915 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4919 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4920 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4922 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4925 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4926 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4927 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4929 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4930 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4931 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4934 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4935 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4936 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4937 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4938 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4939 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4940 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4941 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4942 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4943 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4946 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4947 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4948 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4949 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4954 fn process_pending_update_add_htlcs(&self) {
4955 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4956 mem::swap(&mut decode_update_add_htlcs, &mut self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4958 let get_failed_htlc_destination = |outgoing_scid_opt: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash| {
4959 if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt {
4960 match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid) {
4961 Some((outgoing_counterparty_node_id, outgoing_channel_id)) =>
4962 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
4963 node_id: Some(*outgoing_counterparty_node_id),
4964 channel_id: *outgoing_channel_id,
4966 None => HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop {
4967 requested_forward_scid: outgoing_scid,
4971 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }
4975 'outer_loop: for (incoming_scid, update_add_htlcs) in decode_update_add_htlcs {
4976 let incoming_channel_details_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
4977 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4978 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
4979 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
4980 let user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
4981 let accept_underpaying_htlcs = chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs;
4982 (counterparty_node_id, channel_id, funding_txo, user_channel_id, accept_underpaying_htlcs)
4985 incoming_counterparty_node_id, incoming_channel_id, incoming_funding_txo,
4986 incoming_user_channel_id, incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs
4987 ) = if let Some(incoming_channel_details) = incoming_channel_details_opt {
4988 incoming_channel_details
4990 // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
4994 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
4995 let mut htlc_fails = Vec::new();
4996 for update_add_htlc in &update_add_htlcs {
4997 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = match decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
4998 &update_add_htlc, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
5000 Ok(decoded_onion) => decoded_onion,
5002 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, HTLCDestination::InvalidOnion));
5007 let is_intro_node_blinded_forward = next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward();
5008 let outgoing_scid_opt = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref().map(|d| d.outgoing_scid);
5010 // Process the HTLC on the incoming channel.
5011 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
5012 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5013 chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(
5014 update_add_htlc, &self.fee_estimator, &logger,
5018 Some(Err((err, code))) => {
5019 let outgoing_chan_update_opt = if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt.as_ref() {
5020 self.do_funded_channel_callback(*outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
5021 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
5026 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
5027 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
5028 outgoing_chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
5030 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
5031 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
5034 // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
5035 None => continue 'outer_loop,
5038 // Now process the HTLC on the outgoing channel if it's a forward.
5039 if let Some(next_packet_details) = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref() {
5040 if let Err((err, code, chan_update_opt)) = self.can_forward_htlc(
5041 &update_add_htlc, next_packet_details
5043 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
5044 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
5045 chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
5047 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
5048 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
5053 match self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
5054 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
5055 incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_details_opt.map(|d| d.next_packet_pubkey),
5057 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(htlc_forward) => {
5058 htlc_forwards.push((htlc_forward, update_add_htlc.htlc_id));
5060 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(htlc_fail) => {
5061 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
5062 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
5067 // Process all of the forwards and failures for the channel in which the HTLCs were
5068 // proposed to as a batch.
5069 let pending_forwards = (incoming_scid, incoming_funding_txo, incoming_channel_id,
5070 incoming_user_channel_id, htlc_forwards.drain(..).collect());
5071 self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&mut [pending_forwards]);
5072 for (htlc_fail, htlc_destination) in htlc_fails.drain(..) {
5073 let failure = match htlc_fail {
5074 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(fail_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
5075 htlc_id: fail_htlc.htlc_id,
5076 err_packet: fail_htlc.reason,
5078 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(fail_malformed_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5079 htlc_id: fail_malformed_htlc.htlc_id,
5080 sha256_of_onion: fail_malformed_htlc.sha256_of_onion,
5081 failure_code: fail_malformed_htlc.failure_code,
5084 self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().entry(incoming_scid).or_insert(vec![]).push(failure);
5085 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5086 prev_channel_id: incoming_channel_id,
5087 failed_next_destination: htlc_destination,
5093 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
5095 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
5096 /// Will likely generate further events.
5097 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
5098 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5100 self.process_pending_update_add_htlcs();
5102 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
5103 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
5104 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
5106 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
5107 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
5109 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
5110 if short_chan_id != 0 {
5111 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
5112 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
5114 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5115 match forward_info {
5116 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5117 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5118 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5119 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
5120 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
5123 macro_rules! failure_handler {
5124 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
5125 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id));
5126 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
5128 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5129 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5130 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5131 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5132 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5133 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5134 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5135 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
5136 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
5139 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
5140 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
5142 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
5145 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
5146 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
5152 macro_rules! fail_forward {
5153 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
5155 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
5159 macro_rules! failed_payment {
5160 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
5162 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
5166 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
5167 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
5168 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
5169 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
5170 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
5171 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
5172 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
5175 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
5176 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
5177 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
5178 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
5179 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
5181 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
5183 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
5184 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
5188 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
5189 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
5190 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
5191 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
5192 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
5193 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
5195 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
5196 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
5202 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
5205 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
5208 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
5209 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
5210 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
5211 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
5212 // problem, not ours.
5218 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
5219 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
5220 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
5222 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5226 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
5227 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5228 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5229 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5230 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5233 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5234 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5235 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
5236 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5237 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5238 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
5239 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5240 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5241 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5242 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
5243 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
5244 onion_packet, blinded, ..
5245 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5248 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
5249 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5250 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5251 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5252 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5253 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5254 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5255 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5256 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
5257 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5258 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
5260 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
5261 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
5262 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
5263 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
5264 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
5265 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
5268 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
5269 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
5270 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
5273 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5274 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
5276 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
5278 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
5279 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
5280 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5281 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
5287 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
5288 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
5290 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
5291 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5292 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
5294 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
5295 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5296 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
5297 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
5299 Some((res, htlc_id))
5302 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5303 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5304 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5305 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
5307 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
5309 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
5310 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
5311 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
5317 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5321 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5322 match forward_info {
5323 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5324 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5325 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5326 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
5327 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5330 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
5331 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
5332 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
5333 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
5334 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
5336 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
5337 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
5338 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
5339 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
5340 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
5342 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
5343 payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata,
5344 incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
5346 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
5347 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
5351 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
5352 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
5355 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
5358 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
5359 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
5360 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5361 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5362 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5363 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5364 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5365 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5366 phantom_shared_secret,
5369 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
5370 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
5371 // if routing nodes overpay
5372 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
5373 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
5375 total_value_received: None,
5376 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
5379 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
5382 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
5384 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
5385 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
5386 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
5387 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5388 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
5389 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
5391 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5392 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
5393 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
5394 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5395 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5396 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
5397 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5398 phantom_shared_secret,
5401 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5402 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
5404 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
5407 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
5408 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5409 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5410 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5411 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5414 macro_rules! check_total_value {
5415 ($purpose: expr) => {{
5416 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
5417 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
5418 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
5419 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
5421 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5422 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
5423 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5425 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
5426 .entry(payment_hash)
5427 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
5428 .or_insert_with(|| {
5429 committed_to_claimable = true;
5431 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
5434 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
5435 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
5436 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
5437 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5439 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5440 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
5441 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5443 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
5444 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
5445 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5448 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
5450 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
5451 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
5452 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
5453 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
5454 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
5455 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
5456 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5457 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
5458 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
5459 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
5461 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
5463 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
5464 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
5465 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5466 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5467 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5468 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
5470 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5471 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5472 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5473 committed_to_claimable = true;
5475 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5476 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
5477 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
5478 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
5479 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
5480 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
5481 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
5482 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
5483 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5487 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
5488 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
5489 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5490 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
5491 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
5493 payment_claimable_generated = true;
5495 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
5496 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
5498 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5499 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5500 committed_to_claimable = true;
5503 payment_claimable_generated
5507 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
5508 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
5509 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
5510 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
5511 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
5512 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
5513 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5514 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5515 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5516 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5517 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
5518 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5519 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
5520 Ok(result) => result,
5522 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
5523 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5526 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
5527 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
5528 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
5529 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
5530 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
5531 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5534 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
5535 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
5536 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
5538 check_total_value!(purpose);
5540 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
5541 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
5542 check_total_value!(purpose);
5546 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
5547 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5548 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
5549 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5551 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5552 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
5553 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
5554 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5555 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
5556 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
5557 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
5558 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5560 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
5561 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
5562 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
5564 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
5565 if payment_claimable_generated {
5566 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
5572 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
5573 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
5581 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
5582 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
5583 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
5584 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
5586 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
5587 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5589 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
5591 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
5592 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
5593 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
5595 self.check_free_holding_cells();
5597 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
5598 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5599 events.append(&mut new_events);
5602 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
5604 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
5605 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
5606 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
5608 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
5610 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
5611 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
5612 if background_events.is_empty() {
5613 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5616 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
5618 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
5619 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
5620 // monitor updating completing.
5621 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5623 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
5624 let mut updated_chan = false;
5626 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5627 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5628 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5629 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5630 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5631 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
5632 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
5633 updated_chan = true;
5634 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
5635 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5637 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
5640 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
5645 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
5646 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5649 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
5650 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5651 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5652 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5653 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5654 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
5655 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5657 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5658 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5659 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5660 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5661 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5667 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5670 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5671 /// Process background events, for functional testing
5672 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
5673 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5674 let _ = self.process_background_events();
5677 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
5678 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
5680 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5682 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
5683 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
5684 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5686 if !chan.context.is_live() {
5687 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
5688 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5689 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5691 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
5692 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5694 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
5695 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5699 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
5700 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
5701 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
5702 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
5703 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
5704 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5705 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5707 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5708 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5710 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5711 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5712 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5713 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5714 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
5715 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
5717 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5722 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5723 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5731 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
5733 /// This currently includes:
5734 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
5735 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
5736 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
5738 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
5739 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
5740 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
5741 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
5742 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
5743 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
5744 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
5745 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
5747 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
5748 /// estimate fetches.
5750 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
5751 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
5752 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
5753 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5754 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5756 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5757 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5759 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
5760 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
5761 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
5762 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
5764 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
5765 chan_id: &ChannelId,
5766 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
5767 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
5768 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5769 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
5771 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5772 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
5773 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
5775 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
5776 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
5777 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
5778 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5779 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5780 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5781 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5782 channel_id: *chan_id,
5783 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
5794 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5795 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5796 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5797 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5798 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5799 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
5800 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
5802 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5803 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5808 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5809 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5811 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
5812 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
5813 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
5814 if needs_close { return false; }
5817 match chan.channel_update_status() {
5818 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5819 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5820 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5821 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5822 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5823 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5824 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5826 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5827 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5828 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5829 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5830 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5834 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5836 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5839 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5841 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5842 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5843 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5844 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5845 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5849 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5851 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5857 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5859 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5860 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5861 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5862 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5863 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5864 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5865 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5866 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5867 channel_id: *chan_id,
5868 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5876 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5877 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5878 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5880 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5881 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5882 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5884 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5885 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5886 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5887 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5889 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5890 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5891 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5892 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5897 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5898 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5899 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5900 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5901 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5902 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5903 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5904 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5905 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5911 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5913 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5914 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5919 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5920 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5921 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5922 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5923 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5924 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5925 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5926 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5927 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5928 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5929 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5930 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5931 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5932 // have no channels to the peer.
5933 let remove_entry = {
5934 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5935 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5938 entry.remove_entry();
5941 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5946 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5947 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5948 // This should be unreachable
5949 debug_assert!(false);
5952 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5953 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5954 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5955 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5956 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5957 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5958 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5961 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5962 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5963 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5965 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5966 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5973 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5974 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5975 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5976 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5977 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5980 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5981 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5984 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5985 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5988 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5989 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5990 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5991 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5992 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5993 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5994 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5997 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5998 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
6001 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
6002 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
6003 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
6004 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6005 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6012 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
6013 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
6014 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
6016 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
6017 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
6018 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
6019 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
6021 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
6022 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
6023 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
6024 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
6025 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
6026 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
6029 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
6030 /// reason for the failure.
6032 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
6033 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
6034 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6036 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
6037 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
6038 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
6039 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
6040 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6041 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
6042 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6047 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
6048 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
6049 match failure_code {
6050 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
6051 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
6052 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
6053 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6054 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
6055 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
6057 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
6058 let fail_data = match data {
6059 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
6062 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
6067 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
6068 /// that we want to return and a channel.
6070 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
6072 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
6073 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
6074 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
6075 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
6076 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
6077 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
6078 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
6080 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
6082 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
6083 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
6085 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6090 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
6091 /// that we want to return and a channel.
6092 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
6093 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
6094 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
6095 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
6096 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
6097 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
6098 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
6099 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6101 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6102 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6103 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6104 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
6106 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
6107 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
6108 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
6109 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
6110 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6114 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
6115 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
6116 // be surfaced to the user.
6117 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
6118 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
6119 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
6121 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
6122 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6123 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6124 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6125 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6126 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
6127 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6128 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
6129 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
6131 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
6132 debug_assert!(false);
6133 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6136 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6138 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
6141 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
6142 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
6143 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
6144 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6148 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
6149 let push_forward_event = self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(source, payment_hash, onion_error, destination);
6150 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
6153 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
6154 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
6155 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) -> bool {
6156 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
6157 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
6158 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
6159 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
6160 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6161 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6162 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6165 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
6166 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
6167 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
6170 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6171 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
6172 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6173 let mut push_forward_event;
6175 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
6176 push_forward_event = self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
6177 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
6178 &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
6180 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6181 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
6182 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
6185 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id)),
6186 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
6187 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
6189 let failure = match blinded_failure {
6190 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
6191 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
6192 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
6193 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
6195 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
6197 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
6198 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
6200 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6201 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
6205 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
6206 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
6208 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
6212 push_forward_event = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
6213 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6214 push_forward_event &= forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6215 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
6216 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6217 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
6219 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6220 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
6223 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
6224 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6225 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
6226 prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
6227 failed_next_destination: destination,
6234 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
6235 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
6237 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
6238 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
6239 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
6240 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
6242 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
6243 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
6244 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
6245 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
6247 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
6248 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
6249 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
6251 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6252 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
6253 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
6254 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
6255 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6256 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6257 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
6258 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
6259 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
6262 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
6263 /// even type numbers.
6267 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
6268 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
6270 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6271 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
6272 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
6275 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
6276 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
6278 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6281 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6282 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
6283 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
6284 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
6285 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
6286 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
6287 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
6288 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
6293 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
6294 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
6295 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
6296 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
6297 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
6299 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
6300 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
6301 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
6305 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
6306 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
6307 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
6308 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
6309 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6310 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
6311 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
6312 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
6313 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6314 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6315 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6324 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
6326 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
6327 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
6328 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
6329 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
6330 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
6331 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
6332 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
6333 let mut valid_mpp = true;
6334 let mut errs = Vec::new();
6335 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6336 for htlc in sources.iter() {
6337 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
6338 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6339 debug_assert!(false);
6343 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
6345 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
6346 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6347 debug_assert!(false);
6351 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
6352 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
6354 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6355 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
6356 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6357 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
6360 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
6361 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6362 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
6363 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
6367 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6368 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
6369 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
6370 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
6371 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
6372 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
6373 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
6376 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
6377 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
6378 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
6379 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
6380 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
6381 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
6386 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6387 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6388 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
6389 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6390 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
6391 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6392 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6394 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6397 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
6398 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
6399 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6400 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6404 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
6405 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
6406 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
6407 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
6409 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
6410 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
6411 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
6412 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6414 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
6415 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
6416 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6417 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6420 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6421 let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
6422 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
6423 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
6427 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
6428 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6429 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
6432 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
6433 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
6434 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6435 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6436 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6437 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6438 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6439 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
6442 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
6443 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
6444 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
6446 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
6449 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6450 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6452 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
6453 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
6454 // monitor update as a background event.
6455 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6456 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6457 counterparty_node_id,
6458 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
6459 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
6460 update: monitor_update.clone(),
6464 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
6465 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
6470 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6472 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
6474 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
6475 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6476 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
6477 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
6478 blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
6480 (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
6482 debug_assert!(false,
6483 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
6486 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
6487 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6488 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
6489 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6490 .get_mut(&channel_id)
6492 let mut found_blocker = false;
6493 blockers.retain(|iter| {
6494 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
6495 // which case we need to only remove the one
6496 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
6497 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
6498 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
6499 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
6501 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
6504 debug_assert!(false);
6513 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6514 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
6515 counterparty_node_id: None,
6516 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6519 channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
6523 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
6524 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
6525 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
6526 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
6527 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
6528 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
6529 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
6530 // again on restart.
6531 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id)),
6532 "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
6533 payment_preimage, update_res);
6536 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
6537 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
6539 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
6540 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
6541 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
6542 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
6543 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
6544 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
6545 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
6546 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6547 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
6548 prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
6551 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
6552 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
6553 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
6554 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
6555 // `PaymentForwarded`).
6556 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
6560 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
6561 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
6564 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
6565 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
6566 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
6567 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId, next_user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
6570 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
6571 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
6572 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
6573 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6574 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
6576 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6577 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
6578 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
6580 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
6581 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
6584 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
6585 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
6586 let prev_user_channel_id = hop_data.user_channel_id;
6587 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
6588 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6589 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
6590 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
6591 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
6592 let chan_to_release =
6593 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6594 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
6596 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
6597 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
6598 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
6599 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
6604 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
6605 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
6606 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
6607 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
6608 // in the background.
6609 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
6610 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6611 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
6612 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
6614 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
6615 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6616 funding_txo, update, ..
6618 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
6619 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
6620 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6621 payment_preimage: update_preimage
6623 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
6629 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
6630 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
6631 (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
6633 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
6634 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
6636 monitor_update.updates[0],
6637 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
6642 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
6643 // immediately once we get going.
6644 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
6647 *channel_id == prev_channel_id,
6649 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
6652 } else if definitely_duplicate {
6653 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
6654 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6655 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
6656 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
6657 downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
6658 blocking_action: other_chan.3,
6662 let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
6663 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
6664 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
6667 debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
6668 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
6669 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6670 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
6671 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
6672 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
6673 prev_user_channel_id,
6674 next_user_channel_id,
6675 total_fee_earned_msat,
6677 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
6678 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
6680 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
6684 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
6685 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6686 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
6692 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
6693 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
6694 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
6697 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
6698 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6699 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6700 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6702 for action in actions.into_iter() {
6704 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
6705 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6706 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
6708 payment_purpose: purpose,
6711 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
6713 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
6717 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
6719 sender_intended_total_msat,
6723 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6724 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
6726 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
6727 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
6728 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
6731 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6732 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
6734 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
6735 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
6736 downstream_funding_outpoint,
6737 downstream_channel_id,
6738 Some(blocking_action),
6745 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
6746 /// update completion.
6747 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
6748 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
6749 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
6750 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
6751 funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
6752 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
6753 -> (Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)>, Option<(u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)>) {
6754 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6755 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {} pending update_add_htlcs, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
6756 &channel.context.channel_id(),
6757 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
6758 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
6759 pending_forwards.len(), pending_update_adds.len(),
6760 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
6761 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
6762 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
6764 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6765 let short_channel_id = channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias());
6767 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
6768 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6769 htlc_forwards = Some((short_channel_id, channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
6770 channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
6772 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = None;
6773 if !pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
6774 decode_update_add_htlcs = Some((short_channel_id, pending_update_adds));
6777 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
6778 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
6780 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
6781 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6782 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6787 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
6788 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
6789 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
6790 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6795 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
6796 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
6797 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
6798 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6799 msg: revoke_and_ack,
6804 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
6808 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
6814 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
6815 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
6816 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6820 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6821 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
6822 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6825 (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs)
6828 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
6829 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6831 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6832 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6834 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6835 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6836 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6837 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6838 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6843 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6844 let mut peer_state_lock;
6845 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6846 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6847 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6848 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6850 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6853 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6854 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6855 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6856 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6857 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6860 let remaining_in_flight =
6861 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6862 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6865 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6866 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6867 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6868 remaining_in_flight);
6869 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
6872 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6875 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6877 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6878 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6881 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6882 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6883 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6885 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6886 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6887 /// used to accept such channels.
6889 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6890 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6891 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6892 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6895 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6896 /// it as confirmed immediately.
6898 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6899 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6900 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6902 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6903 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6905 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6906 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6908 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6909 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6911 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6912 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6913 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6914 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6917 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6919 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6920 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6922 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6923 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6924 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6925 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6927 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6928 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6930 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6932 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6933 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6934 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6936 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6937 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6938 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6940 let res = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6941 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6942 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6943 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6944 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6945 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6946 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|err| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(err, *temporary_channel_id))
6949 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6950 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6952 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6958 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6959 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6960 match handle_error!(self, Result::<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>::Err(err), *counterparty_node_id) {
6961 Ok(_) => unreachable!("`handle_error` only returns Err as we've passed in an Err"),
6963 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err });
6967 Ok(mut channel) => {
6969 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6970 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6971 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6972 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6973 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6974 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6975 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6978 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6979 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6980 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6982 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6984 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6985 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6986 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6987 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6988 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6989 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6990 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6991 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6994 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6995 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6996 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6998 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
7002 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
7003 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
7004 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7006 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
7007 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7008 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
7011 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
7018 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
7019 /// or 0-conf channels.
7021 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
7022 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
7023 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
7024 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
7025 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
7026 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
7028 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7029 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
7030 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7031 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
7032 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
7033 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
7034 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
7038 return peers_without_funded_channels;
7041 fn unfunded_channel_count(
7042 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
7044 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
7045 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
7047 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7048 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
7049 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
7050 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
7051 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
7053 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
7056 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
7057 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
7058 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
7061 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
7062 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
7063 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
7064 // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
7065 // included in the unfunded count.
7066 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
7067 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
7068 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
7071 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
7072 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
7075 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
7076 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
7077 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
7078 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
7083 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
7086 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7087 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
7088 // likely to be lost on restart!
7089 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
7090 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
7091 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7094 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
7095 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
7096 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7099 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
7100 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
7101 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
7102 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
7103 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
7105 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7106 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7108 debug_assert!(false);
7109 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7110 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7111 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
7113 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7114 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7116 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
7117 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
7118 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
7119 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
7120 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
7121 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
7123 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7124 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
7125 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7128 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
7129 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
7130 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7131 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
7132 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7135 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
7136 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
7138 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7139 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
7140 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7143 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
7144 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
7145 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
7146 &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
7148 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
7150 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7151 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
7152 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
7153 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7154 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
7155 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
7158 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
7159 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
7160 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
7165 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
7166 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
7167 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
7168 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
7169 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
7170 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
7171 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7174 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7179 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
7180 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
7181 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7182 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
7183 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7185 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
7186 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7187 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
7188 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7191 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
7192 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7194 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
7195 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7196 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
7198 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
7202 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7203 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
7204 // likely to be lost on restart!
7205 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
7206 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7207 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7209 debug_assert!(false);
7210 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
7212 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7213 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7214 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
7215 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
7216 match phase.get_mut() {
7217 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7218 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
7219 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
7222 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7226 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
7229 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7230 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
7231 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
7232 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7233 channel_value_satoshis: value,
7235 user_channel_id: user_id,
7240 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7241 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7243 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7244 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7246 debug_assert!(false);
7247 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
7250 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7251 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7252 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
7253 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
7254 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
7255 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
7256 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
7258 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
7259 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
7260 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
7261 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7262 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
7263 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
7264 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
7265 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
7266 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
7270 Some(mut phase) => {
7271 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
7272 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
7273 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
7275 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
7278 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
7280 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
7281 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
7282 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
7283 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
7284 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
7285 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
7287 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
7288 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
7289 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
7292 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
7293 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7294 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
7296 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7297 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7298 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
7299 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7300 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
7302 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
7303 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
7304 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
7305 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
7306 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
7308 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
7309 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
7310 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
7311 // until we have persisted our monitor.
7312 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
7313 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7314 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7319 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
7320 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
7321 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7323 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
7327 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7328 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
7329 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
7337 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7338 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7339 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7340 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7342 debug_assert!(false);
7343 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7346 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7347 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7348 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7349 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
7350 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
7351 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
7352 let logger = WithContext::from(
7354 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
7355 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
7358 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
7360 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
7361 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
7362 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
7363 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
7364 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
7365 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
7366 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
7367 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7368 } else { unreachable!(); }
7371 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
7372 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
7373 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
7374 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
7375 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
7376 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
7377 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7381 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
7382 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
7383 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
7384 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
7385 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7386 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7390 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
7393 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
7397 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7398 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7399 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7400 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7401 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7403 debug_assert!(false);
7404 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7406 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7407 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7408 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7409 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7410 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7411 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7412 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
7413 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7414 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
7415 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7416 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7417 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7418 msg: announcement_sigs,
7420 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7421 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
7422 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
7423 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
7424 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
7425 // announcement_signatures.
7426 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7427 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7428 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7429 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7436 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7437 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
7442 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7443 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
7446 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7447 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7452 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7453 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
7454 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
7456 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7457 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7459 debug_assert!(false);
7460 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7462 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7463 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7464 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7465 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
7467 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7468 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
7469 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7470 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
7472 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
7475 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7476 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7477 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7478 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
7480 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
7481 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
7482 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
7483 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
7484 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7485 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7489 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
7490 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7491 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7492 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7495 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
7496 let context = phase.context_mut();
7497 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
7498 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7499 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7500 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7502 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
7503 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
7504 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
7505 let context = phase.context_mut();
7506 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7507 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7508 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7512 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7515 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
7516 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
7517 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7518 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
7520 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
7521 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
7527 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7528 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7529 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7531 debug_assert!(false);
7532 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7534 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
7535 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7536 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7537 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7538 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7539 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7540 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7541 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7542 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
7543 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7544 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7549 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
7550 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
7551 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
7552 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
7553 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
7554 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
7555 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
7557 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7558 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7561 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7564 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
7565 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
7566 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
7567 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
7569 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
7570 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7571 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
7572 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7577 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7578 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
7579 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7584 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7585 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
7586 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
7587 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
7589 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
7590 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
7591 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
7592 //but we should prevent it anyway.
7594 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7595 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7597 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
7598 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7599 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7601 debug_assert!(false);
7602 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7604 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7605 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7606 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7607 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7608 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7609 let mut pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
7610 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
7611 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
7612 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
7613 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
7615 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
7617 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7618 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
7619 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
7620 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
7621 if let Err((_, error_code)) = chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &logger) {
7622 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
7623 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
7624 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7625 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7626 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7627 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
7628 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
7632 match pending_forward_info {
7633 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
7634 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
7636 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
7637 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
7638 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
7639 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
7640 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
7642 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
7643 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
7644 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7645 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7646 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7649 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg));
7655 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), chan_phase_entry);
7657 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7658 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7661 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7666 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7668 let next_user_channel_id;
7669 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
7670 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7671 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7673 debug_assert!(false);
7674 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7676 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7677 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7678 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7679 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7680 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7681 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7682 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
7683 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7685 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
7687 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
7688 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7689 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
7691 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
7692 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
7693 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
7694 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
7695 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
7696 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
7697 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
7698 next_user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
7701 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7702 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7705 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7708 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
7709 Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
7710 funding_txo, msg.channel_id, Some(next_user_channel_id),
7716 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7717 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7718 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7719 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7720 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7722 debug_assert!(false);
7723 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7725 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7726 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7727 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7728 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7729 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7730 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
7732 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7733 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7736 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7741 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7742 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7743 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7744 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7745 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7747 debug_assert!(false);
7748 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7750 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7751 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7752 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7753 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7754 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
7755 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
7756 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
7758 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7759 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
7761 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7762 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7766 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7770 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7771 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7772 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7774 debug_assert!(false);
7775 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7777 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7778 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7779 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7780 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7781 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7782 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7783 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7784 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7785 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7786 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
7787 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7791 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7792 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7795 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7799 fn push_decode_update_add_htlcs(&self, mut update_add_htlcs: (u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)) {
7800 let mut push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7801 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7802 push_forward_event &= decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty();
7803 let scid = update_add_htlcs.0;
7804 match decode_update_add_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7805 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => { e.get_mut().append(&mut update_add_htlcs.1); },
7806 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(update_add_htlcs.1); },
7808 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
7812 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
7813 let push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(per_source_pending_forwards);
7814 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7818 fn forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) -> bool {
7819 let mut push_forward_event = false;
7820 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
7821 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
7822 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
7823 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
7824 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
7825 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
7826 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7827 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
7828 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
7830 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
7831 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
7833 let decode_update_add_htlcs_empty = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7834 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7835 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
7836 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7837 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7838 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7839 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
7841 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7842 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
7843 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
7845 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
7846 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7847 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
7848 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7849 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
7850 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
7851 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
7852 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
7853 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
7856 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7857 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
7859 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7860 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id));
7861 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7862 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7863 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7864 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7865 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7866 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7867 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7868 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7869 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7870 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7873 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7874 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7875 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7880 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7881 // payments are being processed.
7882 push_forward_event |= forward_htlcs_empty && decode_update_add_htlcs_empty;
7883 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7884 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7891 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7892 push_forward_event |= self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7895 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7896 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7897 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7903 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7904 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7905 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7906 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7907 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7909 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7910 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7911 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7912 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7913 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7914 // real by taking more time.
7915 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7916 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7917 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7922 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7923 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7924 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7925 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7926 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7927 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7928 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7930 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7931 .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7932 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7933 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7934 channel_funding_outpoint,
7936 counterparty_node_id,
7941 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7942 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7943 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7945 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7946 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7947 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7948 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7950 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7951 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7952 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7958 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7959 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7960 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7961 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7963 debug_assert!(false);
7964 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7965 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7966 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7967 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7968 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7969 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7970 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7971 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7972 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7973 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7974 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
7975 *counterparty_node_id)
7977 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7978 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7979 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7980 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7981 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7982 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7983 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7987 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7988 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7991 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7994 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7998 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7999 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8000 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
8002 debug_assert!(false);
8003 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8005 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8006 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8007 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
8008 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8009 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8010 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8011 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
8013 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8014 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8017 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
8022 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8023 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8024 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
8026 debug_assert!(false);
8027 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8029 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8030 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8031 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
8032 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8033 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8034 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
8035 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
8038 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8039 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
8040 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
8041 msg, &self.default_configuration
8042 ), chan_phase_entry),
8043 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8044 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8045 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
8048 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8049 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8052 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
8057 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
8058 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8059 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
8060 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
8062 // It's not a local channel
8063 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
8066 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8067 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
8068 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
8069 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
8071 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8072 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8073 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
8074 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8075 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8076 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
8077 if chan.context.should_announce() {
8078 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
8079 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
8080 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
8081 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
8083 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
8085 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
8086 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
8087 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
8088 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
8090 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8091 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
8092 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
8093 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
8096 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
8100 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8101 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8104 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
8106 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
8109 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8110 let need_lnd_workaround = {
8111 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8113 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
8115 debug_assert!(false);
8116 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8117 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
8121 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
8122 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8123 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8124 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
8125 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8126 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8127 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
8128 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
8129 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
8130 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
8131 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
8132 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
8133 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
8134 let mut channel_update = None;
8135 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
8136 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8137 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
8140 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
8141 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
8142 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
8143 // they have the latest channel parameters.
8144 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
8145 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8146 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8151 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
8152 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = self.handle_channel_resumption(
8153 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
8154 Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
8155 debug_assert!(htlc_forwards.is_none());
8156 debug_assert!(decode_update_add_htlcs.is_none());
8157 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
8158 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
8162 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8163 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8166 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
8167 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
8169 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
8170 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
8171 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
8172 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
8173 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
8174 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
8176 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
8177 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
8178 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
8179 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
8180 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
8181 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
8182 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
8183 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8184 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8185 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
8186 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8187 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
8188 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
8189 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
8190 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
8191 next_funding_txid: None,
8194 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8195 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
8196 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8202 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
8203 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
8205 Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents)
8208 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
8209 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
8210 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
8212 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8213 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
8214 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
8215 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
8216 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
8217 match monitor_event {
8218 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
8219 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id));
8220 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
8221 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
8222 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
8223 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
8224 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8226 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
8227 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
8228 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8229 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8232 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) | MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => {
8233 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
8234 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
8236 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
8237 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
8238 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8239 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
8242 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
8243 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8244 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8245 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8246 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8247 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8248 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
8249 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
8250 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
8253 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
8255 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
8256 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8257 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8258 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8262 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8263 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8264 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8265 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: reason.to_string() })
8273 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
8274 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
8280 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8281 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8284 has_pending_monitor_events
8287 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
8288 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
8289 /// update events as a separate process method here.
8291 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
8292 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8293 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
8296 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
8297 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
8298 /// update was applied.
8299 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
8300 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
8301 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8303 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
8304 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
8305 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
8306 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
8308 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8309 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8311 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8312 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8313 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
8314 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
8316 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
8317 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8318 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
8319 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
8320 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
8321 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
8323 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
8324 has_monitor_update = true;
8326 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
8327 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8328 continue 'peer_loop;
8337 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
8338 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8339 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
8345 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
8346 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
8348 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
8349 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
8351 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
8352 #[cfg(async_signing)]
8353 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
8354 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8356 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
8357 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
8359 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8360 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
8361 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
8362 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
8367 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
8368 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
8373 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
8374 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
8377 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8378 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
8379 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
8385 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
8389 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8390 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
8391 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8392 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8393 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8394 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
8395 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8399 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8400 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8401 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8402 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8403 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8409 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
8410 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
8411 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
8412 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
8413 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
8414 let mut has_update = false;
8415 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
8417 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8419 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8420 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8421 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8422 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8423 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
8425 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8426 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8427 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
8428 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
8429 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
8431 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
8432 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
8435 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
8436 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
8437 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
8439 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
8440 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
8441 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
8442 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8443 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8444 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8449 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
8450 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
8451 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
8457 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
8458 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
8463 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
8469 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
8470 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
8473 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
8474 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
8480 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
8481 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
8483 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
8484 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8485 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
8486 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
8487 // reorganized out of the main chain.
8488 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
8489 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
8490 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
8491 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
8492 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
8493 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
8494 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
8495 assert!(should_broadcast);
8496 } else { unreachable!(); }
8497 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
8498 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8499 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
8502 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8507 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8508 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
8509 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
8510 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
8514 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
8515 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
8516 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
8517 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
8518 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
8520 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
8524 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
8529 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
8531 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
8533 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
8534 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8535 pub fn create_offer_builder(
8536 &$self, description: String
8537 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8538 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8539 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8540 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8541 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8543 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8544 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
8545 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
8547 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8554 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8555 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
8556 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
8560 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
8561 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
8563 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
8564 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
8565 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
8568 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8569 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
8570 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8572 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8573 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8577 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
8578 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
8579 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
8580 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
8581 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8583 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
8587 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
8588 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8593 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8594 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
8595 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
8597 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
8599 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
8600 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8601 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8602 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8603 pub fn create_refund_builder(
8604 &$self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
8605 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8606 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8607 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8608 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8609 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8610 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8612 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8613 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
8614 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
8616 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8617 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
8620 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
8622 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
8623 $self.pending_outbound_payments
8624 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8625 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
8627 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8633 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8635 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8636 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8637 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8638 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8639 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8640 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8644 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8645 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
8646 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8647 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
8650 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8652 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8654 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
8655 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
8656 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
8658 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
8659 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
8660 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
8661 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
8662 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
8663 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
8664 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
8666 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8667 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8671 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
8672 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
8675 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8676 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
8677 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8681 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
8682 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
8683 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
8684 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8688 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
8689 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
8690 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8695 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8696 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
8697 /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
8698 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
8701 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8702 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
8703 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
8704 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
8705 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8706 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8707 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8708 pub fn pay_for_offer(
8709 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
8710 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
8711 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8712 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8713 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8714 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8715 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8717 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
8718 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
8720 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
8722 let builder = match quantity {
8724 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
8726 let builder = match amount_msats {
8728 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
8730 let builder = match payer_note {
8732 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
8734 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
8735 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8737 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8739 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
8740 self.pending_outbound_payments
8741 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8742 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
8744 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8746 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8747 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
8748 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8749 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
8750 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
8753 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8755 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
8756 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
8757 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
8758 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
8759 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
8760 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8761 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
8762 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8763 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8765 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8772 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
8775 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
8776 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
8777 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
8781 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
8782 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
8783 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
8784 /// received and no retries will be made.
8789 /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
8790 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
8793 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8794 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8795 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8796 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8797 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8799 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
8800 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8802 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
8803 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
8806 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8808 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
8809 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8810 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
8811 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8813 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8814 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
8815 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
8817 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8818 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8819 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8821 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8822 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8823 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
8825 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
8826 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
8827 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
8828 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8830 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8831 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
8832 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8833 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
8834 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
8837 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8839 for path in refund.paths() {
8840 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8841 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8842 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8843 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8845 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8851 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
8855 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
8858 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
8859 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
8861 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
8862 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
8863 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
8864 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8866 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8868 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8869 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8873 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8874 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8876 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8878 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8879 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8881 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8882 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8883 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8884 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
8885 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
8886 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8887 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8888 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8889 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8890 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8891 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8894 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8895 /// stored external to LDK.
8897 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8898 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8899 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8901 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8902 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8905 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8906 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8907 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8908 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8910 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8911 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8912 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8913 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8914 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8916 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8917 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8918 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8919 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8920 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8922 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8923 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8925 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8926 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8930 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8931 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8933 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8935 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8936 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8938 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8939 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8940 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8941 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8942 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8943 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8944 min_final_cltv_expiry)
8947 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8948 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8950 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8951 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
8952 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
8955 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
8957 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8958 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8959 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8960 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8962 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8964 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8965 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
8966 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8969 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8970 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8973 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
8974 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
8975 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
8976 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
8977 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
8978 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8980 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
8981 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
8982 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
8983 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8984 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
8986 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
8988 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
8991 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8992 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
8996 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
8997 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
8999 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
9000 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
9001 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9002 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
9004 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
9005 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
9006 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
9007 Some(_) => continue,
9008 None => return scid_candidate
9013 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
9015 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
9016 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
9018 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
9019 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
9020 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
9024 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
9025 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
9026 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
9028 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
9029 /// times to get a unique scid.
9030 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
9031 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9032 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
9034 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
9035 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
9036 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
9037 return scid_candidate
9041 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
9042 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
9043 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
9044 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
9046 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9047 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9048 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9049 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9050 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
9051 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
9053 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9054 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
9055 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
9064 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
9065 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
9066 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
9067 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
9068 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
9072 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
9073 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
9074 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9075 events.push_back((event, None));
9079 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
9080 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9081 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
9085 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
9086 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
9090 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
9091 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
9094 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
9095 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
9096 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
9097 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
9098 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
9099 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
9100 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
9102 let logger = WithContext::from(
9103 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
9106 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9107 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
9108 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
9109 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
9110 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
9111 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
9112 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9113 .get_mut(&channel_id)
9115 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
9119 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
9120 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
9121 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
9122 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
9123 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
9124 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
9129 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
9131 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
9132 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
9133 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
9134 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
9136 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
9137 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
9138 if further_update_exists {
9139 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
9144 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
9151 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
9152 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9158 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
9159 for action in actions {
9161 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9162 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
9164 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
9170 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
9171 /// using the given event handler.
9173 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
9174 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
9178 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
9182 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9184 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9185 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9186 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9187 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9188 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9189 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9193 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
9194 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
9195 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
9196 /// is always placed next to each other.
9198 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
9199 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
9200 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
9201 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
9203 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
9204 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be placed among
9205 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
9206 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
9207 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
9208 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9209 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9211 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
9212 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
9213 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
9214 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9217 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
9218 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9220 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
9221 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9224 let mut is_any_peer_connected = false;
9225 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
9226 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9227 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9228 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9229 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9230 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
9231 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
9233 if peer_state.is_connected {
9234 is_any_peer_connected = true
9238 // Ensure that we are connected to some peers before getting broadcast messages.
9239 if is_any_peer_connected {
9240 let mut broadcast_msgs = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
9241 pending_events.append(&mut broadcast_msgs);
9244 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
9245 events.replace(pending_events);
9254 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9256 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9257 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9258 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9259 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9260 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9261 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9265 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
9267 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
9268 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
9269 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
9271 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
9275 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9277 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9278 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9279 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9280 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9281 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9282 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9286 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9288 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9289 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
9290 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
9291 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
9292 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
9295 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
9296 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
9299 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9300 let _persistence_guard =
9301 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9302 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9303 let new_height = height - 1;
9305 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
9306 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
9307 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
9308 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
9309 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
9310 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
9313 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
9317 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9319 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9320 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9321 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9322 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9323 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9324 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9328 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9329 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9330 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9331 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9333 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9334 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
9336 let _persistence_guard =
9337 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9338 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9339 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
9340 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
9342 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9343 if height < last_best_block_height {
9344 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9345 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
9349 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9350 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9351 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9352 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9354 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9355 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
9357 let _persistence_guard =
9358 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9359 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9360 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
9362 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
9364 macro_rules! max_time {
9365 ($timestamp: expr) => {
9367 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
9368 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
9369 // having an explicit local time source.
9370 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
9371 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
9372 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9373 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
9374 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
9380 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
9381 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9382 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
9383 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
9387 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
9388 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
9389 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
9390 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9391 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9392 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
9393 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
9394 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
9395 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
9396 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
9397 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
9404 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
9405 let _persistence_guard =
9406 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9407 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9408 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
9409 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
9410 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
9411 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
9412 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9413 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9418 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9420 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9421 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9422 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9423 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9424 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9425 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9429 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
9430 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
9432 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
9433 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
9434 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9435 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9436 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9438 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9439 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
9441 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9442 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9443 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9444 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9445 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9447 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9449 // Retain unfunded channels.
9450 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
9451 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
9452 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9453 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
9454 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
9455 let res = f(channel);
9456 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
9457 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
9458 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
9459 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
9460 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
9462 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
9463 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
9464 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
9465 if channel.context.is_usable() {
9466 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9467 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
9468 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
9469 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9474 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9479 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9480 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
9483 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
9484 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9485 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
9486 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9487 msg: announcement_sigs,
9489 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9490 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
9491 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
9493 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
9494 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
9495 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
9500 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
9501 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9502 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
9503 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
9504 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
9505 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
9506 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
9507 // is always consistent.
9508 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
9509 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9510 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
9511 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
9512 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
9515 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
9516 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
9517 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
9518 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
9519 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
9520 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
9521 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
9522 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
9523 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
9527 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9528 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9529 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
9530 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
9531 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9532 data: reason_message,
9545 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9546 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
9547 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
9548 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
9549 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
9550 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
9551 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
9552 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9553 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
9554 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
9556 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
9557 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
9558 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
9562 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
9565 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9566 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
9567 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9568 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
9569 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
9570 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
9571 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
9572 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
9573 phantom_shared_secret: None,
9574 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
9575 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
9576 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
9579 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
9580 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
9581 _ => unreachable!(),
9583 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
9584 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
9585 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
9586 let logger = WithContext::from(
9587 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id)
9589 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
9595 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
9597 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
9598 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
9602 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
9603 /// may have events that need processing.
9605 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
9606 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
9608 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
9609 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
9610 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
9611 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
9614 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
9616 /// See [`Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] for retrieving a [`Future`] that
9617 /// indicates this should be checked.
9618 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
9619 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
9622 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
9623 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
9624 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
9627 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
9628 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
9629 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
9630 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
9633 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9634 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9635 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9636 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9639 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9640 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9642 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9643 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9644 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9645 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9646 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9649 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9650 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9651 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9652 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9655 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9656 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9657 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
9658 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
9661 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9662 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9663 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9664 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
9667 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9668 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9669 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
9670 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9674 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9675 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9677 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9678 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9679 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9680 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9681 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9682 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9686 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
9687 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9688 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9689 // change to the contents.
9690 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9691 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9692 let persist = match &res {
9693 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
9694 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
9695 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9697 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9699 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9704 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
9705 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9706 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9707 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9710 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
9711 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9712 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9713 // change to the contents.
9714 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9715 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9716 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
9720 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
9721 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9722 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9723 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9726 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
9727 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9728 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9731 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
9732 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9733 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9736 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
9737 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9738 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
9739 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
9740 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
9741 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9742 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9743 let persist = match &res {
9744 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9745 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9747 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9752 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
9753 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9754 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
9755 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9758 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
9759 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9760 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
9761 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9764 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
9765 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9766 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
9767 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9770 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
9771 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9772 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
9773 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9776 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
9777 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9778 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9781 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
9782 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9783 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9786 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
9787 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9788 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9789 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9790 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9791 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9792 let persist = match &res {
9793 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9794 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9795 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9797 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9802 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
9803 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9804 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9807 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
9808 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9809 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9810 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9811 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9812 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9813 let persist = match &res {
9814 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9815 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9816 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9818 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9823 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
9824 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9825 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
9826 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9827 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9828 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9829 let persist = match &res {
9830 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9831 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9832 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9834 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9839 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
9840 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9841 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9844 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
9845 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9846 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9849 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
9850 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9851 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9852 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9853 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9854 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9855 let persist = match &res {
9856 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9857 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9858 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9860 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9865 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
9866 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9867 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9870 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
9871 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9872 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
9875 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9880 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9881 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9882 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9883 let persist = match &res {
9884 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9885 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9886 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9888 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9893 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9894 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9895 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9896 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9897 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9900 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
9901 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9902 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9904 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9905 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9906 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9907 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9908 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9909 let context = match phase {
9910 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9911 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9912 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9913 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9918 // We retain UnfundedOutboundV1 channel for some time in case
9919 // peer unexpectedly disconnects, and intends to reconnect again.
9920 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
9923 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9924 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9927 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9928 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9931 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9932 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9936 // Clean up for removal.
9937 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
9938 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
9941 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9942 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9943 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9944 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
9946 // V1 Channel Establishment
9947 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
9948 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
9949 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
9950 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
9951 // V2 Channel Establishment
9952 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9953 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9954 // Common Channel Establishment
9955 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
9956 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
9958 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
9960 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
9961 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
9962 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
9963 // Interactive Transaction Construction
9964 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
9965 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
9966 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
9967 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
9968 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
9969 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
9970 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
9971 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
9972 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
9973 // Channel Operations
9974 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
9975 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
9976 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
9977 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
9978 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
9979 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
9981 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
9982 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9983 // [`ChannelManager::pending_broadcast_events`] holds the [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]
9984 // This check here is to ensure exhaustivity.
9985 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {
9986 debug_assert!(false, "This event shouldn't have been here");
9989 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9990 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
9991 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
9992 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
9993 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
9994 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
9997 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
9998 peer_state.is_connected = false;
9999 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
10000 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
10003 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
10005 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
10007 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
10008 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
10012 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
10013 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
10014 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
10015 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
10019 let mut res = Ok(());
10021 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
10022 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
10023 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
10024 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
10025 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
10026 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
10027 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
10030 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10031 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
10032 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
10033 if inbound_peer_limited {
10035 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
10037 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
10038 channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10039 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10040 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
10041 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10042 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10043 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10044 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10045 is_connected: true,
10048 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
10049 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
10050 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
10052 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
10053 if inbound_peer_limited &&
10054 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
10055 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
10058 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
10061 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
10062 peer_state.is_connected = true;
10067 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
10069 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10070 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
10071 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10072 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10073 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
10075 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10077 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
10078 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
10079 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
10080 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10081 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
10085 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
10086 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
10087 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10088 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
10092 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
10093 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
10094 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
10095 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
10096 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10097 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
10101 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
10102 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
10103 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
10104 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
10105 debug_assert!(false);
10108 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
10109 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
10110 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
10111 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
10112 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
10113 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
10114 debug_assert!(false);
10120 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
10121 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
10126 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
10127 match &msg.data as &str {
10128 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
10129 "link failed to shutdown" =>
10131 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
10132 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
10133 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
10134 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
10135 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
10136 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
10137 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
10138 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
10139 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
10141 || -> NotifyOption {
10142 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10143 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10144 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
10145 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10146 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
10147 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
10148 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
10149 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10153 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
10154 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10155 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
10156 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
10157 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
10158 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
10160 log_level: Level::Trace,
10163 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
10164 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
10165 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
10167 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
10176 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
10178 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
10179 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
10180 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10181 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10182 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
10183 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10184 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10185 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
10186 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
10187 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
10188 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
10190 for channel_id in channel_ids {
10191 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
10192 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
10196 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
10197 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10198 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10199 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
10200 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10201 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10202 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
10203 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
10204 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
10205 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
10206 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10212 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
10213 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
10214 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
10215 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
10216 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10222 None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
10223 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
10224 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
10228 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
10229 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
10233 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
10234 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
10237 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
10238 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
10241 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
10242 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
10245 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
10246 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10247 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10248 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10251 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
10252 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10253 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10254 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10257 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
10258 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10259 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10260 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10263 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
10264 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10265 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10266 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10269 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
10270 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10271 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10272 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10275 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
10276 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10277 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10278 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10281 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
10282 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10283 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10284 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10287 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
10288 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10289 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10290 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10293 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
10294 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10295 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10296 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10300 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10301 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10303 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10304 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10305 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10306 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10307 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10308 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10312 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
10313 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
10314 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
10317 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
10318 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
10321 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
10322 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10324 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
10325 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
10327 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
10328 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10332 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
10333 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
10334 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
10336 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
10338 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
10339 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10343 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
10344 amount_msats, payment_secret
10346 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
10348 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
10349 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10353 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10354 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
10355 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
10358 let response = if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
10359 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10360 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
10361 payment_paths, payment_hash
10363 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10364 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
10365 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10368 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::from)
10369 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx))
10370 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10372 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10373 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
10374 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10375 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
10376 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10379 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<ExplicitSigningPubkey>::from)
10380 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
10381 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10382 .and_then(|invoice| {
10384 let mut invoice = invoice;
10386 .sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
10387 self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
10389 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10394 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
10395 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10398 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
10399 let response = invoice
10400 .verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx)
10401 .map_err(|()| InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned()))
10402 .and_then(|payment_id| {
10403 let features = self.bolt12_invoice_features();
10404 if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&features) {
10405 Err(InvoiceError::from(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures))
10407 self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id)
10409 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
10410 InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))
10417 Err(e) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e)),
10420 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
10421 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
10427 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
10428 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
10432 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10433 NodeIdLookUp for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10435 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10436 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10437 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10438 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10439 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10440 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10444 fn next_node_id(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<PublicKey> {
10445 self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).map(|(pubkey, _)| *pubkey)
10449 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10450 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10451 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
10452 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
10453 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
10457 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10458 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10460 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
10461 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
10462 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
10463 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
10464 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10467 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10468 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10469 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
10470 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10473 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10474 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10475 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
10476 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10479 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10480 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10481 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
10482 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
10485 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10486 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10487 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
10488 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
10489 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
10490 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
10491 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
10492 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
10493 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
10494 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
10495 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
10496 features.set_payment_secret_required();
10497 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
10498 features.set_wumbo_optional();
10499 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
10500 features.set_channel_type_optional();
10501 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
10502 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
10503 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
10504 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
10505 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
10510 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10511 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10513 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
10514 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
10515 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
10516 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
10519 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
10520 (2, node_id, required),
10521 (4, features, required),
10522 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
10523 (8, forwarding_info, option),
10524 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10525 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10528 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
10529 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10530 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
10531 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
10532 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
10533 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
10534 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10535 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
10536 (2, self.channel_id, required),
10537 (3, self.channel_type, option),
10538 (4, self.counterparty, required),
10539 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
10540 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
10541 (7, self.config, option),
10542 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
10543 (9, self.confirmations, option),
10544 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
10545 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
10546 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
10547 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
10548 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
10549 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
10550 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
10551 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
10552 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
10553 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
10554 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
10555 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
10556 (30, self.is_usable, required),
10557 (32, self.is_public, required),
10558 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10559 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10560 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
10561 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
10562 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
10563 (43, self.pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10564 (45, self.pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10570 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
10571 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10572 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10573 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
10574 (2, channel_id, required),
10575 (3, channel_type, option),
10576 (4, counterparty, required),
10577 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
10578 (6, funding_txo, option),
10579 (7, config, option),
10580 (8, short_channel_id, option),
10581 (9, confirmations, option),
10582 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
10583 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
10584 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
10585 (16, balance_msat, required),
10586 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
10587 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
10588 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10589 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
10590 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
10591 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
10592 (22, confirmations_required, option),
10593 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
10594 (26, is_outbound, required),
10595 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
10596 (30, is_usable, required),
10597 (32, is_public, required),
10598 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10599 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10600 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
10601 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
10602 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
10603 (43, pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10604 (45, pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10607 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
10608 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
10609 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
10610 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
10611 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
10614 inbound_scid_alias,
10615 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
10617 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
10618 outbound_scid_alias,
10622 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
10623 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
10625 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
10626 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
10627 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
10628 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
10629 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
10630 confirmations_required,
10632 force_close_spend_delay,
10633 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
10634 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
10635 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
10636 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
10637 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
10638 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
10639 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
10640 channel_shutdown_state,
10641 pending_inbound_htlcs: pending_inbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
10642 pending_outbound_htlcs: pending_outbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
10647 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
10648 (2, channels, required_vec),
10649 (4, phantom_scid, required),
10650 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
10653 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
10654 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
10655 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
10658 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
10660 (0, onion_packet, required),
10661 (1, blinded, option),
10662 (2, short_channel_id, required),
10665 (0, payment_data, required),
10666 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10667 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10668 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10669 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10670 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10672 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
10673 (0, payment_preimage, required),
10674 (1, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10675 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10676 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10677 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
10678 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10682 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
10683 (0, routing, required),
10684 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
10685 (4, payment_hash, required),
10686 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
10687 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
10688 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
10689 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10693 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10694 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10696 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
10697 0u8.write(writer)?;
10698 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10699 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10700 reason.write(writer)?;
10702 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10703 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
10705 1u8.write(writer)?;
10706 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10707 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10708 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
10709 failure_code.write(writer)?;
10716 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10717 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10718 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10721 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
10722 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10723 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10724 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
10728 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10729 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10730 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10731 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
10732 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
10735 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
10736 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
10737 // messages contained in the variants.
10738 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
10739 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
10740 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
10742 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10743 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10744 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10745 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10746 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
10749 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10750 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10751 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10752 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10753 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
10755 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10760 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
10765 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
10766 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
10767 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
10770 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
10771 (0, short_channel_id, required),
10772 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10773 (2, outpoint, required),
10774 (3, blinded_failure, option),
10775 (4, htlc_id, required),
10776 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
10777 (7, user_channel_id, option),
10778 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
10779 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10780 (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10783 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
10784 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10785 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
10786 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
10787 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
10789 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10790 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
10791 (1, self.total_msat, required),
10792 (2, self.value, required),
10793 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
10794 (4, payment_data, option),
10795 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
10796 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
10797 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10798 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10804 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
10805 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10806 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10807 (0, prev_hop, required),
10808 (1, total_msat, option),
10809 (2, value_ser, required),
10810 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
10811 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
10812 (5, total_value_received, option),
10813 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
10814 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10815 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10817 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
10818 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
10819 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
10821 if payment_data.is_some() {
10822 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10824 if total_msat.is_none() {
10825 total_msat = Some(value);
10827 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
10830 if total_msat.is_none() {
10831 if payment_data.is_none() {
10832 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10834 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
10836 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
10840 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
10843 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
10844 total_value_received,
10845 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
10847 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
10848 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
10853 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
10854 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10855 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10858 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
10859 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
10860 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
10861 let mut payment_id = None;
10862 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
10863 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
10864 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10865 (0, session_priv, required),
10866 (1, payment_id, option),
10867 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10868 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
10869 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
10870 (6, blinded_tail, option),
10872 if payment_id.is_none() {
10873 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
10875 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
10877 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
10878 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
10879 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10881 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
10882 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
10883 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
10884 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10888 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10889 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
10890 first_hop_htlc_msat,
10892 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
10895 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
10896 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10901 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10902 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10904 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10905 0u8.write(writer)?;
10906 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10907 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10908 (0, session_priv, required),
10909 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10910 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10911 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10912 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10913 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10914 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10917 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10918 1u8.write(writer)?;
10919 field.write(writer)?;
10926 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
10927 (0, forward_info, required),
10928 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
10929 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
10930 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
10931 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
10932 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
10933 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10934 (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10937 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10938 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10939 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
10941 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
10945 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
10946 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10947 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10948 (0, htlc_id, required),
10949 (2, err_packet, required),
10952 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
10953 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
10954 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
10955 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
10956 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10957 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
10958 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10959 (0, htlc_id, required),
10960 (1, failure_code, required),
10961 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
10962 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
10970 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10971 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10972 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
10974 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
10976 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
10977 (0, htlc_id, required),
10978 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
10979 (2, err_packet, required),
10980 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
10982 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
10983 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
10984 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10986 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
10990 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10991 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
10995 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
11000 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
11001 (0, payment_secret, required),
11002 (2, expiry_time, required),
11003 (4, user_payment_id, required),
11004 (6, payment_preimage, required),
11005 (8, min_value_msat, required),
11008 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
11010 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11011 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11012 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11013 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11014 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11015 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11019 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
11020 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
11022 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
11024 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
11026 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
11027 best_block.height.write(writer)?;
11028 best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
11031 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
11033 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11034 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
11035 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
11036 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11037 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11038 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
11039 serializable_peer_count += 1;
11042 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
11043 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
11047 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
11049 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
11050 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11051 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11052 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
11053 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
11054 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
11057 channel.write(writer)?;
11063 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
11064 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11065 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
11066 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
11067 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11068 for forward in pending_forwards {
11069 forward.write(writer)?;
11074 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = None;
11075 let decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
11076 if !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() {
11077 decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = Some(decode_update_add_htlcs);
11080 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
11082 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
11083 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
11084 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
11086 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
11087 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
11088 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11089 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
11090 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
11091 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11092 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
11093 htlc.write(writer)?;
11095 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
11096 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
11099 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
11100 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
11101 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
11102 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
11103 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
11104 // per_peer_state lock at all.
11105 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
11108 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
11109 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
11110 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
11111 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
11112 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
11114 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
11115 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
11116 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
11117 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
11118 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
11119 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
11120 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
11125 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
11126 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
11127 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
11128 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
11129 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
11130 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
11131 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
11132 // well save the space and not write any events here.
11133 0u64.write(writer)?;
11135 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11136 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
11137 event.write(writer)?;
11141 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
11142 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
11143 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
11144 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
11145 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
11146 0u64.write(writer)?;
11148 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
11149 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
11150 // likely to be identical.
11151 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
11152 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
11154 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11155 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
11156 hash.write(writer)?;
11157 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
11160 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
11161 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
11162 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11163 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
11164 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
11167 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
11168 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11170 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
11171 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
11172 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
11173 session_priv.write(writer)?;
11176 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
11177 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
11178 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
11179 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
11183 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
11184 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
11185 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11187 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
11188 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
11189 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
11195 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
11196 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
11197 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
11198 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
11201 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
11202 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
11203 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
11204 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
11205 pending_claiming_payments = None;
11208 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11209 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
11210 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
11211 if !updates.is_empty() {
11212 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
11213 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
11218 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
11219 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
11220 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11221 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
11222 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11223 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
11224 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11225 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
11226 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
11227 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
11228 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11229 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
11230 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11231 (14, decode_update_add_htlcs_opt, option),
11238 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
11239 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
11240 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
11241 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
11244 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
11245 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
11246 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
11247 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
11248 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
11249 // check that the event is sane here.
11250 let event_encoded = event.encode();
11251 let event_read: Option<Event> =
11252 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
11253 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
11259 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
11260 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11261 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11262 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
11263 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
11264 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
11267 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
11268 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
11269 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
11270 events.push_back((ev, action));
11271 } else if action.is_some() {
11272 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11279 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
11280 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
11281 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
11282 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
11283 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
11284 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
11287 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
11289 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
11291 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11292 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
11293 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
11294 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
11295 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
11296 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
11297 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
11298 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
11299 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11300 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
11301 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
11302 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
11303 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
11305 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
11306 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
11308 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
11309 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
11311 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
11312 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
11313 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
11314 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
11315 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
11316 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
11318 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
11319 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11321 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11322 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11323 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11324 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11325 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11326 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11330 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
11331 pub entropy_source: ES,
11333 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
11334 pub node_signer: NS,
11336 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
11337 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
11339 pub signer_provider: SP,
11341 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11343 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
11344 pub fee_estimator: F,
11345 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11347 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
11348 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
11349 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
11350 pub chain_monitor: M,
11352 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
11353 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
11354 /// force-closed during deserialization.
11355 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
11356 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
11357 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
11359 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
11361 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
11362 /// deserialization.
11364 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
11365 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
11366 pub default_config: UserConfig,
11368 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
11369 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
11371 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
11372 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
11373 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
11374 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
11376 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
11379 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
11380 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
11383 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11384 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
11386 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11387 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11388 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11389 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11390 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11391 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11395 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
11396 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
11397 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
11398 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
11399 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
11401 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
11402 channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
11403 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
11409 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
11410 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
11411 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11412 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
11414 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11415 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11416 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11417 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11418 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11419 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11423 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11424 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
11425 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
11429 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11430 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
11432 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11433 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11434 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11435 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11436 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11437 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11441 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11442 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
11444 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11445 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11446 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11448 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
11450 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11451 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11452 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11453 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11454 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11455 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
11456 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
11457 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
11458 for _ in 0..channel_count {
11459 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
11460 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
11462 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11463 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11464 funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
11465 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
11466 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
11467 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
11468 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
11469 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
11470 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11471 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
11472 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
11473 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
11474 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11475 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
11476 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
11478 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
11479 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
11480 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
11482 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
11483 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
11484 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11486 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
11487 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
11488 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11490 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
11491 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
11492 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11494 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
11495 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11496 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
11499 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
11500 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11501 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11502 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11503 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
11504 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11505 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11506 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11508 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
11509 let mut found_htlc = false;
11510 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11511 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
11514 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
11515 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
11516 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
11517 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
11518 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
11519 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
11520 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
11522 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
11523 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
11524 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11528 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
11529 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
11530 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11531 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
11532 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11534 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
11535 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
11537 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
11538 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11539 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
11540 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11542 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11543 let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
11544 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11545 entry.insert(by_id_map);
11549 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
11550 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
11551 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
11552 // safely discard the channel.
11553 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
11554 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11555 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11556 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11557 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
11558 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11559 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11560 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11563 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
11564 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11565 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11566 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11567 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11568 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11572 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11573 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
11574 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11575 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
11576 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
11578 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
11579 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
11580 counterparty_node_id: None,
11581 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
11582 channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
11584 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
11588 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
11589 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11590 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11591 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
11592 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
11593 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11594 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
11595 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
11596 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
11598 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
11601 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11602 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11603 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
11604 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11605 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11606 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
11607 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
11608 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
11610 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
11613 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
11616 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
11617 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
11618 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
11619 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11620 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
11621 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11622 is_connected: false,
11626 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11627 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
11628 for _ in 0..peer_count {
11629 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
11630 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
11631 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
11632 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
11633 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
11636 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11637 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
11638 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
11639 for _ in 0..event_count {
11640 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
11641 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
11646 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11647 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
11648 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
11650 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
11651 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
11652 // on-startup monitor updates.
11653 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
11654 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
11656 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
11660 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
11661 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11663 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11664 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
11665 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
11666 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
11667 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11671 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11672 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
11673 hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
11674 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
11675 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
11676 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
11677 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
11679 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
11680 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11684 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
11685 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
11686 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
11687 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
11688 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
11689 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11690 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11691 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
11692 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
11693 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
11694 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
11695 let mut events_override = None;
11696 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11697 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs: Option<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>> = None;
11698 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
11699 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
11700 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11701 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
11702 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11703 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
11704 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11705 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
11706 (8, events_override, option),
11707 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
11708 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11709 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
11710 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11711 (14, decode_update_add_htlcs, option),
11713 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = decode_update_add_htlcs.unwrap_or_else(|| new_hash_map());
11714 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
11715 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11718 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
11719 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11722 if let Some(events) = events_override {
11723 pending_events_read = events;
11726 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
11727 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
11730 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
11731 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
11732 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
11733 let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
11734 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
11735 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
11737 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
11739 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
11740 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
11741 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
11744 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
11745 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
11746 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
11747 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
11748 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
11750 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
11751 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
11752 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
11754 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
11755 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
11756 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
11757 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
11758 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
11760 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
11761 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11762 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
11763 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
11764 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
11765 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
11766 pending_background_events.push(
11767 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11768 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11769 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
11770 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11771 update: update.clone(),
11774 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
11775 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
11776 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
11777 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
11778 pending_background_events.push(
11779 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
11780 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11781 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11784 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
11785 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
11786 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11788 max_in_flight_update_id
11792 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11793 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
11794 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11795 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
11796 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11797 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11799 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
11801 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11802 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
11803 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
11804 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
11805 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
11806 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
11807 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
11808 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
11809 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
11812 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
11813 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return DangerousValue:
11814 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11815 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
11816 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
11817 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
11818 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11819 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11820 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11821 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11822 return Err(DecodeError::DangerousValue);
11825 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11826 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11827 debug_assert!(false);
11828 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11833 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
11834 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
11835 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
11836 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id);
11837 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
11838 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
11839 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
11840 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
11841 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
11842 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
11844 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11845 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
11846 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
11848 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11849 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
11850 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
11851 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11852 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11853 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11854 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11855 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11860 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
11861 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
11863 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
11864 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
11865 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
11866 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
11869 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
11870 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
11871 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
11872 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
11873 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
11874 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
11875 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
11877 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11878 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
11879 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
11880 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11881 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
11882 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
11883 if path.hops.is_empty() {
11884 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
11885 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11888 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
11889 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
11890 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
11891 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
11892 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11893 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
11894 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
11895 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
11897 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11898 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
11899 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
11900 retry_strategy: None,
11901 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
11902 payment_params: None,
11903 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
11904 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
11905 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11906 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11907 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11908 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11909 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11910 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11911 total_msat: path_amt,
11912 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11913 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11915 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11916 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
11921 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11922 match htlc_source {
11923 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
11924 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
11925 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
11926 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
11928 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
11929 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
11930 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
11931 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
11932 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
11933 decode_update_add_htlcs.retain(|scid, update_add_htlcs| {
11934 update_add_htlcs.retain(|update_add_htlc| {
11935 let matches = *scid == prev_hop_data.short_channel_id &&
11936 update_add_htlc.htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id;
11938 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-decode HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11939 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11943 !update_add_htlcs.is_empty()
11945 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
11946 forwards.retain(|forward| {
11947 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
11948 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11949 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11950 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11955 !forwards.is_empty()
11957 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
11958 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11959 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11960 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11961 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
11962 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
11963 intercepted_id != ev_id
11970 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
11971 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
11972 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
11973 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
11974 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
11975 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
11976 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
11977 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
11978 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
11979 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
11980 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
11982 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
11983 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
11984 channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
11985 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
11987 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
11988 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
11989 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
11996 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
11997 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
11999 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
12001 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
12002 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
12003 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
12004 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
12005 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
12006 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
12007 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
12008 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
12009 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
12010 monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
12013 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
12014 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
12015 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
12016 // channel still live case here.
12020 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
12021 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
12026 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
12027 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
12028 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
12029 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
12030 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
12031 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
12032 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
12033 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
12037 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
12038 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
12040 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
12041 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
12042 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
12043 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12045 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
12046 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
12047 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12049 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
12050 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
12052 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
12053 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
12055 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
12058 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
12059 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
12060 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
12062 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
12066 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
12067 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
12068 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
12069 if htlcs.is_empty() {
12070 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12072 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
12073 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
12074 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
12075 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
12076 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
12077 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
12078 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
12079 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
12081 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
12082 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12086 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
12088 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
12090 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
12091 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
12093 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
12094 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
12099 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
12100 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
12102 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
12104 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
12106 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
12107 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
12108 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
12109 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12113 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
12114 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
12115 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
12116 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
12117 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
12118 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
12119 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
12120 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
12121 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
12123 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
12124 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
12125 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
12127 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
12128 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
12129 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
12130 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
12131 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
12132 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12134 if chan.context.is_usable() {
12135 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
12136 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
12137 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
12138 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
12139 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12143 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
12144 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
12145 debug_assert!(false);
12146 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12151 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
12153 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
12154 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
12155 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
12156 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
12157 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
12158 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
12159 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
12160 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
12161 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
12162 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
12163 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
12165 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
12166 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
12168 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
12169 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
12170 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
12171 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
12173 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
12174 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
12175 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
12176 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
12178 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
12179 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
12180 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
12181 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
12183 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
12184 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
12185 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
12186 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
12187 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
12188 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
12189 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
12190 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
12193 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
12194 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
12197 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
12200 purpose: payment.purpose,
12201 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
12202 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
12203 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
12209 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
12210 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
12211 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
12212 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
12213 for action in actions.iter() {
12214 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
12215 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
12216 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
12218 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
12220 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
12221 blocked_channel_id);
12222 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
12223 .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
12224 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
12226 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
12227 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
12228 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
12229 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
12233 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
12234 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
12238 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
12240 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
12241 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12245 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
12247 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
12248 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
12249 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
12250 router: args.router,
12252 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
12254 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
12255 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
12256 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
12257 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
12259 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
12260 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(decode_update_add_htlcs),
12261 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
12262 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
12263 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
12264 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
12265 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
12267 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
12269 our_network_pubkey,
12272 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
12274 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
12276 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
12277 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
12278 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
12279 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
12280 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
12282 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
12283 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
12285 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
12287 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
12289 pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
12291 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
12292 node_signer: args.node_signer,
12293 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
12295 logger: args.logger,
12296 default_configuration: args.default_config,
12299 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
12300 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
12301 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
12302 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
12303 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
12306 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
12307 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
12308 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
12309 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
12310 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
12311 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding,
12312 downstream_channel_id, None
12316 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
12317 //connection or two.
12319 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
12325 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12326 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12327 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
12328 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
12329 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
12330 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
12331 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
12332 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
12333 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12334 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
12335 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
12336 use crate::prelude::*;
12337 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
12338 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
12339 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
12340 use crate::util::test_utils;
12341 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
12342 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
12345 fn test_notify_limits() {
12346 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
12347 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
12348 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12349 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12350 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12351 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12353 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
12354 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
12355 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12356 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12357 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12359 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12361 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
12362 // to connect messages with new values
12363 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12364 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12365 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12366 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12367 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12368 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12370 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
12371 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12372 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12373 // ... but the last node should not.
12374 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12375 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
12376 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12377 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12379 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
12380 // about the channel.
12381 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12382 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12383 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12385 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
12387 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12388 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12389 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12390 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12391 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12392 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12394 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
12395 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12396 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12398 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
12399 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
12400 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
12401 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
12402 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
12403 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
12405 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
12406 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
12407 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12408 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12409 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12410 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12411 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12412 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12414 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
12415 // the channel info has updated.
12416 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12417 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12418 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12419 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12420 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12421 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12425 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
12426 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
12428 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12429 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12430 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12431 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12432 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12434 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
12435 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
12436 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
12437 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
12439 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12440 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
12441 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
12442 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
12443 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
12444 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
12445 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
12446 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
12447 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12448 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12449 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12450 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
12452 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
12453 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12454 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12455 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12456 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12457 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12458 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12459 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12460 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12461 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12462 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12463 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12464 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
12465 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12466 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12467 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12468 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12469 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12470 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12471 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12472 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12473 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12474 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
12476 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
12477 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
12478 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
12479 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12480 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12481 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12482 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
12484 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
12485 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
12486 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
12487 // lightning messages manually.
12488 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12489 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
12490 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
12492 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12493 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12494 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
12495 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
12496 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12497 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12498 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
12499 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12500 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12501 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
12502 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12503 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12504 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12505 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12506 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12507 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12508 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
12509 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12510 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12511 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
12512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12513 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12514 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12515 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12516 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
12517 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12519 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
12520 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
12521 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12522 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
12524 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12525 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12526 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12527 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12529 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12532 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12533 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12534 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12535 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12537 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12542 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
12543 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
12544 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
12547 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
12548 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
12549 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
12550 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
12551 // fails as expected.
12552 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
12553 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
12554 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
12555 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
12556 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
12557 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
12558 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12559 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12560 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12561 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
12562 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12563 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12564 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12565 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12566 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12568 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
12569 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
12570 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
12572 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12573 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12574 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
12575 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
12576 let route = find_route(
12577 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12578 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12580 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12581 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12582 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12583 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12584 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12585 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12586 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12587 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12588 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12589 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12590 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
12591 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
12592 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12593 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12594 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12595 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12596 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12597 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12598 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12599 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12600 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12601 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12602 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12603 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12605 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12606 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12608 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12609 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12610 let route = find_route(
12611 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12612 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12614 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12615 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12617 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12618 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12619 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12620 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12621 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12623 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
12624 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12625 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12626 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
12627 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12628 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12629 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12630 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12631 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12632 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12633 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12634 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12635 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12636 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12637 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12638 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12639 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12640 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12641 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12642 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12643 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12644 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12645 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12646 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12648 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
12649 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12651 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12652 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
12653 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12654 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
12655 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12656 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12657 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12658 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12659 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12660 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12662 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12663 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12664 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
12667 let route = find_route(
12668 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12669 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12671 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
12672 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12673 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
12674 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12675 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12676 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12677 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12678 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12679 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12680 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12681 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12682 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12683 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12684 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12685 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12686 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12687 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12688 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12689 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12690 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12691 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12692 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12693 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12695 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12696 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12700 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
12701 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
12702 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
12703 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12704 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12705 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12706 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12708 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12709 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12711 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12712 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12713 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12714 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12715 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12716 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12717 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12718 let route = find_route(
12719 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12720 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12723 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12724 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
12725 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
12726 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12727 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
12728 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12729 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12731 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12732 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12733 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12734 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12735 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12736 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12737 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12739 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
12743 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
12744 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
12745 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
12746 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12747 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
12748 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12749 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12750 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12751 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12753 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12754 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12756 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12757 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12758 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12759 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12760 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12761 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12762 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12763 let route = find_route(
12764 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12765 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12768 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12769 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12770 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
12771 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
12772 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12773 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
12774 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
12775 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12776 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12778 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12779 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12780 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12781 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12782 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12783 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12784 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12786 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
12790 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
12791 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
12792 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
12793 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
12794 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12796 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12797 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12798 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12799 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12801 // Marshall an MPP route.
12802 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
12803 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
12804 route.paths.push(path);
12805 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12806 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
12807 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
12808 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
12809 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
12810 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
12812 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12813 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
12815 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
12816 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
12818 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
12823 fn test_channel_update_cached() {
12824 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12825 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12826 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12827 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12829 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12831 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, true).unwrap();
12832 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12833 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12835 // Confirm that the channel_update was not sent immediately to node[1] but was cached.
12836 let node_1_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12837 assert_eq!(node_1_events.len(), 0);
12840 // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been added to node[0] pending broadcast messages
12841 let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12842 assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 1);
12845 // Test that we do not retrieve the pending broadcast messages when we are not connected to any peer
12846 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12847 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12849 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
12850 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12852 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12853 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 0);
12855 // Now we reconnect to a peer
12856 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12857 features: nodes[2].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12859 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12860 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12861 }, false).unwrap();
12863 // Confirm that get_and_clear_pending_msg_events correctly captures pending broadcast messages
12864 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12865 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 1);
12866 match &node_0_events[0] {
12867 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => (),
12868 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12871 // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been cleared from nodes[0] pending broadcast messages
12872 let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12873 assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 0);
12878 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
12879 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12880 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12881 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12882 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12884 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12886 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12887 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12889 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12890 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
12891 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12892 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12895 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
12896 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
12897 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
12898 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
12899 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
12900 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
12903 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
12906 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
12907 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
12912 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
12913 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
12914 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12915 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12916 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12917 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12919 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
12920 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12922 total_msat: 100_000,
12925 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
12926 // payment verification fails as expected.
12927 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
12928 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
12929 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
12930 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
12932 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
12936 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
12937 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
12941 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
12942 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
12943 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
12944 // the channel is successfully closed.
12945 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12946 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12947 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12948 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12950 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12951 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12952 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
12953 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12954 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12956 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
12957 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
12959 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
12960 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
12961 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12962 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12965 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12967 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
12968 // as it has the funding transaction.
12969 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12970 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12971 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12974 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12976 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12978 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12980 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12981 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12982 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12984 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12987 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
12988 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
12989 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12990 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12991 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12993 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12994 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12995 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12996 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12997 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12998 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
12999 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
13000 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
13002 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13003 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
13004 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13005 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
13007 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13008 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
13010 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
13011 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
13012 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
13013 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
13014 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13015 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
13016 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13020 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
13021 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
13022 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
13023 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
13024 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13025 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
13026 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13029 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
13031 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
13032 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
13033 // closing transaction).
13034 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
13035 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
13036 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13038 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
13039 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
13040 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13041 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
13042 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13045 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13047 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
13049 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
13050 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
13051 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13053 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13055 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
13056 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
13059 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
13060 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
13061 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13064 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
13065 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
13066 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13069 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
13070 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
13071 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13074 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
13075 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
13076 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13079 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
13081 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
13082 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
13084 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
13085 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
13087 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
13088 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
13093 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
13094 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
13095 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
13096 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
13097 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13098 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13099 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
13100 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13103 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
13104 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
13105 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
13107 // Test the API functions.
13108 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
13110 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
13112 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
13114 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
13116 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
13118 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
13120 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
13124 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
13125 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
13126 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
13127 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
13128 // the given `channel_id`.
13129 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13130 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13131 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
13132 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13134 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
13137 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
13139 // Test the API functions.
13140 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
13142 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13144 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13146 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13148 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13150 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13154 fn test_connection_limiting() {
13155 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
13156 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13157 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13158 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
13159 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13161 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13163 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13164 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13166 let mut funding_tx = None;
13167 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
13168 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13169 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13172 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
13173 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
13174 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
13175 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
13176 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13178 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
13179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
13180 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13182 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13184 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
13185 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
13186 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13188 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13191 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
13192 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
13193 &nodes[0].keys_manager);
13194 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13195 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13196 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13198 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
13199 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
13201 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
13202 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
13203 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13204 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13205 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
13206 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13207 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13210 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13211 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13212 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13213 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13214 }, true).unwrap_err();
13216 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
13217 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
13218 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13219 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13220 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
13221 for ev in chan_closed_events {
13222 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
13224 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13225 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13227 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13228 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13229 }, true).unwrap_err();
13231 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
13232 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13233 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13234 }, false).unwrap();
13235 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13237 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
13238 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
13240 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
13241 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
13242 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
13243 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
13244 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13246 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13247 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13248 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13250 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
13251 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13252 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
13254 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
13255 // "protected" and can connect again.
13256 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
13257 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13258 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13260 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13262 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
13264 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13265 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13269 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
13270 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
13271 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13272 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13273 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
13274 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13276 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13278 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13279 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13281 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
13282 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13283 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13284 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13287 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
13289 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13290 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13291 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13293 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
13294 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13295 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13297 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
13298 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13299 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13300 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13304 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
13305 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13306 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13307 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13308 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13309 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
13310 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13311 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
13312 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13314 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13316 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13317 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13319 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
13320 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
13321 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13322 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13323 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13324 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13327 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13328 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13330 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13331 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13333 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13335 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
13336 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13339 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
13340 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13341 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13342 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13343 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13345 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13346 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13348 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13349 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
13350 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
13351 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
13355 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13357 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13358 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13360 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
13361 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13362 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13364 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13365 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13367 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13369 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13373 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
13374 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13375 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13376 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13377 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13378 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
13379 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
13380 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13381 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13382 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13383 payment_metadata: None,
13384 keysend_preimage: None,
13385 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13386 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13388 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13390 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
13391 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
13392 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13393 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
13394 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13395 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13396 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
13398 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
13399 } else { panic!(); }
13401 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
13402 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
13403 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13404 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13405 payment_metadata: None,
13406 keysend_preimage: None,
13407 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13408 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13410 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13412 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13413 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13414 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13415 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
13419 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
13420 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13421 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13422 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13423 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13425 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13426 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13427 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13428 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
13429 payment_metadata: None,
13430 keysend_preimage: None,
13431 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13432 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
13434 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13435 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
13436 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
13438 // Should not return an error as this condition:
13439 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
13440 // is not satisfied.
13441 assert!(result.is_ok());
13445 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
13446 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13447 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13448 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
13449 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13451 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
13452 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13454 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
13455 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
13456 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
13457 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
13458 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13460 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13461 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13463 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13464 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13465 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13466 match &msg_events[0] {
13467 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
13468 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13470 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
13471 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
13472 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
13475 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13478 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13479 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13481 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
13482 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
13483 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13485 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13489 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
13490 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
13491 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
13492 // the channel without the anchors feature.
13493 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13494 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13495 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
13496 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13497 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13498 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
13499 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13501 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
13502 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13503 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13505 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13506 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13508 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13509 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13511 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13514 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13515 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
13517 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13518 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13520 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
13521 // not have generated any events.
13522 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13526 fn test_update_channel_config() {
13527 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13528 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13529 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13530 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13531 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13532 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13533 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
13535 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13536 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13537 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13539 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
13540 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13541 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
13542 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13543 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13545 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13546 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13549 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
13550 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13551 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13553 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
13554 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13555 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
13556 ..Default::default()
13558 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13559 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13560 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13562 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13563 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13566 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
13567 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13568 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13569 ..Default::default()
13571 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13572 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
13573 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13574 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13576 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13577 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13580 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
13581 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
13582 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
13583 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
13584 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
13587 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13588 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13589 ..Default::default()
13591 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
13594 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
13595 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
13596 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13597 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13601 fn test_payment_display() {
13602 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
13603 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13604 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
13605 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13606 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
13607 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13611 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
13612 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13613 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13614 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13615 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13616 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13618 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
13619 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13620 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13621 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13622 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13623 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
13624 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
13625 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13627 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13628 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13629 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13632 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
13633 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
13635 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13636 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13638 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13639 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13640 }, false).unwrap();
13641 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
13642 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
13643 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
13645 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
13647 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
13648 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
13649 // close even if it was an lnd node.
13650 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13651 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13652 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
13653 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13654 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
13655 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
13656 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
13657 } else { panic!() };
13658 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
13659 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
13660 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
13661 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
13663 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13665 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13666 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13667 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13672 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
13673 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
13674 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13675 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13678 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13679 let deserialized_chanmgr;
13680 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
13682 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13683 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
13685 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13686 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
13689 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13690 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
13691 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13693 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13697 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13698 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
13699 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13701 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13706 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
13707 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
13708 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
13709 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
13711 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13712 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
13713 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
13715 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
13717 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13718 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
13719 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
13720 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
13722 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
13723 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
13725 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
13731 use crate::chain::Listen;
13732 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
13733 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
13734 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
13735 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
13736 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
13737 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
13738 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
13739 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
13740 use crate::util::test_utils;
13741 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
13743 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
13744 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
13745 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
13746 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
13748 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
13750 use criterion::Criterion;
13752 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
13753 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
13754 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
13755 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
13756 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
13757 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
13758 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
13760 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
13761 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
13763 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
13764 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
13766 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
13768 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
13771 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
13772 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
13775 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
13776 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
13777 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
13779 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
13780 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
13782 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
13783 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
13784 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13785 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
13786 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
13788 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
13789 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
13790 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
13792 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
13793 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
13794 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
13795 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13797 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13798 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13799 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
13801 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13802 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
13803 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
13804 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
13805 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13807 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13808 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13809 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
13811 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13812 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13814 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13815 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13816 }, false).unwrap();
13817 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13818 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13819 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13822 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
13823 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
13824 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
13826 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
13827 } else { panic!(); }
13829 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13830 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13831 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13832 match events_b[0] {
13833 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13834 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13836 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13839 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13840 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13841 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13842 match events_a[0] {
13843 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13844 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13846 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13849 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
13851 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
13852 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
13853 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
13855 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13856 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13857 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13858 match msg_events[0] {
13859 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
13860 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
13861 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13865 match msg_events[1] {
13866 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13870 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13871 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13872 match events_a[0] {
13873 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13874 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13876 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13879 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13880 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13881 match events_b[0] {
13882 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13883 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13885 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13888 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
13889 macro_rules! send_payment {
13890 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
13891 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
13892 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
13893 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
13894 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
13895 payment_count += 1;
13896 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
13897 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
13899 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
13900 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
13901 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
13902 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
13903 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
13904 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
13905 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
13906 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
13907 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13908 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13909 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13911 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
13912 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
13913 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
13914 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
13916 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
13917 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
13918 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
13919 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
13920 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
13922 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
13925 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
13926 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13927 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13928 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13930 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
13934 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
13935 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
13936 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);