1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
47 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus};
48 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
51 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
53 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
54 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
55 use util::config::UserConfig;
56 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
57 use util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
59 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
60 use util::logger::Logger;
61 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use std::sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
73 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
75 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
77 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
78 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
79 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
81 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
82 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
83 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
84 // before we forward it.
86 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
87 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
88 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
89 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
90 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
92 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
93 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
95 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
96 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
99 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
100 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
104 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
105 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
106 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
107 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
108 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
109 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
110 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
113 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
114 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
115 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
116 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
119 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
122 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
123 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
126 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
128 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
130 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
131 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
132 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
134 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
136 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
140 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
144 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
145 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
146 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
147 short_channel_id: u64,
149 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
151 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
152 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
156 struct ClaimableHTLC {
157 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
159 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
160 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
161 /// are part of the same payment.
162 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
166 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
167 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
168 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
169 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
172 session_priv: SecretKey,
173 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
174 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
175 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
180 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
181 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
183 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
184 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
189 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
190 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
192 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
200 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
202 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
203 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
204 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
205 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
206 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
208 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
209 err: msgs::LightningError,
210 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
212 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
214 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
216 err: LightningError {
218 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
219 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
225 shutdown_finish: None,
229 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
231 err: LightningError {
233 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
235 shutdown_finish: None,
239 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
240 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
243 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
245 err: LightningError {
247 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
248 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
254 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
258 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
261 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
263 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
265 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
267 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
268 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
274 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
276 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
277 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
284 shutdown_finish: None,
289 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
290 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
291 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
292 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
293 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
295 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
296 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
297 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
298 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
299 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
300 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
301 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
303 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
307 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
308 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
309 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
310 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
311 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
312 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
313 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
314 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
315 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
316 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
317 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
318 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
320 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
321 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
322 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
323 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
326 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
327 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
328 /// quite some time lag.
329 enum BackgroundEvent {
330 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
331 /// commitment transaction.
332 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
335 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
336 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
338 latest_features: InitFeatures,
341 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
342 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
344 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
346 struct PendingInboundPayment {
347 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
348 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
349 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
350 /// this payment being removed.
352 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
353 user_payment_id: u64,
354 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
355 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
356 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
359 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
360 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
361 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
362 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
363 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
364 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
365 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
366 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
368 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
369 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
370 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
371 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
372 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
373 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
374 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
375 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
376 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
378 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
379 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
381 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
382 /// to individual Channels.
384 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
385 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
386 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
387 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
389 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
390 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
391 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
392 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
393 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
394 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
395 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
397 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
398 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
399 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
400 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
403 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
404 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
405 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
406 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
407 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
409 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
410 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
411 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
412 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
413 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
414 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
415 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
416 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
417 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
418 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
421 default_configuration: UserConfig,
422 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
428 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
430 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
431 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
433 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
434 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
435 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
436 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
438 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
439 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
440 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
441 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
442 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
443 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
445 /// The session_priv bytes of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
446 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
447 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
448 /// PaymentSent/PaymentFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
449 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
450 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
451 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
452 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
454 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
455 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashSet<[u8; 32]>>,
457 our_network_key: SecretKey,
458 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
460 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
461 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
462 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
464 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
465 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
466 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
467 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
469 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
470 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
471 /// are currently open with that peer.
472 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
473 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
475 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
477 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
478 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
479 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
480 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
481 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
482 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
483 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
484 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
485 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
487 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
494 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
496 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
497 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
498 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
499 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
500 pub struct ChainParameters {
501 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
502 pub network: Network,
504 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
506 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
507 pub best_block: BestBlock,
510 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
516 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
517 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
518 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
519 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
520 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
521 /// updates are ready for persistence).
523 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
524 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
525 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
526 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
527 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
529 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
530 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
533 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
534 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
535 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
538 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
539 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
541 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
542 persistence_notifier: notifier,
543 should_persist: persist_check,
544 _read_guard: read_guard,
549 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
551 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
552 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
557 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
558 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
560 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
562 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
563 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
564 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
565 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
566 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
568 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
569 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
571 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
573 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
574 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
575 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
576 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
577 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
578 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
579 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
581 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
582 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
584 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
585 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
586 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
587 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
589 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
590 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
591 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
592 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
593 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
594 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
597 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
599 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
600 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
603 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
605 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
606 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
607 pub struct ChannelDetails {
608 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
609 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
610 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
611 /// lifetime of the channel.
612 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
613 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
614 /// our counterparty already.
616 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
617 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
618 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
619 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
620 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
621 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
622 /// The node_id of our counterparty
623 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
624 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
625 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
626 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
627 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
628 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
629 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
630 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
631 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
632 /// this value on chain.
634 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
636 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
638 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
639 pub to_self_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
640 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
641 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
642 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
644 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
646 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
647 pub to_remote_reserve_satoshis: u64,
648 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
650 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
651 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
652 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
653 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
655 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
656 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
657 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
658 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
659 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
660 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
661 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
662 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
663 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
665 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
666 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
667 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
668 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
669 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
670 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
671 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
672 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
673 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
675 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
677 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
678 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
679 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
680 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
681 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
682 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
683 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
684 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
685 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
687 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
688 pub spend_csv_on_our_commitment_funds: Option<u16>,
689 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
690 pub is_outbound: bool,
691 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
692 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
693 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
694 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
695 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
697 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
698 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
699 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
700 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
702 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
704 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
706 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
707 /// payments to us through this channel.
708 pub counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
711 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
712 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
714 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
715 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
716 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
717 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
718 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
719 ParameterError(APIError),
720 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
721 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
722 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
725 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
727 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
728 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
729 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
730 /// paths than the ones selected).
731 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
732 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
733 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
734 /// in over-/re-payment.
736 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
737 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
738 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
740 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
741 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
742 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
743 /// with the latest update_id.
744 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
747 macro_rules! handle_error {
748 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
751 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
752 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
754 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
755 // entering the macro.
756 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
759 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
761 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
762 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
763 if let Some(update) = update_option {
764 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
770 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
771 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
773 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
774 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
775 action: err.action.clone()
779 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
780 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
783 // Return error in case higher-API need one
790 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
791 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
792 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
794 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
795 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
797 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
798 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
799 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
800 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
802 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
803 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&$channel).ok()))
805 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
806 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
807 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
808 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
810 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
811 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&$channel).ok()))
817 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
818 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
822 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
824 $entry.remove_entry();
832 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
833 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
837 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
839 $entry.remove_entry();
847 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
848 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
849 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
851 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
853 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
854 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
855 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
856 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
858 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
859 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
860 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
861 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
862 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
863 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
864 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
865 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
866 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
867 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&$chan).ok()));
870 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
871 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
872 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
873 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
875 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
876 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
878 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
879 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
881 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
882 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
883 if !$resend_commitment {
884 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
887 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
889 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
890 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
894 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { {
895 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $entry.key());
897 $entry.remove_entry();
903 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
904 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
905 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
907 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
908 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
912 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
913 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
914 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
915 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
916 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
919 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
924 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
925 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
926 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
927 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
928 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
929 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
931 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
932 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
934 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
935 if !forwards.is_empty() {
936 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
937 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
940 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
941 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
942 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
943 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
944 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
945 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
946 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
947 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
948 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
949 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
950 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
951 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
954 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
955 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
956 // before it should be allowed to.
957 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
958 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
959 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
962 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
963 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
964 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
965 msg: announcement_sigs,
968 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
971 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
972 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
973 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
974 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
975 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
976 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
977 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
978 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
979 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
980 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
981 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
982 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
983 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
984 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
985 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
986 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
987 let mut order = $order;
989 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
991 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
995 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
996 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
997 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
998 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1003 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1004 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1005 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1006 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1007 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1012 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1016 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1021 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1022 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1023 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1028 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1029 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1030 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1031 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1032 assert!(res.is_ok());
1035 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1039 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1040 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1041 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1043 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1045 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1046 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1051 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1052 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1053 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1054 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1055 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1058 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1060 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1061 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1063 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1065 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1067 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1068 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1069 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1070 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1071 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1072 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1075 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1076 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1077 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1081 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1083 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1084 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1085 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1086 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1087 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1088 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1090 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1091 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1093 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1094 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1097 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1098 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1100 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1102 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1103 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1104 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1105 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1113 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1114 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1115 &self.default_configuration
1118 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1120 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
1121 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
1122 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
1123 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
1124 /// otherwise ignored.
1126 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
1127 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1129 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
1130 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
1131 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1132 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1133 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1136 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1137 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
1138 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1140 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1141 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1142 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1144 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1145 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1146 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1147 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1148 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1150 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1153 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1155 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1156 node_id: their_network_key,
1162 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1163 let mut res = Vec::new();
1165 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1166 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1167 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1168 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1169 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1170 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1171 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1172 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1173 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1174 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1175 remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1176 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1177 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1178 to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1179 to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1180 inbound_capacity_msat,
1181 outbound_capacity_msat,
1182 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1183 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1184 spend_csv_on_our_commitment_funds: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1185 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1186 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1187 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1188 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1189 counterparty_forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1193 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1194 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1195 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
1196 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1202 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1203 /// more information.
1204 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1205 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1208 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1209 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1211 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1212 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1214 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1215 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1216 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1217 // really wanted anyway.
1218 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1221 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1222 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1223 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1225 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1226 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1227 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1229 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1230 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1231 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1232 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1233 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1234 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
1235 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1236 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1239 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1240 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1241 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1243 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1244 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
1246 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1249 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1250 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1252 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1253 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1258 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
1259 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1260 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1269 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1270 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1271 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1272 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1273 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1275 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1276 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1277 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1278 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1279 // ignore the result here.
1280 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1284 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1286 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1287 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1288 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1289 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1290 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1291 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1294 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1295 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1297 chan.remove_entry().1
1299 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1302 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1303 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1304 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1305 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1306 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1311 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1314 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1315 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1316 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1317 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1318 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1319 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1320 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1321 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1322 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1323 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1324 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1334 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1335 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1336 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1337 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1338 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1342 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1343 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1344 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1346 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1347 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1348 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1349 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1350 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1351 failure_code: $err_code,
1352 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1357 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1358 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1361 let shared_secret = {
1362 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1363 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1366 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1368 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1369 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1370 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1371 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1372 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1373 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1374 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1375 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1378 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1379 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1380 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1381 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1382 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1385 let mut channel_state = None;
1386 macro_rules! return_err {
1387 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1389 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1390 if channel_state.is_none() {
1391 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1393 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1394 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1395 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1396 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1397 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1402 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1403 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1404 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1405 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1407 let error_code = match err {
1408 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1409 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1410 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1411 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1412 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1414 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1417 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1418 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1419 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1426 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1429 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1430 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1431 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1432 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1433 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1434 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1435 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1436 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1437 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1438 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1439 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1440 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1444 // final_expiry_too_soon
1445 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1446 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1447 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1448 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1449 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1450 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1452 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1453 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1454 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1456 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1457 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1458 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1461 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1462 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1463 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1464 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1467 if payment_data.is_none() {
1468 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1471 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1472 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1473 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1474 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1476 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1477 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1478 payment_data: payment_data.unwrap(),
1479 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1481 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1482 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1483 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1484 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1487 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1488 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1489 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1491 // Check two things:
1492 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1493 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1494 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1496 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1498 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1499 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1500 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1502 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1504 let blinding_factor = {
1505 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1506 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1507 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1508 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1511 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1513 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1515 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1518 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1519 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1522 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1523 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1524 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1525 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1526 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1530 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1531 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1532 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1535 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1536 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1537 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1538 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1542 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1543 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1544 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1545 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1546 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1547 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1548 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1549 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1550 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1551 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1553 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1555 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1556 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1558 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1559 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1560 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1561 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1562 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1563 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1564 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1566 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1567 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1569 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1570 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1571 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1573 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1574 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1576 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1577 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1578 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1579 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1580 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1582 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1583 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1585 // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1586 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
1587 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1588 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1594 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1595 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1596 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1597 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1599 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1600 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1602 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1603 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1604 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1606 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1608 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1613 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1616 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1617 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1618 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1619 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1620 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1624 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1626 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1627 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1629 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1630 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1631 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1632 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1633 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1634 fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1635 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1636 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1639 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1640 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1642 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1648 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1649 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1650 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1651 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1652 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1653 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1655 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1656 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1657 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1658 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1659 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1661 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1663 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1664 assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().insert(session_priv_bytes));
1666 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1667 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1668 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1669 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1670 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1673 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1674 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1676 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1677 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1679 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1680 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1682 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1684 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1685 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1686 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1688 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1689 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1690 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1691 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1692 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1693 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1694 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1695 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1696 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1699 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
1700 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1701 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1702 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1703 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1704 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1705 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1706 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1714 } else { unreachable!(); }
1718 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1719 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1721 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1726 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1728 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1729 /// fields for more info.
1731 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1732 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1733 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1734 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1735 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1736 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1738 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1740 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1741 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1742 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1744 /// In general, a path may raise:
1745 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1746 /// node public key) is specified.
1747 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1748 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1750 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1751 /// relevant updates.
1753 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1754 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1755 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1757 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1758 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1759 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1760 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1762 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1763 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1764 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1765 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1766 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1767 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1769 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1770 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1771 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1772 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1773 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1775 let mut total_value = 0;
1776 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1777 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1778 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1779 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1780 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1781 continue 'path_check;
1783 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1784 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1785 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1786 continue 'path_check;
1789 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1790 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1792 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1793 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1796 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1797 let mut results = Vec::new();
1798 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1799 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1801 let mut has_ok = false;
1802 let mut has_err = false;
1803 for res in results.iter() {
1804 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1805 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1806 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1807 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1814 if has_err && has_ok {
1815 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1817 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1823 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
1824 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
1825 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
1826 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1828 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1830 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
1832 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
1833 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1834 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1835 } else { unreachable!(); })
1838 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
1840 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1841 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1844 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
1845 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
1850 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1851 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1852 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1855 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1856 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1857 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1859 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1867 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1868 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
1869 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
1873 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1875 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
1876 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1878 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1880 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
1881 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
1882 /// keys per-channel).
1884 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
1885 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
1886 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
1888 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
1889 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
1890 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
1892 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
1893 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1894 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1896 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
1897 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
1898 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1899 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
1903 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
1904 let mut output_index = None;
1905 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
1906 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1907 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
1908 if output_index.is_some() {
1909 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1910 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
1913 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
1914 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1915 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
1918 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
1921 if output_index.is_none() {
1922 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1923 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
1926 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
1930 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1931 if !chan.should_announce() {
1932 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1936 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1938 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1940 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1941 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1943 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1944 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1945 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1946 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1947 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1952 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1953 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1954 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1956 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1959 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1960 // smaller than 500:
1961 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1963 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
1964 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
1965 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
1966 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
1967 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
1968 /// our network addresses.
1970 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
1971 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1973 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
1974 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
1975 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
1976 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
1978 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
1980 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
1981 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
1982 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1984 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1985 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1988 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
1989 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
1990 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
1992 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1993 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1994 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1995 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1996 rgb, alias, addresses,
1997 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1998 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2000 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2001 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2003 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2004 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2006 let mut announced_chans = false;
2007 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2008 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2009 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2011 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update(chan) {
2016 announced_chans = true;
2018 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2019 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2020 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2024 if announced_chans {
2025 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2026 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2027 signature: node_announce_sig,
2028 contents: announcement
2034 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2036 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2037 /// Will likely generate further events.
2038 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2039 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2041 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2042 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2043 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2045 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2046 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2048 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2049 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2050 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2051 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2053 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2054 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2055 match forward_info {
2056 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2057 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2058 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2059 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2060 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2061 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2062 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2064 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2065 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2068 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2069 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2070 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2071 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2072 // problem, not ours.
2079 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2080 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2081 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2082 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2083 match forward_info {
2084 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2085 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2087 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2088 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2089 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2090 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2091 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2092 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2093 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2094 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2096 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2098 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2099 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2101 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2103 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
2104 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2105 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2111 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2113 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2114 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2115 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2116 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2117 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2118 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2119 // this channel currently :/.
2125 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2126 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2128 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2129 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2130 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2132 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2133 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2135 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2137 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2138 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2139 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2142 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2144 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2145 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2146 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2147 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2148 // messages when we can.
2149 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2150 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2151 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2158 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2159 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2162 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2163 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2164 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2165 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2166 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
2167 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2169 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2170 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2171 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2172 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2173 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2175 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
2177 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2179 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2183 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2184 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2187 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2188 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2189 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2190 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2191 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2192 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2193 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2194 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2195 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2197 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2205 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2206 match forward_info {
2207 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2208 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
2209 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2210 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2211 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2212 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2213 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2214 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2215 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2216 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2218 value: amt_to_forward,
2219 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
2220 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
2223 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2225 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2226 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2227 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2229 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2230 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2231 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2232 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2233 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2235 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2240 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2241 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2242 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2243 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2244 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2245 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2246 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2247 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2248 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2249 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2250 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2252 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2253 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2254 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2255 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2256 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2257 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2258 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2259 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2261 let mut total_value = 0;
2262 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2263 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2264 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2265 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2266 total_value += htlc.value;
2267 if htlc.payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2268 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2269 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc.payment_data.total_msat);
2270 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2272 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2274 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2275 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2276 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2277 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2280 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2281 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2283 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2284 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2286 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2288 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2289 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2291 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2293 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2294 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2301 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2302 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2304 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2305 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2313 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2314 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2317 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2318 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2321 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2322 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2323 events.append(&mut new_events);
2326 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2328 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2329 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2331 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2332 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2333 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2334 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2335 if background_events.is_empty() {
2339 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2341 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2342 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2343 // monitor updating completing.
2344 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2351 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2352 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2353 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2354 self.process_background_events();
2357 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
2358 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
2359 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
2361 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
2363 /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
2364 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2365 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2366 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2367 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2369 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2370 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2371 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
2372 match chan.channel_update_status() {
2373 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
2374 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
2375 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
2376 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
2377 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
2378 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2379 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2383 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2384 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
2386 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
2387 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2388 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2392 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2393 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
2403 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2404 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2405 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2406 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2407 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2408 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
2409 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2411 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2412 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
2413 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2414 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2415 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2416 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2417 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2418 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2419 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2420 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2421 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2427 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2428 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2429 // be surfaced to the user.
2430 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2431 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2433 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2434 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2435 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2436 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2437 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(&chan_entry.get()) {
2438 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2440 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2443 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2445 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2446 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2447 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2449 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2451 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2452 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2453 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2455 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2456 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2458 rejected_by_dest: false,
2466 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2473 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2474 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2475 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2476 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2477 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2478 /// still-available channels.
2479 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2480 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2481 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2482 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2485 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2486 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2487 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2489 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, .. } => {
2491 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2492 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2493 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2495 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2498 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2499 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2500 match &onion_error {
2501 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2503 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2505 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2506 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2507 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2508 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2509 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2510 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2511 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2516 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2517 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2518 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2519 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2521 error_code: onion_error_code,
2523 error_data: onion_error_data
2527 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2533 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2534 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2535 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2536 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2538 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2539 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2540 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2541 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2542 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2543 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2545 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2547 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2553 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2554 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2555 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2556 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2557 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2558 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2560 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2561 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2562 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2566 let mut forward_event = None;
2567 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2568 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2570 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2571 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2572 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2574 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2575 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2578 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2579 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2580 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2581 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2582 time_forwardable: time
2589 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2590 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2591 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2593 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
2594 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
2595 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
2596 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
2598 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2600 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
2601 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
2602 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
2603 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2605 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2607 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2608 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
2609 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2610 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2612 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2613 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2614 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2615 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2617 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2618 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2619 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2620 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2621 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2623 let mut valid_mpp = true;
2624 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2625 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2631 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2632 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2633 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2635 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2636 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2637 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2638 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2639 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2640 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2641 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2643 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2645 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2646 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2647 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2648 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2649 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2650 } else { errs.push(e); }
2652 Err(None) => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2653 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2658 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2659 // which were generated.
2660 channel_state.take();
2662 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2663 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2664 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2671 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2672 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2673 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2674 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2675 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2681 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2682 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2683 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2684 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2685 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2686 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2687 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2688 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2690 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2694 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2695 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
2696 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2697 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2698 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2699 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2700 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2701 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2702 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2703 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2712 // TODO: Do something with e?
2713 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2714 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2715 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2716 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2717 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2718 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2719 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2723 } else { unreachable!(); }
2726 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2728 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2729 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2731 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2732 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2733 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2735 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2736 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2740 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
2743 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2744 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2745 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2748 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2749 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2750 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2751 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2754 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2755 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2756 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2757 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2758 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2759 payment_preimage, e);
2763 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2765 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2766 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2767 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2773 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2774 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2775 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
2778 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2779 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2782 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2783 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2785 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2786 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2787 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2788 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2790 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2791 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2792 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2793 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2794 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2795 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2796 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2797 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2798 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2799 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2801 let (mut pending_failures, chan_restoration_res) = {
2802 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2803 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2804 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2805 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
2806 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
2808 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2812 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2813 (pending_failures, handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked))
2815 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
2816 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2817 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2821 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2822 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2823 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2826 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2827 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2828 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2829 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2830 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2831 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2832 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2833 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2834 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2835 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2837 entry.insert(channel);
2843 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2844 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2845 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2846 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2847 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2848 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2849 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2850 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2852 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2853 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2855 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2858 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2859 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2860 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2861 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2863 user_channel_id: user_id,
2868 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2869 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
2870 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2871 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2872 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2873 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2874 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2875 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2876 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2878 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2880 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2883 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2884 // lock before watch_channel
2885 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
2887 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2888 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2889 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2890 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2891 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2892 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
2893 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
2894 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
2895 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
2896 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
2897 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
2899 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2900 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2901 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2902 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2903 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2904 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2908 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2909 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2910 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2911 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2912 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
2914 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2915 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2916 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2925 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2927 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2928 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2929 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2930 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2931 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2932 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2933 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2935 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
2936 Ok(update) => update,
2937 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2939 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2940 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2944 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2947 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
2948 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
2952 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2953 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2954 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2955 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2956 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2957 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2958 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2960 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2961 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2962 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2963 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2964 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2965 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2966 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2967 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2968 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2969 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2970 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2971 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2972 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2973 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2974 msg: announcement_sigs,
2979 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2983 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2984 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2985 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2986 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2988 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2989 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2990 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2991 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2993 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2994 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2995 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2996 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3000 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3001 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3002 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3006 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
3007 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3008 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3010 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3011 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
3013 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3016 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3017 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3019 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3020 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3021 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3022 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3030 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3031 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3032 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3033 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3034 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3035 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3036 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3037 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3039 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3040 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3041 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3042 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3047 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3048 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3049 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3050 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3051 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3052 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3053 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3055 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3056 } else { (tx, None) }
3058 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3061 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3062 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3063 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3065 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3066 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3067 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3068 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3076 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3077 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3078 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3079 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3081 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3082 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3083 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3084 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3086 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3087 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3089 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3090 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3091 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3092 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3095 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3096 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
3097 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
3098 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
3099 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3100 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3101 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3102 match pending_forward_info {
3103 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3104 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) {
3105 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3106 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3107 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3108 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3109 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3113 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3114 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3115 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3116 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3117 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3118 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
3119 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3120 // no problem just calling this
3121 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3122 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3124 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3125 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3126 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3129 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3131 _ => pending_forward_info
3134 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3136 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3141 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3142 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3144 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3145 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3146 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3147 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3148 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3150 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3152 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3155 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
3159 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3160 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3161 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3162 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3163 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3164 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3165 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3167 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3169 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3174 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3175 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3176 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3177 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3178 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3179 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3180 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3182 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3183 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3184 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3186 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3189 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3193 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3194 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3195 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3196 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3197 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3198 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3199 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3201 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
3202 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
3203 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3204 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3205 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3206 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3207 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3212 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3213 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3214 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
3216 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3217 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3218 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3220 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3221 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3222 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3223 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3224 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3225 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3226 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3227 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3229 commitment_signed: msg,
3233 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3234 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3235 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3241 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3246 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3247 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3248 let mut forward_event = None;
3249 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3250 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3251 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3252 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3254 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3255 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3256 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3257 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3259 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3260 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3261 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3263 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3264 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3265 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3270 match forward_event {
3272 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3273 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3274 time_forwardable: time
3282 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3283 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3285 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3286 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3287 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3288 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3289 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3290 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3292 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3293 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3294 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3295 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3296 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3297 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3298 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3299 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3301 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3303 } else { unreachable!(); }
3306 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3307 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3308 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3312 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3313 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3314 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3318 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3320 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3323 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3325 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3326 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3327 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3329 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3336 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3337 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3338 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3339 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3340 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3341 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3342 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3344 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3346 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3351 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3352 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3353 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3355 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3356 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3357 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3358 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3360 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3361 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3364 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3365 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
3366 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
3369 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3374 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
3375 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3376 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3377 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3378 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3379 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3381 // It's not a local channel
3382 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
3385 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3386 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3387 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3388 if chan.get().should_announce() {
3389 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
3390 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
3391 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
3392 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3394 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3396 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3398 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3400 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
3403 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3404 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround, chan_restoration_res) = {
3405 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3406 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3408 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3409 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3410 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3411 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3413 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3414 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3415 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3416 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3417 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
3418 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3419 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3420 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3421 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3425 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
3426 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround,
3427 handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked))
3429 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3432 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3433 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
3435 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
3436 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
3441 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
3442 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
3443 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
3444 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
3445 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
3447 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3448 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3449 let counterparty_node_id;
3450 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3451 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3452 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3454 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3455 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
3456 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3457 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
3458 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
3460 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3461 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
3463 if !chan.get().is_live() {
3464 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3466 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3467 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
3468 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
3470 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3473 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating fee resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3474 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3475 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3476 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3477 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3478 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3479 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3480 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3481 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3491 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3492 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3493 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3497 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
3498 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
3499 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3500 let pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
3501 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
3502 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events {
3503 match monitor_event {
3504 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3505 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3506 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3507 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
3509 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3510 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3513 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3514 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3515 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3516 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3517 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3518 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3519 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3520 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3521 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3523 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3524 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3525 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3529 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3530 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3531 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3532 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3540 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3541 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3544 has_pending_monitor_events
3547 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
3548 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
3549 /// update was applied.
3551 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
3552 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
3553 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
3554 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
3555 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
3556 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
3557 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3558 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3560 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3561 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3562 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3563 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3564 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3566 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
3567 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
3568 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
3569 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
3570 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
3572 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
3573 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3574 has_monitor_update = true;
3575 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
3576 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
3577 if close_channel { return false; }
3579 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3580 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3581 updates: commitment_update,
3588 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
3589 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
3596 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
3597 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3598 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
3601 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3602 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3608 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
3609 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
3611 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
3612 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3613 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
3614 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
3615 // reorganized out of the main chain.
3616 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
3617 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
3618 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
3619 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
3620 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
3621 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
3622 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
3623 assert!(should_broadcast);
3624 } else { unreachable!(); }
3625 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
3627 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3631 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3632 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
3634 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3636 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3637 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3638 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3639 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3640 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
3641 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
3642 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
3643 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
3644 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
3645 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
3646 // never fail a payment too early.
3647 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
3649 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
3652 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
3657 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
3660 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
3661 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
3663 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
3664 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
3665 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
3667 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
3669 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
3670 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3671 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
3672 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3673 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
3674 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3675 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3678 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3679 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
3682 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
3683 /// stored external to LDK.
3685 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
3686 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
3687 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
3689 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
3690 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
3692 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentReceived::user_payment_id`] events to
3693 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
3694 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
3695 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
3696 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
3698 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
3699 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
3700 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
3701 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
3703 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
3704 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
3705 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
3706 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
3707 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
3709 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
3710 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
3711 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
3712 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
3713 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
3715 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
3716 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
3717 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
3719 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
3721 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
3722 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
3724 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3725 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3726 /// [`PaymentReceived::user_payment_id`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::user_payment_id
3727 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3728 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3731 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
3732 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
3733 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
3734 let event_handler = |event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
3735 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
3740 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3741 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3742 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3743 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3744 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3747 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3748 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
3749 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3750 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3752 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3753 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3754 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3755 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3758 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3759 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3762 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
3763 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3764 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3766 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3767 events.replace(pending_events);
3776 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3778 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3779 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3780 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3781 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3784 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
3786 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
3787 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
3789 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
3790 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
3791 /// restarting from an old state.
3792 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
3793 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3794 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3796 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3797 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3798 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3799 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3802 let mut pending_events = std::mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
3803 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3804 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3807 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
3808 handler.handle_event(event);
3816 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3818 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3819 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3820 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3821 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3824 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
3826 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3827 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
3828 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
3829 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
3830 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
3833 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
3834 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
3835 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
3838 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3839 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3840 let new_height = height - 1;
3842 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
3843 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
3844 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
3845 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
3846 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
3847 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
3850 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
3854 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3856 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3857 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3858 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3859 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3862 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3863 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3864 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3865 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3867 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3868 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
3870 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3871 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
3874 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3875 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3876 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3877 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3879 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3880 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3882 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3884 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3886 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
3888 macro_rules! max_time {
3889 ($timestamp: expr) => {
3891 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
3892 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3893 // having an explicit local time source.
3894 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
3895 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
3896 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3897 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3898 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3904 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
3905 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
3906 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3907 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
3908 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
3912 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
3913 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3914 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
3915 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
3916 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
3917 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
3923 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
3924 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3925 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
3926 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
3927 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
3928 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
3929 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3930 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3935 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3937 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3938 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3939 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3940 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3943 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
3944 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
3946 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
3947 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
3948 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3949 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3950 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3952 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3953 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3955 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3956 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3957 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3958 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3959 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
3960 let res = f(channel);
3961 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
3962 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
3963 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3964 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3965 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
3969 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
3970 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3971 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3972 msg: funding_locked,
3974 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
3975 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3976 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3977 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3978 msg: announcement_sigs,
3981 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3983 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
3985 } else if let Err(e) = res {
3986 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3987 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3989 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
3990 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
3991 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
3992 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3993 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3997 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3998 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3999 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4006 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4007 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4008 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4009 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4010 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4011 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4012 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4013 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4014 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4015 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4016 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4017 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4018 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4023 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4028 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4030 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4031 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4035 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4036 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4037 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4039 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4040 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4041 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4042 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4045 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4046 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4048 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4049 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4052 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4053 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4054 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4055 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4056 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4060 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4061 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4062 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4063 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4067 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4068 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4069 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4070 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4071 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4072 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4075 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4076 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4077 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4080 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4081 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4082 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4085 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4086 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4087 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4090 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4091 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4092 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4095 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4096 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4097 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4100 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4101 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4102 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4105 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4106 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4107 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4110 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4111 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4112 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4115 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4116 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4117 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4120 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4121 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4122 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4125 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4126 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4127 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4130 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4131 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4132 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4135 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4136 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4137 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4140 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4141 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4142 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4145 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
4146 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4147 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4150 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
4151 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4152 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
4155 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
4160 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
4161 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4162 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4165 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
4166 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4167 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4168 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
4170 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4171 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4172 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4173 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4174 if no_connection_possible {
4175 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4176 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4177 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4178 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4179 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4181 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
4182 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
4183 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4193 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4194 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4195 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4196 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
4197 if chan.is_shutdown() {
4198 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4199 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4203 no_channels_remain = false;
4209 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
4211 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4212 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4213 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4214 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4215 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4216 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4217 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4218 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4219 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4220 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4221 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4222 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4223 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4224 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
4225 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4226 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
4227 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
4228 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
4229 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
4233 if no_channels_remain {
4234 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
4237 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4238 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4242 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
4243 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4245 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4248 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4249 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
4250 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4251 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
4252 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
4255 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
4256 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
4261 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4262 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4263 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4264 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4265 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4266 if !chan.have_received_message() {
4267 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
4268 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
4269 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
4273 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
4274 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4275 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
4281 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
4284 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
4285 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4287 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
4288 for chan in self.list_channels() {
4289 if chan.remote_network_id == *counterparty_node_id {
4290 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4291 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4295 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4296 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4301 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
4302 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
4303 struct PersistenceNotifier {
4304 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
4305 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
4306 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
4309 impl PersistenceNotifier {
4312 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
4318 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4319 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4324 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
4325 let result = *guard;
4333 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4334 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4335 let current_time = Instant::now();
4337 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4338 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4343 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
4344 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
4345 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
4346 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
4347 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
4349 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
4350 let result = *guard;
4351 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
4355 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
4356 None => return result,
4362 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
4364 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
4365 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4366 *persistence_lock = true;
4367 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
4372 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4373 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4375 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
4377 (0, onion_packet, required),
4378 (2, short_channel_id, required),
4381 (0, payment_data, required),
4382 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4386 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
4387 (0, routing, required),
4388 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
4389 (4, payment_hash, required),
4390 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
4391 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
4394 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailureMsg, ;
4398 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
4403 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
4404 (0, short_channel_id, required),
4405 (2, outpoint, required),
4406 (4, htlc_id, required),
4407 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
4410 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimableHTLC, {
4411 (0, prev_hop, required),
4412 (2, value, required),
4413 (4, payment_data, required),
4414 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
4417 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCSource,
4418 (0, OutboundRoute) => {
4419 (0, session_priv, required),
4420 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
4421 (4, path, vec_type),
4423 (1, PreviousHopData)
4426 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
4427 (0, LightningError) => {
4431 (0, failure_code, required),
4432 (2, data, vec_type),
4436 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
4438 (0, forward_info, required),
4439 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
4440 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
4441 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
4444 (0, htlc_id, required),
4445 (2, err_packet, required),
4449 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
4450 (0, payment_secret, required),
4451 (2, expiry_time, required),
4452 (4, user_payment_id, required),
4453 (6, payment_preimage, required),
4454 (8, min_value_msat, required),
4457 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4458 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4459 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4460 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4461 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4464 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4465 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
4467 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4469 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
4471 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4472 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
4473 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
4476 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4477 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
4478 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4479 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4480 unfunded_channels += 1;
4483 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4484 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4485 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4486 channel.write(writer)?;
4490 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4491 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
4492 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4493 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4494 for forward in pending_forwards {
4495 forward.write(writer)?;
4499 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4500 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
4501 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4502 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4503 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
4504 htlc.write(writer)?;
4508 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4509 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4510 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4511 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4512 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4513 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
4516 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4517 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4518 for event in events.iter() {
4519 event.write(writer)?;
4522 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
4523 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4524 for event in background_events.iter() {
4526 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
4528 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4529 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
4534 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4535 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4537 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4538 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4539 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
4540 hash.write(writer)?;
4541 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
4544 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4545 (pending_outbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4546 for session_priv in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
4547 session_priv.write(writer)?;
4550 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
4556 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
4558 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
4560 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
4561 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
4562 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
4563 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
4564 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
4565 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
4566 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
4567 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
4568 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
4569 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
4570 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
4572 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
4573 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
4575 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
4576 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
4577 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
4578 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
4579 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
4580 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
4581 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4582 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4583 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4584 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4585 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4588 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
4589 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
4591 pub keys_manager: K,
4593 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4595 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
4596 pub fee_estimator: F,
4597 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4599 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
4600 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
4601 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
4602 pub chain_monitor: M,
4604 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
4605 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
4606 /// force-closed during deserialization.
4607 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
4608 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
4609 /// deserialization.
4611 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
4612 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
4613 pub default_config: UserConfig,
4615 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
4616 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
4618 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
4619 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
4620 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
4621 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
4623 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
4626 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
4627 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4630 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4631 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4632 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4633 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4634 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4635 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4638 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
4639 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
4640 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
4641 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
4642 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
4644 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
4645 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
4650 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
4651 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
4652 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4653 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
4654 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4655 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4656 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4657 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4660 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4661 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
4662 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
4666 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4667 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
4668 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4669 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4670 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4671 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4674 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4675 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4677 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4678 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4679 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4681 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4683 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4684 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4685 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4686 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4687 for _ in 0..channel_count {
4688 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
4689 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
4690 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
4691 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
4692 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4693 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4694 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4695 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4696 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
4697 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
4698 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
4699 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4700 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
4701 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
4702 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
4703 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
4704 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4705 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4706 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4707 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4708 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4709 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
4710 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
4711 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
4712 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4714 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4715 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
4717 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
4720 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4721 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
4722 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
4723 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
4724 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
4725 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4729 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
4730 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
4731 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4735 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
4736 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4737 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4738 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
4739 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4740 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4741 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
4742 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
4743 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4745 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
4748 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4749 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4750 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
4751 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4752 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4753 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
4754 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
4755 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4757 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
4760 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4761 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
4762 for _ in 0..peer_count {
4763 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4764 let peer_state = PeerState {
4765 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
4767 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
4770 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4771 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
4772 for _ in 0..event_count {
4773 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4774 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
4779 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4780 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
4781 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
4782 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4783 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
4784 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4788 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4789 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4791 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4792 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
4793 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
4794 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
4795 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4799 let pending_outbound_payments_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4800 let mut pending_outbound_payments: HashSet<[u8; 32]> = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
4801 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count {
4802 if !pending_outbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?) {
4803 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4807 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
4809 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4810 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4812 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
4814 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
4815 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
4816 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
4818 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
4820 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
4825 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
4827 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
4828 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments),
4830 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
4831 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
4834 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
4835 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
4837 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
4839 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
4840 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
4841 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
4842 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
4844 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
4845 logger: args.logger,
4846 default_configuration: args.default_config,
4849 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4850 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4853 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
4854 //connection or two.
4856 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
4862 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
4864 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
4866 use core::time::Duration;
4867 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
4868 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
4869 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
4872 fn test_wait_timeout() {
4873 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
4874 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
4876 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
4877 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
4878 thread::spawn(move || {
4880 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
4881 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4882 *persistence_lock = true;
4885 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
4891 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
4892 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
4894 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
4897 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4902 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
4904 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
4907 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4914 fn test_notify_limits() {
4915 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
4916 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
4917 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4918 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4919 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4920 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4922 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4924 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
4925 // to connect messages with new values
4926 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
4927 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
4928 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
4929 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
4931 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
4932 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
4933 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
4934 // ... but the last node should not.
4935 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
4936 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
4937 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
4938 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
4940 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
4941 // about the channel.
4942 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
4943 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
4944 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
4946 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
4948 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
4949 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
4950 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
4951 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
4952 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
4953 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
4955 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
4956 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
4957 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
4961 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
4964 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
4965 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
4966 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
4967 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
4968 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
4969 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
4970 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
4971 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
4972 use routing::router::get_route;
4973 use util::test_utils;
4974 use util::config::UserConfig;
4975 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
4977 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4978 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4979 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
4981 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
4985 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
4986 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
4987 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
4988 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
4989 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
4990 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
4991 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
4996 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
4997 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
5000 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
5001 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
5002 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
5004 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
5005 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5007 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
5008 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
5010 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
5011 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
5013 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5014 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
5015 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
5016 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
5017 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5019 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5021 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
5023 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5024 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
5025 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
5026 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
5027 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5029 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5031 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
5033 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
5034 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5035 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5038 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
5039 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5040 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
5042 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
5043 } else { panic!(); }
5045 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5046 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5048 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
5051 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5054 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
5055 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
5057 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5058 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5060 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
5062 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
5063 macro_rules! send_payment {
5064 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
5065 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
5066 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
5067 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
5069 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
5070 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
5072 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
5073 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
5075 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5076 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
5077 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5078 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
5079 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5080 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5081 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5082 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5084 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
5085 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
5086 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5088 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
5089 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
5090 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5091 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5092 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
5094 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
5097 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
5098 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5099 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5100 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5102 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
5107 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
5108 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);