1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
72 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
73 use std::time::Instant;
76 use alloc::string::ToString;
77 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
78 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
79 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
80 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
81 use chain::keysinterface::{KeyMaterial, KeysInterface, Sign};
82 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
83 use ln::channelmanager::APIError;
85 use ln::msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
86 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
87 use util::logger::Logger;
89 use core::convert::TryInto;
92 const IV_LEN: usize = 16;
93 const METADATA_LEN: usize = 16;
94 const METADATA_KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
95 const AMT_MSAT_LEN: usize = 8;
96 // Used to shift the payment type bits to take up the top 3 bits of the metadata bytes, or to
97 // retrieve said payment type bits.
98 const METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET: usize = 5;
100 /// A set of keys that were HKDF-expanded from an initial call to
101 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
103 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
104 pub(super) struct ExpandedKey {
105 /// The key used to encrypt the bytes containing the payment metadata (i.e. the amount and
106 /// expiry, included for payment verification on decryption).
107 metadata_key: [u8; 32],
108 /// The key used to authenticate an LDK-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
109 /// registered with LDK.
110 ldk_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
111 /// The key used to authenticate a user-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
112 /// registered with LDK.
113 user_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
117 pub(super) fn new(key_material: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey {
118 hkdf_extract_expand(b"LDK Inbound Payment Key Expansion", &key_material)
128 fn from_bits(bits: u8) -> Result<Method, u8> {
130 bits if bits == Method::LdkPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash),
131 bits if bits == Method::UserPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash),
132 unknown => Err(unknown),
137 pub(super) fn create<Signer: Sign, K: Deref>(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, keys_manager: &K, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()>
138 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
140 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::LdkPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
142 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
143 let rand_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
144 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&rand_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
146 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
147 hmac.input(&iv_bytes);
148 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
149 let payment_preimage_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
151 let ldk_pmt_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_bytes).into_inner());
152 let payment_secret = construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key);
153 Ok((ldk_pmt_hash, payment_secret))
156 pub(super) fn create_from_hash(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
157 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::UserPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
159 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
160 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
161 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
162 let hmac_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
164 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
165 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&hmac_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
167 Ok(construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key))
170 fn construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_type: Method, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<[u8; METADATA_LEN], ()> {
171 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
175 let mut min_amt_msat_bytes: [u8; AMT_MSAT_LEN] = match min_value_msat {
176 Some(amt) => amt.to_be_bytes(),
177 None => [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN],
179 min_amt_msat_bytes[0] |= (payment_type as u8) << METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET;
181 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time - it's updated when
182 // we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in a header. It should never be more
183 // than two hours in the future. Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we
184 // absolutely never fail a payment too early.
185 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date timestamps.
186 let expiry_bytes = (highest_seen_timestamp + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200).to_be_bytes();
188 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
189 metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN].copy_from_slice(&min_amt_msat_bytes);
190 metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].copy_from_slice(&expiry_bytes);
195 fn construct_payment_secret(iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], metadata_key: &[u8; METADATA_KEY_LEN]) -> PaymentSecret {
196 let mut payment_secret_bytes: [u8; 32] = [0; 32];
197 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_slice) = payment_secret_bytes.split_at_mut(IV_LEN);
198 iv_slice.copy_from_slice(iv_bytes);
200 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(metadata_key, iv_bytes);
201 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
202 encrypted_metadata_slice[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ metadata_bytes[i];
204 PaymentSecret(payment_secret_bytes)
207 /// Check that an inbound payment's `payment_data` field is sane.
209 /// LDK does not store any data for pending inbound payments. Instead, we construct our payment
210 /// secret (and, if supplied by LDK, our payment preimage) to include encrypted metadata about the
213 /// The metadata is constructed as:
214 /// payment method (3 bits) || payment amount (8 bytes - 3 bits) || expiry (8 bytes)
215 /// and encrypted using a key derived from [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
217 /// Then on payment receipt, we verify in this method that the payment preimage and payment secret
218 /// match what was constructed.
220 /// [`create_inbound_payment`] and [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] are called by the user to
221 /// construct the payment secret and/or payment hash that this method is verifying. If the former
222 /// method is called, then the payment method bits mentioned above are represented internally as
223 /// [`Method::LdkPaymentHash`]. If the latter, [`Method::UserPaymentHash`].
225 /// For the former method, the payment preimage is constructed as an HMAC of payment metadata and
226 /// random bytes. Because the payment secret is also encoded with these random bytes and metadata
227 /// (with the metadata encrypted with a block cipher), we're able to authenticate the preimage on
230 /// For the latter, the payment secret instead contains an HMAC of the user-provided payment hash
231 /// and payment metadata (encrypted with a block cipher), allowing us to authenticate the payment
232 /// hash and metadata on payment receipt.
234 /// See [`ExpandedKey`] docs for more info on the individual keys used.
236 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
237 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment
238 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
239 pub(super) fn verify<L: Deref>(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_data: &msgs::FinalOnionHopData, highest_seen_timestamp: u64, keys: &ExpandedKey, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<PaymentPreimage>, ()>
240 where L::Target: Logger
242 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_data.payment_secret, keys);
244 let payment_type_res = Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET);
245 let mut amt_msat_bytes = [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN];
246 amt_msat_bytes.copy_from_slice(&metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN]);
247 // Zero out the bits reserved to indicate the payment type.
248 amt_msat_bytes[0] &= 0b00011111;
249 let min_amt_msat: u64 = u64::from_be_bytes(amt_msat_bytes.into());
250 let expiry = u64::from_be_bytes(metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].try_into().unwrap());
252 // Make sure to check to check the HMAC before doing the other checks below, to mitigate timing
254 let mut payment_preimage = None;
255 match payment_type_res {
256 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => {
257 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
258 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes[..]);
259 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
260 if !fixed_time_eq(&iv_bytes, &Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner().split_at_mut(IV_LEN).0) {
261 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash {}: unexpected payment_secret", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
265 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
266 match derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys) {
267 Ok(preimage) => payment_preimage = Some(preimage),
268 Err(bad_preimage_bytes) => {
269 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to mismatching preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes));
274 Err(unknown_bits) => {
275 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment hash {} due to unknown payment type {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), unknown_bits);
280 if payment_data.total_msat < min_amt_msat {
281 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to total_msat {} being less than the minimum amount of {} msat", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, min_amt_msat);
285 if expiry < highest_seen_timestamp {
286 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {}: expired payment", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
293 pub(super) fn get_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
294 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_secret, keys);
296 match Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET) {
297 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
298 derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys)
299 .map_err(|bad_preimage_bytes| APIError::APIMisuseError {
300 err: format!("Payment hash {} did not match decoded preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes))
303 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
304 err: "Expected payment type to be LdkPaymentHash, instead got UserPaymentHash".to_string()
306 Err(other) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Unknown payment type: {}", other) }),
310 fn decrypt_metadata(payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> ([u8; IV_LEN], [u8; METADATA_LEN]) {
311 let mut iv_bytes = [0; IV_LEN];
312 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_bytes) = payment_secret.0.split_at(IV_LEN);
313 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(iv_slice);
315 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(&keys.metadata_key, &iv_bytes);
316 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
317 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
318 metadata_bytes[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ encrypted_metadata_bytes[i];
321 (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes)
324 // Errors if the payment preimage doesn't match `payment_hash`. Returns the bad preimage bytes in
326 fn derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, [u8; 32]> {
327 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
328 hmac.input(iv_bytes);
329 hmac.input(metadata_bytes);
330 let decoded_payment_preimage = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
331 if !fixed_time_eq(&payment_hash.0, &Sha256::hash(&decoded_payment_preimage).into_inner()) {
332 return Err(decoded_payment_preimage);
334 return Ok(PaymentPreimage(decoded_payment_preimage))
337 fn hkdf_extract_expand(salt: &[u8], ikm: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey {
338 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(salt);
340 let prk = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
341 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
343 let metadata_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
345 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
346 hmac.input(&metadata_key);
348 let ldk_pmt_hash_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
350 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
351 hmac.input(&ldk_pmt_hash_key);
353 let user_pmt_hash_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
363 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
365 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
366 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
367 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
369 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
370 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
371 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
372 // before we forward it.
374 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
375 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
376 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
377 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
378 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
380 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
381 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
383 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
384 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
387 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
388 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
391 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
392 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
396 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
397 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
398 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
399 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
400 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
401 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
402 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
405 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
406 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
407 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
408 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
411 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
412 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
413 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
414 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
415 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
418 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
420 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
422 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
423 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
424 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
426 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
428 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
432 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
436 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
437 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
438 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
439 short_channel_id: u64,
441 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
443 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
444 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
449 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
450 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
451 /// are part of the same payment.
452 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
453 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
454 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
457 struct ClaimableHTLC {
458 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
461 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
464 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
465 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
466 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
467 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
469 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
470 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
475 impl Readable for PaymentId {
476 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
477 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
481 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
482 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
483 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
484 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
485 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
488 session_priv: SecretKey,
489 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
490 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
491 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
492 payment_id: PaymentId,
493 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
494 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
497 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
498 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
499 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
501 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
503 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
505 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
508 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
509 payment_id.hash(hasher);
510 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
511 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
512 payment_params.hash(hasher);
519 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
520 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
522 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
523 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
524 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
525 payment_secret: None,
526 payment_params: None,
531 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
532 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
534 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
542 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
543 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
545 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
550 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
552 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
553 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
554 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
555 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
556 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
558 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
559 err: msgs::LightningError,
560 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
561 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
563 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
565 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
567 err: LightningError {
569 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
570 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
577 shutdown_finish: None,
581 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
583 err: LightningError {
585 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
588 shutdown_finish: None,
592 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
593 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
596 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
598 err: LightningError {
600 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
601 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
607 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
608 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
612 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
615 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
617 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
618 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
622 log_level: Level::Warn,
625 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
627 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
629 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
631 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
632 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
638 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
640 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
641 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
649 shutdown_finish: None,
654 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
655 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
656 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
657 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
658 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
660 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
661 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
662 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
663 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
664 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
665 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
666 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
668 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
672 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
673 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
674 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
675 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
676 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
677 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
678 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
679 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
680 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
681 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
682 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
683 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
685 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
686 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
687 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
688 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
691 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
692 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
693 /// quite some time lag.
694 enum BackgroundEvent {
695 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
696 /// commitment transaction.
697 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
700 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
701 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
703 latest_features: InitFeatures,
706 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
707 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
709 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
712 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
713 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
714 struct PendingInboundPayment {
715 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
716 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
717 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
718 /// this payment being removed.
720 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
721 user_payment_id: u64,
722 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
723 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
724 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
727 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
728 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
729 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
731 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
734 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
735 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
736 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
737 pending_amt_msat: u64,
738 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
739 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
740 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
742 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
743 starting_block_height: u32,
745 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
746 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
747 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
749 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
750 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
752 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
753 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
754 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
755 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
756 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
758 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
760 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
761 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
765 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
766 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
768 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
772 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
774 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
778 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
780 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
784 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
786 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
791 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
793 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
794 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
795 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
796 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
800 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
801 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
802 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
803 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
804 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
805 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
806 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
809 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
810 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
813 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
814 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
815 let our_payment_hash;
816 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
817 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
818 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
820 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
821 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
822 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
826 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
830 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
831 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
832 let remove_res = match self {
833 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
834 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
835 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
836 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
837 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
841 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
842 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
843 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
844 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
845 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
846 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
853 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
854 let insert_res = match self {
855 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
856 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
857 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
859 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
860 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
863 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
864 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
865 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
866 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
867 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
874 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
876 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
877 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
878 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
879 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
886 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
887 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
888 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
889 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
890 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
891 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
892 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
893 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
895 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
896 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
897 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
898 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
899 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
900 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
901 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
902 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
903 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
905 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
906 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
908 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
909 /// to individual Channels.
911 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
912 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
913 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
914 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
916 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
917 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
918 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
919 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
920 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
921 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
922 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
924 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
925 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
926 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
927 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
930 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
931 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
932 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
933 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
934 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
936 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
937 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
938 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
939 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
940 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
941 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
942 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
943 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
944 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
945 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
948 default_configuration: UserConfig,
949 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
955 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
957 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
958 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
960 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
961 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
962 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
963 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
965 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
966 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
967 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
968 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
969 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
970 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
972 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
973 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
974 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
975 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
976 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
977 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
978 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
979 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
981 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
983 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
984 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
986 our_network_key: SecretKey,
987 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
989 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
991 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
992 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
993 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
995 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
996 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
997 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
998 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1000 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
1001 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1002 /// are currently open with that peer.
1003 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1004 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
1007 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
1008 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
1010 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
1011 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1012 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1013 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1014 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1015 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1016 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1017 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1018 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1020 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
1027 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1029 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1030 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1031 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1032 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1033 pub struct ChainParameters {
1034 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1035 pub network: Network,
1037 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1039 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1040 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1043 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1049 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1050 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1051 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1052 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1053 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1054 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1056 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1057 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1058 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1059 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1060 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
1062 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1063 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1066 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1067 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1068 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1071 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1072 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1074 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1075 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1076 should_persist: persist_check,
1077 _read_guard: read_guard,
1082 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1083 fn drop(&mut self) {
1084 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1085 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1090 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1091 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1093 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1095 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1096 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1097 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1098 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1099 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1101 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1102 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1104 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1106 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1107 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1108 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1109 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1110 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1111 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1112 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
1114 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1115 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
1117 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1118 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1119 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1120 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
1122 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1123 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1124 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1125 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1126 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1127 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1130 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1132 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1133 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1136 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1138 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
1139 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
1140 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
1142 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1143 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1144 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1145 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1146 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1147 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1148 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1149 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1150 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1151 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1152 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1155 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1156 /// to better separate parameters.
1157 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1158 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1159 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1160 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1161 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1162 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1163 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1164 pub features: InitFeatures,
1165 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1166 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1167 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1169 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1171 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1172 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1173 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1174 /// payments to us through this channel.
1175 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1178 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1179 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1180 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1181 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1182 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1183 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1184 /// lifetime of the channel.
1185 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1186 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1187 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1188 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1189 /// our counterparty already.
1191 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1192 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1193 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1194 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1195 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1196 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1197 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1198 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1199 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1200 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1201 /// this value on chain.
1203 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1205 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1207 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1208 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1209 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1210 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1211 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1212 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1213 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1215 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1216 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1217 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1218 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1220 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1221 pub balance_msat: u64,
1222 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1223 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1224 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1225 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1227 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1229 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1230 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1231 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1232 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1233 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1234 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1235 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1236 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1237 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1239 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1240 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1241 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1242 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1243 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1244 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1245 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1246 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1247 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1249 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1251 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1252 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1253 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1254 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1255 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1256 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1257 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1258 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1259 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1261 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1262 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1263 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1264 pub is_outbound: bool,
1265 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
1266 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
1267 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1268 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1269 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1271 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1272 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
1273 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
1274 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1276 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
1277 pub is_usable: bool,
1278 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1279 pub is_public: bool,
1282 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1283 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1284 /// states for more.
1285 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1286 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1287 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1288 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1289 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1290 ParameterError(APIError),
1291 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1292 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1293 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1294 /// payment in full.
1296 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1298 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1299 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1300 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1301 /// paths than the ones selected).
1302 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1303 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1304 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1305 /// in over-/re-payment.
1307 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1308 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1309 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1311 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1312 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1313 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1314 /// with the latest update_id.
1316 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1317 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1318 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1319 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1320 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1321 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1322 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1323 payment_id: PaymentId,
1327 macro_rules! handle_error {
1328 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1331 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1332 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1334 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1335 // entering the macro.
1336 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1337 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1340 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1342 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1343 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1344 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1345 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1349 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1350 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1351 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1352 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1357 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1358 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1360 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1361 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1362 action: err.action.clone()
1366 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1367 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1370 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1377 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1378 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1379 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1381 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1382 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1384 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1385 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1387 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1388 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1389 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1390 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1392 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1393 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1394 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1396 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1397 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1398 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1399 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1401 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1402 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1403 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1409 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1410 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1414 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1416 $entry.remove_entry();
1424 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1425 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1429 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1431 $entry.remove_entry();
1439 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1440 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1442 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1443 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1444 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1451 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1452 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1453 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1455 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1457 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1458 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1459 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1460 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1462 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1463 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1464 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1465 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1466 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1467 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1468 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1469 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1470 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1471 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1472 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1475 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1476 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1477 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1478 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1479 match $action_type {
1480 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1481 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1483 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1484 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1486 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1487 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1488 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1489 if !$resend_commitment {
1490 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1493 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1495 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1496 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1500 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1501 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1503 $entry.remove_entry();
1507 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1508 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1512 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1513 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1514 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1516 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1517 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1521 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1522 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1523 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1524 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1525 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1528 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1533 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1534 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1535 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1536 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
1537 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1538 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1540 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1541 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1543 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1544 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1545 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1546 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1549 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1550 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1551 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1552 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1553 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1554 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1555 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1556 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1557 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1558 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1559 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1560 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1563 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1564 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1565 // before it should be allowed to.
1566 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1567 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1568 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1571 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1572 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1573 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1574 msg: announcement_sigs,
1577 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1580 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1581 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1582 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1583 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1584 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1585 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1586 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1587 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1588 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1589 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1590 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1591 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1592 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1593 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1594 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1595 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1596 let mut order = $order;
1598 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1600 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1604 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1605 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1606 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1607 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1612 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1613 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1614 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1615 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1616 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1621 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1625 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1630 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1631 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1632 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1637 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1638 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1639 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1640 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1641 assert!(res.is_ok());
1644 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1648 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1649 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1650 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1652 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1654 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1655 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1660 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1661 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1662 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1663 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1664 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1667 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1669 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1670 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1672 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1674 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1676 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1677 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1678 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1679 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1680 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1681 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1682 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1683 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1685 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1686 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1687 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1691 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1693 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1694 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1695 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1696 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1697 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1698 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1700 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1701 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1703 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1704 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1707 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1709 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1710 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1712 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1714 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1715 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1716 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1717 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1725 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1726 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1727 &self.default_configuration
1730 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1732 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1733 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1734 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1735 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1736 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1739 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1740 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1742 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1743 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1744 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1746 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1747 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1748 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1749 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1750 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1751 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1753 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1754 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1755 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1756 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1757 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1758 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1762 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1763 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1764 Some(peer_state) => {
1765 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1766 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1767 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1768 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features,
1769 channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())?
1771 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1774 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1776 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1777 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1778 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1780 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1781 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1782 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1783 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1784 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1785 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1787 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1790 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1792 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1793 node_id: their_network_key,
1796 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1799 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1800 let mut res = Vec::new();
1802 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1803 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1804 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1805 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1806 let balance_msat = channel.get_balance_msat();
1807 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1808 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1809 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1810 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1811 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1812 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1813 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1814 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1815 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1817 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1818 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1819 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1820 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1822 inbound_capacity_msat,
1823 outbound_capacity_msat,
1824 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1825 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1826 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1827 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1828 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1829 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1830 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1834 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1835 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1836 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1837 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1843 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1844 /// more information.
1845 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1846 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1849 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1850 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1852 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1853 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1855 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1856 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1857 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1858 // really wanted anyway.
1859 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1862 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1863 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1864 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1865 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1866 Some(transaction) => {
1867 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1871 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1872 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1873 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1874 reason: closure_reason
1878 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1879 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1881 let counterparty_node_id;
1882 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1883 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1884 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1885 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1886 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1887 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1888 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1889 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1890 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1891 Some(peer_state) => {
1892 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1893 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1894 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1896 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1898 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1900 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1901 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1902 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1903 let (result, is_permanent) =
1904 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1906 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1912 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1913 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1917 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1918 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1919 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1920 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1924 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1928 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1932 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1933 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1936 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1940 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1941 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1942 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1944 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1945 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1947 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1948 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1949 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1950 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1952 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1954 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1955 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1956 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1957 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1958 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1961 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1962 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1963 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1965 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1966 /// the channel being closed or not:
1967 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1968 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1969 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1970 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1971 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1972 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1973 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1975 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1977 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1978 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1979 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1980 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1981 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1985 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1986 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1987 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1988 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1989 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1991 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1992 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1993 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1994 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1995 // ignore the result here.
1996 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2000 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2001 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2002 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2004 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2005 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2006 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2007 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
2008 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
2009 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2012 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2013 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2015 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
2016 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2017 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
2020 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2022 chan.remove_entry().1
2024 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2027 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2028 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
2029 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2030 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2031 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2036 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2039 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
2040 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
2041 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2042 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2043 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
2044 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2045 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2046 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2047 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2048 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2049 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2059 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2060 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2061 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
2062 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2063 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2067 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2068 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2069 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2071 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2072 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2073 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2074 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2075 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2076 failure_code: $err_code,
2077 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2082 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2083 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2086 let shared_secret = {
2087 let mut arr = [0; 32];
2088 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
2091 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
2093 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2094 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2095 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2096 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2097 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2098 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2099 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2100 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2103 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
2104 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
2105 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
2106 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
2107 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
2110 let mut channel_state = None;
2111 macro_rules! return_err {
2112 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2114 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2115 if channel_state.is_none() {
2116 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2118 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2119 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2120 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2121 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2122 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2127 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
2128 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
2129 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
2130 match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
2132 let error_code = match err {
2133 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
2134 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
2135 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
2136 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
2137 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
2139 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
2142 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
2143 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
2144 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2151 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
2154 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
2155 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
2156 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
2157 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
2158 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
2159 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
2160 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
2161 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
2162 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
2163 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
2164 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
2165 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
2169 // final_expiry_too_soon
2170 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2171 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2172 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2173 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2174 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2175 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2176 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
2178 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2179 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
2180 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2182 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2183 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
2184 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2187 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
2188 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
2189 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
2190 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2191 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2192 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
2193 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2194 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2196 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2198 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2199 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2200 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2201 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2202 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2203 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2204 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2205 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
2206 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
2209 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2211 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2214 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
2219 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2220 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2221 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2222 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2224 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2226 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2227 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2228 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2229 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2232 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
2233 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
2234 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2236 // Check two things:
2237 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
2238 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
2239 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
2241 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
2243 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
2244 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
2245 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
2247 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2249 let blinding_factor = {
2250 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
2251 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
2252 sha.input(&shared_secret);
2253 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
2256 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
2258 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
2260 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2263 hop_data: new_packet_data,
2264 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2267 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2268 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2269 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2270 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2271 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2275 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2276 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2277 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2280 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2281 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2282 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2283 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2287 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2288 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2289 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2290 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2291 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2292 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2293 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2294 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2295 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
2296 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2297 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2299 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2302 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2304 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2305 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2306 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2307 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2308 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2311 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2312 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2313 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2314 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2315 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2316 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2317 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2319 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2320 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2322 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2323 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2324 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2325 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2326 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2328 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2329 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2331 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2332 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2333 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2334 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2335 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2336 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2338 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2339 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2341 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2342 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2343 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2344 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2345 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2346 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2347 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2348 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2349 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2350 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2356 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2357 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2358 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2359 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2361 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2362 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2364 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2365 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2366 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2368 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2370 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
2375 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2378 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2379 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2380 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2382 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2383 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2384 if !chan.should_announce() {
2385 return Err(LightningError {
2386 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2387 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2390 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2391 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2394 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2395 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2396 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2397 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2398 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2399 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2400 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2401 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2402 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2406 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2408 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2409 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2411 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2412 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2413 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2414 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2415 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2416 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2417 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2418 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2421 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2422 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2424 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2430 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2431 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2432 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2433 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2434 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2435 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2437 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2438 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2439 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2440 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2441 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2443 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2445 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2447 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2448 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2450 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2451 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2452 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2453 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2454 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2455 err: "Payment already completed"
2460 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2461 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2462 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2465 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2467 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2468 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2469 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2470 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2471 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2472 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2473 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2474 total_msat: total_value,
2476 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2480 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2481 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2483 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2484 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2486 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2487 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2489 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2490 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2492 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2493 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2495 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2496 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2497 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2498 channel_state, chan)
2500 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2501 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2502 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2503 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2504 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2505 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2506 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2507 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2508 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2509 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2511 insert_outbound_payment!();
2513 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2514 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2515 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2516 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2517 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2518 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2519 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2520 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2526 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2528 } else { unreachable!(); }
2532 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2533 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2535 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2540 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2542 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2543 /// fields for more info.
2545 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2546 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2547 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2548 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2549 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2550 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2552 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2554 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2555 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2556 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2558 /// In general, a path may raise:
2559 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2560 /// node public key) is specified.
2561 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2562 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2564 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2565 /// relevant updates.
2567 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2568 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2569 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2571 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2572 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2573 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2574 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2576 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2577 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2578 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2579 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2580 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2583 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2584 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2585 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2587 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2588 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2589 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2590 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2591 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2593 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2594 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2596 let mut total_value = 0;
2597 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2598 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2599 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2600 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2601 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2602 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2603 continue 'path_check;
2605 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2606 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2607 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2608 continue 'path_check;
2611 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2612 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2614 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2615 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2617 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2618 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2619 total_value = amt_msat;
2622 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2623 let mut results = Vec::new();
2624 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2625 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2627 let mut has_ok = false;
2628 let mut has_err = false;
2629 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2630 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2631 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2632 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2633 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2634 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2635 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2639 } else if res.is_err() {
2640 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2641 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2644 if has_err && has_ok {
2645 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2648 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2649 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2650 Some(RouteParameters {
2651 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2652 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2653 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2659 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2660 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2661 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2662 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2668 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2670 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2671 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2672 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2673 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2674 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2676 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2677 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2678 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2679 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2680 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2681 if path.len() == 0 {
2682 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2683 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2688 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2689 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2690 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2692 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2693 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2695 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2696 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2697 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2698 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2701 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2703 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2704 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2705 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2708 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2709 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2710 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2713 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2714 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2715 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2720 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2721 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2725 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2728 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2730 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2731 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2732 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2733 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2735 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2736 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2737 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2739 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2740 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2741 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2742 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2743 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2745 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2746 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2747 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2748 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2749 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2751 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2759 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2760 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2761 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2762 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2763 /// never reach the recipient.
2765 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2767 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2768 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2770 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2772 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2773 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2774 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2776 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2778 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2779 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2780 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2785 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2786 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2787 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2788 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2790 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2792 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2794 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2795 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2796 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2797 } else { unreachable!(); })
2800 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2802 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2803 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2806 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2807 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2812 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2813 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2814 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2817 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2818 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2819 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2821 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2829 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2830 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2831 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2835 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2837 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2838 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2840 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2841 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2843 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2844 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2845 /// keys per-channel).
2847 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2848 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2849 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2851 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2852 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2853 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2855 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2856 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2857 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2858 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2860 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2861 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2862 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2863 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2867 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2868 let mut output_index = None;
2869 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2870 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2871 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2872 if output_index.is_some() {
2873 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2874 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2877 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2878 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2879 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2882 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2885 if output_index.is_none() {
2886 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2887 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2890 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2894 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2895 if !chan.should_announce() {
2896 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2900 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2902 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2904 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2905 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2907 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2908 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2909 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2910 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2911 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2916 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2917 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2918 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2920 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2923 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2924 // smaller than 500:
2925 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2927 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2928 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2929 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2930 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2931 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2932 /// our network addresses.
2934 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2935 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2937 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2938 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2939 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2940 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2942 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2944 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2945 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2946 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2948 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2949 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2952 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2953 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2954 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2956 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2957 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2958 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2959 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2960 rgb, alias, addresses,
2961 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2962 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2964 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2965 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2967 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2968 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2970 let mut announced_chans = false;
2971 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2972 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2973 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2975 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2980 announced_chans = true;
2982 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2983 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2984 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2988 if announced_chans {
2989 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2990 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2991 signature: node_announce_sig,
2992 contents: announcement
2998 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3000 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3001 /// Will likely generate further events.
3002 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3003 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3005 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3006 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3007 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3009 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3010 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3012 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
3013 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3014 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
3015 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3017 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
3018 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3019 match forward_info {
3020 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
3021 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3022 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3023 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3024 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3025 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3026 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3028 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
3029 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
3032 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3033 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3034 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3035 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3036 // problem, not ours.
3043 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3044 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3045 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3046 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3047 match forward_info {
3048 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3049 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3051 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3052 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3053 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3054 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3055 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3056 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3057 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3058 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3060 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3062 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3063 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3065 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3067 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
3068 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3069 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
3075 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3077 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3078 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3079 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3080 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3081 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3082 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3083 // this channel currently :/.
3089 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3090 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3092 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3093 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3094 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3096 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3097 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3099 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3101 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3102 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3103 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3106 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3108 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3109 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3110 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3111 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3112 // messages when we can.
3113 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3114 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3115 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3122 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3123 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3126 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3127 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3128 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3129 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3130 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3131 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3133 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3134 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3135 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
3136 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3137 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3139 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3140 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3142 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
3144 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3148 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3149 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3152 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3153 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3154 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3155 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3156 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3157 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3158 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3159 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3160 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3162 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3170 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3171 match forward_info {
3172 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3173 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3174 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3175 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
3176 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3177 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
3178 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3179 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
3181 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3184 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3185 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3186 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3187 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3188 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3189 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3191 value: amt_to_forward,
3196 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3198 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3199 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3200 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3202 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3203 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3204 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3205 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3206 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3208 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3213 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3214 ($payment_data_total_msat: expr, $payment_secret: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3215 let mut total_value = 0;
3216 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3217 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3218 .or_insert(Vec::new());
3219 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3220 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3221 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3222 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3226 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3227 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3228 total_value += htlc.value;
3229 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3230 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
3231 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != $payment_data_total_msat {
3232 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3233 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data_total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
3234 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3236 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3238 _ => unreachable!(),
3241 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data_total_msat {
3242 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3243 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data_total_msat);
3244 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3247 } else if total_value == $payment_data_total_msat {
3248 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3250 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3251 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3252 payment_secret: $payment_secret,
3256 payment_received_generated = true;
3258 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3259 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3262 payment_received_generated
3266 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3267 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3268 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3269 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3270 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3271 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3272 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3273 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3274 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3275 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3276 OnionPayload::Invoice(ref payment_data) => {
3277 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3278 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3280 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3284 let payment_data_total_msat = payment_data.total_msat;
3285 let payment_secret = payment_data.payment_secret.clone();
3286 check_total_value!(payment_data_total_msat, payment_secret, payment_preimage);
3288 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3289 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3290 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3291 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
3292 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3294 amt: amt_to_forward,
3295 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
3298 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3299 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3300 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3306 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3308 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3311 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3312 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3315 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3316 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3317 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3318 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3319 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3320 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3321 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3323 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data.total_msat, payment_data.payment_secret, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3324 if payment_received_generated {
3325 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3331 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3332 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3340 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3341 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3344 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3345 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3348 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3349 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3350 events.append(&mut new_events);
3353 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3355 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3356 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3358 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3359 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3360 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3361 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3362 if background_events.is_empty() {
3366 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3368 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3369 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3370 // monitor updating completing.
3371 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3378 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3379 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3380 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3381 self.process_background_events();
3384 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3385 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3386 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3387 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3388 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3389 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3390 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3392 if !chan.is_live() {
3393 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3394 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3395 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3397 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3398 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3400 let mut retain_channel = true;
3401 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3404 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3405 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3409 let ret_err = match res {
3410 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3411 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3412 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
3413 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3416 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3417 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3418 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3419 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3420 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3421 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3422 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3423 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3433 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3437 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3438 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3439 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3440 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3441 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3442 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3443 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3445 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3447 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3449 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3450 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3451 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3452 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3453 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3454 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3455 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3457 handle_errors.push(err);
3467 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3469 /// This currently includes:
3470 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3471 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3472 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3475 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3476 /// estimate fetches.
3477 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3478 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3479 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3480 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3482 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3484 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3486 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3487 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3488 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3489 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3490 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3491 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3492 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3493 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3495 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3497 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3499 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3500 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3501 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3502 if needs_close { return false; }
3505 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3506 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3507 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3508 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3509 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3510 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3511 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3512 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3516 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3517 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3519 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3520 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3521 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3525 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3526 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3535 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3536 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3542 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3543 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3544 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3545 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3546 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3547 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3548 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3550 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3551 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3552 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3553 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3554 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3555 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3556 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3557 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3558 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3559 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3560 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3566 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3567 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3568 // be surfaced to the user.
3569 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3570 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3572 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3573 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3574 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3575 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3576 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3577 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3579 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3582 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3584 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3585 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3586 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3588 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3589 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3590 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3591 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3592 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3593 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3594 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3595 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3596 Some(RouteParameters {
3597 payment_params: payment_params_data,
3598 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3599 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3602 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3603 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3604 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3606 rejected_by_dest: false,
3607 network_update: None,
3608 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3610 short_channel_id: None,
3617 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3618 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3620 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3626 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3633 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3634 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3635 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3636 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3637 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3638 /// still-available channels.
3639 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3640 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3641 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3642 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3645 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3646 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3647 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3649 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3650 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3651 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3652 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3653 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3654 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3655 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3656 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3657 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3660 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3661 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3664 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3665 all_paths_failed = true;
3666 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3667 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3669 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3675 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3678 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3679 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3680 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3681 Some(RouteParameters {
3682 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3683 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3684 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3687 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3689 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3690 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3692 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3694 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3695 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3696 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3697 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3698 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3699 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3700 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3701 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3708 error_code: onion_error_code,
3710 error_data: onion_error_data
3713 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3719 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3720 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3721 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3722 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3724 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3725 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3726 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3727 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3728 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3729 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3730 network_update: None,
3733 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3736 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3738 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3742 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3743 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3744 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3746 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3747 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3748 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3749 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3750 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3751 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3753 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3754 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3755 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3759 let mut forward_event = None;
3760 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3761 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3763 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3764 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3765 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3767 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3768 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3771 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3772 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3773 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3774 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3775 time_forwardable: time
3782 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3783 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3785 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3786 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3787 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3788 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3790 /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
3791 /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
3793 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3794 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3795 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3796 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3797 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3798 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3800 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3802 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3803 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3804 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3805 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3807 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3808 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3809 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3810 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3812 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3813 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3814 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3815 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3816 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3818 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3819 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3820 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3826 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3827 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3828 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3830 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3831 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3832 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3833 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3834 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3835 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3836 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3838 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3839 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3840 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3841 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3842 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3843 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3844 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3845 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3847 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3848 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3849 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3850 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3851 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3852 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3854 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3859 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3860 // which were generated.
3861 channel_state.take();
3863 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3864 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3865 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3872 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3873 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3874 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3875 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3876 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3878 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3882 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3883 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3884 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3885 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3886 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3887 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3888 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3889 payment_preimage, e);
3890 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3891 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3892 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3893 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3896 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3897 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3898 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3899 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3900 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3901 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3902 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3903 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3904 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3905 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3911 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3913 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3916 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3917 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3918 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3919 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3920 payment_preimage, e);
3922 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3923 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3925 chan.remove_entry();
3927 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3930 } else { unreachable!(); }
3933 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3934 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3935 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3936 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3937 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
3938 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3939 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3940 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3941 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3942 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
3943 pending_events.push(
3944 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3946 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
3951 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3959 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3961 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3962 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3963 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3964 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3965 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3966 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3967 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3968 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3969 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3970 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
3971 pending_events.push(
3972 events::Event::PaymentSent {
3973 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3979 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3983 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
3984 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
3985 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
3987 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
3988 // irrevocably fulfilled.
3989 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3990 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
3991 pending_events.push(
3992 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4000 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4005 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4008 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4009 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4010 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4011 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4012 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4013 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4014 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4017 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4018 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4019 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4020 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4021 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4024 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4025 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4026 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4027 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4028 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4029 payment_preimage, e);
4031 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4032 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4033 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4034 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4037 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4038 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4039 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4040 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4044 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4045 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4046 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4049 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4050 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4052 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4060 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4061 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4062 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4065 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4066 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4068 let chan_restoration_res;
4069 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
4070 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4071 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4072 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4073 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4074 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4076 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4080 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
4081 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
4082 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4083 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
4084 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
4085 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
4086 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4087 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4088 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
4091 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked);
4092 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4093 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4095 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4097 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4098 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4099 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4100 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4104 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4105 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4106 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4109 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4110 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4113 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4114 &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger)
4115 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
4116 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4117 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4118 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4119 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
4120 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4121 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4122 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4123 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
4125 entry.insert(channel);
4131 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4132 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4133 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4134 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4135 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4136 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4137 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4138 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4140 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4141 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4143 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4146 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4147 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4148 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4149 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4151 user_channel_id: user_id,
4156 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4157 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
4158 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4159 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4160 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4161 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4162 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4163 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4164 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4166 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4168 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4171 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4172 // lock before watch_channel
4173 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4175 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4176 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4177 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4178 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4179 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4180 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4181 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4182 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4183 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4184 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4185 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4187 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4188 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4189 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4190 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
4191 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4192 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4196 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4197 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4198 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4199 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4200 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4202 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4203 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4204 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4213 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4215 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4216 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4217 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4218 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4219 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4220 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4221 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4223 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4224 Ok(update) => update,
4225 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4227 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4228 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
4229 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4230 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4231 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4232 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4233 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4234 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4241 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4244 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4245 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4249 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4250 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4251 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4252 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4253 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4254 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4255 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4257 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4258 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
4259 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4260 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
4261 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
4262 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
4263 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
4264 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
4265 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
4266 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
4267 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
4268 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
4269 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4270 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4271 msg: announcement_sigs,
4273 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4274 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4275 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4276 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4281 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4285 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4286 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4287 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4288 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4289 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4291 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4292 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4293 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4294 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4297 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4298 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4299 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4300 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4303 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4304 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4306 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4307 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4308 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4309 let (result, is_permanent) =
4310 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
4312 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
4318 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4319 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4320 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4327 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4330 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4331 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4334 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4338 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4339 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4340 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4341 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4342 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4343 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4344 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4345 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4347 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4348 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4349 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4350 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4355 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4356 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4357 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4358 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4359 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4360 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
4361 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4363 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
4364 } else { (tx, None) }
4366 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4369 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4370 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4371 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4373 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4374 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4375 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4376 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4380 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4385 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4386 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4387 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4388 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4390 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4391 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4392 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4393 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4395 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4396 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4398 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4399 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4400 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4401 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4404 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4405 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4406 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4407 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4408 match pending_forward_info {
4409 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4410 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4411 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
4412 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
4413 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
4414 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
4415 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
4416 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
4420 // The only case where we'd be unable to
4421 // successfully get a channel update is if the
4422 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
4423 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
4424 // payments over the channel back to themselves
4425 // (because no one else should know the short_id
4426 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
4427 // no problem just calling this
4428 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
4429 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
4432 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4434 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4435 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4436 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4439 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4441 _ => pending_forward_info
4444 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4446 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4451 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4452 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4453 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4454 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4455 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4456 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4457 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4458 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4460 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4462 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4465 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4469 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4470 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4471 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4472 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4473 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4474 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4475 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4477 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4479 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4484 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4485 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4486 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4487 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4488 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4489 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4490 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4492 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4493 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4494 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4496 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4499 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4503 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4504 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4505 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4506 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4507 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4508 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4509 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4511 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4512 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4513 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4514 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4515 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4516 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4517 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4522 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4523 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4525 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4526 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4527 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4529 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4530 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4531 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4532 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4533 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4534 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4535 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4536 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4538 commitment_signed: msg,
4544 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4549 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4550 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4551 let mut forward_event = None;
4552 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4553 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4554 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4555 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4557 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4558 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4559 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4560 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4561 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4563 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4564 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4565 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4567 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4568 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4569 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4574 match forward_event {
4576 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4577 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4578 time_forwardable: time
4586 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4587 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4589 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4590 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4591 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4592 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4593 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4594 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4596 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4597 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4598 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4599 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4600 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4601 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4602 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4603 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4604 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4605 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4606 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4608 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4609 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4610 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4611 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4612 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4614 } else { unreachable!(); }
4617 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4618 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4619 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4623 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4624 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4625 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4626 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4627 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4629 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4632 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4634 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4635 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4637 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4638 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4640 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4641 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4648 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4649 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4650 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4651 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4652 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4653 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4654 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4656 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4658 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4663 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4664 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4665 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4667 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4668 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4669 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4670 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4672 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4673 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4676 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4677 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4678 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4679 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4680 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4683 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4688 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4689 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4690 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4691 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4692 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4693 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4695 // It's not a local channel
4696 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4699 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4700 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4701 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4702 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4703 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4704 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4705 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4706 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4708 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4710 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4711 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4712 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4713 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4715 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4718 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4720 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4723 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4724 let chan_restoration_res;
4725 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4726 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4727 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4729 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4730 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4731 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4732 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4734 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4735 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4736 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4737 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4738 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
4739 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4740 let mut channel_update = None;
4741 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4742 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4743 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4746 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4747 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4748 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4749 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4750 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4751 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4752 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4755 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4756 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
4757 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4758 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4760 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
4762 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4765 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4766 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4768 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4769 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4774 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4775 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4776 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4777 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4778 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4779 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4780 match monitor_event {
4781 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4782 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4783 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4784 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4786 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4787 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4790 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4791 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4792 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4793 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4794 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4795 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4796 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4797 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4798 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4799 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4801 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4802 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4803 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4807 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4808 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4810 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4812 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4813 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4814 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4815 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4816 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4821 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4822 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4827 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4828 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4831 has_pending_monitor_events
4834 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4835 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4836 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4837 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
4838 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4839 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4842 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4843 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4844 /// update was applied.
4846 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4847 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4848 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4849 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4850 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4851 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4852 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4853 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4855 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4856 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4857 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4858 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4859 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4861 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4862 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4863 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4864 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4865 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4867 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4868 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4869 has_monitor_update = true;
4870 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4871 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4872 if close_channel { return false; }
4874 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4875 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4876 updates: commitment_update,
4883 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4884 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4885 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4892 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4893 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4894 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4897 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4898 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4904 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4905 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4906 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4907 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4908 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4909 let mut has_update = false;
4911 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4912 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4913 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4914 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4915 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4917 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4918 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4919 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4920 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4922 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4923 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4926 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4927 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4928 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4929 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4930 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4933 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4934 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4939 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4941 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4942 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4948 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4949 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4956 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4957 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4963 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4964 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4966 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4967 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4968 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4969 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4970 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4971 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4972 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4973 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4974 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4975 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4976 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4977 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4978 assert!(should_broadcast);
4979 } else { unreachable!(); }
4980 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4982 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4986 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4987 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4989 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4990 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
4993 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4995 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4996 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4997 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4998 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4999 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5000 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5001 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5002 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5003 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5004 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5005 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5006 // never fail a payment too early.
5007 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5009 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5012 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5017 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5020 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5021 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5023 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5024 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5025 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5027 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5029 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5030 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5034 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5035 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5037 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5039 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5040 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5041 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5042 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5043 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5044 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5047 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5048 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5051 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5053 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5055 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5056 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5057 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5058 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5059 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5062 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5063 /// stored external to LDK.
5065 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5066 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5067 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5069 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5070 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5073 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5074 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5075 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5076 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5078 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5079 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5080 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5081 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5082 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5084 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5085 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5086 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5087 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5088 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5090 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5092 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5093 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5095 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5096 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5100 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5101 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5103 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5105 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5106 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5107 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5108 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5111 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5112 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5115 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5117 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5119 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5120 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5123 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5124 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5126 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5127 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5128 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5131 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
5132 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5133 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5134 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5135 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5140 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5141 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5145 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5146 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5150 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5151 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5152 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5153 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5154 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5157 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5158 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5159 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5160 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5162 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5163 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5164 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5165 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5168 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5169 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5171 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5172 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5175 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5176 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5177 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5179 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5180 events.replace(pending_events);
5189 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5191 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5192 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5193 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5194 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5197 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5199 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5200 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5202 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5203 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5204 /// restarting from an old state.
5205 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5206 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5207 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5209 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5210 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5211 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5212 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5215 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5216 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5217 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5220 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5221 handler.handle_event(&event);
5229 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5231 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5232 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5233 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5234 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5237 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
5239 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5240 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
5241 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5242 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5243 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5246 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
5247 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
5248 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
5251 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5252 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5253 let new_height = height - 1;
5255 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5256 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5257 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5258 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5259 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5260 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5263 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
5267 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5269 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5270 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5271 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5272 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5275 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5276 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5277 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5278 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5280 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5281 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5283 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5284 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
5287 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5288 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5289 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5290 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5292 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5293 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5295 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5297 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5299 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
5301 macro_rules! max_time {
5302 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5304 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5305 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5306 // having an explicit local time source.
5307 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5308 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5309 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5310 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5311 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5317 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5318 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5319 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5320 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5321 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5324 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5325 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5326 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5327 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5328 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5329 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5330 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5331 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5332 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5340 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5341 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5342 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5343 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5344 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5345 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5351 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5352 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5353 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5354 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5355 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5356 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
5357 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
5358 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
5363 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5365 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5366 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5367 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5368 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5371 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5372 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5374 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ClosureReason>>
5375 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5376 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5377 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5378 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5380 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5381 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5383 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5384 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5385 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5386 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5387 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5388 let res = f(channel);
5389 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
5390 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5391 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
5392 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5393 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
5397 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
5398 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
5399 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5400 msg: funding_locked,
5402 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
5403 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5404 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5405 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5406 msg: announcement_sigs,
5408 } else if channel.is_usable() {
5409 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5410 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5411 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5412 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
5415 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5417 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
5419 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5420 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5421 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5423 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5424 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5425 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5426 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5427 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5431 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5432 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5433 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5434 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5435 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5436 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5437 data: reason_message,
5445 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5446 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
5447 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5448 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5449 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5450 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5451 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5452 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5453 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5454 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5455 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5456 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5457 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5462 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5467 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5469 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5470 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5474 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5475 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5476 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5479 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5480 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5481 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5482 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5485 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5486 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5488 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5489 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5492 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5493 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5494 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5495 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5496 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5500 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5501 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5502 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5503 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5507 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5508 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5509 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5510 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5511 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5512 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5515 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5516 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5517 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5520 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5521 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5522 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5525 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5526 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5527 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5530 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5531 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5532 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5535 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5536 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5537 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5540 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5541 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5542 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5545 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5546 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5547 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5550 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5551 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5552 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5555 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5556 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5557 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5560 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5561 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5562 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5565 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5566 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5567 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5570 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5571 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5572 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5575 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5576 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5577 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5580 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5581 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5582 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5585 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5586 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5587 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5590 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5591 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5592 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5595 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5600 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5601 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5602 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5605 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5606 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5607 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5608 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5610 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5611 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5612 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5613 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5614 if no_connection_possible {
5615 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5616 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5617 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5618 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5619 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5621 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5622 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5623 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5627 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5634 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5635 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5636 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5637 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5638 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5639 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5640 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5642 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5645 no_channels_remain = false;
5651 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5653 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5654 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5655 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5656 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5657 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5658 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5659 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5660 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5661 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5662 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5663 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5664 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5665 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5666 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5667 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5668 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5669 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5670 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5671 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5675 if no_channels_remain {
5676 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5679 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5680 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5684 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5685 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5687 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5690 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5691 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5692 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5693 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5694 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5697 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5698 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5703 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5704 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5705 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5706 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5707 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5708 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5709 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5710 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5711 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5715 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5716 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5717 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5723 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5726 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5727 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5729 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5730 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5731 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5732 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5733 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5737 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5738 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5743 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5744 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5745 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5746 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5747 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5748 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5751 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5754 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5760 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5761 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5766 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5767 let result = *guard;
5775 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5776 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5777 let current_time = Instant::now();
5779 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5780 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5785 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5786 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5787 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5788 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5789 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5791 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5792 let result = *guard;
5793 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5797 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5798 None => return result,
5804 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5806 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5807 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5808 *persistence_lock = true;
5809 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5814 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5815 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5817 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5819 (0, onion_packet, required),
5820 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5823 (0, payment_data, required),
5824 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5826 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5827 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5828 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5832 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5833 (0, routing, required),
5834 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5835 (4, payment_hash, required),
5836 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5837 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5841 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5842 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5844 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5846 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5847 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5848 reason.write(writer)?;
5850 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5851 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
5854 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5855 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5856 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
5857 failure_code.write(writer)?;
5864 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5865 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5866 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5869 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5870 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5871 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5872 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
5876 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5877 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5878 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5879 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
5880 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
5883 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
5884 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
5885 // messages contained in the variants.
5886 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
5887 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
5888 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
5890 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5891 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5892 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5893 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5894 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
5897 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5898 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5899 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5900 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5901 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
5903 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5908 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
5913 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
5914 (0, short_channel_id, required),
5915 (2, outpoint, required),
5916 (4, htlc_id, required),
5917 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
5920 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
5921 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5922 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
5923 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
5926 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
5927 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
5928 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
5933 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
5934 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
5935 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
5941 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
5942 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5943 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5945 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
5946 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
5947 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5951 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
5952 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
5953 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
5955 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
5957 if payment_data.is_some() {
5958 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5960 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
5963 if payment_data.is_none() {
5964 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5966 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
5970 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
5978 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
5979 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5980 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5983 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5984 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
5985 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
5986 let mut payment_id = None;
5987 let mut payment_secret = None;
5988 let mut payment_params = None;
5989 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5990 (0, session_priv, required),
5991 (1, payment_id, option),
5992 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5993 (3, payment_secret, option),
5994 (4, path, vec_type),
5995 (5, payment_params, option),
5997 if payment_id.is_none() {
5998 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6000 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6002 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6003 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6004 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6005 path: path.unwrap(),
6006 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6011 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6012 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6017 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6018 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6020 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6022 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6023 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6024 (0, session_priv, required),
6025 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6026 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6027 (3, payment_secret, option),
6028 (4, path, vec_type),
6029 (5, payment_params, option),
6032 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6034 field.write(writer)?;
6041 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6042 (0, LightningError) => {
6046 (0, failure_code, required),
6047 (2, data, vec_type),
6051 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6053 (0, forward_info, required),
6054 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6055 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6056 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6059 (0, htlc_id, required),
6060 (2, err_packet, required),
6064 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6065 (0, payment_secret, required),
6066 (2, expiry_time, required),
6067 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6068 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6069 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6072 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6074 (0, session_privs, required),
6077 (0, session_privs, required),
6078 (1, payment_hash, option),
6081 (0, session_privs, required),
6082 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6083 (2, payment_hash, required),
6084 (4, payment_secret, option),
6085 (6, total_msat, required),
6086 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6087 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6090 (0, session_privs, required),
6091 (2, payment_hash, required),
6095 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6096 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6097 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6098 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6099 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6102 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6103 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6105 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6107 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6109 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6110 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6111 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6114 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6115 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6116 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6117 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6118 unfunded_channels += 1;
6121 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6122 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6123 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6124 channel.write(writer)?;
6128 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6129 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6130 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6131 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6132 for forward in pending_forwards {
6133 forward.write(writer)?;
6137 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6138 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6139 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6140 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6141 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6142 htlc.write(writer)?;
6146 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6147 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6148 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6149 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6150 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6151 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6154 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6155 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6156 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6157 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6158 for event in events.iter() {
6159 event.write(writer)?;
6162 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6163 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6164 for event in background_events.iter() {
6166 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6168 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6169 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6174 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6175 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6177 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6178 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6179 hash.write(writer)?;
6180 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6183 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6184 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6185 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6186 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6187 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6190 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6191 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6193 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6194 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6195 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6196 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6199 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6200 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6204 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6205 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6206 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6208 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6209 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6210 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6215 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6216 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6217 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6218 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required)
6225 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6227 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6229 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6230 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6231 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6232 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6233 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6234 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6235 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6236 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6237 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6238 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6239 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6240 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6241 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6243 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6244 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6246 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6247 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6249 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6250 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6251 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6252 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6253 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6254 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6256 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6257 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6258 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6259 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6260 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6261 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6264 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6265 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6267 pub keys_manager: K,
6269 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6271 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6272 pub fee_estimator: F,
6273 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6275 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6276 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6277 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6278 pub chain_monitor: M,
6280 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6281 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6282 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6283 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6284 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6285 /// deserialization.
6287 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6288 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6289 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6291 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6292 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6294 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6295 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6296 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6297 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6299 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6302 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6303 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6306 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6307 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6308 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6309 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6310 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6311 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6314 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6315 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6316 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6317 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6318 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6320 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6321 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6326 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6327 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6328 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6329 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6330 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6331 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6332 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6333 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6336 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6337 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6338 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6342 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6343 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6344 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6345 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6346 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6347 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6350 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6351 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6353 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6354 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6355 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6357 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6359 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6360 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6361 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6362 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6363 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6364 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6365 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6366 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6367 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6368 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6369 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6370 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6371 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6372 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6373 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6374 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6375 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6376 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6377 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6378 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6379 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6380 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6381 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6382 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6383 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6384 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6385 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6386 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6387 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6388 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6389 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6390 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6391 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6392 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6393 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6394 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6395 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6396 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6397 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6400 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6401 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6402 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6404 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6407 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6408 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6409 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6410 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6411 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6412 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6416 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6417 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6418 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6419 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6423 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6424 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6425 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6426 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6427 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6428 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6429 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6430 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6431 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6433 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6436 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6437 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6438 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6439 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6440 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6441 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6442 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6443 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6445 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
6448 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6449 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6450 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6451 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6452 let peer_state = PeerState {
6453 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6455 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6458 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6459 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6460 for _ in 0..event_count {
6461 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6462 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6466 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6467 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6468 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6469 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6470 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6471 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6472 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6473 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6477 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6478 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6479 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6480 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6481 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6482 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6486 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6487 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6489 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6490 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6491 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6492 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6493 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6497 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6498 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6499 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6500 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6501 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6502 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6503 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6505 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6506 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6510 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6511 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6512 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6513 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6514 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6515 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6516 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6517 (5, received_network_pubkey, option)
6520 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6521 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6522 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6523 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6524 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6525 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6527 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6529 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6530 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6531 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6532 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6533 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6534 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6535 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6537 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6538 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6539 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6540 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6541 if path.is_empty() {
6542 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6543 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6545 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6546 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6547 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6548 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6549 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6550 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6551 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6552 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6554 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6555 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6556 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6557 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6558 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6560 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6561 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6562 total_msat: path_amt,
6563 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6565 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6566 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6575 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6576 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6578 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6579 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6582 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret());
6583 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
6584 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
6585 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
6586 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6590 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
6591 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
6592 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6594 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6595 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6596 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6598 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6600 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6605 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6607 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
6608 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6609 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6611 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
6615 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6616 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6618 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6620 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6621 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6622 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6623 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6625 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6626 logger: args.logger,
6627 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6630 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6631 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6634 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6635 //connection or two.
6637 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6643 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6644 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6645 use core::time::Duration;
6646 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
6647 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6648 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6649 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
6650 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6651 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6653 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6654 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
6655 use util::errors::APIError;
6656 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6657 use util::test_utils;
6659 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6661 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6662 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6664 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
6667 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6668 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6670 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6671 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6672 thread::spawn(move || {
6674 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6675 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6676 *persistence_lock = true;
6679 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6685 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6686 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6688 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6691 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6696 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6698 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6701 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6708 fn test_notify_limits() {
6709 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6710 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6711 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6712 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6713 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6714 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6716 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6717 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6718 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6719 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6720 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6722 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6724 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6725 // to connect messages with new values
6726 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6727 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6728 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6729 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6731 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6732 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6733 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6734 // ... but the last node should not.
6735 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6736 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6737 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6738 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6740 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6741 // about the channel.
6742 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6743 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6744 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6746 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6748 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6749 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6750 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6751 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6752 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6753 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6755 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6756 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6757 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6759 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6760 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6761 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6762 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6763 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6764 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6766 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6767 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6768 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6769 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6770 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6771 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6772 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6773 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6775 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6776 // the channel info has updated.
6777 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6778 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6779 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6780 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6781 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6782 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6786 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6787 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6789 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6790 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6791 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6792 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6793 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6795 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6796 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6797 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6798 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6799 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6800 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6801 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6803 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6804 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6805 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
6807 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
6808 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6809 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6810 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6811 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6812 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6813 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6814 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6815 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6816 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6817 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6818 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6819 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6820 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6821 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6822 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6823 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6824 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6825 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6826 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6827 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6828 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
6830 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
6831 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6832 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6833 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6834 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6835 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
6837 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
6838 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
6839 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
6840 // lightning messages manually.
6841 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6842 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6843 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6844 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6845 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
6846 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6847 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6848 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
6849 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6850 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6851 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
6852 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6853 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6854 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6855 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6856 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6857 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6858 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
6859 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6860 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6861 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
6862 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6863 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6864 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6865 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6866 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
6867 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6869 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
6870 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
6871 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6872 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
6874 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
6875 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
6876 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
6877 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
6879 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6882 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6883 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6884 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6885 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6887 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6890 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6891 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6892 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6893 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6895 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6900 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
6901 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
6902 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
6903 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
6904 // fails as expected.
6905 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6906 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6907 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6908 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6909 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6910 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6912 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
6913 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
6914 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
6916 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
6917 let route_params = RouteParameters {
6918 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
6919 final_value_msat: 100_000,
6920 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
6922 let route = find_route(
6923 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6924 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6926 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6928 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6929 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6930 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6931 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6932 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6933 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6934 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6935 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6936 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6937 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6938 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6939 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6940 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6941 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6942 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6943 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6944 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6945 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6946 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6948 // Finally, claim the original payment.
6949 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6951 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
6952 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6953 let route = find_route(
6954 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6955 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6957 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6958 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6959 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6960 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6961 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
6962 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
6963 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
6965 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
6966 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6967 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6968 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6969 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6970 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6971 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6972 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6973 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6974 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6975 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6976 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6977 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6978 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6979 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6980 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6981 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6982 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6983 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6984 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6985 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6986 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6987 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6989 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
6990 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6994 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
6995 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
6996 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
6997 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6998 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6999 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7000 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7002 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7003 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7004 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7005 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7007 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7008 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7009 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7010 final_value_msat: 10000,
7011 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7013 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7014 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7015 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7016 let route = find_route(
7017 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7018 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7021 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7022 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7023 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7024 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7026 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7027 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7028 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7029 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7030 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7031 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7032 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7034 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7038 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7039 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7040 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7041 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7042 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7043 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7045 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7046 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7047 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7048 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7050 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7051 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7052 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7053 final_value_msat: 10000,
7054 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7056 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7057 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7058 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7059 let route = find_route(
7060 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7061 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7064 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7065 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7066 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7067 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7068 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7070 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7071 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7072 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7073 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7074 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7075 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7076 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7078 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7082 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7083 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7084 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7085 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7086 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7088 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7089 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7090 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7091 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7093 // Marshall an MPP route.
7094 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7095 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7096 route.paths.push(path);
7097 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7098 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7099 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7100 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7101 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7102 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7104 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7105 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7106 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7107 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7112 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7113 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7114 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7115 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7116 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7117 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7119 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7120 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7122 total_msat: 100_000,
7125 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7126 // payment verification fails as expected.
7127 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7128 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7129 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7130 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7132 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7136 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7137 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7141 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
7144 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7145 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
7146 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7147 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7148 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7149 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7150 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
7151 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7152 use routing::scoring::Scorer;
7153 use util::test_utils;
7154 use util::config::UserConfig;
7155 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
7157 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7158 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7159 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7161 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7165 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7166 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7167 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7168 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7169 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7170 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7171 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7176 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7177 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7180 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7181 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7182 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7184 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7185 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7187 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7188 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7190 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7191 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7193 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7194 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7195 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7196 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7197 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7199 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7201 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7203 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7204 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7205 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7206 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7207 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7209 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7211 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7213 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7214 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7215 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7216 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7217 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7220 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7221 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7222 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7224 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7225 } else { panic!(); }
7227 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7228 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7230 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7233 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7236 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7237 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7239 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7240 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7241 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7242 match msg_events[0] {
7243 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
7244 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7245 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7249 match msg_events[1] {
7250 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7254 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
7256 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7257 macro_rules! send_payment {
7258 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7259 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7260 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7261 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7262 let scorer = Scorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7263 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph,
7264 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
7266 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7267 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7269 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7270 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7272 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7273 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7274 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7275 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7276 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7277 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7278 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7279 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7281 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7282 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7283 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7285 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7286 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7287 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7288 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7289 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7291 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7294 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7295 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7296 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7297 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7299 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7304 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7305 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);