1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
115 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
116 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
117 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
118 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
119 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
125 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
126 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
127 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
129 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
130 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
131 /// may overshoot this in either case)
132 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
133 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
136 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
137 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
138 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
139 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
142 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
145 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
146 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
149 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
150 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
152 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
153 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
154 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
157 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
158 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
160 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
161 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
164 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
165 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
168 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
172 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
173 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
174 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
175 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
176 short_channel_id: u64,
178 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
179 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
181 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
182 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
187 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
189 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
190 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
191 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
193 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
194 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
197 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
198 struct ClaimableHTLC {
199 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
201 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
203 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
204 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
205 sender_intended_value: u64,
206 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
208 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
209 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
210 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
211 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
215 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
217 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
218 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
219 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
221 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
222 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
227 impl Readable for PaymentId {
228 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
229 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
234 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
236 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
237 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
238 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
240 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
241 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
246 impl Readable for InterceptId {
247 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
248 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
253 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
254 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
255 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
256 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
257 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
260 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
262 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
263 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
264 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
266 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
267 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
271 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
272 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
273 (0, short_channel_id, required),
274 (2, htlc_id, required),
276 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
277 (0, session_priv, required),
282 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
283 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
284 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
285 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
286 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
289 session_priv: SecretKey,
290 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
291 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
292 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
293 payment_id: PaymentId,
296 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
297 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
298 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
300 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
302 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
304 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
307 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
308 payment_id.hash(hasher);
309 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
315 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
317 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
318 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
319 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
320 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
321 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
322 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
326 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
327 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
328 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
329 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
330 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
331 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
333 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
339 struct ReceiveError {
345 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
346 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
348 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
349 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
350 pub enum FailureCode {
351 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
352 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
353 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
354 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
355 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
356 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
357 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
358 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
359 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
360 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
361 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
364 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
365 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
366 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
367 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
368 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
370 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
371 err: msgs::LightningError,
372 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
373 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
375 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
377 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
379 err: LightningError {
381 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
382 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
389 shutdown_finish: None,
393 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
394 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
397 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
399 err: LightningError {
401 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
402 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
408 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
409 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
413 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
416 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
418 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
419 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
423 log_level: Level::Warn,
426 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
428 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
430 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
432 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
433 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
441 shutdown_finish: None,
446 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
447 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
448 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
449 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
450 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
452 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
453 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
454 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
455 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
456 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
457 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
458 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
460 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
464 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
465 struct ClaimingPayment {
467 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
468 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
470 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
471 (0, amount_msat, required),
472 (2, payment_purpose, required),
473 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
476 struct ClaimablePayment {
477 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
478 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
479 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
482 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
483 struct ClaimablePayments {
484 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
485 /// failed/claimed by the user.
487 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
488 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
490 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
491 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
492 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
494 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
495 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
496 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
497 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
500 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
501 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
502 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
503 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
504 enum BackgroundEvent {
505 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel. This is only separated from
506 /// [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the maybe-non-closing variant needs a public
507 /// key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the channel has been force-closed we do not
508 /// need the counterparty node_id.
510 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
511 /// are regenerated on startup.
512 ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
513 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
514 /// channel to continue normal operation.
516 /// In general this should be used rather than
517 /// [`Self::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
518 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
519 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
521 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
522 /// are regenerated on startup.
523 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
524 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
525 funding_txo: OutPoint,
526 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
531 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
532 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
533 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
534 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
535 /// event can be generated.
536 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
537 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
538 /// operation of another channel.
540 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
541 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
542 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
543 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
545 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
546 event: events::Event,
547 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
551 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
552 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
553 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
554 (0, event, upgradable_required),
555 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
556 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
557 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
558 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
559 // downgrades to prior versions.
560 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
564 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
565 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
566 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
567 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
568 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
571 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
572 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
573 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
574 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
578 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
579 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
580 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
581 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
582 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
583 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
585 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
586 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
587 channel_id: [u8; 32],
588 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
593 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
595 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
596 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
597 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
598 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
603 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
604 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
608 /// State we hold per-peer.
609 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
610 /// `channel_id` -> `Channel`.
612 /// Holds all funded channels where the peer is the counterparty.
613 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
614 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `OutboundV1Channel`.
616 /// Holds all outbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an outbound channel has
617 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
619 pub(super) outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], OutboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
620 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundV1Channel`.
622 /// Holds all inbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an inbound channel has
623 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
625 pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
626 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
627 latest_features: InitFeatures,
628 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
629 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
630 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
631 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
632 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
634 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
635 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
636 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
637 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
639 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
640 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
641 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
642 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
643 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
644 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
645 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
646 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
647 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
648 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
649 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
650 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
651 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
652 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
653 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
657 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
658 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
659 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
660 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
661 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
662 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
665 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
668 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including pending channels.
669 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
670 self.channel_by_id.len() +
671 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
672 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len()
675 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
676 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
677 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
678 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
679 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
683 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
684 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
686 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
689 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
690 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
691 struct PendingInboundPayment {
692 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
693 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
694 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
695 /// this payment being removed.
697 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
698 user_payment_id: u64,
699 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
700 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
701 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
704 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
705 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
706 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
707 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
708 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
709 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
710 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
711 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
713 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
714 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
722 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
724 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
725 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
726 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
731 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
732 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
733 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
734 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
735 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
736 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
737 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
738 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
739 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
741 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
742 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters, ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, &'g L>;
744 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
745 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
746 $vis trait AChannelManager {
747 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
748 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
749 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
750 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
751 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
752 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
753 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
754 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
755 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
756 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
757 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
758 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
759 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
760 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
761 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
762 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
763 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
764 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
767 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
768 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
769 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
770 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
771 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
772 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
774 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
775 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
776 ES::Target: EntropySource,
777 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
778 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
779 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
783 type Watch = M::Target;
785 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
787 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
789 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
791 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
792 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
794 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
796 type Router = R::Target;
798 type Logger = L::Target;
800 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
803 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
804 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
806 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
807 /// to individual Channels.
809 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
810 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
811 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
812 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
814 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
815 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
816 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
817 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
818 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
819 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
820 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
822 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
823 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
824 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
826 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
827 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
828 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
829 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
830 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
832 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
833 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
834 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
835 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
837 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
838 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
839 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
841 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
842 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
843 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
844 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
845 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
847 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
848 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
849 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
850 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
851 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
852 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
853 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
854 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
857 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
858 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
859 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
860 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
861 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
865 // `total_consistency_lock`
867 // |__`forward_htlcs`
869 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
871 // |__`per_peer_state`
873 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
875 // | |__`claimable_payments`
877 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
883 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
885 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
889 // | |__`pending_events`
891 // | |__`pending_background_events`
893 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
895 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
896 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
897 ES::Target: EntropySource,
898 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
899 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
900 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
904 default_configuration: UserConfig,
905 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
906 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
912 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
914 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
916 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
917 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
919 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
920 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
921 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
922 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
924 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
925 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
927 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
928 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
929 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
930 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
931 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
932 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
933 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
934 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
936 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
938 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
939 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
941 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
943 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
944 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
945 /// and via the classic SCID.
947 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
948 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
950 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
952 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
954 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
955 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
956 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
958 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
959 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
961 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
962 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
964 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
965 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
967 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
968 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
969 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
970 /// active channel list on load.
972 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
973 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
975 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
977 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
978 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
979 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
981 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
982 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
983 /// the handling of the events.
985 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
986 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
989 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
990 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
991 /// would break backwards compatability.
992 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
993 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
994 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
996 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
997 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
999 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1001 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1002 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1003 /// confirmation depth.
1005 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1006 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1007 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1009 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1011 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1013 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1015 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1017 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1019 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1020 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1021 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1023 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1024 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1026 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1027 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1028 /// keeping additional state.
1029 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1031 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1032 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1033 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1034 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1036 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1037 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1039 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1040 /// are currently open with that peer.
1042 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1043 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1046 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1048 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1049 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1050 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1051 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1052 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1054 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1055 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1056 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1057 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1058 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1060 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1061 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1063 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1064 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1065 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1066 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1068 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1069 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1070 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1071 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1072 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1074 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1076 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1078 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1079 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1080 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1081 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1082 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1083 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1084 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1085 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1086 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1088 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1089 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1091 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1095 signer_provider: SP,
1100 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1102 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1103 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1104 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1105 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1106 pub struct ChainParameters {
1107 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1108 pub network: Network,
1110 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1112 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1113 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1116 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1123 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1124 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1125 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1126 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1127 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1128 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1130 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1131 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1132 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1133 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1134 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1136 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1137 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1140 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1141 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1142 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1143 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1145 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1146 persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1147 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1148 _read_guard: read_guard,
1153 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1154 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1155 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1156 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1158 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1159 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1160 should_persist: persist_check,
1161 _read_guard: read_guard,
1166 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1167 fn drop(&mut self) {
1168 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1169 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1174 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1175 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1177 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1179 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1180 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1181 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1182 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1183 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1185 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1186 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1188 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1190 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1191 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1192 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1193 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1194 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1195 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1196 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1197 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1198 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1199 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1200 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1201 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1202 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1204 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1205 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1207 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1208 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1209 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1210 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1212 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1213 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1214 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1215 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1216 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1217 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1220 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1222 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1223 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1226 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1228 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1229 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1231 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1232 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1233 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1234 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1236 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1237 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1238 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1240 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1241 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1242 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1244 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1245 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1246 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1247 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1249 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1250 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1251 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1253 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1254 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1255 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1257 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1258 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1259 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1260 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1261 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1262 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1263 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1264 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1265 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1266 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1267 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1270 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1271 /// to better separate parameters.
1272 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1273 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1274 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1275 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1276 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1277 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1278 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1279 pub features: InitFeatures,
1280 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1281 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1282 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1284 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1286 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1287 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1288 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1289 /// payments to us through this channel.
1290 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1291 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1292 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1293 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1294 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1295 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1296 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1299 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1300 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1301 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1302 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1303 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1304 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1305 /// lifetime of the channel.
1306 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1307 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1308 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1309 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1310 /// our counterparty already.
1312 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1313 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1314 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1315 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1317 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1318 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1319 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1320 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1322 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1323 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1325 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1326 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1328 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1329 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1330 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1331 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1332 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1333 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1334 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1335 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1336 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1339 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1341 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1342 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1343 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1344 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1345 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1346 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1347 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1349 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1350 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1352 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1353 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1354 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1355 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1356 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1357 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1358 /// this value on chain.
1360 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1362 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1364 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1365 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1366 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1367 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1369 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1370 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1371 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1373 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1374 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1375 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1376 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1377 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1379 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1380 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1381 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1382 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1384 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1385 pub balance_msat: u64,
1386 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1387 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1388 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1389 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1391 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1393 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1394 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1395 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1396 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1397 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1398 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1399 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1400 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1402 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1403 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1404 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1405 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1406 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1407 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1408 /// route which is valid.
1409 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1410 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1411 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1412 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1413 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1414 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1416 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1417 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1418 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1419 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1420 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1421 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1422 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1423 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1424 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1426 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1428 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1429 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1430 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1431 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1432 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1434 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1435 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1436 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1437 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1438 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1439 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1440 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1442 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1443 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1444 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1445 pub is_outbound: bool,
1446 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1447 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1448 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1449 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1450 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1452 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1453 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1454 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1455 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1457 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1458 pub is_usable: bool,
1459 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1460 pub is_public: bool,
1461 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1462 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1463 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1464 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1465 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1466 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1468 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1469 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1472 impl ChannelDetails {
1473 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1474 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1475 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1477 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1478 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1479 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1480 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1483 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1484 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1485 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1487 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1488 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1489 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1490 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1493 fn from_channel_context<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(context: &ChannelContext<Signer>,
1494 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1496 let balance = context.get_available_balances();
1497 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1498 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1500 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1501 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1502 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1503 features: latest_features,
1504 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1505 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1506 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1507 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1508 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1509 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1510 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1511 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1512 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1513 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1515 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1516 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1517 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1518 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1519 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1520 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1521 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1522 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1523 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1524 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1525 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1526 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1527 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1528 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1529 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1530 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1531 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1532 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1533 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1534 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1535 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1536 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1537 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1538 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1539 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1540 config: Some(context.config()),
1545 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1546 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1547 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1548 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1549 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1551 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1553 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1554 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1555 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1558 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1559 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1560 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1562 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1563 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1564 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1566 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1567 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1568 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1570 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1571 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1575 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1577 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1579 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1580 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1581 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1582 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1584 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1585 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1586 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1589 macro_rules! handle_error {
1590 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1591 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1592 // entering the macro.
1593 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1594 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1598 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1599 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1601 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1602 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1603 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1604 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1608 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1609 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1610 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1611 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1616 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1617 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1619 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1620 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1621 action: err.action.clone()
1625 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1626 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1627 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1628 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1629 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1633 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1638 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1641 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1642 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1643 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1649 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1650 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1651 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1652 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1653 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1654 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1656 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1657 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1658 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1659 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1660 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1662 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1663 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1665 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1669 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1670 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1671 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1673 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1674 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1676 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1677 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1679 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1680 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1681 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel.context);
1682 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1683 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1684 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1688 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_context: expr, $channel_id: expr, PREFUNDED) => {
1690 // We should only ever have `ChannelError::Close` when prefunded channels error.
1691 // In any case, just close the channel.
1692 ChannelError::Warn(msg) | ChannelError::Ignore(msg) | ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1693 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing prefunded channel {} due to an error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1694 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel_context);
1695 let shutdown_res = $channel_context.force_shutdown(false);
1696 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel_context.get_user_id(),
1697 shutdown_res, None))
1703 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1704 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1708 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1710 $entry.remove_entry();
1718 macro_rules! try_v1_outbound_chan_entry {
1719 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1723 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut().context, $entry.key(), PREFUNDED);
1725 $entry.remove_entry();
1733 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1734 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1738 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1740 $entry.remove_entry();
1748 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1749 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1751 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1752 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context);
1758 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1759 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1760 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1761 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1762 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1764 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1765 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1766 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1767 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1768 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1769 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1770 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1771 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1772 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1773 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1778 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1779 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1780 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1781 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1782 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1783 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1784 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1785 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1786 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1788 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1793 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1794 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1795 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1796 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1797 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1798 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1799 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1800 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1801 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1803 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1808 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1809 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1810 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1811 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1812 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1813 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1814 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
1815 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1816 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1817 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1818 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1820 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1821 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1822 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1828 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1829 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1831 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1832 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1833 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1834 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1835 updates.announcement_sigs);
1836 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1837 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1840 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
1841 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1842 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1844 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1846 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1847 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1849 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1850 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1851 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1852 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1857 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1858 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1859 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1860 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1861 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1862 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
1863 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
1866 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1867 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1868 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1871 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1872 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1873 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1874 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
1875 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1876 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
1877 $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
1878 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1882 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1883 $chan.complete_one_mon_update($update_id);
1884 if $chan.no_monitor_updates_pending() {
1885 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1891 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1892 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1896 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1897 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1898 let mut processed_all_events = false;
1899 while !processed_all_events {
1900 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
1904 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1907 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
1908 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
1909 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1911 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
1912 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
1913 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
1915 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
1916 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
1917 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
1918 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1922 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
1923 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1924 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
1925 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1928 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
1930 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
1931 $event_to_handle = event;
1933 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
1934 post_event_actions.push(action);
1939 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1940 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1941 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
1942 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
1945 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
1946 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
1947 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
1948 processed_all_events = false;
1951 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1952 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1958 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1960 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1961 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1962 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1963 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1964 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1965 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1969 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1971 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1972 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1974 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1976 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1977 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1978 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1981 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1982 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1983 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1984 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1985 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1986 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1987 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1988 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1990 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1991 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1992 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1997 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1999 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2000 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2001 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2002 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2003 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2004 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2005 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2006 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2008 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2011 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2012 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2014 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2016 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
2018 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2020 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2021 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2022 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2023 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2024 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2025 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2026 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2036 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2037 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2038 &self.default_configuration
2041 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2042 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2043 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2046 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2047 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2049 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2051 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2055 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2060 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2062 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2063 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2064 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2065 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2066 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2068 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2069 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2071 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2072 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2073 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2075 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2076 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2077 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2079 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2080 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2081 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2082 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2083 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2084 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2086 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2087 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2088 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2089 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
2090 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2091 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2094 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2095 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2096 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2098 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2100 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2101 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2103 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2105 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2106 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2107 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2108 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2109 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2110 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2114 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2119 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2121 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2122 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2123 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2125 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2127 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2130 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
2133 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2134 node_id: their_network_key,
2137 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2140 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2141 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2142 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2143 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2144 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2145 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2146 // the same channel.
2147 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2149 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2150 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2151 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2152 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2153 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2154 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
2155 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2156 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2164 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2165 /// more information.
2166 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2167 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2168 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2169 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2170 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2171 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2172 // the same channel.
2173 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2175 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2176 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2177 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2178 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2179 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2180 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
2181 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2182 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2185 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2186 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2187 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2195 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2196 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2198 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2199 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2201 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2202 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2203 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2204 // really wanted anyway.
2205 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2208 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2209 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2210 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2211 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2213 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2214 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2215 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2216 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2217 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2220 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height, features.clone()))
2226 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2227 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2229 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2230 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2231 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2233 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2234 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2235 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2236 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2237 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2238 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2239 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2240 total_msat: *total_msat,
2243 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2244 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2246 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2247 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2249 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2254 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2255 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2256 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2257 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2258 Some(transaction) => {
2259 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2260 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2265 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2266 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2267 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2268 reason: closure_reason
2272 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2273 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2275 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2276 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2277 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2279 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2280 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2282 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2283 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2284 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2285 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2286 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
2287 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2288 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2289 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2290 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2292 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2293 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2294 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2295 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2296 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2300 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2301 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2302 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2303 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
2304 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
2307 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2308 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2309 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2310 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2314 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2318 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
2322 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2323 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2324 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2325 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2328 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2332 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2333 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2334 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2336 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2337 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2339 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2340 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2341 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2342 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2344 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2346 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2347 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2348 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2351 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2352 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2353 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2354 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2355 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2356 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2359 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2360 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2361 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2363 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2364 /// the channel being closed or not:
2365 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2366 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2367 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2368 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2369 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2370 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2371 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2373 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2374 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2375 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2376 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2378 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2380 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2381 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2382 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2385 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2386 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2387 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2388 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2389 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2390 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2394 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2395 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2396 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2397 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2398 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2399 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2400 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2401 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2403 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2404 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2405 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2406 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2407 // ignore the result here.
2408 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2412 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2413 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2414 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2415 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2416 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2417 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2418 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2419 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2420 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2421 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2422 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2423 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2425 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2427 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2428 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2429 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2430 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2431 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2432 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2433 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2434 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2435 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2436 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2437 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2438 // Prefunded channel has no update
2439 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2441 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2444 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2445 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2446 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2451 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2454 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2455 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2456 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2457 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2458 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2459 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2460 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2461 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2462 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2463 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2464 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2465 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2476 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2477 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2478 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2480 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2481 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2482 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2485 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2486 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2487 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2489 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2490 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2491 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2492 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2493 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2496 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2497 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2498 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2499 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2500 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2504 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2505 /// local transaction(s).
2506 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2507 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2508 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2512 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2513 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2515 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2516 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2517 return Err(ReceiveError {
2518 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2520 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2523 // final_expiry_too_soon
2524 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2525 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2527 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2528 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2529 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2530 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2531 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2532 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2533 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2534 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2535 return Err(ReceiveError {
2536 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2537 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2540 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2541 return Err(ReceiveError {
2543 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2544 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2548 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2549 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2550 return Err(ReceiveError {
2551 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2552 err_data: Vec::new(),
2553 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2556 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
2557 if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2558 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2559 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2560 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2561 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2562 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2563 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2564 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2565 return Err(ReceiveError {
2566 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2567 err_data: Vec::new(),
2568 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2571 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2572 return Err(ReceiveError {
2573 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2574 err_data: Vec::new(),
2575 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2578 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2582 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2584 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2585 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2588 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2589 phantom_shared_secret,
2592 return Err(ReceiveError {
2593 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2594 err_data: Vec::new(),
2595 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2600 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2603 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2604 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2605 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2606 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2610 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2611 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2612 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2614 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2615 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2616 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2617 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2618 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2619 failure_code: $err_code,
2625 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2626 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2629 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2630 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2631 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2633 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2634 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2635 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2636 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2637 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2638 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2639 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2640 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2642 macro_rules! return_err {
2643 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2645 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2646 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2647 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2648 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2649 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2650 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2656 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2658 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2659 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2661 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2662 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2666 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2667 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2669 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2671 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2672 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2673 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2674 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2675 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2677 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2680 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2681 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2682 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2684 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2685 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2686 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2689 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2690 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2691 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2692 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2696 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2697 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2698 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2701 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2702 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2703 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2704 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2705 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2710 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2711 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2712 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2713 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2714 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2715 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2716 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2717 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2718 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2719 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2720 // phantom or an intercept.
2721 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2722 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2723 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2727 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2730 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2732 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2733 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2734 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2735 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2736 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2738 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2739 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2740 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2742 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2743 // have no consistency guarantees.
2744 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2748 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2749 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2750 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2751 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2752 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2754 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
2755 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2756 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2757 // we don't have the channel here.
2758 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2760 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2762 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2763 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2764 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2765 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2766 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2767 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2768 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2769 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2770 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2771 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2772 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2774 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2777 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2778 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2780 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2781 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2785 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2786 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2787 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2788 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2790 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2797 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2798 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2799 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2800 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2801 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2802 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2804 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2805 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2807 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2808 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2809 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2810 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2811 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2812 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2813 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2814 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2815 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2816 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2822 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2823 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2824 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2825 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2827 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2828 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2830 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2831 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2832 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2834 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2835 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2836 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2837 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2838 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2839 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2840 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2844 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2849 pending_forward_info
2852 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2853 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2854 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2856 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2857 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2858 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2860 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2861 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2862 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2863 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
2864 return Err(LightningError {
2865 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2866 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2869 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2870 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2872 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
2873 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2876 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2877 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2878 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2879 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2881 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2882 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2883 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2885 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2886 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2887 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2888 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
2889 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2890 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2894 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2897 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2898 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
2899 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2901 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
2902 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
2903 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
2904 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
2905 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
2908 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2909 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2911 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
2912 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
2913 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2914 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2915 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2916 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2917 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2918 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2920 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2921 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2922 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2924 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2926 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2933 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2934 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2935 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2938 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2939 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2940 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2942 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2943 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2944 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2946 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2947 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2948 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2950 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
2951 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
2953 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2954 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2955 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2956 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2959 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2960 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2961 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2962 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2963 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2964 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2965 if !chan.get().context.is_live() {
2966 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2968 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2969 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2970 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2972 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2973 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2975 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2976 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2977 Some(monitor_update) => {
2978 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2979 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2980 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2983 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2984 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2985 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2986 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2987 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2988 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2989 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2990 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2996 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2997 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2998 // `channel_by_id` map.
2999 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3000 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3005 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3006 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3008 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3013 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3015 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3016 /// fields for more info.
3018 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3019 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3021 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3023 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3024 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3025 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3026 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3027 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3029 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3030 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3031 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3032 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3033 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3035 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3036 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3037 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3038 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3040 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3042 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3043 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3044 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3046 /// In general, a path may raise:
3047 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3048 /// node public key) is specified.
3049 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3050 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3052 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3053 /// relevant updates.
3055 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3056 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3057 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3059 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3060 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3061 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3062 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3063 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3064 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3065 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3066 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3067 self.pending_outbound_payments
3068 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3069 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3070 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3073 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3074 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3075 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3076 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3077 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3078 self.pending_outbound_payments
3079 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3080 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3081 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3082 &self.pending_events,
3083 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3084 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3088 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3089 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3090 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3091 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3092 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3093 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3097 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3098 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3099 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3103 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3104 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3108 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3109 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3110 /// retries are exhausted.
3112 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3113 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3115 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3116 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3117 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3119 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
3120 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3122 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3123 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3124 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3125 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3126 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3129 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3130 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3131 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3132 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3133 /// never reach the recipient.
3135 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3136 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3138 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3139 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3141 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3142 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3143 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3144 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3145 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3146 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3147 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3148 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3149 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3152 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3153 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3155 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3158 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3159 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3160 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3161 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3162 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3163 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3164 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3165 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3166 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3167 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3170 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3171 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3172 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3173 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3174 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3175 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3176 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3177 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3178 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3181 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3184 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3185 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3188 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3189 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3190 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3191 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3192 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3193 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3194 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3195 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3197 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3198 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3199 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3201 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3203 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3204 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3205 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3206 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3207 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3208 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None))
3209 } else { unreachable!(); });
3211 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3212 Err((chan, err)) => {
3213 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3214 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3216 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3217 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3218 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3224 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3226 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3227 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3232 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3233 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3236 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3237 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3238 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3240 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3241 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3242 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3243 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3252 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3253 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3254 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3258 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3260 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3261 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3263 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3264 /// across the p2p network.
3266 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3267 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3269 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3270 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3271 /// keys per-channel).
3273 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3274 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3275 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3277 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3278 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3279 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3281 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3282 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3283 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3284 /// for more details.
3286 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3287 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3288 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3289 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3291 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3292 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3293 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3294 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3299 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3300 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3301 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3302 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3303 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3304 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3305 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3306 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3310 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3311 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3312 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3313 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3317 let mut output_index = None;
3318 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3319 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3320 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3321 if output_index.is_some() {
3322 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3323 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3326 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3329 if output_index.is_none() {
3330 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3331 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3334 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3338 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3340 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3341 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3342 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3343 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3345 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3346 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3348 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3349 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3351 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3353 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3354 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3355 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3356 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3357 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3358 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3359 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3360 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3361 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3362 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3363 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3364 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3365 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3369 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3370 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3371 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3372 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3373 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3374 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3375 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3376 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
3377 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3378 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3382 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3383 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3384 let mut config = channel.context.config();
3385 config.apply(config_update);
3386 if !channel.context.update_config(&config) {
3389 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3390 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3391 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3392 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3393 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3401 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3403 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3404 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3405 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3406 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3408 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3409 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3411 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3412 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3414 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3416 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3417 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3418 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3419 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3420 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3421 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3422 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3423 pub fn update_channel_config(
3424 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3425 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3426 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3429 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3430 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3432 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3433 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3435 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3436 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3437 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3438 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3439 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3441 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3442 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3444 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3447 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3448 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3449 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3450 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3451 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3452 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3454 let next_hop_scid = {
3455 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3456 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3457 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3458 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3459 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3460 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3462 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3463 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3464 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3467 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3469 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3470 err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.",
3471 log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3476 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3477 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3478 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3481 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3482 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3483 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3485 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3487 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3488 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3491 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3492 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3493 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3494 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3495 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3497 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3501 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3502 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3504 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3507 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3508 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3509 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3511 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3512 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3513 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3516 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3517 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3518 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3519 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3520 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3521 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3522 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3525 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3526 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3527 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3528 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3533 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3535 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3536 /// Will likely generate further events.
3537 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3538 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3540 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3541 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3542 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3544 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3545 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3547 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3548 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3549 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3551 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3552 match forward_info {
3553 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3554 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3555 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3556 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3557 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3560 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3561 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3562 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3564 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3565 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3566 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3567 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3568 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3569 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3572 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3573 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3575 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3578 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3579 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3585 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3586 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3588 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3592 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3593 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3595 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3599 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3600 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3601 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3602 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3603 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3605 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3606 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3607 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3608 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3609 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3611 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3613 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3614 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3618 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3619 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3620 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3621 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3627 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3630 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3633 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3634 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3635 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3636 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3637 // problem, not ours.
3643 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3644 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3646 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3650 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3651 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3652 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3653 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3656 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3657 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3658 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3659 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3660 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3663 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3664 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3665 match forward_info {
3666 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3667 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3668 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3669 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3670 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3673 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3674 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3675 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3676 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3677 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3678 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3679 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3680 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3682 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3683 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3684 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3686 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3687 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3689 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3691 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3692 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3693 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3694 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3699 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3700 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3702 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3703 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3704 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3705 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3707 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3708 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3710 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3712 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3713 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3714 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3723 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3724 match forward_info {
3725 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3726 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3727 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3728 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3731 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3732 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3733 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3735 RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3736 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3737 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3739 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3740 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
3741 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
3744 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3745 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
3748 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3751 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3752 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3753 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3754 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3755 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3756 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3757 phantom_shared_secret,
3759 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3760 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3761 // if routing nodes overpay
3762 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3763 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3765 total_value_received: None,
3766 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3771 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3773 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3774 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3775 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3776 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3777 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3778 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3780 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3781 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3782 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3783 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3784 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3785 phantom_shared_secret,
3787 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3788 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3790 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3793 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3794 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3795 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3796 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3797 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3800 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3801 ($purpose: expr) => {{
3802 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3803 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
3804 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
3805 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
3807 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3808 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3809 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3811 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3812 .entry(payment_hash)
3813 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3814 .or_insert_with(|| {
3815 committed_to_claimable = true;
3817 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
3820 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
3821 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
3822 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_keysend(!is_keysend));
3823 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3825 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
3826 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3827 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3829 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
3830 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
3831 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3834 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
3836 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3837 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3838 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3839 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3840 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3841 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3842 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3843 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3844 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3845 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3847 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3849 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3850 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3851 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3852 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3853 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3854 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3855 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3856 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3857 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3858 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3859 committed_to_claimable = true;
3861 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3862 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3863 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3864 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3865 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3866 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3870 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3871 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3872 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3873 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
3875 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3877 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3878 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3880 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3881 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3882 committed_to_claimable = true;
3885 payment_claimable_generated
3889 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3890 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3891 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3892 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3893 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3894 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3895 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3896 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3897 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3898 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3899 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3900 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3901 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3902 Ok(result) => result,
3904 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3905 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3908 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3909 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3910 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3911 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3912 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3913 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3916 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3917 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3918 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
3920 check_total_value!(purpose);
3922 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3923 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3924 check_total_value!(purpose);
3928 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3929 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3930 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3931 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3933 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3934 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3935 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3936 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3937 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3938 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3939 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3940 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3942 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3943 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
3944 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
3946 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
3947 if payment_claimable_generated {
3948 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3954 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3955 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3963 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3964 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3965 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3966 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3967 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3968 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3970 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3971 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3973 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3975 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3976 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3977 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3979 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3981 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3982 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3983 events.append(&mut new_events);
3986 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
3988 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3989 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
3990 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
3992 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3993 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
3995 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3996 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3997 if background_events.is_empty() {
3998 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4001 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4003 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4004 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4005 // monitor updating completing.
4006 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4008 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4009 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4012 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4013 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4014 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4015 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4016 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4017 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4018 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update.update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
4020 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
4024 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
4025 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
4026 // however, ensure that.
4028 log_error!(self.logger,
4029 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
4031 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4035 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4038 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4039 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4040 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4041 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4042 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4045 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4046 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
4047 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4048 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4049 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4050 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4051 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4053 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4054 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4055 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4056 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4058 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4059 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4061 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
4062 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4066 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4067 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4068 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4069 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4070 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4071 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4072 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4074 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4076 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4077 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4078 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4079 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4080 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
4081 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4082 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4090 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4092 /// This currently includes:
4093 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4094 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4095 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4097 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4098 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4099 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4101 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4102 /// estimate fetches.
4104 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4105 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4106 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4107 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4108 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4110 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4112 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4113 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4114 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4116 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4117 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4118 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4119 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4120 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4121 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4122 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
4123 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4124 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4126 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4127 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
4128 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4129 if needs_close { return false; }
4132 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4133 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4134 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4135 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4136 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4137 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4138 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4139 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4141 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4142 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4143 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4144 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4148 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4150 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4153 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4155 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4156 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4157 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4158 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4162 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4164 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4170 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4172 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4173 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4174 counterparty_node_id, log_bytes!(*chan_id));
4175 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4176 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4177 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4178 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4179 channel_id: *chan_id,
4180 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4188 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4189 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4194 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4195 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4196 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4197 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4198 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4199 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4200 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4201 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4202 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4203 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4204 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4205 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4206 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4207 // have no channels to the peer.
4208 let remove_entry = {
4209 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4210 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4213 entry.remove_entry();
4216 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4221 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4222 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4223 // This should be unreachable
4224 debug_assert!(false);
4227 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4228 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4229 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4230 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4231 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4232 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4233 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4236 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4237 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4238 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4240 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4241 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4248 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4249 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4250 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4251 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4252 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4255 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4256 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4259 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4261 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4262 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4263 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4264 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4265 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4272 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4273 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4274 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4276 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4277 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4278 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4279 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4281 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4282 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4283 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4284 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4285 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4286 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4289 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4290 /// reason for the failure.
4292 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4293 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4294 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4296 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4297 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4298 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4299 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4300 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4301 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4302 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4307 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4308 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4309 match failure_code {
4310 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4311 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4312 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4313 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4314 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4315 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
4320 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4321 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4323 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4325 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4326 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4327 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4328 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4329 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4330 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4331 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4333 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4335 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4336 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4338 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4343 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4344 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4345 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4346 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4347 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4348 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4349 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4350 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4351 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4352 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4354 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4355 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4356 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4357 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4359 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4360 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4361 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4362 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4363 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4367 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4368 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4369 // be surfaced to the user.
4370 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4371 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4372 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4374 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4375 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4376 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4377 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4378 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4379 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4380 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4381 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4383 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4385 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4388 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4389 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4390 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4391 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4395 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4396 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4397 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4398 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4399 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4400 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4401 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4402 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4403 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4406 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4407 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4408 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4411 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4412 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4413 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4415 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4416 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4417 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4418 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4419 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4421 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4422 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4423 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4425 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4426 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4427 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4428 push_forward_ev = true;
4430 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4431 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4432 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4434 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4435 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4438 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4439 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4440 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4441 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4442 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4443 failed_next_destination: destination,
4449 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4450 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4452 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4453 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4454 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4455 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4457 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4458 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4459 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4460 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4462 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4463 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4464 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4465 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4466 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4467 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4468 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4469 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4471 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4474 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4475 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4476 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4477 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4478 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4479 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4480 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4481 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4486 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4487 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4488 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4490 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4491 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4492 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4493 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4498 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4500 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4501 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4502 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4503 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4504 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4505 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4506 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4507 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4508 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4509 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4510 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4511 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4512 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4513 debug_assert!(false);
4517 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4519 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4520 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4521 debug_assert!(false);
4525 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4526 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4528 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4529 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4530 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4531 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4534 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4535 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4536 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4537 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4541 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4542 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4543 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4544 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4546 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4547 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4548 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4549 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4550 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4555 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4556 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4557 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4558 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4559 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4560 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4561 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4563 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4566 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4567 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4568 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4569 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4573 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4574 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4575 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4576 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4579 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4580 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4581 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4582 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4586 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4587 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4588 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4591 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4592 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4593 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4594 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4595 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4596 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4598 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4599 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4600 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4601 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4602 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4604 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4605 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4606 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4607 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4608 if let Err(e) = res {
4609 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4610 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4611 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4612 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4613 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4620 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4621 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4622 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4626 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4627 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4628 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4629 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4630 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4631 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4632 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4633 // again on restart.
4634 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4635 payment_preimage, update_res);
4637 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4638 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4639 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4640 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4641 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4642 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4646 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4647 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4650 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4652 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4653 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4655 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4656 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4657 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4658 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4659 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4660 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4661 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4664 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4665 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4667 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4668 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
4669 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
4670 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4672 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
4676 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4677 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4678 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4684 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4685 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4686 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4689 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4690 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4692 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4693 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4694 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4695 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4696 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4700 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4701 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
4703 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
4704 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
4705 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
4712 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4713 /// update completion.
4714 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4715 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4716 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4717 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4718 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4719 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4720 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4721 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()),
4722 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4723 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4724 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4725 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4726 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4728 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4730 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4731 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4732 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
4733 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4736 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4737 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4739 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4740 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4741 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4746 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4747 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4748 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4749 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4754 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4755 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4756 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4757 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4758 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4763 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4767 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4773 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4774 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4775 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
4779 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4780 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4781 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4787 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4788 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4790 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4791 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4793 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4794 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4795 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4796 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4797 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4802 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4803 let mut peer_state_lock;
4804 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4805 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4806 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4807 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4809 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4810 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4811 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4814 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4815 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4816 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4819 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4822 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4824 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4825 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4828 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4829 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4830 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4832 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4833 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4834 /// used to accept such channels.
4836 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4837 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4838 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4839 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4842 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4843 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4845 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4846 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4847 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4849 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4850 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4852 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4853 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4855 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4856 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4858 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4859 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4860 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4861 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4864 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4865 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4867 let peers_without_funded_channels =
4868 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
4869 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4870 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4871 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4872 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4873 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4874 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
4875 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4876 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4877 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4878 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4881 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4882 } else if channel.get().context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4883 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4884 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4885 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4886 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4889 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4890 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4891 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4893 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4894 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4895 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4896 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4897 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4898 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4899 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4900 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4903 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4904 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4905 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4909 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4910 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4911 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4914 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4915 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4921 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4922 /// or 0-conf channels.
4924 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4925 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4926 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4927 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4928 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4929 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4931 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4932 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4933 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4934 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4935 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4936 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
4937 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4941 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4944 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4945 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4947 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4948 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4949 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4950 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4952 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4955 num_unfunded_channels
4958 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4959 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4960 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4963 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4964 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4967 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4968 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4969 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4970 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4972 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4973 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4974 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4975 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
4976 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
4978 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4979 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4981 debug_assert!(false);
4982 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4984 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4985 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4987 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4988 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4989 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4990 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
4991 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4992 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4994 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4995 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4996 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4999 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5000 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5001 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5002 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5003 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5006 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5007 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5008 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
5011 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
5012 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5016 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
5017 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5019 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
5020 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
5022 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5023 if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5024 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5026 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5027 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5028 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
5031 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5032 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5033 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5034 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5035 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5036 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5037 channel_type: channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
5040 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, channel);
5045 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5046 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5047 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5048 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5050 debug_assert!(false);
5051 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5053 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5054 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5055 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5056 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5057 try_v1_outbound_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
5058 (chan.get().context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().context.get_user_id())
5060 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5063 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5064 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5065 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5066 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5067 channel_value_satoshis: value,
5069 user_channel_id: user_id,
5074 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5075 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5077 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5078 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5080 debug_assert!(false);
5081 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5084 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5085 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5086 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
5087 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5088 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5089 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
5091 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5094 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5095 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5096 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5098 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5099 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5100 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5101 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5102 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5103 funding_msg.channel_id))
5105 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5106 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5110 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5111 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5112 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5113 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5114 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5115 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5116 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5120 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5122 let chan = e.insert(chan);
5123 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5124 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5126 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5127 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5128 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5129 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5130 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5131 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5132 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5133 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5141 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5142 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5143 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5144 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5146 debug_assert!(false);
5147 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5150 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5151 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5152 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5153 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5154 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
5155 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
5156 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5157 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5158 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5159 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5160 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5161 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5162 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5163 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5168 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5172 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5173 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5174 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5176 debug_assert!(false);
5177 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5179 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5180 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5181 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5182 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5183 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5184 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
5185 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5186 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5187 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5188 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5189 msg: announcement_sigs,
5191 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5192 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5193 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5194 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5195 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5196 // announcement_signatures.
5197 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5198 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5199 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5200 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5207 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5208 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
5213 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5217 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5218 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5219 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5220 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5221 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5223 debug_assert!(false);
5224 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5226 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5227 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5228 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5229 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5231 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5232 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5233 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5234 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5237 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5238 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
5239 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5240 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5242 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5243 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5244 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5245 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5246 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5247 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5252 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5253 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5254 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5255 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5256 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
5260 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5263 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5264 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5265 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5266 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5272 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5273 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5274 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5276 debug_assert!(false);
5277 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5279 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5280 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5281 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5282 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5283 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5284 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5285 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5286 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5287 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5292 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5293 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5294 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5295 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5296 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5297 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5298 } else { (tx, None) }
5300 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5303 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5304 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5305 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5307 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5308 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5309 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5310 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5311 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5315 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5320 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5321 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5322 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5323 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5325 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5326 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5327 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5328 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5330 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5331 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5332 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5334 debug_assert!(false);
5335 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5337 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5338 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5339 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5340 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5342 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5343 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5344 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5345 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5346 match pending_forward_info {
5347 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5348 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5349 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5350 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5352 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5353 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5354 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5355 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5356 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5359 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5361 _ => pending_forward_info
5364 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5366 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5371 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5372 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5373 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5374 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5376 debug_assert!(false);
5377 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5379 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5380 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5381 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5382 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5383 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5385 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5388 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5392 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5393 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5394 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5396 debug_assert!(false);
5397 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5399 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5400 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5401 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5402 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5403 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5405 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5410 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5411 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5412 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5414 debug_assert!(false);
5415 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5417 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5418 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5419 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5420 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5421 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5422 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5423 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5425 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5428 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5432 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5433 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5434 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5436 debug_assert!(false);
5437 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5439 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5440 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5441 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5442 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5443 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5444 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5445 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5446 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5447 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5448 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
5449 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5452 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5457 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5458 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5459 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5460 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5461 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5462 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5463 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5464 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5465 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5466 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5467 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5469 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5470 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5472 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5473 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5474 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5475 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5476 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5477 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5479 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5480 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5481 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5483 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5484 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5485 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5486 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5487 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5488 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5489 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5490 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5491 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5494 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5495 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5497 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5498 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5499 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5500 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5501 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5502 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5503 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5504 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5507 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5508 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5509 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5514 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5515 // payments are being processed.
5516 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5517 push_forward_event = true;
5519 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5520 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5527 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5528 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5531 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5532 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5533 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5535 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5539 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5540 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5541 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5542 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5543 .find(|(ev, _)| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5545 if !forward_ev_exists {
5546 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5548 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5553 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
5554 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other event
5555 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
5556 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
5557 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
5558 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
5559 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
5561 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5562 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
5563 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
5564 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5565 channel_funding_outpoint,
5566 counterparty_node_id,
5571 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5572 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5573 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5574 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5576 debug_assert!(false);
5577 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5578 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5579 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5580 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5581 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5582 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5583 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5584 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5585 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5586 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5587 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5588 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5590 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5592 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5595 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5599 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5600 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5601 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5603 debug_assert!(false);
5604 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5606 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5607 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5608 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5609 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5610 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5612 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5617 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5618 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5619 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5621 debug_assert!(false);
5622 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5624 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5625 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5626 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5627 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5628 if !chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5629 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5632 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5633 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5634 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5635 msg, &self.default_configuration
5637 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5638 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5639 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5642 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5647 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5648 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5649 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5650 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5652 // It's not a local channel
5653 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5656 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5657 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5658 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5659 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5661 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5662 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5663 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5664 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5665 if chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5666 if chan.get().context.should_announce() {
5667 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5668 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5669 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5670 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5672 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5674 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5675 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5676 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5677 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5679 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5680 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5683 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5685 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5688 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5690 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5691 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5693 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5695 debug_assert!(false);
5696 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5698 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5699 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5700 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5701 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5702 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5703 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5704 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5705 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5706 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5707 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5708 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5709 let mut channel_update = None;
5710 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5711 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5712 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5715 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5716 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5717 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5718 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5719 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5720 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5721 node_id: chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5726 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5727 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5728 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5729 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5730 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5731 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5735 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5739 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5740 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5743 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5744 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5749 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5750 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5751 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5753 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5754 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5755 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5756 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5757 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5758 match monitor_event {
5759 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5760 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5761 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5762 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5764 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5765 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5766 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5767 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5770 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5771 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5772 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5773 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5775 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5776 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5777 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5778 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5781 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5782 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5783 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5784 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5785 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5786 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5787 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5788 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5789 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5790 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5791 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5795 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5796 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5798 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5800 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
5801 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5802 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5803 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5804 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5811 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5812 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5818 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5819 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5822 has_pending_monitor_events
5825 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5826 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5827 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5829 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5830 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5831 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5834 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5835 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5836 /// update was applied.
5837 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5838 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5839 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5840 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5842 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5843 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5844 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5845 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5847 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5848 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5850 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5851 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5852 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5853 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5854 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
5855 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5856 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5857 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5858 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5860 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5861 has_monitor_update = true;
5863 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5864 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5865 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5866 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5867 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5868 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5869 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5871 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5873 continue 'peer_loop;
5882 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5883 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5884 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5887 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5888 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5894 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5895 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5896 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5897 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5898 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5899 let mut has_update = false;
5901 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5903 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5904 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5905 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5906 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5907 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5908 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5909 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5910 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5912 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5913 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5916 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5917 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5918 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5919 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5920 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5925 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5927 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5928 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5929 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
5935 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5936 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5944 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5945 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5951 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5952 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5954 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5955 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5956 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5957 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5958 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5959 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5960 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5961 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5962 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5963 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5964 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5965 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5966 assert!(should_broadcast);
5967 } else { unreachable!(); }
5968 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5969 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5970 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
5973 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5977 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5978 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5980 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5981 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5984 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5986 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5987 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5988 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5989 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5990 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5991 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5992 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5993 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5994 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5995 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5996 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5997 // never fail a payment too early.
5998 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
6000 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
6003 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
6008 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6011 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6012 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6014 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6015 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6016 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6017 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6019 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6021 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6022 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6026 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6027 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6029 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6031 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6032 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6034 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6035 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6036 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6037 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6038 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6039 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6040 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6041 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6042 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6043 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6044 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6047 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
6048 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
6050 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
6053 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
6055 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6057 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
6058 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6059 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
6060 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
6061 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
6064 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6065 /// stored external to LDK.
6067 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6068 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6069 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6071 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6072 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6075 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6076 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6077 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6078 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6080 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6081 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6082 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6083 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6084 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6086 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6087 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6088 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6089 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6090 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6092 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6093 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6095 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6096 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6100 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6101 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6103 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6105 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6106 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6108 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6109 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6110 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6111 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6112 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6113 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6114 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6117 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
6118 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
6120 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
6123 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
6125 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6127 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
6128 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
6131 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6132 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6134 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6135 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6136 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6139 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6140 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6142 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6143 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6144 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6145 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6147 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6148 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6149 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6150 Some(_) => continue,
6151 None => return scid_candidate
6156 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6158 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6159 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6161 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6162 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6163 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6167 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6168 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6169 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6171 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6172 /// times to get a unique scid.
6173 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6174 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6175 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6177 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6178 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6179 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6180 return scid_candidate
6184 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6185 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6186 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6187 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6189 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6190 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6191 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6192 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6193 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6194 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6195 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6196 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6205 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6206 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6207 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6208 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6209 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6213 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6214 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6215 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6216 events.push_back((event, None));
6220 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6221 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6222 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6226 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6227 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6231 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6232 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6235 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6236 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6237 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6238 /// making progress and then any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6239 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6240 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6242 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6243 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6244 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6245 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6247 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6248 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6249 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6250 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6252 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6256 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6257 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6258 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6259 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6260 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6261 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6262 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6266 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6267 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6268 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6269 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6270 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6271 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update);
6272 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
6273 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
6274 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6276 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6278 if further_update_exists {
6279 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6284 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6285 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6289 log_debug!(self.logger,
6290 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6291 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6295 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6296 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6297 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6301 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6302 for action in actions {
6304 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6305 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6307 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
6313 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6314 /// using the given event handler.
6316 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6317 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6321 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6325 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6327 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6328 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6329 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6330 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6331 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6332 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6336 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6337 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6338 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6339 /// is always placed next to each other.
6341 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6342 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6343 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6344 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6346 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6347 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6348 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6349 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6350 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6351 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6352 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
6354 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6355 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6356 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6357 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6360 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6361 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6363 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6364 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6367 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6368 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6369 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6370 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6371 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6372 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6373 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6377 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6378 events.replace(pending_events);
6387 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6389 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6390 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6391 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6392 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6393 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6394 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6398 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6400 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6401 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6402 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6404 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6408 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6410 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6411 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6412 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6413 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6414 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6415 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6419 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6421 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6422 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6423 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6424 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6425 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6428 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6429 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6432 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6433 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6434 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6435 let new_height = height - 1;
6437 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6438 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6439 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6440 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6441 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6442 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6445 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6449 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6451 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6452 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6453 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6454 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6455 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6456 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6460 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6461 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6462 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6463 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6465 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6466 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6468 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6469 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6470 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6471 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6473 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6474 if height < last_best_block_height {
6475 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6476 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6480 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6481 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6482 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6483 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6485 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6486 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6488 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6489 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6490 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6492 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6494 macro_rules! max_time {
6495 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6497 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6498 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6499 // having an explicit local time source.
6500 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6501 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6502 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6503 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6504 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6510 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6511 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6512 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6513 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6517 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6518 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6519 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6520 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6521 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6522 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6523 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6524 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6531 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6532 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6533 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6534 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6535 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
6536 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6537 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6538 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6539 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6544 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6546 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6547 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6548 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6549 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6550 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6551 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6555 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6556 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6558 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6559 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6560 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6561 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6562 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6564 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6565 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6567 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6568 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6569 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6570 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6571 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6572 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6573 let res = f(channel);
6574 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6575 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6576 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6577 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6578 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
6580 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6581 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6582 if channel.context.is_usable() {
6583 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6584 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6585 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6586 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6591 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6596 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6597 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6600 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6601 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6602 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6603 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6604 msg: announcement_sigs,
6606 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6607 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6608 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6610 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6611 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6612 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6617 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6618 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6619 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6620 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6621 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6622 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6623 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6624 // is always consistent.
6625 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6626 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
6627 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
6628 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6629 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6632 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6633 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
6634 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6635 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6636 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
6637 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6638 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6642 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6643 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
6644 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6645 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6646 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6647 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
6648 data: reason_message,
6658 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6659 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6660 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6661 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6662 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6663 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6664 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6665 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6666 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6667 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6669 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6670 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6671 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6675 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6678 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6679 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6680 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6681 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6682 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6683 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6684 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6685 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6686 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6689 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6690 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6691 _ => unreachable!(),
6693 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6694 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6695 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6696 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6702 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6704 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6705 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6709 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6711 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6712 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6714 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6715 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6718 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6719 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6720 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6723 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6724 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6725 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6726 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6729 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6730 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6731 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6732 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6735 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6736 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6738 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6739 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6740 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6741 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6742 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6745 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6746 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6747 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6748 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6751 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6752 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6753 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6754 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6757 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6758 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6759 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6760 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6764 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6765 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6767 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6768 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6769 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6770 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6771 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6772 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6776 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6777 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6778 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6781 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
6782 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6783 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6784 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6787 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6788 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6789 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6792 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
6793 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6794 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6795 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6798 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6799 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6800 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6803 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6804 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6805 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6808 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6809 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6810 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6813 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6814 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6815 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6818 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6819 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6820 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6823 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6824 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6825 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6828 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6829 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6830 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6833 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6834 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6835 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6838 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6839 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6840 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6843 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6844 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6845 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6848 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6849 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6850 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6853 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6854 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6855 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6858 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6859 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6860 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6863 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6864 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6865 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
6866 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6867 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
6869 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6874 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6875 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6876 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6879 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6880 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6881 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6882 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6884 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6885 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6886 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6887 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6888 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6889 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6890 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6891 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6892 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6893 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6894 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6899 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6900 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6901 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6904 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6906 // V1 Channel Establishment
6907 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6908 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6909 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6910 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6911 // V2 Channel Establishment
6912 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6913 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6914 // Common Channel Establishment
6915 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6916 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6917 // Interactive Transaction Construction
6918 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
6919 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
6920 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
6921 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
6922 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
6923 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
6924 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
6925 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
6926 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
6927 // Channel Operations
6928 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6929 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6930 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6931 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6932 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6933 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6935 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6936 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6937 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6938 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6939 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6940 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6941 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6942 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6943 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6946 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6947 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6948 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6949 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6952 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6954 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6956 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6957 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6961 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6962 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6963 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6967 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6969 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6970 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6971 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6972 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6973 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6974 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6977 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6978 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6979 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6980 if inbound_peer_limited {
6983 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6984 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6985 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6986 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6987 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6988 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6989 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6990 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
6994 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6995 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6996 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6998 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6999 if inbound_peer_limited &&
7000 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
7001 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
7006 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
7007 peer_state.is_connected = true;
7012 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7014 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7015 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7016 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7017 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7018 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7019 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7020 let retain = if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
7021 if !chan.context.have_received_message() {
7022 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
7023 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
7024 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
7028 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7029 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7030 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7035 if retain && chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7036 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
7037 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
7038 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
7039 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7048 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7052 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
7053 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7055 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
7056 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
7057 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7058 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7059 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7060 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7061 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7062 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned()
7063 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned())
7064 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned()).collect()
7066 for channel_id in channel_ids {
7067 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7068 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7072 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
7073 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7074 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7075 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7076 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7077 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7078 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
7079 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
7080 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
7081 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7089 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7090 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7094 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7095 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7098 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
7099 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7102 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
7103 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
7106 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
7107 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7108 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7109 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7112 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7113 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7114 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7115 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7118 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7119 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7120 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7121 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7124 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7125 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7126 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7127 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7130 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7131 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7132 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7133 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7136 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7137 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7138 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7139 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7142 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7143 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7144 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7145 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7148 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7149 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7150 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7151 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7154 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7155 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7156 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7157 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7161 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7162 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7163 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7164 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7167 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7168 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7170 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7171 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7172 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7173 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
7174 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7177 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7178 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7179 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7180 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7183 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7184 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7185 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7186 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7189 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7190 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7191 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7192 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7193 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7194 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
7195 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
7196 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
7197 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
7198 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
7199 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
7200 features.set_payment_secret_required();
7201 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
7202 features.set_wumbo_optional();
7203 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
7204 features.set_channel_type_optional();
7205 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
7206 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
7208 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
7209 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
7210 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
7216 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7217 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7219 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7220 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7221 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7222 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7225 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7226 (2, node_id, required),
7227 (4, features, required),
7228 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7229 (8, forwarding_info, option),
7230 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7231 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7234 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7235 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7236 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7237 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7238 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7239 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7240 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7241 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7242 (2, self.channel_id, required),
7243 (3, self.channel_type, option),
7244 (4, self.counterparty, required),
7245 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
7246 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
7247 (7, self.config, option),
7248 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
7249 (9, self.confirmations, option),
7250 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
7251 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7252 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7253 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
7254 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7255 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
7256 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7257 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
7258 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7259 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7260 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7261 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7262 (30, self.is_usable, required),
7263 (32, self.is_public, required),
7264 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7265 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7266 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7267 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7273 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7274 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7275 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7276 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7277 (2, channel_id, required),
7278 (3, channel_type, option),
7279 (4, counterparty, required),
7280 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7281 (6, funding_txo, option),
7282 (7, config, option),
7283 (8, short_channel_id, option),
7284 (9, confirmations, option),
7285 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7286 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7287 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7288 (16, balance_msat, required),
7289 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7290 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7291 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7292 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7293 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7294 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
7295 (22, confirmations_required, option),
7296 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7297 (26, is_outbound, required),
7298 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7299 (30, is_usable, required),
7300 (32, is_public, required),
7301 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7302 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7303 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7304 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7307 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7308 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7309 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7310 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7311 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7315 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7317 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7318 outbound_scid_alias,
7322 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7323 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7325 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
7326 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7327 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7328 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
7329 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7330 confirmations_required,
7332 force_close_spend_delay,
7333 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7334 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7335 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7336 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7337 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7338 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7339 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7344 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7345 (2, channels, vec_type),
7346 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7347 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7350 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7352 (0, onion_packet, required),
7353 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7356 (0, payment_data, required),
7357 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7358 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7359 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7361 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7362 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7363 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7364 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7365 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
7369 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7370 (0, routing, required),
7371 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7372 (4, payment_hash, required),
7373 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7374 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7375 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7379 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7380 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7382 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7384 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7385 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7386 reason.write(writer)?;
7388 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7389 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7392 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7393 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7394 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7395 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7402 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7403 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7404 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7407 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7408 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7409 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7410 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7414 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7415 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7416 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7417 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7418 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7421 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7422 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7423 // messages contained in the variants.
7424 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7425 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7426 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7428 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7429 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7430 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7431 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7432 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7435 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7436 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7437 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7438 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7439 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7441 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7446 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7451 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7452 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7453 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7454 (2, outpoint, required),
7455 (4, htlc_id, required),
7456 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7459 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7460 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7461 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7462 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7463 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7465 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7466 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7467 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7468 (2, self.value, required),
7469 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7470 (4, payment_data, option),
7471 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7472 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7473 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7479 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7480 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7481 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7483 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
7484 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
7485 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
7486 let mut total_value_received = None;
7487 let mut total_msat = None;
7488 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7489 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7490 (0, prev_hop, required),
7491 (1, total_msat, option),
7492 (2, value, required),
7493 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7494 (4, payment_data, option),
7495 (5, total_value_received, option),
7496 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7497 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
7499 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7501 if payment_data.is_some() {
7502 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7504 if total_msat.is_none() {
7505 total_msat = Some(value);
7507 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7510 if total_msat.is_none() {
7511 if payment_data.is_none() {
7512 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7514 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7516 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7520 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7523 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7524 total_value_received,
7525 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7532 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7533 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7534 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7537 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7538 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7539 let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
7540 let mut payment_id = None;
7541 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7542 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7543 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7544 (0, session_priv, required),
7545 (1, payment_id, option),
7546 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7547 (4, path_hops, vec_type),
7548 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7549 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7551 if payment_id.is_none() {
7552 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7554 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7556 let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
7557 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7558 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7560 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7561 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
7562 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
7563 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7567 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7568 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7569 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7571 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7574 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7575 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7580 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7581 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7583 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7585 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7586 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7587 (0, session_priv, required),
7588 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7589 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7590 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7591 (4, path.hops, vec_type),
7592 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7593 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7596 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7598 field.write(writer)?;
7605 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7606 (0, forward_info, required),
7607 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7608 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7609 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7610 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7613 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7615 (0, htlc_id, required),
7616 (2, err_packet, required),
7621 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7622 (0, payment_secret, required),
7623 (2, expiry_time, required),
7624 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7625 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7626 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7629 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7631 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7632 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7633 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7634 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7635 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7636 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7640 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7641 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7643 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7645 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7647 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7648 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7649 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7652 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7654 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7655 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7656 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7657 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7658 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7659 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7660 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7661 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7663 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7664 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7665 if !channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
7666 unfunded_channels += 1;
7671 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7673 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7674 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7675 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7676 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7677 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
7678 channel.write(writer)?;
7685 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7686 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7687 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7688 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7689 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7690 for forward in pending_forwards {
7691 forward.write(writer)?;
7696 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7698 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7699 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7700 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7702 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7703 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7704 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7705 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7706 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7707 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7708 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7709 htlc.write(writer)?;
7711 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7712 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7715 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7716 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7717 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7718 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7719 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7720 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7721 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7724 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7725 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7726 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7727 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7728 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7730 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7731 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7732 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7733 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7734 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7735 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7736 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7741 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7742 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
7743 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
7744 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
7745 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
7746 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
7747 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
7748 // well save the space and not write any events here.
7749 0u64.write(writer)?;
7751 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7752 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
7753 event.write(writer)?;
7757 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
7758 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
7759 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
7760 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
7761 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
7762 0u64.write(writer)?;
7764 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7765 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7766 // likely to be identical.
7767 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7768 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7770 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7771 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7772 hash.write(writer)?;
7773 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7776 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7777 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7778 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7779 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7780 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7783 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7784 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7786 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7787 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7788 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7789 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7792 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7793 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7797 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7798 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7799 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7801 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7802 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7803 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7809 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7810 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7811 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7812 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7815 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7816 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7817 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7818 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7819 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7822 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7823 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7824 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7825 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7826 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7827 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7828 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7829 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7830 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
7831 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7832 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7833 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7840 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7841 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7842 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
7843 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
7846 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
7847 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
7848 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
7849 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
7850 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
7851 // check that the event is sane here.
7852 let event_encoded = event.encode();
7853 let event_read: Option<Event> =
7854 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
7855 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
7861 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7862 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7863 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7864 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
7865 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
7866 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
7869 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
7870 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
7871 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
7872 events.push_back((ev, action));
7873 } else if action.is_some() {
7874 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7881 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7883 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7885 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7886 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7887 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7888 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7889 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7890 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7891 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7892 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7893 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7894 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7895 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7896 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7897 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7899 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7900 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7902 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7903 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7905 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7906 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7907 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7908 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7909 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7910 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7912 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7913 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7915 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7916 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7917 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7918 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7919 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7920 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7924 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7925 pub entropy_source: ES,
7927 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7928 pub node_signer: NS,
7930 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7931 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7933 pub signer_provider: SP,
7935 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7937 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7938 pub fee_estimator: F,
7939 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7941 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7942 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7943 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7944 pub chain_monitor: M,
7946 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7947 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7948 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7949 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7950 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7951 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7953 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7955 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7956 /// deserialization.
7958 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7959 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7960 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7962 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7963 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7965 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7966 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7967 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7968 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7970 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7973 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7974 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7977 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7978 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7980 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7981 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7982 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7983 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7984 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7985 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7989 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7990 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7991 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7992 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7993 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7995 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7996 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
8001 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
8002 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
8003 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8004 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
8006 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8007 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8008 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8009 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8010 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8011 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8015 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8016 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
8017 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
8021 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8022 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
8024 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8025 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8026 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8027 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8028 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8029 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8033 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8034 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8036 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8037 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8038 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8040 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8042 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8043 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8044 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8045 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8046 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8047 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
8048 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
8049 for _ in 0..channel_count {
8050 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
8051 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
8053 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8054 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
8055 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
8056 if channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8057 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
8058 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8059 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8060 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id());
8061 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8062 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8063 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8064 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8065 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8066 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
8067 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
8068 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
8069 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8070 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
8071 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
8072 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
8073 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8074 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
8075 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
8076 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
8077 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8078 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
8081 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
8082 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8083 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8084 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8085 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
8087 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8088 let mut found_htlc = false;
8089 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8090 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
8093 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
8094 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
8095 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
8096 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
8097 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
8098 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
8099 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
8100 log_info!(args.logger,
8101 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
8102 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8103 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8107 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
8108 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
8109 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8110 channel.complete_all_mon_updates_through(monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8111 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8112 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8114 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8115 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
8117 match peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8118 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8119 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8120 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8122 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8123 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8124 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8125 entry.insert(by_id_map);
8129 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
8130 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
8131 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
8132 // safely discard the channel.
8133 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
8134 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8135 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8136 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8137 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8140 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
8141 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8142 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8143 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8144 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8145 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8149 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8150 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8151 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8152 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8153 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8154 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8155 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8157 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8161 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8162 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8163 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8164 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8165 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8166 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8167 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
8168 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
8169 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
8171 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
8174 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8175 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8176 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
8177 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8178 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8179 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
8180 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
8181 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
8183 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
8186 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8187 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
8188 for _ in 0..peer_count {
8189 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8190 let peer_state = PeerState {
8191 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
8192 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8193 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8194 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
8195 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8196 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8197 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8198 is_connected: false,
8200 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
8203 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8204 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
8205 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
8206 for _ in 0..event_count {
8207 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
8208 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
8213 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8214 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
8215 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8217 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
8218 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
8219 // on-startup monitor updates.
8220 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
8221 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
8223 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8227 for (node_id, peer_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8228 let peer_state = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8229 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8230 for update in chan.uncompleted_unblocked_mon_updates() {
8231 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.context.get_funding_txo() {
8232 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for channel {}",
8233 update.update_id, log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8234 pending_background_events.push(
8235 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8236 counterparty_node_id: *node_id, funding_txo, update: update.clone(),
8239 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8245 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
8246 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8248 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8249 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
8250 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
8251 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
8252 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8256 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8257 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
8258 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
8259 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
8260 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
8261 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
8262 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
8264 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
8265 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8269 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
8270 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
8271 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
8272 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
8273 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
8274 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8275 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8276 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
8277 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
8278 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
8279 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
8280 let mut events_override = None;
8281 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8282 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
8283 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8284 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
8285 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8286 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
8287 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8288 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
8289 (8, events_override, option),
8290 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
8291 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
8292 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8294 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
8295 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8298 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
8299 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8302 if let Some(events) = events_override {
8303 pending_events_read = events;
8306 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
8307 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
8310 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
8311 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
8312 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
8313 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
8314 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
8315 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
8317 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
8319 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
8320 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8321 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8325 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8326 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8327 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8328 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8329 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8330 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8331 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8333 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8334 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
8335 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8336 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8337 if path.hops.is_empty() {
8338 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8339 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8342 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
8343 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
8344 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
8345 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
8346 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8347 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
8348 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
8349 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
8351 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8352 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
8353 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
8354 retry_strategy: None,
8355 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
8356 payment_params: None,
8357 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
8358 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
8359 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8360 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8361 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8362 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
8363 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
8364 total_msat: path_amt,
8365 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
8367 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
8368 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
8373 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8375 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
8376 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
8377 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
8378 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
8380 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
8381 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
8382 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
8383 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
8384 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
8385 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
8386 forwards.retain(|forward| {
8387 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
8388 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8389 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8390 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8395 !forwards.is_empty()
8397 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
8398 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8399 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8400 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8401 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
8402 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
8403 intercepted_id != ev_id
8410 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
8411 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
8412 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
8413 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
8414 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
8415 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
8416 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
8417 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
8418 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
8419 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
8420 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
8421 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
8422 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
8431 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
8432 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
8433 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
8434 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
8435 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
8436 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
8437 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
8438 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
8442 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
8443 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
8445 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
8446 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
8447 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8448 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8450 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
8451 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8452 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8454 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
8455 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
8457 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8458 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
8460 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8463 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
8464 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8465 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8467 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8471 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
8472 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
8473 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
8474 if htlcs.is_empty() {
8475 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8477 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
8478 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
8479 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
8480 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
8481 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
8482 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
8483 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
8484 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
8486 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8487 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8491 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
8493 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8495 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
8496 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
8498 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8499 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8504 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8505 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8507 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
8509 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8511 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
8512 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
8513 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
8514 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8518 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
8519 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8520 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8521 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8522 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8523 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
8524 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
8526 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
8527 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
8528 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
8530 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
8531 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
8532 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8533 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8534 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
8535 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8537 if chan.context.is_usable() {
8538 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
8539 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8540 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8541 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
8542 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8548 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
8550 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8551 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
8552 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
8553 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8554 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
8555 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
8556 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
8557 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
8558 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
8559 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
8560 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
8562 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
8563 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
8565 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
8566 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
8567 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
8568 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
8570 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
8571 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
8572 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
8573 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
8575 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
8576 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
8577 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
8578 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
8580 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
8581 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
8582 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
8583 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8584 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8585 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
8586 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
8589 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
8590 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
8593 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
8596 purpose: payment.purpose,
8597 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
8603 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
8604 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
8605 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
8606 for action in actions.iter() {
8607 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
8608 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
8609 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
8611 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
8612 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8613 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8614 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
8619 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
8621 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
8622 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8626 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
8628 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
8629 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
8630 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
8631 router: args.router,
8633 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
8635 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
8636 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
8637 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
8638 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
8640 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
8641 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
8642 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
8643 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
8644 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
8645 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
8647 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
8652 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
8654 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
8656 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
8657 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
8658 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
8659 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
8660 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8661 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
8662 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
8664 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
8665 node_signer: args.node_signer,
8666 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
8668 logger: args.logger,
8669 default_configuration: args.default_config,
8672 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8673 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
8674 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
8675 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8676 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8679 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
8680 //connection or two.
8682 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
8688 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8689 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8690 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
8691 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
8692 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
8693 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
8694 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
8695 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8696 use crate::ln::msgs;
8697 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
8698 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
8699 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8700 use crate::util::test_utils;
8701 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
8702 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
8705 fn test_notify_limits() {
8706 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
8707 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
8708 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8709 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8710 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8711 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8713 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
8714 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
8715 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8716 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8717 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8719 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8721 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
8722 // to connect messages with new values
8723 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8724 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8725 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8726 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8727 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8728 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8730 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
8731 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8732 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8733 // ... but the last node should not.
8734 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8735 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
8736 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8737 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8739 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
8740 // about the channel.
8741 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8742 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8743 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8745 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8747 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8748 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8749 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8750 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8751 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8752 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8754 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8755 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8756 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8758 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8759 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8760 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8761 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8762 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8763 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8765 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8766 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8767 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8768 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8769 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8770 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8771 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8772 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8774 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8775 // the channel info has updated.
8776 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8777 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8778 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8779 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8780 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8781 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8785 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8786 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8788 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8789 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8790 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8791 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8792 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8794 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8795 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8796 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8797 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8799 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8800 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8801 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8802 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8803 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8804 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8805 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8806 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8807 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8808 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8809 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8810 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8812 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8813 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8814 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8815 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8816 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8817 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8818 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8819 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8820 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8821 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8822 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8823 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8824 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8825 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8826 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8827 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8828 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8829 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8830 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8831 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8832 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8833 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8834 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8836 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8837 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8838 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8839 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8840 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8841 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8842 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8844 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8845 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8846 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8847 // lightning messages manually.
8848 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8849 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8850 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8852 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8853 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8854 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8855 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8856 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8857 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8858 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8859 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8860 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8861 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8862 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8863 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8864 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8865 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8866 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8867 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8868 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8869 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8870 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8871 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8872 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8873 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8874 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8875 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8876 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8878 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8879 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8880 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8881 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8883 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8884 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8885 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8886 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8888 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8891 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8892 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8893 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8894 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8896 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8899 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8900 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8901 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8902 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8904 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8909 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8910 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
8911 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
8914 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
8915 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8916 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8917 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8918 // fails as expected.
8919 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
8920 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
8921 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
8922 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
8923 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
8924 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
8925 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8926 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8927 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
8928 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
8929 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
8930 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8931 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8932 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8933 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8935 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8936 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8937 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8939 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8940 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8941 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
8942 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8944 let route = find_route(
8945 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8946 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
8948 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8949 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8950 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8951 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8952 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8953 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8954 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8955 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8956 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8957 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8958 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8959 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8960 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8961 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8962 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8963 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8964 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8965 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8966 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8967 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8968 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8969 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8970 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8971 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8973 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8974 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8976 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8977 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8978 let route = find_route(
8979 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8980 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
8982 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8983 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8984 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8985 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8986 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8987 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8988 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8989 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8991 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8992 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8993 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8994 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8995 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8996 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8997 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8998 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8999 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9000 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9001 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9002 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9003 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9004 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9005 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9006 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9007 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9008 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9009 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9010 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9011 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9012 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9013 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9014 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9016 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
9017 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9019 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9020 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
9021 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9022 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
9023 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9024 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9025 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9026 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9027 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9028 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9030 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9031 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9032 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9033 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9035 let route = find_route(
9036 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9037 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9039 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
9040 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9041 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
9042 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9043 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9044 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9045 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9046 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9047 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9048 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9049 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9050 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9051 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9052 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9053 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9054 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9055 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9056 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9057 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9058 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9059 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9060 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9061 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9063 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9064 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9068 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
9069 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
9070 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
9071 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9072 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9073 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9074 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9076 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9077 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9079 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9080 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9081 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9082 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9084 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9085 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9086 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9087 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9088 let route = find_route(
9089 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9090 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9093 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9094 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
9095 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
9096 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9097 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
9098 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9099 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9101 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9102 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9103 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9104 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9105 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9106 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9107 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9109 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
9113 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
9114 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
9115 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
9116 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9117 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
9118 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9119 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9120 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9121 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9123 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9124 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9126 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9127 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9128 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9129 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9131 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9132 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9133 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9134 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9135 let route = find_route(
9136 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9137 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9140 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9141 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9142 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
9143 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
9144 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9145 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
9146 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
9147 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9150 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9151 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9152 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9153 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9154 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9155 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9156 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9158 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
9162 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
9163 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9164 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9165 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9166 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9168 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9169 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9170 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9171 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9173 // Marshall an MPP route.
9174 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
9175 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
9176 route.paths.push(path);
9177 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9178 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
9179 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
9180 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
9181 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
9182 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
9184 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9185 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
9187 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
9188 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
9190 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
9195 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
9196 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9197 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9198 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9199 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9201 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9203 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9204 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9206 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9207 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9208 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9209 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9212 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
9213 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
9214 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9215 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
9216 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
9217 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
9220 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9223 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
9224 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
9229 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
9230 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
9231 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9232 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9233 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9234 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9236 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
9237 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9239 total_msat: 100_000,
9242 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
9243 // payment verification fails as expected.
9244 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
9245 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
9246 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
9247 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
9249 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
9253 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
9254 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
9258 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
9259 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
9260 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
9261 // the channel is successfully closed.
9262 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9263 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9264 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9265 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9267 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9268 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9269 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9270 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9271 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9273 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9274 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
9276 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
9277 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
9278 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9279 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9282 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9284 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9285 // as it has the funding transaction.
9286 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9287 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9288 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9291 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9293 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9295 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9297 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9298 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9299 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9301 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9304 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9305 // as it has the funding transaction.
9306 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9307 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9308 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9310 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9311 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9312 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9313 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9314 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9315 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9316 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9317 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
9319 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9320 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9321 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9322 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
9324 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9325 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
9327 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
9328 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
9329 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
9330 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
9331 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9332 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9333 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9337 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
9338 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
9339 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
9340 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
9341 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9342 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9343 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9346 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9348 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
9349 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
9350 // closing transaction).
9351 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
9352 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
9353 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9355 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
9356 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
9357 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9358 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9359 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9362 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9364 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
9366 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
9367 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
9368 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9370 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9372 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9373 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9376 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9377 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
9378 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9381 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9382 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
9383 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9386 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
9388 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9389 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9391 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
9392 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9394 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
9395 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
9400 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
9401 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
9402 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
9403 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
9404 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9405 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9406 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
9407 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9410 let channel_id = [4; 32];
9411 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9412 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
9414 // Test the API functions.
9415 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
9417 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
9419 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9421 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9423 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9425 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
9427 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
9431 fn test_connection_limiting() {
9432 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
9433 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9434 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9435 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9436 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9438 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9440 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9441 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9443 let mut funding_tx = None;
9444 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9445 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9446 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9449 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9450 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9451 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
9452 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
9453 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9455 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9457 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9459 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9461 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9462 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9463 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9465 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9468 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
9469 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9470 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9471 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9472 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9474 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
9475 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
9477 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
9478 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
9479 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9480 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9481 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
9482 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9483 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9486 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9487 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9488 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9489 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9490 }, true).unwrap_err();
9492 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
9493 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
9494 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9495 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9496 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
9497 for ev in chan_closed_events {
9498 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
9500 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9501 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9503 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9504 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9505 }, true).unwrap_err();
9507 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
9508 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9509 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9511 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9513 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
9514 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
9516 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
9517 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9518 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
9519 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
9520 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9522 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9523 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9524 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9526 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
9527 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9528 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
9530 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
9531 // "protected" and can connect again.
9532 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
9533 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9534 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9536 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9538 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
9540 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9541 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9545 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
9546 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
9547 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9548 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9549 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9550 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9552 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9554 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9555 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9557 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9558 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9559 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9560 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9563 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
9565 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9566 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9567 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9569 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
9570 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9571 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9573 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
9574 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9575 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9576 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9580 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
9581 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
9582 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
9583 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9584 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9585 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
9586 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9587 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
9588 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9590 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9592 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9593 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9595 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
9596 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9597 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9598 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9599 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9600 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9603 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9604 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9606 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9607 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9609 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9611 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
9612 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9615 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
9616 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9617 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9618 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9619 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9621 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9622 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9624 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9625 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
9626 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
9627 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
9631 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9633 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9634 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9636 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
9637 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9638 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9640 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9641 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9643 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9645 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9650 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
9651 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
9652 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
9653 // the channel without the anchors feature.
9654 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9655 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9656 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
9657 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9658 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9659 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
9660 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9662 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
9663 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9664 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9666 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9667 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9669 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9670 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9672 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9675 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9676 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
9678 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9679 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9681 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9685 fn test_update_channel_config() {
9686 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9687 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9688 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
9689 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
9690 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9691 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9692 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
9694 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
9695 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9696 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
9698 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
9699 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
9700 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
9701 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9702 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9704 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9705 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
9708 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
9709 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9710 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
9712 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
9713 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
9714 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
9715 ..Default::default()
9717 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
9718 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9719 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9721 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9722 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
9725 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
9726 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
9727 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
9728 ..Default::default()
9730 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
9731 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
9732 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9733 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9735 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9736 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
9743 use crate::chain::Listen;
9744 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
9745 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
9746 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
9747 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
9748 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9749 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
9750 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
9751 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
9752 use crate::util::test_utils;
9753 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9755 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9756 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9757 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
9759 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
9761 use criterion::Criterion;
9763 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
9764 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
9765 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
9766 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
9767 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
9768 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
9769 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
9771 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
9772 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
9774 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
9775 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
9777 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
9779 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
9782 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
9783 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
9786 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
9787 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
9788 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
9790 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
9792 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
9793 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
9794 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9795 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
9796 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
9798 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
9799 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
9801 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
9802 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
9803 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
9804 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9806 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9808 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
9810 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9811 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
9812 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
9813 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
9814 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9816 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9818 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
9820 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
9821 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9823 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
9824 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9826 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9827 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9828 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9831 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
9832 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9833 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
9835 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9836 } else { panic!(); }
9838 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9839 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9840 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9842 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9843 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9845 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9848 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9849 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9850 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9852 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9853 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9855 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9858 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
9860 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
9861 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
9862 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
9864 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9865 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9866 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
9867 match msg_events[0] {
9868 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
9869 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
9870 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9874 match msg_events[1] {
9875 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9879 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9880 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9882 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9883 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9885 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9888 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9889 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9891 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9892 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9894 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9897 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
9898 macro_rules! send_payment {
9899 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
9900 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9901 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9902 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
9903 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
9905 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
9906 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
9908 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
9909 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
9910 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
9911 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
9912 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
9913 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9914 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
9915 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
9916 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9917 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9918 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9920 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
9921 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
9922 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9923 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9925 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9926 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9927 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9928 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9929 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9931 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9934 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9935 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9936 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9937 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9939 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9943 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
9944 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9945 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);