1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::router::Route;
34 use ln::msgs::LocalFeatures;
36 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
38 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
41 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
42 use util::logger::Logger;
43 use util::errors::APIError;
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::Duration;
52 const SIXTY_FIVE_ZEROS: [u8; 65] = [0; 65];
54 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
56 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
57 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
58 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
60 // When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
61 // which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
62 // filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
63 // the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
64 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
65 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
66 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
67 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
68 pub(super) struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
69 onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
70 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
71 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
72 short_channel_id: u64,
73 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
74 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
77 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
78 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
79 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
80 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
83 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
84 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
85 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
86 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
90 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
91 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
92 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
93 short_channel_id: u64,
95 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
98 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
99 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
100 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
101 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
104 session_priv: SecretKey,
105 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
106 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
107 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
112 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
113 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
114 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
115 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
116 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
121 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
122 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
124 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
132 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
133 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
134 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
135 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
136 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
137 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
139 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
141 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
142 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
143 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
144 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
145 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
147 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
148 err: msgs::LightningError,
149 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
151 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
153 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
155 err: LightningError {
157 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
158 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
160 data: err.to_string()
164 shutdown_finish: None,
168 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
170 err: LightningError {
172 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
174 shutdown_finish: None,
178 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
179 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
182 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
184 err: LightningError {
186 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
187 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
189 data: err.to_string()
193 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
197 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
200 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
202 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
204 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
206 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
207 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
209 data: msg.to_string()
213 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => LightningError {
215 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
216 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
218 data: msg.to_string()
223 shutdown_finish: None,
228 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
229 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
230 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
231 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
232 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
234 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
236 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
238 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
242 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
246 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
247 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
248 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
249 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
250 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
251 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
252 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
254 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
258 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
259 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
260 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<ChanSigner>>,
261 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
262 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
263 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
264 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
265 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
266 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
267 /// payment_hash -> Vec<(amount_received, htlc_source)> for tracking things that were to us and
268 /// can be failed/claimed by the user
269 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
270 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
272 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
273 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
274 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
275 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
277 pub(super) struct MutChannelHolder<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + 'a> {
278 pub(super) by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<ChanSigner>>,
279 pub(super) short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
280 pub(super) forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
281 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
282 pub(super) pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
284 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelHolder<ChanSigner> {
285 pub(super) fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder<ChanSigner> {
287 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
288 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
289 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
290 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
291 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
296 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
297 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
299 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
300 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
302 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
303 /// to individual Channels.
305 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
306 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
307 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
308 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
310 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
311 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
312 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
313 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
314 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
315 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
316 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
318 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
319 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
320 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
321 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
324 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
325 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
326 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
327 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
328 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfec.
329 pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
330 default_configuration: UserConfig,
331 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
332 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
333 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
334 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
337 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
339 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
340 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
341 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
344 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
346 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
347 our_network_key: SecretKey,
349 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
350 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
351 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
352 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
353 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
355 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>,
360 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
361 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
362 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
363 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
364 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
366 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
367 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
368 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
369 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
370 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
371 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
372 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
374 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
375 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
376 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
377 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
378 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
379 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
382 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
384 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
385 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
388 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
390 macro_rules! secp_call {
391 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
394 Err(_) => return Err($err),
399 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
400 pub struct ChannelDetails {
401 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
402 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
403 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
404 /// lifetime of the channel.
405 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
406 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
407 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
408 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
409 /// The node_id of our counterparty
410 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
411 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
412 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
413 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
415 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
416 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
417 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
418 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
419 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
420 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
421 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
422 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
423 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
424 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
425 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
426 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
427 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
431 macro_rules! handle_error {
432 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
435 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
436 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
437 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
438 if let Some(update) = update_option {
439 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
440 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
451 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
452 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
455 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
456 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
458 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
459 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
460 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
461 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
462 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
464 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
466 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
471 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
472 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
475 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
476 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
478 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
479 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
480 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
481 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
482 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
484 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
486 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, update }) => {
487 log_error!($self, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
488 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
489 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
490 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
492 if let Some(update) = update {
493 if let Err(e) = $self.monitor.add_update_monitor(update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update) {
495 // Upstream channel is dead, but we want at least to fail backward HTLCs to save
496 // downstream channels. In case of PermanentFailure, we are not going to be able
497 // to claim back to_remote output on remote commitment transaction. Doesn't
498 // make a difference here, we are concern about HTLCs circuit, not onchain funds.
499 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {},
500 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {},
504 let mut shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown();
505 if shutdown_res.0.len() >= 1 {
506 log_error!($self, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction {} avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take", shutdown_res.0[0].txid());
508 shutdown_res.0.clear();
509 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
515 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
516 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
517 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
519 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
521 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
522 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
523 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
524 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
525 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
527 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
528 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
529 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
530 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
531 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
532 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
533 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
534 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
535 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
536 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
539 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
540 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
541 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
542 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
544 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
545 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
547 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
548 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
550 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
551 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
552 if !$resend_commitment {
553 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
556 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
558 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
559 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
565 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
566 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
567 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
569 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
570 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
574 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
575 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
576 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
577 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
578 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
581 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
586 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelManager<ChanSigner> {
587 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
589 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
590 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
592 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
594 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
596 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
597 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
599 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
600 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
601 /// However, rather than calling these methods directly, the user should register
602 /// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's
603 /// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one
605 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager<ChanSigner>>, secp256k1::Error> {
606 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
608 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
609 default_configuration: config.clone(),
610 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
611 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
612 monitor: monitor.clone(),
615 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
616 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
619 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
620 by_id: HashMap::new(),
621 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
622 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
623 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
624 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
626 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
628 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
629 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
639 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
641 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
642 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
643 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
644 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
646 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
647 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
649 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
650 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
651 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
652 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
653 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
656 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
657 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
659 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
660 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
661 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
662 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
663 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
664 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
666 panic!("RNG is bad???");
669 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
671 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
672 node_id: their_network_key,
678 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
679 /// more information.
680 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
681 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
682 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
683 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
684 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
685 res.push(ChannelDetails {
686 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
687 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
688 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
689 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
690 inbound_capacity_msat,
691 outbound_capacity_msat,
692 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
693 is_live: channel.is_live(),
699 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
700 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
702 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
703 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
704 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
705 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
706 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
707 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
708 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
709 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
710 // really wanted anyway.
711 if channel.is_live() {
712 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
713 res.push(ChannelDetails {
714 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
715 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
716 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
717 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
718 inbound_capacity_msat,
719 outbound_capacity_msat,
720 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
728 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
729 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
730 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
732 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
733 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
734 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
736 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
737 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
738 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
739 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
740 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
741 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
742 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
743 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
746 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
747 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
748 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
750 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
751 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
753 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
756 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
757 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
759 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
760 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
765 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
766 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
767 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
776 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
777 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
778 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
779 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
780 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
782 for tx in local_txn {
783 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
784 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
788 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
789 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
790 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
791 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
794 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
795 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
796 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
797 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
798 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
805 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
806 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
807 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
808 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
809 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
815 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
816 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
817 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
818 for chan in self.list_channels() {
819 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
823 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>) {
824 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
825 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
827 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
828 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
829 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
830 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
831 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
832 failure_code: $err_code,
833 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
838 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
839 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
842 let shared_secret = {
843 let mut arr = [0; 32];
844 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
847 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
849 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
850 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
851 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
852 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
853 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
854 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
855 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
856 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
859 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
860 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
861 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
862 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
863 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
866 let mut channel_state = None;
867 macro_rules! return_err {
868 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
870 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
871 if channel_state.is_none() {
872 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
874 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
875 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
876 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
877 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
878 })), channel_state.unwrap());
883 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
884 let next_hop_data = {
885 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
886 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
887 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
889 let error_code = match err {
890 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
891 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
893 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
899 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
902 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
903 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
904 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
905 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
906 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
907 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
908 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
909 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 19*65];
910 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
911 assert_ne!(new_packet_data[0..65], [0; 65][..]);
912 assert_ne!(new_packet_data[..], [0; 19*65][..]);
916 // final_expiry_too_soon
917 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
918 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
920 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
921 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
922 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
924 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
925 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
926 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
929 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
930 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
931 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
932 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
934 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
936 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
938 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
939 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
940 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
943 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
944 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
945 chacha.process(&SIXTY_FIVE_ZEROS[..], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
947 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
949 let blinding_factor = {
950 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
951 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
952 sha.input(&shared_secret);
953 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
956 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
958 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
960 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
963 hop_data: new_packet_data,
964 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
967 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
968 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
969 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
970 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
971 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
972 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
973 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
977 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
978 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
979 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
980 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
981 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
982 None => { // unknown_next_peer
983 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
985 Some(id) => id.clone(),
987 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
988 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
990 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
991 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
992 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
993 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
994 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
995 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
996 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
998 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
999 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1001 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1002 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1003 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1005 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1006 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1008 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1009 // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1010 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1011 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1013 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1014 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1019 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1020 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1021 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1022 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1024 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1025 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1027 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1028 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
1030 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1032 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1037 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1040 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1041 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1042 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1043 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1044 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1048 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1050 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1051 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1052 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1053 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1054 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1055 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1056 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1057 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1058 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1059 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1062 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1063 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1065 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1071 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1073 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1074 /// fields for more info.
1076 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1077 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1078 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1079 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1080 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1081 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1083 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1085 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1086 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1087 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1088 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1089 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1090 /// relevant updates.
1092 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1093 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1094 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1095 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1096 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1097 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1098 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1099 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1101 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1102 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1103 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1104 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1108 let (session_priv, prng_seed) = self.keys_manager.get_onion_rand();
1110 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1112 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1113 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1114 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1115 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash);
1117 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1119 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1120 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1122 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1123 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1124 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1127 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1128 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1130 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1131 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1133 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1134 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1136 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1137 route: route.clone(),
1138 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1139 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1140 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1142 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1143 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1144 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1145 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1146 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1147 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1148 // something else in case we will resend later!
1149 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1152 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1153 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1154 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1155 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1156 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1157 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1158 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1166 } else { unreachable!(); }
1170 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1171 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1173 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.action {
1175 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1176 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1177 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1178 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1182 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1187 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1189 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1190 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1192 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1194 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1195 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1196 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1197 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1199 let (mut chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1201 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1202 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1204 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1205 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1206 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1207 } else { unreachable!(); })
1213 match handle_error!(self, res) {
1214 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1215 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1218 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1219 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1220 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1221 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1228 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1229 // lock before add_update_monitor
1230 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1232 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1233 match handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", *temporary_channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None))) {
1235 log_error!(self, "Failed to store ChannelMonitor update for funding tx generation");
1236 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1237 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1238 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1243 Ok(()) => unreachable!(),
1246 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1247 // Its completely fine to continue with a FundingCreated until the monitor
1248 // update is persisted, as long as we don't generate the FundingBroadcastSafe
1249 // until the monitor has been safely persisted (as funding broadcast is not,
1251 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1256 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1257 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1258 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1261 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1262 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1263 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1265 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1271 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1272 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1274 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1276 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1278 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1279 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1281 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1282 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1283 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1284 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1285 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1289 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1291 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1292 /// Will likely generate further events.
1293 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1294 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1296 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1297 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1298 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1300 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1301 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1303 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1304 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1305 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1306 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1308 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1309 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1310 match forward_info {
1311 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1312 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1313 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1314 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1315 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1317 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1319 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1320 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1321 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1322 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1323 // problem, not ours.
1330 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1331 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1332 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1333 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1334 match forward_info {
1335 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1336 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1337 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1338 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1339 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1340 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1342 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1344 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1345 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), msg);
1347 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1349 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1350 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1355 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1357 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1358 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1359 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1360 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1361 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1362 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1363 // this channel currently :/.
1369 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1370 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1371 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1373 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1374 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1376 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1378 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1379 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1380 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1383 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1385 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1386 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1387 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1388 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1389 // messages when we can.
1390 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1391 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1392 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1399 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1400 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1403 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1404 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1405 let their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
1406 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1407 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1408 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1410 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1411 log_trace!(self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1412 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1413 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1414 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1416 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1418 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. } => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1420 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1421 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1424 msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError => {},
1426 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1427 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1428 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1429 node_id: their_node_id,
1439 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1440 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1443 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1444 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1445 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1446 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1447 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1448 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1449 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1451 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1459 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1460 match forward_info {
1461 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1462 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1463 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1464 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1465 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1467 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1468 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push((forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)),
1469 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![(forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)]); },
1471 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1472 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1473 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1476 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1477 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1485 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1487 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1488 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1492 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1493 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1496 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.action {
1498 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1499 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1500 node_id: their_node_id,
1508 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1509 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1510 events.append(&mut new_events);
1513 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1514 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1515 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1517 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1518 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1519 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1520 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1521 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1522 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id {
1523 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1524 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1525 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1530 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1532 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1533 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1538 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1539 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1540 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1541 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1542 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1543 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
1544 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1546 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1547 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1548 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1549 for (recvd_value, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1550 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1551 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1552 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1553 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(recvd_value).to_vec() });
1559 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1560 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1561 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1562 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1563 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1564 /// still-available channels.
1565 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1566 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1567 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1568 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1571 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1572 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1573 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1574 match &onion_error {
1575 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1577 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1579 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1580 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1581 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1582 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1583 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1584 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1585 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1590 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1591 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1592 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1593 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1595 error_code: onion_error_code
1599 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1603 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1604 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1605 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1606 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1608 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1609 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1610 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1611 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1612 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1613 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1615 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1621 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1622 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1623 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1624 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1625 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1626 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1628 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1629 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1630 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1634 let mut forward_event = None;
1635 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1636 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1638 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1639 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1640 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1642 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1643 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1646 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1647 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1648 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1649 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1650 time_forwardable: time
1657 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1658 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1659 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1661 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
1662 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
1663 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
1664 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
1665 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
1666 /// motivated attackers.
1668 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1669 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
1670 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1672 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1674 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1675 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1676 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1677 for (received_amount, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1678 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1679 if received_amount < expected_amount || received_amount > expected_amount * 2 {
1680 let mut htlc_msat_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(received_amount).to_vec();
1681 let mut height_data = byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).to_vec();
1682 htlc_msat_data.append(&mut height_data);
1683 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1684 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), &payment_hash,
1685 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_data });
1687 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1693 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1694 let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
1696 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1697 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1698 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1699 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1703 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1704 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1705 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1707 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1708 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1710 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1711 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1712 // why it's missing.
1717 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
1718 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
1719 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1720 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1721 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1722 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1723 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
1724 assert!(msgs.is_none());
1726 break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
1730 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1731 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1732 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1733 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1734 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1735 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1736 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1737 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1745 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1746 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1747 //TODO: Do something with e?
1751 } else { unreachable!(); }
1757 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1760 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.action {
1762 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1763 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1764 node_id: their_node_id,
1772 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1773 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1774 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1777 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1778 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1780 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1781 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1782 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1783 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1784 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
1785 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1788 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1789 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1790 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1791 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1792 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1793 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1794 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1795 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1797 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1798 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1799 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1800 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1801 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1802 // on-chain confirmations.
1803 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once it's merged a test
1804 // should be written.
1805 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1806 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1808 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1809 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1810 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1816 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1819 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1820 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1821 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1823 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1825 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1826 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1827 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1828 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1833 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1834 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1835 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1836 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1837 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1842 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1846 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1851 if needs_broadcast_safe {
1852 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1853 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
1854 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1857 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
1858 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1859 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1862 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
1863 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1864 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1865 msg: announcement_sigs,
1868 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
1876 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
1878 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1879 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1881 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1883 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1884 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1888 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1889 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1890 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1893 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_local_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1894 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1895 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1896 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1897 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1898 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1899 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1900 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1901 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1902 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1904 entry.insert(channel);
1910 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1911 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1912 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1913 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1914 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1915 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1916 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1917 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1918 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1920 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_local_features), channel_state, chan);
1921 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1923 //TODO: same as above
1924 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1927 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1928 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1929 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1930 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1931 output_script: output_script,
1932 user_channel_id: user_id,
1937 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1938 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = {
1939 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1940 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1941 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1942 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1943 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1944 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1945 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1947 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1949 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1952 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1953 // lock before add_update_monitor
1954 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1956 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1957 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
1958 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
1959 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
1960 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
1961 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None));
1963 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1964 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
1965 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
1966 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
1967 // until we have persisted our monitor.
1968 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1972 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1973 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1974 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1975 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1976 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1978 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1979 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1980 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1989 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1990 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1991 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1992 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1993 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1994 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1995 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1996 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1997 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1999 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2000 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2001 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2003 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2005 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2008 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2009 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2010 funding_txo: funding_txo,
2011 user_channel_id: user_id,
2016 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2017 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2018 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2019 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2020 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2021 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2022 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2023 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2025 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2026 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2027 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2028 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2029 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2030 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2031 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2032 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2033 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2034 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2035 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2036 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2037 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2038 msg: announcement_sigs,
2043 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2047 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2048 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2049 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2050 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2052 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2053 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2054 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2055 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2056 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2058 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2059 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2060 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2061 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2065 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2066 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2067 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2071 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2072 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2073 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2075 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2076 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2078 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2081 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2082 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2084 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2085 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2086 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2087 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2095 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2096 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2097 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2098 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2099 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2100 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2101 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2102 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2103 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2105 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2106 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2107 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2108 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2113 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2114 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2115 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2116 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2117 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2118 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2119 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2121 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2122 } else { (tx, None) }
2124 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2127 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2128 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2129 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2131 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2132 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2133 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2134 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2142 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2143 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2144 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2145 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2147 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2148 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2149 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2150 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2152 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2153 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2155 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2156 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2157 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2158 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2159 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2161 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2162 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2163 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2164 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2165 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2166 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2167 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2168 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2169 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2170 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2171 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
2172 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
2173 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
2174 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
2176 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
2177 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2178 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
2179 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2183 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2184 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2185 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2186 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2187 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2188 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2193 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2195 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2200 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2201 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2203 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2204 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2205 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2206 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2207 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2208 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2210 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2212 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2215 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2219 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2220 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2221 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2222 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2223 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2224 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2225 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2226 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2228 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2230 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2235 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2236 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2237 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2238 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2239 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2240 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2241 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2242 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2244 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2245 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2247 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2250 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2254 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2255 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2256 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2257 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2258 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2259 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2260 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2261 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2263 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2264 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2265 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2266 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2267 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2269 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2270 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2271 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2273 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2274 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2275 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2276 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2277 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2278 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2279 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2280 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2282 commitment_signed: msg,
2286 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2287 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2288 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2294 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2299 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2300 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2301 let mut forward_event = None;
2302 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2303 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2304 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2305 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2307 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2308 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2309 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2310 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2312 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2313 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2318 match forward_event {
2320 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2321 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2322 time_forwardable: time
2330 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2331 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2332 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2333 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2334 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2335 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2336 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2337 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2338 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2340 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2341 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2342 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2343 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2344 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2345 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2346 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2348 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2351 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2352 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2353 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2357 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2358 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2359 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2363 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2365 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2368 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2369 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2371 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2376 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2377 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2378 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2379 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2380 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2381 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2382 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2383 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2385 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2387 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2392 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2393 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2394 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2396 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2397 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2398 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2399 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2401 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2402 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2405 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2406 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2407 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2409 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2410 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2411 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2412 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2413 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2416 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2418 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2419 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2420 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2421 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2422 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2423 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2424 contents: announcement,
2426 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2429 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2434 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2435 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2436 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2438 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2439 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2440 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2441 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2443 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2444 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2445 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2446 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2447 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2448 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2449 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2450 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2451 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2453 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2454 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2456 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2457 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2460 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2461 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2462 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2466 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2467 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2468 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2469 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2474 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2475 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2476 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2477 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2483 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2487 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2492 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2493 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2494 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2500 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2504 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2505 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2506 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2507 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2509 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2510 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2512 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2513 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2514 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2516 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2517 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2518 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2519 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2520 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2522 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2523 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2525 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2526 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2528 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2529 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2530 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2532 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2535 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2536 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2537 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2538 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2539 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2540 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2541 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2542 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2552 match handle_error!(self, err) {
2553 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2555 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.action {
2557 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
2558 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2559 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2560 node_id: their_node_id,
2564 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
2570 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner> {
2571 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2572 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2573 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2574 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2576 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2577 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2578 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2579 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2580 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2582 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2583 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2588 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2589 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2590 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2595 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner> {
2596 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2597 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2598 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2599 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2601 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2602 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2603 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2604 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2605 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2607 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2608 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2613 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2614 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2615 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2620 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChainListener for ChannelManager<ChanSigner> {
2621 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2622 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2623 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2624 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2625 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2627 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2628 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2629 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2630 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2631 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2632 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2633 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2634 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2635 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2636 msg: funding_locked,
2638 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2639 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2640 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2641 msg: announcement_sigs,
2644 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2645 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2646 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2647 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2648 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
2652 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2653 for tx in txn_matched {
2654 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2655 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2656 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2657 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2658 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2660 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2661 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2662 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2663 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2664 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2665 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2674 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2675 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2676 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2678 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2679 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2680 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2681 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2682 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2683 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2684 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2693 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2694 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2696 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2697 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2700 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2701 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
2702 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2703 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2705 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2706 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2707 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2708 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2709 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2710 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2711 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2712 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2714 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2715 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2716 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2726 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2727 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2729 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2730 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2734 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner> {
2735 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2736 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2737 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2738 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_local_features, msg))
2741 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2742 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2743 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_local_features, msg))
2746 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2747 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2748 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg))
2751 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2752 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2753 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2756 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2757 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2758 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg))
2761 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2762 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2763 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg))
2766 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2767 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2768 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2771 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2772 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2773 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2776 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2777 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2778 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2781 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2782 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2783 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2786 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2787 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2788 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2791 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2792 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2793 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2796 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2797 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2798 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg))
2801 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2802 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2803 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg))
2806 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2807 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2808 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg))
2811 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2812 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2813 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg))
2816 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2817 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2818 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2819 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2821 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2822 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2823 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2824 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2825 if no_connection_possible {
2826 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2827 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2828 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2829 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2830 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2832 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2833 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2834 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2844 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2845 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2846 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2847 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2848 chan.to_disabled_marked();
2849 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2850 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2851 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2853 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2854 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2855 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2863 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
2865 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2866 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2867 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2868 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2869 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2870 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2871 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2872 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2873 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2874 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2875 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2876 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
2877 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
2878 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2879 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
2883 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2884 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2886 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2887 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2888 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2893 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2894 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2896 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2897 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2898 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2899 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2900 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2901 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2902 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2903 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2904 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2905 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2909 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2910 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2911 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2917 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2920 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2921 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2923 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2924 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2925 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2926 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2930 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2935 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2936 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2938 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2939 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2940 self.onion_packet.write(writer)?;
2941 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2942 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2943 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2944 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2945 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2950 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2951 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2952 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2953 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
2954 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2955 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2956 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2957 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2958 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2963 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2964 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2966 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2968 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2970 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2972 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2979 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2980 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2981 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2982 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2983 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2984 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2989 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
2990 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2992 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
2994 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2996 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
2998 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3005 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
3006 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3007 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3008 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3009 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3010 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3015 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3018 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3021 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3022 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3024 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3026 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3028 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3030 route.write(writer)?;
3031 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3032 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3039 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
3040 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3041 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3042 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3043 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3044 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
3045 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3046 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3048 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3053 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3054 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3056 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3060 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3062 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3063 data.write(writer)?;
3070 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3071 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3072 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3073 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3074 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3075 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3076 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3078 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3083 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3084 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3086 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3088 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3089 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3090 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3092 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3094 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3095 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3102 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCForwardInfo {
3103 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3104 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3105 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3106 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3107 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3108 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3110 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3111 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3112 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3114 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3119 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner> {
3120 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3121 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3123 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3124 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3126 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3127 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3128 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3130 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3131 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3132 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3133 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3134 unfunded_channels += 1;
3137 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3138 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3139 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3140 channel.write(writer)?;
3144 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3145 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3146 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3147 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3148 for forward in pending_forwards {
3149 forward.write(writer)?;
3153 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3154 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3155 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3156 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3157 for &(recvd_amt, ref previous_hop) in previous_hops.iter() {
3158 recvd_amt.write(writer)?;
3159 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3167 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3169 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3171 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3172 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3173 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3174 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3175 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3176 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3177 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3178 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3179 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3180 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3181 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface.
3182 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
3183 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3184 /// deserialization.
3185 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>,
3187 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3189 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3190 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3191 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3193 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3194 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3195 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3196 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
3198 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3199 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3200 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3201 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3202 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3203 /// deserialization.
3204 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3205 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3206 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3207 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3209 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3210 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3212 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3213 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3214 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3215 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3217 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3219 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3222 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable<R>> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner>) {
3223 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3224 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3225 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3226 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3227 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3230 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3231 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3232 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3234 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3236 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3237 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3238 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3239 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3240 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3241 let mut channel: Channel<ChanSigner> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3242 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3243 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3246 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3247 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3248 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3249 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3250 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3251 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3252 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3253 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3254 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3256 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3257 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3259 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3262 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3266 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3267 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3268 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3272 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3273 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3274 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3275 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3276 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3277 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3278 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3279 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3281 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3284 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3285 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3286 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3287 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3288 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3289 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3290 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3291 previous_hops.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3293 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3296 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3298 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3299 monitor: args.monitor,
3300 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3302 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3303 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3304 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3306 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3311 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3313 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3315 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3316 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3317 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3318 logger: args.logger,
3319 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3322 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3323 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3324 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3325 //connection or two.
3328 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))