1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
82 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
84 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
85 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
86 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
88 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
89 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
90 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
91 // before we forward it.
93 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
94 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
95 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
96 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
97 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
99 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
100 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
102 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
103 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
104 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
105 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
108 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
109 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
114 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
120 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
121 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
122 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
124 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
125 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
126 /// may overshoot this in either case)
127 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
128 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
131 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
132 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
133 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
134 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
137 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
138 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
139 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
140 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
141 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
144 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
145 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
147 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
148 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
149 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
152 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
153 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
155 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
156 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
159 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
160 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
163 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
167 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
168 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
169 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
170 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
171 short_channel_id: u64,
173 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
174 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
176 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
177 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
182 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
184 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
185 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
186 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
188 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
189 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
192 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
193 struct ClaimableHTLC {
194 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
196 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
198 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
199 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
200 sender_intended_value: u64,
201 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
203 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
204 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
205 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
206 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
210 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
212 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
213 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
214 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
216 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
217 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
222 impl Readable for PaymentId {
223 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
224 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
229 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
231 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
232 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
233 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
235 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
236 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
241 impl Readable for InterceptId {
242 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
243 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
248 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
249 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
250 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
251 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
252 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
255 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
257 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
258 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
259 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
261 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
262 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
266 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
267 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
268 (0, short_channel_id, required),
269 (2, htlc_id, required),
271 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
272 (0, session_priv, required),
277 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
278 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
279 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
280 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
281 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
284 session_priv: SecretKey,
285 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
286 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
287 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
288 payment_id: PaymentId,
291 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
292 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
293 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
295 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
297 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
299 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
302 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
303 payment_id.hash(hasher);
304 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
310 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
312 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
313 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
315 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
316 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
317 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
321 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
322 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
323 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
324 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
325 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
326 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
328 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
334 struct ReceiveError {
340 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
341 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
343 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
344 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
345 pub enum FailureCode {
346 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
347 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
348 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
349 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
350 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
351 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
352 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
353 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
354 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
355 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
356 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
359 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
361 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
362 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
363 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
364 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
365 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
367 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
368 err: msgs::LightningError,
369 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
370 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
372 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
374 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
376 err: LightningError {
378 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
379 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
386 shutdown_finish: None,
390 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
391 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
394 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
396 err: LightningError {
398 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
399 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
405 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
406 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
410 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
413 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
415 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
416 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
420 log_level: Level::Warn,
423 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
425 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
427 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
429 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
430 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
438 shutdown_finish: None,
443 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
444 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
445 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
446 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
447 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
449 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
450 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
451 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
452 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
453 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
454 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
455 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
457 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
461 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
462 struct ClaimingPayment {
464 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
465 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
467 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
468 (0, amount_msat, required),
469 (2, payment_purpose, required),
470 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
473 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
474 struct ClaimablePayments {
475 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
476 /// failed/claimed by the user.
478 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
479 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
481 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
482 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
483 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
485 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
486 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
487 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
488 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
491 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
492 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
493 /// quite some time lag.
494 enum BackgroundEvent {
495 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
496 /// commitment transaction.
497 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
501 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
502 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
503 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
504 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
505 /// event can be generated.
506 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
507 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
508 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
511 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
512 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
513 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
516 /// State we hold per-peer.
517 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
518 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
520 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
521 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
523 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
524 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
525 latest_features: InitFeatures,
526 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
527 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
528 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
529 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
530 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
532 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
533 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
534 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
535 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
537 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
538 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
539 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
540 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
541 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
542 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
543 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
544 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
545 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
546 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
550 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
551 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
552 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
553 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
554 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
555 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
558 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
562 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
563 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
565 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
568 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
569 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
570 struct PendingInboundPayment {
571 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
572 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
573 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
574 /// this payment being removed.
576 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
577 user_payment_id: u64,
578 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
579 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
580 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
583 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
584 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
585 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
586 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
587 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
588 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
589 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
590 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
592 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
593 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
601 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
603 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
608 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
609 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
610 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
611 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
612 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
613 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
614 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
615 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
616 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
618 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
619 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
621 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
622 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
624 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
625 /// to individual Channels.
627 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
628 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
629 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
630 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
632 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
633 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
634 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
635 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
636 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
637 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
638 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
640 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
641 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
642 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
644 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
645 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
646 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
647 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
648 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
650 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
651 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
652 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
653 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
655 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
656 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
657 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
659 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
660 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
661 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
662 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
663 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
665 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
666 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
667 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
668 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
669 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
670 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
671 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
672 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
675 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
676 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
677 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
678 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
679 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
683 // `total_consistency_lock`
685 // |__`forward_htlcs`
687 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
689 // |__`per_peer_state`
691 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
693 // | |__`claimable_payments`
695 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
701 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
703 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
707 // | |__`pending_events`
709 // | |__`pending_background_events`
711 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
713 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
714 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
715 ES::Target: EntropySource,
716 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
717 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
718 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
722 default_configuration: UserConfig,
723 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
724 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
730 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
732 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
734 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
735 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
737 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
738 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
739 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
740 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
742 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
743 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
745 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
746 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
747 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
748 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
749 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
750 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
751 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
752 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
754 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
756 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
757 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
759 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
761 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
762 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
763 /// and via the classic SCID.
765 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
766 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
768 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
770 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
772 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
773 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
774 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
776 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
777 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
779 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
780 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
782 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
783 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
785 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
786 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
787 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
788 /// active channel list on load.
790 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
791 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
793 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
795 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
796 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
797 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
799 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
800 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
801 /// the handling of the events.
803 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
804 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
807 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
808 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
809 /// would break backwards compatability.
810 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
811 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
812 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
814 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
815 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
817 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
819 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
820 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
821 /// confirmation depth.
823 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
824 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
825 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
827 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
829 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
831 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
833 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
835 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
837 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
838 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
839 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
841 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
842 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
844 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
845 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
846 /// keeping additional state.
847 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
849 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
850 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
851 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
852 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
854 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
855 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
857 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
858 /// are currently open with that peer.
860 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
861 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
864 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
866 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
867 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
868 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
869 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
870 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
872 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
873 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
874 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
875 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
876 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
877 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
878 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
879 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
880 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
881 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
882 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
884 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
893 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
895 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
896 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
897 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
898 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
899 pub struct ChainParameters {
900 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
901 pub network: Network,
903 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
905 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
906 pub best_block: BestBlock,
909 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
915 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
916 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
917 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
918 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
919 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
920 /// updates are ready for persistence).
922 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
923 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
924 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
925 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
926 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
928 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
929 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
932 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
933 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
934 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
937 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
938 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
940 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
941 persistence_notifier: notifier,
942 should_persist: persist_check,
943 _read_guard: read_guard,
948 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
950 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
951 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
956 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
957 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
959 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
961 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
962 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
963 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
964 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
965 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
967 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
968 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
970 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
972 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
973 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
974 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
975 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
976 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
977 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
978 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
979 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
980 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
981 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
982 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
983 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
984 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
986 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
987 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
989 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
990 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
991 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
992 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
994 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
995 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
996 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
997 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
998 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
999 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1002 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1004 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1005 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1008 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1010 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1011 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1013 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1014 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1015 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1016 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1018 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1019 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1020 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1021 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1023 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1024 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1025 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1027 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1028 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1029 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1031 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1032 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1033 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1034 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1035 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1036 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1037 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1038 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1039 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1040 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1041 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1044 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1045 /// to better separate parameters.
1046 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1047 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1048 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1049 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1050 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1051 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1052 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1053 pub features: InitFeatures,
1054 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1055 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1056 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1058 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1060 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1061 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1062 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1063 /// payments to us through this channel.
1064 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1065 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1066 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1067 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1068 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1069 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1070 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1073 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1074 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1075 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1076 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1077 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1078 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1079 /// lifetime of the channel.
1080 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1081 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1082 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1083 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1084 /// our counterparty already.
1086 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1087 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1088 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1089 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1091 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1092 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1093 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1094 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1096 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1097 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1099 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1100 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1102 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1103 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1104 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1105 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1106 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1107 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1108 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1109 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1110 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1113 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1115 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1116 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1117 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1118 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1119 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1120 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1121 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1123 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1124 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1126 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1127 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1128 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1129 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1130 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1131 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1132 /// this value on chain.
1134 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1136 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1138 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1139 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1140 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1141 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1143 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1144 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1145 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1147 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1148 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1149 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1150 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1151 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1153 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1154 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1155 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1156 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1158 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1159 pub balance_msat: u64,
1160 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1161 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1162 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1163 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1165 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1167 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1168 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1169 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1170 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1171 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1172 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1173 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1174 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1176 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1177 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1178 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1179 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1180 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1181 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1182 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1184 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1185 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1186 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1187 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1188 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1189 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1190 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1191 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1192 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1194 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1196 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1197 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1198 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1199 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1200 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1202 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1203 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1204 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1205 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1206 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1207 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1208 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1210 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1211 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1212 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1213 pub is_outbound: bool,
1214 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1215 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1216 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1217 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1218 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1220 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1221 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1222 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1223 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1225 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1226 pub is_usable: bool,
1227 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1228 pub is_public: bool,
1229 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1230 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1231 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1232 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1233 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1234 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1236 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1237 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1240 impl ChannelDetails {
1241 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1242 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1243 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1245 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1246 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1247 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1248 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1251 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1252 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1253 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1255 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1256 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1257 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1258 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1261 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1262 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1264 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1265 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1266 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1268 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1269 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1270 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1271 features: latest_features,
1272 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1273 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1274 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1275 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1276 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1277 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1278 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1279 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1280 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1281 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1283 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1284 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1285 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1286 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1287 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1288 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1289 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1290 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1291 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1292 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1293 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1294 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1295 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1296 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1297 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1298 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1299 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1300 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1301 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1302 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1303 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1304 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1305 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1306 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1307 config: Some(channel.config()),
1312 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1313 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1314 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1315 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1316 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1318 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1320 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1321 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1322 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1325 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1326 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1327 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1329 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1330 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1331 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1333 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1334 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1335 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1337 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1338 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1342 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1344 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1346 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1347 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1348 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1349 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1351 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1352 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1353 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1356 macro_rules! handle_error {
1357 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1360 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1361 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1362 // entering the macro.
1363 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1364 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1366 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1368 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1369 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1370 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1371 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1375 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1376 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1377 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1378 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1383 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1384 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1386 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1387 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1388 action: err.action.clone()
1392 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1393 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1394 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1395 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1396 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1400 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1407 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1408 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1409 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1410 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1411 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1412 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1414 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1415 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1416 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1417 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1418 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1420 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1421 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1423 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1427 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1428 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1429 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1431 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1432 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1434 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1435 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1437 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1438 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1439 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1440 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1441 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1442 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1448 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1449 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1453 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1455 $entry.remove_entry();
1463 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1464 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1468 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1470 $entry.remove_entry();
1478 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1479 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1481 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1482 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1488 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1489 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1490 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1491 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1492 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1494 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1495 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1496 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1497 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1498 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1499 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1500 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1501 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1502 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1503 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1508 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1509 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1510 if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1511 $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelPending {
1512 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1513 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
1514 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1515 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1516 funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1518 $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1523 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1524 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1525 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1526 debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1527 $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1528 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1529 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1530 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1531 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1533 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1538 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1539 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1540 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1541 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1542 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1543 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1544 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1545 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1546 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1547 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1548 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1550 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1551 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1552 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1558 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1559 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1561 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1562 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1563 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1564 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1565 updates.announcement_sigs);
1566 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1567 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1570 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1571 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1572 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1574 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1576 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1577 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1579 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1580 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1581 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1582 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1587 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1588 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1589 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1590 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1591 debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok());
1593 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1594 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1595 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1598 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1599 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1600 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1601 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1602 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1603 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1604 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1605 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1609 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1610 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1611 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1612 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1613 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1615 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1621 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1622 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1626 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1628 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1629 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1630 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1631 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1632 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1633 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1637 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1639 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1640 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1642 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1644 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1645 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1646 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1649 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1650 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1651 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1652 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1653 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1654 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1655 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1656 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1658 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1659 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1660 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1665 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1667 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1668 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1669 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1670 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1671 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1672 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1673 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1674 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1676 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1679 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1680 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1682 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1684 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1686 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1688 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1689 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1690 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1691 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1701 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1702 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1703 &self.default_configuration
1706 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1707 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1708 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1711 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1712 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1714 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1716 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1720 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1725 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1727 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1728 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1729 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1730 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1731 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1733 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1734 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1736 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1737 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1738 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1740 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1741 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1742 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1743 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1744 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1745 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1747 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1748 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1749 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1750 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1751 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1752 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1755 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1756 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1757 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1759 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1761 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1762 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1764 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1766 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1767 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1768 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1769 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1770 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1771 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1775 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1780 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1782 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1783 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1784 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1786 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1788 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1791 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1794 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1795 node_id: their_network_key,
1798 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1801 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1802 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1803 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1804 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1805 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1806 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1807 // the same channel.
1808 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1810 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1811 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1812 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1813 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1814 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1815 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1816 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1817 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1825 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
1826 /// more information.
1827 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1828 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1831 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1832 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1834 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1835 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1837 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1838 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1839 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1840 // really wanted anyway.
1841 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1844 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
1845 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1846 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1847 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1849 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
1850 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1851 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1852 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1853 return peer_state.channel_by_id
1856 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
1862 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1863 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1865 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1866 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1867 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1869 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1870 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1871 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1872 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1873 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1874 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1875 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1876 total_msat: *total_msat,
1879 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1880 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1882 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1883 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1885 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1890 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1891 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1892 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1893 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1894 Some(transaction) => {
1895 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1899 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1900 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1901 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1902 reason: closure_reason
1906 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1907 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1909 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1910 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1911 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1913 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1914 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1916 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1917 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1918 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1919 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1920 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
1921 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1922 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
1923 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1924 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1926 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
1927 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
1928 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
1929 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1930 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1934 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1935 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
1936 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1937 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
1938 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
1941 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1942 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1943 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1944 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1948 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1952 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1956 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1957 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1958 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1959 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1962 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1966 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1967 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1968 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1970 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1971 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1973 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1974 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1975 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1976 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1978 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
1980 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1981 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1982 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1983 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
1984 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1985 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1988 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1989 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1990 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1992 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1993 /// the channel being closed or not:
1994 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1995 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1996 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1997 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1998 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1999 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2000 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2002 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2004 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2005 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2006 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2007 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2008 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2009 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
2013 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2014 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2015 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2016 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2017 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2018 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2019 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2020 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2022 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2023 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2024 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2025 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2026 // ignore the result here.
2027 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2031 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2032 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2033 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2034 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2035 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2036 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2037 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2039 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2040 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2041 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2042 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2043 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2045 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2047 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2049 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2052 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2053 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2054 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2055 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2056 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2061 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2064 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2065 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2066 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2067 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2068 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2069 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2070 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2071 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2072 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2073 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2074 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2075 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2086 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2087 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2088 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2090 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2091 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2092 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2095 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2096 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2097 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2099 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2100 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2101 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2102 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2103 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2106 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2107 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2108 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2109 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2110 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2114 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2115 /// local transaction(s).
2116 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2117 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2118 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2122 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2123 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2125 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2126 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2127 return Err(ReceiveError {
2128 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2130 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2133 // final_expiry_too_soon
2134 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2135 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2137 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2138 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2139 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2140 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2141 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2142 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2143 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2144 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2145 return Err(ReceiveError {
2146 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2147 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2150 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2151 return Err(ReceiveError {
2153 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2154 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2158 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2159 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2160 return Err(ReceiveError {
2161 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2162 err_data: Vec::new(),
2163 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2166 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2167 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2168 return Err(ReceiveError {
2169 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2170 err_data: Vec::new(),
2171 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2173 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2174 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2176 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2177 phantom_shared_secret,
2179 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2180 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2181 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2182 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2183 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2184 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2185 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2186 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2187 return Err(ReceiveError {
2188 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2189 err_data: Vec::new(),
2190 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2194 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2196 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2199 return Err(ReceiveError {
2200 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2201 err_data: Vec::new(),
2202 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2207 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2210 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2211 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2212 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2213 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2217 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2218 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2219 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2221 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2222 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2223 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2224 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2225 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2226 failure_code: $err_code,
2232 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2233 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2236 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2237 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2238 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2240 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2241 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2242 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2243 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2244 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2245 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2246 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2247 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2249 macro_rules! return_err {
2250 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2252 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2253 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2254 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2255 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2256 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2257 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2263 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2265 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2266 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2268 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2269 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2273 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2274 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2276 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2278 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2279 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2280 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2281 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2282 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2284 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2287 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2288 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2289 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2291 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2292 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2293 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2296 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2297 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2298 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2299 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2303 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2304 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2305 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2308 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2309 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2310 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2311 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2312 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2317 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2318 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2319 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2320 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2321 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2322 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2323 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2324 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2325 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2326 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2327 // phantom or an intercept.
2328 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2329 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2330 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2334 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2337 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2339 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2340 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2341 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2342 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2343 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2345 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2346 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2347 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2349 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2350 // have no consistency guarantees.
2351 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2355 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2356 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2357 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2358 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2359 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2361 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2362 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2363 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2364 // we don't have the channel here.
2365 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2367 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2369 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2370 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2371 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2372 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2373 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2374 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2375 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2377 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2378 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2380 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2381 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2385 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2386 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2387 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2388 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2390 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2397 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2398 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2399 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2400 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2401 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2402 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2404 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2405 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2407 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2408 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2409 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2410 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2411 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2412 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2413 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2414 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2415 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2416 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2422 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2423 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2424 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2425 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2427 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2428 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2430 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2431 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2432 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2434 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2435 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2436 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2437 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2438 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2439 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2440 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2444 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2449 pending_forward_info
2452 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2453 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2454 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2456 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2457 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2458 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2460 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2461 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2462 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2463 if !chan.should_announce() {
2464 return Err(LightningError {
2465 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2466 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2469 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2470 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2472 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2473 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2476 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2477 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2478 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2479 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2481 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2482 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2483 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2485 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2486 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2487 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2488 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2489 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2490 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2494 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2496 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2497 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2498 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2500 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2501 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2503 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2504 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2505 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2506 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2507 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2508 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2509 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2510 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2512 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2513 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2514 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2516 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2518 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2525 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2526 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2527 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2530 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2531 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2532 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2534 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2535 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2536 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2538 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2539 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2540 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2541 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2542 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2544 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2546 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2547 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2548 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2549 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2552 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2553 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2554 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2555 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2556 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2557 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2558 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2559 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2561 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2562 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2563 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2565 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2566 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2568 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2569 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2570 Some(monitor_update) => {
2571 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2572 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2573 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2576 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2577 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2578 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2579 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2580 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2581 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2582 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2583 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2589 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2590 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2591 // `channel_by_id` map.
2592 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2593 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2598 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2599 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2601 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2606 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2608 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2609 /// fields for more info.
2611 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2612 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2614 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2616 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2617 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2618 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2619 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2620 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2622 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2623 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2624 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2625 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2626 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2628 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2629 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2630 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2631 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2633 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2635 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2636 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2637 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2639 /// In general, a path may raise:
2640 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2641 /// node public key) is specified.
2642 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2643 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2645 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2646 /// relevant updates.
2648 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2649 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2650 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2652 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2653 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2654 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2655 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2656 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2657 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2658 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2659 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2660 self.pending_outbound_payments
2661 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2662 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2663 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2666 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2667 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2668 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2669 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2670 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2671 self.pending_outbound_payments
2672 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2673 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2674 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2675 &self.pending_events,
2676 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2677 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2681 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2682 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2683 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2684 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2685 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2686 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2690 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2691 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2692 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2696 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2697 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2698 /// retries are exhausted.
2700 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2701 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2703 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2704 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2705 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2707 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2708 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2710 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2711 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2712 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2713 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2714 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events);
2717 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2718 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2719 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2720 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2721 /// never reach the recipient.
2723 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2724 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2726 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2727 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2729 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2731 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2732 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2733 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2734 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2735 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2736 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
2737 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2738 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2739 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2742 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2743 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2745 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2748 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2749 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2750 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2751 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2752 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
2753 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2754 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2755 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2756 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2757 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2760 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2761 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2762 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2763 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2764 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2765 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2766 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2767 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2768 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2771 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2774 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2775 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2778 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2779 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2780 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2781 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2782 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2783 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2784 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2785 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2787 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2788 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2791 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2793 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2795 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2796 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2797 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2798 } else { unreachable!(); })
2801 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2804 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2805 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2808 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2809 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
2814 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2815 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2818 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2819 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2820 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2822 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2823 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2824 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2825 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2834 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2835 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2836 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2840 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2842 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2843 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2845 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2846 /// across the p2p network.
2848 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2849 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2851 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2852 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2853 /// keys per-channel).
2855 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2856 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2857 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2859 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2860 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2861 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2863 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2864 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2865 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2866 /// for more details.
2868 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2869 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2870 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2871 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2873 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2874 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2875 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2876 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2881 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2882 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2883 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2884 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2885 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2886 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2887 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2891 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2892 let mut output_index = None;
2893 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2894 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2895 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2896 if output_index.is_some() {
2897 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2898 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2901 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2902 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2903 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2906 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2909 if output_index.is_none() {
2910 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2911 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2914 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2918 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2920 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2921 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2922 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2923 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2925 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2926 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2928 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2929 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2931 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2933 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2934 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2935 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2936 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2937 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2938 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2939 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2940 pub fn update_channel_config(
2941 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2942 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2943 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2944 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2945 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2949 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2950 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2952 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2953 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2954 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2955 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2956 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2957 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2958 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2959 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2960 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2964 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2965 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2966 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2969 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2970 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2971 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2972 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2973 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2981 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2982 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2984 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2985 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2987 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2988 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2989 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2990 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2991 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2993 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2994 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2996 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2999 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3000 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3001 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3002 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3003 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3004 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3006 let next_hop_scid = {
3007 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3008 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3009 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3010 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3011 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3012 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3014 if !chan.is_usable() {
3015 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3016 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3019 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3021 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3022 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3027 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3028 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3029 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3032 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3033 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3034 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3036 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3038 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3039 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3042 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3043 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3044 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3045 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3046 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3048 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3052 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3053 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3055 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3058 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3059 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3060 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3062 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3063 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3064 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3067 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3068 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3069 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3070 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3071 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3072 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3073 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3076 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3077 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3078 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3079 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3084 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3086 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3087 /// Will likely generate further events.
3088 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3089 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3091 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3092 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3093 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3095 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3096 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3098 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3099 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3100 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3102 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3103 match forward_info {
3104 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3105 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3106 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3107 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3108 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3111 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3112 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3113 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3115 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3116 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3117 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3118 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3119 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3120 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3123 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3124 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3126 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3129 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3130 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3136 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3137 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3139 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3143 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3144 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3146 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3150 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3151 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3152 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3153 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3154 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3156 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3157 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3158 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3159 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3160 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3162 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3164 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3165 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3169 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3170 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3171 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3172 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3178 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3181 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3184 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3185 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3186 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3187 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3188 // problem, not ours.
3194 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3195 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3197 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3201 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3202 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3203 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3204 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3207 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3208 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3209 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3210 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3211 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3214 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3215 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3216 match forward_info {
3217 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3218 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3219 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3220 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3221 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3224 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3225 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3226 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3227 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3228 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3229 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3230 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3231 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3233 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3234 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3235 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3237 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3238 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3240 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3242 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3243 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3244 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3245 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3250 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3251 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3253 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3254 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3255 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3256 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3258 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3259 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3261 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3263 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3264 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3265 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3274 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3275 match forward_info {
3276 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3277 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3278 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3279 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3282 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3283 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3284 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3285 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3287 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3288 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3290 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3293 let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3294 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3295 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3296 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3297 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3298 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3299 phantom_shared_secret,
3301 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3302 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3303 // if routing nodes overpay
3304 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3305 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3307 total_value_received: None,
3308 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3313 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3314 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3315 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3316 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3317 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3319 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3320 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3321 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3322 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3323 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3324 phantom_shared_secret,
3326 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3327 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3331 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3332 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3333 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3334 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3335 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3338 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3339 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3340 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3342 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3343 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3344 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3347 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3348 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3349 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3352 let (_, ref mut htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3353 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3354 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3355 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3356 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3357 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3361 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3362 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3363 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3364 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3365 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3366 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3367 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3368 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3369 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3370 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3371 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3373 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3375 _ => unreachable!(),
3378 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3379 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3380 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3381 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3382 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3383 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3384 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3385 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3386 } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3387 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3388 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3389 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3390 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3391 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3392 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3396 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3397 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3398 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3400 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3402 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3403 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3405 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3407 payment_claimable_generated
3411 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3412 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3413 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3414 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3415 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3416 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3417 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3418 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3419 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3420 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3421 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3422 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3423 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3424 Ok(result) => result,
3426 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3427 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3431 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3432 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3433 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3434 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3435 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3436 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3440 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3442 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3443 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3444 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3445 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3448 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3449 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3450 let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
3451 claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
3452 let claim_deadline = Some(claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER);
3453 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3454 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3455 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3456 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3457 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3461 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3462 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3466 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3467 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3468 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3474 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3475 if payment_data.is_none() {
3476 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3477 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3480 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3481 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3482 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3483 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3484 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3485 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3486 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3487 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3489 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3490 if payment_claimable_generated {
3491 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3497 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3498 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3506 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3507 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3508 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3509 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3510 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3511 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3513 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3514 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3516 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3518 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3519 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3520 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3522 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3524 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3525 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3526 events.append(&mut new_events);
3529 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3531 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3532 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3534 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3535 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3536 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3537 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3538 if background_events.is_empty() {
3542 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3544 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3545 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3546 // monitor updating completing.
3547 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3554 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3555 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3556 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3557 self.process_background_events();
3560 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3561 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3562 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3563 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3564 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3565 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3566 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3568 if !chan.is_live() {
3569 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3570 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3571 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3573 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3574 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3576 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3577 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3581 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3582 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3583 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3584 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3585 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3586 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3587 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3589 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3591 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3592 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3593 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3594 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3595 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3596 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3597 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3605 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3607 /// This currently includes:
3608 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3609 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3610 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3612 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3613 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3614 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3616 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3617 /// estimate fetches.
3619 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3620 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3621 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3622 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3623 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3624 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3626 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3628 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3629 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3630 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3632 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3633 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3634 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3635 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3636 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3637 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3638 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3639 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3640 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3642 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3643 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3644 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3645 if needs_close { return false; }
3648 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3649 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3650 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3651 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3652 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3653 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3654 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3655 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3659 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3660 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3662 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3663 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3664 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3668 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3669 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3674 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3678 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3679 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3684 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3685 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3686 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3687 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3688 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3689 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3690 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3691 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3692 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3693 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3694 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3695 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3696 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3697 // have no channels to the peer.
3698 let remove_entry = {
3699 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3700 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3703 entry.remove_entry();
3706 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3711 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3712 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3713 // This should be unreachable
3714 debug_assert!(false);
3717 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3718 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3719 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3720 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
3721 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
3722 if htlcs[0].total_msat <= htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value) {
3724 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3725 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3726 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3728 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3735 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3736 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3737 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3738 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3739 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3742 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3743 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3746 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3748 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3749 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3750 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3751 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3752 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3759 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3760 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3761 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3763 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3764 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3765 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3766 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3768 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3769 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3770 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3771 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3772 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3773 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3776 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3777 /// reason for the failure.
3779 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3780 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
3781 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3783 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3784 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3785 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3786 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3787 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3788 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3789 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3794 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3795 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3796 match failure_code {
3797 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3798 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3799 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3800 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3801 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3802 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3807 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3808 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3810 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3812 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3813 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3814 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3815 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3816 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3817 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3818 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3820 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3822 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3823 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3825 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3830 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3831 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3832 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3833 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3834 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3835 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3836 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3837 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3838 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3839 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3841 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3842 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3843 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3844 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3846 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3847 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3848 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3849 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3850 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3854 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3855 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3856 // be surfaced to the user.
3857 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3858 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3859 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3861 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3862 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3863 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3864 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3865 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3866 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3867 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3868 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3870 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3872 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3875 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3876 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3877 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3878 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3882 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3883 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3884 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3885 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3886 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3887 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3888 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3889 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3890 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3893 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3894 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3895 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3898 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3899 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3900 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3902 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
3903 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
3904 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
3905 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
3906 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3908 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3909 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3910 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3912 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
3913 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3914 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3915 push_forward_ev = true;
3917 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3918 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3919 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3921 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3922 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3925 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3926 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3927 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3928 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3929 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3930 failed_next_destination: destination,
3936 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3937 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3939 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
3940 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
3941 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
3942 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
3944 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3945 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3946 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3947 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3949 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3950 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
3951 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3952 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3953 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3954 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3955 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3956 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3958 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3961 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3962 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3963 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3964 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3965 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3966 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3967 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3968 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3973 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3974 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3975 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3977 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3978 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3979 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3980 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3985 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3987 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
3988 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
3989 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
3990 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
3991 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3992 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
3993 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3994 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3995 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3996 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3997 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3998 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3999 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4000 debug_assert!(false);
4004 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4006 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4007 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4008 debug_assert!(false);
4012 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4014 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4015 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4016 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4017 if sources.len() != 1 {
4018 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4019 debug_assert!(false);
4025 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4027 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4028 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4029 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4030 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4033 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4034 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4035 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4036 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4040 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4041 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4042 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4043 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4045 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4046 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4047 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4048 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4049 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4054 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4055 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4056 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4057 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4058 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4059 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4060 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4062 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4065 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4066 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4067 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4068 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4072 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4073 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4074 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4075 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4078 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4079 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4080 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4081 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4085 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4086 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4087 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4090 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4091 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4092 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4093 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4094 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4095 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4097 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4098 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4099 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4100 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4101 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4103 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4104 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4105 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4106 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4107 if let Err(e) = res {
4108 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4109 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4110 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4111 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4112 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4119 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4120 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4121 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4125 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4126 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4127 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4128 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4129 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4130 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4131 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4132 // again on restart.
4133 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4134 payment_preimage, update_res);
4136 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4137 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4138 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4139 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4140 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4141 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4145 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4146 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4149 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4151 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4152 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4154 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4155 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4156 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4157 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4158 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4159 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4160 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4163 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4164 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4166 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4168 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4171 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4175 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4176 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4177 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4183 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4184 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4185 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4188 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4189 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4191 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4192 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4193 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4194 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4195 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4199 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4200 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4206 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4207 /// update completion.
4208 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4209 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4210 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4211 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4212 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4213 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4214 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4215 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4216 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4217 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4218 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4219 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4220 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4222 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4224 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4225 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4226 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4227 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4230 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4231 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4233 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4234 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4235 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4240 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4241 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4242 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4243 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4248 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4249 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4250 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4251 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4252 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4257 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4261 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4267 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4268 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4269 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4273 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4274 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4275 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4281 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4282 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4284 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4285 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4287 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4288 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4289 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4290 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4291 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4296 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4297 let mut peer_state_lock;
4298 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4299 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4300 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4301 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4303 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4304 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4305 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4308 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4309 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4310 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4313 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4316 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4318 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4319 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4322 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4323 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4324 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4326 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4327 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4328 /// used to accept such channels.
4330 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4331 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4332 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4333 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4336 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4337 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4339 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4340 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4341 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4343 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4344 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4346 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4347 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4349 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4350 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4352 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4353 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4354 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4355 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4358 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4359 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4361 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4362 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4363 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4364 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4365 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4366 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4367 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4368 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4369 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4370 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4371 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4374 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4375 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4376 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4377 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4378 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4379 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4382 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4383 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4384 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4386 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4387 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4388 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4389 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4390 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4391 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4392 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4393 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4396 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4397 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4398 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4402 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4403 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4404 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4407 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4408 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4414 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4415 /// or 0-conf channels.
4417 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4418 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4419 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4420 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4421 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4422 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4424 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4425 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4426 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4427 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4428 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4429 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4430 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4434 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4437 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4438 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4440 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4441 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4442 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4443 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4445 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4448 num_unfunded_channels
4451 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4452 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4453 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4456 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4457 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4460 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4461 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4462 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4463 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4465 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4466 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4467 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4468 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4470 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4471 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4473 debug_assert!(false);
4474 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4476 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4477 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4479 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4480 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4481 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4482 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4483 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4484 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4486 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4487 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4488 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4491 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4492 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4493 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4494 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4495 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4498 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4499 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4500 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4503 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4504 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4508 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4509 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4510 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4511 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4513 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4514 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4515 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4516 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4518 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4519 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4520 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4523 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4524 pending_events.push(
4525 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4526 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4527 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4528 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4529 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4530 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4535 entry.insert(channel);
4541 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4542 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4543 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4544 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4546 debug_assert!(false);
4547 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4549 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4550 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4551 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4552 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4553 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4554 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4556 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4559 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4560 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4561 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4562 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4563 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4565 user_channel_id: user_id,
4570 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4571 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4573 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4574 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4576 debug_assert!(false);
4577 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4580 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4581 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4582 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4583 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4584 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4585 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4587 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4590 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4591 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4592 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4594 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4595 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4596 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4597 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4598 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4599 funding_msg.channel_id))
4601 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4602 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4606 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4607 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4608 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4609 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4610 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4611 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4612 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4616 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4618 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4619 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4620 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4622 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4623 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4624 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4625 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4626 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4627 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4628 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4629 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4637 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4638 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4639 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4640 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4642 debug_assert!(false);
4643 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4646 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4647 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4648 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4649 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4650 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4651 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4652 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4653 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4654 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4655 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4656 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4657 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4658 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4659 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4664 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4668 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4669 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4670 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4672 debug_assert!(false);
4673 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4675 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4676 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4677 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4678 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4679 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4680 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4681 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4682 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4683 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4684 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4685 msg: announcement_sigs,
4687 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4688 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4689 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4690 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4691 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4692 // announcement_signatures.
4693 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4694 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4695 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4696 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4703 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4704 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
4709 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4713 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4714 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4715 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4716 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4717 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4719 debug_assert!(false);
4720 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4722 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4723 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4724 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4725 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4727 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4728 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4729 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4730 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4733 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4734 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4735 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4736 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4738 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4739 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4740 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4741 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4742 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4743 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4748 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4749 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4750 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4751 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4752 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
4756 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4759 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4760 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4761 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4762 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4768 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4769 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4770 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4772 debug_assert!(false);
4773 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4775 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4776 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4777 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4778 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4779 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4780 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4781 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4782 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4783 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4788 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4789 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4790 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4791 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4792 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4793 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4794 } else { (tx, None) }
4796 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4799 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4800 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4801 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4803 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4804 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4805 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4806 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4807 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4811 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4816 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4817 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4818 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4819 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4821 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4822 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4823 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4824 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4826 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4827 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4828 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4830 debug_assert!(false);
4831 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4833 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4834 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4835 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4836 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4838 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4839 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4840 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4841 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4842 match pending_forward_info {
4843 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4844 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4845 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4846 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4848 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4849 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4850 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4851 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4852 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4855 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4857 _ => pending_forward_info
4860 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4862 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4867 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4868 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4869 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4870 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4872 debug_assert!(false);
4873 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4875 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4876 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4877 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4878 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4879 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4881 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4884 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4888 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4889 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4890 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4892 debug_assert!(false);
4893 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4895 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4896 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4897 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4898 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4899 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4901 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4906 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4907 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4908 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4910 debug_assert!(false);
4911 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4913 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4914 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4915 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4916 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4917 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4918 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4919 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4921 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4924 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4928 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4929 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4930 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4932 debug_assert!(false);
4933 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4935 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4936 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4937 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4938 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4939 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
4940 let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4941 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4942 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4943 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4944 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
4946 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4951 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4952 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4953 let mut push_forward_event = false;
4954 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4955 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4956 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4957 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4958 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4959 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4960 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4961 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4963 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4964 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4966 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4967 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4968 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4969 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4970 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4971 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4973 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4974 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4975 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4977 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4978 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4979 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4980 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4981 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4982 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4983 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4984 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4985 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4988 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4989 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4991 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4992 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4993 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4994 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4995 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4996 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4997 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4998 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5001 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5002 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5003 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5008 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5009 // payments are being processed.
5010 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5011 push_forward_event = true;
5013 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5014 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5021 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5022 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5025 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5026 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5027 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5029 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5033 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5034 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5035 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5036 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5037 .find(|ev| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5039 if !forward_ev_exists {
5040 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5042 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5047 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5048 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5049 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5050 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5052 debug_assert!(false);
5053 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5054 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5055 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5056 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5057 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5058 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5059 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5060 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5061 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5062 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5063 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5064 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5066 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5069 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5073 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5074 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5075 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5077 debug_assert!(false);
5078 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5080 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5081 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5082 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5083 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5084 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5086 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5091 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5092 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5093 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5095 debug_assert!(false);
5096 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5098 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5099 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5100 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5101 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5102 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5103 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5106 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5107 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5108 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5109 msg, &self.default_configuration
5111 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5112 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5113 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5116 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5121 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5122 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5123 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5124 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5126 // It's not a local channel
5127 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5130 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5131 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5132 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5133 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5135 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5136 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5137 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5138 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5139 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5140 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5141 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5142 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5143 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5144 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5146 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5148 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5149 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5150 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5151 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5153 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5154 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5157 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5159 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5162 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5164 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5165 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5167 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5169 debug_assert!(false);
5170 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5172 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5173 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5174 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5175 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5176 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5177 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5178 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5179 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5180 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5181 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5182 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5183 let mut channel_update = None;
5184 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5185 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5186 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5189 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5190 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5191 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5192 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5193 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5194 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5195 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5200 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5201 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5202 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5203 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5204 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5205 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5209 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5213 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5214 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5217 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5218 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5223 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5224 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5225 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5227 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5228 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5229 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5230 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5231 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5232 match monitor_event {
5233 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5234 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5235 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5236 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5238 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5239 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5240 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5241 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5244 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5245 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5246 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5247 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5249 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5250 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5251 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5252 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5255 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5256 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5257 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5258 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5259 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5260 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5261 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5262 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5263 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5264 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5265 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5269 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5270 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5272 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5274 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5275 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5276 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5277 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5278 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5285 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5286 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5292 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5293 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5296 has_pending_monitor_events
5299 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5300 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5301 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5303 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5304 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5305 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5306 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5308 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5313 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5314 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5315 /// update was applied.
5316 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5317 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5318 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5319 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5321 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5322 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5323 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5324 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5326 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5327 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5329 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5330 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5331 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5332 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5333 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5334 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5335 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5336 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5337 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5339 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5340 has_monitor_update = true;
5342 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5343 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5344 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5345 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5346 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5347 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5348 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5350 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5352 continue 'peer_loop;
5361 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5362 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5363 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5366 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5367 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5373 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5374 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5375 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5376 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5377 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5378 let mut has_update = false;
5380 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5382 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5383 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5384 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5385 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5386 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5387 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5388 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5389 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5391 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5392 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5395 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5396 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5397 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5398 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5399 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5404 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5406 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5407 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5408 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5414 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5415 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5423 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5424 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5430 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5431 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5433 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5434 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5435 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5436 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5437 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5438 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5439 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5440 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5441 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5442 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5443 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5444 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5445 assert!(should_broadcast);
5446 } else { unreachable!(); }
5447 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5449 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5453 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5454 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5456 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5457 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5460 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5462 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5463 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5464 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5465 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5466 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5467 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5468 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5469 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5470 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5471 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5472 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5473 // never fail a payment too early.
5474 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5476 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5479 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5484 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5487 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5488 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5490 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5491 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5492 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5493 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5495 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5497 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5498 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5502 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5503 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5505 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5507 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5508 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5510 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5511 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5512 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5513 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5514 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5515 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5516 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5517 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5518 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5519 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5520 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5523 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5524 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5526 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5529 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5531 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5533 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5534 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5535 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5536 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5537 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5540 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5541 /// stored external to LDK.
5543 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5544 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5545 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5547 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5548 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5551 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5552 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5553 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5554 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5556 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5557 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5558 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5559 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5560 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5562 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5563 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5564 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5565 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5566 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5568 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5569 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5571 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5572 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5576 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5577 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5579 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5581 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5582 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5584 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5585 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5586 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5587 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5588 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5589 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5590 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5593 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5594 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5596 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5599 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5601 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5603 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5604 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5607 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5608 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5610 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5611 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5612 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5615 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5616 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5618 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5619 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5620 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5621 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5623 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5624 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5625 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5626 Some(_) => continue,
5627 None => return scid_candidate
5632 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5634 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5635 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5637 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5638 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5639 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5643 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5644 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5645 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5647 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5648 /// times to get a unique scid.
5649 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5650 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5651 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5653 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5654 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5655 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5656 return scid_candidate
5660 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5661 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5662 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5663 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5665 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5666 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5667 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5668 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5669 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5670 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5671 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5672 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5681 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5682 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5683 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5684 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5685 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5689 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5690 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5691 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5696 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5697 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5698 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5702 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5703 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5707 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5708 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5711 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5712 /// using the given event handler.
5714 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5715 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5718 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5719 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5720 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5722 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5724 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5725 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5726 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5727 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5730 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5731 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5732 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5735 for event in pending_events {
5736 handler(event).await;
5739 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5740 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5745 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5747 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5748 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5749 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5750 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5751 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5752 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5756 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5757 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5758 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5759 /// is always placed next to each other.
5761 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5762 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5763 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5764 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5766 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5767 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5768 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5769 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5770 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5771 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5772 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5774 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5775 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5776 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5777 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5780 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5781 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5783 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5784 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5787 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5788 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5789 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5790 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5791 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5792 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5793 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5797 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5798 events.replace(pending_events);
5807 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5809 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5810 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5811 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5812 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5813 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5814 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5818 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5820 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5821 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5822 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5823 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5824 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5826 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5827 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5828 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5829 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5832 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5833 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5834 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5837 for event in pending_events {
5838 handler.handle_event(event);
5846 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5848 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5849 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5850 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5851 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5852 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5853 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5857 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5859 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5860 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5861 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5862 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5863 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5866 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5867 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5870 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5871 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5872 let new_height = height - 1;
5874 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5875 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5876 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5877 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5878 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5879 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5882 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5886 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5888 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5889 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5890 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5891 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5892 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5893 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5897 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5898 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5899 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5900 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5902 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5903 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5905 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5906 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5907 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5909 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5910 if height < last_best_block_height {
5911 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5912 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5916 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5917 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5918 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5919 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5921 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5922 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5924 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5926 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5928 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5930 macro_rules! max_time {
5931 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5933 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5934 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5935 // having an explicit local time source.
5936 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5937 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5938 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5939 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5940 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5946 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5947 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5948 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5949 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5953 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5954 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5955 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5956 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5957 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5958 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5959 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5960 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
5967 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5968 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5969 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5970 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5971 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5972 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5973 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5974 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5979 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5981 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5982 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5983 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5984 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5985 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5986 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5990 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5991 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5993 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5994 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5995 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5996 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5997 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5999 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6000 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6002 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6003 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6004 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6005 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6006 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6007 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6008 let res = f(channel);
6009 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6010 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6011 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6012 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6013 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6015 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6016 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6017 if channel.is_usable() {
6018 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6019 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6020 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6021 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6026 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6031 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6032 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6035 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6036 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6037 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6038 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6039 msg: announcement_sigs,
6041 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6042 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6043 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6045 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6046 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6047 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6052 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6053 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6054 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6055 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6056 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6057 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6058 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6059 // is always consistent.
6060 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6061 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6062 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6063 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6064 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6067 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6068 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6069 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6070 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6071 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6072 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6073 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6077 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6078 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6079 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6080 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6081 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6082 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6083 data: reason_message,
6093 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6094 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6095 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6096 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6097 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6098 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6099 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6100 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6101 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6102 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6104 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6105 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6106 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6110 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6113 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6114 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6115 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6116 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6117 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6118 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6119 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6120 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6121 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6124 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6125 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6126 _ => unreachable!(),
6128 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6129 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6130 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6131 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6137 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6139 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6140 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6144 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6146 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6147 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6149 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6150 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6153 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6154 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6155 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6158 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6159 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6160 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6161 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6164 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6165 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6166 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6167 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6170 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6171 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6173 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6174 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6175 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6176 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6177 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6180 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6181 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6182 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6183 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6186 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6187 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6188 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6189 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6192 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6193 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6194 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6195 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6199 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6200 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6202 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6203 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6204 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6205 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6206 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6207 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6211 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6212 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6213 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6216 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6217 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6218 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6221 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6222 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6223 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6226 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6227 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6228 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6231 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6232 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6233 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6236 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6237 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6238 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6241 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6242 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6243 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6246 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6247 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6248 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6251 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6252 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6253 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6256 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6257 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6258 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6261 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6262 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6263 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6266 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6267 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6268 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6271 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6272 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6273 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6276 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6277 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6278 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6281 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6282 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6283 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6286 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6287 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6288 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6291 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6296 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6297 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6298 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6301 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6302 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6303 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6304 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6306 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6307 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6308 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6309 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6310 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6311 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6312 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6313 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6314 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6315 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6316 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6321 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6323 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6324 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6325 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6326 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6327 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6328 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6329 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6330 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6331 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6332 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6333 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6334 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6335 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6336 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6337 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6338 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6339 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6340 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6341 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6342 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6343 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6346 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6347 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6348 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6349 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6352 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6354 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6356 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6357 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6361 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6362 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6363 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6367 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6369 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6370 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6371 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6372 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6373 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6374 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6377 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6378 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6379 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6380 if inbound_peer_limited {
6383 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6384 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6385 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6386 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6387 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6391 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6392 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6393 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6395 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6396 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6397 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6398 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6403 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6404 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6409 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6411 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6412 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6413 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6414 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6415 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6416 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6417 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6418 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6419 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6420 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6421 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6425 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6426 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6427 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6432 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6433 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6434 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6435 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6436 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6445 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6449 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6450 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6452 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6453 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6454 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6455 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6456 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6457 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6458 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6459 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6461 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6462 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6463 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6467 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6468 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6469 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6470 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6471 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6472 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6473 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6474 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6475 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6476 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6484 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6485 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6489 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6490 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6493 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6494 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6498 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6499 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6500 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6501 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6504 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6505 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6507 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6508 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6509 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6510 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6511 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6514 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6515 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6516 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6517 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6520 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6521 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6522 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6523 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6526 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6527 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6528 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6529 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6530 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
6531 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
6532 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6533 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6534 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6535 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6536 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6537 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6538 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6539 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6540 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6541 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6542 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6543 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6545 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6546 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6547 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6553 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6554 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6556 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6557 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6558 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6559 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6562 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6563 (2, node_id, required),
6564 (4, features, required),
6565 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6566 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6567 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6568 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6571 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6572 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6573 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6574 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6575 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6576 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6577 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6578 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6579 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6580 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6581 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6582 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6583 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6584 (7, self.config, option),
6585 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6586 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6587 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6588 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6589 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6590 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6591 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6592 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6593 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6594 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6595 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6596 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6597 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6598 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6599 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6600 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6601 (32, self.is_public, required),
6602 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6603 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6604 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6605 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6611 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6612 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6613 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6614 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6615 (2, channel_id, required),
6616 (3, channel_type, option),
6617 (4, counterparty, required),
6618 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6619 (6, funding_txo, option),
6620 (7, config, option),
6621 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6622 (9, confirmations, option),
6623 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6624 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6625 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6626 (16, balance_msat, required),
6627 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6628 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6629 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6630 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6631 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6632 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6633 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6634 (26, is_outbound, required),
6635 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6636 (30, is_usable, required),
6637 (32, is_public, required),
6638 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6639 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6640 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6641 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6644 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6645 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6646 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6647 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6648 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6652 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6654 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6655 outbound_scid_alias,
6659 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6660 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6662 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6663 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6664 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6665 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6666 confirmations_required,
6668 force_close_spend_delay,
6669 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6670 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6671 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6672 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6673 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6674 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6675 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
6680 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6681 (2, channels, vec_type),
6682 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6683 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6686 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6688 (0, onion_packet, required),
6689 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6692 (0, payment_data, required),
6693 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6694 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6696 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6697 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6698 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6702 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6703 (0, routing, required),
6704 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6705 (4, payment_hash, required),
6706 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6707 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6708 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6712 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6713 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6715 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6717 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6718 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6719 reason.write(writer)?;
6721 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6722 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6725 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6726 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6727 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6728 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6735 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6736 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6737 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6740 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6741 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6742 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6743 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6747 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6748 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6749 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6750 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6751 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6754 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6755 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6756 // messages contained in the variants.
6757 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6758 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6759 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6761 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6762 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6763 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6764 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6765 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6768 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6769 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6770 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6771 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6772 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6774 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6779 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6784 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6785 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6786 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6787 (2, outpoint, required),
6788 (4, htlc_id, required),
6789 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6792 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6793 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6794 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6795 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6796 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6798 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6799 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6800 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6801 (2, self.value, required),
6802 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
6803 (4, payment_data, option),
6804 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
6805 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6806 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6812 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6813 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6814 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6816 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
6817 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6818 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6819 let mut total_value_received = None;
6820 let mut total_msat = None;
6821 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6822 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6823 (0, prev_hop, required),
6824 (1, total_msat, option),
6825 (2, value, required),
6826 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
6827 (4, payment_data, option),
6828 (5, total_value_received, option),
6829 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6830 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6832 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6834 if payment_data.is_some() {
6835 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6837 if total_msat.is_none() {
6838 total_msat = Some(value);
6840 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6843 if total_msat.is_none() {
6844 if payment_data.is_none() {
6845 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6847 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6849 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6853 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6856 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
6857 total_value_received,
6858 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6865 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6866 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6867 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6870 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6871 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6872 let mut path: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
6873 let mut payment_id = None;
6874 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
6875 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6876 (0, session_priv, required),
6877 (1, payment_id, option),
6878 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6879 (4, path, vec_type),
6880 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
6882 if payment_id.is_none() {
6883 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6885 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6887 if path.is_none() || path.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6888 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6890 let path = path.unwrap();
6891 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
6892 if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
6893 params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta;
6896 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6897 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6898 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6900 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6903 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6904 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6909 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6910 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6912 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
6914 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6915 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6916 (0, session_priv, required),
6917 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6918 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6919 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
6920 (4, *path, vec_type),
6921 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
6924 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6926 field.write(writer)?;
6933 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6934 (0, forward_info, required),
6935 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6936 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6937 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6938 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6941 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6943 (0, htlc_id, required),
6944 (2, err_packet, required),
6949 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6950 (0, payment_secret, required),
6951 (2, expiry_time, required),
6952 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6953 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6954 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6957 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6959 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6960 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6961 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6962 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6963 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6964 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6968 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6969 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6971 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6973 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6975 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6976 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6977 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6980 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
6982 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6983 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6984 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6985 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6986 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6987 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6988 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
6989 serializable_peer_count += 1;
6991 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
6992 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6993 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6994 unfunded_channels += 1;
6999 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7001 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7002 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7003 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7004 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7005 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7006 channel.write(writer)?;
7013 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7014 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7015 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7016 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7017 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7018 for forward in pending_forwards {
7019 forward.write(writer)?;
7024 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7026 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7027 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7028 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7030 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7031 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7032 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
7033 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7034 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7035 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
7036 htlc.write(writer)?;
7038 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
7041 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7042 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7043 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7044 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7045 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7046 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7047 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7050 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7051 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7052 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7053 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7054 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7056 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7057 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7058 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7059 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7060 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7061 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7062 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7067 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7068 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7069 for event in events.iter() {
7070 event.write(writer)?;
7073 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7074 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7075 for event in background_events.iter() {
7077 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7079 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7080 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7085 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7086 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7087 // likely to be identical.
7088 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7089 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7091 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7092 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7093 hash.write(writer)?;
7094 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7097 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7098 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7099 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7100 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7101 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7104 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7105 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7107 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7108 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7109 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7110 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7113 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7114 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7118 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7119 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7120 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7122 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7123 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7124 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7130 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7131 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7132 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7133 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7136 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7137 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7138 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7139 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7140 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7143 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7144 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7145 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7146 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7147 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7148 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7149 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7150 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7151 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7152 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7159 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7161 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7163 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7164 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7165 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7166 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7167 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7168 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7169 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7170 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7171 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7172 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7173 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7174 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7175 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7177 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7178 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7180 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7181 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7183 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7184 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7185 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7186 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7187 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7188 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7190 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7191 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7193 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7194 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7195 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7196 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7197 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7198 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7202 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7203 pub entropy_source: ES,
7205 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7206 pub node_signer: NS,
7208 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7209 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7211 pub signer_provider: SP,
7213 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7215 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7216 pub fee_estimator: F,
7217 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7219 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7220 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7221 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7222 pub chain_monitor: M,
7224 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7225 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7226 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7227 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7228 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7229 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7231 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7233 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7234 /// deserialization.
7236 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7237 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7238 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7240 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7241 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7243 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7244 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7245 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7246 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7248 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7251 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7252 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7255 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7256 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7258 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7259 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7260 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7261 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7262 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7263 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7267 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7268 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7269 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7270 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7271 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7273 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7274 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7279 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7280 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7281 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7282 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7284 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7285 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7286 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7287 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7288 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7289 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7293 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7294 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7295 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7299 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7300 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7302 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7303 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7304 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7305 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7306 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7307 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7311 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7312 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7314 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7315 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7316 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7318 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7320 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7321 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7322 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7323 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7324 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7325 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7326 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
7327 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7328 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7329 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7331 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7332 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7333 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7334 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7335 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7336 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7337 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7338 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7339 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7340 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7341 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7342 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7343 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7344 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7345 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7346 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7347 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7348 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7349 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7350 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7351 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7352 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7353 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7354 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7355 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7356 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7357 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
7358 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate(monitor_update));
7360 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7361 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7362 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7363 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7364 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7366 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7367 let mut found_htlc = false;
7368 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7369 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7372 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7373 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7374 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7375 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7376 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7377 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7378 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7379 log_info!(args.logger,
7380 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7381 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7382 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7386 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7387 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7388 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7390 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7391 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7393 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7394 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7395 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7396 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7398 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7399 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7400 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7401 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7405 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7406 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7407 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7408 // safely discard the channel.
7409 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7410 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7411 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7412 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7413 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7416 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7417 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7418 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7419 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7420 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7421 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7425 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7426 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7427 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7428 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
7429 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
7431 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7435 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7436 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7437 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7438 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7439 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7440 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7441 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7442 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7443 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7445 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7448 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7449 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7450 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7451 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7452 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7453 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7454 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7455 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7457 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7460 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7461 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7462 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7463 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7464 let peer_state = PeerState {
7465 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7466 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7467 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7468 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7469 is_connected: false,
7471 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7474 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7475 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7476 for _ in 0..event_count {
7477 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7478 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7483 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7484 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7485 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7487 let (funding_txo, monitor_update): (OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate) = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
7488 if pending_background_events.iter().find(|e| {
7489 let BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((pending_funding_txo, pending_monitor_update)) = e;
7490 *pending_funding_txo == funding_txo && *pending_monitor_update == monitor_update
7492 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7495 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7499 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7500 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7502 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7503 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7504 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7505 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7506 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7510 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7511 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7512 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7513 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7514 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7515 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7516 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7518 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7519 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7523 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7524 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7525 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7526 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7527 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7528 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7529 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7530 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7531 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7532 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7533 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7534 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7535 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7536 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7537 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7538 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7539 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7540 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7541 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7542 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7544 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7545 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7548 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7549 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7552 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7553 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7556 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7557 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7558 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7559 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7560 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7561 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7563 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7565 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7566 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7567 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7571 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7572 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7573 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7574 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7575 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7576 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7577 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7579 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7580 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7581 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
7582 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
7583 if path.is_empty() {
7584 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7585 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7588 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7589 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7590 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7591 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7592 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7593 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7594 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7595 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7597 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7598 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7599 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7600 retry_strategy: None,
7601 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7602 payment_params: None,
7603 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7604 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7605 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7606 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7607 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7608 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7609 total_msat: path_amt,
7610 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7612 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7613 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7618 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7620 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
7621 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7622 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7623 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7625 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7626 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7627 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7628 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7629 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7630 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7631 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7632 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7633 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7634 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7635 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7640 !forwards.is_empty()
7642 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7643 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7644 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7645 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7646 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7647 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7648 intercepted_id != ev_id
7655 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
7656 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
7657 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
7658 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
7659 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
7660 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
7661 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
7662 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
7663 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
7664 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
7665 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
7666 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
7667 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
7676 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
7677 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7678 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7679 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7680 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7681 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7682 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7683 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7687 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7688 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7690 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7691 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7692 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7693 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7695 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7696 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7699 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7700 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7701 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7702 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7703 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7705 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7706 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7707 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7708 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7709 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7710 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7711 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7712 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7714 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7715 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7719 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7721 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7723 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7724 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7726 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7730 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7731 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7733 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7735 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7737 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7738 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7739 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7740 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7744 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7745 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7746 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7747 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7748 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7749 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7750 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7752 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7753 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7754 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7756 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7757 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7758 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7759 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7760 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7761 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7763 if chan.is_usable() {
7764 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7765 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7766 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7767 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7768 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7774 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7776 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7777 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7778 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7779 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7780 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7781 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7782 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7783 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7784 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7785 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7786 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7788 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7789 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7791 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7792 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7793 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7794 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7796 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7797 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7798 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7799 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7801 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7802 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7803 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7804 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7806 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7807 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7808 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7809 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7810 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7811 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7812 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7815 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7816 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7819 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7822 purpose: payment_purpose,
7823 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7829 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7830 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7831 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7833 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7834 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7838 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7840 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7841 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7842 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7843 router: args.router,
7845 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7847 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7848 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7849 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
7850 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7852 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7853 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7854 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7855 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7856 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7857 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7859 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7864 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7866 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7868 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7869 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
7870 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7871 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7873 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7874 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7875 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7877 logger: args.logger,
7878 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7881 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7882 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7883 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7884 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7885 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7888 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7889 //connection or two.
7891 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7897 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7898 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7899 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7900 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7901 use core::time::Duration;
7902 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7903 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7904 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7905 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
7906 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7907 use crate::ln::msgs;
7908 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7909 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7910 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7911 use crate::util::test_utils;
7912 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7913 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7916 fn test_notify_limits() {
7917 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7918 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7919 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7920 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7921 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7922 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7924 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7925 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7926 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7927 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7928 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7930 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7932 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7933 // to connect messages with new values
7934 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7935 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7936 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7937 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7938 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7939 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7941 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7942 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7943 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7944 // ... but the last node should not.
7945 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7946 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7947 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7948 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7950 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7951 // about the channel.
7952 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7953 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7954 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7956 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7958 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7959 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7960 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7961 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7962 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7963 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7965 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7966 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7967 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7969 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7970 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7971 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7972 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7973 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7974 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7976 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7977 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7978 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7979 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7980 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7981 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7982 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7983 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7985 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7986 // the channel info has updated.
7987 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7988 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7989 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7990 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7991 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7992 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7996 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7997 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7999 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8000 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8001 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8002 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8003 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8005 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8006 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8007 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8008 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8010 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8011 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8012 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8013 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8014 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8015 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8016 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8017 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8018 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8019 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8020 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8021 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8023 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8024 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8025 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8026 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8027 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8028 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8029 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8030 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8031 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8032 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8033 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8034 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8035 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8036 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8037 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8038 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8039 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8040 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8041 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8042 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8043 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8044 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8045 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8047 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8048 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8049 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8050 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8051 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8052 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8053 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8055 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8056 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8057 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8058 // lightning messages manually.
8059 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8060 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8061 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8063 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8064 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8065 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8067 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8068 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8069 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8070 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8071 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8072 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8073 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8074 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8075 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8077 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8078 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8079 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8081 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8082 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8083 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8084 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8085 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8086 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8087 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8089 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8090 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8091 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8092 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8094 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8095 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8096 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8097 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8099 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8102 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8103 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8104 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8105 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8107 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8110 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8111 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8112 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8113 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8115 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8120 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8121 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8122 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8123 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8124 // fails as expected.
8125 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8126 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8127 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8128 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8129 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8130 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8131 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8133 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8134 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8135 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8137 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8138 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8139 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8140 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8142 let route = find_route(
8143 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8144 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8146 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8147 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8149 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8150 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8151 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8152 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8153 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8154 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8155 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8156 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8157 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8158 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8159 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8161 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8162 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8163 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8164 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8165 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8166 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8167 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8168 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8169 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8171 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8172 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8174 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8175 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8176 let route = find_route(
8177 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8178 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8180 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8181 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8183 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8184 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8185 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8186 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8187 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8189 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8190 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8191 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8192 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8194 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8195 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8196 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8197 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8198 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8200 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8201 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8202 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8203 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8204 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8205 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8206 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8207 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8208 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8209 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8210 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8211 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8212 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8214 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8215 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8219 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8220 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8221 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8222 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8223 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8224 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8225 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8227 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8228 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8230 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8231 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8232 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8233 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8235 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8236 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8237 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8238 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8239 let route = find_route(
8240 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8241 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8244 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8245 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8246 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
8247 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8248 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
8249 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8252 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8253 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8254 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8255 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8256 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8257 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8258 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8260 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8264 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8265 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8266 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8267 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8268 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8269 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8271 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8272 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8274 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8275 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8276 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8277 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8279 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8280 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8281 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8282 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8283 let route = find_route(
8284 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8285 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8288 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8289 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8290 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8291 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
8292 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8293 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
8294 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
8295 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8296 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8298 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8299 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8300 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8301 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8302 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8303 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8304 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8306 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8310 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8311 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8312 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8313 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8314 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8316 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8317 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8318 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8319 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8321 // Marshall an MPP route.
8322 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8323 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8324 route.paths.push(path);
8325 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8326 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8327 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8328 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8329 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8330 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8332 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8333 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
8335 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8336 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
8338 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8343 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8344 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8345 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8346 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8347 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8349 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8351 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8352 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8354 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8355 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8357 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8360 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8361 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8362 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8363 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8364 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8365 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8368 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8371 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8372 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8377 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8378 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8379 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8380 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8381 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8382 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8384 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8385 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8387 total_msat: 100_000,
8390 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8391 // payment verification fails as expected.
8392 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8393 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8394 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8395 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8397 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
8401 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8402 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8406 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8407 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8408 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8409 // the channel is successfully closed.
8410 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8411 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8412 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8413 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8415 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8416 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8417 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8418 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8419 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8421 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8422 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8424 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8425 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8426 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8427 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8430 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8432 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8433 // as it has the funding transaction.
8434 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8435 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8436 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8439 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8441 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8443 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8445 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8446 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8447 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8449 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8452 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8453 // as it has the funding transaction.
8454 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8455 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8456 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8458 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8459 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8460 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8461 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8462 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8463 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8464 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8465 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8467 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8468 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8469 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8470 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8472 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8473 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8475 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8476 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8477 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8478 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8479 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8480 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8481 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8485 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8486 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8487 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8488 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8489 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8490 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8491 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8494 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8496 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8497 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8498 // closing transaction).
8499 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8500 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8501 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8503 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8504 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8505 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8506 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8507 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8510 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8512 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8514 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8515 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8516 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8518 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8520 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8521 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8524 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8525 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8526 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8529 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8530 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8531 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8534 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8536 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8537 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8539 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8540 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8542 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8543 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8548 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8549 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8550 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8551 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8552 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8553 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8554 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8555 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8558 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8559 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8560 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8562 // Test the API functions.
8563 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8565 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8567 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8569 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8571 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8573 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8575 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8579 fn test_connection_limiting() {
8580 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
8581 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8582 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8583 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8584 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8586 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8588 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8589 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8591 let mut funding_tx = None;
8592 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8593 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8594 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8597 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8598 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8599 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
8600 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
8601 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8603 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8604 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8605 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8607 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8609 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8610 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8611 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8613 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8616 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
8617 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8618 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8619 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8620 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8622 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
8623 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
8625 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
8626 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
8627 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8628 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8629 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
8630 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8631 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8633 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8634 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8635 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8636 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8638 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
8639 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
8640 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8641 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8642 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
8643 for ev in chan_closed_events {
8644 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
8646 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8647 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8648 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8649 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8651 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
8652 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8653 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8654 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8656 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
8657 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
8659 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
8660 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8661 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
8662 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
8663 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8665 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8666 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8667 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8669 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
8670 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8671 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
8673 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
8674 // "protected" and can connect again.
8675 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
8676 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8677 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8678 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8680 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
8682 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8683 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8687 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
8688 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
8689 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8690 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8691 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8692 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8694 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8696 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8697 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8699 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8700 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8701 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8702 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8705 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
8707 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8708 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8709 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8711 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
8712 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8713 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8715 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
8716 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8717 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8718 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8722 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
8723 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
8724 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
8725 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8726 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8727 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
8728 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8729 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
8730 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8732 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8734 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8735 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8737 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
8738 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8739 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8740 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8741 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8742 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8744 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8745 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8747 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8748 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8750 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8752 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
8753 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8756 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
8757 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8758 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8759 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8760 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8761 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8762 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8764 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8765 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
8766 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
8767 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
8771 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8773 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8774 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8776 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
8777 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8778 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8780 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8781 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8783 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8785 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8790 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8791 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8792 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8793 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8794 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8795 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8796 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8797 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8798 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8799 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8800 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8802 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8803 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8804 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8806 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8807 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8809 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8810 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8812 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8815 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8816 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8818 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8819 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8821 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8825 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8827 use crate::chain::Listen;
8828 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8829 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8830 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8831 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
8832 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8833 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8834 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8835 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
8836 use crate::util::test_utils;
8837 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8839 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8840 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8841 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8843 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8847 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8848 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8849 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8850 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8851 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8852 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8853 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8854 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8859 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8860 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8863 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8864 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8865 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8867 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8869 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8870 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8871 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8872 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8873 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8875 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8876 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8878 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8879 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8880 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8881 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8883 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8885 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8887 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8888 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8889 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8890 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8891 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8893 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8895 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8897 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8898 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8899 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8900 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8901 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8904 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8905 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8906 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8908 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8909 } else { panic!(); }
8911 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8912 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8913 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8915 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8916 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8918 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8921 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8922 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8923 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8925 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8926 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8928 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8931 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8934 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8937 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8938 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8940 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8941 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8942 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8943 match msg_events[0] {
8944 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8945 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8946 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8950 match msg_events[1] {
8951 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8955 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8956 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8958 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8959 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8961 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8964 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8965 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8967 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8968 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8970 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8973 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8974 macro_rules! send_payment {
8975 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8976 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
8977 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
8978 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8979 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8981 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8982 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
8984 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
8985 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
8986 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
8987 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
8988 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8989 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8990 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8991 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
8992 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8993 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8994 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8996 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8997 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8998 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8999 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9001 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9002 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9003 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9004 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9005 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9007 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9010 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9011 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9012 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9013 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9015 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9020 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9021 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);