1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
114 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
117 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
118 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
119 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
120 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
121 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
122 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
129 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
130 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
131 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
133 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
134 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
135 /// may overshoot this in either case)
136 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
137 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
138 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
139 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
140 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
145 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
146 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
149 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
150 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
151 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
152 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
153 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
156 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
157 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
159 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
160 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
161 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
164 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
165 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
167 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
168 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
171 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
172 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
175 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
179 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
180 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
181 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
182 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
183 short_channel_id: u64,
185 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
186 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
188 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
189 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
194 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
196 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
197 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
198 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
200 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
201 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
204 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
205 struct ClaimableHTLC {
206 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
208 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
210 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
211 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
212 sender_intended_value: u64,
213 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
215 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
216 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
217 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
218 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
220 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
221 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
224 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
226 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
227 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
228 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
230 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
231 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
236 impl Readable for PaymentId {
237 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
238 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
243 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
245 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
246 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
247 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
249 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
250 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
255 impl Readable for InterceptId {
256 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
257 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
262 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
263 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
264 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
265 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
266 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
269 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
271 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
272 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
273 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
275 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
276 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
280 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
281 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
282 (0, short_channel_id, required),
283 (2, htlc_id, required),
285 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
286 (0, session_priv, required),
291 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
292 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
293 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
294 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
295 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
298 session_priv: SecretKey,
299 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
300 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
301 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
302 payment_id: PaymentId,
305 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
306 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
307 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
309 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
311 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
313 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
316 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
317 payment_id.hash(hasher);
318 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
324 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
326 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
327 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
328 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
329 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
330 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
331 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
335 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
336 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
337 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
338 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
339 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
340 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
342 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
348 struct InboundOnionErr {
354 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
355 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
357 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
358 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
359 pub enum FailureCode {
360 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
361 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
362 TemporaryNodeFailure,
363 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
364 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
365 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
366 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
367 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
368 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
369 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
370 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
371 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
372 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
374 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
375 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
376 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
379 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
380 fn into(self) -> u16 {
382 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
383 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
384 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
385 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
390 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
391 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
392 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
393 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
394 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
396 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
397 err: msgs::LightningError,
398 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
399 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
400 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
402 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
404 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
406 err: LightningError {
408 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
409 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
416 shutdown_finish: None,
417 channel_capacity: None,
421 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
422 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
425 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
427 err: LightningError {
429 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
430 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
436 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
437 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
438 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
442 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
445 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
447 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
448 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
452 log_level: Level::Warn,
455 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
457 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
459 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
461 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
462 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
470 shutdown_finish: None,
471 channel_capacity: None,
476 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
477 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
478 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
479 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
480 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
482 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
483 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
484 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
485 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
486 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
487 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
488 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
490 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
494 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
495 struct ClaimingPayment {
497 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
498 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
500 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
501 (0, amount_msat, required),
502 (2, payment_purpose, required),
503 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
506 struct ClaimablePayment {
507 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
508 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
509 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
512 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
513 struct ClaimablePayments {
514 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
515 /// failed/claimed by the user.
517 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
518 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
520 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
521 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
522 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
524 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
525 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
526 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
527 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
530 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
531 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
532 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
533 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
534 enum BackgroundEvent {
535 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
536 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
537 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
538 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
540 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
541 /// are regenerated on startup.
542 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
543 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
544 /// channel to continue normal operation.
546 /// In general this should be used rather than
547 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
548 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
549 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
551 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
552 /// are regenerated on startup.
553 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
554 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
555 funding_txo: OutPoint,
556 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
558 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
559 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
561 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
562 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
563 channel_id: [u8; 32],
568 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
569 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
570 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
571 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
572 /// event can be generated.
573 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
574 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
575 /// operation of another channel.
577 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
578 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
579 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
580 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
582 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
583 event: events::Event,
584 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
588 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
589 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
590 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
591 (0, event, upgradable_required),
592 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
593 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
594 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
595 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
596 // downgrades to prior versions.
597 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
601 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
602 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
603 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
604 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
605 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
608 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
609 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
610 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
611 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
615 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
616 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
617 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
618 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
619 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
620 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
622 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
623 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
624 channel_id: [u8; 32],
625 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
630 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
632 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
633 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
634 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
635 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
640 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
641 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
645 /// State we hold per-peer.
646 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
647 /// `channel_id` -> `Channel`.
649 /// Holds all funded channels where the peer is the counterparty.
650 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
651 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `OutboundV1Channel`.
653 /// Holds all outbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an outbound channel has
654 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
656 pub(super) outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], OutboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
657 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundV1Channel`.
659 /// Holds all inbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an inbound channel has
660 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
662 pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
663 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
665 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
666 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
667 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
668 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
669 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundChannelRequest>,
670 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
671 latest_features: InitFeatures,
672 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
673 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
674 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
675 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
676 /// user but which have not yet completed.
678 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
679 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
680 /// for a missing channel.
681 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
682 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
683 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
685 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
686 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
687 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
688 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
690 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
691 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
692 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
693 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
694 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
695 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
696 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
697 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
698 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
699 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
700 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
701 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
702 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
703 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
704 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
708 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
709 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
710 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
711 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
712 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
713 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
716 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
717 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
720 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
721 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
722 self.channel_by_id.len() +
723 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
724 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
725 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
728 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
729 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
730 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
731 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
732 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
733 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
737 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
738 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
739 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
740 /// The original OpenChannel message.
741 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
742 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
743 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
746 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
747 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
748 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
750 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
751 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
753 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
756 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
757 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
758 struct PendingInboundPayment {
759 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
760 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
761 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
762 /// this payment being removed.
764 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
765 user_payment_id: u64,
766 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
767 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
768 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
771 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
772 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
773 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
774 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
775 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
776 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
777 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
778 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
780 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
781 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
789 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
791 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
792 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
793 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
798 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
799 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
800 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
801 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
802 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
803 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
804 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
805 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
806 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
808 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
809 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
818 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
820 &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
821 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
822 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
827 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
828 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
829 $vis trait AChannelManager {
830 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
831 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
832 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
833 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
834 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
835 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
836 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
837 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
838 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
839 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
840 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
841 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
842 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
843 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
844 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
845 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
846 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
847 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
850 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
851 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
852 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
853 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
854 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
855 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
857 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
858 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
859 ES::Target: EntropySource,
860 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
861 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
862 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
866 type Watch = M::Target;
868 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
870 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
872 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
874 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
875 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
877 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
879 type Router = R::Target;
881 type Logger = L::Target;
883 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
886 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
887 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
889 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
890 /// to individual Channels.
892 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
893 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
894 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
895 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
897 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
898 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
899 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
900 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
901 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
902 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
903 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
905 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
906 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
907 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
909 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
910 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
911 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
912 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
913 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
915 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
916 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
917 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
918 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
920 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
921 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
922 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
924 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
925 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
926 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
927 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
928 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
930 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
931 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
932 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
933 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
934 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
935 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
936 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
937 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
940 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
941 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
942 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
943 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
944 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
948 // `total_consistency_lock`
950 // |__`forward_htlcs`
952 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
954 // |__`per_peer_state`
956 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
958 // | |__`claimable_payments`
960 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
966 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
968 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
972 // | |__`pending_events`
974 // | |__`pending_background_events`
976 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
978 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
979 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
980 ES::Target: EntropySource,
981 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
982 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
983 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
987 default_configuration: UserConfig,
988 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
989 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
995 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
997 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
999 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1000 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1002 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1003 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1004 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1005 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1007 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1008 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1010 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1011 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1012 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1013 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1014 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1015 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1016 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1017 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1019 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1021 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1022 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1024 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1026 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1027 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1028 /// and via the classic SCID.
1030 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1031 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1033 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1035 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1037 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1038 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1039 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1041 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1042 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1044 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1045 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1047 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1048 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1050 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1051 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1052 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1053 /// active channel list on load.
1055 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1056 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1058 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1060 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1061 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1062 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1064 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1065 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1066 /// the handling of the events.
1068 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1069 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1072 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1073 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1074 /// would break backwards compatability.
1075 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1076 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1077 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1079 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1080 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
1082 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1084 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1085 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1086 /// confirmation depth.
1088 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1089 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1090 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1092 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1094 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1096 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1098 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1100 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1102 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1103 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1104 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1106 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1107 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1109 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1110 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1111 /// keeping additional state.
1112 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1114 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1115 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1116 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1117 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1119 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1120 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1122 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1123 /// are currently open with that peer.
1125 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1126 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1129 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1131 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1132 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1133 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1134 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1135 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1137 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1138 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1139 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1140 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1141 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1143 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1144 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1146 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1147 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1148 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1149 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1151 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1152 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1153 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1154 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1155 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1157 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1159 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1161 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1162 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1163 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1164 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1165 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1166 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1167 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1168 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1169 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1171 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1173 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1177 signer_provider: SP,
1182 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1184 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1185 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1186 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1187 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1188 pub struct ChainParameters {
1189 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1190 pub network: Network,
1192 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1194 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1195 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1198 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1205 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1206 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1207 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1208 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1209 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1210 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1212 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1213 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1214 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1215 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1216 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1218 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1219 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1222 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1223 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1224 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1225 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1227 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1228 persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1229 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1230 _read_guard: read_guard,
1235 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1236 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1237 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1238 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1240 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1241 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1242 should_persist: persist_check,
1243 _read_guard: read_guard,
1248 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1249 fn drop(&mut self) {
1250 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1251 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1256 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1257 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1259 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1261 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1262 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1263 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1264 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1265 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1267 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1268 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1270 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1272 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1273 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1274 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1275 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1276 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1277 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1278 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1279 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1280 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1281 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1282 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1283 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1284 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1286 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1287 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1289 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1290 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1291 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1292 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1294 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1295 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1296 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1297 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1298 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1299 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1302 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1304 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1305 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1308 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1310 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1311 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1313 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1314 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1315 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1316 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1318 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1319 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1320 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1322 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1323 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1324 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1326 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1327 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1328 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1329 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1331 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1332 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1333 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1335 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1336 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1337 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1339 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1340 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1341 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1342 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1343 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1344 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1345 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1346 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1347 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1348 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1349 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1352 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1353 /// to better separate parameters.
1354 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1355 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1356 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1357 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1358 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1359 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1360 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1361 pub features: InitFeatures,
1362 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1363 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1364 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1366 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1368 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1369 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1370 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1371 /// payments to us through this channel.
1372 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1373 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1374 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1375 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1376 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1377 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1378 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1381 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1382 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1383 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1384 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1385 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1386 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1387 /// lifetime of the channel.
1388 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1389 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1390 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1391 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1392 /// our counterparty already.
1394 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1395 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1396 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1397 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1399 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1400 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1401 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1402 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1404 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1405 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1407 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1408 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1410 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1411 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1412 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1413 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1414 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1415 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1416 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1417 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1418 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1421 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1423 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1424 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1425 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1426 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1427 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1428 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1429 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1431 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1432 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1434 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1435 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1436 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1437 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1438 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1439 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1440 /// this value on chain.
1442 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1444 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1446 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1447 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1448 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1449 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1450 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1451 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1452 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1454 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1455 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1456 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1457 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1458 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1459 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1461 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1462 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1463 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1464 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1465 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1467 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1468 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1469 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1470 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1472 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1473 pub balance_msat: u64,
1474 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1475 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1476 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1477 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1479 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1481 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1482 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1483 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1484 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1485 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1486 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1487 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1488 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1490 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1491 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1492 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1493 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1494 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1495 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1496 /// route which is valid.
1497 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1498 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1499 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1500 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1501 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1502 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1504 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1505 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1506 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1507 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1508 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1509 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1510 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1511 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1512 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1514 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1516 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1517 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1518 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1519 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1520 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1522 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1523 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1524 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1525 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1526 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1527 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1528 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1530 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1531 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1532 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1533 pub is_outbound: bool,
1534 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1535 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1536 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1537 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1538 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1540 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1541 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1542 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1543 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1544 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1545 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1546 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1548 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1549 pub is_usable: bool,
1550 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1551 pub is_public: bool,
1552 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1553 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1554 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1555 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1556 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1557 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1559 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1560 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1563 impl ChannelDetails {
1564 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1565 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1566 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1568 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1569 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1570 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1571 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1574 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1575 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1576 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1578 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1579 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1580 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1581 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1584 fn from_channel_context<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, F: Deref>(
1585 context: &ChannelContext<Signer>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1586 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1588 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1590 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1591 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1592 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1594 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1595 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1596 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1597 features: latest_features,
1598 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1599 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1600 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1601 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1602 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1603 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1604 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1605 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1606 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1607 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1609 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1610 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1611 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1612 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1613 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1614 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1615 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1616 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1617 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1618 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1619 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1620 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1621 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1622 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1623 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1624 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1625 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1626 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1627 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1628 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1629 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1630 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1631 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1632 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1633 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1634 config: Some(context.config()),
1635 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1640 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1641 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1642 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1643 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1644 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1645 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1646 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1647 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1648 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1650 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1652 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1653 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1655 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1656 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1657 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1658 /// to drop the channel.
1662 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1663 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1664 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1665 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1666 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1668 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1670 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1671 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1672 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1675 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1676 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1677 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1679 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1680 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1681 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1683 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1684 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1685 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1687 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1688 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1692 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1694 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1696 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1697 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1698 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1699 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1701 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1702 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1703 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1706 macro_rules! handle_error {
1707 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1708 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1709 // entering the macro.
1710 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1711 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1715 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1716 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1718 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1719 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1720 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1721 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1725 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1726 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1727 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1728 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1729 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1730 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1735 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1736 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1738 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1739 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1740 action: err.action.clone()
1744 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1745 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1746 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1747 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1748 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1752 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1757 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1760 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1761 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1762 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1768 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1769 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1770 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1771 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1772 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1773 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1775 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1776 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1777 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1778 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1779 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1781 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1782 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1784 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1788 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1789 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1790 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1792 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1793 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1795 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1796 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1798 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1799 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1800 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel.context);
1801 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1802 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1803 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok(), $channel.context.get_value_satoshis()))
1807 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_context: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED) => {
1809 // We should only ever have `ChannelError::Close` when unfunded channels error.
1810 // In any case, just close the channel.
1811 ChannelError::Warn(msg) | ChannelError::Ignore(msg) | ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1812 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing unfunded channel {} due to an error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1813 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel_context);
1814 let shutdown_res = $channel_context.force_shutdown(false);
1815 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel_context.get_user_id(),
1816 shutdown_res, None, $channel_context.get_value_satoshis()))
1822 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1823 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1827 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1829 $entry.remove_entry();
1837 macro_rules! try_v1_outbound_chan_entry {
1838 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1842 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut().context, $entry.key(), UNFUNDED);
1844 $entry.remove_entry();
1852 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1853 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1857 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1859 $entry.remove_entry();
1867 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1868 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1870 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1871 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context);
1877 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1878 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1879 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1880 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1881 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1883 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1884 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1885 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1886 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1887 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1888 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1889 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1890 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1891 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1892 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1897 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1898 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1899 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1900 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1901 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1902 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1903 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1904 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1905 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1907 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1912 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1913 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1914 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1915 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1916 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1917 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1918 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1919 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1920 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1922 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1927 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1928 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1929 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1930 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1931 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1932 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1933 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
1934 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1935 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1936 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1937 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1939 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1940 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1941 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1947 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1948 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1950 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1951 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1952 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1953 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1954 updates.announcement_sigs);
1955 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1956 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1959 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
1960 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1961 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1963 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1965 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1966 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1968 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1969 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1970 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1971 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1976 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1977 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $remove: expr, $completed: expr) => { {
1978 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1979 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1980 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1981 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
1983 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1984 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1985 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1988 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1989 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1990 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1991 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
1992 let res = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1993 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
1994 $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
1995 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok(), $chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
1999 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2005 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $remove: expr) => {
2006 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2007 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2008 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2010 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2011 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
2013 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
2014 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2015 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2016 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2017 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2018 // filter for uniqueness here.
2019 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2020 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2021 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2022 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2024 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2025 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2026 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2028 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2029 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2030 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2034 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
2035 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $funding_txo, $update, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
2039 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2040 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2041 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2042 while !processed_all_events {
2043 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2047 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2050 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2051 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2052 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2054 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2055 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2056 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2058 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2059 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2060 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2061 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2065 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2066 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2067 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2068 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2071 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2073 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2074 $event_to_handle = event;
2076 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2077 post_event_actions.push(action);
2082 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2083 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2084 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2085 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2086 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2087 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2090 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2091 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2092 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2093 processed_all_events = false;
2096 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
2097 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
2103 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2105 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2106 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2107 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2108 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2109 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2110 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2114 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2116 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2118 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2119 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2121 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2123 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2124 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2125 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2128 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2129 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2130 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2132 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2133 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2134 current_timestamp: u32,
2136 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2137 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2138 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2139 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2141 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2142 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2143 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2148 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2150 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2151 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2152 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2153 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2154 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2155 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2156 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2157 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2159 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2162 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2163 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2165 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2167 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2169 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2171 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2172 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2173 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2174 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2175 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2176 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2186 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2187 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2188 &self.default_configuration
2191 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2192 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2193 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2196 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2197 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2199 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2201 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2205 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2210 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2212 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2213 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2214 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2215 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2216 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2218 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2219 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2221 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2222 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2223 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2225 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2226 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2227 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2229 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2230 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2231 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2232 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2233 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2234 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2236 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2237 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2238 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2239 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
2240 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2241 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2244 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2245 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2246 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2248 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2250 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2251 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2253 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2255 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2256 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2257 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2258 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2259 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2260 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2264 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2269 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2271 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2272 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2273 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2275 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2277 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2280 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
2283 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2284 node_id: their_network_key,
2287 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2290 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2291 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2292 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2293 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2294 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2295 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2296 // the same channel.
2297 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2299 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2300 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2301 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2302 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2303 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2304 // Only `Channels` in the channel_by_id map can be considered funded.
2305 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
2306 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2307 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2315 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2316 /// more information.
2317 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2318 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2319 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2320 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2321 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2322 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2323 // the same channel.
2324 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2326 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2327 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2328 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2329 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2330 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2331 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
2332 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2333 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2336 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2337 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2338 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2341 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2342 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2343 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2351 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2352 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2354 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2355 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2357 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2358 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2359 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2360 // really wanted anyway.
2361 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2364 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2365 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2366 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2367 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2369 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2370 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2371 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2372 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2373 let chan_context_to_details = |context| {
2374 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2376 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2378 .map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context)
2379 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
2380 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
2381 .map(chan_context_to_details)
2387 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2388 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2390 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2391 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2392 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2394 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2395 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2396 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2397 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2398 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2399 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2400 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2401 total_msat: *total_msat,
2404 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2405 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2407 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2408 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2410 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2415 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2416 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2417 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2418 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2419 Some(transaction) => {
2420 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2421 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2426 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2427 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2428 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2429 reason: closure_reason,
2430 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2431 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2435 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2436 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2438 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2439 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2441 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2443 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2444 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2446 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2447 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2449 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2450 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2451 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
2452 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2453 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2454 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2455 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2457 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2458 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2459 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2460 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2461 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2465 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2466 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2467 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2468 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
2471 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2472 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2473 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2474 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2478 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2482 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (),
2485 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2486 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2488 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2489 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2490 // TODO(dunxen): This is still not ideal as we're doing some extra lookups.
2491 // Fix this with https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
2494 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2495 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2496 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2497 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2500 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2504 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2505 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2506 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2508 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2509 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2511 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2512 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2513 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2514 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2516 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2518 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2519 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2520 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2523 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2524 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2525 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2526 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2527 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2528 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2531 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2532 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2533 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2535 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2536 /// the channel being closed or not:
2537 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2538 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2539 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2540 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2541 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2542 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2543 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2545 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2546 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2547 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2548 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2550 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2552 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2553 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2554 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2557 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2558 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2559 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2560 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2561 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2562 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2566 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2567 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2568 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2569 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2570 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2571 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2572 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2573 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2575 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2576 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2577 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2578 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2579 // ignore the result here.
2580 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2584 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2585 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2586 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2587 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2588 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2589 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2590 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2591 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2592 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2593 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2594 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2595 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2597 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2599 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2600 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2601 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2602 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2603 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2604 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2605 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2606 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2607 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2608 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2609 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2610 // Unfunded channel has no update
2611 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2612 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2613 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2614 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2615 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2616 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2617 // Unfunded channel has no update
2618 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2619 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2620 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2621 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2622 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2624 (None, *peer_node_id)
2626 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2629 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2630 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2631 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2636 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2639 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2640 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2641 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2642 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2643 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2644 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2645 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2646 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2647 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2648 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2649 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2650 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2661 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2662 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2663 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2665 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2666 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2667 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2670 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2671 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2672 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2674 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2675 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2676 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2677 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2678 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2681 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2682 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2683 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2684 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2685 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2689 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2690 /// local transaction(s).
2691 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2692 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2693 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2697 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2698 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2699 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2700 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2701 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2702 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2703 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2705 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2706 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2710 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2711 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2712 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2713 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } =>
2714 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2715 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2716 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2717 err_data: Vec::new(),
2721 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2722 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2723 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2726 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2727 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2728 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2729 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2730 outgoing_cltv_value,
2731 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2735 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2736 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2737 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2738 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2739 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2740 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2741 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2742 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2744 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2746 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2747 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2748 err_data: Vec::new(),
2749 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2752 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2753 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2754 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2755 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2757 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2760 // final_expiry_too_soon
2761 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2762 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2764 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2765 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2766 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2767 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2768 if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2769 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2770 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2771 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2772 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2773 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2774 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2777 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2778 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2779 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2781 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2783 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2784 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2788 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2789 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2790 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2791 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2792 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2793 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2794 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2795 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2796 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2797 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2798 err_data: Vec::new(),
2799 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2802 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2803 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2804 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2805 err_data: Vec::new(),
2806 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2809 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2813 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2816 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2817 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2820 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2821 phantom_shared_secret,
2825 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2826 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2827 err_data: Vec::new(),
2828 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2831 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2834 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2835 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2836 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
2837 outgoing_cltv_value,
2838 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
2842 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2843 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2844 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
2845 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2846 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2848 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2849 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2850 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2851 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2852 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2853 failure_code: $err_code,
2859 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2860 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2863 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2864 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2865 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2867 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2868 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2869 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2870 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2871 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2872 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2873 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2874 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2876 macro_rules! return_err {
2877 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2879 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2880 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2881 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2882 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2883 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2884 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2890 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2892 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2893 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2895 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2896 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2899 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
2900 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2901 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
2902 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
2905 let next_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
2906 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
2907 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_pk))
2909 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
2910 // inbound channel's state.
2911 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2912 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } => {
2913 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
2917 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2918 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2919 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2920 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2921 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2922 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2923 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2924 // phantom or an intercept.
2925 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2926 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2927 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
2931 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2934 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2936 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2937 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2938 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2939 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2940 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2942 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2943 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2944 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2946 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2947 // have no consistency guarantees.
2948 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2952 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2953 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2954 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2955 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2956 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2958 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
2959 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2960 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2961 // we don't have the channel here.
2962 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2964 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
2966 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2967 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2968 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2969 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2970 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2971 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2972 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2973 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2974 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2975 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2976 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2978 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2981 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2982 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2984 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
2985 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2989 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2990 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2991 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2992 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2994 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3001 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3002 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3003 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3004 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3005 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3006 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3008 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3009 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3011 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3012 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3013 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3014 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3015 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3016 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3017 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3018 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3019 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3020 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3026 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3027 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3028 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3029 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3031 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3032 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3034 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3035 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3036 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3038 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3039 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3040 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3041 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3042 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3043 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3044 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3048 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3050 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3053 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3054 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3055 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3056 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3057 macro_rules! return_err {
3058 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3060 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3061 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3062 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3063 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3064 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3065 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3071 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3073 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3074 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3077 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3078 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3079 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3080 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3081 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3083 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3086 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3087 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3088 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3089 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3090 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3096 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3097 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3098 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3100 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3101 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3102 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3104 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3105 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3106 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3107 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3108 return Err(LightningError {
3109 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3110 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3113 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3114 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3116 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3117 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3120 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3121 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3122 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3123 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3125 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3126 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3127 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3129 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3130 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3131 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3132 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3133 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3134 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3138 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3141 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3142 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3143 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3145 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3146 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3147 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3148 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3149 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3152 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3153 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3155 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3156 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3157 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3158 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3159 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3160 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3161 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3162 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3164 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3165 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3166 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3168 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3170 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3177 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3178 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3179 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3180 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3185 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3186 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3187 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3190 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3191 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3193 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3194 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3195 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3197 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3198 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3199 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3201 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3202 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3204 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3205 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3206 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3207 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3210 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3211 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3212 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3213 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3214 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3215 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3216 if !chan.get().context.is_live() {
3217 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3219 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3220 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3221 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3223 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3224 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3226 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3227 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
3228 Some(monitor_update) => {
3229 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3230 Err(e) => break Err(e),
3232 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3233 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3234 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3235 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3236 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3237 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3238 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3246 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3247 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3248 // `channel_by_id` map.
3249 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3250 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3255 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3256 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3258 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3263 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3265 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3266 /// fields for more info.
3268 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3269 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3271 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3273 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3274 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3275 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3276 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3277 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3279 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3280 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3281 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3282 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3283 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3285 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3286 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3287 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3288 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3290 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3292 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3293 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3294 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3296 /// In general, a path may raise:
3297 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3298 /// node public key) is specified.
3299 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3300 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3302 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3303 /// relevant updates.
3305 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3306 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3307 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3309 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3310 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3311 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3312 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3313 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3314 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3315 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3316 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3317 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3318 self.pending_outbound_payments
3319 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3320 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3321 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3324 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3325 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3326 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3327 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3328 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3329 self.pending_outbound_payments
3330 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3331 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3332 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3333 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3337 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3338 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3339 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3340 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3341 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3342 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3346 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3347 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3348 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3352 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3353 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3357 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3358 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3359 /// retries are exhausted.
3361 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3362 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3364 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3365 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3366 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3368 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
3369 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3371 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3372 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3373 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3374 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3375 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3378 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3379 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3380 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3381 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3382 /// never reach the recipient.
3384 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3385 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3387 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3388 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3390 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3391 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3392 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3393 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3394 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3395 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3396 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3399 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3400 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3402 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3405 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3406 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3407 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3408 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3409 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3410 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3411 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3412 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3415 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3416 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3417 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3418 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3419 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3420 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3421 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3422 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3423 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3426 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3429 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3430 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3433 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3434 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3435 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3436 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3437 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3438 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3439 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3440 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3442 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3443 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3444 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3446 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3448 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3449 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3450 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3451 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3452 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3453 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3454 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3455 } else { unreachable!(); });
3457 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3458 Err((chan, err)) => {
3459 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3460 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3462 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3463 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3464 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3470 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3472 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3473 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3478 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3479 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3482 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3483 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3484 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3486 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3487 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3488 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3489 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3498 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3499 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3500 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3504 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3506 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3507 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3509 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3510 /// across the p2p network.
3512 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3513 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3515 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3516 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3517 /// keys per-channel).
3519 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3520 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3521 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3523 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3524 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3525 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3527 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3528 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3529 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3530 /// for more details.
3532 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3533 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3534 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3535 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3537 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3538 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3539 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3540 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3545 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3546 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3547 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3548 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3549 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3550 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3551 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3552 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3556 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3557 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3558 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3559 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3563 let mut output_index = None;
3564 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3565 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3566 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3567 if output_index.is_some() {
3568 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3569 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3572 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3575 if output_index.is_none() {
3576 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3577 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3580 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3584 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3586 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3587 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3588 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3589 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3591 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3592 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3594 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3595 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3597 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3599 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3600 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3601 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3602 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3603 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3604 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3605 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3606 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3607 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3608 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3609 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3610 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3611 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3615 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3616 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3617 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3618 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3619 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3620 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3621 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3622 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3623 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3624 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3628 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3629 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3630 let mut config = channel.context.config();
3631 config.apply(config_update);
3632 if !channel.context.update_config(&config) {
3635 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3636 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3637 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3638 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3639 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3646 let context = if let Some(channel) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3647 &mut channel.context
3648 } else if let Some(channel) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3649 &mut channel.context
3651 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3652 debug_assert!(false);
3653 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3655 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3656 log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3659 let mut config = context.config();
3660 config.apply(config_update);
3661 // We update the config, but we MUST NOT broadcast a `channel_update` before `channel_ready`
3662 // which would be the case for pending inbound/outbound channels.
3663 context.update_config(&config);
3668 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3670 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3671 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3672 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3673 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3675 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3676 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3678 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3679 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3681 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3683 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3684 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3685 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3686 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3687 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3688 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3689 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3690 pub fn update_channel_config(
3691 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3692 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3693 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3696 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3697 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3699 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3700 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3702 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3703 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3704 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3705 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3706 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3708 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3709 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3710 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3713 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3716 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3717 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3718 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3719 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3720 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3721 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3722 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3724 let next_hop_scid = {
3725 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3726 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3727 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3728 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3729 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3730 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3732 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3733 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3734 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3737 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3739 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3740 err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.",
3741 log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3746 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3747 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3748 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3751 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3752 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3753 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3755 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3757 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3758 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
3759 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3760 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
3761 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3764 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3765 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3766 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3767 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3768 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3770 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3774 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3775 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3777 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3780 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3781 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3782 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3784 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3785 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3786 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3789 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3790 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3791 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3792 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3793 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3794 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3795 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3798 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3799 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3800 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3801 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3806 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3808 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3809 /// Will likely generate further events.
3810 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3811 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3813 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3814 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3815 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3817 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3818 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3820 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3821 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3822 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3824 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3825 match forward_info {
3826 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3827 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3828 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3829 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3830 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
3833 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3834 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3835 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3837 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3838 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3839 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3840 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3841 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3842 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3845 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3846 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3848 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3851 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3852 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3858 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3859 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3861 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3865 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3866 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3868 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3872 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3873 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3874 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3875 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3876 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3878 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3879 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3880 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3881 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3882 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3884 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3886 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3887 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3891 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3892 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
3893 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3894 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
3896 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3897 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3903 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3906 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3909 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3910 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3911 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3912 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3913 // problem, not ours.
3919 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3920 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3922 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3926 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3927 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3928 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3929 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3932 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3933 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3934 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3935 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3936 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3939 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3940 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3941 match forward_info {
3942 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3943 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3944 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3945 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3946 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3949 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3950 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3951 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3952 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3953 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3954 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3955 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3956 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3958 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3959 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3960 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
3963 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3964 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3966 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3968 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3969 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3970 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3971 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3976 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3977 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3979 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3980 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3981 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3982 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3984 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3985 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3987 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3989 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3990 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3991 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4000 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4001 match forward_info {
4002 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4003 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4004 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4005 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4006 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4009 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4010 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4011 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4012 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4013 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4014 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4015 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4017 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4018 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4019 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4023 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4024 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4027 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4030 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4031 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4032 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4033 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4034 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4035 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4036 phantom_shared_secret,
4038 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4039 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4040 // if routing nodes overpay
4041 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4042 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4044 total_value_received: None,
4045 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4048 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4051 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4053 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4054 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4055 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4056 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4057 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4058 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4060 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4061 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4062 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4063 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4064 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4065 phantom_shared_secret,
4067 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4068 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4070 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4073 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4074 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4075 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4076 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4077 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4080 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4081 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4082 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4083 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4084 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4085 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4087 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4088 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4089 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4091 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4092 .entry(payment_hash)
4093 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4094 .or_insert_with(|| {
4095 committed_to_claimable = true;
4097 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4100 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4101 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4102 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4103 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4105 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4106 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4107 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4109 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4110 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4111 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4114 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4116 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4117 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4118 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4119 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4120 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4121 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4122 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4123 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4124 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4125 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4127 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4129 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4130 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4131 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4132 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4133 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4134 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4135 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4136 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4137 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4138 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4139 committed_to_claimable = true;
4141 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4142 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4143 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4144 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4145 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4146 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4147 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4148 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4149 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4150 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4154 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4155 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4156 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4157 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4158 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4160 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4162 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4163 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4165 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4166 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4167 committed_to_claimable = true;
4170 payment_claimable_generated
4174 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4175 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4176 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4177 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4178 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4179 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4180 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4181 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4182 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4183 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4184 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4185 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4186 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4187 Ok(result) => result,
4189 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4190 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4193 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4194 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4195 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4196 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4197 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4198 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4201 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4202 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4203 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4205 check_total_value!(purpose);
4207 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4208 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4209 check_total_value!(purpose);
4213 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4214 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4215 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4216 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4218 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4219 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4220 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4221 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4222 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4223 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4224 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4225 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4227 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4228 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4229 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4231 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4232 if payment_claimable_generated {
4233 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4239 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4240 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4248 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4249 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4250 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4251 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4253 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4254 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4256 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4258 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4259 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4260 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4262 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4264 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4265 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4266 events.append(&mut new_events);
4269 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4271 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4272 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4273 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4275 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4277 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4278 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4279 if background_events.is_empty() {
4280 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4283 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4285 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4286 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4287 // monitor updating completing.
4288 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4290 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4291 let mut updated_chan = false;
4293 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4294 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4295 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4296 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4297 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4298 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4299 updated_chan = true;
4300 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4301 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
4303 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
4308 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4309 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4311 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
4312 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
4313 // however, ensure that.
4315 log_error!(self.logger,
4316 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
4318 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4320 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4321 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4322 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4323 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4324 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4325 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4326 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4328 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4329 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4330 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4331 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4332 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4338 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4341 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4342 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4343 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4344 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4345 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4348 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4349 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
4350 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4351 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4352 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4353 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4354 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4356 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4357 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4358 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4359 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4361 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4362 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4364 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4365 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4369 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4370 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4371 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4372 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4373 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4374 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4375 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4377 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4378 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4380 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4381 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4382 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4383 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4384 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
4385 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4390 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4391 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4399 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4401 /// This currently includes:
4402 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4403 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4404 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4406 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4407 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4408 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4409 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4411 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4412 /// estimate fetches.
4414 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4415 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4416 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4417 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4418 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4420 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4421 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4423 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4424 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4425 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4427 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4428 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4429 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4430 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4431 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4432 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4433 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
4434 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4439 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4440 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4442 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4443 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
4444 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4445 if needs_close { return false; }
4448 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4449 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4450 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4451 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4452 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4453 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4454 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4455 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4457 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4458 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4459 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4460 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4464 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4466 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4469 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4471 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4472 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4473 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4474 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4478 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4480 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4486 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4488 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4489 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4490 counterparty_node_id, log_bytes!(*chan_id));
4491 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4492 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4493 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4494 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4495 channel_id: *chan_id,
4496 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4505 let process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4507 chan_context: &mut ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
4508 unfunded_chan_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4510 chan_context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4511 if unfunded_chan_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4512 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing pending outbound channel {} for not establishing in a timely manner", log_bytes!(&chan_id[..]));
4513 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan_context);
4514 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4515 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan_context.force_shutdown(false));
4521 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context));
4522 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context));
4524 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4525 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4526 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", log_bytes!(&chan_id[..]));
4527 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4528 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4529 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4530 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4531 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4537 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4539 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4540 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4545 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4546 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4547 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4548 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4549 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4550 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4551 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4552 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4553 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4554 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4555 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4556 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4557 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4558 // have no channels to the peer.
4559 let remove_entry = {
4560 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4561 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4564 entry.remove_entry();
4567 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4572 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4573 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4574 // This should be unreachable
4575 debug_assert!(false);
4578 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4579 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4580 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4581 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4582 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4583 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4584 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4587 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4588 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4589 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4591 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4592 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4599 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4600 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4601 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4602 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4603 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4606 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4607 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4610 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4612 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4613 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4614 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4615 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4616 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4623 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4624 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4625 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4627 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4628 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4629 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4630 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4632 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4633 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4634 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4635 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4636 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4637 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4640 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4641 /// reason for the failure.
4643 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4644 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4645 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4647 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4648 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4649 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4650 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4651 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4652 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4653 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4658 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4659 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4660 match failure_code {
4661 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4662 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4663 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4664 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4665 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4666 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
4668 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
4669 let fail_data = match data {
4670 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
4673 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
4678 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4679 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4681 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4683 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4684 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4685 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4686 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4687 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4688 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4689 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4691 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4693 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4694 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4696 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4701 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4702 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4703 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4704 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4705 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4706 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4707 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4708 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4709 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4710 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4712 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4713 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4714 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4715 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4717 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4718 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4719 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4720 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4721 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4725 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4726 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4727 // be surfaced to the user.
4728 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4729 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4730 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4732 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4733 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4734 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4735 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4736 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4737 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4738 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4739 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4741 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4743 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4746 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4747 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4748 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4749 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4753 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4754 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4755 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4756 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4757 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4758 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4759 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4760 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4761 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4764 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4765 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4766 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4769 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4770 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4771 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4773 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4774 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4775 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4776 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4777 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4779 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4780 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4781 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4783 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4784 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4785 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4786 push_forward_ev = true;
4788 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4789 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4790 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4792 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4793 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4796 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4797 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4798 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4799 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4800 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4801 failed_next_destination: destination,
4807 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4808 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4810 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4811 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4812 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4813 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4815 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4816 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4817 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4818 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4820 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
4821 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
4822 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
4824 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4825 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4826 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4827 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4828 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4829 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4830 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
4831 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4832 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
4835 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
4836 /// even type numbers.
4840 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
4841 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
4843 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4844 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4845 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
4848 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
4849 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4851 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4854 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4855 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4856 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4857 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4858 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4859 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4860 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4861 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4866 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4867 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4868 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4870 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4871 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4872 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4873 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4876 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
4877 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
4878 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
4879 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
4880 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4881 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
4882 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4883 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
4884 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4885 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4886 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4895 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4897 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4898 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4899 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4900 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4901 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4902 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4903 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4904 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4905 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4906 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4907 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4908 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4909 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4910 debug_assert!(false);
4914 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4916 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4917 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4918 debug_assert!(false);
4922 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4923 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4925 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4926 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4927 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4928 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4931 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4932 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4933 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4934 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4938 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4939 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4940 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4941 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4943 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4944 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4945 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4946 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4947 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4952 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4953 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4954 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4955 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4956 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4957 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4958 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4960 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4963 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4964 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4965 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4966 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4970 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4971 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4972 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4973 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4975 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
4976 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
4977 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
4978 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4981 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4982 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4983 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4984 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4988 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4989 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4990 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4993 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4994 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4995 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4996 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4997 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4998 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5000 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
5001 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
5002 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5003 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
5004 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5007 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5008 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5009 if let Err(e) = res {
5010 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
5011 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
5012 // update over and over again until morale improves.
5013 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
5014 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
5017 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5018 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5019 // monitor update as a background event.
5020 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5021 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5022 counterparty_node_id,
5023 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5024 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5032 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5033 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5034 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5040 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5041 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5042 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5043 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5044 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5045 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5046 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5047 // again on restart.
5048 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5049 payment_preimage, update_res);
5052 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5053 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5055 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5056 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5057 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5058 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5059 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5060 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5061 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5062 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5063 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5064 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5067 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5068 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5069 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5070 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5071 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5072 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
5076 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5077 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5080 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
5082 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5083 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5084 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5085 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
5087 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5088 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5089 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5090 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
5091 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5092 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5093 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5096 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5097 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5099 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5100 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5101 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
5102 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5104 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
5108 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5109 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5110 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5116 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5117 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5118 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5121 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5122 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5124 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5125 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5126 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
5127 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5128 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5132 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5133 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5135 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5136 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5137 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5144 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5145 /// update completion.
5146 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5147 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5148 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5149 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5150 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5151 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5152 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5153 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()),
5154 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5155 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5156 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5157 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5158 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5160 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5162 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5163 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5164 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5165 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5168 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5169 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5171 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5172 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5173 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5178 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5179 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5180 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5181 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5186 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5187 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5188 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5189 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5190 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5195 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5199 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5205 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5206 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5207 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5211 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5212 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5213 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5219 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5220 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5222 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5223 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5225 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5226 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5227 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5228 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5229 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5234 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5235 let mut peer_state_lock;
5236 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5237 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5238 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5239 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5241 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5244 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5245 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5246 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5247 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5248 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5251 let remaining_in_flight =
5252 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5253 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5256 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5257 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5258 remaining_in_flight);
5259 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5262 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5265 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5267 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5268 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5271 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5272 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5273 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5275 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5276 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5277 /// used to accept such channels.
5279 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5280 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5281 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5282 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5285 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5286 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5288 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5289 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5290 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5292 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5293 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5295 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5296 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5298 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5299 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5301 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5302 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5303 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5304 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5307 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5308 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5310 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5311 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5312 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5313 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5314 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5315 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5316 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5317 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5319 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5320 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5321 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5323 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5324 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5325 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5326 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5327 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5328 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5329 &self.logger, /*outbound_scid_alias=*/0, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5331 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5335 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5336 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5337 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5338 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5339 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5340 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5341 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5344 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5345 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5347 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5348 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5349 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5350 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5351 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5352 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5353 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5354 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5357 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5358 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5362 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5363 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5364 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5366 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5367 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5368 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5371 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), channel);
5376 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5377 /// or 0-conf channels.
5379 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5380 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5381 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5382 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
5383 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5384 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5386 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5387 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5388 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5389 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5390 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5391 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5392 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5396 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5399 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5400 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
5402 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5403 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5404 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5405 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5406 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5407 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5409 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5412 for (_, chan) in peer.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
5413 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5414 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5417 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5420 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5421 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5422 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5425 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5426 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5429 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5430 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5431 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5432 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5433 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5435 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5436 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5438 debug_assert!(false);
5439 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5441 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5442 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5444 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5445 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5446 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5447 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5448 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5449 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5451 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5452 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5453 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5456 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5457 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5458 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5459 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5460 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5463 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
5464 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5466 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5469 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
5470 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5471 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5472 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5473 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5474 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5475 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5476 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5477 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
5479 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
5480 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
5481 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
5486 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
5487 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5488 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5489 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5490 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5491 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5492 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*outbound_scid_alias=*/0, /*is_0conf=*/false)
5495 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5500 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5501 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5502 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5504 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5505 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5508 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5509 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5511 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5512 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5513 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5515 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, channel);
5519 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5520 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5521 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5522 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5524 debug_assert!(false);
5525 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5527 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5528 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5529 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5530 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5531 try_v1_outbound_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
5532 (chan.get().context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().context.get_user_id())
5534 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5537 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5538 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5539 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5540 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5541 channel_value_satoshis: value,
5543 user_channel_id: user_id,
5548 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5549 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5551 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5552 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5554 debug_assert!(false);
5555 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5558 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5559 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5560 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5561 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5562 Some(inbound_chan) => {
5563 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5565 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5566 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5567 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5568 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5569 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5570 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5571 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5572 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5573 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
5577 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5580 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5581 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5582 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5584 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5585 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5586 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5587 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5588 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5589 funding_msg.channel_id))
5591 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5592 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5596 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5597 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5598 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5599 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5600 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5601 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5602 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5606 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5608 let chan = e.insert(chan);
5609 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5610 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR,
5611 { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5613 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5614 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5615 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5616 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5617 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5618 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5619 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5620 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5628 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5629 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5630 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5631 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5633 debug_assert!(false);
5634 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5637 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5638 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5639 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5640 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5641 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
5642 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
5643 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5644 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
5645 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5646 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5647 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5648 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5649 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5650 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5655 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5659 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5660 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5661 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5663 debug_assert!(false);
5664 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5666 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5667 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5668 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5669 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5670 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5671 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
5672 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5673 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5674 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5675 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5676 msg: announcement_sigs,
5678 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5679 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5680 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5681 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5682 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5683 // announcement_signatures.
5684 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5685 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5686 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5687 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5694 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5695 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
5700 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5704 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5705 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5706 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5707 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5708 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5710 debug_assert!(false);
5711 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5713 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5714 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5715 // TODO(dunxen): Fix this duplication when we switch to a single map with enums as per
5716 // https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
5717 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5718 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", log_bytes!(&msg.channel_id[..]));
5719 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5720 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5721 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5723 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5724 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", log_bytes!(&msg.channel_id[..]));
5725 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5726 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5727 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5729 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5730 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5731 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5732 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5733 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5736 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5737 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
5738 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5739 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5741 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5742 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5743 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5744 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5745 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5746 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5751 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5752 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5753 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5754 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
5758 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5761 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5762 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5763 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5764 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5770 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5771 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5772 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5774 debug_assert!(false);
5775 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5777 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5778 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5779 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5780 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5781 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5782 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5783 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5784 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5785 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5790 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5791 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5792 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5793 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5794 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5795 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5796 } else { (tx, None) }
5798 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5801 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5802 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5803 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5805 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5806 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5807 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5808 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5809 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5813 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5818 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5819 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5820 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5821 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5823 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5824 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5825 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5826 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5828 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5829 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5830 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5832 debug_assert!(false);
5833 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5835 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5836 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5837 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5838 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5840 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
5841 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
5842 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
5843 chan.get().context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
5844 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
5846 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5847 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5848 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5849 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5850 match pending_forward_info {
5851 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5852 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5853 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5854 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5856 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5857 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5858 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5859 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5860 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5863 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5865 _ => pending_forward_info
5868 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
5870 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5875 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5876 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5877 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5878 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5880 debug_assert!(false);
5881 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5883 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5884 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5885 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5886 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5887 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5889 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5892 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5896 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5897 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5898 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5900 debug_assert!(false);
5901 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5903 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5904 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5905 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5906 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5907 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5909 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5914 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5915 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5916 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5918 debug_assert!(false);
5919 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5921 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5922 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5923 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5924 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5925 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5926 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5927 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5929 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5932 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5936 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5937 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5938 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5940 debug_assert!(false);
5941 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5943 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5944 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5945 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5946 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5947 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5948 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5949 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5950 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5951 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
5954 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5959 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5960 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5961 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5962 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5963 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5964 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5965 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5966 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5967 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5968 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5969 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5971 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5972 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5974 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5975 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5976 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5977 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5978 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5979 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5981 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5982 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5983 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5985 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5986 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5987 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5988 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5989 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5990 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5991 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5992 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5993 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5996 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5997 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5999 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6000 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6001 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6002 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6003 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6004 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6005 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6006 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6009 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6010 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6011 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6016 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6017 // payments are being processed.
6018 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6019 push_forward_event = true;
6021 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6022 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6029 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6030 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6033 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6034 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6035 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6037 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6041 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6042 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6043 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6044 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6045 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6047 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6048 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6049 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6050 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6051 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6052 // real by taking more time.
6053 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6054 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6055 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6060 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6061 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6062 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6063 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6064 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6065 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6066 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6068 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6069 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6070 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6071 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6072 channel_funding_outpoint,
6073 counterparty_node_id,
6078 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6079 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
6080 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6081 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6083 debug_assert!(false);
6084 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6085 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6086 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6087 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6088 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6089 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
6090 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
6091 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6092 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6093 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
6095 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
6097 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6100 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6104 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6105 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6106 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6108 debug_assert!(false);
6109 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6111 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6112 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6113 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6114 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6115 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
6117 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6122 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6123 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6124 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6126 debug_assert!(false);
6127 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6129 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6130 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6131 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6132 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6133 if !chan.get().context.is_usable() {
6134 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6137 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6138 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
6139 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6140 msg, &self.default_configuration
6142 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6143 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6144 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
6147 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6152 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
6153 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6154 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6155 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6157 // It's not a local channel
6158 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6161 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6162 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6163 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6164 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6166 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6167 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6168 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6169 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6170 if chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6171 if chan.get().context.should_announce() {
6172 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6173 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6174 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6175 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6177 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6179 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6180 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6181 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6182 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6184 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
6185 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
6188 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6190 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6193 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6195 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6196 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6198 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6200 debug_assert!(false);
6201 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6203 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6204 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6205 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6206 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6207 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6208 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6209 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6210 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6211 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
6212 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
6213 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
6214 let mut channel_update = None;
6215 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6216 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6217 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6220 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
6221 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6222 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6223 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6224 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
6225 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6226 node_id: chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6231 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6232 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6233 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6234 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6235 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6236 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6240 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6244 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6245 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6248 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6249 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6254 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6255 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6256 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6258 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6259 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6260 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6261 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6262 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6263 match monitor_event {
6264 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6265 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6266 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
6267 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
6269 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
6270 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6271 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6272 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6275 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
6276 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
6277 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6278 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6280 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6281 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6282 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6283 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6286 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6287 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6288 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6289 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6290 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6291 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6292 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6293 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
6294 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6295 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6296 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6300 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
6301 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
6303 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
6305 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
6306 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6307 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6308 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
6309 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
6316 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6317 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6323 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6324 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6327 has_pending_monitor_events
6330 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6331 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6332 /// update events as a separate process method here.
6334 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6335 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6336 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6339 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6340 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6341 /// update was applied.
6342 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6343 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6344 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6345 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
6347 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6348 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6349 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6350 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6352 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6353 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6355 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6356 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6357 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
6358 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6359 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6360 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6361 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
6362 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6363 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6365 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6366 has_monitor_update = true;
6368 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
6369 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6370 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
6371 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
6373 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
6375 continue 'peer_loop;
6384 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
6385 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6386 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
6389 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6390 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6396 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
6397 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
6398 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
6399 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
6400 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6401 let mut has_update = false;
6403 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6405 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6406 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6407 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6408 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6409 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
6410 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6411 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6412 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
6414 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6415 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
6418 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
6419 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
6420 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6421 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6422 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6427 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6429 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
6430 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6431 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6437 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
6438 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
6446 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6447 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6453 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
6454 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
6456 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
6457 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6458 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
6459 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
6460 // reorganized out of the main chain.
6461 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
6462 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
6463 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
6464 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
6465 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
6466 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
6467 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
6468 assert!(should_broadcast);
6469 } else { unreachable!(); }
6470 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6471 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6472 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6475 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6479 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6482 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6483 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6485 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6486 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6487 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6488 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6490 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6492 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6493 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6497 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6498 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6500 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6502 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6503 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6505 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6506 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6507 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6508 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6509 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6510 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6511 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6512 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6513 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6514 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6515 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6518 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6519 /// stored external to LDK.
6521 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6522 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6523 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6525 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6526 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6529 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6530 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6531 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6532 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6534 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6535 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6536 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6537 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6538 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6540 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6541 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6542 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6543 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6544 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6546 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6547 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6549 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6550 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6554 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6555 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6557 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6559 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6560 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6562 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6563 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6564 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6565 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6566 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6567 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6568 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6571 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6572 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6574 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6575 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6576 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6579 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6580 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6582 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6583 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6584 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6585 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6587 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6588 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6589 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6590 Some(_) => continue,
6591 None => return scid_candidate
6596 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6598 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6599 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6601 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6602 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6603 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6607 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6608 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6609 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6611 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6612 /// times to get a unique scid.
6613 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6614 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6615 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6617 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6618 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6619 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6620 return scid_candidate
6624 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6625 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6626 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6627 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6629 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6630 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6631 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6632 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6633 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6634 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6635 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6636 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6645 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6646 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6647 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6648 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6649 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6653 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6654 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6655 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6656 events.push_back((event, None));
6660 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6661 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6662 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6666 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6667 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6671 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6672 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6675 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6676 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6677 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6678 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6679 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6680 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6682 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6683 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6684 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6685 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6687 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6688 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6689 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6690 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6692 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6696 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6697 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6698 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6699 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6700 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6701 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6702 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6706 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6707 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6708 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6709 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6710 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6711 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
6712 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6714 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6716 if further_update_exists {
6717 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6722 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6723 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6727 log_debug!(self.logger,
6728 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6729 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6733 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6734 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6735 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6739 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6740 for action in actions {
6742 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6743 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6745 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
6751 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6752 /// using the given event handler.
6754 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6755 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6759 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6763 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6765 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6766 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6767 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6768 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6769 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6770 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6774 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6775 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6776 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6777 /// is always placed next to each other.
6779 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6780 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6781 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6782 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6784 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6785 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6786 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6787 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6788 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6789 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6790 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
6792 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6793 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6794 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6795 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6798 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6799 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6801 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6802 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6805 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6806 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6807 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6808 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6809 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6810 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6811 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6815 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6816 events.replace(pending_events);
6825 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6827 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6828 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6829 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6830 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6831 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6832 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6836 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6838 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6839 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6840 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6842 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6846 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6848 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6849 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6850 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6851 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6852 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6853 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6857 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6859 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6860 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6861 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6862 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6863 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6866 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6867 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6870 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6871 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6872 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6873 let new_height = height - 1;
6875 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6876 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6877 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6878 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6879 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6880 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6883 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6887 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6889 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6890 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6891 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6892 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6893 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6894 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6898 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6899 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6900 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6901 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6903 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6904 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6906 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6907 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6908 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6909 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6911 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6912 if height < last_best_block_height {
6913 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6914 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6918 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6919 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6920 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6921 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6923 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6924 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6926 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6927 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6928 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6930 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6932 macro_rules! max_time {
6933 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6935 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6936 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6937 // having an explicit local time source.
6938 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6939 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6940 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6941 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6942 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6948 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6949 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6950 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6951 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6955 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6956 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6957 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6958 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6959 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6960 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6961 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6962 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6969 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6970 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6971 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6972 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6973 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
6974 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6975 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6976 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6977 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6982 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6984 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6985 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6986 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6987 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6988 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6989 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6993 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6994 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6996 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6997 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6998 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6999 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7000 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7002 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7003 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
7005 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7006 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7007 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7008 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7009 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7010 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
7011 let res = f(channel);
7012 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
7013 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
7014 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
7015 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
7016 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
7018 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
7019 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
7020 if channel.context.is_usable() {
7021 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
7022 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
7023 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7024 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7029 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
7034 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7035 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
7038 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
7039 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
7040 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7041 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7042 msg: announcement_sigs,
7044 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7045 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
7046 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7048 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7049 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7050 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
7055 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
7056 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
7057 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
7058 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
7059 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
7060 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
7061 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
7062 // is always consistent.
7063 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
7064 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
7065 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
7066 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
7067 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
7070 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
7071 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
7072 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
7073 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
7074 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
7075 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
7076 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7080 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
7081 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
7082 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7083 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7084 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
7085 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7086 data: reason_message,
7096 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7097 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
7098 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
7099 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
7100 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
7101 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
7102 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
7103 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7104 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7105 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
7107 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
7108 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
7109 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
7113 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
7116 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7117 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
7118 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7119 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7120 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
7121 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
7122 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7123 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7124 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
7127 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
7128 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7129 _ => unreachable!(),
7131 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
7132 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
7133 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
7134 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
7140 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
7142 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
7143 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
7147 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
7149 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
7150 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
7152 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
7153 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
7156 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7157 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
7158 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
7161 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
7162 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
7163 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
7164 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
7167 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7168 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7169 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7170 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7173 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7174 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7176 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7177 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7178 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7179 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7180 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
7183 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7184 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7185 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
7186 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
7189 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7190 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7191 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7192 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
7195 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7196 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7197 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
7198 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7202 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7203 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7205 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7206 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7207 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7208 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7209 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7210 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7214 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
7215 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7216 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7219 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
7220 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7221 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7222 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7225 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
7226 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7227 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7230 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
7231 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7232 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7233 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7236 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
7237 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7238 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7241 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
7242 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7243 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7246 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
7247 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7248 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7251 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
7252 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7253 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7256 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
7257 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7258 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7261 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
7262 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7263 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7266 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
7267 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7268 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7271 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
7272 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7273 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7276 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
7277 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7278 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7281 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
7282 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7283 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7286 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
7287 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7288 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7291 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
7292 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7293 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7296 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
7297 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7298 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7301 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
7302 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
7303 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
7304 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
7305 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
7307 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
7312 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
7313 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7314 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7317 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
7318 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7319 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7320 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7322 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
7323 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7324 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7325 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7326 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7327 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7328 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7329 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
7330 if chan.is_shutdown() {
7331 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7332 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7337 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7338 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7339 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7342 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7343 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7344 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7347 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
7349 // V1 Channel Establishment
7350 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
7351 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
7352 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
7353 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
7354 // V2 Channel Establishment
7355 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7356 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7357 // Common Channel Establishment
7358 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
7359 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
7360 // Interactive Transaction Construction
7361 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
7362 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
7363 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
7364 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
7365 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
7366 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
7367 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
7368 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
7369 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
7370 // Channel Operations
7371 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
7372 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
7373 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
7374 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
7375 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
7376 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
7378 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
7379 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7380 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
7381 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7382 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
7383 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
7384 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
7385 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
7386 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
7389 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
7390 peer_state.is_connected = false;
7391 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
7392 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
7395 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
7397 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7399 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7400 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
7404 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
7405 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
7406 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7410 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7412 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
7413 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
7414 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
7415 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
7416 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
7417 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
7420 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7421 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
7422 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7423 if inbound_peer_limited {
7426 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
7427 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7428 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7429 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7430 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7431 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
7432 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7433 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7434 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7435 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7439 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
7440 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
7441 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
7443 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7444 if inbound_peer_limited &&
7445 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
7446 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
7451 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
7452 peer_state.is_connected = true;
7457 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7459 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7460 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7461 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7462 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7463 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7465 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
7466 // (so won't be recovered after a crash) we don't need to bother closing unfunded channels and
7467 // clearing their maps here. Instead we can just send queue channel_reestablish messages for
7468 // channels in the channel_by_id map.
7469 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().for_each(|(_, chan)| {
7470 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7471 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7472 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7476 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7480 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
7481 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7483 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
7484 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
7485 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7486 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7487 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7488 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7489 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7490 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned()
7491 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned())
7492 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned()).collect()
7494 for channel_id in channel_ids {
7495 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7496 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7500 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
7501 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7502 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7503 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7504 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7505 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7506 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
7507 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
7508 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
7509 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7517 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7518 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7522 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7523 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7526 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
7527 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7530 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
7531 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
7534 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
7535 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7536 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7537 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7540 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7541 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7542 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7543 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7546 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7547 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7548 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7549 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7552 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7553 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7554 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7555 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7558 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7559 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7560 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7561 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7564 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7565 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7566 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7567 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7570 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7571 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7572 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7573 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7576 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7577 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7578 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7579 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7582 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7583 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7584 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7585 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7589 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7590 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7591 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7592 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
7593 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
7597 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7598 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7600 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7601 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7602 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7603 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7604 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7607 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7608 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7609 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7610 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7613 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7614 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7615 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7616 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7619 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7620 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7621 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7622 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7623 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7624 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
7625 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
7626 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
7627 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
7628 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
7629 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
7630 features.set_payment_secret_required();
7631 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
7632 features.set_wumbo_optional();
7633 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
7634 features.set_channel_type_optional();
7635 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
7636 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
7637 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
7638 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
7643 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7644 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7646 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7647 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7648 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7649 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7652 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7653 (2, node_id, required),
7654 (4, features, required),
7655 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7656 (8, forwarding_info, option),
7657 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7658 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7661 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7662 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7663 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7664 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7665 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7666 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7667 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7668 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7669 (2, self.channel_id, required),
7670 (3, self.channel_type, option),
7671 (4, self.counterparty, required),
7672 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
7673 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
7674 (7, self.config, option),
7675 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
7676 (9, self.confirmations, option),
7677 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
7678 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7679 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7680 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
7681 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7682 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
7683 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7684 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
7685 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7686 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7687 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7688 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7689 (30, self.is_usable, required),
7690 (32, self.is_public, required),
7691 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7692 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7693 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7694 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7695 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
7701 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7702 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7703 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7704 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7705 (2, channel_id, required),
7706 (3, channel_type, option),
7707 (4, counterparty, required),
7708 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7709 (6, funding_txo, option),
7710 (7, config, option),
7711 (8, short_channel_id, option),
7712 (9, confirmations, option),
7713 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7714 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7715 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7716 (16, balance_msat, required),
7717 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7718 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7719 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7720 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7721 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7722 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
7723 (22, confirmations_required, option),
7724 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7725 (26, is_outbound, required),
7726 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7727 (30, is_usable, required),
7728 (32, is_public, required),
7729 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7730 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7731 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7732 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7733 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
7736 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7737 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7738 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7739 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7740 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7744 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7746 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7747 outbound_scid_alias,
7751 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7752 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7754 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
7755 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7756 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7757 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
7758 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7759 confirmations_required,
7761 force_close_spend_delay,
7762 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7763 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7764 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7765 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7766 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7767 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7768 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7769 channel_shutdown_state,
7774 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7775 (2, channels, required_vec),
7776 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7777 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7780 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7782 (0, onion_packet, required),
7783 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7786 (0, payment_data, required),
7787 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7788 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7789 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7790 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
7792 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7793 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7794 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7795 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7796 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
7797 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
7801 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7802 (0, routing, required),
7803 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7804 (4, payment_hash, required),
7805 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7806 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7807 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7808 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7812 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7813 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7815 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7817 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7818 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7819 reason.write(writer)?;
7821 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7822 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7825 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7826 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7827 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7828 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7835 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7836 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7837 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7840 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7841 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7842 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7843 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7847 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7848 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7849 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7850 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7851 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7854 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7855 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7856 // messages contained in the variants.
7857 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7858 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7859 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7861 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7862 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7863 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7864 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7865 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7868 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7869 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7870 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7871 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7872 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7874 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7879 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7884 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7885 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7886 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7887 (2, outpoint, required),
7888 (4, htlc_id, required),
7889 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7892 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7893 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7894 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7895 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7896 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7898 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7899 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7900 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7901 (2, self.value, required),
7902 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7903 (4, payment_data, option),
7904 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7905 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7906 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7907 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7913 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7914 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7915 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7916 (0, prev_hop, required),
7917 (1, total_msat, option),
7918 (2, value_ser, required),
7919 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7920 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
7921 (5, total_value_received, option),
7922 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7923 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7924 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7926 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
7927 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
7928 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7930 if payment_data.is_some() {
7931 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7933 if total_msat.is_none() {
7934 total_msat = Some(value);
7936 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7939 if total_msat.is_none() {
7940 if payment_data.is_none() {
7941 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7943 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7945 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7949 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7952 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7953 total_value_received,
7954 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7956 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
7957 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
7962 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7963 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7964 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7967 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7968 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7969 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
7970 let mut payment_id = None;
7971 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7972 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7973 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7974 (0, session_priv, required),
7975 (1, payment_id, option),
7976 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7977 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
7978 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7979 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7981 if payment_id.is_none() {
7982 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7984 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7986 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
7987 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7988 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7990 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7991 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
7992 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
7993 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7997 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7998 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7999 first_hop_htlc_msat,
8001 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
8004 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8005 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8010 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
8011 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
8013 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
8015 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
8016 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8017 (0, session_priv, required),
8018 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
8019 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8020 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
8021 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
8022 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
8023 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
8026 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
8028 field.write(writer)?;
8035 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
8036 (0, forward_info, required),
8037 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
8038 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
8039 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
8040 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
8043 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
8045 (0, htlc_id, required),
8046 (2, err_packet, required),
8051 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
8052 (0, payment_secret, required),
8053 (2, expiry_time, required),
8054 (4, user_payment_id, required),
8055 (6, payment_preimage, required),
8056 (8, min_value_msat, required),
8059 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8061 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8062 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8063 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8064 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8065 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8066 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8070 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8071 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
8073 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8075 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
8077 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8078 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
8079 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
8082 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
8084 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8085 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
8086 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
8087 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8088 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8089 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8090 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8091 serializable_peer_count += 1;
8093 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
8094 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8095 if !channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8096 unfunded_channels += 1;
8101 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
8103 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8104 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8105 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8106 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8107 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8108 channel.write(writer)?;
8115 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8116 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8117 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
8118 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8119 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8120 for forward in pending_forwards {
8121 forward.write(writer)?;
8126 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8128 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8129 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
8130 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8132 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
8133 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
8134 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8135 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
8136 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8137 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8138 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
8139 htlc.write(writer)?;
8141 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
8142 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
8145 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
8146 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
8147 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8148 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
8149 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
8150 // per_peer_state lock at all.
8151 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
8154 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
8155 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8156 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
8157 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
8158 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
8160 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8161 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
8162 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
8163 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
8164 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
8165 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
8166 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
8171 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8172 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
8173 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
8174 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
8175 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
8176 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
8177 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
8178 // well save the space and not write any events here.
8179 0u64.write(writer)?;
8181 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8182 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
8183 event.write(writer)?;
8187 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
8188 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
8189 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
8190 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
8191 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
8192 0u64.write(writer)?;
8194 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
8195 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
8196 // likely to be identical.
8197 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8198 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8200 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8201 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
8202 hash.write(writer)?;
8203 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
8206 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
8207 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
8208 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8209 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
8210 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
8213 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
8214 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8216 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8217 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8218 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
8219 session_priv.write(writer)?;
8222 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
8223 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
8227 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
8228 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
8229 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8231 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8232 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8233 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
8239 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
8240 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8241 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
8242 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
8245 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
8246 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
8247 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
8248 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
8249 pending_claiming_payments = None;
8252 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8253 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8254 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
8255 if !updates.is_empty() {
8256 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
8257 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
8262 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8263 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
8264 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8265 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
8266 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8267 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
8268 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8269 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
8270 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
8271 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
8272 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8273 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
8274 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8281 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8282 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8283 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
8284 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
8287 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
8288 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
8289 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
8290 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
8291 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
8292 // check that the event is sane here.
8293 let event_encoded = event.encode();
8294 let event_read: Option<Event> =
8295 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
8296 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
8302 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8303 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8304 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8305 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
8306 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
8307 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
8310 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
8311 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
8312 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
8313 events.push_back((ev, action));
8314 } else if action.is_some() {
8315 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8322 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
8323 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
8324 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
8325 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
8326 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
8327 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
8330 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
8332 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
8334 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8335 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
8336 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
8337 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
8338 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
8339 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
8340 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
8341 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
8342 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8343 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
8344 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
8345 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
8346 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
8348 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
8349 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
8351 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
8352 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
8354 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
8355 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
8356 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
8357 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
8358 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
8359 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
8361 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
8362 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8364 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8365 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8366 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8367 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8368 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8369 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8373 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
8374 pub entropy_source: ES,
8376 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
8377 pub node_signer: NS,
8379 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
8380 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
8382 pub signer_provider: SP,
8384 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8386 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
8387 pub fee_estimator: F,
8388 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8390 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
8391 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
8392 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
8393 pub chain_monitor: M,
8395 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
8396 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
8397 /// force-closed during deserialization.
8398 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
8399 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
8400 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
8402 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
8404 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
8405 /// deserialization.
8407 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
8408 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
8409 pub default_config: UserConfig,
8411 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
8412 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
8414 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
8415 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
8416 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
8417 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
8419 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
8422 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
8423 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
8426 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8427 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8429 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8430 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8431 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8432 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8433 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8434 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8438 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
8439 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
8440 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
8441 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
8442 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
8444 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
8445 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
8450 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
8451 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
8452 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8453 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
8455 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8456 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8457 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8458 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8459 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8460 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8464 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8465 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
8466 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
8470 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8471 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
8473 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8474 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8475 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8476 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8477 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8478 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8482 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8483 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8485 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8486 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8487 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8489 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8491 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8492 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8493 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8494 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8495 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8496 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
8497 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
8498 for _ in 0..channel_count {
8499 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
8500 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
8502 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8503 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
8504 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
8505 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
8506 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
8507 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
8508 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8509 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
8510 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
8511 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
8512 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8513 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
8514 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
8515 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
8516 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8517 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
8520 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
8521 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8522 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8523 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8524 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
8525 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
8526 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
8528 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8529 let mut found_htlc = false;
8530 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8531 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
8534 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
8535 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
8536 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
8537 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
8538 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
8539 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
8540 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
8541 log_info!(args.logger,
8542 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
8543 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8544 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8548 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
8549 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
8550 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8551 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8552 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8554 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8555 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
8557 match peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8558 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8559 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8560 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8562 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8563 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8564 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8565 entry.insert(by_id_map);
8569 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
8570 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
8571 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
8572 // safely discard the channel.
8573 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
8574 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8575 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8576 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8577 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8578 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
8579 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
8582 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
8583 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8584 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8585 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8586 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8587 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8591 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8592 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8593 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8594 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8595 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8596 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8597 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8599 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8603 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8604 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8605 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8606 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8607 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8608 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8609 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
8610 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
8611 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
8613 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
8616 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8617 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8618 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
8619 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8620 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8621 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
8622 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
8623 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
8625 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
8628 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
8631 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8632 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8633 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8634 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
8635 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8636 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8637 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8638 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8639 is_connected: false,
8643 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8644 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
8645 for _ in 0..peer_count {
8646 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8647 let peer_chans = peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
8648 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
8649 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
8650 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
8653 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8654 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
8655 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
8656 for _ in 0..event_count {
8657 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
8658 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
8663 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8664 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
8665 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8667 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
8668 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
8669 // on-startup monitor updates.
8670 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
8671 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
8673 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8677 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
8678 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8680 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8681 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
8682 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
8683 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
8684 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8688 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8689 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
8690 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
8691 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
8692 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
8693 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
8694 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
8696 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
8697 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8701 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
8702 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
8703 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
8704 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
8705 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
8706 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8707 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8708 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
8709 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
8710 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
8711 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
8712 let mut events_override = None;
8713 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8714 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8715 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
8716 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8717 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
8718 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8719 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
8720 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8721 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
8722 (8, events_override, option),
8723 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
8724 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8725 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
8726 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8728 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
8729 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8732 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
8733 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8736 if let Some(events) = events_override {
8737 pending_events_read = events;
8740 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
8741 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
8744 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
8745 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
8746 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
8747 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
8748 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
8749 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
8751 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
8753 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
8754 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8755 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8758 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
8759 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
8760 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
8761 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
8762 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
8764 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
8765 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
8766 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
8768 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
8769 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
8770 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
8771 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
8772 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
8774 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
8775 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8776 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
8777 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
8778 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, log_bytes!($funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8779 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
8780 pending_background_events.push(
8781 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8782 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8783 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
8784 update: update.clone(),
8787 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
8788 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
8789 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
8790 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
8791 pending_background_events.push(
8792 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
8793 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8794 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
8797 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
8798 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
8799 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8801 max_in_flight_update_id
8805 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8806 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8807 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8808 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8809 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
8811 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8812 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
8813 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
8814 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
8815 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
8816 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
8817 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
8818 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
8819 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
8822 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
8823 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
8824 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8825 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
8826 log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
8827 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
8828 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8829 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8830 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8831 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8832 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8837 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
8838 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
8839 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
8840 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
8841 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
8842 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
8843 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
8844 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
8846 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8847 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
8848 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
8850 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8851 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
8852 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8853 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8854 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8855 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8856 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8857 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8862 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
8863 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
8865 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
8866 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
8867 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
8868 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
8871 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8872 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8873 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8874 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8875 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8876 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8877 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8879 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8880 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
8881 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
8882 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8883 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8884 if path.hops.is_empty() {
8885 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8886 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8889 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
8890 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
8891 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
8892 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
8893 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8894 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
8895 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
8896 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
8898 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8899 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
8900 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
8901 retry_strategy: None,
8902 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
8903 payment_params: None,
8904 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
8905 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
8906 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8907 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8908 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8909 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8910 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
8911 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
8912 total_msat: path_amt,
8913 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
8915 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
8916 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
8921 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8923 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
8924 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
8925 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
8926 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
8928 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
8929 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
8930 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
8931 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
8932 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
8933 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
8934 forwards.retain(|forward| {
8935 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
8936 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8937 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8938 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8943 !forwards.is_empty()
8945 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
8946 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8947 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8948 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8949 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
8950 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
8951 intercepted_id != ev_id
8958 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
8959 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
8960 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
8961 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
8962 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
8963 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
8964 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
8965 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
8966 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
8967 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
8968 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
8969 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
8970 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
8977 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
8978 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
8980 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
8982 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
8983 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
8984 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
8985 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
8986 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
8987 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
8988 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
8989 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
8990 monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()))
8993 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
8994 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
8995 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
8996 // channel still live case here.
9000 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
9001 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
9006 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
9007 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
9008 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
9009 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
9010 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
9011 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
9012 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
9013 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
9017 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
9018 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
9020 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
9021 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
9022 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9023 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9025 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
9026 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9027 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9029 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
9030 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
9032 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9033 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
9035 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9038 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
9039 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9040 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9042 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9046 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
9047 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
9048 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
9049 if htlcs.is_empty() {
9050 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9052 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
9053 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
9054 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
9055 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
9056 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
9057 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
9058 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
9059 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
9061 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
9062 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9066 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
9068 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9070 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
9071 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
9073 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9074 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9079 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9080 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9082 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
9084 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9086 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
9087 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
9088 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
9089 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9093 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
9094 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9095 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9096 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9097 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9098 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
9099 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
9101 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
9102 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
9103 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
9105 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
9106 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
9107 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9108 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9109 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9110 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9112 if chan.context.is_usable() {
9113 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
9114 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9115 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9116 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9117 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9123 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
9125 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9126 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
9127 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
9128 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
9129 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
9130 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
9131 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
9132 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
9133 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
9134 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
9135 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
9137 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
9138 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
9140 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
9141 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
9142 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
9143 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
9145 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
9146 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
9147 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
9148 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
9150 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
9151 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
9152 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
9153 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
9155 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
9156 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
9157 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
9158 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9159 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9160 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
9161 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
9164 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
9165 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
9168 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
9171 purpose: payment.purpose,
9172 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
9178 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
9179 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
9180 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
9181 for action in actions.iter() {
9182 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
9183 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
9184 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
9186 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
9187 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9188 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
9189 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
9191 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
9192 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
9193 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
9194 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
9200 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
9202 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
9203 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9207 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
9209 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
9210 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
9211 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
9212 router: args.router,
9214 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
9216 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
9217 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
9218 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
9219 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
9221 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
9222 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
9223 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
9224 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
9225 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
9226 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
9228 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
9233 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
9235 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
9237 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
9238 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
9239 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
9240 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
9241 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
9242 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
9244 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
9245 node_signer: args.node_signer,
9246 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
9248 logger: args.logger,
9249 default_configuration: args.default_config,
9252 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
9253 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
9254 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
9255 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
9256 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
9259 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_chan_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
9260 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
9261 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
9262 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
9263 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
9264 downstream_closed, downstream_chan_id);
9267 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
9268 //connection or two.
9270 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
9276 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9277 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9278 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
9279 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
9280 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
9281 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
9282 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
9283 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9284 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
9285 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
9286 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
9287 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9288 use crate::util::test_utils;
9289 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
9290 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
9293 fn test_notify_limits() {
9294 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
9295 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
9296 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9297 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9298 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9299 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9301 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
9302 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
9303 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9304 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9305 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9307 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9309 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
9310 // to connect messages with new values
9311 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9312 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9313 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9314 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9315 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9316 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9318 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
9319 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9320 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9321 // ... but the last node should not.
9322 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9323 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
9324 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9325 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9327 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
9328 // about the channel.
9329 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9330 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9331 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9333 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
9335 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9336 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9337 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9338 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9339 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9340 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9342 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
9343 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9344 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9346 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
9347 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
9348 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
9349 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
9350 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
9351 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
9353 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
9354 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
9355 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9356 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9357 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9358 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9359 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9360 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9362 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
9363 // the channel info has updated.
9364 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9365 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9366 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9367 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9368 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9369 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9373 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
9374 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
9376 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9377 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9378 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9379 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9380 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9382 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
9383 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9384 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
9385 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
9387 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9388 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
9389 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
9390 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
9391 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9392 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
9393 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9394 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9395 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9396 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9397 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9398 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9400 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
9401 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9402 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9403 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9404 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9405 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9406 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9407 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9408 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9409 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9410 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9411 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9412 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9414 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9415 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9416 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9417 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9418 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9419 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9420 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9421 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9422 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9424 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
9425 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9426 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9428 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9429 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9430 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
9432 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
9433 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
9434 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
9435 // lightning messages manually.
9436 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9437 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
9438 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9440 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9441 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9442 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
9443 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9444 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9445 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
9446 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9447 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9448 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
9449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9450 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9451 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9452 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9454 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9455 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
9456 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9457 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9458 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
9459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9460 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9461 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9462 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9463 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
9464 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9466 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
9467 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
9468 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9469 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
9471 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
9472 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
9473 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
9474 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
9476 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9479 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9480 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9481 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9482 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9484 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9487 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9488 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9489 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9490 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9492 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9497 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
9498 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
9499 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
9502 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
9503 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
9504 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
9505 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
9506 // fails as expected.
9507 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
9508 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
9509 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
9510 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
9511 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
9512 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
9513 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9514 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9515 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9516 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
9517 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9518 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9519 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9520 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9521 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9523 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
9524 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
9525 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
9527 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9528 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9529 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9530 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9532 let route = find_route(
9533 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9534 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9536 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9537 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9538 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9539 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9540 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9541 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9542 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9543 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9545 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9546 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
9547 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
9548 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9549 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9550 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9551 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9552 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9553 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9554 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9555 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9556 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9557 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9558 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9559 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9561 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9562 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9564 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9565 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9566 let route = find_route(
9567 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9568 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9570 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9571 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9572 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9573 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9574 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9575 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9576 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9577 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9579 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
9580 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9581 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9582 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9583 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9584 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9585 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9586 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9587 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9588 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9590 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9591 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9592 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9593 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9594 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9595 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9596 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9597 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9598 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9599 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9600 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9601 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9602 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9604 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
9605 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9607 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9608 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
9609 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9610 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
9611 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9612 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9613 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9614 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9615 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9616 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9618 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9619 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9620 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9621 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9623 let route = find_route(
9624 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9625 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9627 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
9628 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9629 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
9630 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9631 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9632 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9633 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9634 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9635 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9636 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9637 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9638 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9639 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9640 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9641 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9642 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9643 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9644 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9645 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9646 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9647 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9648 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9649 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9651 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9652 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9656 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
9657 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
9658 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
9659 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9660 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9661 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9662 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9664 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9665 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9667 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9668 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9669 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9670 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9672 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9673 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9674 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9675 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9676 let route = find_route(
9677 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9678 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9681 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9682 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
9683 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
9684 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9685 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
9686 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9687 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9689 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9690 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9691 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9692 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9693 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9694 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9695 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9697 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
9701 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
9702 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
9703 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
9704 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9705 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
9706 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9707 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9708 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9709 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9711 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9712 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9714 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9715 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9716 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9717 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9719 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9720 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9721 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9722 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9723 let route = find_route(
9724 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9725 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9728 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9729 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9730 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
9731 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
9732 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9733 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
9734 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
9735 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9736 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9738 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9739 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9740 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9741 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9742 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9743 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9744 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9746 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
9750 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
9751 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9752 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9753 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9754 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9756 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9757 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9758 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9759 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9761 // Marshall an MPP route.
9762 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
9763 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
9764 route.paths.push(path);
9765 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9766 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
9767 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
9768 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
9769 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
9770 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
9772 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9773 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
9775 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
9776 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
9778 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
9783 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
9784 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9785 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9786 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9787 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9789 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9791 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9792 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9794 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9795 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9796 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9797 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9800 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
9801 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
9802 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9803 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
9804 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
9805 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
9808 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9811 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
9812 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
9817 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
9818 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
9819 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9820 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9821 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9822 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9824 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
9825 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9827 total_msat: 100_000,
9830 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
9831 // payment verification fails as expected.
9832 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
9833 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
9834 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
9835 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
9837 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
9841 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
9842 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
9846 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
9847 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
9848 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
9849 // the channel is successfully closed.
9850 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9851 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9852 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9853 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9855 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9856 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9857 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9858 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9859 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9861 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9862 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
9864 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
9865 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
9866 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9867 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9870 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9872 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9873 // as it has the funding transaction.
9874 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9875 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9876 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9879 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9881 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9883 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9885 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9886 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9887 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9889 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9892 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9893 // as it has the funding transaction.
9894 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9895 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9896 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9898 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9899 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9900 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9901 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9902 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9903 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9904 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9905 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
9907 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9908 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9909 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9910 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
9912 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9913 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
9915 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
9916 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
9917 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
9918 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
9919 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9920 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9921 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9925 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
9926 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
9927 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
9928 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
9929 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9930 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9931 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9934 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9936 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
9937 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
9938 // closing transaction).
9939 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
9940 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
9941 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9943 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
9944 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
9945 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9946 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9947 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9950 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9952 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
9954 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
9955 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
9956 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9958 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9960 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
9961 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
9964 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9965 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
9966 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9969 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9970 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
9971 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9974 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
9976 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9977 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9979 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
9980 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9982 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
9983 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
9988 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
9989 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
9990 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
9991 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
9992 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9993 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9994 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
9995 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9998 let channel_id = [4; 32];
9999 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10000 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
10002 // Test the API functions.
10003 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
10005 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
10007 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10009 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10011 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10013 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
10015 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
10019 fn test_connection_limiting() {
10020 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
10021 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10022 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10023 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10024 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10026 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10028 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10029 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10031 let mut funding_tx = None;
10032 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10033 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10034 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10037 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10038 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
10039 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
10040 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
10041 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10043 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10045 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10047 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10049 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10050 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10051 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10053 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10056 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
10057 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10058 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10059 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10060 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10062 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
10063 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
10065 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
10066 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
10067 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10068 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10069 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
10070 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10071 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10074 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10075 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10076 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10077 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10078 }, true).unwrap_err();
10080 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
10081 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
10082 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10083 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10084 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
10085 for ev in chan_closed_events {
10086 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
10088 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10089 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10091 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10092 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10093 }, true).unwrap_err();
10095 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
10096 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10097 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10098 }, false).unwrap();
10099 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10101 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
10102 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
10104 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
10105 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10106 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
10107 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
10108 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10110 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10111 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10112 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10114 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
10115 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10116 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
10118 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
10119 // "protected" and can connect again.
10120 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
10121 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10122 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10124 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10126 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
10128 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10129 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10133 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
10134 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
10135 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10136 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10137 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10138 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10140 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10142 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10143 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10145 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10146 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10147 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10148 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10151 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
10153 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10154 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10155 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10157 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
10158 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10159 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10161 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
10162 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10163 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10164 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10168 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
10169 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10170 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10171 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10172 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10173 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
10174 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10175 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
10176 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10178 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10180 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10181 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10183 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
10184 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10185 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10186 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10187 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10188 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10191 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10192 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10194 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10195 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10197 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10199 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
10200 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10203 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
10204 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10205 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10206 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10207 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10209 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10210 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10212 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10213 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
10214 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
10215 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
10219 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10221 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10222 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10224 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
10225 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10226 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10228 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10229 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10231 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10233 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10237 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
10238 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
10239 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
10240 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
10241 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10242 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
10243 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
10244 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
10246 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10247 payment_metadata: None,
10248 keysend_preimage: None,
10249 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10250 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10252 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10254 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
10255 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
10256 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
10257 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10258 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
10260 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
10261 } else { panic!(); }
10263 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
10264 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
10266 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10267 payment_metadata: None,
10268 keysend_preimage: None,
10269 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10270 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10272 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10274 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10275 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
10279 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
10280 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10281 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10282 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10283 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10285 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
10286 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10288 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10289 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10290 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
10291 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
10292 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10294 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10295 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10297 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10298 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10299 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10300 match &msg_events[0] {
10301 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
10302 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10304 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
10305 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
10306 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
10309 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10312 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10313 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10315 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
10316 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
10317 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10319 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10323 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
10324 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
10325 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
10326 // the channel without the anchors feature.
10327 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10328 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10329 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
10330 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10331 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10332 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
10333 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10335 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
10336 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10337 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10339 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10340 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10342 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10343 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10345 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10348 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10349 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
10351 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10352 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10354 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
10355 // not have generated any events.
10356 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10360 fn test_update_channel_config() {
10361 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10362 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10363 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
10364 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
10365 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10366 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10367 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
10369 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10370 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10371 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10373 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
10374 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10375 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
10376 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10377 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10379 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10380 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10383 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
10384 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10385 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10387 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
10388 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10389 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
10390 ..Default::default()
10392 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10393 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10394 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10396 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10397 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10400 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
10401 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10402 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10403 ..Default::default()
10405 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10406 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
10407 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10408 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10410 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10411 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10414 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
10415 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
10416 let bad_channel_id = [10; 32];
10417 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
10418 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
10421 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10422 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10423 ..Default::default()
10425 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
10428 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
10429 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
10430 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10431 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10437 use crate::chain::Listen;
10438 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
10439 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
10440 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
10441 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
10442 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10443 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
10444 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
10445 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
10446 use crate::util::test_utils;
10447 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
10449 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10450 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10451 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
10453 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
10455 use criterion::Criterion;
10457 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
10458 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
10459 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
10460 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
10461 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
10462 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
10463 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
10465 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
10466 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
10468 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
10469 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
10471 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
10473 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
10476 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
10477 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
10480 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
10481 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
10482 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
10484 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
10485 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
10487 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
10488 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
10489 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10490 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
10491 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
10493 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
10494 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
10495 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10497 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
10498 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
10499 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
10500 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10502 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10503 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10504 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
10506 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10507 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
10508 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
10509 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
10510 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10512 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10513 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10514 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
10516 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10517 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10519 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10520 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10521 }, false).unwrap();
10522 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10523 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10524 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10527 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
10528 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
10529 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
10531 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10532 } else { panic!(); }
10534 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10535 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10536 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10537 match events_b[0] {
10538 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10539 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10541 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10544 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10545 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10546 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10547 match events_a[0] {
10548 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10549 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10551 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10554 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
10556 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
10557 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
10558 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
10560 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10561 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10562 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
10563 match msg_events[0] {
10564 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
10565 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
10566 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10570 match msg_events[1] {
10571 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10575 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10576 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10577 match events_a[0] {
10578 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10579 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10581 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10584 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10585 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10586 match events_b[0] {
10587 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10588 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10590 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10593 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
10594 macro_rules! send_payment {
10595 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
10596 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
10597 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
10598 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
10599 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
10600 payment_count += 1;
10601 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
10602 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
10604 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
10605 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
10606 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
10607 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
10608 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
10609 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10610 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
10611 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
10612 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10613 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10614 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10616 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
10617 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
10618 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10619 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
10621 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
10622 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
10623 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
10624 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10625 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
10627 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
10630 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
10631 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10632 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10633 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10635 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
10639 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
10640 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
10641 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);