1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
33 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
34 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
36 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
46 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
50 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
51 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
53 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
55 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
57 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
59 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
60 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY};
61 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
62 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
63 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
64 use crate::onion_message::{Destination, OffersMessage, PendingOnionMessage};
65 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
66 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
67 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
68 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
69 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
70 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
71 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
72 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
74 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
77 use crate::prelude::*;
79 use core::cell::RefCell;
81 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
82 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
83 use core::time::Duration;
86 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
87 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
88 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
90 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
92 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
93 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
94 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
96 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
97 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
98 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
99 // before we forward it.
101 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
102 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
103 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
104 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
105 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
107 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
108 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
110 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
111 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
112 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
113 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
116 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
117 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
118 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
119 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
120 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
121 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
124 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
125 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
126 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
127 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
128 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
129 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
130 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
134 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
135 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
136 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
137 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
138 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
140 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
141 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
142 /// may overshoot this in either case)
143 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
144 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
145 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
146 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
147 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
150 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
151 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
152 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
153 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
156 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
157 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
158 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
159 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
160 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
163 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
164 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
166 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
167 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
168 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
171 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
172 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
174 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
175 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
178 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
179 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
182 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
186 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
187 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
188 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
189 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
190 short_channel_id: u64,
191 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
193 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
194 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
196 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
197 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
202 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
204 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
205 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
206 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
208 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
209 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
212 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
213 struct ClaimableHTLC {
214 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
216 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
218 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
219 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
220 sender_intended_value: u64,
221 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
223 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
224 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
225 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
226 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
228 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
229 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
232 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
233 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
234 events::ClaimedHTLC {
235 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
236 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
237 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
238 value_msat: val.value,
243 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
244 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
246 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
247 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
248 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
251 /// Number of bytes in the id.
252 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
255 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
256 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
261 impl Readable for PaymentId {
262 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
263 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
268 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
269 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
270 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
274 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
276 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
277 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
278 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
280 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
281 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
286 impl Readable for InterceptId {
287 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
288 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
293 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
294 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
295 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
296 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
297 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
300 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
302 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
303 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
304 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
306 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
307 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
311 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
312 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
313 (0, short_channel_id, required),
314 (2, htlc_id, required),
316 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
317 (0, session_priv, required),
322 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
323 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
324 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
325 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
326 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
329 session_priv: SecretKey,
330 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
331 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
332 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
333 payment_id: PaymentId,
336 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
337 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
338 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
340 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
342 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
344 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
347 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
348 payment_id.hash(hasher);
349 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
355 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
357 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
358 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
359 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
360 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
361 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
362 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
366 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
367 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
368 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
369 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
370 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
371 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
373 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
379 struct InboundOnionErr {
385 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
386 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
388 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
389 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
390 pub enum FailureCode {
391 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
392 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
393 TemporaryNodeFailure,
394 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
395 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
396 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
397 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
398 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
399 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
400 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
401 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
402 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
403 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
405 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
406 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
407 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
410 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
411 fn into(self) -> u16 {
413 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
414 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
415 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
416 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
421 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
422 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
423 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
424 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
425 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
427 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
428 err: msgs::LightningError,
429 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
430 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
431 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
433 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
435 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
437 err: LightningError {
439 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
440 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
447 shutdown_finish: None,
448 channel_capacity: None,
452 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
453 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
456 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
457 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
458 let action = if let (Some(_), ..) = &shutdown_res {
459 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
460 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
461 // commitment upon reconnecting.
462 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
464 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
467 err: LightningError { err, action },
468 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
469 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
470 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
474 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
477 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
479 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
480 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
484 log_level: Level::Warn,
487 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
489 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
491 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
493 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
494 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
502 shutdown_finish: None,
503 channel_capacity: None,
507 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
508 self.chan_id.is_some()
512 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
513 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
514 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
515 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
516 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
518 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
519 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
520 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
521 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
522 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
523 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
524 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
526 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
530 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
531 struct ClaimingPayment {
533 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
534 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
535 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
536 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
538 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
539 (0, amount_msat, required),
540 (2, payment_purpose, required),
541 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
542 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
543 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
546 struct ClaimablePayment {
547 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
548 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
549 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
552 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
553 struct ClaimablePayments {
554 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
555 /// failed/claimed by the user.
557 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
558 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
560 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
561 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
562 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
564 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
565 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
566 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
567 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
570 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
571 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
572 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
573 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
575 enum BackgroundEvent {
576 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
577 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
578 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
579 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
581 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
582 /// are regenerated on startup.
583 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
584 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
585 /// channel to continue normal operation.
587 /// In general this should be used rather than
588 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
589 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
590 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
592 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
593 /// are regenerated on startup.
594 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
595 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
596 funding_txo: OutPoint,
597 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
599 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
600 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
602 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
603 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
604 channel_id: ChannelId,
609 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
610 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
611 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
612 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
613 /// event can be generated.
614 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
615 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
616 /// operation of another channel.
618 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
619 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
620 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
621 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
623 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
624 event: events::Event,
625 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
627 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
628 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
629 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
631 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
632 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
633 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
634 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
635 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
637 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
638 /// stored for later processing.
639 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
640 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
641 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
642 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
646 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
647 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
648 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
649 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
650 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
651 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
652 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
653 (4, blocking_action, required),
655 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
656 (0, event, upgradable_required),
657 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
658 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
659 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
660 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
661 // downgrades to prior versions.
662 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
666 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
667 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
668 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
669 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
670 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
673 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
674 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
675 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
676 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
680 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
681 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
682 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
683 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
684 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
685 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
687 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
688 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
689 channel_id: ChannelId,
690 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
695 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
696 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
697 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
698 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
699 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
704 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
705 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
709 /// State we hold per-peer.
710 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
711 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
713 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
714 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
715 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
717 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
718 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
719 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
720 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
721 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
722 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
723 latest_features: InitFeatures,
724 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
725 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
726 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
727 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
728 /// user but which have not yet completed.
730 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
731 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
732 /// for a missing channel.
733 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
734 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
735 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
737 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
738 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
739 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
740 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
742 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
743 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
744 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
745 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
746 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
747 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
748 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
749 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
750 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
751 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
752 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
753 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
754 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
755 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
756 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
760 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
761 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
762 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
763 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
764 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
765 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
768 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
769 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
770 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
773 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
774 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
775 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
778 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
779 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
780 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
781 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
785 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
786 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
787 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
788 /// The original OpenChannel message.
789 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
790 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
791 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
794 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
795 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
796 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
798 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
799 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
801 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
804 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
805 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
806 struct PendingInboundPayment {
807 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
808 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
809 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
810 /// this payment being removed.
812 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
813 user_payment_id: u64,
814 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
815 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
816 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
819 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
820 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
821 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
822 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
823 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
824 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
825 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
826 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
828 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
829 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
837 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
839 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
840 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
841 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
846 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
847 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
848 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
849 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
850 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
851 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
852 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
853 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
854 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
856 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
857 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
866 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
868 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
869 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
870 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
875 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
877 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
879 pub trait AChannelManager {
880 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
881 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
882 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
883 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
884 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
885 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
886 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
887 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
888 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
889 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
890 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
891 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
892 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
893 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
894 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
895 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
896 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
897 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
898 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
899 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
900 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
901 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
902 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
903 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
904 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
905 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
906 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
907 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
908 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
909 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
910 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
911 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
912 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
913 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
914 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
915 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
918 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
919 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
921 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
922 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
923 ES::Target: EntropySource,
924 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
925 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
926 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
930 type Watch = M::Target;
932 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
934 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
936 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
938 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
939 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
941 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
943 type Router = R::Target;
945 type Logger = L::Target;
947 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
950 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
951 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
953 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
954 /// to individual Channels.
956 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
957 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
958 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
959 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
961 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
962 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
963 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
964 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
965 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
966 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
967 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
968 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
969 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
971 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
972 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
973 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
975 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
976 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
977 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
978 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
979 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
981 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
982 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
983 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
984 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
986 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
987 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
988 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
990 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
991 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
992 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
993 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
994 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
996 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
997 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
998 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
999 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1000 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1001 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1002 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1003 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1006 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1007 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1008 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1009 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1010 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1014 // `pending_offers_messages`
1016 // `total_consistency_lock`
1018 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1020 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1022 // |__`per_peer_state`
1024 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1026 // |__`claimable_payments`
1028 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1034 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1036 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1040 // |__`pending_events`
1042 // |__`pending_background_events`
1044 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1046 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1047 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1048 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1049 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1050 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1051 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1055 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1056 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1057 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1063 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1065 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1067 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1068 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1070 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1071 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1072 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1073 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1075 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1076 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1078 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1079 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1080 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1081 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1082 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1083 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1084 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1085 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1087 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1089 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1090 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1092 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1094 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1095 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1096 /// and via the classic SCID.
1098 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1099 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1101 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1103 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1105 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1106 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1107 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1109 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1110 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1112 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1113 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1115 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1116 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1118 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1119 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1120 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1121 /// active channel list on load.
1123 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1124 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1126 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1128 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1129 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1130 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1132 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1133 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1134 /// the handling of the events.
1136 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1137 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1140 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1141 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1142 /// would break backwards compatability.
1143 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1144 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1145 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1147 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1148 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1150 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1152 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1153 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1154 /// confirmation depth.
1156 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1157 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1158 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1160 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1162 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1164 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1166 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1168 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1170 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1171 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1172 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1174 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1175 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1177 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1178 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1179 /// keeping additional state.
1180 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1182 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1183 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1184 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1185 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1187 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1188 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1190 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1191 /// are currently open with that peer.
1193 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1194 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1197 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1199 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1200 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1201 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1202 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1203 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1205 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1206 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1207 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1208 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1209 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1211 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1212 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1214 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1215 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1216 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1217 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1218 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1220 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1221 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1223 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1224 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1225 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1226 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1227 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1229 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1231 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1233 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1234 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1235 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1236 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1237 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1238 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1239 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1240 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1241 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1242 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1243 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1245 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1246 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1247 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1249 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1251 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1252 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1254 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1258 signer_provider: SP,
1263 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1265 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1266 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1267 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1268 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1269 pub struct ChainParameters {
1270 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1271 pub network: Network,
1273 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1275 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1276 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1279 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1283 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1284 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1287 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1288 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1289 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1290 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1291 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1292 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1294 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1295 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1296 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1297 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1298 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1299 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1301 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1302 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1305 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1306 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1307 /// events to handle.
1309 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1310 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1312 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1313 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1316 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1317 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1318 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1319 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1321 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1322 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1323 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1324 should_persist: move || {
1325 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1326 // processing and return that.
1327 let notify = persist_check();
1328 match (notify, force_notify) {
1329 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1330 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1331 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1332 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1333 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1336 _read_guard: read_guard,
1340 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1341 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1342 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1343 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1344 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1345 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1347 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1348 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1349 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1350 should_persist: persist_check,
1351 _read_guard: read_guard,
1356 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1357 fn drop(&mut self) {
1358 match (self.should_persist)() {
1359 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1360 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1361 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1363 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1364 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1365 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1370 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1371 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1373 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1375 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1376 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1377 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1378 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1379 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1381 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1382 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1384 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1386 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1387 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1388 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1389 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1390 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1391 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1392 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1393 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1394 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1395 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1396 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1397 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1398 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1400 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1401 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1403 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1404 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1405 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1406 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1408 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1409 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1410 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1411 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1412 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1413 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1416 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1418 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1419 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1422 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1424 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1425 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1427 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1428 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1429 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1431 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1432 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1433 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1435 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1436 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1437 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1438 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1440 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1441 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1442 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1444 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1445 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1446 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1448 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1449 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1450 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1451 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1452 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1453 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1454 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1455 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1456 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1457 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1458 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1461 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1462 /// to better separate parameters.
1463 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1464 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1465 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1466 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1467 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1468 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1469 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1470 pub features: InitFeatures,
1471 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1472 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1473 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1475 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1477 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1478 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1479 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1480 /// payments to us through this channel.
1481 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1482 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1483 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1484 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1485 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1486 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1487 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1490 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1491 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1492 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1493 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1494 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1495 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1496 /// lifetime of the channel.
1497 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1498 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1499 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1500 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1501 /// our counterparty already.
1503 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1504 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1505 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1506 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1508 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1509 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1510 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1511 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1513 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1514 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1516 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1517 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1519 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1520 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1521 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1522 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1523 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1524 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1525 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1526 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1527 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1530 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1532 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1533 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1534 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1535 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1536 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1537 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1538 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1540 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1541 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1543 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1544 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1545 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1546 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1547 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1548 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1549 /// this value on chain.
1551 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1553 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1555 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1556 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1557 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1558 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1559 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1560 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1561 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1563 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1564 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1565 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1566 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1567 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1568 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1570 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1571 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1572 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1573 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1574 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1576 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1577 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1578 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1579 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1581 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1582 pub balance_msat: u64,
1583 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1584 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1585 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1586 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1588 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1590 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1591 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1592 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1593 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1594 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1595 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1596 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1597 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1599 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1600 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1601 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1602 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1603 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1604 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1605 /// route which is valid.
1606 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1607 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1608 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1609 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1610 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1611 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1613 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1614 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1615 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1616 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1617 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1618 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1619 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1620 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1621 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1623 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1625 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1626 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1627 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1628 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1629 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1631 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1632 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1633 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1634 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1635 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1636 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1637 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1639 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1640 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1641 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1642 pub is_outbound: bool,
1643 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1644 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1645 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1646 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1647 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1649 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1650 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1651 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1652 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1653 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1654 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1655 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1657 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1658 pub is_usable: bool,
1659 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1660 pub is_public: bool,
1661 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1662 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1663 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1664 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1665 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1666 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1668 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1669 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1672 impl ChannelDetails {
1673 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1674 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1675 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1677 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1678 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1679 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1680 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1683 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1684 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1685 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1687 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1688 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1689 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1690 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1693 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1694 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1695 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1698 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1699 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1701 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1702 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1703 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1705 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1706 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1707 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1708 features: latest_features,
1709 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1710 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1711 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1712 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1713 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1714 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1715 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1716 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1717 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1718 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1720 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1721 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1722 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1723 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1724 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1725 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1726 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1727 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1728 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1729 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1730 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1731 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1732 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1733 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1734 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1735 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1736 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1737 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1738 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1739 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1740 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1741 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1742 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1743 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1744 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1745 config: Some(context.config()),
1746 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1751 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1752 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1753 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1754 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1755 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1756 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1757 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1758 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1759 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1761 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1763 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1764 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1766 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1767 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1768 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1769 /// to drop the channel.
1773 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1774 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1775 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1776 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1777 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1779 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1780 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1781 payment_id: PaymentId,
1783 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1785 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1786 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1787 payment_id: PaymentId,
1788 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1790 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1791 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1792 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1795 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1796 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1797 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1799 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1800 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1801 payment_id: PaymentId,
1802 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1803 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1804 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1806 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1807 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1808 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1810 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1811 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1812 payment_id: PaymentId,
1813 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1814 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1818 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1820 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1822 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1823 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1824 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1825 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1827 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1828 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1829 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1832 macro_rules! handle_error {
1833 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1834 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1835 // entering the macro.
1836 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1837 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1841 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1842 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1844 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1845 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1846 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1847 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1851 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1852 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1853 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1854 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1855 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1856 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1861 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1862 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1864 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1865 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1866 action: err.action.clone()
1870 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1871 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1872 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1873 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1874 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1878 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1883 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1886 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1887 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1888 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1894 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1895 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1896 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1897 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1898 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1899 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1901 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1902 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1903 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1904 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1905 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1907 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1908 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1910 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1914 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1915 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1916 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1918 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1919 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1921 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1922 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1924 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1925 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1926 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1927 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1928 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1929 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1931 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1932 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1936 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1937 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1939 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1940 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1942 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1943 match $channel_phase {
1944 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1945 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1947 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1948 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1950 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1951 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1957 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1958 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1962 let key = *$entry.key();
1963 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1965 $entry.remove_entry();
1973 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
1974 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1978 let key = *$entry.key();
1979 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1981 $entry.remove_entry();
1989 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
1990 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1992 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1993 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
1999 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2000 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2001 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2002 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2003 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2005 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2006 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2007 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2008 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2009 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2010 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2011 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2012 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2013 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2014 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2019 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2020 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2021 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2022 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2023 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2024 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2025 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2026 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2027 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2029 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2034 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2035 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2036 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2037 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2038 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2039 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2040 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2041 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2042 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2044 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2049 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2050 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2051 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
2052 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2053 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2054 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2055 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2056 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2057 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2058 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2059 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2061 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2062 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2063 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2069 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2070 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2072 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2073 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2074 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2075 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2076 updates.announcement_sigs);
2077 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2078 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2081 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2082 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2083 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2084 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2086 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2087 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2088 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2089 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2090 let mut batch_completed = false;
2091 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2092 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2093 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2094 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2096 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2097 channel_state.2 = true;
2099 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2101 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2103 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2106 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2107 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2108 if batch_completed {
2109 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2110 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2111 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2112 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2113 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2114 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2115 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2116 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2117 chan.set_batch_ready();
2118 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2119 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2123 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2124 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2125 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2130 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2132 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2133 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2135 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2136 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2137 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2138 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2143 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2144 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2145 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2147 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2148 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2149 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
2150 panic!("{}", err_str);
2152 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2153 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2154 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2157 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2163 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2164 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2165 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2167 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2168 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2169 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2170 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2171 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2172 // filter for uniqueness here.
2173 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2174 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2175 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2176 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2178 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2179 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2181 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2182 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2183 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2189 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2190 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2191 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2192 while !processed_all_events {
2193 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2200 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2201 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2202 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2204 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2205 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2206 result = $self.process_background_events();
2208 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2209 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2210 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2211 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2215 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2216 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2217 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2218 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2221 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2223 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2224 $event_to_handle = event;
2226 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2227 post_event_actions.push(action);
2232 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2233 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2234 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2235 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2236 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2237 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2240 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2241 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2242 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2243 processed_all_events = false;
2247 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2248 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2249 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2251 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2252 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2253 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2259 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2261 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2262 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2263 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2264 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2265 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2266 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2270 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2272 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2274 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2275 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2277 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2279 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2280 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2281 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2284 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2285 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2286 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2288 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2289 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2290 current_timestamp: u32,
2292 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2293 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2294 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2295 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2297 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2298 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2299 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2304 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2306 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2307 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2308 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2309 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2310 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2311 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2312 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2313 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2315 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2318 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2319 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2321 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2323 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2325 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2327 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2328 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2329 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2330 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2331 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2332 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2333 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2334 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2336 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2346 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2347 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2348 &self.default_configuration
2351 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2352 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2353 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2356 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2357 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2359 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2361 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2365 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2370 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2372 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2373 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2374 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2375 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2376 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2378 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2379 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2381 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2382 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2383 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2385 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2386 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2387 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2389 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2390 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2391 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2392 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2393 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2394 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2396 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2397 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2398 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2399 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2400 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2401 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2404 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2405 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2406 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2408 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2410 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2411 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2413 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2415 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2416 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2417 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2418 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2419 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2420 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2424 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2429 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2431 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2432 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2433 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2435 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2437 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2440 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2443 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2444 node_id: their_network_key,
2447 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2450 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2451 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2452 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2453 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2454 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2455 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2456 // the same channel.
2457 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2459 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2460 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2461 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2462 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2463 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2464 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2465 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2466 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2467 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2471 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2472 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2473 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2481 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2482 /// more information.
2483 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2484 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2485 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2486 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2487 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2488 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2489 // the same channel.
2490 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2492 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2493 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2494 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2495 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2496 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2497 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2498 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2499 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2507 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2508 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2510 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2511 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2513 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2514 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2515 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2516 // really wanted anyway.
2517 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2520 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2521 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2522 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2523 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2525 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2526 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2527 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2528 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2529 let context_to_details = |context| {
2530 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2532 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2534 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2535 .map(context_to_details)
2541 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2542 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2544 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2545 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2546 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2548 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2549 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2550 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2551 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2552 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2553 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2555 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2556 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2557 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2559 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2560 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2561 payment_id: *payment_id,
2562 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2563 total_msat: *total_msat,
2566 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2567 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2569 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2570 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2572 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2577 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2578 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2579 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2580 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2581 Some(transaction) => {
2582 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2583 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2588 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2589 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2590 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2591 reason: closure_reason,
2592 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2593 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2597 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2598 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2600 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2601 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2603 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2605 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2606 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2608 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2609 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2611 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2612 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2613 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2614 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2615 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2616 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2617 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2618 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2619 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2621 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2622 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2623 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2624 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2625 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2629 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2630 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2632 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2633 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2634 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2635 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2639 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2640 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2641 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2642 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2646 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2647 shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
2653 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2654 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2655 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2657 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2658 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2659 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2660 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2665 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2666 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2667 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2668 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2671 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2672 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2678 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2679 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2680 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2682 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2683 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2685 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2686 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2687 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2688 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2690 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2692 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2693 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2694 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2697 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2698 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2699 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2700 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2701 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2702 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2705 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2706 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2707 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2709 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2710 /// the channel being closed or not:
2711 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2712 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2713 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2714 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2715 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2716 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2717 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2719 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2720 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2721 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2722 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2724 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2726 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2727 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2728 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2731 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2732 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2733 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2734 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2735 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2736 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2739 fn finish_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2740 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2741 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2742 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2743 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2746 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs, unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid) = shutdown_res;
2747 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2748 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2749 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2750 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2751 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2752 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2754 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2755 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2756 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2757 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2758 // ignore the result here.
2759 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2761 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2762 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2763 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2764 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2765 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2766 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2767 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2768 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2769 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2770 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2771 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2772 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2773 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2776 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2779 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2780 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2783 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2784 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2788 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2789 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2790 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2791 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2792 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2793 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2794 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2795 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2796 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2797 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2798 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2800 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2802 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2803 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2804 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2805 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2806 mem::drop(peer_state);
2807 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2809 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2810 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2811 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2813 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2814 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2815 // Unfunded channel has no update
2816 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2819 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2820 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2821 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2822 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2824 (None, *peer_node_id)
2826 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2829 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2830 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2831 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2832 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2833 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2834 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2835 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2836 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2837 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2843 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2846 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2847 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2848 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2849 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2850 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2851 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2852 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2853 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2854 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2855 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2856 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2857 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2868 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2869 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2870 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2872 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2873 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2874 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2877 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2878 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2879 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2881 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2882 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2883 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2884 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2885 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2888 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2889 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2890 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2891 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2892 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2896 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2897 /// local transaction(s).
2898 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2899 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2900 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2904 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2905 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2906 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2907 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2908 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2909 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2910 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2912 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2913 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2917 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2918 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2919 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2920 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } =>
2921 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2922 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2923 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2924 err_data: Vec::new(),
2928 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2929 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2930 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2933 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2934 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2935 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2936 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2937 outgoing_cltv_value,
2938 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2942 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2943 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2944 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2945 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2946 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2947 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2948 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2949 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2951 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2952 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
2953 amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, ..
2955 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
2956 (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None)
2958 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => {
2959 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2960 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2961 err_data: Vec::new(),
2962 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2966 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2967 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2968 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2969 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2971 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2974 // final_expiry_too_soon
2975 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2976 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2978 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2979 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2980 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2981 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2982 if cltv_expiry <= current_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 {
2983 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2984 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2985 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2986 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2987 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2988 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2991 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2992 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2993 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2995 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2997 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2998 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
3002 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
3003 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
3004 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
3005 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
3006 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
3007 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
3008 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3009 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
3010 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3011 err_code: 0x4000|22,
3012 err_data: Vec::new(),
3013 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
3016 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
3017 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3018 err_code: 0x4000|22,
3019 err_data: Vec::new(),
3020 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
3023 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
3027 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
3030 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
3031 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3034 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
3035 phantom_shared_secret,
3039 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3040 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
3041 err_data: Vec::new(),
3042 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
3045 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3048 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
3049 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
3050 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
3051 outgoing_cltv_value,
3052 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
3056 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3057 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
3058 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
3059 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
3060 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
3062 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3063 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3064 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3065 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3066 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
3067 failure_code: $err_code,
3073 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
3074 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
3077 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
3078 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
3079 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3081 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
3082 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
3083 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
3084 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
3085 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
3086 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
3087 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
3088 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
3090 macro_rules! return_err {
3091 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3093 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3094 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3095 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3096 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3097 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3098 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3104 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
3105 shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
3106 msg.payment_hash, &self.node_signer
3109 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3110 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
3112 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3113 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
3116 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
3117 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3118 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
3119 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
3122 let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
3123 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
3124 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
3126 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
3127 // inbound channel's state.
3128 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3129 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } |
3130 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } =>
3132 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
3136 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3137 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3138 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3139 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3140 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3141 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3142 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3143 // phantom or an intercept.
3144 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3145 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3146 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3150 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3153 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3155 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3156 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3157 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3158 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3159 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3161 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3162 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3163 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3164 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3167 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3168 // have no consistency guarantees.
3169 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3173 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3174 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3175 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3176 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3177 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3179 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3180 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3181 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3182 // we don't have the channel here.
3183 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3185 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3187 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3188 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3189 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3190 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3191 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3192 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3193 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3194 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3195 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3196 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3197 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3199 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3202 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3203 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3205 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3206 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3210 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3211 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3212 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3213 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3215 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3222 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3223 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3224 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3225 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3226 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3227 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3229 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3230 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3232 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3233 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3234 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3235 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3236 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3237 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3238 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3239 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3240 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3241 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3247 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3248 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3249 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3250 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3252 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3253 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3255 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3256 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3257 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3259 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3260 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3261 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3262 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3263 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3264 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3265 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3269 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3271 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3274 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3275 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3276 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3277 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3278 macro_rules! return_err {
3279 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3281 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3282 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3283 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3284 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3285 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3286 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3292 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3294 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3295 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3298 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3299 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3300 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3301 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3302 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3304 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3307 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3308 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3309 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3310 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3311 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3317 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3318 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3319 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3321 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3322 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3323 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3325 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3326 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3327 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3328 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3329 return Err(LightningError {
3330 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3331 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3334 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3335 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3337 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3338 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3341 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3342 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3343 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3344 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3346 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3347 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3348 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3350 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3351 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3352 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3353 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3354 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3355 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3359 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3362 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3363 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3364 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3366 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3367 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3368 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3369 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3370 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3373 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3374 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3376 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3377 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3378 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3379 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3380 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3381 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3382 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3383 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3385 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3386 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3387 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3389 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3391 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3398 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3399 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3400 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3401 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3406 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3407 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3408 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3411 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3412 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3414 log_trace!(self.logger,
3415 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3416 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3417 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3418 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3420 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3421 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3422 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3424 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3425 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3427 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3428 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3429 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3430 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3433 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3434 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3435 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3436 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3437 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3438 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3439 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3440 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3441 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3442 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3444 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3445 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3446 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3448 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3449 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3451 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3452 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3453 Some(monitor_update) => {
3454 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3456 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3457 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3458 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3459 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3460 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3461 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3462 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3470 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3473 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3474 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3475 // `channel_by_id` map.
3476 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3477 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3482 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3483 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3485 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3490 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3492 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3493 /// fields for more info.
3495 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3496 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3498 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3500 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3501 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3502 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3503 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3504 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3506 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3507 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3508 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3509 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3510 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3512 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3513 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3514 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3515 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3517 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3519 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3520 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3521 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3523 /// In general, a path may raise:
3524 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3525 /// node public key) is specified.
3526 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3527 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3528 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3529 /// relevant updates.
3531 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3532 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3533 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3535 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3536 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3537 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3538 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3539 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3540 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3541 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3542 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3543 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3544 self.pending_outbound_payments
3545 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3546 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3547 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3550 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3551 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3552 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3553 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3554 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3555 self.pending_outbound_payments
3556 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3557 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3558 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3559 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3563 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3564 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3565 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3566 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3567 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3568 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3572 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3573 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3574 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3578 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3579 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3583 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3584 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3585 /// retries are exhausted.
3587 /// # Event Generation
3589 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3590 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3592 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3593 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3594 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3596 /// # Restart Behavior
3598 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3599 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3600 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3601 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3602 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3605 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3606 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3607 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3608 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3609 /// never reach the recipient.
3611 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3612 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3614 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3615 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3617 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3618 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3619 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3620 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3621 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3622 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3623 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3626 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3627 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3629 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3632 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3633 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3634 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3635 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3636 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3637 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3638 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3639 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3642 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3643 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3644 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3645 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3646 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3647 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3648 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3649 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3650 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3653 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3656 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3657 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3660 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3661 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3663 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3664 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3665 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3666 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3667 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3668 let payment_params =
3669 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3671 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3673 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3676 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3677 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3679 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3680 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3681 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3682 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3684 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3685 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3686 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3687 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3688 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3689 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3690 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3691 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3692 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3693 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3695 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3696 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3697 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3698 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3702 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3704 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3705 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3708 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3710 let mut res = Vec::new();
3712 for mut path in route.paths {
3713 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3714 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3715 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3716 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3717 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3720 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3723 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3724 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3726 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3728 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3729 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3734 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3737 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3742 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3743 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3744 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3746 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3747 let used_liquidity =
3748 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3750 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3751 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3753 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3756 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3761 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3762 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3763 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3770 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3771 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3772 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3773 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3774 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3775 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3776 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3777 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3778 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3780 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3781 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3782 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3783 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3784 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3786 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &self.logger)
3787 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3788 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3789 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3790 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3791 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3792 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3793 } else { unreachable!(); });
3795 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3796 Err((chan, err)) => {
3797 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3798 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3800 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3801 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3802 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3808 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3809 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3811 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3812 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3815 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3816 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3817 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3821 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3822 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3825 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3826 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3827 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3829 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3830 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3831 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3832 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3834 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3841 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3842 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3843 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3847 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3849 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3850 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3852 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3853 /// across the p2p network.
3855 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3856 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3858 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3859 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3860 /// keys per-channel).
3862 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3863 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3864 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3866 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3867 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3868 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3870 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3871 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3872 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3873 /// for more details.
3875 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3876 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3877 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3878 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3881 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3883 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3884 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3886 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transcaction
3887 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3888 /// signature for each channel.
3890 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3891 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3892 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3893 let mut result = Ok(());
3895 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3896 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3897 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3898 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3899 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3904 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3905 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3906 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3910 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3911 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3912 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3913 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3914 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3915 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3916 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3917 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3922 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3923 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3924 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3925 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3929 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3930 match states.entry(txid) {
3931 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3932 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3933 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3937 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3940 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels.iter() {
3941 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3942 temporary_channel_id,
3943 counterparty_node_id,
3944 funding_transaction.clone(),
3947 let mut output_index = None;
3948 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3949 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3950 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3951 if output_index.is_some() {
3952 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3953 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3956 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3959 if output_index.is_none() {
3960 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3961 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3964 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3965 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3966 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3972 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3973 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3974 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3975 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3976 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3977 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3978 .into_iter().flatten()
3979 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3981 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3982 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3984 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3986 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3987 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3988 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3989 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3990 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3992 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3993 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
3994 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
3998 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3999 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4005 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4007 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4008 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4009 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4010 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4012 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4013 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4015 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4016 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4018 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4020 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4021 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4022 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4023 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4024 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4025 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4026 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4027 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4028 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4029 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4030 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4031 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4032 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4036 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4037 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4038 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4039 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4040 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4041 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4042 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4043 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4044 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4045 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4049 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4050 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4051 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4052 config.apply(config_update);
4053 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4056 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4057 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4058 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4059 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4060 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4061 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4068 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4069 debug_assert!(false);
4070 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4072 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4073 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4080 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4082 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4083 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4084 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4085 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4087 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4088 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4090 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4091 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4093 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4095 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4096 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4097 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4098 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4099 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4100 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4101 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4102 pub fn update_channel_config(
4103 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4104 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4105 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4108 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4109 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4111 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4112 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4114 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4115 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4116 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4117 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4118 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4120 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4121 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4122 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4125 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4128 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4129 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4130 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4131 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4132 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4133 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4134 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4136 let next_hop_scid = {
4137 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4138 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4139 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4140 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4141 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4142 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4143 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4144 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4145 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4146 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4149 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4151 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4152 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4153 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4155 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4156 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4157 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4162 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4163 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4164 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4167 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4168 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
4169 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
4171 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4173 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4174 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4175 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4176 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4177 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4180 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4181 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4182 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4183 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4184 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4186 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4190 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4191 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4193 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4196 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4197 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4198 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4200 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4201 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4202 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4205 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4206 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4207 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4208 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4209 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4210 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4211 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4212 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4215 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4216 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4217 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4218 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4223 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4225 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4226 /// Will likely generate further events.
4227 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4228 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4230 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4231 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4232 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4234 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4235 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4237 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4238 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4239 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4241 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4242 match forward_info {
4243 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4244 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4245 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4246 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4247 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4250 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4251 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4252 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4254 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4255 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4256 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4257 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4258 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4259 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4260 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4263 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4264 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4266 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4269 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4270 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4276 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4277 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4279 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4283 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4284 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4286 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4290 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4291 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4292 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4293 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4294 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4295 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4296 payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4299 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4300 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
4301 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4302 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4303 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4305 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4307 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4308 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4312 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4313 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4314 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4315 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
4317 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4318 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4324 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4327 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4330 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4331 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4332 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4333 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4334 // problem, not ours.
4340 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4341 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4342 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4344 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4348 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4349 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4350 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4351 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4354 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4355 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4356 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4357 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4358 match forward_info {
4359 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4360 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4361 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4362 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4363 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4366 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4367 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4368 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4369 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4370 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4371 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4372 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4373 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4374 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4376 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4377 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4378 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4381 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4382 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4384 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4386 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4387 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4388 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4389 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4394 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4395 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4397 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4398 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4399 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4400 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4402 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4403 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4405 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4407 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4408 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4409 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4416 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4420 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4421 match forward_info {
4422 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4423 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4424 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4425 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4426 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4429 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4430 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4431 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4432 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4433 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4434 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4435 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4437 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4438 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4439 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4443 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4444 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4447 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4450 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4451 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4452 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4453 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4454 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4455 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4456 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4457 phantom_shared_secret,
4459 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4460 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4461 // if routing nodes overpay
4462 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4463 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4465 total_value_received: None,
4466 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4469 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4472 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4474 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4475 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4476 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4477 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4478 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4479 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4481 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4482 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4483 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4484 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4485 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4486 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4487 phantom_shared_secret,
4489 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4490 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4492 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4495 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4496 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4497 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4498 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4499 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4502 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4503 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4504 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4505 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4506 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4507 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4509 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4510 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4511 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4513 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4514 .entry(payment_hash)
4515 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4516 .or_insert_with(|| {
4517 committed_to_claimable = true;
4519 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4522 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4523 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4524 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4525 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4527 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4528 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4529 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4531 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4532 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4533 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4536 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4538 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4539 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4540 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4541 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4542 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4543 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4544 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4545 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4546 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4547 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4549 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4551 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4552 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4553 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4554 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4555 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4556 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4558 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4559 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4560 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4561 committed_to_claimable = true;
4563 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4564 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4565 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4566 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4567 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4568 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4569 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4570 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4571 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4572 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4576 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4577 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4578 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4579 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4580 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4582 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4584 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4585 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4587 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4588 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4589 committed_to_claimable = true;
4592 payment_claimable_generated
4596 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4597 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4598 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4599 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4600 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4601 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4602 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4603 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4604 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4605 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4606 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4607 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4608 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4609 Ok(result) => result,
4611 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4612 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4615 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4616 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4617 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4618 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4619 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4620 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4623 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4624 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4625 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4627 check_total_value!(purpose);
4629 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4630 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4631 check_total_value!(purpose);
4635 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4636 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4637 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4638 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4640 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4641 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4642 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4643 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4644 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4645 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4646 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4647 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4649 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4650 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4651 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4653 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4654 if payment_claimable_generated {
4655 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4661 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4662 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4670 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4671 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4672 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4673 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4675 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4676 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4678 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4680 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4681 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4682 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4684 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4686 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4687 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4688 events.append(&mut new_events);
4691 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4693 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4694 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4695 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4697 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4699 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4700 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4701 if background_events.is_empty() {
4702 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4705 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4707 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4708 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4709 // monitor updating completing.
4710 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4712 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4713 let mut updated_chan = false;
4715 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4716 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4717 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4718 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4719 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4720 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4721 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4722 updated_chan = true;
4723 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4724 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4726 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4729 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4734 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4735 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4738 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4739 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4740 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4741 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4742 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4743 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4744 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4746 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4747 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4748 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4749 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4750 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4756 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4759 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4760 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4761 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4762 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4763 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4766 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4767 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4768 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4769 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4770 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4771 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4772 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4774 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4776 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4777 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4778 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4779 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4781 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4782 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4784 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4785 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4789 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4790 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4791 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4792 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4793 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4794 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4795 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4797 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4798 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4800 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4801 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4802 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4803 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4804 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4805 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4807 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4812 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4813 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4821 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4823 /// This currently includes:
4824 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4825 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4826 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4828 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4829 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4830 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4831 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4832 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4833 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4834 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4835 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4837 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4838 /// estimate fetches.
4840 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4841 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4842 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4843 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4844 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4846 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4847 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4849 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4850 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4851 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4852 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4854 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4855 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4856 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4857 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4858 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4859 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4861 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4862 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4863 log_error!(self.logger,
4864 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4865 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4866 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4867 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4868 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4869 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4870 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4871 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4872 channel_id: *chan_id,
4873 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4884 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4885 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4886 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4887 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4888 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4889 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4890 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4892 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4893 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4898 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4899 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4901 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4902 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4903 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4904 if needs_close { return false; }
4907 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4908 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4909 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4910 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4911 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4912 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4913 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4914 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4916 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4917 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4918 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4919 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4923 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4925 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4928 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4930 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4931 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4932 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4933 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4937 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4939 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4945 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4947 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4948 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4949 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4950 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4951 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4952 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4953 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4954 channel_id: *chan_id,
4955 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4963 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4964 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4965 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4967 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4968 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4969 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4974 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4975 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4976 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4977 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4978 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4979 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4980 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4981 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4987 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4989 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4990 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4995 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4996 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4997 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4998 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4999 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5000 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5001 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5002 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5003 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5004 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5005 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5006 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5007 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5008 // have no channels to the peer.
5009 let remove_entry = {
5010 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5011 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5014 entry.remove_entry();
5017 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5022 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5023 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5024 // This should be unreachable
5025 debug_assert!(false);
5028 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5029 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5030 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5031 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5032 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5033 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5034 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5037 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5038 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5039 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5041 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5042 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5049 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5050 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5051 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5052 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5053 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5056 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5057 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5060 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5061 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5064 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5065 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5066 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5067 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5068 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5069 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5070 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5073 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5074 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5077 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5078 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5079 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5080 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5081 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5088 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5089 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5090 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5092 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5093 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5094 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5095 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5097 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5098 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5099 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5100 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5101 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5102 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5105 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5106 /// reason for the failure.
5108 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5109 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5110 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5112 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5113 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5114 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5115 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5116 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5117 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5118 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5123 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5124 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5125 match failure_code {
5126 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5127 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5128 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5129 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5130 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5131 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5133 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5134 let fail_data = match data {
5135 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5138 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5143 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5144 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5146 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5148 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5149 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5150 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5151 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5152 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5153 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5154 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5156 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5158 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5159 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5161 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5166 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5167 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5168 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5169 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5170 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5171 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5172 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5173 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5174 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5175 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5177 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5178 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5179 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5180 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5182 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5183 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5184 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5185 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5186 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5190 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5191 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5192 // be surfaced to the user.
5193 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5194 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5195 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5197 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5198 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5199 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5200 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5201 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5202 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5203 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5204 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5205 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5207 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5208 debug_assert!(false);
5209 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5212 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5214 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5217 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5218 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5219 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5220 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5224 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5225 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5226 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5227 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5228 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5229 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5230 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5231 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5232 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5233 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5236 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5237 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5238 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5241 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5242 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5243 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5245 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5246 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5247 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5248 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5249 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5251 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
5252 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
5253 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
5255 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5256 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5257 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5258 push_forward_ev = true;
5260 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5261 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5262 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5264 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5265 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5268 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5269 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5270 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5271 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5272 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5273 failed_next_destination: destination,
5279 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5280 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5282 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5283 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5284 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5285 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5287 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5288 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5289 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5290 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5292 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5293 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5294 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5296 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5297 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5298 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5299 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5300 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5301 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5302 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5303 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5304 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5307 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5308 /// even type numbers.
5312 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5313 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5315 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5316 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5317 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5320 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5321 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5323 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5326 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5327 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5328 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5329 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5330 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5331 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5332 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5333 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5338 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5339 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5340 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5341 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5342 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5344 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5345 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5346 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5350 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5351 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5352 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5353 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5354 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5355 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5356 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5357 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5358 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5359 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5360 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5369 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5371 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5372 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5373 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5374 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5375 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5376 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5377 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5378 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5379 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5380 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5381 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5382 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5383 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5384 debug_assert!(false);
5388 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5390 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5391 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5392 debug_assert!(false);
5396 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5397 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5399 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5400 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5401 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5402 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5405 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5406 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5407 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5408 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5412 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5413 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5414 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5415 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5416 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5417 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5420 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5421 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5422 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5423 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5424 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5429 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5430 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5431 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5432 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5433 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5434 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5435 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5437 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5440 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5441 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5442 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5443 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5447 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5448 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5449 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5450 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5452 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5453 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5454 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5455 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5457 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5458 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5459 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5460 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5463 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5464 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5465 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5466 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5470 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5471 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5472 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5475 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5476 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5477 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5478 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5479 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5480 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5481 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5484 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5485 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5486 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5488 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5491 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5492 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5494 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5495 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5496 // monitor update as a background event.
5497 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5498 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5499 counterparty_node_id,
5500 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5501 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5505 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5506 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5511 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5513 log_trace!(self.logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5515 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5516 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5517 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5518 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5519 blocking_action: blocker,
5521 (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5523 debug_assert!(false,
5524 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5527 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5528 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5529 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5530 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5531 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5533 let mut found_blocker = false;
5534 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5535 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5536 // which case we need to only remove the one
5537 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5538 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5539 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5540 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5542 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5545 debug_assert!(false);
5554 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5555 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5556 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5562 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5563 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5564 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5565 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5566 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5567 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5568 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5569 // again on restart.
5570 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5571 payment_preimage, update_res);
5574 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5575 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5577 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5578 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5579 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5580 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5581 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5582 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5583 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5584 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5585 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5586 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5589 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5590 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5591 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5592 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5593 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5594 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5598 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5599 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5602 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5603 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5604 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5607 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5608 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5609 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5610 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5611 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5613 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5614 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5615 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5617 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5618 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5621 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5622 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5623 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5624 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5625 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5626 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5627 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5628 let chan_to_release =
5629 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5630 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5632 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5633 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5634 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5635 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5640 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5641 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5642 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5643 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5644 // in the background.
5645 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5646 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5647 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5648 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5650 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5651 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5652 funding_txo, update, ..
5654 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5655 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5656 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5657 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5659 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5665 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5666 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5667 (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5669 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5670 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5672 monitor_update.updates[0],
5673 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5678 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5679 // immediately once we get going.
5680 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5683 *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5685 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5688 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5689 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5690 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5691 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5692 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5693 blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5697 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5698 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5699 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5702 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5703 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5705 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5706 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5707 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5708 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5710 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5714 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5715 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5716 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5722 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5723 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5724 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5727 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5728 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5729 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5730 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5732 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5734 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5735 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5736 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5738 payment_purpose: purpose,
5741 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5743 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5747 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5749 sender_intended_total_msat,
5753 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5754 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5756 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5757 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5758 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5761 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5762 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5764 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5765 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5766 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5767 Some(blocking_action),
5774 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5775 /// update completion.
5776 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5777 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5778 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5779 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5780 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5781 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5782 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5783 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5784 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5785 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5786 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5787 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5788 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5790 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5792 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5793 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5794 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5795 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5798 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5799 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5801 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5802 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5803 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5808 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5809 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5810 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5811 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5816 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5817 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5818 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5819 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5820 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5825 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5829 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5835 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5836 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5837 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5841 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5842 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5843 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5849 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5850 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5852 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5853 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5855 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5856 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5857 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5858 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5859 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5864 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5865 let mut peer_state_lock;
5866 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5867 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5868 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5869 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5871 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5874 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5875 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5876 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5877 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5878 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5881 let remaining_in_flight =
5882 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5883 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5886 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5887 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5888 remaining_in_flight);
5889 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5892 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5895 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5897 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5898 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5901 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5902 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5903 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5905 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5906 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5907 /// used to accept such channels.
5909 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5910 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5911 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5912 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5915 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5916 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5918 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5919 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5920 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5922 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5923 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5925 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5926 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5928 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5929 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5931 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5932 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5933 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5934 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5937 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5938 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5940 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5941 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5942 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5943 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5944 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5945 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5946 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5947 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5949 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5950 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5951 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5953 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5954 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5955 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5956 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5957 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5958 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5959 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5961 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5965 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5966 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5967 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5968 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5969 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5970 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5971 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5974 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5975 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5977 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5978 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5979 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5980 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5981 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5982 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5983 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5984 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5987 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5988 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5992 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5993 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5994 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5996 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5997 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5998 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6001 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6006 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6007 /// or 0-conf channels.
6009 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6010 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6011 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6012 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6013 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6014 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6016 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6017 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6018 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6019 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6020 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6021 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6022 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6026 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6029 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6030 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6032 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6033 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6035 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6036 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6037 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6038 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6039 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6041 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6044 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6045 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6046 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6049 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6050 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6055 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6058 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6059 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6060 // likely to be lost on restart!
6061 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6062 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6065 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6066 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6069 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6070 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6071 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6072 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6073 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6075 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6076 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6078 debug_assert!(false);
6079 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6081 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6082 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6084 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6085 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6086 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6087 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6088 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6089 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6091 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6092 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6093 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6096 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6097 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6098 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6099 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6100 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6103 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6104 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6106 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6109 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6110 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6111 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6112 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6113 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6114 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6115 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6116 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6117 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
6119 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6120 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6121 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6126 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6127 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6128 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6129 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6130 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6131 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6132 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6135 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6140 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6141 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6142 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6144 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6145 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6148 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6149 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6151 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6152 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6153 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6155 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6159 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6160 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6161 // likely to be lost on restart!
6162 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6163 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6164 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6166 debug_assert!(false);
6167 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6169 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6170 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6171 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6172 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6173 match phase.get_mut() {
6174 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6175 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6176 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6179 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6183 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6186 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6187 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6188 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6189 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6190 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6192 user_channel_id: user_id,
6197 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6198 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6200 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6201 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6203 debug_assert!(false);
6204 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6207 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6208 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6209 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
6210 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6211 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6212 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
6214 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6215 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6216 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6217 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6218 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6219 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6220 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6221 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6222 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6226 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6227 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6229 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6232 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
6233 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6234 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
6236 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6237 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6238 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6239 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6240 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6241 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6242 funding_msg.channel_id))
6244 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6245 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6246 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6247 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6248 mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6250 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6251 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6252 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6253 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6254 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6255 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6259 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6260 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6261 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6263 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6267 log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6268 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6269 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6270 funding_msg.channel_id));
6278 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6279 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6280 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6281 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6283 debug_assert!(false);
6284 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6287 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6288 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6289 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6290 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6291 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6292 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
6293 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6294 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6295 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6296 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6299 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
6303 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6307 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6311 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6312 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6313 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6314 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6315 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6317 debug_assert!(false);
6318 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6320 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6321 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6322 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6323 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6324 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6325 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6326 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6327 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6328 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6329 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6330 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6331 msg: announcement_sigs,
6333 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6334 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6335 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6336 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6337 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6338 // announcement_signatures.
6339 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6340 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6341 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6342 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6349 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6350 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6355 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6356 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6359 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6360 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6365 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6366 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6367 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6369 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6370 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6372 debug_assert!(false);
6373 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6375 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6376 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6377 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6378 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6380 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6381 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6382 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6384 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6387 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6388 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6389 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6390 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6392 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6393 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6394 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6395 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6396 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6397 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6401 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6402 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6403 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6404 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6407 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6408 let context = phase.context_mut();
6409 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6410 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6411 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6412 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6416 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6419 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6420 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6421 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6422 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6424 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6425 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6431 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6432 let mut shutdown_result = None;
6433 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid;
6434 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6435 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6437 debug_assert!(false);
6438 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6440 let (tx, chan_option) = {
6441 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6442 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6443 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6444 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6445 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6446 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
6447 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6448 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6449 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6450 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6455 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6456 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6457 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6458 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6459 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6460 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)))
6461 } else { (tx, None) }
6463 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6464 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6467 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6470 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6471 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6472 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6474 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6475 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6476 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6477 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6478 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6482 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6483 shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
6485 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6486 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6487 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6492 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6493 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6494 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6495 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6497 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6498 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6499 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6500 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6502 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6503 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6505 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6506 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6507 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6509 debug_assert!(false);
6510 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6512 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6513 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6514 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6515 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6516 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6517 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6518 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6519 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6520 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6521 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6523 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6524 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6525 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6526 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6527 match pending_forward_info {
6528 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6529 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6530 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6531 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6533 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6534 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6535 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6536 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6537 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6540 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6542 _ => pending_forward_info
6545 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6547 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6548 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6551 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6556 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6558 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6559 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6560 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6562 debug_assert!(false);
6563 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6565 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6566 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6567 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6568 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6569 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6570 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6571 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6572 log_trace!(self.logger,
6573 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6575 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6576 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6577 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6579 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6580 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6581 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6582 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6583 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6584 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6585 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6588 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6589 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6592 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6595 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6599 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6600 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6601 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6602 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6603 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6605 debug_assert!(false);
6606 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6608 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6609 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6610 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6611 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6612 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6613 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6615 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6616 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6619 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6624 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6625 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6626 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6627 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6628 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6630 debug_assert!(false);
6631 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6633 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6634 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6635 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6636 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6637 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6638 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6639 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6641 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6642 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6644 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6645 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6649 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6653 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6654 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6655 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6657 debug_assert!(false);
6658 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6660 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6661 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6662 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6663 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6664 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6665 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6666 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6667 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6668 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6669 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6673 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6674 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6677 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6682 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6683 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6684 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6685 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6686 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6687 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6688 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6689 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6690 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6691 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6692 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6694 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6695 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6697 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6698 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6699 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6700 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6701 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6702 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6704 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6705 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6706 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6708 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6709 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6710 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6711 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6712 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6713 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6714 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6715 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6716 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6719 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6720 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6722 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6723 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6724 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6725 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6726 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6727 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6728 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6729 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6730 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6733 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6734 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6735 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6740 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6741 // payments are being processed.
6742 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6743 push_forward_event = true;
6745 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6746 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6753 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6754 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6757 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6758 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6759 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6761 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6765 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6766 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6767 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6768 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6769 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6771 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6772 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6773 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6774 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6775 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6776 // real by taking more time.
6777 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6778 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6779 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6784 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6785 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6786 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6787 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6788 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6789 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6790 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6792 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6793 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6794 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6795 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6796 channel_funding_outpoint,
6797 counterparty_node_id,
6802 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6803 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6804 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6806 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6807 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6808 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6809 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6811 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6812 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6813 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6819 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6820 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6821 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6822 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6824 debug_assert!(false);
6825 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6826 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6827 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6828 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6829 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6830 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6831 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6832 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6833 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6834 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6835 *counterparty_node_id)
6837 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6838 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6839 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6840 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6841 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6842 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6843 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6847 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6848 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6851 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6854 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6858 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6859 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6860 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6862 debug_assert!(false);
6863 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6865 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6866 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6867 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6868 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6869 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6870 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6872 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6873 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6876 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6881 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6882 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6883 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6885 debug_assert!(false);
6886 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6888 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6889 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6890 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6891 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6892 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6893 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6894 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6897 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6898 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6899 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6900 msg, &self.default_configuration
6901 ), chan_phase_entry),
6902 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6903 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6904 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6907 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6908 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6911 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6916 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6917 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6918 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6919 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6921 // It's not a local channel
6922 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6925 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6926 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6927 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6928 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6930 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6931 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6932 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6933 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6934 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6935 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6936 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6937 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6938 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6939 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6940 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6942 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6944 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6945 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6946 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6947 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6949 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
6950 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6951 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
6954 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6958 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6959 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6962 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6964 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6967 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6969 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6970 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6972 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6974 debug_assert!(false);
6975 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6976 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6980 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6981 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6982 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6983 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6984 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6985 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6986 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6987 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6988 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6989 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
6990 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
6991 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
6992 let mut channel_update = None;
6993 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6994 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6995 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6998 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6999 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7000 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7001 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7002 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7003 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7004 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7009 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7010 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7011 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7012 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7013 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7014 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7018 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7019 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7022 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7023 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7024 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id.0));
7025 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7026 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7027 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7028 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7029 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7030 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7032 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7033 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7034 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7035 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7036 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7037 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7038 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7039 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7040 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7041 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7042 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7043 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7044 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7045 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7046 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7047 next_funding_txid: None,
7050 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7051 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7052 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7058 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7059 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7060 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7061 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7064 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7065 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7070 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7071 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7072 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7074 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7075 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7076 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7077 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7078 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7079 match monitor_event {
7080 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7081 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7082 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7083 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7085 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7086 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7087 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7088 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7091 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7092 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7093 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7095 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7096 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
7097 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7098 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
7101 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7102 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7103 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7104 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7105 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7106 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7107 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7108 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7109 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
7110 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7111 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7115 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7116 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7117 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7118 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7119 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7127 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7128 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7134 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7135 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7138 has_pending_monitor_events
7141 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7142 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7143 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7145 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7146 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7147 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7150 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7151 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7152 /// update was applied.
7153 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7154 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7155 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7157 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7158 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7159 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7160 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7162 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7163 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7165 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7166 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7167 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7168 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7170 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7171 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7172 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7173 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
7174 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7175 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7177 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7178 has_monitor_update = true;
7180 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7181 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7182 continue 'peer_loop;
7191 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7192 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7193 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7199 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7200 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7201 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7202 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7203 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7204 let mut has_update = false;
7205 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7207 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7209 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7210 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7211 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7212 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7213 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7215 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7216 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
7217 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
7218 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
7219 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7221 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7222 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7225 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7226 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7227 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7228 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7229 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7234 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7236 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7237 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7238 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7239 shutdown_results.push((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
7245 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7246 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7251 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7257 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7258 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7261 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7262 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7268 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7269 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7271 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7272 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7273 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7274 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7275 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7276 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7277 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7278 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7279 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7280 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
7281 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7282 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7283 assert!(should_broadcast);
7284 } else { unreachable!(); }
7285 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7286 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7287 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7290 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7294 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7295 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7296 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7298 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the
7299 /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently,
7300 /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction
7301 /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7303 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7304 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7305 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7306 &self, description: String
7307 ) -> OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
7308 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7309 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7310 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7311 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7312 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7314 OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx)
7315 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7319 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7320 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7322 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7323 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7324 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7327 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund. To
7328 /// revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the invoice.
7330 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as
7331 /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for sender privacy. As such, currently, the
7332 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7333 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7335 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7336 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7337 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7338 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7339 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7340 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7341 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7342 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7343 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7344 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7345 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7347 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7348 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7350 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7351 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7354 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7355 self.pending_outbound_payments
7356 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7357 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7359 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7364 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7365 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7366 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7368 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7369 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7370 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7371 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7372 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7373 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7374 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7376 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7377 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7378 /// been sent. To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving
7381 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link.
7383 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7384 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7385 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7386 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7387 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7388 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7389 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7390 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7391 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7392 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7393 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7394 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7395 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7396 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7399 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7400 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7401 let builder = match quantity {
7403 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7405 let builder = match amount_msats {
7407 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7409 let builder = match payer_note {
7411 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7414 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7415 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7417 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7418 self.pending_outbound_payments
7419 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7420 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7422 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7424 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7425 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7426 let message = PendingOnionMessage {
7427 contents: OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7428 destination: Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7429 reply_path: Some(reply_path),
7431 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7433 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7434 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7435 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7436 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7437 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7438 let message = PendingOnionMessage {
7439 contents: OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7440 destination: Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7441 reply_path: Some(reply_path.clone()),
7443 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7450 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7453 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7454 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7455 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7457 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7458 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7459 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7460 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7461 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7463 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7464 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7466 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7467 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7468 let payment_paths = vec![
7469 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
7471 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7472 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7473 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7475 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7476 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7477 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7479 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7480 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7481 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7483 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7484 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7486 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7487 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7488 let message = PendingOnionMessage {
7489 contents: OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7490 destination: Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7491 reply_path: Some(reply_path),
7493 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7495 for path in refund.paths() {
7496 let message = PendingOnionMessage {
7497 contents: OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7498 destination: Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7499 reply_path: Some(reply_path.clone()),
7501 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7507 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7511 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7514 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7515 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7517 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7518 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7519 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7520 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7522 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7524 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7525 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7529 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7530 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7532 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7534 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7535 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7537 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7538 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7539 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7540 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7541 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7542 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7543 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7544 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7545 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7546 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7547 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7550 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7551 /// stored external to LDK.
7553 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7554 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7555 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7557 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7558 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7561 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7562 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7563 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7564 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7566 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7567 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7568 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7569 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7570 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7572 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7573 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7574 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7575 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7576 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7578 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7579 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7581 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7582 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7586 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7587 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7589 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7591 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7592 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7594 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7595 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7596 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7597 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7598 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7599 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7600 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7603 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7604 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7606 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7607 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7608 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7611 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7613 fn create_one_hop_blinded_path(&self) -> BlindedPath {
7614 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7615 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7616 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap()
7619 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7621 fn create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(
7622 &self, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7623 ) -> (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath) {
7624 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7625 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7627 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7628 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7629 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7631 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7633 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7636 // TODO: Err for overflow?
7637 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_payment(
7638 payee_node_id, payee_tlvs, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7642 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7643 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7645 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7646 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7647 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7648 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7650 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7651 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7652 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7653 Some(_) => continue,
7654 None => return scid_candidate
7659 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7661 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7662 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7664 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7665 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7666 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7670 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7671 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7672 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7674 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7675 /// times to get a unique scid.
7676 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7677 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7678 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7680 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7681 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7682 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7683 return scid_candidate
7687 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7688 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7689 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7690 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7692 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7693 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7694 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7695 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7696 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7697 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7699 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7700 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7701 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7710 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7711 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7712 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7713 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7714 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7718 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7719 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7720 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7721 events.push_back((event, None));
7725 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7726 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7727 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7731 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7732 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7736 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7737 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7740 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7741 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7742 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7743 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7744 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7746 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7747 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7748 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7749 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7751 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7752 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7753 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7754 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7756 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7760 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7761 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7762 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7763 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7764 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7765 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7766 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7770 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7771 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7772 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7773 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7774 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7775 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7776 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7777 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7778 if further_update_exists {
7779 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7784 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7785 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7790 log_debug!(self.logger,
7791 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7792 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7798 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7799 for action in actions {
7801 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7802 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7804 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7810 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7811 /// using the given event handler.
7813 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7814 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7818 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7822 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7824 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7825 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7826 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7827 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7828 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7829 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7833 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
7834 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
7835 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
7836 /// is always placed next to each other.
7838 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
7839 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
7840 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
7841 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
7843 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
7844 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
7845 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
7846 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
7847 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7848 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7849 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
7851 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
7852 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
7853 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
7854 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7857 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
7858 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7860 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
7861 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7864 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
7865 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7866 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7867 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7868 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7869 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
7870 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7874 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
7875 events.replace(pending_events);
7884 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7886 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7887 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7888 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7889 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7890 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7891 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7895 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
7897 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
7898 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
7899 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
7901 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
7905 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7907 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7908 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7909 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7910 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7911 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7912 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7916 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7918 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7919 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
7920 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
7921 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
7922 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
7925 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
7926 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
7929 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7930 let _persistence_guard =
7931 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7932 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7933 let new_height = height - 1;
7935 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
7936 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
7937 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
7938 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
7939 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
7940 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
7943 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7947 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7949 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7950 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7951 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7952 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7953 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7954 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7958 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7959 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7960 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7961 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7963 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7964 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
7966 let _persistence_guard =
7967 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7968 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7969 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
7970 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
7972 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7973 if height < last_best_block_height {
7974 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7975 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7979 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7980 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7981 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7982 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7984 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7985 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
7987 let _persistence_guard =
7988 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7989 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7990 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
7992 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7994 macro_rules! max_time {
7995 ($timestamp: expr) => {
7997 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
7998 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
7999 // having an explicit local time source.
8000 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8001 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8002 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8003 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8004 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8010 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8011 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8012 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8013 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8017 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8018 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8019 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8020 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8021 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8022 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8023 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
8024 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
8031 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8032 let _persistence_guard =
8033 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8034 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8035 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8036 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8037 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8038 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8039 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8040 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8045 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8047 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8048 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8049 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8050 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8051 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8052 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8056 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8057 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8059 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8060 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8061 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8062 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8063 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8065 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8066 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8068 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8069 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8070 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8071 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8072 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8073 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8075 // Retain unfunded channels.
8076 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8077 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8078 let res = f(channel);
8079 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8080 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8081 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8082 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8083 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8085 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8086 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8087 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8088 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8089 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8090 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8091 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8096 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8101 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8102 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8105 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8106 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8107 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8108 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8109 msg: announcement_sigs,
8111 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8112 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8113 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8115 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8116 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8117 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8122 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8123 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8124 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8125 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8126 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8127 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8128 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8129 // is always consistent.
8130 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8131 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8132 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8133 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8134 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8137 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8138 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8139 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8140 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8141 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
8142 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8143 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8147 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8148 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
8149 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8150 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8151 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8152 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8153 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8154 data: reason_message,
8167 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8168 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8169 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8170 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8171 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8172 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8173 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8174 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8175 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8176 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8178 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8179 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8180 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8184 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8187 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8188 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8189 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8190 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8191 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8192 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8193 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8194 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8195 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8196 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8199 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8200 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8201 _ => unreachable!(),
8203 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8204 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8205 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8206 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8212 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8214 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8215 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8219 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8220 /// may have events that need processing.
8222 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8223 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8225 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8226 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8227 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8228 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8231 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8232 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8233 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8236 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8237 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8238 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8241 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8242 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8243 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8244 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8247 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8248 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8249 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8250 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8253 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8254 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8256 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8257 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8258 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8259 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8260 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8263 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8264 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8265 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8266 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8269 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8270 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8271 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8272 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8275 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8276 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8277 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8278 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8282 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8283 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8285 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8286 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8287 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8288 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8289 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8290 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8294 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8295 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8296 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8297 // change to the contents.
8298 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8299 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8300 let persist = match &res {
8301 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8302 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8303 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8305 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8307 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8312 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8313 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8314 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8315 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8318 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8319 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8320 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8321 // change to the contents.
8322 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8323 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8324 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8328 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8329 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8330 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8331 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8334 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8335 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8336 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8339 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8340 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8341 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8344 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8345 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8346 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8347 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8348 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8349 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8350 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8351 let persist = match &res {
8352 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8353 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8355 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8360 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8361 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8362 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8365 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8366 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8367 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8370 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8371 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8372 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8373 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8374 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8375 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8376 let persist = match &res {
8377 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8378 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8379 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8381 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8386 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8387 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8388 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8391 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8392 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8393 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8394 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8395 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8396 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8397 let persist = match &res {
8398 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8399 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8400 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8402 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8407 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8408 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8409 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8410 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8411 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8412 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8413 let persist = match &res {
8414 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8415 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8416 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8418 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8423 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8424 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8425 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8428 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8429 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8430 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8433 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8434 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8435 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8436 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8437 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8438 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8439 let persist = match &res {
8440 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8441 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8442 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8444 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8449 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8450 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8451 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8454 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8455 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8456 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8459 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8464 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8465 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8466 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8467 let persist = match &res {
8468 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8469 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8470 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8472 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8477 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8478 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8479 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8480 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8481 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8483 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8484 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8485 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8486 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8487 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8488 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8489 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8490 let context = match phase {
8491 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8492 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger).is_ok() {
8493 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8498 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8499 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8502 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8506 // Clean up for removal.
8507 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8508 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8509 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8512 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8513 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8514 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8515 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8517 // V1 Channel Establishment
8518 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8519 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8520 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8521 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8522 // V2 Channel Establishment
8523 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8524 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8525 // Common Channel Establishment
8526 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8527 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8528 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8529 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8530 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8531 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8532 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8533 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8534 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8535 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8536 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8537 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8538 // Channel Operations
8539 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8540 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8541 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8542 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8543 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8544 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8546 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8547 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8548 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8549 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8550 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8551 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8552 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8553 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8554 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8557 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8558 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8559 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8560 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8563 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8565 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8567 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8568 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8572 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8573 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8574 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8578 let mut res = Ok(());
8580 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8581 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8582 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8583 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8584 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8585 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8586 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8589 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8590 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8591 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8592 if inbound_peer_limited {
8594 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8596 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8597 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8598 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8599 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8600 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8601 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8602 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8603 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8607 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8608 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8609 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8611 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8612 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8613 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8614 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8617 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8620 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8621 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8626 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8628 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8629 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8630 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8631 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8632 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8634 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8635 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8636 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8637 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8638 // worry about closing and removing them.
8639 debug_assert!(false);
8643 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8644 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8645 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
8650 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8651 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8656 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8657 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8659 match &msg.data as &str {
8660 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8661 "link failed to shutdown" =>
8663 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8664 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8665 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8666 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8667 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8668 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8669 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8670 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8671 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8672 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8673 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8674 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8675 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8676 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8677 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8678 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8682 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8683 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8684 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8685 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8686 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8687 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8689 log_level: Level::Trace,
8699 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8700 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8701 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8702 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8703 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8704 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8705 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8706 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8707 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8708 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8709 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8711 for channel_id in channel_ids {
8712 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8713 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8717 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8718 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8719 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8720 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8721 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8722 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8723 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8724 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8725 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8726 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8734 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8735 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8739 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8740 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8743 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8744 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8747 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8748 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
8751 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8752 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8753 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8754 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8757 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8758 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8759 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8760 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8763 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
8764 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8765 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8766 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8769 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
8770 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8771 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8772 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8775 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
8776 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8777 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8778 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8781 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
8782 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8783 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8784 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8787 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
8788 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8789 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8790 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8793 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
8794 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8795 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8796 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8799 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
8800 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8801 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8802 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8806 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8807 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8808 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
8809 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
8810 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
8814 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8815 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8817 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8818 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8819 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8820 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8821 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8824 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8825 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8826 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
8827 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8830 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8831 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8832 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8833 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
8836 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8837 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8838 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
8839 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
8840 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
8841 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
8842 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
8843 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
8844 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
8845 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
8846 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
8847 features.set_payment_secret_required();
8848 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
8849 features.set_wumbo_optional();
8850 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
8851 features.set_channel_type_optional();
8852 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
8853 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
8854 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
8855 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
8860 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8861 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8863 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
8864 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
8865 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
8866 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
8869 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
8870 (2, node_id, required),
8871 (4, features, required),
8872 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
8873 (8, forwarding_info, option),
8874 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8875 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8878 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
8879 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8880 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8881 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8882 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
8883 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
8884 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8885 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
8886 (2, self.channel_id, required),
8887 (3, self.channel_type, option),
8888 (4, self.counterparty, required),
8889 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
8890 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
8891 (7, self.config, option),
8892 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
8893 (9, self.confirmations, option),
8894 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
8895 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8896 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8897 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
8898 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8899 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
8900 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8901 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
8902 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
8903 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
8904 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
8905 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
8906 (30, self.is_usable, required),
8907 (32, self.is_public, required),
8908 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8909 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8910 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8911 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8912 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
8918 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
8919 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8920 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8921 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
8922 (2, channel_id, required),
8923 (3, channel_type, option),
8924 (4, counterparty, required),
8925 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8926 (6, funding_txo, option),
8927 (7, config, option),
8928 (8, short_channel_id, option),
8929 (9, confirmations, option),
8930 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
8931 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8932 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8933 (16, balance_msat, required),
8934 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8935 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
8936 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
8937 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
8938 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8939 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
8940 (22, confirmations_required, option),
8941 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
8942 (26, is_outbound, required),
8943 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
8944 (30, is_usable, required),
8945 (32, is_public, required),
8946 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8947 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8948 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8949 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8950 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
8953 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8954 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8955 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
8956 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
8957 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
8961 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
8963 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
8964 outbound_scid_alias,
8968 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
8969 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
8971 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
8972 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8973 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
8974 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
8975 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8976 confirmations_required,
8978 force_close_spend_delay,
8979 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
8980 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
8981 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
8982 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
8983 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
8984 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
8985 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8986 channel_shutdown_state,
8991 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
8992 (2, channels, required_vec),
8993 (4, phantom_scid, required),
8994 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
8997 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
8999 (0, onion_packet, required),
9000 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9003 (0, payment_data, required),
9004 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9005 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9006 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9007 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9009 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9010 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9011 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9012 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9013 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9014 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9018 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9019 (0, routing, required),
9020 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9021 (4, payment_hash, required),
9022 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9023 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9024 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9025 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9029 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9030 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9032 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9034 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9035 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9036 reason.write(writer)?;
9038 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9039 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9042 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9043 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9044 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9045 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9052 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9053 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9054 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9057 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9058 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9059 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9060 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9064 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9065 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9066 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9067 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9068 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9071 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9072 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9073 // messages contained in the variants.
9074 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9075 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9076 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9078 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9079 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9080 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9081 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9082 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9085 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9086 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9087 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9088 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9089 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9091 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9096 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9101 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9102 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9103 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9104 (2, outpoint, required),
9105 (4, htlc_id, required),
9106 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9107 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9110 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9111 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9112 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9113 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9114 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9116 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9117 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9118 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9119 (2, self.value, required),
9120 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9121 (4, payment_data, option),
9122 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9123 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9124 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9125 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9131 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9132 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9133 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9134 (0, prev_hop, required),
9135 (1, total_msat, option),
9136 (2, value_ser, required),
9137 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9138 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9139 (5, total_value_received, option),
9140 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9141 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9142 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9144 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9145 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9146 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9148 if payment_data.is_some() {
9149 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9151 if total_msat.is_none() {
9152 total_msat = Some(value);
9154 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9157 if total_msat.is_none() {
9158 if payment_data.is_none() {
9159 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9161 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9163 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9167 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9170 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9171 total_value_received,
9172 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9174 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9175 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9180 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9181 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9182 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9185 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9186 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9187 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9188 let mut payment_id = None;
9189 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9190 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9191 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9192 (0, session_priv, required),
9193 (1, payment_id, option),
9194 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9195 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9196 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9197 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9199 if payment_id.is_none() {
9200 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9202 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9204 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9205 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9206 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9208 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9209 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9210 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9211 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9215 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9216 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9217 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9219 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9222 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9223 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9228 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9229 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9231 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9233 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9234 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9235 (0, session_priv, required),
9236 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9237 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9238 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9239 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9240 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9241 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9244 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9246 field.write(writer)?;
9253 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9254 (0, forward_info, required),
9255 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9256 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9257 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9258 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9261 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
9263 (0, htlc_id, required),
9264 (2, err_packet, required),
9269 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9270 (0, payment_secret, required),
9271 (2, expiry_time, required),
9272 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9273 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9274 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9277 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9279 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9280 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9281 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9282 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9283 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9284 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9288 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9289 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9291 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9293 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9295 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9296 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9297 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9300 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9302 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9303 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9304 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9305 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9306 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9307 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9308 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9311 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9312 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9316 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9318 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9319 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9320 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9321 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9322 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9323 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9326 channel.write(writer)?;
9332 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9333 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9334 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9335 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9336 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9337 for forward in pending_forwards {
9338 forward.write(writer)?;
9343 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9345 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9346 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9347 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9349 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9350 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9351 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9352 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9353 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9354 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9355 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9356 htlc.write(writer)?;
9358 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9359 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9362 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9363 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9364 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9365 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9366 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9367 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9368 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9371 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9372 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9373 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9374 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9375 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9377 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9378 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9379 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9380 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9381 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9382 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9383 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9388 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9389 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9390 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9391 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9392 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9393 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9394 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9395 // well save the space and not write any events here.
9396 0u64.write(writer)?;
9398 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9399 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9400 event.write(writer)?;
9404 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9405 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9406 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9407 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9408 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9409 0u64.write(writer)?;
9411 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9412 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9413 // likely to be identical.
9414 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9415 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9417 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9418 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9419 hash.write(writer)?;
9420 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9423 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9424 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9425 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9426 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9427 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9430 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9431 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9433 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9434 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9435 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9436 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9439 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9440 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9441 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9442 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9446 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9447 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9448 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9450 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9451 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9452 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9458 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9459 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9460 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9461 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9464 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9465 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9466 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9467 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9468 pending_claiming_payments = None;
9471 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9472 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9473 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9474 if !updates.is_empty() {
9475 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9476 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9481 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9482 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9483 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9484 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9485 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9486 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9487 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9488 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9489 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9490 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9491 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9492 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9493 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9500 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9501 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9502 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9503 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9506 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9507 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9508 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9509 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9510 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9511 // check that the event is sane here.
9512 let event_encoded = event.encode();
9513 let event_read: Option<Event> =
9514 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
9515 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
9521 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9522 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9523 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9524 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
9525 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
9526 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
9529 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
9530 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
9531 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
9532 events.push_back((ev, action));
9533 } else if action.is_some() {
9534 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9541 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
9542 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
9543 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
9544 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
9545 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
9546 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
9549 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
9551 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
9553 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9554 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
9555 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
9556 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
9557 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
9558 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
9559 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
9560 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
9561 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9562 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
9563 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
9564 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
9565 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
9567 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
9568 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
9570 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
9571 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
9573 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
9574 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
9575 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
9576 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
9577 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
9578 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
9580 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
9581 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9583 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9584 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9585 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9586 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9587 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9588 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9592 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9593 pub entropy_source: ES,
9595 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9596 pub node_signer: NS,
9598 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9599 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9601 pub signer_provider: SP,
9603 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9605 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9606 pub fee_estimator: F,
9607 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9609 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9610 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9611 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9612 pub chain_monitor: M,
9614 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9615 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9616 /// force-closed during deserialization.
9617 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9618 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
9619 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
9621 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
9623 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
9624 /// deserialization.
9626 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
9627 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
9628 pub default_config: UserConfig,
9630 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
9631 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
9633 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
9634 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
9635 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
9636 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
9638 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
9641 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
9642 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
9645 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9646 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9648 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9649 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9650 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9651 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9652 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9653 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9657 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
9658 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
9659 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
9660 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
9661 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
9663 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
9664 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
9669 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
9670 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
9671 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9672 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
9674 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9675 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9676 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9677 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9678 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9679 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9683 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9684 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
9685 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
9689 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9690 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
9692 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9693 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9694 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9695 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9696 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9697 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9701 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9702 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9704 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9705 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9706 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9708 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
9710 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9711 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9712 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9713 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9714 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9715 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
9716 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
9717 for _ in 0..channel_count {
9718 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
9719 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
9721 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9722 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
9723 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
9724 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
9725 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
9726 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
9727 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9728 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
9729 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
9730 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
9731 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9732 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
9733 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
9735 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
9736 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
9737 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
9739 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
9740 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
9741 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9743 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
9744 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
9745 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9747 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs, batch_funding_txid) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
9748 if batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
9749 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9751 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
9752 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9753 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
9756 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
9757 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9758 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9759 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9760 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
9761 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9762 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9764 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9765 let mut found_htlc = false;
9766 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9767 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
9770 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
9771 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
9772 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
9773 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
9774 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
9775 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
9776 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
9777 log_info!(args.logger,
9778 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
9779 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
9780 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9784 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
9785 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
9786 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9787 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9788 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9790 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
9791 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
9793 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
9794 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9795 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
9796 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9798 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9799 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
9800 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9801 entry.insert(by_id_map);
9805 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
9806 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
9807 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
9808 // safely discard the channel.
9809 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
9810 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9811 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9812 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9813 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
9814 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9815 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9818 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
9819 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9820 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9821 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9822 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9823 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9827 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9828 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
9829 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
9830 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9831 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
9832 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
9833 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
9835 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
9839 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
9840 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9841 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9842 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
9843 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9844 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9845 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
9846 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
9847 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
9849 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
9852 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9853 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9854 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
9855 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9856 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9857 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
9858 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
9859 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
9861 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
9864 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
9867 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
9868 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
9869 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9870 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9871 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9872 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9873 is_connected: false,
9877 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9878 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
9879 for _ in 0..peer_count {
9880 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
9881 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
9882 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
9883 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
9884 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
9887 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9888 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
9889 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
9890 for _ in 0..event_count {
9891 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
9892 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
9897 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9898 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
9899 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9901 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
9902 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
9903 // on-startup monitor updates.
9904 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
9905 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
9907 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9911 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
9912 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9914 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9915 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
9916 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
9917 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
9918 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9922 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9923 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
9924 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
9925 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
9926 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
9927 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
9928 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
9930 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
9931 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9935 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
9936 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
9937 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
9938 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
9939 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9940 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9941 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9942 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
9943 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
9944 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
9945 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
9946 let mut events_override = None;
9947 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9948 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9949 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
9950 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9951 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
9952 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9953 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
9954 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9955 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
9956 (8, events_override, option),
9957 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
9958 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9959 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
9960 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9962 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
9963 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9966 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
9967 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9970 if let Some(events) = events_override {
9971 pending_events_read = events;
9974 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
9975 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
9978 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
9979 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
9980 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
9981 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
9982 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
9983 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
9985 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
9987 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
9988 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
9989 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
9992 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
9993 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
9994 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
9995 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
9996 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
9998 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
9999 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10000 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10002 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10003 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10004 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10005 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10006 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10008 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10009 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10010 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10011 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10012 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10013 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10014 pending_background_events.push(
10015 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10016 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10017 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10018 update: update.clone(),
10021 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10022 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10023 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10024 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10025 pending_background_events.push(
10026 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10027 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10028 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10031 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10032 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10033 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10035 max_in_flight_update_id
10039 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10040 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10041 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10042 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10043 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10044 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10046 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10047 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10048 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10049 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10050 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10051 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10052 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10053 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10054 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
10057 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10058 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10059 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10060 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10061 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10062 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10063 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10064 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10065 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10066 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10067 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10070 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10071 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10072 debug_assert!(false);
10073 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10078 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10079 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10080 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10081 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10082 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10083 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10084 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10085 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10087 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10088 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10089 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
10091 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10092 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10093 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10094 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10095 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10096 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10097 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10098 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10103 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10104 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10106 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10107 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10108 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10109 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10112 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10113 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10114 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10115 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10116 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10117 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10118 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10120 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10121 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10122 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10123 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10124 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10125 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10126 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10127 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10130 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10131 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10132 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10133 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10134 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10135 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10136 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10137 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
10139 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10140 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10141 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10142 retry_strategy: None,
10143 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10144 payment_params: None,
10145 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10146 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10147 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10148 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10149 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10150 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10151 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10152 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10153 total_msat: path_amt,
10154 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10155 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10157 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10158 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10163 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10164 match htlc_source {
10165 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10166 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10167 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10168 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10170 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10171 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10172 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10173 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10174 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10175 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10176 forwards.retain(|forward| {
10177 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10178 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10179 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10180 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10185 !forwards.is_empty()
10187 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10188 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10189 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10190 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10191 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10192 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10193 intercepted_id != ev_id
10200 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10201 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10202 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10203 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10204 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10205 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10206 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10207 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10208 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10209 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10210 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10212 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10213 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10214 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10216 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10217 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
10218 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10225 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10226 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10228 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10230 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10231 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10232 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10233 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10234 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10235 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10236 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10237 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10238 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10239 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10242 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10243 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10244 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10245 // channel still live case here.
10249 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10250 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10255 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10256 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10257 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10258 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10259 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10260 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10261 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10262 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10266 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10267 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10269 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10270 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10271 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10272 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10274 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10275 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10276 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10278 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10279 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10281 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10282 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10284 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10287 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10288 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10289 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10291 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10295 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10296 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10297 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10298 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10299 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10301 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10302 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10303 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10304 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10305 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10306 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10307 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10308 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10310 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10311 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10315 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10317 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10319 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10320 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10322 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10323 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10328 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10329 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10331 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10333 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10335 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10336 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10337 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10338 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10342 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10343 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10344 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10345 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10346 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10347 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10348 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10349 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10351 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10352 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10353 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10355 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10356 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10357 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10358 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10359 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10360 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10362 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10363 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10364 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10365 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10366 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10367 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10371 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10372 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10373 debug_assert!(false);
10374 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10379 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10381 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10382 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10383 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10384 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10385 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10386 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10387 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10388 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10389 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10390 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10391 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10393 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10394 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10396 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10397 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10398 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10399 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10401 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10402 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10403 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10404 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10406 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10407 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10408 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10409 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10411 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10412 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
10413 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10414 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10415 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10416 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10417 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
10420 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10421 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
10424 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10427 purpose: payment.purpose,
10428 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10429 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10430 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10436 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10437 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10438 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10439 for action in actions.iter() {
10440 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10441 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10442 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10444 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10445 log_trace!(args.logger,
10446 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
10447 blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
10448 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10449 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10450 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10452 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10453 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10454 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10455 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10459 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
10460 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
10464 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
10466 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
10467 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10471 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10473 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10474 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10475 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10476 router: args.router,
10478 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10480 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10481 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10482 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10483 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10485 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10486 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10487 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10488 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10489 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10490 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10492 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10494 our_network_pubkey,
10497 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10499 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10501 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10502 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10503 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10504 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10505 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10507 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10508 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10510 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10512 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
10514 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
10515 node_signer: args.node_signer,
10516 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
10518 logger: args.logger,
10519 default_configuration: args.default_config,
10522 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
10523 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
10524 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
10525 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
10526 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
10529 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
10530 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
10531 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
10532 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
10533 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
10534 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
10537 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
10538 //connection or two.
10540 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
10546 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10547 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10548 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
10549 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
10550 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
10551 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
10552 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
10553 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
10554 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10555 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
10556 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
10557 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
10558 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
10559 use crate::util::test_utils;
10560 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
10561 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
10564 fn test_notify_limits() {
10565 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
10566 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
10567 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10568 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10569 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10570 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10572 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
10573 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
10574 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10575 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10576 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10578 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10580 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
10581 // to connect messages with new values
10582 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10583 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10584 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10585 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10586 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10587 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10589 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
10590 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10591 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10592 // ... but the last node should not.
10593 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10594 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
10595 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10596 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10598 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
10599 // about the channel.
10600 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10601 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10602 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10604 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10606 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10607 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10608 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10609 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10610 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10611 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10613 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
10614 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10615 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10617 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
10618 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
10619 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
10620 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
10621 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
10622 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
10624 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
10625 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
10626 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10627 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10628 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10629 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10630 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10631 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10633 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
10634 // the channel info has updated.
10635 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10636 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10637 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10638 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10639 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10640 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10644 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
10645 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
10647 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10648 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10649 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10650 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10651 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10653 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
10654 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
10655 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
10656 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
10658 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10659 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
10660 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
10661 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
10662 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
10663 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
10664 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
10665 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
10666 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10667 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10668 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10669 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10671 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
10672 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10673 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10674 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10675 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10676 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10677 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10678 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10679 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10680 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10681 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10682 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10683 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
10684 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10685 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10686 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10687 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10688 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10689 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10690 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10691 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10692 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10693 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
10695 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
10696 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
10697 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
10698 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10699 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10700 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10701 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
10703 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
10704 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
10705 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
10706 // lightning messages manually.
10707 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10708 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
10709 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
10711 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10712 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10713 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
10714 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
10715 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10716 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10717 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
10718 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10719 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10720 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
10721 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10722 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10723 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10724 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10725 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10726 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10727 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
10728 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10729 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10730 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
10731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10732 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10733 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10734 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10735 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
10736 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10738 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
10739 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
10740 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10741 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10743 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10744 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10745 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10746 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10748 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10751 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10752 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10753 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10754 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10756 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10761 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
10762 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
10763 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
10766 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
10767 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
10768 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
10769 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
10770 // fails as expected.
10771 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
10772 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
10773 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
10774 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
10775 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
10776 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
10777 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10778 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10779 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10780 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
10781 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10782 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10783 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10784 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10785 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10787 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
10788 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
10789 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
10791 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10792 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10793 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
10794 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
10795 let route = find_route(
10796 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10797 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10799 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10800 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10801 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10802 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10803 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10804 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10805 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10806 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10807 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10808 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10809 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
10810 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
10811 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10812 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10813 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10814 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10815 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10816 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10817 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10818 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10819 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10820 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10821 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10822 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10824 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10825 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10827 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10828 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10829 let route = find_route(
10830 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10831 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10833 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10834 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10835 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10836 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10837 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10838 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10839 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10840 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10842 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
10843 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10844 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10845 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10846 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10847 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10848 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10849 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10850 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10851 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10852 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10853 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10854 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10855 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10856 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10857 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10858 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10859 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10860 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10861 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10862 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10863 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10864 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10865 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10867 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
10868 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10870 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10871 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
10872 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10873 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
10874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10875 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10876 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10877 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10878 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10879 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10881 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10882 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10883 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
10886 let route = find_route(
10887 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10888 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10890 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
10891 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10892 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
10893 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10894 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10895 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10896 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10897 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10898 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10899 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10900 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10901 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10902 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10903 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10904 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10905 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10906 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10907 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10908 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10909 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10910 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10911 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10912 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10914 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10915 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10919 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
10920 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
10921 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
10922 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10923 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10924 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10925 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10927 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10928 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10930 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10931 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10932 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10933 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10934 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10935 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10936 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10937 let route = find_route(
10938 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10939 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10942 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10943 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
10944 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
10945 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10946 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
10947 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10948 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10950 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10951 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10952 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10953 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10954 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10955 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10956 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10958 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
10962 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
10963 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
10964 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
10965 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10966 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
10967 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10968 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10969 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10970 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10972 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10973 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10975 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10976 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10977 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10978 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10979 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10980 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10981 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10982 let route = find_route(
10983 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10984 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10987 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10988 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10989 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
10990 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
10991 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10992 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
10993 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
10994 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10995 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10997 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10998 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10999 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11000 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11001 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11002 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11003 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11005 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11009 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11010 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11011 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11012 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11013 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11015 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11016 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11017 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11018 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11020 // Marshall an MPP route.
11021 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11022 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11023 route.paths.push(path);
11024 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11025 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11026 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11027 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11028 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11029 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11031 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11032 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11034 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11035 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11037 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11042 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11043 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11044 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11045 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11046 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11048 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11050 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11051 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11053 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11054 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11055 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11056 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11059 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11060 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11061 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11062 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11063 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11064 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11067 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11070 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11071 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11076 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11077 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11078 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11079 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11080 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11081 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11083 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11084 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11086 total_msat: 100_000,
11089 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11090 // payment verification fails as expected.
11091 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11092 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11093 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11094 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11096 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11100 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11101 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11105 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
11106 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11107 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11108 // the channel is successfully closed.
11109 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11110 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11111 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11112 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11114 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
11115 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11116 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11117 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11118 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11120 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11121 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
11123 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11124 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11125 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11126 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11129 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11131 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11132 // as it has the funding transaction.
11133 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11134 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11135 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11138 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11140 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11142 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11144 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11145 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11146 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11148 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11151 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11152 // as it has the funding transaction.
11153 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11154 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11155 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11158 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11159 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11161 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11162 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11163 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11164 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11166 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11167 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11168 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11169 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11171 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11172 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11174 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11175 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11176 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11177 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11178 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11179 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11180 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11184 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11185 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11186 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11187 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
11188 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11189 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11190 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11193 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11195 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11196 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11197 // closing transaction).
11198 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
11199 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11200 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11202 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11203 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11204 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11205 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11206 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11209 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11211 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11213 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
11214 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11215 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11217 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11219 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11220 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11223 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11224 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11225 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11228 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11229 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11230 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11233 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11234 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11235 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11238 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11239 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11240 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11243 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11245 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11246 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11248 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11249 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11251 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11252 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11257 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11258 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11259 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11260 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11261 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11262 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11263 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11264 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11267 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11268 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11269 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11271 // Test the API functions.
11272 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
11274 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11276 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11278 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11280 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11282 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11284 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11288 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11289 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11290 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11291 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11292 // the given `channel_id`.
11293 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11294 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11295 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11296 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11298 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11301 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11303 // Test the API functions.
11304 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11306 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11308 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11310 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11312 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11314 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11318 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11319 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11320 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11321 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11322 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11323 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11325 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11327 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11328 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11330 let mut funding_tx = None;
11331 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11332 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11333 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11336 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11337 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11338 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11339 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11340 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11342 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11344 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11346 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11348 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11349 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11350 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11352 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11355 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11356 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11357 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11358 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11359 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11361 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11362 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11364 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11365 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11366 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11367 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11368 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11369 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11370 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11373 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11374 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11375 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11376 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11377 }, true).unwrap_err();
11379 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11380 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11381 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11382 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11383 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11384 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11385 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11387 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11388 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11390 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11391 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11392 }, true).unwrap_err();
11394 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11395 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11396 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11397 }, false).unwrap();
11398 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11400 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11401 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11403 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11404 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11405 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11406 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11407 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11409 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11410 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11411 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11413 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11414 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11415 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11417 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11418 // "protected" and can connect again.
11419 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11420 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11421 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11423 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11425 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11427 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11428 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11432 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11433 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11434 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11435 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11436 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11437 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11439 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11441 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11442 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11444 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11445 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11446 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11447 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11450 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11452 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11453 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11454 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11456 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11457 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11458 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11460 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
11461 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11462 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11463 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11467 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
11468 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11469 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11470 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11471 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11472 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
11473 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11474 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
11475 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11477 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11479 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11480 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11482 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11483 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11484 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11485 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11486 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11487 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11490 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11491 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11493 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11494 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11496 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11498 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11499 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11502 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11503 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11504 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11505 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11506 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11508 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11509 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11511 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11512 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
11513 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
11514 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
11518 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11520 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11521 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11523 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
11524 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11525 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11527 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11528 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11530 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11532 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11536 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
11537 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11538 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11539 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11540 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11541 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
11542 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
11543 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11545 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11546 payment_metadata: None,
11547 keysend_preimage: None,
11548 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11549 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11551 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11553 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
11554 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
11555 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
11556 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11557 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
11559 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
11560 } else { panic!(); }
11562 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
11563 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
11565 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11566 payment_metadata: None,
11567 keysend_preimage: None,
11568 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11569 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11571 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11573 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11574 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
11578 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
11579 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11580 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11581 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11582 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11584 let result = node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11586 outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
11587 payment_metadata: None,
11588 keysend_preimage: None,
11589 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11590 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
11592 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11593 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None);
11595 // Should not return an error as this condition:
11596 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
11597 // is not satisfied.
11598 assert!(result.is_ok());
11602 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
11603 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11604 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11605 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11606 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11608 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
11609 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11611 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11612 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11613 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
11614 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
11615 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11617 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11618 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11620 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11621 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11622 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11623 match &msg_events[0] {
11624 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
11625 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11627 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
11628 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
11629 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
11632 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11635 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11636 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11638 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
11639 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
11640 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11642 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11646 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
11647 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
11648 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
11649 // the channel without the anchors feature.
11650 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11651 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11652 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
11653 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11654 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11655 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
11656 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11658 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
11659 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11660 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11662 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11663 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11665 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11666 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11668 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11671 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11672 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
11674 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11675 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11677 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
11678 // not have generated any events.
11679 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11683 fn test_update_channel_config() {
11684 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11685 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11686 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11687 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11688 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11689 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11690 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
11692 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11693 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11694 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11696 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
11697 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11698 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
11699 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11700 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11702 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11703 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11706 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
11707 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11708 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11710 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
11711 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11712 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
11713 ..Default::default()
11715 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11716 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11717 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11719 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11720 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11723 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
11724 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11725 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11726 ..Default::default()
11728 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11729 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
11730 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11731 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11733 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11734 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11737 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
11738 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
11739 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
11740 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
11741 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
11744 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11745 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11746 ..Default::default()
11748 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
11751 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
11752 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
11753 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11754 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11758 fn test_payment_display() {
11759 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11760 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11761 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
11762 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11763 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11764 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11768 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
11769 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11770 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11771 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11772 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11773 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11775 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
11776 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11777 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11778 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11779 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11780 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
11781 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
11782 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11784 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
11785 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
11786 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
11789 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
11790 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
11792 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11793 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11795 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11796 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11797 }, false).unwrap();
11798 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
11799 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
11800 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
11802 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
11804 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
11805 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
11806 // close even if it was an lnd node.
11807 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11808 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
11809 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
11810 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11811 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
11812 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
11813 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
11814 } else { panic!() };
11815 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
11816 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
11817 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
11818 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
11820 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11822 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
11823 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
11824 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
11831 use crate::chain::Listen;
11832 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
11833 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
11834 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
11835 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
11836 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11837 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
11838 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
11839 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
11840 use crate::util::test_utils;
11841 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
11843 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11844 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11845 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
11847 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
11849 use criterion::Criterion;
11851 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
11852 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
11853 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
11854 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
11855 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
11856 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
11857 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
11859 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
11860 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
11862 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
11863 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
11865 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
11867 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
11870 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
11871 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
11874 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
11875 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
11876 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
11878 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
11879 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
11881 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
11882 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
11883 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
11884 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
11885 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
11887 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
11888 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
11889 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
11891 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
11892 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
11893 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
11894 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
11896 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
11897 }, genesis_block.header.time);
11898 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
11900 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
11901 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
11902 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
11903 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
11904 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
11906 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
11907 }, genesis_block.header.time);
11908 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
11910 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
11911 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11913 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
11914 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11915 }, false).unwrap();
11916 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
11917 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11918 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11921 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
11922 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
11923 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
11925 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11926 } else { panic!(); }
11928 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11929 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11930 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
11931 match events_b[0] {
11932 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11933 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11935 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11938 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11939 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11940 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
11941 match events_a[0] {
11942 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11943 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11945 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11948 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
11950 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
11951 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
11952 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
11954 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11955 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11956 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
11957 match msg_events[0] {
11958 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
11959 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
11960 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11964 match msg_events[1] {
11965 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11969 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11970 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
11971 match events_a[0] {
11972 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11973 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11975 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11978 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11979 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
11980 match events_b[0] {
11981 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11982 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11984 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11987 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
11988 macro_rules! send_payment {
11989 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
11990 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
11991 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
11992 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
11993 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
11994 payment_count += 1;
11995 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
11996 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
11998 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
11999 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12000 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12001 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12002 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12003 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12004 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12005 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12006 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12007 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12008 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12010 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12011 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12012 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12013 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12015 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12016 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12017 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12018 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12019 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12021 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12024 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12025 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12026 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12027 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12029 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12033 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12034 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12035 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);