1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
39 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
42 // construct one themselves.
43 use ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
44 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
45 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
46 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
48 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
50 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
51 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
52 use util::config::UserConfig;
53 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
54 use util::{byte_utils, events};
55 use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
56 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
57 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
58 use util::errors::APIError;
63 use core::cell::RefCell;
65 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
66 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
67 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
73 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
75 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
76 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
77 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
79 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
80 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
81 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
82 // before we forward it.
84 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
85 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
86 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
87 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
88 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
90 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
91 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
93 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
94 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
97 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
98 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
99 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
102 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
103 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
107 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
108 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
109 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
110 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
111 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
112 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
113 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
116 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
117 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
118 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
119 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
122 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
125 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
126 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
129 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
131 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
133 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
134 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
135 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
137 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
139 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
143 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
147 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
148 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
149 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
150 short_channel_id: u64,
152 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
153 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
155 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
156 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
161 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
162 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
163 /// are part of the same payment.
164 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
165 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
166 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
169 struct ClaimableHTLC {
170 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
173 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
177 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
178 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
179 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
180 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
182 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
183 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
188 impl Readable for PaymentId {
189 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
190 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
194 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
195 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
196 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
197 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
198 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
201 session_priv: SecretKey,
202 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
203 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
204 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
205 payment_id: PaymentId,
206 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
207 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
210 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
211 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
212 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
214 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
216 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
218 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
221 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
222 payment_id.hash(hasher);
223 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
224 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
225 payment_params.hash(hasher);
232 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
233 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
235 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
236 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
237 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
238 payment_secret: None,
239 payment_params: None,
244 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
245 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
247 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
255 struct ReceiveError {
261 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
262 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
264 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
269 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
271 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
272 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
273 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
274 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
275 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
277 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
278 err: msgs::LightningError,
279 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
280 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
282 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
284 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
286 err: LightningError {
288 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
289 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
296 shutdown_finish: None,
300 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
302 err: LightningError {
304 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
307 shutdown_finish: None,
311 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
312 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
315 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
317 err: LightningError {
319 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
320 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
326 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
327 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
331 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
334 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
336 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
337 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
341 log_level: Level::Warn,
344 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
346 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
348 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
350 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
351 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
357 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
359 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
360 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
368 shutdown_finish: None,
373 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
374 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
375 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
376 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
377 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
379 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
380 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
381 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
382 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
383 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
384 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
385 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
387 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
391 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
392 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
393 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
394 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) to the real channel id. Outbound SCID aliases are added
395 /// here once the channel is available for normal use, with SCIDs being added once the funding
396 /// transaction is confirmed at the channel's required confirmation depth.
397 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
398 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
400 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
401 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
402 /// and via the classic SCID.
404 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
405 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
406 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
407 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
408 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
409 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
410 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
412 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
413 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
414 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
415 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
418 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
419 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
420 /// quite some time lag.
421 enum BackgroundEvent {
422 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
423 /// commitment transaction.
424 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
427 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
428 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
430 latest_features: InitFeatures,
433 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
434 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
436 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
439 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
440 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
441 struct PendingInboundPayment {
442 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
443 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
444 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
445 /// this payment being removed.
447 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
448 user_payment_id: u64,
449 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
450 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
451 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
454 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
455 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
456 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
458 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
461 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
462 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
463 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
464 pending_amt_msat: u64,
465 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
466 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
467 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
469 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
470 starting_block_height: u32,
472 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
473 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
474 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
476 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
477 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
479 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
480 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
481 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
482 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
483 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
485 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
487 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
488 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
492 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
493 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
495 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
499 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
501 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
505 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
507 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
511 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
513 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
518 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
520 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
521 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
522 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
523 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
527 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
528 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
529 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
530 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
531 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
532 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
533 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
536 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
537 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
540 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
541 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
542 let our_payment_hash;
543 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
544 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
545 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
547 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
548 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
549 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
553 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
557 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
558 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
559 let remove_res = match self {
560 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
561 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
562 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
563 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
564 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
568 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
569 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
570 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
571 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
572 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
573 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
580 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
581 let insert_res = match self {
582 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
583 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
584 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
586 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
587 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
590 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
591 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
592 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
593 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
594 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
601 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
603 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
604 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
605 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
606 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
613 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
614 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
615 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
616 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
617 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
618 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
619 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
621 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
622 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
624 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
625 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
626 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
627 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
628 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
629 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
630 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
631 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
633 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
634 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
636 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
637 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
639 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
640 /// to individual Channels.
642 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
643 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
644 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
645 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
647 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
648 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
649 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
650 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
651 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
652 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
653 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
655 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
656 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
657 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
658 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
661 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
662 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
663 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
664 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
665 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
667 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
668 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
669 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
670 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
671 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
672 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
673 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
674 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
675 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
676 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
679 default_configuration: UserConfig,
680 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
686 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
688 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
689 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
691 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
692 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
693 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
694 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
696 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
697 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
698 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
699 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
700 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
701 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
703 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
704 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
705 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
706 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
707 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
708 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
709 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
710 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
712 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
714 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
715 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
717 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
718 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
719 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
720 /// active channel list on load.
721 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
723 our_network_key: SecretKey,
724 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
726 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
728 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
729 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
730 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
732 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
733 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
735 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
736 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
737 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
739 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
740 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
741 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
742 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
744 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
745 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
746 /// are currently open with that peer.
747 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
748 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
751 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
752 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
754 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
755 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
756 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
757 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
758 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
759 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
760 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
761 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
762 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
764 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
771 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
773 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
774 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
775 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
776 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
777 pub struct ChainParameters {
778 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
779 pub network: Network,
781 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
783 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
784 pub best_block: BestBlock,
787 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
793 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
794 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
795 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
796 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
797 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
798 /// updates are ready for persistence).
800 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
801 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
802 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
803 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
804 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
806 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
807 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
810 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
811 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
812 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
815 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
816 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
818 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
819 persistence_notifier: notifier,
820 should_persist: persist_check,
821 _read_guard: read_guard,
826 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
828 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
829 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
834 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
835 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
837 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
839 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
840 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
841 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
842 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
843 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
845 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
846 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
848 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
850 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
851 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
852 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
853 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
854 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
855 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
856 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
858 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
859 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
861 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
862 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
863 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
864 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
866 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
867 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
868 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
869 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
870 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
871 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
874 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
876 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
877 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
880 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
882 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
883 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
884 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
886 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
887 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
889 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
890 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
891 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
892 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
893 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
894 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
895 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
896 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
897 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
898 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
899 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
902 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
903 /// to better separate parameters.
904 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
905 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
906 /// The node_id of our counterparty
907 pub node_id: PublicKey,
908 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
909 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
910 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
911 pub features: InitFeatures,
912 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
913 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
914 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
916 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
918 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
919 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
920 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
921 /// payments to us through this channel.
922 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
925 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
926 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
927 pub struct ChannelDetails {
928 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
929 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
930 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
931 /// lifetime of the channel.
932 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
933 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
934 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
935 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
936 /// our counterparty already.
938 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
939 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
940 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
941 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
942 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
944 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
945 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
947 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
948 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
949 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
950 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
951 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
952 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
953 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
955 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
956 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
957 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
958 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
959 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
960 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
961 /// this value on chain.
963 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
965 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
967 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
968 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
969 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
970 pub user_channel_id: u64,
971 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
972 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
973 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
975 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
976 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
977 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
978 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
980 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
981 pub balance_msat: u64,
982 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
983 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
984 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
985 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
987 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
989 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
990 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
991 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
992 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
993 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
994 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
995 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
996 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
997 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
999 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1000 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1001 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1002 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1003 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1004 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1005 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1006 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1007 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1009 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1011 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1012 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1013 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1014 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1015 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1016 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1017 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1018 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1019 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1021 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1022 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1023 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1024 pub is_outbound: bool,
1025 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
1026 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
1027 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1028 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1029 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1031 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1032 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
1033 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
1034 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1036 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
1037 pub is_usable: bool,
1038 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1039 pub is_public: bool,
1042 impl ChannelDetails {
1043 /// Gets the SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments. This
1044 /// should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our counterparty
1045 /// will forward a payment to us.
1046 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1047 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1051 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1052 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1053 /// states for more.
1054 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1055 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1056 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1057 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1058 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1059 ParameterError(APIError),
1060 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1061 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1062 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1063 /// payment in full.
1065 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1067 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1068 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1069 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1070 /// paths than the ones selected).
1071 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1072 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1073 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1074 /// in over-/re-payment.
1076 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1077 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1078 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1080 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1081 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1082 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1083 /// with the latest update_id.
1085 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1086 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1087 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1088 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1089 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1090 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1091 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1092 payment_id: PaymentId,
1096 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1098 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1100 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1101 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1102 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1103 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1105 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1106 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1107 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1110 macro_rules! handle_error {
1111 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1114 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1115 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1117 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1118 // entering the macro.
1119 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1120 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1123 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1125 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1126 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1127 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1128 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1132 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1133 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1134 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1135 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1140 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1141 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1143 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1144 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1145 action: err.action.clone()
1149 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1150 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1153 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1160 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1161 ($self: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1162 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1163 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1165 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1166 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1167 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1168 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1169 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1171 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1172 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1174 $short_to_id.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1178 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1179 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1180 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1182 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1183 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1185 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1186 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1188 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1189 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1190 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1191 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1192 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1193 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1195 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1196 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1197 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1198 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1199 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1200 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1206 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1207 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1211 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1213 $entry.remove_entry();
1221 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1222 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1226 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1228 $entry.remove_entry();
1236 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1237 ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1239 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1240 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_id, channel);
1246 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1247 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1249 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1250 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1251 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $chan);
1252 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1253 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1254 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1255 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1256 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1257 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1258 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1259 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1260 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1261 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1262 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1265 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1266 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1267 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1268 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1269 match $action_type {
1270 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1271 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1273 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1274 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1276 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1277 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1278 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1279 if !$resend_commitment {
1280 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1283 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1285 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1286 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1290 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1291 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1293 $entry.remove_entry();
1297 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1298 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1299 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1301 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1302 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1304 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1305 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1307 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1308 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1312 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1313 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1314 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1316 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1317 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1321 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1322 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1323 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1324 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1325 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1328 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1333 macro_rules! send_funding_locked {
1334 ($short_to_id: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $funding_locked_msg: expr) => {
1335 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1336 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1337 msg: $funding_locked_msg,
1339 // Note that we may send a funding locked multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1340 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1341 let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_id.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), $channel.channel_id());
1342 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1343 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1344 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1345 let scid_insert = $short_to_id.insert(real_scid, $channel.channel_id());
1346 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1347 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1352 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1353 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1354 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1355 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1356 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1358 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1359 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1360 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1362 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1363 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1364 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1365 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1368 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1369 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1370 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1371 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1372 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1373 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1374 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1375 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1376 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1377 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1378 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1379 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1382 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1383 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1384 // before it should be allowed to.
1385 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1386 send_funding_locked!($channel_state.short_to_id, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
1388 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1389 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1390 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1395 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1396 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1397 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1398 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1399 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1400 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1401 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1402 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1403 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1404 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1405 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1406 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1407 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1408 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1409 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1410 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1411 let mut order = $order;
1413 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1415 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1419 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1420 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1421 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1422 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1427 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1428 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1429 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1430 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1431 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1436 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1440 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1445 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1446 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1447 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1452 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1453 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1454 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1455 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1456 assert!(res.is_ok());
1459 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1463 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1464 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1465 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1467 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1469 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1470 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1475 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1476 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1477 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1478 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1479 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1482 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1484 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1485 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1487 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1489 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1491 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1492 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1493 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1494 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1495 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1496 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1497 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1498 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1500 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1501 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1502 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1506 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1508 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1509 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1510 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1511 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1512 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1513 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1515 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1516 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1517 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1519 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1520 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1523 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1524 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1526 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1527 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1529 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1531 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1532 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1533 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1534 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1542 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1543 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1544 &self.default_configuration
1547 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1548 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1549 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1552 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1553 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1555 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1557 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1561 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1566 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1568 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1569 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1570 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1571 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1572 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1575 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1576 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1578 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1579 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1580 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1582 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1583 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1584 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1585 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1586 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1587 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1589 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1590 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1591 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1592 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1593 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1594 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1598 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1599 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1600 Some(peer_state) => {
1601 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1602 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1603 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1604 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1605 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1606 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1607 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1611 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1616 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1619 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1621 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1622 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1623 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1625 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1626 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1627 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1628 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1630 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1632 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1635 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1637 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1638 node_id: their_network_key,
1641 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1644 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1645 let mut res = Vec::new();
1647 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1648 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1649 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1650 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1651 let balance_msat = channel.get_balance_msat();
1652 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1653 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1654 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1655 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1656 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1657 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1658 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1659 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1660 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1662 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1663 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1664 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1665 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1666 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1668 inbound_capacity_msat,
1669 outbound_capacity_msat,
1670 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1671 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1672 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1673 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1674 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1675 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1676 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1680 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1681 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1682 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1683 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1689 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1690 /// more information.
1691 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1692 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1695 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1696 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1698 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1699 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1701 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1702 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1703 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1704 // really wanted anyway.
1705 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1708 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1709 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1710 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1711 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1712 Some(transaction) => {
1713 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1717 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1718 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1719 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1720 reason: closure_reason
1724 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1725 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1727 let counterparty_node_id;
1728 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1729 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1730 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1731 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1732 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1733 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1734 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1735 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1736 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1737 Some(peer_state) => {
1738 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1739 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1740 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1742 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1744 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1746 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1747 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1748 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1749 let (result, is_permanent) =
1750 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1752 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1758 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1759 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1763 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1764 let channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1765 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1766 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1770 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1774 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1778 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1779 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1782 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1786 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1787 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1788 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1790 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1791 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1793 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1794 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1795 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1796 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1798 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1800 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1801 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1802 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1803 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1804 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1807 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1808 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1809 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1811 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1812 /// the channel being closed or not:
1813 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1814 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1815 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1816 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1817 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1818 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1819 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1821 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1823 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1824 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1825 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1826 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1827 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1831 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1832 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1833 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1834 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1835 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1837 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1838 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1839 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1840 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1841 // ignore the result here.
1842 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1846 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1847 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1848 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1850 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1851 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1852 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1853 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1854 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1855 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1858 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
1859 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1860 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1863 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1865 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan)
1867 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1870 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1871 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1872 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1873 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1874 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1879 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1882 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1883 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1884 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1885 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1886 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
1887 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1888 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1889 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1890 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1891 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1892 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1902 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1903 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1904 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1905 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1906 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1910 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
1911 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
1913 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1914 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
1915 return Err(ReceiveError {
1916 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
1918 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
1921 // final_expiry_too_soon
1922 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1923 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1924 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1925 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1926 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1927 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1928 return Err(ReceiveError {
1930 err_data: Vec::new(),
1931 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
1934 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
1935 return Err(ReceiveError {
1937 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
1938 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
1942 let routing = match hop_data.format {
1943 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
1944 return Err(ReceiveError {
1945 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
1946 err_data: Vec::new(),
1947 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
1950 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
1951 return Err(ReceiveError {
1952 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1953 err_data: Vec::new(),
1954 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
1957 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1958 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1959 return Err(ReceiveError {
1960 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1961 err_data: Vec::new(),
1962 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
1964 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1965 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1967 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1968 phantom_shared_secret,
1970 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1971 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1972 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1973 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1974 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1975 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1976 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1977 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
1978 return Err(ReceiveError {
1979 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1980 err_data: Vec::new(),
1981 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
1985 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1987 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1990 return Err(ReceiveError {
1991 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
1992 err_data: Vec::new(),
1993 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
1998 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2001 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2002 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2003 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2007 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2008 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2009 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2011 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2012 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2013 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2014 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2015 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2016 failure_code: $err_code,
2017 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2022 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2023 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2026 let shared_secret = {
2027 let mut arr = [0; 32];
2028 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
2032 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2033 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2034 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2035 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2036 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2037 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2038 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2039 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2042 let mut channel_state = None;
2043 macro_rules! return_err {
2044 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2046 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2047 if channel_state.is_none() {
2048 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2050 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2051 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2052 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2053 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2054 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2059 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2061 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2062 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2064 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2065 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2069 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2070 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2072 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2074 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2075 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2076 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2077 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2078 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2080 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2083 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2084 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2086 let blinding_factor = {
2087 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
2088 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
2089 sha.input(&shared_secret);
2090 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
2093 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
2095 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
2097 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2100 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2101 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2104 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2105 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2106 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2107 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2108 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2112 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2113 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2114 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2117 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2118 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2119 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2120 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2125 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2126 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2127 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2128 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2129 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2130 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2131 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2132 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2133 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2134 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2135 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2137 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2140 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2143 Some(id) => Some(id.clone()),
2145 let (chan_update_opt, forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta) = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2146 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2147 // Leave channel updates as None for private channels.
2148 let chan_update_opt = if chan.should_announce() {
2149 Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap()) } else { None };
2150 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2151 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2152 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2153 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2154 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2157 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2158 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2159 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2160 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2161 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2162 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2163 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2165 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2166 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2168 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2169 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2170 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2171 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2172 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, chan_update_opt));
2174 (chan_update_opt, chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta())
2175 } else { (None, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA) };
2177 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2178 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, chan_update_opt));
2180 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2181 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2182 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2183 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2184 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2185 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2187 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2188 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2190 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2191 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2192 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2193 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2194 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2195 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2196 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2197 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2198 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2199 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2205 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2206 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2207 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2208 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2210 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2211 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2213 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2214 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2215 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2217 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2219 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
2224 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2227 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2228 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2229 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2231 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2232 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2233 if !chan.should_announce() {
2234 return Err(LightningError {
2235 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2236 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2239 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2240 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2243 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2244 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2245 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2246 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2247 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2248 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2249 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2250 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2251 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2255 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2257 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2258 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2260 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2261 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2262 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2263 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2264 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2265 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2266 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2267 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2270 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2271 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2273 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2279 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2280 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2281 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2282 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2283 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2284 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2286 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2287 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2288 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2289 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2290 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2292 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2294 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2296 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2297 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2299 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2300 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2301 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2302 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2303 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2304 err: "Payment already completed"
2309 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2310 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2311 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2314 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2316 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2317 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2318 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2319 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2320 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2321 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2322 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2323 total_msat: total_value,
2325 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2329 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2330 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2332 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2333 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2335 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2336 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2338 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2339 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2341 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2342 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2344 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2345 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2346 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2347 channel_state, chan)
2349 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2350 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2351 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2352 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2353 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2354 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2355 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2356 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2357 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2358 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2360 insert_outbound_payment!();
2362 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2363 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2364 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2365 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2366 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2367 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2368 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2369 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2375 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2377 } else { unreachable!(); }
2381 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2382 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2384 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2389 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2391 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2392 /// fields for more info.
2394 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2395 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2396 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2397 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2398 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2399 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2401 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2403 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2404 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2405 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2407 /// In general, a path may raise:
2408 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2409 /// node public key) is specified.
2410 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2411 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2413 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2414 /// relevant updates.
2416 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2417 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2418 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2420 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2421 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2422 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2423 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2425 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2426 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2427 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2428 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2429 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2432 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2433 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2434 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2436 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2437 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2438 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2439 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2440 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2442 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2443 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2445 let mut total_value = 0;
2446 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2447 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2448 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2449 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2450 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2451 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2452 continue 'path_check;
2454 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2455 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2456 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2457 continue 'path_check;
2460 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2461 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2463 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2464 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2466 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2467 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2468 total_value = amt_msat;
2471 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2472 let mut results = Vec::new();
2473 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2474 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2476 let mut has_ok = false;
2477 let mut has_err = false;
2478 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2479 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2480 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2481 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2482 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2483 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2484 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2488 } else if res.is_err() {
2489 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2490 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2493 if has_err && has_ok {
2494 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2497 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2498 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2499 Some(RouteParameters {
2500 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2501 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2502 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2508 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2509 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2510 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2511 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2517 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2519 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2520 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2521 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2522 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2523 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2525 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2526 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2527 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2528 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2529 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2530 if path.len() == 0 {
2531 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2532 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2537 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2538 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2539 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2541 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2542 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2544 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2545 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2546 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2547 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2550 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2552 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2553 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2554 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2557 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2558 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2559 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2562 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2563 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2564 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2569 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2570 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2574 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2577 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2579 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2580 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2581 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2582 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2584 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2585 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2586 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2588 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2589 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2590 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2591 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2592 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2594 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2595 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2596 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2597 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2598 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2600 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2608 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2609 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2610 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2611 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2612 /// never reach the recipient.
2614 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2616 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2617 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2619 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2621 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2622 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2623 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2625 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2627 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2628 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2629 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2634 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2635 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2636 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2637 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2639 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2641 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2643 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2644 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2645 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2646 } else { unreachable!(); })
2649 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2651 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2652 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2655 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2656 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2661 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2662 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2663 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2666 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2667 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2668 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2670 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2678 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2679 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2680 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2684 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2686 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2687 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2689 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2690 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2692 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2693 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2694 /// keys per-channel).
2696 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2697 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2698 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2700 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2701 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2702 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2704 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2705 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2706 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2707 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2709 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2710 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2711 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2712 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2716 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2717 let mut output_index = None;
2718 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2719 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2720 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2721 if output_index.is_some() {
2722 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2723 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2726 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2727 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2728 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2731 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2734 if output_index.is_none() {
2735 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2736 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2739 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2744 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2745 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2746 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2748 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2751 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2752 // smaller than 500:
2753 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2755 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2756 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2757 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2758 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2759 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2760 /// our network addresses.
2762 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2763 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2765 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2766 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2767 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2768 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2770 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2772 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2773 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2774 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2776 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2777 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2780 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2781 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2782 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2784 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2785 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2786 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2787 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2788 rgb, alias, addresses,
2789 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2790 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2792 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2793 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2795 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2796 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2798 let mut announced_chans = false;
2799 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2800 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
2801 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2803 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2808 announced_chans = true;
2810 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2811 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2812 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2816 if announced_chans {
2817 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2818 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2819 signature: node_announce_sig,
2820 contents: announcement
2826 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2828 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2829 /// Will likely generate further events.
2830 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2831 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2833 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2834 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2835 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
2836 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2838 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2839 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2841 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2842 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2843 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2844 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2846 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2847 match forward_info {
2848 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2849 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2850 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2851 macro_rules! fail_forward {
2852 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
2854 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2855 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2856 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2857 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2858 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2859 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2860 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
2862 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2863 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data }
2869 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
2870 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
2871 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
2872 let phantom_shared_secret = {
2873 let mut arr = [0; 32];
2874 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap())[..]);
2877 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
2879 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2880 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
2881 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
2882 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
2883 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
2885 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
2887 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2888 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
2892 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
2893 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
2894 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
2895 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => fail_forward!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
2901 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2904 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2907 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2908 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2909 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2910 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2911 // problem, not ours.
2918 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2919 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2920 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2921 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2922 match forward_info {
2923 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2924 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2926 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2927 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2928 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2929 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2930 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2931 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2932 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2933 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2934 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
2935 phantom_shared_secret: None,
2937 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
2939 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2940 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2942 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2944 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2945 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2946 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2952 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2954 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2955 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2956 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2957 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2958 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2959 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2960 // this channel currently :/.
2966 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2967 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2969 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2970 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2971 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2973 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2974 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2976 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2978 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2979 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2980 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2983 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2985 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2986 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2987 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2988 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2989 // messages when we can.
2990 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2991 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2992 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2999 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3000 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3003 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3004 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3005 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3006 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3007 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3008 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3010 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3011 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3012 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan);
3013 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3014 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3016 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
3018 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3022 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3023 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3026 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3027 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3028 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3029 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3030 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3031 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3032 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3033 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3034 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3036 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3044 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3045 match forward_info {
3046 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3047 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3048 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3049 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3050 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } =>
3051 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret),
3052 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3053 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None),
3055 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3058 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3059 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3060 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3061 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3062 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3063 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3064 phantom_shared_secret,
3066 value: amt_to_forward,
3072 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3074 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3075 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3076 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3078 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3079 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3080 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3081 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3082 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3083 phantom_shared_secret,
3085 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3090 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3091 ($payment_data_total_msat: expr, $payment_secret: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3092 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3093 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3094 .or_insert(Vec::new());
3095 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3096 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3097 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3098 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3102 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3103 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3104 total_value += htlc.value;
3105 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3106 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
3107 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != $payment_data_total_msat {
3108 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3109 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data_total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
3110 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3112 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3114 _ => unreachable!(),
3117 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data_total_msat {
3118 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3119 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data_total_msat);
3120 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3121 } else if total_value == $payment_data_total_msat {
3122 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3123 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3125 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3126 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3127 payment_secret: $payment_secret,
3131 payment_received_generated = true;
3133 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3134 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3136 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3138 payment_received_generated
3142 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3143 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3144 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3145 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3146 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3147 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3148 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3149 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3150 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3151 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3152 OnionPayload::Invoice(ref payment_data) => {
3153 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3154 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3156 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3160 let payment_data_total_msat = payment_data.total_msat;
3161 let payment_secret = payment_data.payment_secret.clone();
3162 check_total_value!(payment_data_total_msat, payment_secret, payment_preimage);
3164 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3165 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3166 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3167 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
3168 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3170 amt: amt_to_forward,
3171 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
3174 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3175 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3176 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3182 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3184 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3187 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3188 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3191 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3192 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3193 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3194 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3195 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3196 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3197 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3199 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data.total_msat, payment_data.payment_secret, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3200 if payment_received_generated {
3201 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3207 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3208 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3216 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3217 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3219 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3221 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3222 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3225 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3226 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3227 events.append(&mut new_events);
3230 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3232 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3233 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3235 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3236 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3237 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3238 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3239 if background_events.is_empty() {
3243 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3245 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3246 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3247 // monitor updating completing.
3248 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3255 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3256 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3257 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3258 self.process_background_events();
3261 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3262 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3263 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3264 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3265 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3266 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3267 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3269 if !chan.is_live() {
3270 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3271 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3272 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3274 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3275 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3277 let mut retain_channel = true;
3278 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3281 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3282 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3286 let ret_err = match res {
3287 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3288 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3289 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3290 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3293 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3294 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3295 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3296 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3297 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3298 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3299 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3300 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3310 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3314 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3315 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3316 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3317 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3318 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3319 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3320 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3322 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3324 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3326 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3327 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3328 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3329 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3330 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3331 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3332 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3334 handle_errors.push(err);
3344 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3346 /// This currently includes:
3347 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3348 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3349 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3352 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3353 /// estimate fetches.
3354 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3355 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3356 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3357 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3359 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3361 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3362 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3364 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3365 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3366 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3367 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3368 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3369 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3370 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3371 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3373 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3375 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3377 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3378 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3379 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3380 if needs_close { return false; }
3383 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3384 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3385 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3386 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3387 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3388 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3389 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3390 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3394 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3395 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3397 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3398 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3399 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3403 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3404 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3412 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
3413 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3414 // This should be unreachable
3415 debug_assert!(false);
3418 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref final_hop_data) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3419 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3420 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3421 if final_hop_data.total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3423 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3424 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3425 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3427 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3435 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3436 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() });
3439 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3440 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3446 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3447 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3448 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3449 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3450 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3451 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3452 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3454 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3455 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3456 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3457 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3458 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3459 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3460 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3461 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3462 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3463 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3464 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3470 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3471 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3472 // be surfaced to the user.
3473 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3474 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3476 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3477 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3478 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3479 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3480 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3481 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3483 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3486 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3488 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3489 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3490 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3492 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3493 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3494 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3495 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3496 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3497 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3498 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3499 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3500 Some(RouteParameters {
3501 payment_params: payment_params_data,
3502 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3503 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3506 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3507 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3508 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3510 rejected_by_dest: false,
3511 network_update: None,
3512 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3514 short_channel_id: None,
3521 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3522 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3524 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3530 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3537 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3538 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3539 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3540 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3541 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3542 /// still-available channels.
3543 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3544 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3545 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3546 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3549 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3550 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3551 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3553 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3554 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3555 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3556 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3557 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3558 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3559 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3560 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3561 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3564 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3565 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3568 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3569 all_paths_failed = true;
3570 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3571 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3573 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3579 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3582 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3583 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3584 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3585 Some(RouteParameters {
3586 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3587 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3588 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3591 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3593 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3594 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3596 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3598 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3599 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3600 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3601 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3602 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3603 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3604 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3605 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3612 error_code: onion_error_code,
3614 error_data: onion_error_data
3617 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3623 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3624 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3625 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3626 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3628 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3629 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3630 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3631 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3632 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3633 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3634 network_update: None,
3637 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3640 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3642 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3646 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3647 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3648 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3650 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3651 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3652 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3653 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3654 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
3655 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3656 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
3657 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
3659 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3660 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3663 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3664 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3665 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3669 let mut forward_event = None;
3670 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3671 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3673 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3674 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3675 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3677 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3678 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3681 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3682 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3683 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3684 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3685 time_forwardable: time
3692 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3693 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3695 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3696 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3697 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3698 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3700 /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
3701 /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
3703 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3704 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3705 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3706 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3707 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3708 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3710 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3712 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3713 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3714 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3715 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3717 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3718 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3719 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3720 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3722 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3723 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3724 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3725 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3726 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3728 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3729 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3730 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3736 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3737 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3738 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3740 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3741 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3742 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3743 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3744 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3745 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3746 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3748 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3749 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3750 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3751 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3752 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3753 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3754 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3755 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3757 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3758 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3759 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3760 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3761 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3762 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3764 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3769 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3770 // which were generated.
3771 channel_state.take();
3773 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3774 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3775 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3782 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3783 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3784 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3785 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3786 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3788 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3792 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3793 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3794 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3795 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3796 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3797 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3798 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3799 payment_preimage, e);
3800 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3801 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3802 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3803 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3806 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3807 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3808 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3809 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3810 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3811 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3812 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3813 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3814 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3815 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3821 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3823 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3826 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3827 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3828 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3829 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3830 payment_preimage, e);
3832 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3833 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3835 chan.remove_entry();
3837 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3840 } else { unreachable!(); }
3843 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3844 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3845 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3846 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3847 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
3848 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3849 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3850 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3851 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3852 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
3853 pending_events.push(
3854 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3856 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
3861 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3869 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3871 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3872 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3873 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3874 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3875 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3876 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3877 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3878 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3879 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3880 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
3881 pending_events.push(
3882 events::Event::PaymentSent {
3883 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3889 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3893 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
3894 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
3895 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
3897 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
3898 // irrevocably fulfilled.
3899 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3900 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
3901 pending_events.push(
3902 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3910 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3915 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3918 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3919 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3920 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3921 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3922 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3923 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3924 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3927 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3928 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3929 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3930 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3931 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3934 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3935 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3936 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3937 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3938 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3939 payment_preimage, e);
3941 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3942 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3943 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3944 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3947 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3948 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3949 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3950 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3954 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3955 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3956 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3959 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3960 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3962 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3970 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3971 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3972 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3975 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3976 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3978 let chan_restoration_res;
3979 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
3980 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3981 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3982 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3983 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3984 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3986 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3990 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
3991 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
3992 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3993 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
3994 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
3995 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
3997 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3998 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3999 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
4002 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked, updates.announcement_sigs);
4003 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4004 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4006 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4008 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4009 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4010 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4011 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4015 /// Called to accept a request to open a channel after [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`] has been
4018 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted.
4020 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: crate::util::events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4021 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4022 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4024 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4025 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4026 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4027 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4028 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4029 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4031 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4032 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4033 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(),
4036 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4037 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4043 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4044 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4045 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4048 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4049 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4052 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4053 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4054 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration,
4055 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4058 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4059 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4063 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4064 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4065 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4066 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4067 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4068 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4070 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4071 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4072 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4073 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4074 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
4077 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4078 pending_events.push(
4079 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4080 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4081 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4082 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4083 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4088 entry.insert(channel);
4094 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4095 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4096 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4097 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4098 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4099 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4100 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4101 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4103 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.peer_channel_config_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4104 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4106 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4109 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4110 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4111 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4112 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4114 user_channel_id: user_id,
4119 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4120 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
4121 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4122 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4123 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4124 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4125 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4126 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4127 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4129 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4131 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4134 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4135 // lock before watch_channel
4136 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4138 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4139 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4140 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4141 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4142 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4143 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4144 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4145 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4146 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4147 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4148 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4150 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4151 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4152 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4153 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
4154 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4155 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4159 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4160 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4161 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4162 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4163 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4165 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4166 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4167 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4176 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4178 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4179 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4180 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4181 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4182 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4183 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4184 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4186 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4187 Ok(update) => update,
4188 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4190 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4191 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
4192 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4193 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4194 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4195 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4196 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4197 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4204 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4207 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4208 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4212 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4213 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4214 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4215 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4216 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4217 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4218 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4220 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4221 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4222 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4223 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4224 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4225 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4226 msg: announcement_sigs,
4228 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4229 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4230 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4231 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4232 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4233 // announcement_signatures.
4234 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4235 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4236 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4237 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4242 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4246 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4247 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4248 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4249 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4250 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4252 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4253 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4254 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4255 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4258 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4259 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4260 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4261 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4264 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4265 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4267 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4268 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4269 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4270 let (result, is_permanent) =
4271 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4273 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4279 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4280 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4281 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4288 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4291 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4292 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4295 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4299 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4300 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4301 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4302 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4303 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4304 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4305 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4306 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4308 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4309 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4310 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4311 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4316 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4317 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4318 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4319 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4320 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4321 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry)))
4322 } else { (tx, None) }
4324 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4327 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4328 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4329 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4331 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4332 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4333 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4334 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4338 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4343 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4344 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4345 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4346 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4348 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4349 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4350 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4351 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4353 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4354 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4356 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4357 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4358 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4359 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4362 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4363 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4364 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4365 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4366 match pending_forward_info {
4367 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4368 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4369 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
4370 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
4371 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
4372 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
4373 if error_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4374 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
4376 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
4380 // The only case where we'd be unable to
4381 // successfully get a channel update is if the
4382 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
4383 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
4384 // payments over the channel back to themselves
4385 // (because no one else should know the short_id
4386 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
4387 // no problem just calling this
4388 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
4389 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
4392 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4394 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4395 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4396 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4399 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4401 _ => pending_forward_info
4404 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4406 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4411 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4412 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4413 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4414 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4415 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4416 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4417 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4418 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4420 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4422 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4425 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4429 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4430 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4431 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4432 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4433 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4434 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4435 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4437 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4439 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4444 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4445 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4446 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4447 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4448 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4449 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4450 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4452 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4453 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4454 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4456 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4459 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4463 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4464 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4465 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4466 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4467 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4468 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4469 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4471 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4472 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4473 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4474 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4475 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4476 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4477 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4482 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4483 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4485 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4486 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4487 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4489 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4490 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4491 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4492 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4493 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4494 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4495 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4496 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4498 commitment_signed: msg,
4504 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4509 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4510 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4511 let mut forward_event = None;
4512 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4513 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4514 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4515 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4517 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4518 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4519 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4520 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4521 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4523 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4524 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4525 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4527 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4528 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4529 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4534 match forward_event {
4536 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4537 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4538 time_forwardable: time
4546 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4547 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4549 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4550 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4551 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4552 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4553 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4554 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4556 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4557 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4558 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4559 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4560 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4561 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4562 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4563 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4564 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4565 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4566 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4568 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4569 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4570 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4571 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4572 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4574 } else { unreachable!(); }
4577 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4578 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4579 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4583 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4584 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4585 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4586 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4587 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4589 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4592 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4594 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4595 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4597 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4598 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4600 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4601 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4608 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4609 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4610 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4611 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4612 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4613 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4614 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4616 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4618 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4623 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4624 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4625 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4627 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4628 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4629 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4630 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4632 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4633 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4636 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4637 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4638 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4639 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4640 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4641 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4644 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4649 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4650 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4651 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4652 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4653 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4654 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4656 // It's not a local channel
4657 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4660 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4661 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4662 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4663 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4664 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4665 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4666 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4667 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4669 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4671 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4672 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4673 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4674 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4676 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4679 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4681 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4684 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4685 let chan_restoration_res;
4686 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4687 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4688 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4690 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4691 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4692 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4693 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4695 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4696 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4697 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4698 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4699 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
4700 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
4701 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
4702 let mut channel_update = None;
4703 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
4704 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4705 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4708 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4709 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4710 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4711 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4712 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4713 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4714 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4717 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4718 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
4719 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
4720 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.funding_locked, responses.announcement_sigs);
4721 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4722 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4724 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
4726 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4729 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4730 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4732 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4733 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4738 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4739 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4740 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4741 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4742 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4743 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4744 match monitor_event {
4745 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4746 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4747 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4748 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4750 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4751 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4754 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4755 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4756 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4757 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4758 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4759 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4760 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4761 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4762 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4763 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4764 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4768 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4769 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4771 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4773 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4774 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4775 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4776 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4777 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4782 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4783 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4788 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4789 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4792 has_pending_monitor_events
4795 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4796 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4797 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4799 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4800 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4803 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4804 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4805 /// update was applied.
4807 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4808 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4809 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4810 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4811 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4812 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4813 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4814 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4816 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4817 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4818 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4819 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4820 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4822 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4823 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4824 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4825 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4826 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4828 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4829 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4830 has_monitor_update = true;
4831 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
4832 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4833 if close_channel { return false; }
4835 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4836 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4837 updates: commitment_update,
4844 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4845 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4846 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4853 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4854 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4855 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4858 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4859 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4865 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4866 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4867 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4868 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4869 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4870 let mut has_update = false;
4872 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4873 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4874 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4875 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4876 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4878 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4879 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4880 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4881 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4883 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4884 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4887 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4888 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4889 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4890 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4891 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4896 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4898 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4899 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4900 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
4906 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4907 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4914 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4915 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4921 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4922 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4924 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4925 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4926 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4927 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4928 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4929 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4930 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4931 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4932 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4933 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4934 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4935 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4936 assert!(should_broadcast);
4937 } else { unreachable!(); }
4938 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4940 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4944 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4945 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4947 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4948 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
4951 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4953 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4954 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4955 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4956 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4957 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4958 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
4959 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
4960 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4961 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4962 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4963 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4964 // never fail a payment too early.
4965 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4967 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4970 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4975 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4978 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4979 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
4981 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4982 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4983 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4985 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4987 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
4988 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
4992 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
4993 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
4995 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
4997 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4998 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4999 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5000 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5001 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5002 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5005 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5006 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5008 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5011 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5013 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5015 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5016 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5017 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5018 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5019 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5022 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5023 /// stored external to LDK.
5025 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5026 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5027 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5029 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5030 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5033 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5034 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5035 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5036 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5038 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5039 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5040 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5041 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5042 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5044 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5045 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5046 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5047 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5048 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5050 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5051 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5053 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5054 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5058 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5059 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5061 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5063 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5064 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5065 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5066 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5069 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5070 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5072 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5075 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5077 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5079 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5080 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5083 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5084 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5086 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5087 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5088 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5091 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5092 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5094 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5095 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5096 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5097 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5099 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5100 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5101 match channel_state.short_to_id.entry(scid_candidate) {
5102 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
5103 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
5108 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5110 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5111 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5113 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5114 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5115 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5119 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5120 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5121 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5122 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5123 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5128 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5129 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5133 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5134 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5138 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5139 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5140 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5141 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5142 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5145 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5146 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5147 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5148 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5150 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5151 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5152 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5153 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5156 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5157 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5159 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5160 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5163 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5164 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5165 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5167 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5168 events.replace(pending_events);
5177 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5179 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5180 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5181 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5182 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5185 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5187 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5188 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5190 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5191 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5192 /// restarting from an old state.
5193 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5194 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5195 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5197 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5198 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5199 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5200 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5203 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5204 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5205 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5208 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5209 handler.handle_event(&event);
5217 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5219 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5220 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5221 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5222 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5225 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
5227 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5228 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
5229 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5230 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5231 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5234 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
5235 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
5236 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
5239 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5240 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5241 let new_height = height - 1;
5243 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5244 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5245 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5246 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5247 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5248 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5251 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5255 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5257 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5258 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5259 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5260 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5263 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5264 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5265 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5266 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5268 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5269 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5271 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5272 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5273 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5275 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5276 if height < last_best_block_height {
5277 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5278 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5282 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5283 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5284 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5285 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5287 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5288 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5290 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5292 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5294 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5296 macro_rules! max_time {
5297 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5299 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5300 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5301 // having an explicit local time source.
5302 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5303 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5304 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5305 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5306 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5312 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5313 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5314 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5315 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5316 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5319 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5320 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5321 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5322 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5323 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5324 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5325 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5326 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5327 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5335 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5336 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5337 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5338 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5339 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5340 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5346 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5347 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5348 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5349 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5350 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5351 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5352 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5353 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5358 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5360 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5361 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5362 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5363 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5366 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5367 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5369 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5370 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5371 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5372 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5373 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5375 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5376 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5378 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5379 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5380 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5381 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5382 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5383 let res = f(channel);
5384 if let Ok((funding_locked_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5385 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5386 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
5387 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5388 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
5392 if let Some(funding_locked) = funding_locked_opt {
5393 send_funding_locked!(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, channel, funding_locked);
5394 if channel.is_usable() {
5395 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5396 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5397 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5398 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
5401 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5404 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5405 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5406 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5407 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5408 msg: announcement_sigs,
5410 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5411 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5412 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5414 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5415 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5416 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5421 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5422 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, channel);
5423 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5424 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5425 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5426 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5427 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5431 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5432 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5433 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5434 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5435 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5436 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5437 data: reason_message,
5445 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5446 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
5447 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5448 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5449 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5450 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5451 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5452 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5453 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5454 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5455 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5456 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5457 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5462 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5467 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5469 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5470 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5474 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5475 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5476 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5479 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5480 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5481 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5482 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5485 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5486 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5488 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5489 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5492 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5493 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5494 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5495 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5496 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5500 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5501 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5502 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5503 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5507 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5508 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5509 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5510 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5511 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5512 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5515 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5516 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5517 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5520 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5521 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5522 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5525 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5526 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5527 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5530 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5531 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5532 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5535 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5536 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5537 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5540 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5541 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5542 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5545 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5546 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5547 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5550 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5551 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5552 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5555 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5556 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5557 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5560 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5561 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5562 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5565 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5566 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5567 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5570 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5571 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5572 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5575 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5576 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5577 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5580 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5581 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5582 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5585 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5586 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5587 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5590 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5591 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5592 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5595 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5600 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5601 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5602 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5605 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5606 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5607 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5608 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5610 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5611 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5612 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5613 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5614 if no_connection_possible {
5615 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5616 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5617 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5618 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5619 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5620 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5621 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5625 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5632 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5633 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5634 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5635 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5636 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5637 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5638 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5641 no_channels_remain = false;
5647 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5649 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5650 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5651 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5652 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5653 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5654 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5655 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5656 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5657 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5658 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5659 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5660 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5661 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5662 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5663 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5664 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5665 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5666 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5667 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5668 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
5672 if no_channels_remain {
5673 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5676 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5677 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5681 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5682 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5684 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5687 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5688 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5689 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5690 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5691 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5694 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5695 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5700 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5701 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5702 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5703 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5704 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5705 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5706 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5707 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5708 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5712 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5713 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5714 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5720 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5723 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5724 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5726 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5727 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5728 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5729 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5730 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5734 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5735 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5740 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5741 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5742 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5743 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5744 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5745 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5748 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5751 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5757 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5758 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5763 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5764 let result = *guard;
5772 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5773 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5774 let current_time = Instant::now();
5776 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5777 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5782 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5783 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5784 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5785 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5786 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5788 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5789 let result = *guard;
5790 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5794 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5795 None => return result,
5801 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5803 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5804 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5805 *persistence_lock = true;
5806 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5811 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5812 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5814 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
5815 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
5816 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
5817 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
5820 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
5821 (2, node_id, required),
5822 (4, features, required),
5823 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
5824 (8, forwarding_info, option),
5827 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
5828 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
5829 (2, channel_id, required),
5830 (4, counterparty, required),
5831 (6, funding_txo, option),
5832 (8, short_channel_id, option),
5833 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
5834 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
5835 (14, user_channel_id, required),
5836 (16, balance_msat, required),
5837 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
5838 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
5839 (22, confirmations_required, option),
5840 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
5841 (26, is_outbound, required),
5842 (28, is_funding_locked, required),
5843 (30, is_usable, required),
5844 (32, is_public, required),
5847 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
5848 (2, channels, vec_type),
5849 (4, phantom_scid, required),
5850 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
5853 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5855 (0, onion_packet, required),
5856 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5859 (0, payment_data, required),
5860 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
5861 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5863 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5864 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5865 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5869 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5870 (0, routing, required),
5871 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5872 (4, payment_hash, required),
5873 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5874 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5878 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5879 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5881 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5883 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5884 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5885 reason.write(writer)?;
5887 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5888 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
5891 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5892 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5893 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
5894 failure_code.write(writer)?;
5901 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5902 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5903 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5906 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5907 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5908 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5909 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
5913 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5914 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5915 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5916 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
5917 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
5920 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
5921 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
5922 // messages contained in the variants.
5923 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
5924 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
5925 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
5927 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5928 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5929 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5930 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5931 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
5934 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5935 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5936 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5937 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5938 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
5940 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5945 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
5950 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
5951 (0, short_channel_id, required),
5952 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
5953 (2, outpoint, required),
5954 (4, htlc_id, required),
5955 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
5958 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
5959 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5960 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
5961 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
5964 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
5965 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
5966 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
5971 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
5972 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
5973 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
5979 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
5980 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5981 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5983 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
5984 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
5985 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5989 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
5990 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
5991 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
5993 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
5995 if payment_data.is_some() {
5996 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5998 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6001 if payment_data.is_none() {
6002 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6004 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
6008 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6017 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6018 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6019 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6022 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6023 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6024 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6025 let mut payment_id = None;
6026 let mut payment_secret = None;
6027 let mut payment_params = None;
6028 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6029 (0, session_priv, required),
6030 (1, payment_id, option),
6031 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6032 (3, payment_secret, option),
6033 (4, path, vec_type),
6034 (5, payment_params, option),
6036 if payment_id.is_none() {
6037 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6039 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6041 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6042 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6043 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6044 path: path.unwrap(),
6045 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6050 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6051 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6056 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6057 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6059 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6061 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6062 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6063 (0, session_priv, required),
6064 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6065 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6066 (3, payment_secret, option),
6067 (4, path, vec_type),
6068 (5, payment_params, option),
6071 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6073 field.write(writer)?;
6080 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6081 (0, LightningError) => {
6085 (0, failure_code, required),
6086 (2, data, vec_type),
6090 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6092 (0, forward_info, required),
6093 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6094 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6095 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6098 (0, htlc_id, required),
6099 (2, err_packet, required),
6103 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6104 (0, payment_secret, required),
6105 (2, expiry_time, required),
6106 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6107 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6108 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6111 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6113 (0, session_privs, required),
6116 (0, session_privs, required),
6117 (1, payment_hash, option),
6120 (0, session_privs, required),
6121 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6122 (2, payment_hash, required),
6123 (4, payment_secret, option),
6124 (6, total_msat, required),
6125 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6126 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6129 (0, session_privs, required),
6130 (2, payment_hash, required),
6134 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6135 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6136 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6137 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6138 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6141 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6142 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6144 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6146 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6148 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6149 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6150 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6153 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6154 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6155 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6156 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6157 unfunded_channels += 1;
6160 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6161 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6162 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6163 channel.write(writer)?;
6167 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6168 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6169 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6170 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6171 for forward in pending_forwards {
6172 forward.write(writer)?;
6176 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6177 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6178 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6179 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6180 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6181 htlc.write(writer)?;
6185 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6186 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6187 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6188 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6189 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6190 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6193 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6194 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6195 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6196 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6197 for event in events.iter() {
6198 event.write(writer)?;
6201 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6202 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6203 for event in background_events.iter() {
6205 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6207 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6208 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6213 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6214 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6216 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6217 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6218 hash.write(writer)?;
6219 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6222 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6223 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6224 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6225 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6226 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6229 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6230 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6232 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6233 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6234 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6235 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6238 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6239 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6243 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6244 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6245 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6247 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6248 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6249 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6254 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6255 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6256 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6257 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6258 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6265 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6267 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6269 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6270 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6271 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6272 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6273 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6274 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6275 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6276 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6277 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6278 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6279 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6280 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6281 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6283 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6284 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6286 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6287 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6289 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6290 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6291 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6292 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6293 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6294 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6296 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6297 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6298 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6299 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6300 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6301 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6304 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6305 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6307 pub keys_manager: K,
6309 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6311 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6312 pub fee_estimator: F,
6313 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6315 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6316 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6317 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6318 pub chain_monitor: M,
6320 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6321 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6322 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6323 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6324 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6325 /// deserialization.
6327 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6328 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6329 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6331 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6332 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6334 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6335 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6336 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6337 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6339 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6342 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6343 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6346 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6347 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6348 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6349 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6350 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6351 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6354 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6355 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6356 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6357 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6358 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6360 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6361 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6366 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6367 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6368 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6369 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6370 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6371 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6372 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6373 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6376 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6377 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6378 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6382 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6383 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6384 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6385 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6386 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6387 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6390 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6391 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6393 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6394 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6395 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6397 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6399 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6400 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6401 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6402 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6403 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6404 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6405 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6406 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6407 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6408 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6409 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6410 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6411 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6412 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6413 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6414 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6415 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6416 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6417 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6418 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6419 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6420 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6421 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6422 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6423 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6424 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6425 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6426 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6427 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6428 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6429 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6430 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6431 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6432 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6433 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6434 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6435 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6436 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6437 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6440 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6441 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6442 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6444 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6447 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6448 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6449 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6450 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6451 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6452 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6456 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6457 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6458 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6459 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6463 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6464 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6465 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6466 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6467 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6468 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6469 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6470 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6471 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6473 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6476 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6477 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6478 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6479 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6480 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6481 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6482 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6483 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6485 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
6488 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6489 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6490 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6491 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6492 let peer_state = PeerState {
6493 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6495 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6498 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6499 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6500 for _ in 0..event_count {
6501 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6502 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6506 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6507 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6508 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6509 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6510 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6511 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6512 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6513 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6517 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6518 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6519 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6520 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6521 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6522 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6526 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6527 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6529 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6530 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6531 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6532 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6533 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6537 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6538 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6539 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6540 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6541 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6542 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6543 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6545 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6546 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6550 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6551 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6552 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6553 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6554 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6555 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6556 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6557 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6558 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
6559 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
6561 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
6562 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6565 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6566 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6567 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6568 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6569 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6570 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6572 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6574 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6575 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6576 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6577 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6578 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6579 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6580 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6582 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6583 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6584 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6585 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6586 if path.is_empty() {
6587 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6588 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6590 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6591 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6592 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6593 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6594 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6595 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6596 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6597 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6599 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6600 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6601 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6602 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6603 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6605 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6606 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6607 total_msat: path_amt,
6608 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6610 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6611 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6620 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6621 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6623 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6624 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6627 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
6629 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6631 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
6632 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
6633 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
6634 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
6635 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6639 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
6640 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
6641 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
6642 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
6644 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
6645 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
6646 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
6648 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6649 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
6650 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
6651 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
6652 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
6653 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6655 if chan.is_usable() {
6656 if short_to_id.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), *chan_id).is_some() {
6657 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
6658 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
6659 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
6660 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6665 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
6666 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
6667 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6669 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6670 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6671 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6673 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6675 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6680 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6682 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
6683 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6684 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6686 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
6687 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
6693 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6694 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6696 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6698 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6699 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6700 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6701 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6703 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6704 logger: args.logger,
6705 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6708 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6709 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6712 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6713 //connection or two.
6715 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6721 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6722 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6723 use core::time::Duration;
6724 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
6725 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6726 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6727 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
6728 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6729 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6731 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6732 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
6733 use util::errors::APIError;
6734 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6735 use util::test_utils;
6736 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
6738 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6740 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6741 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6743 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
6746 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6747 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6749 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6750 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6751 thread::spawn(move || {
6753 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6754 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6755 *persistence_lock = true;
6758 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6764 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6765 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6767 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6770 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6775 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6777 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6780 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6787 fn test_notify_limits() {
6788 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6789 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6790 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6791 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6792 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6793 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6795 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6796 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6797 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6798 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6799 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6801 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6803 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6804 // to connect messages with new values
6805 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6806 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6807 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6808 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6810 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6811 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6812 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6813 // ... but the last node should not.
6814 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6815 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6816 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6817 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6819 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6820 // about the channel.
6821 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6822 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6823 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6825 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6827 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6828 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6829 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6830 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6831 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6832 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6834 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6835 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6836 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6838 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6839 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6840 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6841 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6842 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6843 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6845 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6846 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6847 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6848 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6849 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6850 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6851 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6852 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6854 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6855 // the channel info has updated.
6856 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6857 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6858 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6859 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6860 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6861 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6865 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6866 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6868 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6869 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6870 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6871 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6872 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6874 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6875 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6876 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6877 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6878 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6879 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6880 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6881 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6882 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6883 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6884 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
6886 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
6887 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6888 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6889 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6890 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6891 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6892 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6893 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6894 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6895 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6896 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6897 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6898 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6899 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6900 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6901 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6902 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6903 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6904 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6905 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6906 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6907 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
6909 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
6910 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6911 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6912 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6913 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6914 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
6916 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
6917 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
6918 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
6919 // lightning messages manually.
6920 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6922 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6923 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6924 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
6925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6926 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6927 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
6928 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6929 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6930 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
6931 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6932 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6933 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6934 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6936 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6937 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
6938 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6939 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6940 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
6941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6942 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6944 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6945 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
6946 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6948 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
6949 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
6950 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6951 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
6953 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
6954 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
6955 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
6956 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
6958 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6961 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6962 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6963 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6964 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6966 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6969 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6970 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6971 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6972 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6974 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6979 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
6980 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
6981 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
6982 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
6983 // fails as expected.
6984 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6985 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6986 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6987 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6988 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6989 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
6990 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
6992 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
6993 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
6994 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
6996 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
6997 let route_params = RouteParameters {
6998 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
6999 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7000 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7002 let route = find_route(
7003 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7004 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7006 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7007 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7008 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7009 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7010 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7011 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7012 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7013 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7014 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7015 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7016 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7017 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7018 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7019 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7020 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7021 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7022 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7023 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7024 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7025 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7026 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7028 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7029 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7031 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7032 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7033 let route = find_route(
7034 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7035 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7037 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7038 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7039 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7040 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7041 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7042 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7043 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7045 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7046 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7047 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7048 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7049 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7050 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7051 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7052 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7053 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7054 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7055 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7056 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7057 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7058 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7059 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7060 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7061 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7062 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7063 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7064 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7065 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7066 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7067 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7069 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7070 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7074 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7075 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7076 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7077 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7078 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7079 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7080 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7082 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7083 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7084 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7085 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7087 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7088 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7089 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7090 final_value_msat: 10000,
7091 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7093 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7094 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7095 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7096 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7097 let route = find_route(
7098 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7099 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7102 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7103 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7104 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7107 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7108 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7109 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7110 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7111 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7112 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7113 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7115 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7119 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7120 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7121 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7122 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7123 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7124 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7126 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7127 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7128 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7129 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7131 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7132 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7133 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7134 final_value_msat: 10000,
7135 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7137 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7138 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7139 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7140 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7141 let route = find_route(
7142 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7143 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7146 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7147 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7148 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7149 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7152 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7153 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7154 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7155 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7156 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7157 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7158 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7160 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7164 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7165 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7166 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7167 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7168 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7170 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7171 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7172 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7173 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7175 // Marshall an MPP route.
7176 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7177 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7178 route.paths.push(path);
7179 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7180 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7181 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7182 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7183 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7184 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7186 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7187 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7188 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7189 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7194 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7195 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7196 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7197 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7198 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7199 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7201 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7202 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7204 total_msat: 100_000,
7207 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7208 // payment verification fails as expected.
7209 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7210 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7211 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7212 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7214 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7218 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7219 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7223 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7226 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7227 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
7228 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7229 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7230 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7231 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7232 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
7233 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7234 use util::test_utils;
7235 use util::config::UserConfig;
7236 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7238 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7239 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7240 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7242 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7246 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7247 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7248 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7249 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7250 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7251 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7252 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7257 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7258 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7261 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7262 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7263 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7265 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7266 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7268 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7269 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7271 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7272 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7274 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7275 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7276 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7277 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7278 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7280 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7282 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7284 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7285 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7286 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7287 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7288 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7290 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7292 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7294 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7295 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7296 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7297 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7298 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7301 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7302 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7303 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7305 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7306 } else { panic!(); }
7308 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7309 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7311 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7314 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7317 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7318 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7320 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7321 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7322 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7323 match msg_events[0] {
7324 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
7325 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7326 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7330 match msg_events[1] {
7331 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7335 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
7337 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7338 macro_rules! send_payment {
7339 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7340 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7341 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7342 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7343 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7344 let seed = [3u8; 32];
7345 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
7346 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7347 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
7348 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7350 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7351 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7353 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7354 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7356 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7357 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7358 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7359 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7360 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7361 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7362 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7363 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7365 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7366 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7367 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7369 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7370 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7371 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7372 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7373 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7375 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7378 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7379 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7380 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7381 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7383 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7388 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7389 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);